ML20078N982
ML20078N982 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Farley ![]() |
Issue date: | 10/31/1983 |
From: | ALABAMA POWER CO. |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20078N980 | List: |
References | |
PROC-831031, NUDOCS 8311030092 | |
Download: ML20078N982 (52) | |
Text
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Attachment
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' t ALABAMA POWER COMPANY CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW t-
' PROGRAM PLAN i
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i B311030092 831031 hDRADOCK 05000348 PDR -
October 1983 f
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Rev. O
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Page 1 Rev. 0
- 1. INTRODUCTION
- The control room design review (CRDR) is an integral part of Alabama Power Company's (APCo) effort to upgrade control rooms, emergency response procedures and emergency response facilities at the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant. The CRDR addresses existing control rooms at the Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP); however, additional areas of concern, for example SPDS design, will be coordinated with the CRDR.
Guidance for the CRDR and related activities has been provided by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) thru NUREGs, and by various Nuclear Utility Task Action Committees (NUTACs). This guidance forms the basis for APCo's CRDR program plan.
This program plan describes the manner in which APCo will conduct a human factor review of the FNP control rooms. Previous CRDR efforts by APCo have been included in this plan.
l This program plan will commence prior to NRC approval. . A summary report I
identifying deficiencies and proposed solutions, including schedules, will l' be submitted to the NRC upon completion and evaluation of the CRDR.
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- 2. OVERVIEW 2.1 PURPOSE The primary purpose of the APCo CRDR is to ensure that the existing FNP control rooms adequately support plant operations under emergency conditions. In addition, the CRDR will address the adequacy of the control room to support normal plant operations. This secondary function (normal plant operation support) of the CRDR will primarily be accomplished thru an operational experience review and previous CRDR efforts.
2.2 OBJECTIVES To ensure that the CRDR fulfills its stated purpose, several objectives will be met during the review. The following specific objectives are defined for the CRDR.
- to review the 1980 APCo Main Control Room Survey and determine those areas of that survey that meet NUTAC criteria. (1980 survey areas that meet the NUTAC criteria will be integrated with future CRDR efforts.)
l l - to perform a control room survey, based on NUTAC guidance, i that compares the existing control room to accepted human engineering criteria.
- to review relevant plant operations using appropriate documentation, operator questionnaires, engineering questionnaires and if necessary, operator interviews.
Pags 3 Rev. 0
- to identify the input / output requirements of control room operator tasks contained in the Emergency Response
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Procedures (ERPs).
.- to ' identify Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs).
- . to determine the extent and importance of all identified discrepancies.
i - to formulate and implement resolutions for significant discrepancies.
i -- .- to ensure that the proposed resolutions eliminate or mitigate the discrepancies for which they are formulated.
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2.3 DESCRIPTION
of CRDR ACTIVITIES To achieve the stated objectives of the CRDR, several activities
' will be completed during this review. Attachment 1 summarizes
- these activities in flow chart format.
.The CRDR has been split into six nominal phases: Planning, Execution, Assessment, Correction, Effectiveness and Documentation..
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The activities within each phase will be described in more detail later, but a brief synopsis of these activities is included below
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- to give a general overview of the review process.
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Page 4 Rev. 0
- 1) Planning Phase !
During the planning phase, CRDR Review Team member qualifications will be defined which will serve as the bases i
for team member selection.
If required, CRDR procedures will be developed during this phase (e.g., task analysis).
' 2) Execution Phase The execution phase will constitute the investigative, data gathering portion of the CRDR. During this phase, a control room survey will compare the characteristics of the control rooms to appropriate human engineering guidelines. In addition, the results of the 1980 Main Control Room Survey will be reviewed to identify guideline items evaluated during the 1980 survey. An examination _of operating experience documents ~(i.e., Licensee Event Reports and Plant Event Reports) will be performed. A task analysis will be performed to identify operator tasks performed in the control room during emergency conditions.
During this task analysis, t
( the new plant specific Emergency Response Procedures (ERPs) based on generic symptom oriented Emergency Response i
Procedure Guidelines (ERGS) will be reviewed to identify the i tasks required of operators during emergencies. These identified tasks will be examined and a simulator analysis
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Page 5 Rev. 0 will be performed to ensure that the required tasks can be performed in the existing control room. The instrumentation and control requirements for these tasks will be evaluated using the ERP documentation and the adequacy of existing instrumentation and controls (with respect to performing ERP steps) will be determined during the simulator analysis.
- 3) Assessment Phase During the assessment. phase, all discrepancies identified in the execution phase will be analyzed, and the potential impact of each discrepancy on emergency plant operations will be determined. Discrepancies will be classified according to their potential impact on emergency plant operation.
Significant discrepancies will be resolved through enhancement, modification or other means (i .e., procedural changes, training, etc.). All proposed resolutions will be analyzed for their ef fect on operations.
- 4) Correction Phase Existing practices and procedures will be utilized to ensure the integration of proposed control room changes with other post-TMI-NRC commitments, as well as plant operating status.
A schedule will be developed for the orderly introduction of t __
J Pag 2 6 Rev. O proposed changes. The schedule will take into account the required training of operators on pending changes, other NRC
. commitments and identified outage activities. Follow-up of implemented modifications will be done in accordance with FNP-0-AP-8 to ensure the successful completion and integration of all control room changes.
- 5) Effectiveness Phase Existing procedures, including FNP-0-AP-8 and FNP-0-AP-1 will be utilized to solicit, evaluate, and act on operational feedback pertaining to control room and procedural changes resulting from the CRDR assessment and correction phases.
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- 6) Documentation Phase A sunmary report will be submitted at the conclusion of the CRDR that will summarize the overall review process and identified HEDs, describe the disposition of discrepancies for which no changes were made, describe control room design improvements implemented during the course of the review, identify existing design characteristics that are beneficial, and identify the proposed design changes and their schedules for implementation. The final report is scheduled to be submitted to the PRC within 6 months of the completion of the CRDR.
Page'7 Rev. 0 2.4 DEFINITION OF TERMS Control Room Design Review (CRDR) - A post-TMI task listed in NUREG-0660, " Task Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident," and NUREG-0737, the staff supplement to NUREG-0660, ec Task I.D.1.
Control Room Survey - One of the activities that consititutes a CRDR. The control room survey is a static verification of the control room performed by comparing the existing control room instrumentation and layout with selected human engineering design criteria, i .e., checking the control room match to the human operator.
4 Critical Incident Technique - An interview technique in which licensed control room personnel are asked to describe situations they have witnessed where either they or someone else committed i
an error that led or almost led to an abnormal or unsafe operational status.
Emergency Response Procedures (ERPsl - Plant procedures directing the operator actions necessary to mitigate the consequences of transients and accidents that cause plant parameters to exceed reactor protection setpoints, engineered safety feature
.setpoints, or other appropriate technical limits.
Pags 8 Rev. 0 Emergency Operating Procedures Guidelines (EPGs) - Generic guidelines, developed from system analysis of transients and accidents, that provide sound technical bases for plant-specific ERPs.
Human Engineering Discrepancy (HED) - A characteristic of the existing control room that does not comply with human engineering criteria.
Nuclear Utility Task Action Committee (NUTAC) for CRDR -
Representatives from various nuclear utilities and INP0 organized to define areas of CRDR implementation for which an overall industry effort can provide assistance to individual utilities in completing Task I.D.1, NUREG-0737.
Operational Experience Review - One of the activities that constitutes a CRDR. The operating experience review screens plant operating documents and operator experience to discover human engineering shortcomings that have caused actual operating problems or near misses in the past.
Review Team - A group of individuals responsible for directing the CRDR of a specific control room.
Paga 9 Rev. O Safety Parameter Display Systems (SPDS) - An aid to the control f s6 room operating crew for use in monitoring the status of critical N safety functions (CSFs) that constitute the basis for '
plant-specific, symptom-oriented ERPs.
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Sinulator Analysis - A dynamic method of task analysis employing event scenario run-throughs on a control room simulator.
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Task Analysis >- The systematic process of identifying and examining operator tasks in order to identify conditions, instru-mentation and controls, skills and knowledge associated with the w 1 performance of a task. In the CRDR context, task analysis is -
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used to demonstrate'that the existing control room supports \ I
emergency operation.
~- r, Validation - The process of determining whether the control room \g operating crew can perform their functions effectively given the N control room instrumentation, procedures, and training. In the \,
CRDR conte'xt, validation implies a dynamic performance ,
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Verification - The process of determining whether instrumen- '
tation, controls, and other equipment exists to meet the specific requirements of the emergency tasks performed by operators. The s
control room survey is a verification activity, checking the control room match to Ithe human operators.- In the CRDR context, verification imkMes a static check of instrumentation against i
human engineering criteria.
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' 3. MANAGEMENT,. STAFFING and SCHEDULING ,
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I, 3.1 CRDR MANAGEMENT REVIEW TEAM i
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The ultimate. responsibility for the FNP CRDR will reside with the i
APCo-Vice Fresident - Nuclear Generation. However, a review team
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specifically for this CRDR will be responsible for s
the daily conduct of the review.
a 3.2 REVIEW TEAM STRUCTURE I
v, N The Review Team will consist of individuals selected from several disciplines. Theteamwilfincludethefollowingpersonnel.
'ilReviewTeamLeader
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Administrative
- Assistant
- Human Factors Specialist
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Operations Specialist
- Instrumentation and Controls (I & C) Design Engineers
- Emergency Procedures Specialist E This team will be supplemented as necessary by specialists in other disciplines (i.e. , mechanical, electrical, training, computer operations , e,tc.).
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Page 11 Rev. 0 3.2.1 -REVIEW TEAM LEADER The Review Team Leader provides administrative and technical direction and 'has responsibility for the project. He has access
.to information, facilities, and individuals that could provide useful or necessary input to the CRDR effort. He provides a
. cohesive force'for the various APCo Department personnel and avendor organizations involved in the project.
It will be'the responsibility of the Review Team Leader to resolve any problems that arise during the: course of the CRDR.
The minimum qualifications for the Review Team Leader will incl ude:
Bachelors = level degree in an engineering discipline
-. SR0 certification
.. 10 years experience in consnerical nuclear plant operations and/or engineering.
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- . 3'. 2. 2 ADMINISTRATIVE' ASSISTANT j A .
f.{ The, Administrative Assistant will assist the Review Team Leader a
in the planning and scheduling of CRDR activities. In addition, he will be. responsible for the acquisition, generation, and 4 : maintenance of all applicable CRDR documentation and reports.
The' minimum qualifications for the Administrative Assistant are:
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Paga 12.
Rev. 0
- Bachelors level degree in an engineering discipline.
- 2 years nuclear experience.
3.2.3 HUMAN FACTORS SPECIALIST (HFS)
The Human Factors Specialist will work closely with the Review Team in various phases of the CRDR to be determined during the APCo/ vendor review of vendor respor.sibilities. He will share the human factors technical leadership of the CRDR project with the Review Team Leader and will serve as the human factor expert. He will review the CRDR implementation plan, review CRDR forms and documents prior to distribution and participate in the on-site survey, task analysis and the preliminary assessment /
resolution of human engineering discrepancies (HEDs). The minimum qualifications for the HFS include the following:
- PHD in human engineering or related discipline
- 5 years experience in human factors engineering, at least 1 of which is in nuclear control room review or a closely i
- related area.
3.2.4 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL (I&C) DESIGN ENGINEER I&C Design Engineers,- from Bechtel and SCSI, will assist in the
!' identification of plant system design features and will serve as the review team experts on capabilities and limitations of
Paga 13 Rev. O instruments and controls. The I&C Design Engineers will also provide expertise to the team during the assessment phase of the review, particularly when the Review Team considers proposals for mitigating HEDs. The niinimum qualifications for the I&C Design Engineers will include the following:
- B.S. degree in engineering or applied science field
- 5 years of I&C engineering at least 2 of which are in the nuclear design area 3.2.5 OPERATIONS SPECIALIST At least one Operations Specialist from FNP will serve as a member of the Review Team. The Operations Specialist will assist in identifying SR0 and R0 tasks and will serve as the Review Team expert on operational constraints for manipulations of plant systems.
The minimum qualifications for the Operations Specialist include the following:
- SR0 license at FNP
- At least 5 years experience as a licensed SR0
Paga 14 Rev. 0 3.2.6 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES SPECIALIST The Emergency Procedures Specialist will provide necessary input to the Review Team concerning operator tasks and instrumentation requirements of the plant-specific ERPs. This individual should have direct involvement in the generation of the plant-specific ERPs and should be familiar with all associated ERP documentation. He will serve as a liason between the Review Team and personnel involved with ERP validation for the coordination of task analysis. The minimum qualifications for the Emergency Procedures Specialist include the following:
- SR0 license at FNP Direct involvement in the generation of the FNP Emergency Respense Procedures.
3.3 REVIEW TEAM ACTIVITIES i
Review Team activities will include:
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- developing the methodology for the review 1
! - performing the review
- assessing discrepancies
- developing recommendations to resolve discrepancies
- establishing planning schedules
- coordinating action items
Pags 15 Rev. O The Review Team Leader will ensure that all reports relating to the CRDR are developed and that appropriate reports are submitted to APCo management for. review and approval following Review Team evaluation and comments. ,
3.4 CORPORATE INTERFACE The Review Team Leader will report to the Superintendent of Nuclear Licensing and Design who reports to the Manager - Nuclear Engineering and Technical Support.
It is necessary that the CRDR be coordinated with other ongoing activities that involve physical changes to the control room, such as the new workstation project. To ensure this coordination, the Review Team Leader will be involved in all ongoing work and development projects relating to the control room.
3.5 REVIEW TEAM ORIENTATION An orientation will be provided for the Review Team to familiarize them with human factors principles and their application to the CRDR. This orientation will be conducted by the HFS and will be directed to tl.ase Review Team members with limited human engineering experience. The orientation will be given prior to conducting the control room survey and should last approximately one day.
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Pag 2 16 Rev. 0 Except for the HFS all Review Team members are familiar with the FNP control rooms and control room operations. The HFS will receive FNP control room familiarization prior to the CRDR survey.
During the course of the review, additional areas may be identified which require Review Team orientation. Should this occur, orientations will be developed and scheduled as necessary.
3.6 SCHEDULING Many activities identified in this plan require the support of APCo personnel other than Review Team members. (e.g., operations personnel, training personnel, etc.). These personnel are presently involved in preparations for the upcoming FNP Unit 1 fifth refueling outage and are unavailable to support CRDR activities at this time. Additionally, several CRDR activities are dependent on the development of the plant-specific ERPs resulting from item I.C.1 of NUREG-0737. These ERPs are scheduled to be implemented nine months after approval of Revision 1 of the ERGS by the Westinghouse Owner's Group.
Therefore, a majority of CRDR activities can not commence prior to the third quarter of 1984.
Paga 17 Rsv. O As stated in APCo's August 5,1983 letter to the NRC..a proposed schedule of CRDR activities will be submitted on December 15, 1983.
- 4. EXECUTION 4.1 OPERATING EXPERIENCE REVIEW The operating experience review should identify potential problem areas in the control room by studying plant-specific and generic occurrence 3 during actual plant operations. This review will consist of a study of applicable plant-specific and generic documentation and an operating personnel survey (consisting of questionnaires and possibly interviews).
4.1.1 HISTORICAL DOCUMENTATION REVIEW The major portion of the documentation review will involve plant-specific documents. The plant-specific documents to be reviewed are:
- 1) Licensee Event Reports
- 2) Plant Event Reports i
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Paga 13 Rev. O These documents will be obtained by NETS.
In addition, documentation will be reviewed to ascertain generic occurrences that may relate to FNP. The following documents will be reviewed for this purpose.
- 1) Significant Operatie- Experience Reports
- 2) Significant Event Reports These documents will be acquired by NETS through the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INP0).
The period to be evaluated will be of 3 years duration, beginning'
' June 1980 and ending June.1983.
It will be the responsibility of the Administrative Assistant to obtain and screen the above documents. The screening process will b'e used to identify documented occurrences that may have resulted from control room discrepancies.
Occurences that may have resulted from control room discrepancies are defined as meeting one or more of the following criteria:
- Equipment referenced must be in the physical confines of the control room.
- Procedural steps referenced must be accomplished within the physical confines of the control room.
Pag? 19 Rev. 0 Personnel error referenced must have occured within the physical confines of the control room, or have entailed a deviation from procedures that were to be performed in the control room.
Items meeting the above selection critieria will be recorded on Operating Experience Review Problem Analysis Reports and retained for documentation and evaluation by the Review Team to determine FNP applicability. An example of a report form that may be used is provided on Figure 1. In addition, applicable information pertaining to appropriate potential control room discrepancies identified in this screening will be obtained by generating Engineering and Operator Questions addressing these potential discrepancies.
4.1.2 ENGINEERING QUESTIONNAIRES As indicated in the NUTAC CRDR survey development guidelines, some topics to be discussed in the CRDR will not be evident to an outsider's examination of the control room. These topics require direct experience with the design of control room equipment.
Thus, a questionnaire will be developed by the Administrative Assistant using NUTAC guidelines and operating experience document screening results and distributed to Westinghouse, Bechtel and SCSI.
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Page 20 Rev. O These questionnaires are intended to provide the Review Team with additional information on areas of concern . identified during
. l operating experience document screening and designer information necessary to effectively review the control room.- The questionnaires shall be distributed with Licensing Support Assignment Sheets (LSAS) as soon as practicable following the operating. experience document screening. The Administrative Assistant will retain returned questionnaires for team review and documentation. !
4.1.3 OPERATING PERS0*lNEL SURVEYS The operator questionnaires will be developed using NUTAC
- operating experience and control-room survey guidelines. Al so ,
questions will be generated to obtain additional information on areas of concern identified in the operating experience document screening. .The operator questionnaire packages to be distributed will include a cover letter that will explain the purpose, describe the format and request biographical information.
4.1.3.2 QUESTIONNAIRE DISTRIBUTION Questionnaires will be transmitted to the FNP Operations Superintendent, who will distribute them to on-shift licensed operations personnel not later than' two months prior to the _
on-site survey. ~ At the time of distribution,' the questionnaire recipients will receive a briefing and instructions by the v,, y -ar. . - , .. --re--- ,>m-,m,--y- - e - ,- -
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Paga 21 Rev. 0 Operations Superintendent. The briefing will emphasize the major elements of the cover letter and will recommend the use of an "at controls" environment (i.e.. control' room or simulator) while answering the questions. This allows the participating operators to refer directly to panels and locate specific components.
Respondents will be instructed to return the completed questionnaires to the Operations Superintendent within two weeks of their distribution. The Operations Superintendent will send the completed questionnaires to the Administrative Assistant, who will be responsible for summarizing the responses. Returned questionnaires will be retained for documentation.
In order to have a sufficient population, as many operators as possible should participate.
4.1.3.3 QUESTIONNAIRE DATA ANALYSIS The Administrative Assistant will review returned questionnaires on an item-by-item basis and will summarize responses on a Questionnaire Item Summary form. An example of a form that may be used is provided on Figure 2.
The summarized results of the questionnaires will be retained for Review Team evaluation and documentation. From these results, the Review Team will determine if any items necessitate further investigation by other means (e.g., operator interviews).
, 'Page 22 y Rev. O The. biographical data information requested in the questionnaire f
cover letters will be processed by the Administrative Assistant to provide the Review Team a summary that indicates the cross-section of operator experience utilized.. This process will verify participation from personnel of varied experience. The
'information summarized will be retained for documentation and 1 submitted as a part of the final CRDR summary report.
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4.1.4 STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS
- i. After reviewing the operator. questionnaires, the Review Team i
- ; Leader will determine if follow-up interviews of the i l questionnaire participants are necessary. This determination will be based on .several factors (i .e., number of negative responses received, ambiguities in responses, etc.). If deemed necessary, structured interviews (e.g., Critical Incident.
Technique) will be developed to obtain additional information.
If necessary, the interviews will also address areas of general interest to the Review Team requiring additional first hand
- operator information.
The interviews, if conducted, will be coordinated with the Operations Superintendent. The interviews will be conducted by personnel designated by the Review Team Leader. Operating personnel selected for interview will include those with negative i
Land /or ambiguous responses to questionnaire items.
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Page 23 Rev. O The results of interviews will be summarized by the conducting personnel, be evaluated by the Review Team, and retained for documentation.
4.1.5 REVIEW 0F OPERATING EXPERIENCE Utilizing the information obtained by the historical documentation review, engineering questionnaires, operator questionnaires, and if necessary operator interviews, the Review Team will conduct an operating experience review at a place and time to be designated by the Review Team Leader.
The review will identify HEDs contained in the above mentioned information. The HEDs will be recorded on HED forms. An example form that may used is provided on Figure 3.
4.2 CONTROL ROOM SURVEY A survey of the existing FNP control rooms will be conducted during the CRDR. The purpose of this survey is to compare the control room design features to applicable human engineering design guidelines. The 1980 Main Control Room Survey will be reviewed prior to this survey. Results of this review will be integrated into the survey effort. Checklists will be developed by the Administrative Assistant and used during the sur>ey which facilitate direct observation and measurement of control room features.
Page 24 Rev. 0
-4.2.1 CHECKLISTS The checklists will be modeled from those contained in the "CRDR Survey Development Guideline" published by the NUTAC on -CRDR.
TheNUTACchecklistsweredevelopedusingNUREG0700section(6) .
criteria and other human engineering guidelines. The checklists will organize guideline items under broad categories (general, lighting, computer, etc.). In the control room survey, these checklists will be used to evaluate instrumentation and controls located on the main control ronai board and the B0P panel.
While most of the checklist items are applicable at the component level, some items apply to the specific use of instruments and equipment, task sequence requirements, communications requirements or other aspects of dynamic ope' ration. . These dynamically oriented guidelines are more appropriately addressed from the- task or function perspective.
Some guideline items will be addressed primarily on a control room wide basis, such as those that fall in the categories of communications, process computer, and control room layout.
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Other items will be approached on a control room wide basis
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initially, and then panel-by-panel (e.g. the annunciator system). Still other guideline items will be evaluated element-by-element, and then for general consistency within the control room (e.g. controls and displays).
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Page 25 Rev. O Checklist / survey worksheets will be organized for easy reference during the survey and will provide space to indicate compliance or noncompliance for each item. An example worksheet that may be used is provided on Figure 4. When noncompliance is found, the specific reason or reasons will be clearly described in an adjacent space. Completed checklists will be retained for documentation. Information relating to noncompliance will be transferred to HED forms upon completion of the survey. ~ These HED forms will be retained for assessment and documentation.
4.2.2 PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS In as much as possible, the Survey Team will consist of members of-the Review Team. This approach is taken for numerous reasons. First, there will be less ambiguity concerning HEDs if those individuals involved in the assessment and resolution of an HED are those who identified the HED. (Loss of information will be minimized.) Second,'the experience of the Review Team is such that the team members are highly familiar with control room operations and the intent of the control room survey with respect to the CRDR, making them the more qualified individuals to perform the survey.
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Pag 26 Rev. 0 4.3 TASK ANALYSIS The objective of task analysis is to identify instrumentation and controls requirements of the control room with respect to emergency operation and to ensure that the required systems can be efficiently and reliably operated under emergency conditions by available personnel. APCo has reviewed NUTAC guidance on task analysis and has determined that, of the available r.iethods for task analysis, simulator analysis is the most efficient and effective method for application in the CRDR (the FNP simulator uses exact duplications of the Main Control Board and B0P panel.) In simulator _ analysis, plant event scenarios will be developed and implemented using the FNP real-time simulator.
This simulator analysis will utilize plant-specific ERPs, based on the Westinghouse Owner's Group ERGS, as its technical basis.
These procedures identify operator tasks required for emergency operation. This approach to task analysis has the following advantages:
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- 1) Task analysis will more accurately address operating under actual emergency conditions if plant-specific ERPs are the technical basis for the task analysis and the simulator is used.
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- 2) Using plant-specific ERPs as the technical basis for task analysis provides the Review Team existing-documentation that identifies an inventory of instruments in the control room believed .necessary to accomplish ERP tasks. (This instrumentation' inventory will be validated during the simulatoranalysis.)
The results of the . task analysis will be evaluated by the Review Team. During this evaluation HEDs will be identified and recorded on HED forms. These HED forms will be retained for assessment and documentation.
.4.3.1 PRELIMINARY STEPS OF SIMULATOR ANALYSIS Prior to performing plant event scenarios in the FNP simulator facility several preliminary steps will -be required (e.g., task identification and identification of- an instrument inventory.)
These steps are as follows:
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( - . After selecting the scenarios for simulator analysis, the Review Team-will identify the ERPs to be exercised by the scenarios.
- The Review Team will review ERP documentation addressing operator tasks and instrumentation requirements to become l ifamiliar with these tasks and requirements prior to the simulator analysis.
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Paga 28 Rav. 0
- The Operations and Emergency Procedures Specialists will head a Review Team evaluation of the ERPs to be utilized during the scenario run-throughs to identify the steps (tasks) within each procedure which the operator could follow and the plant-specific instrumentation he would use in mitigating the emergency. These steps would include those in the ERP and those acquired through training. (The Operations and Emergency Procedures Specialists will identify steps acquired through training). A complete list of expected operator actions (tasks) and instruments used will be prepared on Task Sequence Charts (TSCs) for each scenario. An example chart that might be used is provided on Figure 5.
- Tasks identified on TSCs will be transferred to Task Validation Forms (TVFs) that will allow the Review Team monitors to validate the identified tasks in an efficient manner. An example form that might be used is provided on Figure 6. The TVF forms will permit:
a) Comments on the operator's ability to control plant parameters with existing instruments and controls.
, b) Comparison of actual operator actions to the previously prepared list of expected operator actions.
Pag 29 Rev. 0 (NOTE: TSCs and TVFs will be retained for documentation)
The Review Team will have reviewed the results of the control room survey and operating experience review to evaluate the human engineering suitability of the required instrumentation and controls prior to the task analysis. Any discrepancies identified will be noted and evaluated further during the simulator analysis.
4.3.2 PLANT EVENTS SCENARIOS FOR SIMULATOR ANALYSIS The below listed events .are tentatively selected for simulator analysis. They were selected on the basis that they provide a thorough exercise of plant systems and emergency procedure tasks.
- small break loss of cooling accident (LOCA)
- inadequate core cooling
- anticipated transient without reactor trip
- steam generator tube rupture
- reactor trip procedure main steamline break j (Note: The selected events may be modified by the Review Team at l a later date.)
l The Review Team will develop scenarios of these events for the FNP simulator.
Paga 30 Rev. 0 4.3.3 SIMULATOR ANALYSIS PLANNING AND SCHEDULING The simulator time necessary to perform the above event scenarios is estimated to be three eight-hour shifts. As early as possible in the CRDR process, the Review Team Leader will
- coordinate with the Operations Superintendent to schedule R0s and/or SR0s to assist in the simulator analysis. The Training Superintendent will also be contacted so that the simulator facilities can be scheduled for the analysis.
(Note: The scheduled dates will be dependent on the development of the ERPs.)
4.3.4 IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE FOR REAL-TIME SIMULATOR RUN-THROUGH OF EVENT SCENARIOS.
The real-time simulation of the plant event scenarios will be performed according to the following procedural checks:
- The Review Team Leader will select an event scenario to be performed for validation and obtain the applicable ERP(s).
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- A trained operating crew will review the procedures. If possible, different crews will run through different' events
. for the Review Team.
Page 31 Rev. 0
- Review Team members will be assigned specific workstations / areas to monitor during.the run-through by the Review Team Leader.
- The Review Team Leader, or designate will brief the
-participating operating crew. (Any assumptions about the operating situation will be specified to the operators during the briefing.)
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- If feas1ble, preparations will be made for video-taping the run-through.
- The event simulation run-through and video-taping will Commence.
- Review team members will monitor their assigned workstations / areas and record their comments regarding the activities of the operating crew on TVFs.
- The HFS will observe and record workstation and workflow information in a manner he deems most suitable.
4.3.5 DEBRIEFINGS A review of the video-tape, if used, and an in-depth debriefing of the operators and monitors (which may be recorded) shall take place insnediately following completion of the simulator run-through.
Page 32 Ray. O The Review Team Leader will inform the operators of the purpose and objectives of the debriefing. The operators will then:
- Present control room prcblems and discrepancies which they identified during the run-through.
- Discuss possible causes and solutions for the problems and discrepancies.
Following the operators' comments the monitors will:
- Present control room and operator problems and discrepancies which they identified during the run-through.
-- Discuss possible causes and solutions of the problems.
4.3.6 DATA ANALYSIS After the debriefing, data gathered during the preliminary steps, the run-through and debriefing will be analyzed and summarized.
HEDs will be identified by the Review Team. These HEDs will be cross-checked with HEDs documented in previous review processes of the CRDR. (It is expected that many of the HEDs will have been previously identified.) Those HEDs not previously idcntified will be recorded on HED forms. These HED forms will be retained for assessment and documentation. If utilized, the video-tapes of the run-through and audio-tapes of the briefing will be retained for documentation.
Page 33 Rev. 0
- 5. ASSESSMENT OF HEDs i 5.1' OBJECTIVES The objective of this phase of the CRDR is to evaluate the significance of the HEDs identified in the previous phases of the CRDR and ' develop a resolution (i.e. , justification, plant modification, procedural revision or training change) for the HED.
A method for HED evaluation is described in the next section.
5.2 ~ EVALUATION CRITERIA HEDs discovered during the control room survey, the operating experience review, or the task analysis will be evaluated according to their potential to adversely affect emergency operation. A categorization scheme will be used that requires each HED to be assessed by the Review Team and prioritized for resolution. This assessment of HEDs will be made using the NUTAC i
on CRDR " Human Engineering Principles for Control l Room Design
~ Review" as a basis. The objective of this assessment is to c.
ensure that-the tasks delineated in-the ERPs can b2 completed in the FNP control rooms. Discrepancies that prevent completion of
.these tasks will be resolved. The following three categories are designed to be unique so that a concensus can be obtained from
- the Review Team as to which category. each HED should be assigned.
t
Page 34 Rav. O Category 1: (Highest Priority) HEDs that are judged likely to adversely effect the management of emargency conditions by control room operators. (Note: HEDs placed in this category will probably be found in the task analysis and may be supported with survey and operational experience review results.)
Category 2: HEDS that are known to have caused problems during normal operation. (Note: The HEDs placed in this category will likely emerge during operator questionnaires and, if conducted, interviews and reviews of plant event reports with some support from the control room survey.)
Category 3: Enhancements proposed by the Review Team that are not in response to an identified HED placed in category 1 or 2.
Cases where the Review Team can not reach a concensus as to the categorization of an HED will be resolved by the Review Team Leader.
5.3 RESOLUTION OF HEDs One of the final responsibilities of the review team will be to propose solutions to the identified and categorized HEDs. In some cases, a change in training or procedures may resolve the
Page 35 Rev. O HED. Some HEDs may be corrected by simple enhancements.
Correction of other HEDs may require more extensive measures.
If it is determined that the correction must involve movement, modification, addition or deletion of instrumentation, then these corrections will be evaluated with respect to their impact on the existing control room, operator performance, training, and procedu res. Corrections will be reviewed, approved and implemented in accordance with FNP-0-AP-8, Design Modification Control.
There may be some HEDs that are assessed by the Review Team as not requiring resolution by the means described above. In such cases, the review team will develop a justification for not resolving the HED. Such justifications will be incorporated into the summary report and retained t1r documentation.
Several criteria will be used by the Review Team when evaluating candidate proposals for HED correction. Some of these criteria are listed below.
- Impact on operating effectiveness
- System safety Cost effectiveness
- Impact on plant availability
- Consistency with existing features
- Compliance with regulatory design requirements
- Impact on control room staffing
-- Impact on operator training programs
r Paga 36 Rev. O Review Team resolutions to HEDS which involve plant modifications will be initiated by NETS who will develop cost estimates and schedules and evaluate engineering studies related to design, materials, installation and testing. In addition, NETS will generate all documentation associated with the implementation of resolutions to HEDs (e.g., Engineering Studies, Plant Change Requests, Licensing Support Assignment Sheets, etc.).
HED resolutions involving procedural or training changes will be resolved by the FNP Staff.
5.4 IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE The actions required to resolve significant HEDs will vary, as will the time required to complete proposed changes. All proposed changes should be completed by the date scheduled in APCo letter dated April 15, 1983 to the NRC or subsequent NRC letter. However, the following guidelines will be utilized for the scheduling of activities appropriate to the resolution of HEDs.
CATEGORY C0!PLETION 1 As soon as practical after a specific recommendation from the Review Team.
2 No specific completion date. Corrective 4
action will be based on availability, lead times, and coordination with other activities.
3 As dictated by APCo Management.
Paga 37 '\;
Rev. 0 5.5 METHODS OF IMPLEMENTATION t
HEDs will be implemented through APCo's existing plant i
modifications, training, and administrative procedures.'
Modifications will be coordinated with other NRC commitments ~ and i, identified outage activities and performed in a manner so as not s
to extend the critipal path of a unit outage. }) -w s N In order to ensure adequate human factors considerations for
~~
modifications that are considered after the CRDR team has completed its activities (e.g., SPDS implementation), NETS will coordinate 'With designers to ensure the necessary criteria is used'to, evaluate the human factors acceptability of proposed modifications. This will be accomplished by specifying that modifications conform to NUTAC or other applicable,hunan_
engineering guidelines which will be provided to the designers by NETS.
\
i e
Existing plant modification procedures (e.g., FNP-0-AP=8) wfll be used to review, approve and implement control room modifications. This ensures that plant operators are made aware of impending control room changes and applicable plant procedures i
are revised as appropriate. Use of FNP-0-AP-8 will ensure the proper implementation of control room modifications.
t k
Pag; 38
- Rev. 0
- 6. DOCUMENTATION 6.1- : GENERAL DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS ps >
',. Adequate documentation and document control creates a traceable t, -
systeNatic translation of information from one phase of the CRDR to the next. It is mandatory that the Review Team have immediate a
access'to a complete and current library of documents to provide a support base to manage and execute the various steps and phases
of the CRDR. The Administrative Assistant will establish a data base library to -be maintained at the General Office - Birmingham, i% to include all applicable CRDR documentation.
~
L< ^'
% ~
, A
.t ,
e
,m b g The documentation system will meet the following requirements:
' \
i '
s
- Provide a record of all documents used by the Review Team as references during various phases of the CRDR (e.g., NUTAC Guidelines,NUREG0/00,Atc.).
s
- Provide a record of all correspondence generated or received by the Review Team during the review.
[
- Pro' vide a record of appropriate worksheets used by the Review Team (e.g., See Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6) x s
7
- Provide a record of all documents produced by the Review Team
' i as project output (HEDs, PCRs, LSAS, etc.).
t N;
Paga 39 Rev. O s
- Provide an auditable path for project documentation. l
' Retain. project files in a manner that allows future access, u,
- 6. 2 '" REFERENCES-e
'I The following documents have been identified as possible
,1
- . , reg -
reference material to be used during the review project. As the s.- yeview progresses, additional material and references may be idedified. 's
- - T .
s . - TJoseph Mc Farley Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 FSAR e.
- ' Regulatory Guides (e.g. ,- R.G.1.97)v gd. (F n- 7, NRC uidance documents (e.g., NUREG 0700) yf -i - CRDR 'NUTAC documents -(e.g. , human principles, survey, a
4g y:1 -implementation plan, and task analysis).
- -? Westinghouse ERGS
-- Westinghouse ERG SRTA x
Control . room drawings and photographs T - Existing system descriptions y,
y <f 4 Farley Nuclear Plant ERPs
+;p'g/
2 y- -
&t-g y Piping'and instrumentation diagrams 4p - L Y.0perator training materials gpp. - g .c Results of previous control room review activities P- o; e ,l.{- Instrument tabulations -
s
- f. - Annunciator and label engraving lists e r ,% _
s h -
INP0/TVA Pilot Systems Review Report (INP0 82-014) g
.(
..It e
- 1.- gg '. g .
4 / .., i ': t - ,
- % ' L'
__ _ [
Page 40 Rev. 0
. 6.3 FINAL
SUMMARY
REPORT A detailed summary of the results. is scheduled to be prepared and submitted to the NRC for review within six months of the completion of'the CRDR. .The final report will address CRDR
-activities as described below:
1)' Planning-
- Identify members of the Review Team and delineate their qualifications
- Describe modifications made to this program plan
- 2) _ Operating Experience Review (0ER)
- Summarize the OER process
- Identify the HEDs resulting from the OER process
- 3) Control Room Survey
- , Summarize the survey process
- Identify the HEDs resulting from the survey process
- 4) . Task Analysis -
- Summarize the task analysis process Identify HEDS resulting from the task analysis process
Paga 41
, Rev. O
~5) Assessment
- Summarize the assessment process
- Justify HEDS not resolved by ' design modifications, procedural revisions or training changes
- summarize HED resolutions (to include design descriptions, procedural revisions and training changes)
- 6) Correction
- submit proposed implementation schedules for HED resolutions
- 7. COORDINATION WITH'0THER ACTIVITIES 4
Several post-TMI activities will be in progress concurrent with the CRDR.
One such task, the upgrading of ERPs will be directly related to the CRDR in that the ERPs for FNP will provide the technical basis for the CRDR task analysis.and CRDR task analysis will be performed concurr '1y with ERP validation.-
Other tasks, such as SPDS development and installation will benefit in
.that participation in the CRDR will, upgrade human factors expertise within APCo. In addition, the methodologies developed for the CRDR provide a foundation for the incorporation of human factors criteria in design and equipment guidelines and standards.
f.-
Paga 42 Rev. 0
_ 8.- ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA' This implementation plan was developed to ' describe the manner in which APCo will conduct a human factors review of the FNP control rooms. Using NUTAC guideline. documents as a basis, this document addresses the major aspects of an effective CRDR. Since the CRDR will, .in as much -as possible, be performed as described in this document, the acceptability of the CRDR should be judged against this document.
l
I
. Paga 43 Rev. O Figure 1 Farley Nuclear Plant OPERATING EXPERIENCE REVIEW PROBLEM ANALYSIS REPORT Name(s) of Investigator:
-Date:
Unit:- Index Number:
-Report Type and Number:
Date of' Incident:
Unit Operating Status:
Documented Problem:
Sequence of Events:
Effect on Unit: Unit Derated' hrs. Unit Shutdown hrs.
Unit Trip (Scram) hrs.
-Corrective Actions Taken or Proposed:
Subsequent Action Taken of a " Corrective" Nature:
Problem Identified and Corrected: Yes- 'No Control Room Human Engineering Discrepancy Index/ Log
. Number:
Page 44 Rev. O Figure 2 Farley Nuclear Plant QUESTIONNAIRE ITEM
SUMMARY
FORM 1.= . Analyst:
- 2. Content Area:
- 3. Question #:
- 4. Question:
FREQUENCY /% TYPE OF RESPONSE / SPECIFIC EQUIP. REF. INVESTIGATION I
l t
l
- Paga 45 Rev. O Figure 3 Farley Nuclear Plant HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY No: Plant Unit: Date:
Reviewer Name:
a) HED title:
b) Items Involved:
Item Type Nomenclature Location Photo No.
c) Problem descriptions (guidelines violated):
d) . Specific operator error (s) that could result from HED:
pags 46 Ray. 0
'F1gure 3 Con'd
~
e), List the. procedures or operations that use the listed items in a manner to
-induce the operator error:
i-3-
i
+
f) . List the consequences of operator error during all modes of operation:
I-I 4
. g) Suggestions for potential backfits:
1.
Paga 47 Rev. O Figure 4 Farley Nuclear Plant CHECKLIST / SURVEY WORKSHEET
- G-51 YES NO N/A Emergency controls are readily accessible.
Comments:
y G-52 YES NO N/A Emergency controls and other important controls are protected from inadvertant operation.
Comments:
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Rev. U Schematic Cf CRDR Activities 1
Review Team Selection
, Preliminary .-
i Efforts.
u Screen Operational Documents 1 F Develop Distribute, Review
, Questionnaire,s Operating Control Experience Room Survey Review g m Assess HEDs, Feedback y Develop Resolutions t 3,-
a -
1 i_, m Train Implement Operators or ;
Resolutions Resolutions u a "
ERPs complet Yes A
Attachment I sheet 1 of 2 l . - . . _ , , _ .
Page 51' R:v. O
~
s r Task I.D
- and Verification a
Simulator
-Analysis
%f Assess New g HE Feedback 1gp
, Resolutions n
Train Implement Operators on W Resolutions Resolutions .
u- -
% f Develop Sumary Report i r Submit Sumary Report .
A Attachment I sheet 2 of 2
.-