ML20080B523
| ML20080B523 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/02/1984 |
| From: | Cole S, Tyrea A, Tyree A NEW YORK, STATE UNIV. OF, STONY BROOK, NY, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL-3, NUDOCS 8402070178 | |
| Download: ML20080B523 (32) | |
Text
.
00CKETED U59C UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
'('
r' _ q p,. 3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
)
In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
)
(Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
)
)
REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN COLE AND ANDREA TYREE ON BEHALF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY REGARDING CONTENTION 23 (EVACUATION SHADOW PHENOMENON) i Q.
Please state your names and your qualifications.
A.
My name is Stephen Cole.
Currently I am a Professor 2
of Sociology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook.
For a complete summary of my qualifications, please see my prior testimony on Contention 23.
A.
My name is Andrea Tyree.
Currently I am an Associate Professor of Sociology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook.
I received my B.A.
from Antioch College in 1962 and my Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Chicago in 1968.
As a graduate student at the University of Chicago, I was a collaborator with Otis Dudley Duncan and Peter Blau on the book, The American Occupational Structure, which later won the Sorokin award of the American Sociological Ascociation.
htU p"E8Maaggg, gy 00 PDR fhD
This book was the first major study in sociology to introduce the method of path analysis.
Since the mid-1960s I have been extensively involved in the quantitative analysis of large data sets and most of my published work has involved the use of various forms of linear regression analysis.
For a more de-tailed description of my qualifications, see the curriculum vitae which is Attachment 1 herete.
Q.
What is the purpose of th.s testimony?
A.
Contention 23 concerns the evacuation shadow phenome-non and its impact upon the effectiveness of protective actions proposed in the LILCO Plan to be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham.
Direct testimony on this contention has already been filed by both LILCO and Suffolk County.
The purpose of this rebuttal testimony is to point out the discrepancies between the data and conclusions in one of the research papers relied upon by LILCO's witnesses on the one hand, and statements allegedly based on that paper, by those witnesses, on the other.
The research paper to which we are referring is entitled " Evacuation Behavior at TMI:
Review and Reexamination."
It was co-authored by Dr. John Sorenson, a LILCO witness on Contention 23, and Dr. Brad Richardson, and was admitted into evidence in these proceedings as Suffolk County Exhibit EP-3 (ff. Tr. 1864).
We will refer to it as the l _
1 1
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"TMI paper."
The direct testimony in which this paper is discussed by LILCO's witnesses is the Testimony of Matthew C.
Cordaro et al. on Behalf of the Long Island Lighting Company on Phase II Emergency Planning Contentions 23 (Shadow Phenomenon) and 65.C.2 and 65.F (Panicked Drivers), dated November 18, 1983 (ff. Tr. 1470) and will be referred to herein as "the LILCO Testimony."
We shall show that the discrepancies we have noted are crucial to the differing interpretations of the TMI evacua-tion put forth by the two parties and that in fact the paper relied upon by the LILCO witnesses in their testimony supports the position of the County and provides no support for the po-sition taken by LILCO.
Q.
Please state briefly the context in which the LILCO witnesses relied upon the TMI paper in their direct testimony.
A.
The TMI paper is relied upon by the LILCO witnesses in their discussion of what they believe to have been the causes of overresponse, or the evacuation shadow, at TMI.
(See pages 55-61 of LILCO Testimony).
In testimony concerning Contention 23, the County witnesses have argued that the primary reason why so many people left their homes at TMI was their fear of I
being exposed to nuclear radiation.
LILCO's witnesses have argued that the primary reason why people left their homes dur-ing the accident at TMI was the conflicting nature and poor 1.-
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quality of information they received about the accident.
- Thus, at page 55 of the LILCO Testimony, LILCO witnesses Dynes, Mileti and Sorensen are asked the following question (number 34):
Q.
You say that the TMI over-reaction is largely explainable by the conflicting, confusing, and frightening information given.
The County says that the over-reaction was due to the fact that this was a radiological emergency.
Since TMI was both a radiological emergency and an emergency characterized by poor informa-tion, how is the Board to know which view is more nearly right?
In this rebuttal testimony, we analyze a portion of the anster given by the LILCO witnesses to this question (see pages 57-61 of LILCO Testimony), in particular, the statement at page 61, that based on the analysis in the TMI paper, " Pre-accident fear of radiation was not a significant cause of evacuation."
It is our opinion that the LILCO witnesses do not actually hcve any quantitative or systematic data to support their position.
Q.
Please explain.
A.
In answer to question 34 asked in their testimony on page 55, Drs. Sorensen, Mileti and Dynes first cite data from a survey conducted after the TMI event by Cynthia Flynn which was sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
(LILCO Testi-mony at 57).
Respondents to the Flynn survey gave many reasons why they had evacuated.
Almost all-respondents (91%) said that 4-
one of the reasons why they evacuated was that "the situation seemed dangerous."
Eighty-three percent mentioned confusing information as one reason why they had evacuated.
The LILCO witnesses conclude:
"It is likely that the ' situational' per-ceptions account for the most frequently given evacuation reason:
91% said the situation seemed dangerous."
(Page 58 of LILCO Testimony.)
That the respondents perceived the situation at TMI as dangerous seems to be an obvious reason why they evacuated.
However, no data are presented in LILCO's testimony on this point that enable us to determine whether the situation being perceived as dangerous results from fear of radiation and/or the confusing information.
Given that 91% of the respondents say that the situation seemed dangerous and 83% mention confus-ing information, it is clear that a substantial majority of the evacuees gave both of these reasons.
It is impossible to tell from the data presented by the LILCO witnesses the relative significance of these reasons.
Beginning on the top of page 60 and running through the bottom of 61, the LILCO witnesses present the only empirical evidence that they have to support their argument that poor quality information is the primary determinant of over-response.
This evidence comes from the TMI paper _
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1 co-authored by Sorensen and Richardsen.
It is our contention that the LILCO witnesses have misinterpreted the TMI paper and its data in concluding that it supports their arguments when in fact the analyses in the paper clearly offer substantially more support for the position of the County.
Q.
Have you conducted an analysis to demonstrate your point?
A.
Yes.
In order to conduct some additional analyses of the data presented in Sorensen and Richardson's TMI paper, we utilized the matrix of correlation coefficients presented in Table 2 on page 15 of the paper.
We entered the correlation matrix into the computer and, with the aid of the SPSS statis-tical. package,1/ were able to replicate the regression equation presented by Sorensen and Richardson.
We also ran several ad-ditional regression equations not presented in their paper.2/
-1/
The SPSS statistical package is a standard tool for conducting quantitative analysis of survey data.
2/
When we ran equations identical to those presented by i
Sorensen and Richardson, we obtained regression coeffi-cients which were almost identical to those that they ob-tained.
We did obtain slightly different coefficients for the age variable.
We believe that these minor differences are probably a result of the fact that Sorensen and Richardson may have used pair wise deletion of missing data for their correlation matrix and list wise deletion of missing data when they ran their regression equations.
Without having a more precise description of their proce-dures, it is not possible to account for the very small differences in the coefficients we c5**i ned and those they (Footnote cont'd next page) r
' l
The variables we used in our analysis are, of course, identical to those used by Sorensen and Richardson and are de-scribed in Table 1 of their paper on page 11.
The results of all of the equations we analyzed are presented in Table 1 below.
(Footnote cont'd from previous page) report in their paper.
The essential point is, however, that these differences occur only for the variable of age which is not an important variable in the analysis and thus the differences have no significant effect en the substantive conclusions reached. -
TABLE 1 Equations Predicting Evacuation from TMI and the Perception of Threat:
Standard Form (N=1504)
INDEPENDENT Dependent Variable 1
VARIABLES EVAC THREAT THREAT THREAT THREAT THREAT EVAC 7
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
)
l AGE
.116
.134
.129
.121
.110
.105 i
DISTANCE
.291
.221
.207
.204
.204
.292 KIDS
.026*
.142 EMPLOYEE
.042 EMITB
.007*
.268
.219
.211
.207
.207
.000*
CONCERN
.262
.233
.222
.222
.142 I
METED
.097
.163
.145
.146
.072 SAT
.138
.070
.070
.090 l
THREAT
.316
.162 4
Adj.R
.169
.186
.246
.270
.274
.274
.314
- Not significantly different from zero at the.95 confidence level.
1 !
l On the top of page 61 of the LILCO Testimony, the LILCO witnesses say that four variables influenced evacuation behavioi at TMI, including " pre-accident fears of radioactive emissions," two variables measuring the respondent's perception of the information available at the time of the accident, and one variable measuring the respondent's perception of how i
serious the threat from the accident was.
They go on to say that " Pre-accident fear of radiation was not a significant cause of evacuation."
(LILCO Testimony at 61).
An equation with evacuation behavior as the dependent variable and these l
four variables as independent variables is not presented in the L
Sorensen and Richardson's TMI paper.
Our equation number 1 in l
Table 1 presents regression coefficients for this equation.
As the LILCO witnesses state in their testimony, evacua-tion is not significantly influenced by what Sorensen and Richardson have called " pre-accident" fear of emission independently of the other three variables.
Thus, it is true 1
that " pre-accident fear of emissions" has no direct effect in 1
the structural equation they have described.
This does not I
mean, however, that pre-accident fear of emissions does not have a causal effect upon evacuation.
In fact, the Sorensen i
and Richardson analysis supports the opposite conclusion that pre-accident fear is an important cause in evacuation behavior.
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It is important to understand the meaning of the terms
" direct" and " indirect" effect.
The testimony of the LILCO witnesses implies that a variable whose causal effect is indirect may not be as important as a variable with a direct effect.
This attempt to downplay fear of emissions as a cause of evacuation behavior is analogous to conducting the following analysis of the causes of homelessness:
ignorance, alcoholism, and mental disorder would be depicted as causes of employment status and employment status would be depicted as a cause of.
homelessness.
(See model below.)
Ignorance Employment Status Alcoholism
)
) Homeless (employed-unemployed)
Mental Disorder l
1 -
Then all of the other variables besides employment status could be dismissed as causes of homelessness since they did not have a direct effect on homelessness, but rather had their effect indirectly through their influence on employment status.
If alcoholism leads someone to be unemployed and being unemployed leads someone to be homeless, then alcoholism is a cause of homelessness.
fear at time sevacuation pre-accident s
fear of accident unemployment xhomelessness alcoholism s
I
/
What we have in both these cases are causal chains.
In both cases, the indirect effects may be significantly more im-portant causes of the behavior than the intervening direct effect and in neither case would it be methodologically correct to suggest that the indirect effect was not a crucially signif-icant causal variable.
This is even more so in the example from the TMI paper in which it is probable that both the question used to measure pre-accident fear and the question _
used to measure fear at the time of the accident are two different indicators or measures of the same variable:
fear of radiation from nuclear power plants.
If this is so, then it should not be surprising that when we control for one measure of the variable, the other measure will not be significantly correlated with the dependent variable.3/
Since THREAT, or a respondent's perception of how serious a threat the accident at TMI represented to his/her f amily, was, excluding actual distance from the plant, the most impor-tant determinant of evacuation behavior, you must ask what were the variables which influenced the-respondent's perception of threat.
In order to answer this question we computed regres-sion equations 2 through 6 of Table 1 to explore the relations among the variables influencing THREAT.
We have employed a procedure sim!1ar to that used by Sorensen and Richardson of beginning in equation 2 with variables they see as " exogenous,"
3/
That antecedent indirect causes, such as " pre-accident fear of emissions" in the Sorensen and Richardson model, should be interpreted as causes of a dependent variable such as evacuation, is universally accepted by social sci-entists writing on the methodology of causal analysis.
- See, e.g.,
Travis Hirshi and Hanan C.
Selvin, Delinquency Research, New York:
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1967, chapter 3; Stephen Cole, The Sociological Method, Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1980, pp. 45-49; Morris Rosenberg, The Logic of Survey Analysis, New York:
Basic Books, 1968, chapter 3; and Herbert H.
Hyman, Survey Design and Analysis, Glencoe, Illinois:
The Free Press, 1955, chapter 7. -
s and progressively adding the additional sariables in equations 3, 4 and 5 as they appear in the Sorensen and Richardson causal model.4/
In the first equation (number 2) EM TB (pre-accident fear) and DISTANCE from TMI (DIST) emerge as almost equally potent and independent determinants of THREAT.
The addition of CONCERN about having a nuclear generating plant nearby reduces the effects of both DISTANCE and EMITB somewhat, though both are still substantial.
We suspect that EMITB and CONCERN are 7
not so much causally related as measures o'f $nderlying feelings about nuclear energy.
In equations 4 and 5 we add the two variables descriptive of the usefulness of information provided by M'etropolitan Edison (METED) and overall satisfaction with the information provided by all sources (SAT).
The introduction of these vari-ables does not significantly reduce the effects of EMITB or CONCERN (or, for that matter, DISTANCE from TMI).
In equation 5, when all significant effects are included; the variables rank in importance (1) CONCFRN, ( 2 ).,EMITB, (3) DISTANCE, (4)
METED, (5) AGE, (6) SAT.
The size of the regression coeffici'ents entered into the I
table for each independent variable may be interpreted as a 4/
As used by Sorensen and Richardson, an "excgenous" vari-able is one which'is given, and that cannot easily be ma-nipulated or changed.
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" rough indicator of_the strength of their influence on THREAT.
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The regression coefficients'for METED and SAT are
.146 and
.07 respectively, whereas the regression coefficient for EMITB e.,
, r; f(pre-accident fear)'is
.207 and the regression coefficient for
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"h0NCERN is.222.
These data lead us to conclude that actual
$1 stance from the plant and two questions measuring the respondent's concern with radiation from nuclear plants, EMI'?B
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and CONCERN, are the primary influences on what the LILCO witnesses have called the situationally perceived threat.
In the analysis we have presented thus far we have accept-ed the causal order of fine variables as designated by Sorensen i
and Fichardson.
In the r,model (TMI paper at 14) they have
~'r listed pre-accident ~ fear of radioactivity as an exogenous, prior variable which causes concern about the plant at TMI, which in turn causes the situationally perceived threat at the time of the accidenh.
'In fact, all of these questions were asked at the same time after the accident at TMI occurred.
Sorensen and Richardson have no way of separating the attitudes of respondents 'towards radiation from nuclear plants before the accident from the attitudes existing at the time of the accident, or from those attitudes existing after the accident.
A..more logical interpretation of their data would view all Nhree questions (pre-accident fear (EMITB), CONCERN, and 3
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s The L2LCO witne'sses in.th,eir testimony arhue that sittia-tionally perceived risk is going to be primarily influenced'6y the type of infor'mation available to individuals at trie time of an accident.
However, theMata presented in the Sorensen and Richardson model show that fear of emissions from nuclear plants and concern w'ith the nuclear plant are more important s
influences on a situationally perceived threat.than are the re-.
a sponden{ts'perceptionsofinformationavailabletothem.
Yet -
o in their Etestimon,y, the LILCO witnesses. ask the Board to believe that* respondents 1will be a tabula rama at the time of a nuclear accidenl: and thit no matter what thdIb level of fear of radiation from. nuclear power plants,..if the information is con-w.
cise and well. designed, they will not evacuate unless advised to.
~
Fear of' radiation from nuclear plants is wide.4pread among
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the residents of LongcIsis'nd. "This is shown by both the Coun-
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ty's survey and the survey conducted for LILCO by Yankelovich,
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s Skelly and White.
It is unrealistic to believe that-people who l
ar6 fearful of possible radioactive contamination from Shoreham
~
pdfor to an' accident would hot be fearful of such contamination a't the tirae of'an actual accident.
Although some people might
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be influenced in their decision to evacuate or not by the information that they have heard about the accident, the prima-ry cause of over-response at TMI, as demonstrated by Sorensen's 1
and Richardson's data, was the deep-seated fear that residents have of radioactive emissions from the plant during an accident.
The LILCO witnesses conclude their analysis of the Sorensen and Richardson paper by stating:
"If information-related variables and situational risk perception cause evacuation in a nuclear emergency, it is possible to use a warning system to create accurate risk perceptions through good warning information principles, and, therefore, decrease or avoid over-or underreaction."
(LILCO Testimony at 61.)
Here the LILCO witnesses have grouped information-related vari-ables and situationally perceived risks together.
Let us now j
look at what the data presented in the Sorensen and Richardson j
paper tell us about the effects of information-related vari-ables on evacuation behavior.
We believe that the data presented in Sorensen's and Richardson's TMI paper offer no support for the conclusion of LILCO's witnesses in their direct testimony that information-related variables will be the primary determinant l
l of evacuation behavior during a nuclear emergency.
First, the l _
two information-related variables included in the Sorensen and Richardson paper are METED (the belief that Metropolitan Edison provided useful information during the accident at TMI) and SAT (the respondent's overall satisfaction with the level of infor-mation that they were provided during the accident).
In both 1
the regression equations presented by Sorensen and Richardson in their Table 3 and in equation 7 in our Table 1 (the equation containing all of the independent variables entered simulta-neously) these two variables are shown to have only a small in-fluence on evacaution behavior.
The coefficient for METED is
.07 and the coefficient for SAT is.09.
This compares with co-efficients of.29 for distance from the plant,.14 for whether or not the respondent had children in the family under the age of 6,
.14 for CONCERN with the plant at TMI, and.16 for per-ceived risk the respondent faced at the time of the accident.
Even age had a more significant influence on evacuation l
behavior than did the two variables utilized by Sorensen and l
Richardson to measure the quality of information.
i l
Second, we were able to conduct an analysis of the effect l
of the actual content of the evacuation advisory issued at TMI l
on the respondent's perceived risk.
At TMI, all residents liv-ing within 5 miles of the plant who had pre-school aged chil-dren and pregnant women in the family were asked to evacuate.
, l I
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1 If respondents' situational perception of risk was actually influenced by the content of EBS messages, we would expect that those respondents with pre-school aged children in the i
household would have perceived the accident at TMI as being more threatening than those respondents who did not have pre-school aged children.
Yet, as Sorensen and Richardson report in Table 2 of the TMI paper, the zero order correlation coefficient between whether or not a family had pre-school aged children in their household and their perceived threat of the accident at TMI was only
,076, a relatively weak correlation.
In order to assess the independent effect having pre-school aged children would have on perceived threat, we added this variable into a regression equation attempting to explain THREAT in which all of the other relevant variables (DISTANCE, EMITB, CONCERN, METED, SAT, and AGE) had already been added.
(See equation 6, Table 1.)
The regression coeffi-cient for having pre-school aged children was
.026 -- a very small and statistically insignificant relationship.
One may conclude that whether or not respondents have pre-school aged children had virtually no ef fect on how they perceived the risk from the accident at TMI.
If respondents are strongly influ-enced by the content of EBS messages, this small relationship between having pre-school aged children and perceived threat is inexplicable.
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l We would also like to point out that, as may be seen in equation 7 of Table 1, whether or not a family had pre-school aged children did have a significant independent effect on j
whether they evacuated.
Thus, the contents of the EBS message j
had an influence on whether some people evacuated but had no influence on what the LILCO witnesses call situationally depen-i dent risk perception.
This supports the Ccunty's contention that the latter is primarily the result of fear of radiation i
from nuclear plants and not the content of emergency informa-1 j
tion.
Third, in the causal model presented in Figure 3 on page i
14 of their TMI paper, Sorensen and Richardson assume that the two information variables are causally prior to perceived threat; i.e.,
t!iat a respondent's satisfaction with the infor-mation provided by Metropolitan Edison or their general satis-faction with information will influence how serious a threat the accident was perceived as being.
There is no evidence to l
support this assumption of causal order.
It is equally likely l
that respondents who perceive the threat from TMI as being more serious would be more likely to be dissatisfied with the infor-i mation that they receive.
Since it is impossible to establish causal order between perceived threat and the two information variables, the TMI paper actually contains no evidence at all
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on the causal effect of satisfaction with information on perceived threat.
Finally, we would like to point out that Sorensen and Richardson have no data on the actual quality of information that was released at TMI.
In fact, all of the respondents in the Flynn survey wete exposed to the same "information soup."
In order to prove that the quality of information is a signifi-cant cause of over-response, it would be necessary to take different accidents as the unit of analysis, to measure inde-pendently the quality of information given out at the time of the accident, and then to measure the size of the over-response.
This has not been done.
Instead, all we have in this article are 'the respondents' perceptiens of essentially the same information.
And, as we have pointed out above, even these perceptions are not strongly or causally related to evac-uation behavior.
Therefore, the LILCO witnesses have presented no evidence to support their contention that information is a more important determinant of over-response than fear of radia-tion.
In fact the Sorensen and Richardson paper leads to just the. opposite conclusion.
Q.
Why do you place so much weight on the Sorensen and Richardson paper?
20 -
A.
Because this is the only piece of quantitative evi-dence that the LILCO witnesses give to support their position on Contention 23.
Q.
What is the significance of Sorensen and Richardson's use of the term exogenous variable?
A.
As noted above, an exogenous variable is one which is given and cannot easily be manipulated or changed.
Pre-accident fear of emissions is classified by Sorensen and Richardson on page 10 as an exogenoat variable.
This is sig-nificant.
If fear of radiation is the primary cause of over-response and if these fears are not easily changed, this means that there is very little that LILCO or anyone else can do to reduce the potentially serious evacuation shadow that could develop were there to be an accident at the Shoreham Nu-clear Power Station.
LILCO would like to be able to show that over-response is a result of poor information and then to prove that LILCO will present the public with good information in case of an l
accident, thus eliminating the problem of evacuation shadow.
The County experts believe that since over-response is primari-ly caused by fear of radiation, large numbers of people will evacuate in a serious nuclear accident no matter what type of information they are given.
Further, the County experts _
believe that it is impossible for a utility to control the flow of information during an accident.
Indeed, it is virtually in-evitable that were an accident to occur at Shoreham, this would become the focus of widespread media attention and conflicting reports and opinions would inevitably be broadcast.
If over-response is determined by fear of radiation and if this fear cannot be overcome by the type of EBS messages issued by a utility, then evacuation shadow is a serious problem which must be dealt with in developing an adequate evacuation plan.
Q.
Are there any other specific items in the TMI paper that support the County's position concerning reaction to a nu-clear emergency?
A.
Yes.
On page 6 of the TMI paper Sorensen and Richardson state:
The induced behavior (evacuation] is guided, on the one hand, by the physical characteristics of the events which are fixed for any single event on the one hand; and situation-specific factors which are highly variable among the population exposed to the event on the other hand.
Thus, overall patterns of response are strongly influenced by the nature of the event; but variability in response to any given event is determined by structural, social and psychological constructs preced-ing risk perception at the time of the im-pact.
(Emphasis added).
We agree with this statement and believe that it supports the position of the County's witnesses that -
people will react differently to a radiological emergency than they will to other kinds of disasters, rather than the position of the LILCO witnesses that response to a radiological emergen-cy is like the response to other disasters.
(See, e.g. LILCO Testimony at 17-18 and 113-14.)
What Sorensen and Richardson are saying in the TMI paper is that the overall size of the group evacuating will be primarily influenced by the nature of the event.
We agree with this.
If the emergency is radiological in nature, more people will be likely to evacuate than if the emergency is of a different type.
The more fear with which the event is viewed, the higher the proportion of people who will evacuate.
Even for nuclear emergencies, the more serious the event, the higher will be the proportion at-tempting to evacuate.
This was shown by comparing the results of the three different scenarios in the County's May 1982 survey.
Q.
Does that conclude your testimony?
A.
Yes.
~ ___
G S
ATTACHMENT 1
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September 1983 CURRICULUM VITA NAME:
Andrea Tyree BIRTHDATE AND PLACE:
November 9, 1940; Dallas, Texas ACADEMIC TRAINING:
B.A.
1962 Antioch College M.A.
1964 University of Hawaii Ph.D.
1968 University of Chicago DOCTORAL DISSERTATION:
" Status Inconsistency and Childbearing," Department;of Sociology, University of Chicago.
FIELDS OF MAJOR INTERESTS:
Demography, especially fertility, and social stratification, especially issues of measurement and comparison (cross-nation'al).
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE:
Research Training Fellow, Population Research and Training Center, University of Chicago; mathematical demography; 1964-65.
Research Assistant to Collaborator, " Occupational Change in Generation," University of Chicago (Peter M.
Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, principal co-investigators): 1965-66.
Principal Investigator, " Labor Force Participation of Married Women and Status Inconsistency," supported by the University of California Committee on Research: 1966-1967.
Co-Investigator, "The Growth of Mexican American Families,"
(George Sabagh, principal investigator), NIH 71-2215:
1971-1972.)
Imm'gration to *:h e Principal Investigator, " Determinants of i
United States:
1968-1977", Select commis sion on Immigration aad Refugee Policy:
1979-80.
1.
_ =_
1 Andrea Tyree.
TRAINING EXPERIENCE:
Institute Rank Dates Antioch College Teaching Assistant Winter, 1962' University of Hawaii Teaching Assistant 1962-1964 University of California Acting Assistant Professor Los Angeles to Associate Professor 1966-1974 University of Hawaii Visiting Assistant Professor Summer, 1968 University of Southern California Visiting Assistant Professor Summer, 1970 Hebrew University of Jerusalem Visiting Senior Lecturer 1975 State University of New York at Stony Brook Associate Professor 1974-Present University of Southern Californis Visiting Associate Professe,r 1981-82 AWARDS AND HONORS:
National Merit Certificate of Merit, 1958 Population Council Summer Fellow, University of Chicago, 1963 Population Center Fellow (Ford Foundation): 1964-1966 La Verne Noyes Foundation Scholarship:
1965-1966 Sorokin Award, Ame rica n Sociological Association:
1968, with Peter M.
Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, for The.American Occupational Structure (as collaborator).
REPORTS AND PUBLICATIONS
~
A Stedy of the Relationship between Status Conflict and Suicide," unpublished Master's thesis, University of Hawaii, 1964.
A Suggested Program of Family Planning Action for Manhattan Island," in Donald J.
- Bogue, ed.,
Mass Communication and Motivation for Birth Control, (Chicago Community and Family Study Center, 1967).
F Computerization of the Branching Process," Nathan Keyfitz and A drea Tyree, Behavioral Science (June, 1967).
The American Occupational Structure, Peter M.
Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, with the collaboration of AWd r e a T yr e e (New York:
John Wiley, 1967).
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9 Andrea Tyree,
" Status Inconsistency and Childbearing," unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Chicago, 1967.
" Fertility and the Future, an Optimistic View," paper presented in Centennial Lecture Series, University of California, Irvine, Spring, 1969.
" Comparability between CPS and Census Data on Children Ever Born," paper read at Pacific Sociological Association meetings, Anaheim, Spring, 1970.
"The Dickensian Occupational Structure," Sociological Inquiry (Winter, 1977).
" Social Mobility," for Sociology:
The Empirical Approach, editors, Marshall Meyer and Edward J.
Epstein (New York:
Ginn), accepted for publication.
q
" Mobility Ratios and Association in Mobility Tables,"
Population Studies (November, 1973).
"The Occupational and Marital Mobility of Women" (with Judith Treas), American Sociological Review (April, 1974).
" Patterns of Ethnic Intermarriage in Israel" (with Robert W.
Hodge), Read at Population Association of America Meetings, New York City, Spring, 1974.
j "An Editorial Foreword:
Five Empirical Landmarks" (with l
Robert W.
Hodge), Social Forces (March, 1978).
[
Occupational Hierarchy in the United States:
1789-1969" (with Billy G.
Smith), Social Forces (March, 1978).
1 Ethnic and Social Origin ' Dominance' in Occupational Attainment in Israel" (with Judah Matras).
Read at the American Sociological Association Annual Meetings, Chicago, September, 1977.
Prestige Socioeconomic' Status, and the Attainment Process of American Men and Women" (with Judith Treas).
Social Science Research, 1979.
l Gaps and Glissandos:
inequality, economic development and l
social mobility in 24 countries" (with Moshe Semyonov and Robert W.
Hodge).
American Sociological Review, June, 1979.
Andrea Tyree
" Occupational Socioeconomic Status in Israel.'"
- Megamot, (September, 1981).
(In Hebrew.)
" Gaps and Glissandos II:
development, mobility and immigration" (with Moshe Semyonov).
Read at annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, Boston, September, 1979.
" Community Segregation and the Costs of Ethnic Subordination" (with Moshe Semyonov).
Social Forces, March, 1981.
"The Influence of Alternative Mobility Regimes on Total Fertility," (with Garry S.
Meyer), submitted to Demography.
" Determinants of Immigration to the United States:
1968-77,"
Final Report, Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, August, 1980.
" Comments on the Observed and Predicted Economic Sucbess of Immigrants."
Gateways, ed. Barry Chiswizk.
American Enterprise Institute, 1981.
" Reply to Messner and Urton."
American Sociological Review, February, 1981.
" Social' Mobility and Immigration or Immigration and Social Mobility," (with Moshe Semyonov).
American Sociological Review (August 1983).
" Escape from Poverty:
Intergenerational Income Mobility of Sons and Daughteres of the Poor," (with Yinon Cohen).
Presented at the American Sociological Association Meetings, San Francisco, 1982.
"The Impact of Microcensus Files on Sociological Research:
Caviar to Vegetarians."
Read at American Sociological Association Meetings, Detroit, 1983.
"Does the Early Bird Really Get the Worm?" (with Moshe Semyonov and Vered Kraus).
Submitted to the American Journal of Sociology for possible publication.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE y
Credentials Committee, American Sociological Association:
1971-73; Chairman, 1973.
Andrea Tyree
- Associate Editor, American Sociological Review:
1974--7.
Program Committee, 1978 American Sociological Association meetings.
Stouffer Award Committee, American Sociological Association; 1977--8.
~
Co-editor, Social Forces special issue (with Robert W.
Hodge):
March 1978.
Social Science Panel, National Institutes of Mental Health:
1977-81.
Associate Editor, Sociology of Education:
1978-81.
Distinguished Contributions to Teaching Awards Sel'Sction Committee, American Sociological Association, 1981--83, Chair 1983.
Committee on Nominations, Section K,
American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1982-.
Associate Editor, Research in Social Stratification and Mobility, 1983-.
I MEETING CHAIRMANSHIPS AND INVITED CONFERENCES Chairman, Stratification Session, Pacific Sociological Association Meetings:
Portland, April, 1972.
Mathematical Social Science Board, Conference on the Mathematics of Population:
Berkeley and Asilomar, California, August 3-9, 1969.
National Institutes of Montal Health, Conference on Sex Roles:
Chicago, Illinois, May 25-27, 1972.
American Sociological Association ongoing seminar on sexual stratification:
1974-75.
Chairman, session on social mobility, American Sociological Association meetings, San Francisco, 1975.*
American Enterprise Institute, Conference on U.S.
Immigration Issues and Policies.
Chicago, June 1980.
d UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
)
In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-322 0.L.
)
(Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit'l)
)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of Rebuttal Testimony of Stephen Cole and Andrea Tyree on Behalf of Suffolk County Regarding Contention 23 (Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon) have been served on the following by U.S. mail, first class, except where noted, this 2nd day of February, 1984.
James
?..
Laurenson, Chairman Ralph Shapiro, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Cammer and Shapiro U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9 East 40th Street Washington, D.C.
20555 New York, New York 10016 0
Dr. Jerry R.
Kline Howard L.
Blau, Esq.
Administrative Judge 217 Newbridge Road Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Hicksville, New York 11801 U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 W.
Taylor Reveley, III, Esq.
Hunton & Williams O
Mr. Frederick J.
Shon P.O.
Box 1535 Administrative Judge 707 East Main Street Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Richmond, Virginia 23212 U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Mr. Jay Dunkleberger New York State Energy Office Edward M.
Barrett, Esq.
Agency Building 2 General Counsel Empire State Plaza Long Island Lighting Company Albany, New York 12223 250 Old Country Road Mineola, New York 11501 James B.
Dougherty, Esq.
3045 Porter Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20008 O
By Hand, 2/2/84 00 By Federal Express, 2/1/84 7
y_
Mr. Brian McCaffrey Stephen B. Latham, Esq.
Long Island Lighting Company Twomey, Latham & Shea 175 East Old Country Road P.O. Box 398 Hi'cksville, New York 11801 33 West Second Street Riverhead, New York 11901 Jeff Smith Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Marc W.
Goldsmith P.O. Box 618 Energy Research Group, Inc.
North Country Road 400-1 Totten Pond Road Wading River, New York 11792 Waltham, Massachusetts 02154 Joel Blau, Esq.
MHB Technical Associates New York Public Service Commission 1723 Hamilton Avenue The Governor Nelson A.
Rockefeller Suite K Building San Jose, California 95125 Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12223 Hon. Peter F. Cohalan Suffolk Gounty Executive Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq.
H.
Lee Dennison Building Suffolk County Attorney Veterans Memorial Highway H. Lee Dennison Building Hauppauge, New York 11788 Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 Ezra I.
Bialik, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Environmental Protection Board Panel Bureau U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission New York State Department Washington, D.C.
20555 of Law 2 World Trade Center Docketing and Service Section New York, New York 10047 Office of the Secretary U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing 1717 H Street, N.W.
Appeal Board Washington, D.C.
20.555 U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bernard M.
Bordenick, Esq.
Washington, D.C.
20555 David A. Repka, Esq.
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq.
Washington, D.C.
20555 Staff Counsel New York State Public Stuart Diamond Service Commission Environment / Energy Writer 3 Rockefeller Plaza NEWSDAY Albany, New York 12223 Long Island, New York 11747 l
Stewart M. Glass, Esq.
Nora Bredes Reg 4'nal Counsel Executive Director Fe6 tal Emergency Management Shoreham Opponents Coalition Agency 195 East Main Street 26 Federal Plaza, Room 1349 Smithtown, New York 11787 New York, New York 10278 Spence Perry, Esq.
O Eleanor L.
Frucci, Esq.
Associate General Counsel Atomic Safety and Licensing Federal Emergency Management Board Panel Agency U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20472 Washington, D.C.
20555 Ben Wiles, Esq.
Gerald C. Crotty Assistant Counsel to the Counsel to the Governor Governor Executive Chamber Executive Chamber State Capitol State Capitol Albany, New York 12224 Albany, New York 12224 00 Fabian Palomino,.Esq.
Special Counsel to the Governor Executive Chamber Room 229 State Capitol Albany, New York 12224 A
1 am eu Karla J.
Letsche KIRKPATRICK, LO KHART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS 1900 M Street, N.W.,
Suite 800 Washington, D.C.
20036 Dated:
February 2, 1984 l
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