Text

Revised TS Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Sys & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation, Reflecting Agreements Reached in 990909 & 16 Discussions
	ML20217B179
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	10/04/1999
From:	; SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20217B161	List: L-99-033, Application for Amends to Licenses NPF-2 & NPF-8,to Change TS Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Sys & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation,Which Reflect Agreements Reached in 990909 & 16 Discussions; ML20217B179;
References
	NUDOCS 9910120170
	Download: ML20217B179 (59)
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i Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Control Room, Penetration Room, and Containment Purge Filtration Systems s.

and Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Technical Specification Changes Unit 1 Rev,ised Technical Specification Panes (Changed Pages Only) i a

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PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION / PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM (CREFS)

L LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l-3.7.7.1 Two Control' Room Emergency' Filtration / Pressurization System (CREFS)

" trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY '

ALL MODES, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and during movement of loads over irradiated fuel.

ACTION '

MODES 1, 2,l3 and 4:

l With one CREFS train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the l

-next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

' MODES 5, 6, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and during movement of loads over irradiated fuel:

a.

_ With one CREFS train inoperable,. restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or immediately place the OPERABLE CREFS train in the emergency recirculation mode or immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and movement of loads over irradiated fuel, b.

With both CREFS trains inoperable, immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and movement of loads over irradiated fuel.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.7.1 Each CREFS train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once.per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST WLSIS by initiating, j

from the control room, flow through the pressurization and recirculation system HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the pressurization system has operated for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months with the heater on during the past 31 days.

EARLEY-UNIT l-3/4 7-16 AMENDMENT NO.

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PLANT SYSTEMS t

3/4.7.8 PENETRATION ROOM' FILTRATION SYSTEM LIMITING-ONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.8 Two independent penetration room filtration systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY.

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

i ACTION:

With~one penetration room filtration _ system inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.8 Each penetration' room filtration system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED. TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, the flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system has operated for at least 15 ndnutes in its post LOCA alignment.

l b.-

At least' oned per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting,. fire or' chemical release that could have contaminated the charcoal adsorbers or HEPA filters in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:

1.

Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place testing acceptance criteria of greater than or equal to 99.5% filter efficiency while operating the system at a flow rate of 5000 cfm i 10 percent and using the following test procedures:

(a)

A visual inspection of the penetration room filtration system shall be made before~each DOP test or activated carbon adsorber section leak test in accordance with ASME N510-1989*.

(b)

An.in place DOP test for the HEPA filters shall be performed in accordance with ASME N510-1989*.

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-(c)

A charcoal adsorber section leak test with a gaseous halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant shall be performed g

in accordance with ASME N510-1989*.

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The FNP Final Safety Analysis Report identifies the relevant surveillance l-testing requirements.

lJ EARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 7-18 AMENDMENT NO.

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PLANT. SYSTEMS-b SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) a 2.

Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample, obtained in accordance with ASME N510-1989* and tested in accordance

-with ASTM D3803-1989,. meets the laboratory testing criterion of greater than or equal-to 95% efficiency when tested with

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methyl iodide at 30*C and 95% relative humidity.

l 3.

Verifying a system flow rate of 5000 cfm i 10% during system operation when tested in accordance with ASME N510-1989*.

c.

-After every 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months of' charcoal adsorber operation by verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample,.obtained in accordance with ASME N510-1989*.and tested in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989, meets l

the laboratory testing criterion of greater than or equal to 95%

.I efficiency when tested with methyl iodide at 30*C and 95% relative I

humidity..

d.

At least once per 18 months by:

1.

Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA

. filters and charcoal adsorber banks' of less than 2.6 inches l

Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 5000 cfm i 10%.

l E.

Verifying that the system starts on a Phase B Isolation test signal.

I e.

At least once per 36 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by verifying one PRF train can maintain a pressure s -0.125 inches water gauge relative _to adjacent areas during the post LOCA mode of operation

-at a flow rate of s 5500 cfm.

f.

'After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank l

by verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove greater than or equal to 99.5% of the DOP when they are tested in-place in accordance with ASME N510-1989* while operating the system at a flow rate of 5000 c&n t 10%.

g.-

After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber l

bank by verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove greater than or equal to 99.5% of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in-place in accordance with ASME N510-1989* while operating the system at a flow rate of 5000 cfmi 10%.

The FNP Final Safety Analysis Report identifies the relevant surveillance testing requirements.

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' FARLEY-UNIT 1

.3/4 7-19 AMENDMENT NO.

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s REFUELING OPERATIONS s.

9-3/4.9.12 STORAGE POOL VENTILATION (TUEL STORAGE)

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.12 One penetration room filtration system (Specification 3.7.8) shall be OPERABLE and aligned to the spent fuel pool room.

APPLICABILITY:

Whenever. irradiated fuel is in the storage pool.

' ACTION:

a.

With'no penetration room filtration system OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving movement of irradiated. fuel within the l

storage pool until'at least'one penetration room filtration system is restored to OPERABLE' status.

-b.

The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not.

applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I

4.9.12.1 A penetration room filtration system shall inn verified to be -

aligned to the spent-fuel pool room'within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months prior to storage of fuel in the spent fuel pool and at least once per 7 days thereafter while fuel is

- stored in the storage pool, 4.9.12.2 The penetration room filtration system shall be demonstrated

)

t OPERABLE.

j a.

At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, 1

Lfrom the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system has operated for at least 15 ndnutes in its fuel handling accident alignment.

b.

. Filter testing per requirements of Specification 4.7.8.b, c, d.1, f and g.

c.

At least once per 36 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by verifying one PRF train can maintain a slightly negative pressure relative to adjacent areas during the fuel handling accident mode of operation at a flow rate of 5 5500 cfm.

4.9.12.3 At least once'per 18 months, verify that the normal spent fuel poo1' ventilation system will isolate upon receipt of either; a.

The spent fuel pool ventilation low differential pressure test signal, or b.

^A spent fuel pool high radiation test signal.

EARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 9-14 AMENDMENT NO.

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PLANT SYSTEMS

. BASES' Sh r

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"3/4 7.6.1" ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (RIVER)

.This specification deleted.

u 3/4 7.6.2 ULTIMATE HEAT' SINK ( POND)

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.The limitations on the ultimate h' eat sink level and temperature 1 ensure-that sufficient-cooling capacity is available to either 1) provide

-normal cooldown'of.the facility, or'2) to mitigate the effects of accident L

Jconditions within acceptable' limits.

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The limitations #on minimum water level and maximum temperature are

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. based on providing.a 30' day ecoling water supply.to safety related equipment without: exceeding their design basis temperature.- The measurement of the 3

ground water. seepage at least once per 5 years will provide assurance that the l

30 day supply of water is;available.

3/4.7.7

~ CONTROL' ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM

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The control room. emergency filtration / pressurization system (CREFS) consists of two independent, redundant trains that recirculate and filter the L

' control room air,1 and two independent, redundant trains that pressurize the 1

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. control' room. ' Operation of the CREFS in the emergency recirculation mode consists of the-control room isolation, with the pressurization unit, filtration unit, and recirculation' unit all in service.

The. OPERABILITY of this" system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on

, limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body,"or its equivalent. This limitation is consistent with i-the requirements'of General' Design Criteria 19 of Appendix

'A',

10CFR50.

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-When one CREFS train is: inoperable, action must be taken to restore LOPERABLE status within 7 days. ;In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREFS' train is' adequate to perform the control room protection function.

.However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the i

OPERABLE CREFS train could result in loss of CREFS function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period 1 of time, and the. ability of the remaining train to provide the required l

capability.

Operation of the pressurization unit with the heaters on for at least

10. continuous hours over a 31 day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup i

of moisture'on the adsorbers and HEPA filter and to verify system stability.

Continuous heater operation during the 10 hour1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months test is assured by operating ~

the heaters with fan flow and allowing only the protective thermal cutout features of the ' heater: controls to be functional.

EThe control room air conditioning system (CRACS) consists of two independent,' redundant trains that provide cooling of recirculated control t room ' ai r.-

Each control room air conditioning (CRAC) train is inoperable if it gx, tis'not capable of removing the required heat load for plant conditions.

The actualiheat-load and the. heat removal capability needed to adequately cool the

' control room'are dependent upon factors such as outdoor air temperature.

l EARLEY-UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-4 AMENDMENT NO.

P PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (con'.inued)

With one CRAC train inoperable, the inoperable train must be returned to OPERABLE status within 30 days.

This Allowed' Outage Time is based on the low probability of complete loss of control room cooling due to the redundancy

of the support systems, the capability of the OPERABLE train to provide the required cooling, the potential that plant staff actions can restore or mitigate the effects of component failures, and the time.available to respond as loss of control room cooling does not have an immediate, irreversible impact.

While in MODES 5 and 6 during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies or movement of-loads over irradiated fuel, if both trains of CRAC cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days, an OPERABLE CRAC train must be placed in operation immediately; otherwise, immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and movement of loads over irradiated fuel.

The OPERABILITY of the. control room emergency ventilation system ensures that 1)'the-anbient air temperature does~not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty. rating for_the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this. system and 2)'the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions.

3/4.7.8 PENETRATION ROOM FILTRATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the penetration room filtration system provides reasonable assurance that radioactive materials leaking from ECCS pump rooms during post LOCA recirculation are filtered prior to reaching the environment.

The minimum system flow rate maintains a slightly negative pressure in the I

penetration room area and ECCS pump rooms assuming only one filter train is operating.

The maximum system flow rate ensures that the pressure drop across filters is not excessive and adequate residence time is attained in the charcoal filter. The PRF system is tested periodically in its post LOCA alignment.

Periodic testing of the RHR heat exchanger room pressure to less than or equal to -0.125 inch water gauge with respect to adjacent area pressure (as measured by the AP between the PRF mechanical equipment room and the RHR Heat Exchanger room) at a flow rate of s 5500 cfm verifies the integrity of the PRF system pressure boundary and is consistent with the guidance for standard technical specifications in NUREG 1431.

Functional testing of proper PRF system operation and pressure boundary integrity provides reasonable assurance that unfiltered release to adjacent areas of any ECCS-leakage will be minimized. The operation of this system and the j

resultant effect from the ECCS leakage on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the accident analyses. Although not credited in the accident analyses, the:PRF system also provides filtration of containment leakage into the penetration room areas.

FARLEY-UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-4a AMENDMENT NO.

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REFUELING OPERATIONS BAS ES '

l 3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT PURGE AND EXHAUST ISOLATION SYSTEM The_ OPERABILITY of this' system ensures.that the containment vent and purge penetrations will be automatically isolated.upon detection of high radiation levels within the containment. The OPERABILITY of this system is Erequired to restrict the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment.

J

- 3/4.9.10'and'3/4.9.ll-WATER LEVEL'- REACTOR VESSEL and STORAGE POOL 1

The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water

{

depth is available to' remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity

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released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water

' depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.

3/4.3.12 and 3/4.9.13 STORAGE POOL VENTILATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY'of the penetration room filtration system ensures that radioactive materials leaking from the' spent fuel pool area following a Fuel Ha'ndling Accident (FRA) are filtered prior to reaching the environment. The PRF system is tested periodically in its FHA alignment to ensure the system functions' properly. Testing of HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal is bounded by testing performed'per 4.7.8.

The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal. capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses.

Dur'ing the fuel' handling mode of operation, the PRF is designed to maintain ^a slightly negative pressure in the spent fuel room with respect to atmospheric. pressure and surrounding areas at a flow rate of 5 5500 cfm, to l

. prevent unfiltered leakage. The slightly negative pressure is verified by f

using.a non rigorous method that yields some observable identification of the

{

negative pressure. Examples of non rigorous methods are smoke sticks, hand held differential pressure indicators, or other measurtment devices that do

. not' provide'for an absolute measurement.

The note regarding PRF electrical system OPERABILITY is provided for j

' clarification to specification 3/4.9.13.

In MODES 5 and 6, the electrical power requirements do not require considering a single failure coincident with l

a loss of all offsite or all onsite power.

The design basis for electrical sources.during refueling requires at least one offsite circuit through the 1E distribution system be operable and at least one of the emergency diesels be operable..The electrical requirements of 3.8.1.2 meet the electrical sources l _

OPERABILITY requirements for two independent PRF systems.

1 3/4.9.14 CONTAINMENT PURGE EXHAUST FILTER g

.This specification deleted.

i EARLEY-UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-3 AMENDMENT NO.

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Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Control Room, Penetration Room, and Containment Purge Filtration Systems and Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Technical Specification Changes Unit 2 Revised Technical Specification Paces (Changed Pages Only)

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PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION / PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM (CREFS)

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7.1 Two control Room Emergency Filtration / Pressurization System (CREFS)

Ltrains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

ALL MODES, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and during movement of loads over irradiated fuel.

ACTION:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4:

With one CREFS. train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the l

next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

MODES 5, 6, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and during movement of loads over irradiated fuel:

With one CREFS train inoperable, restore the inoperable system to a.

OPERABLE status within 7 days or immediately place the OPERABLE CREFS train in the emergency recirculation mode or immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and movement of loads over irradiated fuel, b.

With both CREFS trains inoperable, immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and movement of loads over irradiated fuel.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.7.1 Each CREFS train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, a.

from the control room, flow through the pressurization and recirculation system HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the pressurization system has operated for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months with the heater on during the past 31 days.

e EARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 7-16 AMENDMENT NO.

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PLANT' SYSTEMS 3/4~7.8 PENETRATION ROOM FILTRATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.8 'Two independent penetration room filtration systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY '

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

r -

ACTION:

With one penetration room filtration system inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next'6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.8. Each penetration room filtration system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

'At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating,

]

from the control room, the flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system has operated for at'least 15 minutes in its post LOCA alignment.

l I

b.

At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural' maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2)_following painting, fire or chemical release that could have contaminated the charcoal adsorbers or HEPA filters in any ventilation tone communicating with the system by:

1.

Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place j

testing acceptance criteria of greater than or equal to j

99.5% filter efficiency while operating the system at a flow rate of 5000 cfm i 10 percent and using the following test procedures:

(a)'

A visual inspection of the penetration room filtration system shall be made before each DOP test or activated carbon adsorber section leak test in accordance with ASME N510-1989*.

(b)

An in-place DOP test for the HEPA filters shall be performed in accordance with ASME N510-1989*.

l (c)

A charcoal adsorber section leak test with a gaseous halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant shall be performed l

in accordance with ASME N510-1989*.

i

The FNP Final Safe'ty Analysis Report identifies the relevant surveillance j

testing. requirements.

)

i FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 7-18 AMENDMENT NO.

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PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) l.

2.

Verifying within 31. days after removal that a laboratory l.

analysis of a representative carbon sample, obtained in accordance with ASME N510-1989* and tested in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989, meets the laboratory testing criterion of greater than or equal to 95% efficiency when tested with methyl iodide at 30*C and 95% relative humidity.

l 3.

Verifying a system flow rate of 5000 efm i 10% during system

-operation when tested in accordance with ASME N510-1989*.

c.

After every 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying within.31' days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample, obtained in accordance with ASME N510-1989* und tested in accordance 5.ith ASTM D3803-1989, meets the laboratory testing criterion of greater than or equal to 95%

efficiency when tested with methyl iodide at 30*C and 95%

relative humidity.

d.

At least once per 18 months by:

1.

Verifying that the pressure drop across the e wined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks of less than 2.6 inches l

Water Gauge while operating the system at a-flow rate of 5000 cfm 10%.

g 2.

Verifying that the system starts on a Phase B Isolation test signal.

At least once per 36 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by verifying e.

one PRF train can maintain a pressure s -0.125 inches water gauge relative to adjacent areas during the post LOCA mode of operation at a flow rate of s 5500 cfm.

f.

After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank l

by verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove greater than or equal to 99.5% of the DOP when they are tested in place in accordance with ASME N510-1989* while operating the systen at a flow l

rate of 5000 cfm i 10%.

g.

After each complete'or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber l

bank by verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove greater than or equal to 99.5% of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in place in accordance with ASME N510-1989* while operating the system at a flow rate of 5000 cfm i 10%.

l

The FNP Final Safety Analysis Report identifies the relevant surveillance testing requirements FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 7-19 AMENDMENT NO.

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REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.12 STORAGE POOL VENTILATION (FUEL STORAGE) l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.12

.One penetration room filtration system (Specification 3.7.8) shall l'

be OPERABLE and aligned to the spent fuel pool room.

APPLICABILITY:

Whenever irradiated fuel is in the storage pool.

' ACTION:

1 a.

With no penetration room filtration-system OPERABLE, suspend all J

operations involving. movement of. irradiated fuel within the l

)

storage pool until at least one penetration room filtration system-is restored to OPERABLE status.

l l

b.

The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not I

applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS j

l 4.9.12.1.

A penetration room filtration system shall be verified to be aligned to the spent fuel pool room within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months prior to storage of fuel in the spent fuel pool and at least once per 7 days thereafter while fuel is stored in the storage pool.

4.9.12.2 The penetration room filtration system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.-

At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system has operated for at least 15 ndnutes in its fuel handling accident alignment.

i l-b.

Filter testing per requirements of Specification 4.7.8.b, c, d.1, f and g.

c.

At least once per 36 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by verifying one PRF train can maintain a slightly negative pressure relative to adjacent areas during the fuel handling accident. mode of operation at a flow rate of 5 5500 cfm.

4.9.12.3 At least once per 18 months, verify'thac the normal spent fuel pool ventilation system will isolate upon receipt of eithers l

a.

., The spent fuel pool ventilation low differential pressure test signal, or.

b.

A' spent fuel' pool high radiation test signal.

l o

EARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 9-14 AMENDMENT NO.

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES' 3/4 7.6.1 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (RIVER)

This specification deleted.

-3/4 7.6.2 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (POND)

The limitations.on the ultimate heat sink level and temperature ensure that sufficient cooling capacity is available to either 1) provide

. normal.cooldown of the facility, or 2) to mitigate'the effects of accident conditions within acceptable limits.

The limitations on minimum water level and maximum temperature are based on providing a 30 day cooling water supply to safety related equipment without exceeding their design basis temperature. The measurement of the ground water seepage at least'once per 5 years will provide assurance that the 30 day supply of water is available.

3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM

.The control room emergency filtration / pressurization system (CREFS) consists of two independent, redundant trains that recirculate and filter the control room air, and two independent, redundant trains that pressurize the control room. Operation of the CREFS in the e:mergency recirculation mode

. consists of the control room isolation, with the pressurization unit, filtration unit, and recirculation unit all in service. The OPERABILITY of I

this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalert. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 19 of Appendix

'A',

10CFR50.

When one CREFS train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days.

In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREFS train is adequate to perform the control room protection function.

However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE CREFS train could result in loss of CREFS function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this i

period of time, and the ability of the remaining train to provide the required l

capability.

Operation of the pressurization unit with the heaters on for at least 10 continuous hours over a 31 day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup i

of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filter and to verify system stability.

Continuous heater operation during the 10 hour1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months test is assured by operating the heaters with fan flow and allowing only the protective thermal cutout j

features of the heater controls to be functional.

The control room air conditioning system (CRACS) consists of two independent, redundant trains that provide cooling of recirculated control E

room air..Each control room air conditioning (CRAC) train is inoperable if it is not. capable of removing the required heat load for plant conditions. The actual heat load and the heat. removal capability needed to adequately cool the control room are dependent upon factors such as outdoor air temperature.

l i

I FARLEY-UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-4 AMENDMENT NO.

b

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PLANT SYSTEMS l

BASES 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (continued)

.With one CRAC' train inoperable, the inoperable train must be returned to OPERABLE status within 30 days. This Allowed Outage Time is based on the low probability of. complete loss of control room cooling due to the redundancy of the support systems, the capability of the OPERABLE train to provide the required cooling, the potential that plant staff actions can restore or mitigate the effects of component failures, and the. time available to respond as loss of, atrol room cooling does not have an immediate, irreversible

impact.

While in MODES 5 and 6 during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies or movement of loads over irradiated fuel, if both trains of CRAC cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days, an OPERABLE CRAC train must be.

placed in operation immediately; otherwise, immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and movement of loads over irradiated fnel.

The OPERABILITY of the control room emergency ventilation system ensures that 1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for contintous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by

'this system and 2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions.

3/4.7.8 PENETRATION ROOM FILTRATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the penetration room filtration system provides l.

reasonable assurance that radioactive materials leaking from ECCS pump rooms L

during post LOCA recirculation are filtered prior to reaching the environment.

The minimum system flow rate raintains a slightly negative pressure in the penetration room area and ECCS pump rooms assuming only one filter train is operating. The maximum system flow rate ensures that the pressure drop across filters is'not excessive and adequate residence time is attained in the charcoal filter. The PRF system is tested periodically in its post LOCA alignment.

Periodic testing of the RHR heat exchanger room pressure to less than or equal to -0.125 inch water gauge with respect ~to adjacent area pressure'(as measured by the AP between the PRF mechanical equipment room and the RHR Heat Exchanger room) at a flow rate of s 5500 cfm verifies the integrity of the PRF system pressure boundary and is consistent with the guidance for standard technical specifications in NUREG 1431.

Functional testing of proper PRF system operation and pressure boundary integrity provides reasonable assurance that unfiltered release to adjacent areas of any

'ECCS leakage will be minimized. The operation of this system and the resultant effect from the_ECCS leakage on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the accident analyses. Although not credited in the accident analyses, the PRF system also provides filtration of containment leakage into the penetration room areas.

FARLEY-UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-4a AMENDMENT NO.

I

y; QTv REFUELING OPERATIONS

..s BASES' 3/4.9.9' CONTAINMENT-PURGE AND EXHAUST ISOLATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of this system. ensures that the containment vent and purge penetrationsLwill'be automatically isolated up'on detection of high

radiation levels within the containment., The OPERABILITY of this system is

. required to restrict the release of radioactive material from the containment

.atmosphereLto the environment.

3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - REA'CTOR VESSEL and STORAGE POOL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth.is.available to remove 99% of.the assumed 10% iodine gap' activity 3 released from the rupture of an' irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water

' depth is consistent with:the-assumptionslof the accident enalysis.

'3/4.9.12 and 3/4.9.13 STORAGE POOL VENTILATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the penetration room filtration _ system ensures that l radioactive materials leaking from the spent fuel pool area following a Fuel Handling ; Accident ' ( FRA) are filtered prior to reaching the environment.' The

,PRF system is tested periodically in its FHA alignment to ensure the system functions properly. Testing of HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal is bounded by testing performed per 4.7.8.

The OPERABILITY of this system and the

'resulting lodine removal capacity are consistent'with the assumptions of the accident analyses.

During the. fuel handling mode of operation, the PRF is designed to maintain a slijhtly negative pressure in the spent fuel room with respect to j

atmospheric pressura and surrounding areas at a flow rate of s 5500 cfm, to

.]

prevent unfilterea leakage. The slightly negative pressure is verified by

.i using a.non rigorous method that yields some observable identification of the

negative pressure.

Examples of non rigorous methods are smoke sticks, hand held differential pressure indicators, or other measurement devices that do.

j not provide for an absolute measurement.

l 1

. The. note regarding PRF electrical system OPERABILITY is provided for j

clarification to. specification 3/4.9.13.

In MODES 5 and 6, the electrical H

power requirements do not require considering a single failure coincident with a loss of.all offsite or all onsite power. The design basis for electrical j

sources during refueling requires at least one offsite circuit through the 1E l

distribution system be operable and at least one of the emergency diesels be j

operable.' The electrical requirements of 3.8.1.2 meet the electrical sources

{

f f0PERABILITY< requirements for two independent PRF systems.

I l

'$/4.9.14L CONTAINMENT PURGE EXHAUST FILTER 7

This specification deleted.

FARLEY-UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-3 AMENDMENT NO.

i

7-p

.~

-i

' Enclosure 5 1

l Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant I

Control Room, Penetration Room, and Containment Purge Filtruion Systems -

I and Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation -

' Technical Specification Changes 4

Units 1&2 Revised Marked-Up Technical Specification Panes i

i

'(Changed Pages Only) f 1

7 i

-1 i

1 i

i

r-

-my.

e Jes:ph M. Fert:y Nucleir Plant Control Room, Penetration Room, and Containment Purge Filtration Systems

-3 and Radiation Monitoring In'strumentation Technical Specification Changes

' Unit 1 Revised Marked-Up Technical Specification Pares 4

s l

l i

l

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTI?.ATXON SYSTD(

CONTROL ROOM EKERGENCY TILTRATION/ PRESSURIZATION SYSTD( (CRITS)

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7.1 Two Control Room Dnergency Filtration / Pressurization System (CREFS) traiss shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

ALL MODES, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and during movement of loads over irradiated fuel.

ACTION:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 With one CRETS train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to l

OPERABLE status within 78 days or be in at least MOT STANDBY within the /l next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SMUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

(//

MODES 5, 6, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and during movemen I

of loads over -irradiated-fuel - ~

f With one CREFS tr'ain inoperable, restore the inoperable system to /

a.

CPERABLE status within 7 days or immediately place the OPERABLE

}

CRETS train in the emergency recirculation mode or immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and movement of loads over irradiated fuel.

(W b.

With both CRETS trains inoperable, issnediately suspend moveme'at od I

irradiated fuel assemblies and movement of loads over irradiated fuel.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.7.1 Each CRETS train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

l At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, a.

from the control room, flow through the pressurization and recirculation system HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the pressurization system has operated.for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months with the heater on during the past 31 days.

A c... ;i.;. ;er.;ier. ;; OO d;y; ;; ;;;r. ;;.ir, ; ;r.; ;;;i;;.le;ier.

fil;;e;;;r. f.;;i;; :f C"?-~ i: ;;:n;;d f:: ' -- _t tirn Of : nt::1 :::

lin; d::i;n then;::. TM: ;:evicien: ef :;::ific: tie 2.0 ' ::: n:t applaceble d.;is.; ;i.i; OO d;y ; ;;..e;e..

Tr.i; e..e ;i.

2 h..;;e...-ri;.;

e..

;1 ti'en f th: " nit 1 l'.th ::ft:lin; ::::;; : p;ir.; ' 0 "' ;

TARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 ~7-16 AMENDMENT N0119 l

E

.s PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.8 PENETRATION ROOM FILTRATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.8 Two independent penetration room filtration systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one penetration room filtre. tion system inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE. status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILIANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.8 Each penetration room filtration system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least o~

i per 31 days on a 5TAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, the flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber g g g g that the system has operated for at at ' ^

hret::: :: t:ir; Istsfsfdpf$964Ofahnnrhr th: ; :t ':

2 ;.

7 b.

At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber hous,'ngs, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release that'could have contaminated the charcoal adsorbers or HEPA filters in any ventilation zone consnunicating with the system by:

1.

Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place testing acceptance criteria of greater than or equal to 99.5% filter efficiency while operating the system at a flow rate of 5000 cfm i 10 percent and using the following test procedures:

(a)

A visual inspection of the penetration room filtration system shall ba made before each Dn?

test or activated carbon adsorber section lett test in accordance with ASME N510-1989*.

(b)

An in-place DOP test for the HEFA filters shall be performed in accordance with 5 :tirr 20 f ?2'rI ASSE l

N510- W84k

/fif#

(c)

A coarcoal adsorber section leak test with a gaseous halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant shall be perforwed in accordance with !:r-'-- 11 :172'!' ///f/

N510-1994.#

1989

The FNP Final Safety Analysis Report identifies the relevant surveillanc

-testing requirements.

l FARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 7-10 AMENDMENT NO.127 l

e PLANT SYSTD8.3 SURVIILIANCE RidUIR.6.3 (Continued) 2.

Verifying within 31 days af ter, removal that a laboratory __

analysis of a representative gg sampi pained in accordance with :::ti:n ! ? O f ---- ' N510-meets the gh [df[g M #tr det#

Aacoratory testing criterion of greater taan or equal to Y'g Affff gJgpJ-/fgf 964 efficiency when tested with methyl iodide at and 2

relative humidity.

O 3.

erifying a system flow rate of 50--

i 14 during system operation when tasted in accordance. <ith ASME M510-1989*.

After every 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months of charcoal adsorber operation by c.

verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative egg samp1 gainedin aceerdance with -:-, ti;; 1 f -. N510-meets the laboratory testing criterion of greater than'or equal to efficiency when tested with methyl iodide at 44.*

and relative humidity.

.__ __ y d.

At least once per 18 months by:

1.

Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined H" y

filters and charcoal adsorber banks of less than inches water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of,/

1. Ws (p

pip:::

2 Verifying that the system starts on a Phase B Isolation test signal.

2.

"e.ifyi ; th:t th: ':- ::: '!::i;r e 2 5 e ?_5 '- + ::

N lt49f pared fer" $$ prper&p Cet d. $1A~ fr0f00 ffff[$4Cr3 h ll

i. m.J a....;

' ^^-- Zi" *^;"^.

6e f

.[ gr.

After each complete or partial replacement of a REPA filter

}

bank by verifying that the EEFA filter banks remove greater than or equal to 97.5% of' the Dcipp they gestedin-place in accordance with 0;c;;;; 1:

f..... N5 0-while operating the system at a flo'w rate of ',0,,""

f i 1".. f/t/

f[.

After.each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank by verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove greater than or equal to 99.5% of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when theyg teste<G place in accordance-with - :;;;i:n 1

f.....

9 while operating the i

systaa at a flee zata of '4;; a a 1..

The FWP Final Safety Analysis Report identifies the relevant surveillance testing requirements.

- e T

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a wm a

wh hhg

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2-_=r. ir.. J u g ; 7 te c-gc;.1.,,. ifice;i

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! 15th :: h:11 ; : - :-

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AMEN 3C2f! NO N I'ARLEY-UNIT 1

~ _ _ _

__ -, _3/.t 7-13_

& fj'ffjg,rp.

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$ NA f

nw to aJjace.+ a,cu ssg,s,gss uamak & rete a f a. // w a fe e f 6 r e t e f a,

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INSERT 1 L

TO TS SURVEILLANCE PAGE 3/4 9-14 3/4.9.12 5'torage Pool Ventilationhstem

~

I 4.9.12.2 The penetration room filtration system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

At least once per 3i days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from a.

the control room, tiow through the HEPA tilters and charcoal adsorbers and' verifying that the system has operated for at least 15 minutes in its fuel handling accident alignment.

b.

Filter testing per requirements of Specification 4.7.8.b. c. d.I, f and g.

Af loeff e*rce fW ff torn /ds der a. 37?Vrdf4fD 1277 d'

OAS.TJ h Wrllyly one PAf 'fbrk M m schrhe, a.-

fnetsno pregais re/anv6 fu #ad d,yH!r

/de 4s/ As.,//ly w//mf m/e p/-

areas Zwi 1

speat% a

//w ran a/ 6 mshe, 4

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4S

f:,,

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sAsEs 1/d *1.8.1 Ut*' wit? HEA* TTMY ft'VFR)

This specification deleted.

3 4 a.sM ut ?wate writ frwr #ponai he limitations on the ultimate heat sink level and temperature en.sure l

that sufficient cocling capacity is available to either il provide normal l

cooldown of the facility, or 2) -to mitigate the effects of accident l

' conditions within acceptable limits.

i The limitations on minimum water level and maximum temperature are based on providing a 30 day cooling water supply to safety related equipment without exceeding their design basis temperature. The measurement of the ground water seepage at least once per 5 years will provide assurance that the 30 day

. supply of water is available.

l 3/d M M coweenr. ennu rurmerw v vrwerr.meram as.a The control room emergency filtration / pressurization system (CREFS) consists of two independent, redundant trains that recirculate and filter the

ontrol room air, and two independent, redundant trains that pressurine the jfN I ^. control room.4 The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control roosi l~

cesign provisiens is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 ran or less whole body, or its equivalent.

This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria f 19 of Appendix

'A',

10CFR50.

When one CREFS train is inope: able, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREFS train is adeg ate to perform the control room protection function.

l However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE CRETS train could result in loss of CREFS function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during thii period of time poseed, an bility of the remaining train to provide the required capability.

p p 'as4*M ag/f

"--d ?'":[peration of the aWwith the heaters on for at least 10 6*,sg-hours over a 31 day period is suffi-i=fe en red"-- che buildup ar -1sture on the adsorbers and HEPA filter Vfrikjh

Nillf[

ffr

- 1 The control room air conditioning system (CRACSI consists of two independent, redundant trains that provide cooling of recirculated control room air.

Each control room air conditaoning (CRAC) train is inoperable if i is not capable of removing the required heat load for plant conditions. The actual heat load and the heat removal capability needed to adequately cool th<

c=ntro'. rocm dependent upon facters such as outdoor air temperature.

l 4

.FAR!.EY-UNIT

B 3/4 7-4 AMENDHENT NO.

119 b

l

I Insert 1 to Bases 3/4.7.7 on Page B 3/4 7-4 j

operation of the CREFS in the emergency recirculation mode consists of the control room isolation, with the pressurization unit, filtration unit, and recirculation unit all in service.

Insert 2 to Bases 3/4.7.7 on Page B 3/4 7-4 Continuous heater operation during the 10 hour1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months test is assured by operating the heaters with _ fan flow and allowing only the protective thernal cutout features of the heater controls to be functional.

i i

i l

4 I

I.

e l

l Insert 1 To TS Bases Page B 3/4 7 4a 3/4.7.8 Penetration Room Tiltration System The' OPERABILITY of the penetration room filtration system provides

{

reasonable assurance that radioactive materials leaking' from ECCS pump rooms during post LOCA recirculation are. filtered prior to reaching the

)

environment. The minimum system flow rate maintains a slightly

]

negative pressure in the penetration room area and ECCS pump rooms assuming only one filter train is operating. The maximum system flow rate ensures that the pressure drop across filters is not excessive and adequate residence time is attained in the charcoal filter. The PRF system is tested periodically in its post LOCA alignment. Periodic testing of the REP. heat exchanger room pressure to less than or equal to -0.125 inch water gauge with respect to adjacent area pressure (as measured by the AP between the PRF mechanical ipment room and the l

IUCR' Heat Exchanger room). at a flow rate of $

cfm verifies the integrity of the PRF system pressure boundary and is consistent with the guidance for standard technical specifications in NUREG 1431.

Functional testing of proper PRF system operation and pressure boundary integrity provides reasonable assurance that unfiltered release to adjacent areas of any ECCS leakage will be minimized. The operation of this system and the resultant effect from the ECCS leakage on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the accident analyses. Although not credited in the accident analyses, the PRF system also provides filtration of containment leakage into the penetration room areas.

m; g

REFUTLING OPEPA* Tows BASES 3 /4.9.9 CONTATNMEN* PURGE AND EIRAUST ISCLATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of this system ensures that the containment vent and

~

purge penetrations will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within the containment. The OPERABILITY of this system is required to re' strict the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment.

H.

3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL and STORACE POOL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water I

depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.

3/4.9.12 and 3/4.9.13 STORACE POOL VENTILATION SYSTEM Th:'l'-it:ti :: ;; th; :::: ; ;::1 -:;til:ti;; ;i;t

th:t

gj zii := tre-tir: =t=i:: ;;;= = s f. = = i; =ei = : f.;:== ':r = = h; lLLt;.;i th;=;h th; L fi:t;;;== :hk.;;; ::;;;h;; ;;i;; t: ii;;h;.5; ylf,9,12 h*

t; th ;" : :;' : ;. The n J. :LITY cf thi: y:t = : d th: ; = lting i:dia: l g,f3 j

~r{~"75-ity - e :- rict ::

rith the ::" ;tirn: O f '" ::Etzt b 'Gr9ef A The note regarding PRT electrical system OPtRABILITY is provided for clarification to specification 3/4.9.13.

In HocEs 5 and 6, the electr8. cal j

power requirements do not require considering a single failure coincic ant j

with a loss of all offsite or all onsite power. The design basis fc.

q electrical sources during refueling. requires at least one of f site-Greuit through the 1E distribution system be operable and at least ene of the emergency diesels be operable. The electrical requirements of 3.5.1.2 seet the electrical sources OPERABILITY requirements fog-tver independent FRF

]

systems.

,. 3/4.9.14 CONTAINMENT PURGE EXMAUST FILTER

_Y YN_

$ _~

2 $

)-

i- " -

?---

ef a fuel h: dlin; =:id::: in th; ;;;;;i..-.;;; th; :.di ;;tive r terielr = ler::e ::: flit:::d red frech;d :!:: t: ::1:51-

....t nu en$ pn M fJ.

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2.

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INSERT 1 TO TS BASES PAGE B 3/4 9-3 3/4.9.12 AND 3/4.9.13. Storage Pool Ventilation System

The OPERABILITY of-the penetration room filtration system ensures.that radioactive materials. leaking from the spent fuel pool area following a Fuel Handling Accident-(FHA) are filtered prior to reaching the environment. The

-FRF. system is ~ tested periodically in its FRA alignment to ensure the system functions properly. ' Testing of HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber, efficiency,.and the physical properties of the activated charcoal is bounded by testing performed per 4.7.8.

The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses.

' INSERT 2 TO TS BASES PAGE B 3/4 9-3 3/4.9.12 AND 3/4.9.13 Storage Pool Ventilation System During the fuel handling mode of operation, the PRF is designed to maintain a slightly negative pressure in the spent fuel room with respect to-atmospheric pressure and surrounding areas at a flow rate of 5 5500 cfm, to prevent unfiltered leakage The slightly negative pressure is verified by using a non rigorous methoc that yields some observable identification of the negative pressure.

Examples of non rigorous methods are smoke sticks, hand held differential pressure. indicators,'or other measurement devices that do 1

not provide for an. absolute measurement.

i 9

1

ff

(

F Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Control Room, Penetration Room, and Containment Purge Filtration Systems and Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Techalcal Specification Changes Unit 2 htevised Marked Un Technical Specification Panes l

i w

3 PLANT SYSTEMS l

3/4.7.7 CONTROL Room EMERGENCY VENTKLATRON SYSTD4 l-CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY TILTRATION/ PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM fCREFS) l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7.1 Two control Room Emergency Filtration / Pressurization System (CREFS) trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

ALL MODES, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and during movement of loads over irradiated fuel.

ACTION:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4:

With one CRETS train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7K days or be in at least NOT STANDBY within the f

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

next MODES 5, 6, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and during movementf of loads over irradiated fuel

(

WithoneCREF3traininoperable,restoretheinoperablesystemtof a.

CPERABLE status within 7 days or inmediately place the OPERABLE CREFS train in the emergency recirculation mode or innediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and movement of loads over irradiated fuel.

1

/

b.

With both CREFS trains inoperable, innnediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and movement of loads over irradiated fuel.

Y SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.7.1 Each CREr5 train shall be demonstrated CPERABLE:

At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating,-

a.

i from the control room, flow through the pressurization and I

recirculation system HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the pressurization system has operated for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months with the heater on during the past 31 days.

n; tin: ;;;:nci t: 20 d:y: f:; ;;;h ::;in ;f 0.; ;;;;;; leti;..

I filt; ;i... f.;';i;; ;f ??** i; g;;r.;;d f;; i;gl:2;r.;etier. ef ce.a.;el ;ee;-

f

lin; d::i;n -hrn; :. The ;::rici::: ;f ;p;;ifi;;;ier. 0. 0. 4 -;....i

p;11:2h1: durin; thir ?O-d:7 enterri:n Thi:s:n: tin.; n;;;.ei;;. ; pi;;; ;.

. 71

i': n :f th: " nit 1 Itt' refuelie; rute;: '!; in;

'9

i l

i t

TARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 7-16 AMENDMENT No.1Il 1

i I

i i

a

L.

{

1 l

PIANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.8 PENETRATION ROOM FILTRATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.8 Two independent penetration room filtration systems shall be i

OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MCDES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

l with one' penetration room filtration system inoperable, restore the inoperable system to CPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.8 Each penetration room filtration system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by a.

initiating, from the control room, the flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system has operated for at_least 1* lcur; =ME f -

h==t

;. du;' ;

'" ---* '---($~nitafef in ify jusf /$M afyamspf,}

l j

b.'

At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural

)

maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release that could have contaminated the charcoal adsorbers or HEPA filters in any ventilation zone connunicating with the system by:

1.

' Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place testing acceptance criteria of greater than or equal to j

99.5% filter efficiency while operating the system at a flow rate of 5000 cfm i 10 percent and using the fallowing. test procedures:

(a)

A visual inspection of the penetration room filtration system shall be made before each DOP test or activated carbon adsorber section leak test in accordance with ASME N510-1989*.'

(b)

An in-place DOP test for the HEPA filters shalt be

' A massadamae-w&Ah-SeeMeer-be-o6,hMMs Apfg l

NS10-

-(c)

A charcoal adsorber section leak test with a gaseous halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant shall

...be perf ormed in accordance with - - - * ^ ' " " ~ ~ A//15 l

N510- W94."

1969

The IWP Final Safety Analysis Report identifies the relevant surveillane testing requiresw.nts.

TARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 7-18 AMENDMENT Wo.121

PI. ANT SYST:.w.S

__ SURVEII. LANCE RICUIRIMENTS (Continued!

2.

Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative p samp ined in gh h g4T#r 54(6" accordance with !:251:2 !?

N510-ets the M

ylh AM,ggggf, laboratory testing criterion of greater than or equal to g

efficiency when tested with methyl iodide at C and relative humidity.

3.

Verifying a system flow rate of 0"""

10" during syates operation when tested in accordance with ASME

[

N510-1989*.

]

After every 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months of charcoal adsorber operation by c.

verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative eg painedin accordance with ^ =-i_; 12 ;f - g samply _ ets the

-. N510-laboratory testing ::1-rie-of greater than or equal to efficiencywhentastedbithmethyliodide'at

C and relative humidity.

jg/

38 9

d.

At least once per II months by:

g 1.

Verifying that the pressure drop across the combine HEPA filters and A.-~ a adsorber banks of less than inches l

f

^f0 er.;. IM[perating the system at a flow rate 'of Water Gauge while o l

l Verifying that the system starts on a Phase B Isolation test signal.

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After each complete or partial replacement of a MEPA filter back by verifying that the REPA filter banks remove ~ greater than or equal to 99.5% of the DoP g they gested in-place in accordance with 5:-ti : 20 '..- N510-ils operating

.the system at-a flow rate of 500" 2 i 10" g/.

After each complete or partial replacement of a chsrcoal adsorber bank by verifying' ther the charcoal adsorbers remove gteater than or equal to 99.56 of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they g teste ace in accordance with ::-- :.10 c f..-_. N51 e operating the system at a flow rate of 5"""

L 4100.

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The INF Final safety Analysis. Report identifies the relevant

{

surveillance testing requirements.

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INSERTI TO TS SI!RyEIL. LANCE PAGE 3/4 9-14 3/4.9.12 Storage Pool Ventilntion System 4.9.12.2 The pene'ation room filtration system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, tiow through the HEPA tilters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system has operated for at least 15 minutes in its fuel handling i

accident alignment.

b.

Filter testing per requirements of Specification 4.7.8.b. c. d.1. f and g.

At leas / e.rce per 16 nn/4s oa a..st?kmsrco Trst C

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E PLANT EYETDtB BASES 3/4 7.E.1 ULTTMAtf WFAT CYNW fRTVERl This specification deleted.

'3/d'7.E

ULTTMAtt vrAT CTWW'fpount

The limitations on the ultimate heat sink level and temperature ensure that sufficient cooling capacity is available to either 11 provide normal cooldown ofl the facility, or 2) to mitigate the effects of, accident

conditions within acceptable limits.

The limitations'en minimum water level and maximum tesperature are based on. providing a 30 day cooling water supply to safety related equipment without exceeding their design basis temperature. The measurement of the ground water seepage at least once per 5 years will provide assurance that the 30 day supply of _ water is available.

3/a.7.7 c'carrent. ennu ;;;,;r;;c.;_1 venerYLATTOM Evetsu The control room emergency filtration /pressurisation system (CREFS) consists of two independent, redundant trains that recirculate and filter the control room air, and two-independent, redundant trains that pressurize the IdfN control room.4the OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room j

desagn provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalent.

This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 19 of Appendix *A*,10CFR50.

When one CREFS train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREFS train is adequate to perform the control room protection function.

However, the overall reli&bility is reduced because a single failure in the f

' OPERABLE CREFS train could result. in loss of CREFS function. The 7 day f

Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period of time T$i en bility of the remaining train to provide the required capability.

(

. Q_rsnwIr*Ree un*10

&tti a eration of the eve 4em with this-heaters on for at least 10 l

ggj,ggs/s ours over a 31 day period is suf fie4 =at es e-d"-=

rha M i l d' = of

,stu e on the adsorbers and HEPA filtery fe(Vfr/[f gffed #dtbI fs/ Q g The control room air conditioning system (CRACS) consists of two independent, redundant trains that provide cooling of recirculated control room air. Each control room air conditioning (CRAC) train is inoperable if it

'is not capable of removing the required heat load for plant conditions. The actual' heat load and the heat removal capability needed to adequately cool the control room ~ dependent upon f actors such as outdoor air temperature.

l FARLEY-UNIT 2 8 3/4 7-4 AMENDMENT NO.111/

p.

t 1

l l

l p

Insert 1 to Bases 3/4.7.7 on Page B 3/4 7-4 operation of the CREFS in the emergency recirculation mode consists of the control room isolation, with the pressurization unit, filtration unit, and l

recirculation unit all in service.

l Insert 2 to Bases 3/4.7.7 on Page B 3/4 7-4 l

Continuous heater operation during the 10 hour1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months test is assured by operating l

the heaters with fan flow and allowing only the protective thermal cutout

~ features of the heater controls to be functional.

4

+

i l

7_;

a 4

Insert 1 To TS Bases Page B 3/4 7 4a 3/4.7.O' Penetration Room Filtration System j

The OPERABILITY of the penetration room filtration system provides reasonable assurance that radioactive materials leaking'from ECCS pump l

rooms during post LOCA recirculation are filtered prior to reaching the environment. The minimum system flow rate maintains a slightly i

negative pressure in the penetration room area and ECCS pump rooms L

assuming only one filter train is operating.. The maximma system flow l

rate ensures that the pressure drop across filters is not excessive and

- adequate residence time is attained in the charcoal filter. The PRF system is tested periodically in its pose LOCA alignment. Periodic j

testing of the RER heat exchanger room pressure to less than or equal to -0.12f. inch water gauge with respect to adjacent area pressure (as l

measured by the AP between the PRF mechanical ipment room and the RRRIEsat Exchanger room) at a flow rate of s cfm verifies the

-integrity of the PRF system pressure boundary and is consistent with the guidance for standard technical specifications in NUREG 1431.

Functional testing of proper PRF system operation and pressure boundary integrity provides reasonable assurance that unfiltered release to adjacent areas of any ECCS leakage will be minimized. The operation of l

~ this system and the resultant effect from the ECCS leakage on offsite i

dosage calculations was assumed in the accident analyses. Although not credited in the accident analyses, the PRF system also provides filtration of containment' leakage into the penetration room areas.

1 l

j i

l l

l

'[

RIFUELING.QPERATIONS 0

BASES l

L 3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT PURGE AND EXMAUST ISOLATION SYSTEM

' The OPERASII.ITY of this system ensures that the containment vent and purge penetrations will be automatically isolated upon detection of high l

~

radiation levels within the' containment. The OPERASILITY of this system is required to restrict the. release-of.radiosesive material from the containment _ atmosphere to the environment.

t 3 /4.9.10 and 3 /4.9.11' WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL and STORAGE POOL The restrictions on miniaram water level ensure that sufficient water

' depth is available'to remove 99% of the assumed los iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. 'The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.

3/4.9.12 and 3/4.9.13 STORAGE POOL VENTILATION SYSTEM Thr.i'

'teti--

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h* I' fMW A The note regarding PRF.elec rical system CPERABI'LITY is provided for clarification to specification 3,. 9.13.

In MODES 5 and 6',

the electrical

~

power requirements do not require considering-a single failure coincident with a loss of all offsite or all onsite power. The design basis for electrical sources.during refueling requires at least one offsite circuit through the IE distribution system be. operable and at least one of the emergency diesels be operable. The electrical requirements of 3.8.1.2 seat i

'the electrical sources'OPERASILITY requirements for two independent PRF systems.

3/4.9.14 eOw?AINxrNT PURGE hXHAUST FILTER TE: crereliity ef the re-tri=::

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-a INSERT 1 4

~1N) TS BASES PAf12 D 3/4 9-3 3/4.9.12 AND 3/,4.9.13 Storage Pool Ventilation System j

i The OPERABILITY of the penetration room filtration system ensures that l

-radioactive materials leaking from the spent fuel pool area following a ruel Handling Accident (FRA) are filtered prior to reaching the environment..The PRF system is-tested periodically in its FRA alignment to ensure the system functions properly.

Testing of HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, and.the physical. properties of the activated charcoal is bounded by. testing performed per 4.7.8.

.The OPERABILITY of this system and the.

resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the l

. accident analyses.

1 INSERT 2

.TO TS BASES PAGE B 3/4 9-3 3/4.9.12'AND.3/4.9.13 Storage Pool Ventilation System During the fuel handling mode of operation, the PAF is designed to maintain a slightly negative pressure in the spent fuel room with respect to

. atmospheric pressure and surrounding areas at a flow rate of 5 5500 cfm, to

-prevent unfiltered leakage. The slightly negative pressure is verified by using a non rigorous method that yields some observable identification of the negative pressure.

Examples'of non rigorous methods are smoke sticks, hand held differential pressure indicators, or other measurement devices that do not provide for an absolute measurement.

i' i

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1

3c-I Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Control Room, Penetration Room, and Containment Purge Filtration Systems and Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Technical Specification Changes Units 1&2 Typed and Marked-Up improved Technical Specification Paees (Changed Pages Only) s

~

f Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Control Room, Penetration Room, and Containment Purge Filtration Systems and Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Technical Specification Changes Units 1 & 2 Tyned improved Technical Specification Pages 1

I i

1 i

)

4 i

)

CREFS 3.7.10 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

Two CREFS trains D.1 Suspend CORE Immediately inoperable during ALTERATIONS movement of irradiated fuel assemblies or during AND

, CORE ALTERATIONS..

1 D.2 Suspend movement of immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

E.

Two CREFS trains E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.

Immediately inoperable in MODE 1,2, 3, or 4.

SURVEILt.ANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.10.1-Operate each CREFS Pressurization train for 31 days 210 continuous hours with the heaters operating and each CREFS Recirculation and Filtration train for 215 minutes.

SR 3.7.10.2 Perform required CREFS filter testing in accordance in accordance with with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP).

VFTP SR 3.7.10.3

--NOTE Not required to be performed in MODES 5 and 6.

l Verify each CREFS train actuates on an actual or 18 months simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.10.4 Verify one CREFS train can maintain a positive 18 months pressure of 2 0.125 inches water gauge, relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation.

l l

~

Farley Units 1 and 2 3.7.10-2 Amendment No. (Unit 1) c 3

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

]

r PRF l

3.7.12 ACTIONS

- CONDITION '

REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

Two PRF trains inoperable D.1 Suspend movement of immediately during movement of irradiated fuel irradiated fuel assemblies assemblies in the spent in the spent fuel pool room.

fuel pool room.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.12.1 NOTE--

Only required to be performed during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool room.

Verify two PRF trains aligned to the spent fuel pool 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months room.

SR 3.7.12.2 Operate each PRF train for 215 minutes in the 31 days applicable mode of operation (post LOCA and/or J

refueling accident).

SR 3.7.12.3 Perform required PRF filter testing in accordance in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP).

with the VFTP SR 3.7.12.4 Verify each PRF train actuates and the normal spent 18 months fuel pool room ventilation system isolates on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

l SR 3.7.12.5 Verify one PRF train can maintain a pressure 18 months on a s -0.125 inches water gauge with respect to adjacent STAGGERED areas during the post LOCA mode of operation at a TEST BASS flow rate s 5500 cfm.

SR '3.7.12.6 Verify one PRF train can maintain a slightly negative 18 months on a i

i pressure with respect to adjacent areas during the STAGGERED l

fuel handling accident mode of operation at a flow TEST BASIS rate s 5500 cfm.

~~"

1 Farley Units 1 and 2 3.7.12-2 Amendment No. (Unit 1) l Amendment No. (Unit 2) 1-

Progr ms and M::nutls 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.10 Secondary Water Chemistry Proaram This program provides controls for monitoring secondary water chemistry to inhibit SG tube degradation. The program shallinclude:

a.

Identification of a sampling schedule for the critical variables and control points for these variables; b.

Identification of the procedures used to measure the values of the critical variables; c.

Identification of process sampling points, which shallinclude monitoring the condenser hotwells for evidence of condenser in leakage; d.

Procedures for the recording and management of data; e.

Procedures defining corrective actions for all off control point chemistry conditions; and f.

A procedure identifying the authority responsible for the interpretation of the data and the sequence and timing of administrative events, which is required to initiate corrective action.

5.5.11 Ventilation Filter Testino Proaram (VFTP)

)

A program shall be established to implement the following required testing of i

Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) filter ventilation systems at the frequencies specified in, and in accordance with, ASME N510-1989. The FNP Final Safety Analysis Report identifies the relevant surveillance testing requirements.

a.

Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that an inplace test of the high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters shows a penetration and system bypass < 0.5% when tested in accordance with ASME N510-1989 at the system flowrate specified below.

ESF Ventilation System Flowrate (CFM)

CREFS Recirculation 2,000 i 10 %

CREFS Filtration 1,000 10%

CREFS Pressurization 300 + 25% to -10%

PRF Post LOCA Mode 5,000 i 10 %

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 5.5-19 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2) m

y Progr ms [nd Minuits 5.5 i

5.5 Programs and Manuals

{

5.5.11 Ventilation Filter Testina Procram (VFTP) (continued) b.

Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that an inplace test of the charcoal adsorber shows a penetration and system bypass < 0.5% when tested in accordance ASME N510-1989 at the system flowrate specified below.

ESF Ventilation System Flowrate (CFM)

CREFS Recirculation 2,000 10%

CREFS Filtration 1,000 i 10 %

CREFS Pressurization 300 + 25% to -10%

PRF Post LOCA Mode 5,000 10 %

c.

Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that a laboratory test of a sample of the charcoal adsorber, when obtained as described in ASME N510-1989, shows the methyl iodide penetration less than the value specified below when tested in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989 at a temperature of s; 30 C and greater than or equal to the relative humidity specified below.

ESF Ventilation System Penetration Bli CREFS Recirculation 2.5%

70%

, CREFS Filtration 2.5%

70%

CREFS Pressurization 0.5%

70%

4 PRF Post LOCA Mode 5%

95 %

l NOTE: CREFS Pressurization methyl iodide penetration limit is based on a 6-inch bed depth.

d.

Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and the charcoal adsorbers is less than the value specified below when tested in accordance with ASME N510-1989 at the system flowrate specified below.

ESF Ventilation System Delta P (in. water gauge) Flowrate (CFM)

CREFS Recirculation 2.3 2,000 i 10 %

CREFS Filtration 2.9 1,000 i 10 %

CREFS Pressurization 2.2 300 + 25% to -10%

PRF Post LOCA Mode 2.0 5,000 10%

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 5.5-20 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

4 CREFS j

B 3.7.10 r

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Filtration / Pressurization System (CREFS) f BASES BACKGROUND The CREFS provides a protected environment from which operators can control the unit following an uncontrolled. release of radioactivity.

The Unit 1 and 2 control room is a common room served by a shared CREFS.

The CREFS consists of two independent, redundant trains that recirculate and filter the control room air in conjunction with the CRACS, and two independent, redundant trains that pressurize the control room with filtered outside air. Each train consists of a prefilter, a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, an activated charcoal adsorber section for removal of gaseous activity (principally lodines),

and a fan. Each pressurization train contains a heater, ductwork, valves or dampers, and instrumentation which also form part of the system.

The CREFS is an emergency system, parts of which may also operate during normal unit operations in the standby mode of operation. Upon receipt of the actuating signal (s), normal air supply to the control room is isolated, and the stream of ventilation air is recirculated through the system filter trains. The prefilters remove any large particles in the air to prevent excessive loading of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. Continuous operation of each pressurization train for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months per month, with the heaters energized, reduces moisture buildup on the HEPA filters and adsorbers. Continuous heater operation during the 10 hour1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months test is assured by operating the heaters with fan flow and allowing only the protective thermal cutout features of the heater controls to be functional. The heater is important to the effectiveness of the charcoal adsorbers.

Actuation of the CREFS places the system in the emergency recirculation mode of operation. Actuation of the system to the emergency recirculation mode of operation, closes the unfiltered outside air intake and unfiltered exhaust dampers, and aligns the system for recirculation of the control room air through the redundant trains of HEPA and the charcoal filters. The emergency recirculation mode of operation also initiates pressurization and filtered ventilation of the air s,upply to the control room.

The normal outside air supply is filtered, diluted with building air from the computer rooms, and added to the air being recirculated from the

]

(continued)

- Farley Units 1 and 2 8 3.7.10-1 Revision 0

CREFS B 3.7.10

-BASES ACTIONS M

(continued)

If both CREFS trains are inoperable in MODE 1,2,3, or 4, the CREFS may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.10.1 REQUIREMENTS Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. As the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not too severe, testing each train (CREFS and Pressurization) once every month provides an adequate check of this system. The CREFS trains are initiated from the control room with flow through the HEPA and charcoal filters. Monthly heater operations dry out any moisture accumulated in the charcoal from humidity in the ambient air. Systems with heaters must be operated for 210 continuous hours with the heaters energized. Systems without heaters need only be operated for 215 minutes to demonstrate the function of the system. The 31 day Frequency is based on the reliability of the equipment and the two train redundancy availability.

SR 3.7.10.2 This SR verifies that the required CREFS testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The CREFS filter tests are in accordance with ASME N510-1989 (Ref. 3).

The VFTP includes testing the performance of the HEPA filter, charcoal adsorber efficiency, flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal. Specific test Frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.7.10.3 This SR verifies that each CREFS train starts and operates on an actual or simulated Safety injection (SI) actuation signal. The Frequency of 18 months is specified in Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 4). This SR is modified by a note which provides an exception to the requirement to meet this SR in MODES 5 and 6. This is acceptable since the automatic Si actuation function is not required in these MODES.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.10-5 Revision 0

p PRF B 3.7.12 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.12.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This SR verifies the integrity of the ECCS pump rooms and penetration area boundary. The ability of the boundary to maintain negative pressure with respect to potentially uncontaminated adjacent areas is periodically tested to verify proper function of the PRF System. During the post-LOCA mode of operation, the PRF System is designed to maintain a slight negative pressure in the ECCS pump rooms and penetration area boundary, to prevent unfiltered LEAKAGE. The PRF System is designed to maintain s-0.125 inches water gauge with respect to adjacent area pressure (as measured by the Ap between the PRF mechanical equipment room and the RHR Heat Exchanger room) at a flow rate of s 5,500 cfm.

An 18 month Frequency (on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS) is consistent with Reference 7.

SR 3.7.12.6 During the fuel handling mode of operation, the PRF is designed to maintain a slightly negative pressure in the spent fuel room with respect to atmospheric pressure and surrounding areas at a flow rate of s 5500 cfm, to prevent unfiltered leakage. The slightly negative pressure is verified by using a non rigorous method that yields some observable identification of the slightly neg'ative pressure. Examples of non rigorous methods are smoke sticks, hand held differential pressure indicators, or other measurement devices that do not provide for an absolute measurement.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.2.3.

2. FSAR, Section 9.4.2.

3. FSAR, Sections 15.4.1 and 15.4.5.

4. Regulatory Guide 1.25.

5. 10 CFR 100.

6. ASME N510-1989.

7. Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Rev. 2).

. Farley Units 1 and 2 8 3.7.12-6 Revision 0

'I. )

~ Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Control Room, Penetration Room, and Containment Purge Filtration Systems

~

and Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Technical Specification Changes

- (Tnits 1 & 2 Marked (in Improved Technical Specification Paees j

i I

1

CREFS 3.7.10 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

Two CREFS trains D.1 Suspend CORE immediately inoperable during ALTERATIONS movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies or during AND CORE ALTERATIONS.

D.2 Suspend movement of immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

E.

Two CREFS trains E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.

Immediately inoperable in MODE 1,2, 3, or 4.

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.10.1 Operate each CREFS Pressurization train for 31 days 210 continuous hours with the heaterhub g!::d and each CREFS Recirculatior, and 7=iltration train for 2 F

15 minutes.

SR 3.7.10.2 Perform required CREFS filter testing in accordance in accordance with

-with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP).

VFTP SR 3.7.10.3 _ Not required to be performed in MODES 5 and 6.

NOTE Verify each CREFS train actuates on an actual or 18 months simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.10.4 Verify one CREFS train can maintain a positive 18 months pressure of2 0.125 inches water gauge, relative to ine outside atmosphere during system operation.

O Farley Units 1 and 2 3.7.10-2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

PRF 3.7.12 ACTIONS f

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

Two PRF trains inoperable D.1 Suspend movement of immediately during movement of

-irradiated fuel irradiated fuel assemblies assemblies in the spent in the spent fuel pool fuel pool room.

room.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.12.1 NOTE Only required to be performed during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool room.

Verify two PRF trains aligned to the spent fuel pool 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months room.

SR 3.7.12.2 Operate each PRF train for 2 15 minutes in the 31 days applicable mode of operation (post LOCA and/or refueling accident).

SR 3.7.12.3 Perform required PRF filter testing in accordance in accordance with with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP).

the VFTP SR 3.7.12.4 Verify each PRF train actuates and the normal spent 18 months fuel pool room ventilation system isolates on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.12.5 Verify one PRF train can maintain a pressure 18 months on a s -0.125 inches water gauge with respect to STAGGERED TEST BASIS

/*8*# #*M o....._m..

r!c precrure during the post LOCA mode of peration at a flow rate s f500 cfm.

S R 1.'7. 1 2, G Veri & one Wfnk cor mink ln a s'lip,lrfly 19 4: se a nejetive p/w:? }4e.. fee / pur to n/fk*4 reuvre vH4 res Sr4GCERED he.<lliy par %f m., ggy aress sode o/ ye tio. af a flow tofe 6 floo c/,.,

J Farley Units 1 and 2 3.7.12-2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

r;

e E

Progrcms cnd Minuils l

5.5 5.5 Programs and' Manuals 5.5.10

_ Secondary Water Chemistry Program Tnis program provides controls for monitoring secondary water chemistry to inhibit SG tube degradation. The program shallinclude:

a.

. Identification of a sampling schedule for the critical variables and control

~ points for these variables; b.

Identification of the procedures used to measure the values of the critical variables; c.

Identification of process sampling points, which shall include monitoring the condenser hotwells for evidence of condenser in leakage; d.

Procedures for the recording and management of data; e.

Procedures defining corrective actions for all off control point chemistry conditions; and'

~

f.

A procedure identifying the authority responsible for the interpretation of the data and the sequence and timing of administrative events, which is required to initiate corrective action.

5.5.11 Ventilation Filter Testino Program (VFTP)

~ A program shall be established to implement the following required testing of Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) filter ventilation systems at the frequencies

.specified in, and in accordance with, ASME N510-1989. The FNP Final Safety Analysis Report identifies the relevant surveillance testing requirements.

a.

Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that an inplace test of the high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters shows a penetration and system bypass < 0.5% when tested in accordance with ASME N510-1989 at the system flowrate specified below MOHr.

ESF Ventilation System Flowrate (CFM)

CREFS Recirculation 2,000ft # A, CREFS Filtration 1,000q tte b CREFS Pressurization 3005 etrp, f, e'r, PRF Post LOCA Mode 5,000?w,t ta r, i-(continued)

I' Farley Units 1 and 2 5.5-19 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

n Programs cnd Minuits 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals

-5.5.11 Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP) (continued) b.

Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that an inplace test of the charcoal adsorber shows a penetration and system bypass < 0.5% when tested in accordance ASME N510-1989 at the system flowrate specified below *-409tr-ESF Ventilation System Flowrate (CFM)

CREFS Recirculation 2,000 $ /#/.

CREFS Filtration 1,0006f (# P,

CREFS Pressurization 300 t K/S & -/0/,

PRF Post LOCA Mode 5,000 t /0 %

c.

Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that a laboratory test of a

- sample of the charcoal adsorber;when obtained as described in ASME N510-1989, shows the methyl looide penetration less than the value specified below when tested in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989 at a temperature of 5 30*C and greater than or equal to the relative humidity specified below.

ESF Ventilation System Penetration RFj CREFS Recirculation 2.5%

70 %

i, CREFS Filtration 2.5%

70%

CREFS Pressurization 0.5%

70%

PRF Post LOCA Mode 5'40%

95%

NOTE: CREFS Pressurization methyl iodide penetration limit is based on a 6-inch bed depth.

d.

Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and the charcoal adsorbers is less than the value specified below when tested in accordance with ASME N510-1989 at the system flowrate specified below t-tek ESF Ventilation System Delta P (in, water guage) Flowrate (CFM)_

CREFS Recirculation 2.3 2,000 7/d7, CREFS Filtration 2.9 1,000.f /# P, CREFS Pressurization 2.2 300 ft/s f,-tet, l

PRF Post LOCA Mode 2.6 5,000 ttar, (continued)

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Farley Units 1 and 2 5.5 20 Amendment No. (Unit 1) l Amendment No. (Unit 2) l

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CREFS B 3.7.10 y B 3.7 Pl. ANT SYSTEMS

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l B 3.7.10 L Control Room Emergency Filtration / Pressurization System (CREFS)

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BASES

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BACKGROUNDL The CREFS provides a protected environment from which operators can control the unit following an uncontrolled release of radioacSvity.

The Unit 1 and 2 control room is a common room served by a shared -

CREFS.

The CREFS consists of two independent, redundant trains that -

recirculate and filter the control room air in conjunction with the

)

CRACS, and two independent, redundant trains that pressurize the

_ control room _with filtered _outside air. Each train consists of a prefilter, a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, an activated charcoal adsorber section for removal of gaseous activity (principally lodines),

and a fan. Each pressurization train contains a heater, ductwork, l

valves or dampers, and instrumentation which also form part of the system.-

The CREFS is an emergency system, parts of which may also

.operato during normal unit operations in the standby mode of L i

operation.- Upon receipt of the actuating signal (s), normal air supply to the control room is isolated, and the stream of ventilation air is recirculated through the system filter trains. The prefilters remove

.j' any large particles in the air to prevent excessive loading of the HEPA i

filters and charcoal adsorbers. Continuous operation of each pressurization train for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months per month, with the heater.r

'l eireeds energized, reduces moisture buildup on the HEPA filters and g g.9 adsorbers.,The heater is important to the effect9eness of the J.

charcoelGCsorbers.

j Actuation of the CREFS places the system in the emergency redietiert (recirculation) mode of operation. Actuation of the system to the emergency recirculation mode of operation, closes the unfiltered outside air intake and unfiltered exhaust dampers, and aligns the i

system for recirculation.of the control room air through the redundantE#g;g l

trains of HEPA and the charcoal filters. The emergencysodiohenrd mode of operation also initiates pressurization and filtered ventilation of the air supply to the control room.

The normal outside air supply l' filtered, diluted with building air from s

- the computer rooms, and added to the air being recirculated from the j

(continued)

. Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.10-1 Revision 0

m f-ITS l

Insert to BASES B 3.7.10 Page B 3.7.10-1 i

Continuous heater operation during the 10 hour1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months test is assured by operating the heaters with fan flow and allowing only the protective thermal cutout features of the heater controls to be I

functional.

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CREFS B 3.7.10 BASES

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ACTIONS Ej (continued)

If both CREFS trains are inoperable in MODE 1,2,3, or 4, the CREFS may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

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SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.10.1 REQUIREMENTS Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. As the environment and normal operating 1

conditions on this system are not too severe, testing each train

]

(CREFS and Pressurization) once every month provides an adequate j

check of this system. The CREFS trains are initiated from the control j

room with flow through the HEPA and charcoal filters. Monthly heater operations dry out any moisture accumulated in the charcoal from j

humidity in the ambient air. Systems with heaters must be operated i

for 2 10 continuous hours with the heater #eisewits energized. Systems without heaters need only be operated for 215 minutes to j

demonstrate the function of the system. The 31 day Frequency is based on the reliability of the equipment and the two train redundancy availability.

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SR 3.7.10.2 This SR verifies that the required CREFS testing is performed in accordance-with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The CREFS filter tests are in accordance with ASME N510-1989 (Ref. 3).

The VFTP includes testing the performance of the HEPA filter, charcoal adsorber efficiency, flow ratef and the physical properties of

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the activated charcoal. Specific test Frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.7.10.3 i

This SR verifies that each CREFS train starts and operates on an actual or simulated Safety injection (SI) actuation signal. The i

Frequency of 18 months is specified in Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 4). This SR is modified by a note which provides an exception to the requirement to meet this SR in MODES 5 and 6. This is acceptable since the automatic Si actuation function is not required in these MODES.

(continued) g Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.10-5 Revision 0

PRF B 3.7.12

. B_ASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.12.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued).

This SR verifies the integrity of the ECCS pump rooms and penetration area boundary. The ability of the boundary to maintain negative pressure with respect to potentially uncontaminated adjacent areas is periodically tested to verify proper function of the PRF System.. During the post-LOCA mode of operation, the PRF System is designed to maintain a slight negative pressure in the ECCS pump rooms and penetration area boundary, to prevent unfiltered LEAKAGE. The PRF System is designed to maintaine e/fdeon/ 8.*M s -0.125 inges water gauge with respect to pressure (as rnessured MtheERF mechanical equipment roo ) at a flow rate _of S5,500Cfm. Q Fbeheer Me) a,/ A4e fyghj'r An 18 month Frequency (on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS) is

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consistent with Reference 7.

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REFERE ES

'1.

FSAR, Section 6.2.3.

2. FSAR, Section 9.4.2.

3. FSAR, Sections 15.4.1 and 15.4.5.

4. Regulatory Guide 1.25.

5. 10 CFR 100.

6. ASME N510-1989.

7. Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Rev. 2).

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Farley Units 1 and

.7.124 Revision 0 c

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~ Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Control Room, Penetration Room, and Containment Purge Filtration Systems and Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Technical Specification Changes AdditionalInformation Reauested By Letter Dated Scotember 30.1999 I

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Answers to Request for AdditionalInformation

1. The penetration room filtration (PRF) system is designed to filter 1) ECCS leakage in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and 2) the release of radioactivity in the event of a fuel handling accident in the spent fuel pool area. The PRF system design basis is that it will process all of the radioactivity released from these accidents. You proposed technical specifications (TS) changes to demonstrate a negative 1/8 inch w.g. pressure relative to adjacent areas for the LOCA system alignment. However, you did not propose TS for the fuel handling system alignment. Please propose a TS surveillance for the fuel handling system alignment at 5000 cfm +/-10% flow. Also, please propose performing your PRF TS surveillance at +/-10% flow.

Response: The changes to the amendment package contain a new surveillance for a negative pressure test on the spent fuel room while the PRF is in the fuel handling accident alignment at a flow rate of 5 5500 cfm. Also, the PRF TS post LOCA alignment surveillances have been retumed to a flow rate of 5000 cfm i 10%.

2. Do you also perform Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ISTS) Surveillance 3.7.12.1 during spent fuel storage on a 7 day basis or does another technical specification address the PRF with spent fuel storage?

Response: This change is part of the conversion to the ITS and not related to this CTS amendment.

The requirement to perform ITS Surveillance 3.7.12.1 during spent fuel storage on a 7-day basis is not included in the ISTS In the conversion to the ITS, CTS 3/4.9.12 (LCO, Applicability, Actions, and Surveillance Requirements) is relocated in its entirety from the Technical Specifications (TS) to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) because it does not meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.36 for inclusion in the TS. The requirement to verify that one penetration room filtration system is aligned to the spent fuel pool room once per 7 days while fuel is stored in the storage pool is included in this CTS as part of surveillance requirement 4.9.12.1 and is moved to the TRM. Therefore, the requirements of the TRM address the PRF during spent fuel storage. This change has been found to be accepuble by the Staff as part of the conversion to the ITS.

3. You proposed changes to the control room emergency filtration system (CREFS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.7.7.1.a and its Bases to indicate that the heater circuits were energized during the 10-hour test Please reword the SR and its Bases to match the ISTS wording for heaters being on and/or energized and clarify the Bases to discuss your heater controls during the 10-hour test.

Response: Changes have been made to the SR and Bases. The CTS SR is returned to original wording. The ITS wording is revised to match the ISTS wording. The CTS and ITS Bases have also been clarified to discuss the active heater controls during the 10 hour1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months test.

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4.

For accident mitigation, does the CREFS initiate on a Hi-Rad signal and a safety injection signal?

Response: For accident mitigation the control room emergency ventilation system initiates control room isolation, pressurization and recirculation (includes filtration unit and recirculation unit operation) on an SI signal. A Hi-Rad signal provides automatic control room isolation. Manual operator actions are required to initiate pressurization and recirculation filtration after a Hi-Rad signal.

5. Should Action 27 of Table 3.3-6 indicate emergency pressurization and recirculation flow? The control room emergency ventilation system TS clearly differentiate between recirculation and pressurization.

Response: Action 27 of Table 3.3-6 was changed to clarify that when the total number of channels of radiation monitors are not operable then the control room emergency ventilation system would be placed in the " emergency recirculation mode of operation." This terminology is consistent w;th CTS action 3.7.7.1 a. which requires placing one train of CREFS in the " emergency recirculation mode" if one train becomes inoperable during fuel movement. This mode of operation includes control room isolation and running the pressurization system, recirculation system, and the filtration system. The differentiation of the different systems in the CTS is for surveillance purposes due to the different flow rates and other features of each individual system. The emergency recirculation mode always includes all three systems running with the control room isolated.

6. What is the setpoint for the containment purge radiation monitor and what source term was used (Ci/MWT)?

Response: The maximum allowable setpoint for high speed purging during MODE 6 is 2.27E-03 pCi/cc Kr-85 as described in the Technical Specifications. The actual setpoint is currently 1.8E-03 Ci/ce, but may be as low as 1/2 decade above background. A lower setpoint value (IE-04 pCi/cc) was assumed for estimating a conservatively long monitor internal response time. All of these values J

are much less than the calculated concentration, indicating the monitor will respond much faster than assumed.

The default source term from TACT 5 (410 Ci/MWT for Kr-85) is not used for this analysis. As described in section 7.6 of Attachment 5 to the Farley power uprate licensing submittal, a Farley specific core inventory was calculated with ORIGEN2 for a power level of 2831 MWT. The resultant 7.2E+5 Ci for Kr-85 was increased by 2% to bound future core design changes. This yields 7.2E+5 x 1.02 / 2775 = 265 Ci/MWT.

The failure of one assembly (out of 157) with a Kr-85 gap fraction of 0.3 and a peaking factor of 1.7, diluted in 660.000 cubic feet is j

7.2E+5 x 1.02 x 0.3 x 1.7 /157 / 6.6E+5 = 3.6E-3 Ci/ Ft3, 1

or about 0.1 Ci/cc.

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7. The following questions concern removing the containment purge system (affecting fuel handling accident inside containment):

a. What is the surface area of the pool?

2 Response: The refueling canal surface area is approximately 1360 ft

b. What is the distance from the pool surface to the point where the air from the pool surface would enter the purge header?

Response: The refueling canal sweep has been disconnected, and all remaining purge connections are below the operating deck. The nearest HVAC inlet is to the containment coolers at elevation 155. These coolers discharge to the lower elevations of the containment and are not directly connected to the containment purge. They are connected by area flowpaths. The dose analysis assumes that the area is uniformly mixed at the purge suction inlet.

c. At what activity level ( Ci/ unit volume, e.g. cubic feet) would SNC isolate the containment purge?

Response: The CTS setpoint of the exhaust monitor is 2.27 E-03 pCi/cc ("Kr) (refer to question 6 response above for discussion of the IE-04 Ci/cc setpoint assumed in the analysis).

d. Have you determined that with a dilution of one third of the containment (660,000 ft3) that the rad monitor would cause an isolation?

Response: For this dilution, the calculated concentration of"Kr is 0.1 Ci/ce, so rapid isolation is expected i

e. SNC's analysis for removing the containment purge filter ventilation system assumed mixing in the containment associated with the containment purge system. Although the filtration system is being removed, will the remaining portions of the system remain safety related with ties to the emergency diesels, and will they remain in the TSs?

Response: Yes. The remaining portions of the system remain safety related and other TS surveillances will still apply. Instrumentation is the same and power supplies are the same.

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ML20217B179

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