ML20070H811
| ML20070H811 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 12/16/1982 |
| From: | ILLINOIS POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17256B288 | List:
|
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8212270242 | |
| Download: ML20070H811 (161) | |
Text
>
jd Fire Protection i
'v Fire Zone Table Exemptions Exceptions Requested from Requested from 10 CFR 50 10 CFR 50 Modification Appendix "R",
Appendix "R",
Fire Zone in Progress III.G III.J A.2.1 None (C,D)*
A.4.6 (A,B)*
None D.2.1 (A,B)
(C,D)
D.3.1 (A,B)
None D.3.2 (A,B)
(C,D) i D.3.6 None (C,D)
D.4.2 (A,B)
None F.3.1 (A,B)
(C,D)
Emergency Lighting (E) l
- Attachment reference letters-see listing on following page f
l Os 8212270242 B21216 PDR ADOCK 05000461
+
..F
. PDR
~. - -
t
(_
Attachment Listing Fire Protection Attachment Summary of fire zones undergoing modifi-
"A" cation Safe Shutdown Analysis (finalized during "B"
11/82)
Requested Exemptions to Section III.G of "C"
10 CFP 50, Appendix "R" List of Electrical Installation, cable pan, and cable pan routing drawings for fire zones A.2.1, D.2.1, D.3.2, D.3.6, and F.3.1 "D"
Requested Exemption to Section III,J of 10 CFR 50, Appendix "R",
(Re:
"E" O-
Attachmant A
.s i
Summary.of Fire Zones Podifications Fire "one Modifications A.4.6 Enclose the Division 2 supply
_)
1 and exhaust ducts in mineral, a fiberous insulating material.
D.2.1 Build a false ceiling below the Division 2 cable trays and a wall along row AA on top of the laboratory roof.
The wall and ceiling are to carry a 3-hour fire rating.
D.3.1 Reroute Division 1 cables 1RH18B, 1RH21B, 1DG01C, 1DG0lJ 1DG0lK, 1SX30E D.3.2 Reroute the Division 1 and 2 diesel generator and diesel generator HVAC cable so that the divisions are separated by 50 feet.
D.4.2:
Provi'de an opening with fire and back-draft dampers in the wall located along column 130.
Connect fans OVA 04CA, 0VA04CB (44 BHP, 50HP motor each),
OVA 05CA and OVA 05CB (39.5 BHP, 50 HP motor each) to the Division 1 diesel generator.
. /.
Fire Zone Modifications F.3.1 Reroute cables 1DG31A and B so that they pass through zones D.3.2, D.3.ll, D.3.12, D.3.10, D.3.8, D.3.6, and D.3.4 before entering the fuel building near the south wall.
e 9
a 9
e O
Attachment "B" Final, Revision (0)
'/N-V CLINTON POWER STATION UNIT #1 SAFE. SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS FOR FIRE PROTECTION O
9 9
4 O
TABLE OF CONTENTS n
1.
Introduction 1.1 Purpose 1.2 Analysis criterion 1.3 Evaluation Methed 1.4 Assumptions 1.5 Associated Circuits 2.
Fire Area / Zone Shutdown Analysis -
3.
Modifications LIST OF TABLES
- 1..
Divisional Equipment or Cable Located in Each Fire Zone 1.1 Systems Necessary for Safe Shutdown 1.2 Method #1 Mechanical Equipment List 1.3 Method #2 Mechanical Equipment List 1.4 Electrical Equipment List
- 1.5 Instrumentation List 1.6 Fire Areas / Zones not Containing Safe Shutdown Equipment or Cable 1.7 Fire Areas / Zones Containing only one Division of Safe Shutdown Equipment or Cable 1.8 Panel Locations.
6 O __-___ _
SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS k~
1.
Introduction 1.1 Purpose The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate that for a fire in any single plant fire area / zone of the Clinton Power. Station Unit 1 there exists at least one method to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition independent of that fire area / zone.
'For the purpose of this evaluation, hot'and cold shutdown are defined as follows:
a.
Hot Shutdown A plant condition in which the reactor is subcritical, and the primary system temperature is sufficient to allow removal of decay heat by steam generation.
This temperature is theoretically greater than 212'F; however, 300* to 350*F is the minimum practical range for this mode.
.b.
Cold Shutdown A plant condition in which the reactor is subcritical and decay heat is removed by either the residual heat removal system or by other decay heat systems.
The primary system temperature is reduced to below 212 F q
and the heat sink is a heat exchanger with a secondary coolant loop.
A safe hot shutdown condition is achieved when the following functions are satisfied:
O l
a.
reactivity controlled,
)
b.
reactor coolant inventory makeup provided,
{}
c.
decay heat removal established and reactor pressure controlled, d.
suppression pool cooling, and e.
system status monitoring provided.
Once the reactor is placed in a hot shutdown condition, station personnel are able to provide equipment lineups, connections, and/or temporary repairs as needed to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
1.2 Analysis Criterion This analysis is the CPS response to the information requested by the NRC in the Fire Protection Supplementary Question 430.01 from the Power Systems Branch.
Power and control cables are separated into three independent
~
electrical divisions--1, 2, and 3--each serving separate safety related systems.
Division 4 has instrument cables only and is not necessary for safe shutdown.
Operation of either Divisions 1 and 3 or 2 and 3 can be completely lost without affecting safe shutdown capability.
Operation of Division 1 only or operation of Division 2 only is sufficient to achieve safe shutdown.
The operability of either Division 1 or 2 safe shutdown equipment is ensured by fire protection measures taken to ensure that a l
single fire cannot disable both divisions.
Separation criteria utilized during the installation of safety-related cables provide
(])
protection against disabling redundant safety-related equipment. _ - -
- - ~
I by cable fire.
To protect against the effects of an exposure fire from in situ or transient combustibles, each area of the plant with safety-related equipment installed was analyzed for a postulated exposure fire.
Fire protection measures, in addition to separation, were provided where necessary to insure safe shutdown equipment.
1.3 Evaluation Method A.
Two redundant methods for performing each safe shutdown function were identified.
Those systems necessary for safe shutdown by each method are shown in Table 1.1.
All systems grouped in Method #1 are operable external to the control room.
Each of these systems must interac,t with other systems in order to achieve a safe shutdown.
Such interaction uses the following
. logic:
a.
RCIC and RHR Loop C (LPCI with depressurization by ADS) maintain reactor water level and aid in removing decay heat initially.
HPCS is also available to maintain reactor water level; however, because it re-quires the operability of Division 3, for simplification it was not considered in the analysis.
b.
SRV depressurizes the reactor and transfers the decay heat to the suppression pool thus causing the suppress-ion pool to heat up, The RHR system cools the suppression pool and transfers c.
the heat to the Shutdown Service Water System via the RHR heat exchanger.
d.
The shutdown service water system transfers heat to the O(~x cooling lake.
-s-
ESF switchgear, motor control centers, distribution e.
/}
panels, and batteries supply electrical power to 7
these systems.
f.
Diesel generators supply electrical power to the ESF switchgear in the event of a loss of offsite power.
g.
Ventilation systems maintain the environrental conditions of various spaces where safety equipment are located.
h.
Monitoring instruments indicate plant parameters to the operators.
CPS has a Division 4 which consists of instrumentation and I
logic only, it is not.necessary for safe shutdown.
.(See FSAR Figures 7.3-7, 7.3-8, and 7.3-9).
B.
Essential mechanical, ventilation, and electrical components needed for both safe shutdown methods are listed in Tables 1.2 through 1.5.
The fire zone, in which each piece of 1
equipment is located, is identified.
These fire zones have I
been' defined in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report.
Divisional cable routing including conduit were identified.
The routing of divisional cable trays is shown on Figures FP-8 through FP-34 of the Fire Protection Evaluation Report.
C.
All fire zones which contain no divisional cable and/or l
safe shutdown equipraent are identified in Table 1.6.
These fire zones are verified to have at least two safe shutdown methods available inlependent of a postulated fire.
O -
. _ _ ~ _ _.. _ _ - _ __ _ _ _ _.. _ _, _ _.._._ _ _ _-
c.
D.
All fire zones which contain only cable and/or equipment (v']
associated with only one division and/or shutdown method are identified in Table 1.7.
These fire zones are verified to have at least one safe shutdown method available inde-pendent of a postulated fire.
E.
A more detailed analysis was performed for' fire zones con-taining active components for both shutdown methods or cables of both divisions.
The results of'the analysis of these fire zones are described in Section 2.
The acceptance criteria for the analysis of each fire area are:
1.
The cables are not-in a system needed for safe shutdown.
2.
The cables service components not necessary for safe shutdown though other portions of the system may be necessary for safe shutdown.
3.
The cables service components necessary only for cold shutdown and repairs'can be achieved in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
The components within the area are necessary only for cold shutdown and can be repaired in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
4.
Modifications will be made as discussed in Section 2 and Section 5.
1.4 Assumotions a.
In the analysis of a fire affecting a safety system, it is assumed the system is functionally lost but that its pressure integrity remains intact.
This assumption is predicated upon the analysis showing the absence of other combustible materials of i
n sufficient loading to breach the pressure boundary.
()
b.
Credit is taken for the tripping of breakers and other electrical protective devices to mitigate the consequences of electrical faults due to fires.
(See Section 1.5 " Associated Circuits")
c.
Fires shall not be considered to occur simultaneously with other accidents, events, or phenomena such as a design-basis accident.
Capability shall be pro-vided (consistent with Cencral Design Criterion 19) to safely shutdown the plant in the event of any singic postulated fire.
d.
When the single fire'is postulated in the control room, a complete loss of the main control room equipment necessary for safe shutdown is assumed.
The assumptions and conditions discussed in FSAR Section 7.4.1.4 also provide the basis for identi-fication of safe shutdown capability in other plant fire zones, except that the control room is assumed to be functional and habitable for the analysis of these area.
(Excluding the fire zones on the top 2 levels of the control building which contain components of the Control Room !!V.".C system. )
e.
Credit is taken for reactor trip and verification of control rod insertion in the control room.
Reactor l
trip can be initiated and verified prior to evacuation, should it be necessary.
If a fire directly affects r-the control rod drive control circuits, the reactor.-
can be scrammed by opening or checking open the output breakers for the RPS.
f.
Valves are assumed to be in their normal position.
In the event of a damage to motor operated valve power cables it is assumed that the valve position does not change.
1.5 Associated Circuits All power and control circuits of both Class lE and non-Class lE circuits are protected by coordinated circuit breakers or fuses.
Therefore, Class lE circuits of the same divihion which are hot required for s'afe shutdown but are, for instance in the same cable tray with safe shutdown related cables are no't considered to be associated cables.
Non-Class lE circuits do not normally have common power sources wi.th Class lE circuits.
Those that do not have common connections are not considered associated circuits.
The few non-Class lE circuits which are connected to Class lE buses are protected by either two series. Class lE breakers or a single Class lE breaker tripped on LOCA.
Cables to equipment whose spurious operation would adversely affect shutdown capability were, in our analysis, considered to be safe shutdown cables, not associated cables such that both operation and non-operation requirements were considered.
All fire zones are sealed at their boundaries with fire stops
()
equivalent tc that required for the wall.
Additionally,.....
all' cables are IEEE 383 rated cables 'and will not allow significant propagation beyond the impingement of the flame source.
6 O
9 e
e h
e e
e 9
O o
0 l
2.
Fire Area / Zone Hot Shutdown Analysis
(~
\\s)
In the fire zone shutdown analysis, the systems of concern are the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, the residual heat removal (RHR) system Loops A, B,
and C and the automatic depressurization system (ADS) and safety relief valve system (SRV), Division 1 and 2.
The evalu-ation determines which of these systems may be affected by.the fire directly or indirectly such as a fire in a diesel-generator room which could affect onsite power to particular systems.
Also discussed are the alternate systems which could be used for safe shutdown.
Each analysis shows that eith'er RCIC or RHR Loop C and either ADS Division 1 or ADS Division 2 are available respectively for depressurization, reactor water makeup, and decay heat removal and that either RHR Loop A or RHR Loop B is avail-able for suppression pool cooling.
2.1
. Fire Zone A.l.1 a.
Description This zcne is comprised of a general access area along the north wall of the auxiliary building at elevation 707'6" (see figure FP-8 of the Fire Protection i
Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cable and equipment The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables; s
/
Division 1 and 2 shutdown service water valves; Division 1 and 2 instrumentation.
c.
Conclusions
(~S The Division 1 and 2 shutdown services water valves L.)
(lSX079A, B,C, and D)'and the inst'rumentation (PT-lE12N057, FE-lE12N006A and B) located in this zone are not needed for safe shutdown.
Cables, both Divisions 1 and 2, which are part of the leak detec-tion, low pressure core spray and suppression pool clean up systems, are not necessary for safe shut-down.
The Division 1 cables belonging to ECCS equipment room HVAC system (lVY10C, E and F) and to the shutdown service water system (lSX45F) are connected to equipment not needed' for safe shutdown.
However, Division 2 cable,s servicing the RHR heat exchanger B room supply fan (lVY05C) and Division 2 cables servicing Division 2 RHR valves are necessary for safe shutdoun.
In the event of a fire in this room, the Division 2 RHR system would be lost.
' However, the redundant Division 1 equipment and a
cables (RHR A) could be used to safely shut down the plant.
Division 1 cables (lVYO4C and IVYO4J) which service RCIC pump room supply fan IVYO4C are routed in conduit from the end of the Division 1 cable tray to instrument panel 1PL62J.
These cables are located below the Division 2 cable trays.
If a fire is postulated in this area it would be assumed that both the Division 2 cables and the Division 1 cables would be lost.
However, the RCIC equipment will be C:)
qualified to function for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following the loss of the RCIC room (fire zone A.l.4) HVAC system and'in the environment that will be present follow-ing a fire in zone A.l.l.
Therefore, even with the loss of the supply fan, cold shutdown could be S
achieved using the Division 1 systems.
Also present in this zone are Division 1 and 2 cable trays.
These trays are separated by a 3-hour fire barrier (see the Fire Protection Report figure FP-8).
The fire barrier is a concrete cantilever ( a horizon-
,tal barrier).
The Division 2 trays ahve-been installed so that the outer edge of the tray is flush with the outer edge of the c.antilever.
Therefore, in the un-likely event of a fire in this zone at least one method to bring the reactor to cold shutdown would be available.
The oerformance goals for safe shutdown functions (Appendix R,Section III L) are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goal System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) or LPCI makeup (Div. 2)
~
2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1) or ADS control (Div. 2) 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) or RHR cooling (Div. 21 4.
Process variable Division 1 or 2 instru-indication mentation for:
? O _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _.
System Which Meets Goal RPV level RPV pressure Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR A, RCIC pump flow RCIC tank level d.-
Modifications No modifications are required.
2.2 Fire Zone A.l.2, a.
Description
- This zone is comprised of the RHR pump C room located on elevation 707'6" (see figure FP-8 of the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cable and equipment The following safety-related cables and equipment ard located in this zone:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables; Residual heat removal pump C; RHR C waterleg pumps; RER pump C room fan-coil; RHR C instrument panel, c.
Conclusions The only Division 1 cable in this zone belongs to the floor drain system.
The operation of this
()
system is not necessary for safe shutdown.
In the
[
.~
event of a fire, the Division 2 Low Pressure Core
()
Injection (LPCI) system is lost.
However, the reactor makeup water would still be available via the Division 1 RCIC system.
The performance goals for safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goal System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant' RCIC '(Div. 1) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1) control
' uppression pool RHR h (D'iv. 1), RNR'B 3.
S cooling (Div. 2) 4.
Process variable Division 1 and 2 instru-indication mentation for:
RPV level and pressure Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR A, RHR B, RCIC Pump flow RCIC tank level d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
2.3 Fire Zone A.l.3 a.
Description This. zone is comprised of the residual heat removal pump B and heat exchanger B rooms which are located at elevation 707'6" (see figure FP-8 of the Fire
()
Protection Evaluation Report). __
b.
Safety-related cable and equipment The following safety-related cable and equipment
'~
are located in this zone:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables RHR pump B RHR pump B room fan-coil unit RHR B instrumentation panel RHR heat exchanger B RHR heat exchanger B room fan-coil unit RHR B flow monitoring instruments.
c.
Conclusions The Division 1 cable in this zone belongs to the leak detection and"RHR systems.
The leak detection system is not needed for safe shutdown.
The four RHR cables in this zone (lRH57G, T,
S, U) service valve lE12F075B which is not necessary for safe shutdown.
In the event of a fire in this zone, the Division 2,RHR B system would be lost.
However, the reactor could still be shutdown using the redundant Division 1 RHR A system.
The performance goals for safe shutdown functions l
are assured by the systems listed below:
l l
Performance Goal Systen Which Meets Goal i
l 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1) control _ _ _
~
Parformanca Coal Syctem Which Meats Goni 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) cooling 4.
Process variable Division 1 instrumenta-indication tion for:
RPV level and pressure Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR A and RCIC pump flow RCIC tank level d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
2.4 Fire Zone A.l.4 a.
Description This zone is comprised of the Reactor Core Injection Cooling (RCIC) pump room located on elevation 707'6" (see figure FP-8 of the Fire Protection Evaluation
- Report).
b.
Safety-related cable and equipment The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables RCIC pump RCIC water leg pump RCIC turbine RCIC pump room fan - coil unit Division 1 and 2 valves
()
Division 1 and 2 instrumentation
c.
Conclusions Cables, both Divisions 1 and 2, belonging to the emN]
leak detection system are not needed for safe shut-down.
The Division 2 RCIC cables (RIl9A, B, C, D,
E, F and 1RIl8E, F) service valves lE51F025 and lE51F004 neither of which are needed for safe shut-down.
Also, the Division 2 valve (lE51F325A) and instrument (PY-lE12K003B) are not required to safely.
shutdown the plant.
Therefore, only Division 1 equipment and cables necessary for safe shutdown are located in this zone.
In the event of a fire in'this zone and the loss of the RCIC, system-reactor water makeup would be provided by the combined opera-tion of the automatic depressurization system and the' low pressure core injection system (RHR loop c).
The performance goals for safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goal System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant LPCI (Div. 2) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure ADS (Div. 2) control 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) cooling RHR B (Div. 2) 4.
Process variable Division 1 and 2 instru-indication mentation for:
i RPV level and pressure
()
Suppression pool level and temp.
-1B-
System Which Meets Goal RHR A, RHR B, RHR C O>
pump flow c.
Modifications No modifications are required.
2.5 Fire Zone A.l.5 a.
Description This zone is comprised of the RHR pump'A and heat exchanger A rooms on elevation 707'6" of the auxiliary building (see figure FP-8 of the Fire Portection
, Evaluation Report).-
b Safety-related cabl,e and equipment The following safety-related cables and equipment
~
are located in this zone:
Division 1 and 2 electrical equipment RHR pump A RHR A instrument panel' RHR pump A fan - coil unit Division 1 instrumentation Division 1 valves l
c.
Conclusion The Division 2 cable's (lRH57D, H, J, K) service valve lE12F060A which is not needed for safe shut-down.
Therefore, only Division 1 cables and equip-ment necessary for safe shutdown are located in this zone.
In the event of'a fire in this zone and the O
resulting loss of the RER A system, suppression,
pool cooling could still be performed by the
({}
Division 2 RHR B system.
The performance goals for safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals Sy, stem Which Meets Goals 1.
Reactor coolant LPCI (Div. 2) makeup i
RCIC (Div. 1) 2.
Reactor pressure ADS (Div. 2) control SRV (Div. 1) 3.
Suppression pool RHR B (Div. 2) cooling -
4.
Process variable Division 1 and 2 indication instrumentation for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR B, RCIC, RHR C pump flows RCIC tank level d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
2.6 Fire Zone A.l.6 a.
Description The zone is comprised of the low pressure core spray pump room located on elevation 707'6" of the auxiliary building (r.ee figure FP-8 of the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
O k) _.
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment
()
The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone:
Division 1 and 2 cables LPCS pump LPCS water leg pump LPCS instrument panel LPCS pump room fun-coil unit Division 1 valves Divirion 1 instrumentation p.
Conclusions The suppression pool cleanup and cooling system is not needed for safe shutdown, therefore, only Division 1 cables and equipment necessary for safe shutdown are located in this zone.
I.
In the event of fire in this cone the only piece l
of' equipment, necessary'for safe shutdown, that-
.would be lost is the Division 1 RER A valve lE12F024A.
Division 1 cable for instrumentation which provides the suppression pool and RCIC tank level would also be lost.
However, the Division 2 RHR B system is still available for suppression pool cooling and Division 2 instrumentation would provide suppression pool level indication.
The performance goals for safe shutdown functions are assured by the system listed below:
O Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal
' (~T 1.
Reactor coolant LPCI (Div. 2) x/
makeup 2.
Reactor pressure ADS (Div. 2) control SRV (Div. 1) 3.
Suppression pool RHR B (Div. 2) cooling j
~
4.
Process variable Division 2 instrumenta-indication tion for:
RPV pressure r"d level Suppression pool level RHR B, RHR C pump flow d,
Alfications 4
No modifications are required.
2.7 Fire Zone A.2.1 a.
Description The zone is comprised of a general access area at elev'ation'737'd" of the auxiliary building (see figure FP-9 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in Liais zone:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables Division 1 and 2 instrumentation Division 1 valves O.
s-c.
Conclusion The electrical cables are located in conduit and cable O-trays.
The Division 1 cable trays are located on the east side of the auxiliary building.
There are both horizontal trays and vertical risers.
The vertical risers are located between columns V and T near row 124.
The Division 2 horizontal trays and vertical risers are located on the west side of the auxiliary building.
Location of the vertical risers is between columns V and U near row 102.
There are Division 1 cables, in conduit routed through the west side of the building.
These cables are part of the MSIV leakage control, component cooling water, cycled condensate and residual heat removal systems.
Except for the RHR system none of these systems are required to bring the reactor to a cold shutdown.
Even though portions of the RHR system are required for safe shutdown the cables routed through this part of the building (IRH45A and B), which service valve lE12-F074B, are not required for safe shutdown since the operation or malfunction of this valve is not required for or will not interfare with obtaining and maintaining a safe cold shutdown.
On the east side of the building the only Division 2 cables, in conduit, belong to the standby gas treatment system.
Following a fire and during the shutdown procedure operation of the standby gas treatment system l
is not required.
-2?-
s The Division 1 and 2 cable trays containing safe shutdown related cable are routed no closer than 136 b~~
feet and the conduit no cloner than 72 feet.
The instruments and valves located within this zone are not required to obtain and maintain cold shutdown.
The combustible material in the zone consists of 34,320 lb. of lEEE 383 cable insulation and 1109 2
ft of two-inch thick 3 lb/ft fiberboard.
This amount of cable insulation amounts to a fire leading of 274,560,000 Btu and the fiberboard to a loading of 842,840 Btu (the fire rating for fiberboard is 2
760 Btu /f t ).
This is equivalent to a total fire 2
load of 41,602 Btu /ft which is a severity of less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
!!owever, it should be noted that cable insul-ation will burn only if a flame is maintained on it and the fiberboard is covered with NFPA fire retardant coating.
In the corridor between the east and west sides of the zone are several balance-of-plant (BOP) cable trays.
These trays are routed next to the ceiling.
Fire detectors are provided over the BOP cable trays.
In the zone there are 2 hose systems and one portable
!!alon extinguisher.
The hose stations are located G\\/
between rows 107 and 110 near column U (west end of
-23a-
i the corridod and row 117 and column U (east end of the corridor).
Based on the distance of separation between the Division 1 and 2 safe shutdown related cables, the fact that there are no safe shutdown valves or instruments located in this zone, the low. fire load-ing of the zone and the location of fire detectors and hose stations in the corridor between the Division 1 and 2 areas at least one division of safe shutdewn equipment will be available to shutdown the reactor.
~
e 8
O
-23b-
.. ~
The performance goals for safe shutdown are assured
(])
by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) or LPCI makeup (Div. 2) 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1) ADS (Div. 2) contral 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) or RHR B cooling (Div. 2) 4.'
Process variable Division 1 instrumenta-indication tion for:
RPV pressure and level Suppress' ion pool level and temp..
RHR A, RCIC pump flow RCIC tank level OR Division 2 instrumenta-tion for:
RPV level and pressure Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR B, RHR C pump flow RPV level and pressure Suppression pool and temp.
d.
Modifications No mo'difications are required.
2.8 Fire Zone A.2.2 I^)
a.
Description V
The zone is comprised of the Ri!R heat exchanger B room on elevation 737'0" of the auxiliary building (see figure FF-9 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cable and equipment The following safety-related cable and equipment are located in this zone:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables
'RHR heat exchanger B Division 1 and 2 valves c.
Conclusions There are two Division 1 valves and their power cables located in this zone which are needed for safe shutdown (lE12F040 and lE12F023).
Valve lE12F040 is the' discharge to radwaste valve and valve lE12F023 is the RCIC connection valve.
Both of these valves are closed during normal operation and remain closed throughout the entire shutdown procedure (both hot and cold shutdown).
Since failure of power cables will not result in the spurious operation of the valve the Division 1 RHR A system could still be used to cool the suppression pool.
The cable which services RCIC valve lESlF078 would be lost if a fire occurred in this zone.
l
([]
l
. i
e However, valve lE51F077 could still be closed for hot shutdown allowing the operation of the RCIC f]
system.
In the event of a fire in this zone cold shutdown can still be achieved using the RCIC and RHR A systems.
The performance goals for safe shutdown functions are assured by the system listed below:
Perforniance Goals System Which Meet Goal 1.
Reactor., coolant RCIC.(Div. 1) makeup 2.
" Reactor pressure ADS (Div. 2) control 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) cooling 4.
Process variable Division 1 and 2 instru-indication mentation for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR A, RHR B, RHR C, RCIC pump flow RCIC tank level d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
2.9 Fire Zone A.2.5 a.
Description The zone is comprised of a pipe tunnel (see figure FP-9 of the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).,.
b.
Safety-related cable and equipment OV The following safety-related cable and equipment is located in this zone:
Division 1 and Division 2 electrical cables.
c.
Conclusion The Division 1 cables in this zone belong to the MSIV leakage control system.
The Division 2 cables belong to the standby gas treatment system.
Neither of these systems is needed for safe shutdown.
There-
, fore, in the. event of,a fire in this 7.one both Division 1 and 2 would be available to shutdown the reactor.
The performance goals for safe shutdown' functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goal System Which Meets Goal 1.
- RCIC (Div. 1)
LPCI (Tei v. 2) 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1) control ADS (Div. 2) 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) cooling RHR B (Div. 2) 4.
Process variable Division 1 and 2 instru-indication mentation for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
O.__
System Which Meets Goal RHR A, RHR B, RHR C,
(;
RCIC pump flows RCIC tank level d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
2.10 Fire Zone A.2.6 a..
Description This zone is comprised of the RHR heat exchanger A room (see Figure FP-9 of the Fire Protection Evalua-tion Report).
b.
Safety-related cable and equipment The following cable and equipment are located in this area:
Division 1, 2, and 3 electrical cable Division 1 and 2 valves RHR heat' exchange.r A.
c.
Conclusions The Division 2 cables in this zone belong to the leak detection, standby gas treatment and RCIC systems.
The leak detection and standby gas treatment systems are not required for safe shutdown.
The RCIC cables service valvo lE51F078.
This valve is not needed for safe shutdown by the Division 2 system.
Therefore, in the event of fire in this zone all the Division 2 systems needed for safe shutdown would be available.
C) l -
The performance goal for the safe shutdown functions rw are assured by the list of systems below:
U Performance Goal System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant LPCI (Div. 2) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure ADS (Div. 2) control 3.
Suppression pool RHR B (Div. 21 cooling 4.
Process variable Division 2 instrumenta-indication tion for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
Modifications No modifications are required.
2.11 Fire' Zone A.2.7 a.
Description This zone is comprised of the reactor water cleanup i'
p' ump B room in the auxiliary building at elevation 737'0" (see figure FP-9 of the Fire Protection F. valuation Report).
b.
Safety-related cable and equipment t
The following safety-related cable and equipment are located in this area.
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables.
l l 1
c.
Conclusions
(}
Th-; Division 1 and 2 cables belong to the leak detec-tion system which is not needed for safe shutdown.
In the event a fire in this zone both divisions would still be available to shut the reactor down.
The performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) makeup LPCI (Div. 2) 2.
Reactor pressure SRV _ (Div. 1) control ADS (Div. 2) 3.
Suppression ~ pool RHR A (Div. 1) cooling RHR B (Div. 2) 4.
Process variable Division 1 and 2 indication instrumentation for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR A, RHR B, RHR C, RCIC pump flow RCIC tank level d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
212 Fire Zone A.2.8 a.
Description
()
The zone is comprised of the reactor water cleanup --
pump C room located in the auxiliary building at
(])
elevation 737'0" (see fi,gure FP-9 of the Fire Protec-tion Evaluation Re' port).
b.
Safety-related cable and equipment See Section 2.11 c.
Conclusion See Section 2.11 d.
Moditications No modifications are required 2.13 Fire Zone A.2.9 a.
Description The zone is comprised of the reactor water cleanup
~
~
punp A room located in the auxiliary building at elevation 737'0" (see figure FP-9 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety related cable and equipment See Section 2.11 c.
Conclusions See Section 2.11 d.
Modifications No modifications a :e required.
2.14 Fire Zone A.2.ll a.
Description The zone is comprised of a general access area O
located on the west side of the auxiliary building
,~.
tf at elevation 737'0" (.see figure FP-9 in the Fire
(}
Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cable and equipment The following safety-related cable and equipment are located in these zones:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cable Division 2 valves c.
Conclusion The Division 1 cable in this room belongs to the RHR, fire protection and component cooling water Only the 'HR system is necessary for safe R
systems.
shutdown, however, the RHR cables in this room
(~1RH4 5A, B and D) service' valve lE12-F074B which is not needed for safe shutdown.
In the event of a fire in this room cables to valve lE12F042C would be lost.
This would result in the loss of the-Division 2 LPCI system for reactor, coolant makeup.
However, the Division 1 RCIC system would still be available to provide reactor coolant makeup.
The performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1)
()
control ADS (Div. 2). - _ _ _ _.
Performance Goals
' System Which Meets Goal 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1)
(~)s cooling s_
RHR B (Div. 2) 4.
Process variable Division 1 and 2 instru-indication mentation for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
- RCIC pump flow RCIC tank level d.
Modifications
~
No modifications are re' quired.
2.15 Fire Zone A.2.12
,,a.
Description The zone is comprised of the main steam isolation valve rooms located in the auxiliary building at elevation 737'0" (see, figure FP-9 in the Fire Protec' tion ' $ valuation Report).
b.
Safety-related cable and equipment The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in these zones:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables Division 1 and 2 valves c.
Conclusions The Division 2 cable belongs to the leakage detection and RCIC systems.
Leakage detectiod is not required for safe shutdown and RCIC cable 1RH17A services _ - -
valve lE51FQ78 This valve is not required by shut-
' (~')
down method #2 (bee Section 1.31.
In the event of LJ a fire in this zone reactor coolant makeup is avail-able via the Division 2 LPCI system.
l Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals System bhich Meets Goals 1.
Reactor coolant LPCI (Div. 2) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure ADS (Div. 21 control SRV (Div. 1) 3.
Supprecsion pool' RHR B (Div. 21 cooling 4.
Process variable Division 1 and 2 instru-indication mentation for:
RPV pressuro and level Suppression pool level RHR B, RHR C pump flow d.
Modifications No raodifications are required.
2.16 Fire Zone A.3.1 a.
Description l
This zone is comprised of the safety-related and non-safety-related switchgear area located in the auxiliary buildi ng at clovation 762'0" (see figure FP-10 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report}.
b.
Safety-related cable and equipment
)
The following safety-related cables and equipment are __.
located in these zones:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cable =
Division 2 6.9 kV switchgear Division 2 motor control center Division 1 instrumentation Division 2 valve Division 2 switchgear heat removal unit c.
Conclusions Division 1 cables in this zone belong to the RHR, RCIC and floor drain systems.
The floor drain system is not required for safe shutdown.and.the RHR cable (lR'H45A, B and D) service valve lE12F074B which is not required for safe shutdown.
Also not required is Division 1 pressure differential transmitter lE32N054.
The RCIC cabic services valve lE51F078.
If a fire destroyed this cable this line could still be closed for hot shutdown using Division 1 valve lE51F077.
In the event of a fire in this zone the Divisich '2 systems would not be available.
The reactor, however, could still be brought to cold shutdown with Division 1 systems (see Section 1.31.
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) makeup
)
2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 11 d
control..
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goals
(])
3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) cooling 4.
Procesc variable Division 1 instrumenta-indication tion for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
T RHR A, RCIC pump flow RCIC tank level d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
2.17 Fire Zone A.3.2 a.-
Description The zone is comprised of the main steam pipe tunnel within the auxiliary building (see. figure FP-10 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cable and equipment The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone:
Main steam isolation valves Division 1 and 2 electrical cable l
Division 1 and 2 valves l
Division 1 instrumentation j
i c.
Conclusions The Division 2 cables routed through this zone j
f service the feedwater, leakage detection, reactor protection, MSIV leak detection system and the MSIV's.
l l. -. - -
l i
The main steam isolation valves fail closed, there-(])
fore, failure of the cable will result in the close-ing of the valves.
This would make it necessary to use the Division 2 automatic depressurization system and LPCI system for shutdown.
Under these conditions the reactor can be shutdown.
There. fore none of the systems or equipemnt located in this zone are required to bring the plant to cold shutdown.
In the event of a fire all of the Division 2 safe
(
shutdown systems and equipment would be available.
The performance goals for the safe shutdown functions
~
are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goals 1.
Reactor coolant LPCI (Div. 2) mahoup 2.
Reactor pressure ADS (.Div. 2) control 3.
' Suppression pdol RHR B (Div. 2')
~
cooling 4..
Process variable Division 2 instrumenta-indication tion for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
Modifications No modifications are required.
O -
2.18 Fire Zone A.3.3
()+
a.
Description
(
The zone is comprised of a safety-reiated and non-safety-related switchgear area located on elevation 762'0" of the auxiliary building (see figure FP-10 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cable and equipment The following safety-related cables ond equipment are located in this zone:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables Division 1 valves Switchgear heat removal unit Division 1 6.9-kV switchgear Division 1 motor control centers Division 1 sprvice range monitor Division 1 intermediate range source monitor drive control relay panel
~
c.
Conclusion The Division 2 cable in this zone belongs to the standby gas treatment system which is not required for safe shutdown.
Therefore, in the event of a fire in this zone all of the systems and instrumenta-tion of shutdown method #2 (Division 2) would be available (see Section 1.3).
The performance goals for the safe shutdown functions l
are assured by the systems listed below:
(
6 i
Performance Goal Syste'm Which Meets Goal
(_)
1.
Reactor coolant LPCI CDiv. 21 f%
makeup 2.
Reactor pressure ADS ODiv. 2).
control 3.
Suppression pool RHR B ODiv. 21 cooling 4.
Process variable Division 2 instrumenta-indication tion for:
.RPV precsure and level Suppression pool level i
and temp.
Modifications No modifications are' required.
2.19' Fire Zone A.3.4 a.
Description This zone consists of an area on the west side of the auxiliary building at elevation 762'0" (.see j
figure FP-10 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
i b.
Safety-related cable and equipment The following safety-related cables and equipment l
are located in this zone:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables Containment electrical penetrations Division 1 snd 3 valves l
c.
Conclusions T te only Division 2 cable routed through this zone.
.L'*
belongs to the combustion gas control system.
This
{}
system is not required for safe shutdown.
Therefore, in the event a fire in this zone all of the systems for shutdown method #2 (Division 2) would be avail-able (see 3ection 1.31.
1 The Division 1 cable and valves located in this zone belong to the RHR and floor drain systems.
The floor drain system is not needed for safe shutdown.
The RHR system cables, 1R1145A, B and D, servien valve lE12F074B which is nce required for safe shutdown.
Therefore, in,the event of a fire, all of the systems required for shutdown method #1 (Division 1) would be available.,
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal l'.
' Reactor coolant LPCI (Div. 2), RCIC (Div.1) makeup 2.
Reactor power ADS (Div. 2), SRV (Div. 1) control 3.
Suppression pool RHR B (Div. 2), RHR A cooling (Div. 1) 4.
Process variable Division 1 and 2 instru-indication ment:ation for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR A, RHR B, RHR C, RCIC pump flow RCIC tank level.
d.
Modifications
()
No modifications are required.
2.20 Fire Zone A.3.5 a.
Description The zone is located on the east side of the-auxiliary building at elevation 762'0" (see figure FP-10 in the Fire Portection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cable and equipment The followit.g safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone:
- Divi'sion 1 and 2 electrical cable Division 1 valves Containment electrical penetrations c.
Conslusions The only Division 2 cable routed through this zone belongs to the SGTS.
This system is not required for safe shutdown.
Therefore, in the event of a' fire in this zone all of the systems for shutdown method #2 (Division 2) will be available (see Section 1.3).
The performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant LPCI (Div. 2) makeup
()
2.
Reactor pressure ADS (Div. 2) control..
]
~
il Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal
()
3.
Suppression pool RHR B (Div. 2) cooling 4.
Process variable Division 2 instrumenta-indication tion for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
Modifications No modifications are required 2.21' '. Fire Zone A.3.6 a.
Description This zone is comprised of the RHR heat exchanger A room (see figure FP-10 in the Fire Prctection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cables and' equipment
'See Section 2.10 c.
Conclusions See Section 2.10 d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
2.22 Fire Zone A.3.7 a.
Description This zone is comprised of the RHR heat exchanger B l
room (see figure FP-10 in the Fire P'rotection Evalu-ation Report). __
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment A
See Section 2.8
()
c.
Conclusions See Section 2.8 d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
2.23 Fire Zone A.4.1 a.
Description The zone is comprised of the Division 2 switchgear area located on elevation 781'0" of the auxiliary building (see figure PP-ll in the Firu Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cab 3es and. equipment The following safety-related equipmnnt is located in this zone:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables Division 2 valves Div.ision 2 motor control' centers
}
Division 2 instrumentation Division 2 4.16kV switchgear Switchgear heat removal coil cabinet, fan and condensing uni.t c.
Conclusions The Division 1 cables routed through this zone belong to the control room HVAC and radiation monitoring systems.
The radiation monitoring system is not _
needed to bring the reactor to cold shutdown.
How-
[)
ever, loss of the control room HVAC system could v
result in the loss of the control room.
Shutdoto would then be achieve from the remote shutdown panel.
Division 2 cables (lRIl7 series) service RCIC valve lE51F078.
This line could still be cloccd for hot shutdown using valve lE51F077 (Div. 1).
Therefore, all the systems required to shutdown the reactor via method #1 are available (see Section 1. 3).
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor ccclant
'RCIC (Div. 1) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1) control 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) cooling Piocess v'ariable Division 1 Instruraenta-
~
4 indication tion for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR A, RCIC pump flows RCIC tank level d.
Modifications No modifications are required.... _ -
2.24 Fire Zone h.4.4 Tne zone is comprised of a general access area of a.
the northeast corner of the auxiliary building at elevation 781'0" (see figure FP-ll in the Fire Protec-tion Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment, The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cable Division 1 and 2 battery room exhaust fans
.c.
Conclusions The Division 1 cables are part of the control room
.HVAC, essential switchgear heat removal and radiation monitoring systems.
Of these only the essential switchgear heat removal system is required for safe shutdown.
The cables from this system, however, service
.the battery room exhaust fans (lVX05CA and lVX11CA).
These fans are not necessary to shutdown the plant.
Division 2 cables (lRIl7 series) service valve lE51F078.
This line could still be closed for hot shutdown using valve lE12F077 (Div. 1).
Therefore, all Division 1 systems required to bring the plant to cold shutdown are 1
available in the event of a fire in this zone.
l The performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
O.
--.____.__._____.._m_
Performanca Goal Syntem Which Mieta Gon1 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1)
,,Q control 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) level 4.
Process variable Division 1 Instrumentation indication for:
RPV pressure and l eve '.
Suppression pool level and temp.
~
RCIC tank level
.d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
2'.25 Fire Zone A.4.6 a.
Description The zone is comprised of the auxiliary building ditision 1 switchgear area (see Figure FP-ll in he Fire Protec-tion, Evaluation Report).
h.
Safety-related cable and equipment The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables Division 1 4.1-kV switchgear Division 1 480-V unit substation Division 1 motor control centers i
Division 1 switchgear heat removal coil cabinet, fan and condensing unit Di. vision 1 panel Division 1 instrumentation 1 s J
..y 4
c.
Conclusions
(~')
Division 2 RHR system cables service valves necessary us for safe shutdown by method #2.
A fire in this zone would resul'c in the loss of shutdown method #1 systems and the RHR B system of method #1.
Also, routed through this zone are the intake and exhaust ducts that provide. cool air to the Division 2 switchgear room.
A fire could result in a loss.of cool air flow to the switchgear room making it difficult to shutdown the reactor via method #2 (see Section 1.3).
For a description of modifications necessary to satisfy the requirements of Appendix R see part d below and Section 3.
d.
Modifications The Division 2 RHR valves need to be operated to bring g the plant to cold shutdown only.
Therefore, after hot
~
shutdown has been achieved repairs can be made to.the Division 2 cables to allow preceding to cold shutdown.
Division 2 ventilation ducts will be surrounded with a fibrous insulating material produced by Transco, Inc., which will provide a 3-hour fire barrier..
Also all of the ductwork hangers and associated structural steel will be fireproof to withstand a 3-hour fire.
Therefore, all of the Division 2 systems necessary to bring the plant to cold shutdown will function.
(~T ASTM fire tests with air flowing inside the ducts will
\\m/
i _
t be conducted and will simulate the' actual conditions
(~)
of a 3-hour fire.
The duct used in the test will be v
a full sizad mock-up.
Upon completion.of the test a detailed report will be prepared and submitted to the NRC.
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goals 1.
Reactor coolant LPCI (Div. 2) makeup ADS (Div. 2) ~
2'.
Reactor pressure control 3.
Suppression pool
- RHR B (Div. 2) cooling 4.
Process variable Division 2 instrumenta-tion for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR B, RHR C pump flow 2.26 Fire Zone D.l.1 a.
Description The zone is comprised of the plant chilled water system equipment area and the general access area of the control-diesel ouilding basement (see Figure FP-14 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cable and equipment The following safety-related cable and equipment are
located in this zone:
f)
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables E
s-Division 1 valve c.
Conclusions Division 2 cables routed through this zone belong to the drywell purge, containment combustible gas control and standby gas treatment systems none of which are required for safe shutdown.
Therefore, in the event of a fire in this zone those systems needed for shut-down method #2 (Division 2) would be available to
~
(see Section 1.3).
shutdown the reactor l
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems lis~ted below:
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant LPCI (Div. 2) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure ~
ADS (Div. 2) control 3.
Suppression pool RHR B (D iv. 2) cooling 4.
Process variable Division 2 instrumenta-indication tion for:
l RPV pressure and level l
Suppression pool level and temp.
Planned Modifications No modifications are required.
(~^>
v l
2.27 Fire Zone D.l.ll 4
a.
Description The zone is comprised of a general access area and general HVAC equipment area of the control-diesel building at elevation 719'0" (she figure FP-15 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-reldted Cable and Equipment The following safety-related cables-and equipment are located in this zone:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables Division 1 and 2 motor control centers-SGTS control and instrument panel A
c.
Conclusions Division 1 cables 1SX25D (power cable connecting the valve to 480V MCC El) and 1SX2SE (instrument cable connecting the valve limit switch to MCC El) approach
,to within 8. feet of Division 2 motor contro,1 center H
~
(OAP 57E).
The Division 1 cables service valve 1SX073A (SGTS train A charcoal bed water supply valve).
This valve is normally closed and remainc closed during shut-down.
Failure of the cable resulting in a break in the line or a hot short will not open the valve.
All other Division 1 cables and equipment are not required to bring the reactor to cold shutdown.
In the event of a fire the Division 1 systems would still be rvailable to shutdown the reactor.
O 1
________________________________0
The performance goals for the safe shutdown functions
~
(G are assured by the systems listed below:
m/
t Performance Goal System Which Meets Goals 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) make;p 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1) control 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) cooling 4.
Process variable Division 1 instrumenta-
. indication tion for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression p'ool level and temp.
RHR A, RCIC pump flows RCIC tank levels d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
2.28 Fire Zone D. 2.1 -
a.
Description The zone is comprised of a general access area of the control building of elevation 737'0" (see figure FP-16 of the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone:
[})
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables Division 1 and 2 diesel generator motor control centers -__-___-_-__n
n c.
Conclusion
()
Division 1 and 2 cable routed through this zone which service the diesel generators, aaxiliary power systems, shutdown service water system and the diesel generator HVAC systems are located in cable trays less then 20 feet apart.
For a description of the modification needed so that Appendix R criteria will be met see part d below and Section 3.
d.
Modifications In order,to prevent a fire from disabling both redundant shutdown methods the Division 2 motor control center LAP 61E will be relocated within
~
the' zone to a point where it will be approximately 46 feet from any Division 1 cables or equipment.
.The Division 2 cable trays will be protected by erecting a false ceiling below the trays in the corridor cutside the diesel generator rooms and a wall that will extend from the laboratory roof to the ceiling along row AA.
The ceiling and wall will carry a 3-hour fire rating.
Therefore, in the event of a fire in this zone cither the Division 1 or 2 s afe ' shutdown systems will be available to bring the reactor to cold shutdown.
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions
()
are assured by the systems listed below:
~52-
Performance Goal System Which Meets Goals i
1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) or LPCI makeup (Div. 21
.I 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1). or ADS control (Div. 21 3.
Suppression pool RIIR A (Div. 1) or RHR B cooling (Div. 2) 4.
Process varir.ble Division 1 instrumenta-indication tion for:
Reactor pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
RCIC, RHR A, pump, flow RCIC' tank level OR Division 2 instrumenta-tion for:
Reactor pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
" ire Zone D.3.1 a.
Description The zone is comprised of a general access and equipment area of the control building at elevat. ion 762'0" (see figure FP-17 in the Fire Pr tection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cable.and equipment The following safety-related cables and equipment 1 I
are in this zone:
C']
Division 1 and 2 electrical cable Division 1 instrumentation Division 2 valve Division 2 heat removal fan and coil cabinec c.
Concitsion The Division 1 pressure differential transmitter, the Division 2 fan (lVX04CB).and the Division 2 valve (lE12-F444D) are not required for safe shut-down.
However, Division 2 risers are located along the south wall.of this.z.one.approximately 19 feet from Division 1 cable trays and Division 2 cable trays are located nea'r the north wall 40 feet from the same Division 1 trays.
Both the Division 1 and 2 trays contain cables servicing equipment needed for safe shutdown.
See part d below and Section 3 for modifications.
d.
Modifications In order to remove the remote possibility of a fire destroying both Division 1 and 2 cables required for safe shutdown, the Division 1 cables required for safe shutdown and listed below.have been rerouted:
1RH18B 1DG0lJ 1RH21B 1DG0lK 1DGGlC 1SX30E Therefore, with this change, performance goals for
(
safe shutdown are assured by the systems listed below: -
Performance Goal System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1)
\\_'s; makeup
/'
2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1) control 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) cooling 4.
Process variable Division 1 instrumentation indication for:
Reactor pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
RCIC, RHR A pump floor RCIC tank level 2.30 Fire Zone D.3.2 a.
Description The zone is comprised of a general access area and HVAC equipment area of the control building at elevation 762'0" (see figure FP-17 in the Fire Protection Report).
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone.
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables c.
Conclusion Disision 1 and 2 cables in conduit are routed no closer than 21 feet of each other.
These cables
\\-)>
f belong to the Division 1 and 2 diesel generator and diesel generator room HVAC systems and are required
.\\
I for safe shutdown. -
I In order to prevent the loss of both redundant shut-(~}
down systems modifications are being made (see part u-d below and Section 3).
d.
Modifications The Division 1 diesel generator and diesel generator HVAC cables are being rerouted so that a separation distance of approximately 46 feet is maintained.
This separation should be adequate since the total fire load-ing of the zone is 13,837 Btu /ft or a severity of less than 30 minutes.
The total loading is made up of 13,249 Btu /ft due to the combustion of cable insulation and 572.4 Btu /ft from the combustion of fiberboard.
It should be emphasized that cable will burn only if a flame is maintained on it and the fiberboard is coated with NFPA fire retardant (see the Fire Protection Evalua-tion Report, pg. 3. 4-51).
The Division 2 diesel generator cables are being rerouted to prevent their passing through this zone.
Therefore, in the event of a fire in this zone at least one division of systems needed to bring the reactor to cold shutdown will be available.
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems licted below:
Performance Goals Systems Which Meets Goals 1.
Peactor cool' apt RCIC (Div. 1) or LPCI
'akeup (Div. 2) 2 Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1) or ADS 3
control (Div. 2)
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goals 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) or RHR B g3 t,)
cooling (Div. 2) 4.
Process variable Division 1 instrumentation indication for:
RPV level and pressure Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR A, RCIC pump ficw RCIC tank level OR Division 2 instrumentation for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR B, RHR C pump flow 2.30a Fire Zone D.3.6 a.
Description The zone is compised of the Unit 1 Division 1 diesel-generator room air inlet missile wall room located on elevation 762'-a" of the control building (see figure FP-17 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report.)
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment The following safety-related cables and equipment l
are located in this zone.
t i
i Division 2 electrical cables Division 1 HVAC dampers
A 4
c.
Conclusion The only combustible material in the zone is the O
insulation on the two Division.2 diesel-generator power _ feeds.
Fire loading for these cables is 2
2,811,304 Btu or 5,567 Stu/ft Since the cable is in conduit flames of a fire originating in the room will not come in contact with the cables, there-by preserving the integrity of the Division 2 shutdown systems.
If a short in the cables were to ignite the insulation the conduit would contain the smoke thus eliminating possible~ contamination of the Division 1 diesel-generator room through its HVAC system.
For prottation against a fire there is a hose station and one portable Halon extinguisher which are accessible to the zone.
They are located along row AF between columns 129 and 130 in fire zone D.3.2.
The portable extinguisher is located in fire zone D.3.2 along row AC between columns 128 and 129.
Based on the lack of combustibles in the zone, the fact that the Division 2 cables are in conduit and location of manual fire protection systems at least one division of safe shutdown equipment will be available to shutdown the reactor.
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
O v
-57a-
Performance Goal System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) or LPCI O
xeue (oiv. 2) 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1) ADS (Div. 2) control 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) or RHR B cooling (Div. 2) 4.
Process variable Division 1 instrumentation indication for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR A, RCIC pump flow RCIC tank level OR Division 2 instrumentation for:
RPV level and pressure Suppressica pool level and temp.
RHR B, RHR C pump flow RPV level and pressure Suppression pool and temp.
Modifications No modifications are required.
P l
O
-57b-
2.31 D.4.2 a.
Description O#
The zone is comprised of the non-safety-related cable room at elevation 781'0" of the control building (see figure FP-18 11 the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables Division 1 and 2 switchgear heat removal return fans.
c.
Conclusion Division 1 cable s routed through this zone and belonging to auxiliary power, diesel generator, nuclear boiler, e
4 0
-57c-
\\
RCIC, RHR, and shutdown service water systems, are
)
connected to an optical isolation cabinet.
Failure of these cables during a fire would not result in the loss of safe shutdown method #1 since these cables do not service equipment needed for safe shutdown (see Section 1.3).
The Divis ion 1 and 2 switchgear heat removal return fans are located in this zone'.
Failure of these fans would result in a loss of both the Division 1 and 2 systems needed for safe shutdown because of the over heating of thei'r'respectivd' cable spreading-rooms.
For a description of planned modificationn see part d
'beloa and Section 3.
d.
Modifications To eliminate the possibility of the loss of cooling to the Division 1 cable spreading room 750 cfm of cool air had been supplied.
In the event of the loss of the switchgear heat removal fans cool air cculd still be The provided by the auxiliary building HVAC system.
~ auxiliary building HVAC system supplies 3000 cfm of air at approximately 65 F to this room.
In order to insure that this system can supply the required ventilation the auxiliary building vent supply fans (lVA04CA and IVA04CB) and exhaust fans (lVA05CA l
and IVA05CB) have been connected to the Division 1 I
Also a relief opening with back j
(])
diesel generators. - - - - - - -
draf t and fire dampers have provided in the wall of
((])
the cable spreading room (Fire Zone D.4.3) along column line 130.
These modifications result in the performance goals for the safe shutdown functions being assured by the systems listed below:
i Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (.Div. 1) control 3.
Suppression' pool RHR A (Div. 1) cooling 4.
Process variable Division 1 instrumenta-indication tion for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
RCIC, RHR A pump flow RCIC tank level 2.32 Fire Zone D.4.3 a.
Description The one is comprised of the Division 1 cable spread-ing room at elevation 781'0" of the control building (see figure FP-18 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone:
l Division 1 and 2 electrical cable.
(]
c.
Conclusion The Division 1 cables routed through this zone are part of systems required to achieve safe shutdown.
The Division 2 cables, however, are not part of a safe shutdown system.
The Division 2 cables are part of the reactor protection system and are not needed l
to bring the reactor to cold shutdown once the control rods have been inserted.
(See Section 1. 4 Assumptions).
Therefore, in the event of a fire in this zone, the Division 1 systems of safe shutdown ~ method #1 systems would be lost, howdver, the reactor cou'ld still be brought to a cold shutdown using the Division 2 systems of safe shutdown method #2 (see Section 1. 3).
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals System Mnich Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant LPCI (Div. 2) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure ADS (Div. 2) control 3.
Suppression pool RHR B (Div. 2) cooling 4.
Process variable Division 2 instrumenta-indication tion for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
2.33 Fire Zone D.4.10 a.
Description The zone is comprised of the Division 3 switchgear room and general access area on elevation 781'0" of the control building (see figure FP-18 in the Fire Evaluation Protection Report).
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment. -
The following safety-related cables and equipment are
~
locatsd in this zone:
Division 3 4.16 kV switchgear 480V transformer Motor control center units inverter Switchgear heat removal and condensing unit Division 1, 2-and 3 cable c.
Conclusions The Division 1 and 2 cables located in this zone belong, to the reactor protection system.
This system is not needed to bring the reactor to hot or cold shutdown.
Therefore, either method for shutting dowr the reactor can be used.
l l
l l
O
.. -. c..
.e-m.:
- 7..: - --
.J.
._ ;.s c
.. s..-
c.,
.g.,..
~
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goals 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1), LPCI (Div. 1) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1), ADS (Div. 2) control 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1), RHR B (Div. 2) cooling 4.
Process variable Division ~1 and 2 indication instrumentation for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR A, RH R B, RHR C, RCIC Pump flows RCIC tank level d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
2.34 Fire Zone D.4.12 a.
Description The zone is comprised of a room enclosing division 1 and 2 vertical cable risers at elevation 787'0" of the control building (see FP-18 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
O A
^' '
4
'e Wj
'er
'(
4 Qf 6
w
-e
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment
()
The following safety Iclated cables and ea.uipment are located in this zone:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables.
c.
Conclusions The Division 1 and 2 cables in this zone service equip-ment of control room ventilation system, shutdown service water deluge valves (lSX073B and 1SX107B) and auxiliary power system 480V substations and motor control centers.
The control room ventilation system is not needed for sa'd shutdown.
In the event of damage to this system, f
the reactor can still. be shutdown f' rom the remote panel.
If valves 1SX073B and 1SX107B were'to open due to a hot short there would be no loss of cooling water to the RHR heat exchangers since the charcoal beds through which these valves provide water are completely enclosed.
The
'480V substations and motor control centers supply power to both the control room HVAC systems and the deluge valves and therefore, damage to these cables would not affect shutdown capabilities.
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals System Which' Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1) control l.
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal
()
3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) cooling 4.
Process variable Division 1 instrumentation indication for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR A, RCIC pump flow RCIC tank level d.
Planned Modifications No modifications are required.
2.35 Fire Zone D.5.1 a.
Description The zone is comprised of the unit 1 terminal cabinet and back panel area of the control room (see figure FP-19 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
.b.
Safety-relate.d cables and equipment.
The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone:
Division 1, 2 and 3 electrical cables i
Division 1, 2 and 3 terminal cabinets Division 1, 2 and 3 panels.
c.
Conclusions A fire.in this zone would not prevent the operators from l
bringing the plant to a cold shutdcwn.
The cables and E
i equipment in this area can be isolated from the rest of I
i.
~. - - - _.
the plant allowing the use of the remote shutdown panel
()
to achieve cold shutdown.
Performance goals for safe shutdown are assured by the equipment listed below:
Performance goals System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC {Div. 1) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1) control 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) cooling Division 1 instrumentation 4.-
Process v'ariable indication for:
RPV Pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR A, RCIC pump flow RCIC tank level d.
Modifications.
No modifications are required.
2.36 Fire Zone D.5.2 a.
Description The zone is comprised of the unit 1 control room (see i
figure FP-19 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cables a.d equipment.
The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone:
(])
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables Main Control and display console for Unit 1.
l
- ~. -
c.
Conclusions
()
In the event of a fire in the control room, a cold shutdown could still be achieved from the remote shut-down panel.
Performance goals for the shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goals 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 3) control 3'. Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) cooling
,4.
Process variable Division 1 instrumentation indication for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR A, RCIC pump flow RCIC tank level d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
2.37 Fire Zone D.5.5 a.
Description The zone comprises the control room sleeping area (see figure FP-19 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
M b.
Safety-related cables and equipment.
(])
The following safety-relat,cd cables and equipment are present in this zone:
Division 1, 2, and 3 electrical cables.
Conclusions c.
The Division 1 and 2 cable belong to'the control room HVAC system.
Failure of this cable will not prevent achieving cold shutdown.
Cold shutdown can still be achieved from the remote shutdown panel.
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goals 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1) control 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) cooling 4.
Process variable Division 1 instrumentation indication for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR A RCIC pump flow RCIC tank level.
d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
O -
[.
l 2.38 Fire Zone D.5.7 a.
Description O
The zone is comprised of the' emergency food storage room (see figure FP-19 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report),
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment.
The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables..
c.
Conclusion
.See section 2.37 d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
2.39 Fire Zone D.5.9 a.
Description The zone is comprised of a corridor in the control room
~
~(see figure FP-19 in t'he Fire Protectio ~n Evdluation area Report).
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment.
See section 2.38 c.
Conclusions The Divisions 1 and 2 cables are part of the control room HVAC system.
Neither system is necessary to bring the reactor to cold shutdown 3 In the event of the loss of the control room HVAC the reactor can still be brought
()
to cold shutdown from the remote panel.,
.mm Performanco goals for the safe shutdown function are assured by the systems listad below:
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div.1) control 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) cooling 4.
Process variable Division 1 instrumentation j
indication for:
RPV pressure and level j
Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR N RCIC pump flow RCIC tank level d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
2.40 Fire Zone D.5.10 a.
Description The zone is comprised of Unit 2 terminal cabinet and panel area of the control room (see figure FP-19 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment.
See section 2.38 c.
Conclusions See section 2.37 l
d.
Modifications
(
No modifications are required.
t 69-1
2.41 Fire Zone D.5.ll a.
Description
("
\\
The zone is comprised the unit 2 control room main i'
control and display console area (see figure FP-19 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment.
See section 2.38 i
c.
Conclusions See section 2.39 d.
Modifications No modifications'are rcquired.
2.42 Fire Zone D.5.13 and D.5.14 a.
Description The zones are comprised of the results records root,and locker room (see figure FP-19 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
'b.
Safety-related cables and equipment.
See section 2.38 c.
Conclusions See section 2.39 d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
e.
2.43 Fire Zone D.6.2 a.
Description The zone is comprised of the control room air handling O -
L
equipment area on elevation 826 '0" of the control
()
building (see figure FP-20 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Raport).
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables Division 1 and ? control air handling units Control room chillers Control. room air filter packages
.Divisicn 1 and 2 fans Division 1 and 2 unit substations and motor control centers i
Division 1 and 2 valves.
c.
Conclusions The Division i and 2 cables in this zone service equipment of control room ventilation system, shutdown service water ^ deluge' valves (lSX073B~and 1SX107B) and auxiliary power system 480V substations and motor control centers.
The control room ventilation system is not needed for safe shutdown.
In the event of damage to this system, the reactor can still be shutdown from the remots panel.
If valves 1SX073B and 1SX107B were to open due to a hr.t short there would be no loss of cooling water to the RHR hea't exchangers since the charcoal beds through which i
these valves provide water are completely enclosed.
The
( l
480V substations and motor control centers supply power only to both the control room HVAC systems and O
the deluge valves and therefore, damage to these cables would not affect shutdown capabilities.
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assSred by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) makeup 2.
-Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1) control 3..
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) cooling 4.
Process variable,
Divis' ion 1 inst 2.umentation indication for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and 6.emp.
RHR A, RCIC pump flow RCIC tank level d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
2.44 Fire Zone D.6.8 a.
Description This zone is comprised "of the unit 2 locker room on elevation 825'0" of the control building (see figure FP-20 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment. -
O rhe fo11o ine sefeer-re1eeed ceb1es end eseismene ere
_~
located in this zone:
O)
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables.'
(_
c.
Conclusions The Division 1 and 2 cables are part of the control room HVAC and radiation monitoring systems.
Neither system in needed to bring the reactor to cold shutdown.
In the event of a fire and the loss of the control room HVAC system the remote shutdown panel can be used to bring the reactor to cold shutdown.
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the ' systems listed below:
Performance Goals _
System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) makeup 1
i 2.
React: _ pressure S RV (D l 7.
1)
Control 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) cooling 4.
Process variable Division 1 instrumentation indication for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR A, RCIC pump flow RCIC tank level d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
O f,
l
l 2.45 Fire Zone F.1.1 a.
Description
(
The zone is comprised of the drywell chillers, drywell water chiller pumps and the gamma scatter room (see figure FP-8 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone:
Division'1, 2 and 3 c'lectrical cables Division 1, 2 and 3 cables Division 1 and 2 instruments c., Conclusions The only division 1 systems present in this zone are:
1.
drywell cooling system 2
standby ga. treatment system 3.
fuel pool cooling and cleanup system None of the 3 systems are required to bring,the plant to cold shutdown, therefore, all division 1 systems necessary for safe shutdown are independent of the zone.
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) makeup 2.
b.eactor pressure SRV (Div. 1) control 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) cooling
-/4-
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal
(
4.
Process variable Division 1 instrumentation indication for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pcol level and temp.
RHR A, RCIC pump flow RCIC tank level d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
]
2.46, Fire Zone F.1.3 a.
Description The zone is comprised ~of the fuel pool cooling and clean-up pump rooms on elevation 712 '0" of the fuel building (see figure FP-? in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment.
The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone:
Fuel pool cooling and cleanup pumps Division 1 and 2.
electrical cables.
c.
Conclusions The cables and pumps are part of the fuel pool cooling system and are not needed to achieve safe shutdown.
In the event of a fire in this room both method #1 and method #2 systems are available to shut the reactor down (See Sectica 1.3).
(~s
%-)
l 1
l
- Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are t]
sssured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1), LPCI (Div. 2) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1), ADS (Div. 2) #
control 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1), RHR B cooling (Div. 2) 4.
Process variable Divisior. I and 2 indication instrui."ntation for:
RPV prc s1re and level'
~ pool level
~
Suppr
Modifications No modifications are required.
2.47 ' Fire Zone F.2.1 a.
Description The zone is comprised of the general access area of elevation 737'0" of the fuel building (see Figure FP-9 of the Fire Protection F. Valuation Report).
b.
Safety-related cables and components The following safety-related cables and components are located in this zone:
Division 1, 2, and 3 electrical equipment O
Division 1 end a ve1ves Division 1 and 3 instrumentation J
c.
Conclusions-The Division 1 cable trays are separated. from the O
Division 2 and 3 risers by the length of the building (approximately 150 feet).
Cables belonging t7 the suppression pool cleanup, component cooling water, low pressuro core spray, fuel pool cooling and cleanup makeup condensate storage, containment monitoring, SGT, drywell purge, equipment drains, drywell cooling, plant.
chilled water and fire protection sys'tems are not required to bring to plant to cold shutdown.
The only Division 1 and 2 equipment required for safe shutdown and in close proximity are the, fuel pool h' eat i
exchanger valves 1SXO62A and 1SX062B.
These valves are 25 feet apart.
The valves are normally closed and remain closed'during shutdown.
Therefore, if the power cables to the valves' fail, the valves will remala in their closed position.
This being the case both methods of shutdown will be available to bring the plant to cold. shutdown.
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
I Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal i
1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1), LPCI (Div. 2) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1), ADS (Div. 2) j control 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1), RHR B cooling (Div. 2) f Cl) l.
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal r-4.
Process variable Division 1 and 2
(>)
indication instrumentation for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
Modifications No modifications are required.
l J
2.48 Fire Zone F.2.3 j
- a.. Description The zone is comprised of the fuel pool heat exchanger division A (see figure FP-9 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cab 1'es and equipment.
The following safety-related cables and equipment are
~
located in this zone:
Division 1 and 2 cables Division 2 fuel pool heat exchanger Division 2 valves.
c.
Conclusion i
The cables and equipment are parts of the component cooling water and fuel pool cooling systems.
Neither of these systems is required to being the plant to cold shutdown.
Tnerefore both the Division 1 and 2 systems
()
necessary for safe shutdown are independent of this fire zone. '
i
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1), LPCI (Div. 2) makeup 2.
. Reactor pressure SRV (Div, 1), ADS (Div. 2) control 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1), RIIR D cooling (Div. 2) 4.
Process variable Division 1 and 2 indication instrumentation for:
RPV pressure and level Suppressioh pool level and temp..
RHR A, RIIR B, RilR C RCIC pump flows RCIC tank level d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
~
2.49 Fire Zone F.3.1 a.
Description This zone is comprised of the fuel building floor at
-elevation 755'0" (see figure FP-10 in the Fire Protection i
Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment.
The following safety-related cables and equipment are present in this zone:
(
l 1 -. -.
Division 1, 2 and 3 electrical cables (v')
Fuel pool cooling and cleanup surge tanks Division 1 and 2 valves c.
Conclusions only the diesel generator and shutdown service water system among the systens present in this zone are required to achieve cold shutdown.
The shutdown service water cables service valves 1SXO88A and 1SX097A.
Neither of these valves is necessary for safe shutdown.
Only cables 1DGilA and B (Div. 1) and 1DG31A&B (Div. 2) are necessary for safe shutdown; they are separated by approximately 19 feet.
These are the power cables from the diesel generator to the 4.16kV switchgear.
Modifications are now being made to prevent the loss of all the cables in the event of a fire (see part d below 4
and section ~3).
d.
Modifications Cables 1DG31A and B are being rerouted so that the cables enter the fuel building in conduit near the south wall i
of the fuel building from fire zone D.3.4.
This routing will result in the Division 1 and 2 cables being separated by a distance of approximately 50 feet.
This separation distance is adequate because of the low fire loading of the zone (20,832 Btu /ft2, less than hour severity)..
Also, the fire load consists of 101.3 Btu /ft3 from cable insulation and 760 Btu /ft2 from fiberboard.
Cable insulation will burn only when d flame is held to it and the fiberboard is coated with NFPA fire retardant (see the Fire Protection Eva3 4ation Report 4
- p. 3.5-17).
l It should also be noted that the Division one cables are located above the mezzanine at elevation 781'0" therefore, a fire on the floor at elevation 762 '0" will not affect the Division 1 cables.
There fo're, in the event of a' fire in this zone bd at least one method would be available to shutdown the reactor.
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal
'l.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) or LPCI (Div. 2).
makeup 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div.1) or ADS (Div. 2) control 3.
Cuppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) or RHR B cooling (Div. 2) 4.
Process variable Division 1 or 2 indication instrumentation for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
[~)
RHRC pump flow
'J RCIC tank level r,
-r
i
()
2.50 Fire Zone C.l.1 a.
Description This zone is comprised of the drywell volume of the control building (see figures FP-8, FP-9, PP-10 and FP-11 of the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment.
The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone:
Reactor vessel
. Recirculation pumps Division 1, 2 and 3 equipment Division 1, 2 and 3 valves Division 1, 2 and 3 instrumentation c.
Conclusions There are Division 1 and 2 cables and equipment located in this zone which are require'd to safely shutdow'n'the reactor.
The principal potential fire hazard in this area is the lubricating oil contained within the two reactor recir-culation pump motors.
Each motor utilizes self-lubricated bearings.
The lubricating oil is cooled by ecoling coils installed within the reservoirs.
Since t$e bearings are self-lubricated and the oil is neither required nor utilized.
This design also minimizes O
piping connections to the oil reservoir.
The heavy construction and non-pressurized design of this
/~s (l
lubricating system minimizes the susceptibility of the system to leakage.
Also, if a leak were to occur, ignition enhancing spray would be unlikely.
Therefore, an exposure fire due to ignition of the recirculation pump lubricating oil is not credible and additional fire protection measures for the recirculation pumps are not required.
The drywell is inaccessible during operation and when opened, stringent administrative controls are implemented to monitor personnel and equipment ingress and egress.
Therefore, an expost're fire from transient combustibles is not postulated.
If a cable fire were postulated in the drywell, it would be detected by the upper and lower drywell temperature monitors.
Once detected, the cable fire could be extin-guished by the fire brigade using portable fire extin-guishers and hose stations available in Te containment.
Therefore, in the event of a fire in this zone at least one independent method of bringing the reactor to cold shutdown would be available.
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
t-)
kJ
j Performance Goal Systems Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) or LPCI (Div. 2) f]
makeup 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div.1) or ADS (Div. 2)'
control 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) or RHR B cooling (Div. 2) 4.
Process variable Division 1 instrumentation indication for:
RPV pressure and level Suppres'sion pool level and temp.
RCIC, RHR A pump flow RCIC tank level or Division 2 instrumentation for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
RER B, RHR C pump flow d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
2.51 Fire Zone C.2.1 a.
Description This zone is somprised of the circular area between the containment wall and the drywell wall at elevation 737'0" (see figure FP-9 of the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
O
-94~
f b.
Safety-related cables. n:td equipment'.
(])
The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone:
l i
Division 1 electrical cables Division 1, 2 and 3 valves c.
Conclusions l
The Division 1, 2 and 3 valves located in this zone are part of the nuclear boiler (lB21-456A (Div. 1)),
1B21F458A (Div. 3) and the reactor recirculation system.
The reactor recirculation system is not required for safe shutdown and neither~ are the two nuclear boiler system valves.
There fore, in the event of a fire in
'this zone the division 2 system of shutdown method #2
~
would cmain operable (See Section 1.3).
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
Performance Goal -
System Which Meets Goal i
l 1.
Reactor coolant LPCI (Div. 2) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure ADS (Div. 2) control 3.
Suppression pool RHR B (Div. 2) level 4.
Process variable Division 2 instrumentation indication for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
()
m 41 l
__,m.
d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
r~s
(_)
2.52 Fire Zone C.3.1, C.4.2 a.
Descriptions The zone consists of the steam and feedwater tunnel between the drywell and containment walls at elevation 755'0" to 790'0" (see figure FP-10 and FP-ll in the i
Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related' cables and equipment The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in this ' zone:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables.
c.
Conclusions l
The only Division 1 cables in this zone belong to the reactor water cleanup and neutron monitoring System which are not required for bringing the reactor to cold shutdown.
Therefore, in the event of fire' in this zone all Division 1 systems needed to shutdown the plant would be available.
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed belos:
l Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) makeup 2.
Reactor pressure SRV (Div. 1) control 3
(N ).
T_ZZ- ~._Z1Z i..__ _
~
~
(
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal l
(
'3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) cooling
. f,}
4.
Process variable Division 1 instrumentation indication for:
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level and temp.
RHR A, RCIC pump flow RCIC tank le'rel d.
Modificaticns No modifications are required.
2.53 Fire Zone C.3.2 a.
Descriptica This is comprised of the circular area between the drywell and containment walls excluding the tunnel area at elevation 755'0" (see figure FP-10 in the Fire Prctection Evaluation Report).
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment.
The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone:
Division 1, 2 and 3 electrical cables Division 1, 2 and 3 control and instrument panels Division 1, 2 alta 3 valves, f
c.
Conclusions All the Division 1 cables and equipment important to safe shutdown are located on the east side of the zone.
O L
All Division 2 cables and equipment. required for safe
(~')
shutdown are located on the west side of the zone.
'a The distance between the divisions is approximately 50 feet and the main steam tunnels provide separation on one side of the zone.
There are Division 2 cables present on the east side of the zone.
These are part of the service air, instrument air, cycled condensate, leak detection, component cooling water, fuel pool cooling and cleanup, equipment drain, plant chilled water, drywell purge, reactor protection and neutron monit'oring ' systems.
None of these systems are required in achieving cold shutfown.
Division 2 nuclear boiler system cables service the main steam flow instrument panel A, also net needed for safe shutdown.
There are Division 1 cables On the west side of the zone.
These' cables are par.t of the neutron monitoring, nuclear boiler and reactor protection system.
The neutron cani-toring systems and reactor protection are not r.oeded for safe shutdown.
Faclear boiler cystem cables service the main steam flow instrument panel A which is not required for safe shutdown.
Therefore, in the event of a fire on the west side of the plant the Division 1 systems are still available for shutdown and with a fire on the east side Division 2 systens are available.
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems listed below:
(
Performance Goals System Which Meets Goal Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) or LPCI (Div. 2) 1 makeup 2.
Reacter protection SRV (Div. 1) or ADS (Div. 2) system 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) or RHR B cooling (Div. 2) 4.
Process variable
' Division 1 3nstrumentation j
indication for a
RPV pressure and level Suppression p.ool level and temp.
RCIC tank level or Division 2 instrumentation for:
RPV presnare and level Suppression pool level and temp.
RER B, RHR C pump flow d.
Modifications i
l No modifications are required.
2.5.3 Fire Zone C.4.1 i
a.
Descriptica The zone is comprised of the general access and equip-ment area at elevation 778 '0" of the containment building (see figure FP-ll in the Fire Protection Evaluation
(
Report).
89-w.*-
.-~%
..,-y
,_w
,,,-p i,e
,.y
,,-,,,,_p-
.-e.-----
b.
Safety-related cables and equipment.
p)
The following safety-related cables and equipment are s_
located in this zone:
Division 1, 2 and 3 electrical cables Standby liquid control storage tank and pumps.
c.
Conclusions All of Division 1 safety-related cables and equipment are located on the east side of this fire zone.
All of the Division 2 cables and equipment are located on the west side of the zone except for cables in the following systems:
1.
Suppression pool makeup 2.
Reactor protection (cables that service hydrogen
~
control unit) 3.
cycled condensate 4.
drywell purge 5.
component cooling w'ater 6.
equipment drain 7.
containment building IIVAC 8.
fuel pool cooling and cleanup 9.
starter cooling water 10.
neutson monitoritig 11.
instrument air 12.
makeup condensate storage 13.
fuel handling and transfer 14.
plant chilled water O
-"~
w
None of these systems are required to bring the plant
()
to cold shutdown.
The Division 1 and 2 systems needed for safe shutdown are separated by approximately 50 fee t.. the main steam tunnel, and partly by the fuel transfer tube.
In the event of a fire on the east side of the plant the Division 2 systems necessary for shutdcun would still be operable.
If a fire occurred on the west side '
the Division 1 systems would be available.
Performanco goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the systems. listed below:
Verformance Goal System Which Meets Goal 4
1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) or LPCI (Div. 2) makeup 2.
Raactor pressure SRV (Div. 1) or (Div. 2) control 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) or RHR B cooling (Div. 2) 4.
Process variable Division 1 instrumentation indication for:
RPV level and pressure s
Supprcssion pool level and temp.
RHR A, RCIC pump flow RCIC tank levei or O
~
f System which Meets Goal Division 2 instrumentation O
for:
\\_/
RPV level and pressure Suppression pool level and temp.
Modifications HNo modifications are required.
2.54 Fire Zone C.5.1 a.
Description The zone is comprised of a general access area at elevatior 803 and the refueling floor at elevation l
t 828'3" (see figure FP-12 and FP-13 in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report).
l b.
Safety-related cables and equipment.
The following safety-related cables and equipment are located in this zone:
Division 1 and 2 electrical cables Division 1 and 2 valves.
c.
Conclusions l
The Division 1 cables and valves are not located closer than about 70 feet from Division 2 cables and valves which are needed for safe shutdown.
The fuel transfer pool is located between the important equipment.
A fire near one of the divisions should not damage the other
, l
divisior, therefore, cold shutdown can be achieved.
Performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured by the system listed below:
Performance Goal System Which Meets Goal 1.
Reactor coolant RCIC (Div. 1) or LPCI (Div. 2) makeup-2.
Reactor pressure control SRV (Div. 1) or ADS - (Div. 2) control 3.
Suppression pool RHR A (Div. 1) or RHR !!
cooling (Div. 2) 4.
Process variable Divisio'n 1 instrumentation indication for:
.RPV pressure and level Suppression' pool level and temp.
RHR A, RCIC pump flow RCIC tank level I
or u
RPV pressure and level Suppression pool level-and temp.
RHR B, -RHR C pump flow e
d.
Modifications No modifications are required.
l.
I i
- O j.
1
3.
List of Modificatior.s Fire Zone Modifications A.4.6 Enclose the Division 2 supply
{;
and exhaust dQcts in mineral, a fiberous insulating material.
Build a false ceiling below the D.2.1 Division 2 cable trays and a wall along row AA on top of the laboratory roof.
The wall and ceiling are to carry a 3-hour fire rating.
D. 3."1 Reroute Division 1 cables 1RH,18B, 1RH21B, 1DG01C, 1DG0lJ 1DG0lK, 1SX30E D.3.2 Reroute the Division 1 and 2 diesel generator and diesel generator HVAC cable so that the divisions are separated by 50 feet.
D.4.2 Provide an opening with fire and back-draft dampers in the wall located along column 130.
Connect fans OVA 04CA, OVA 04CB (44 BHP, 50HP motor each),
OVA 05CA and OVA 05CB (39.5 BHP, 50 HP motor each) to the Division 1 diesel generator.
l l
l l.
=.-.-.
Fire Zone Modifications I
F.3.1 Reroute cables 1DG31A and B
]
I so that they pass through zoner D.3.2, D.3.ll, D.3.12, D.3.10, D.3.8, D.3.6, and D.3.4 before entering the fuel building near l
the south wall.
l 1
e f
r i
I i
J 1
e e
i i
l l
O l l
l qil l
1 I
.l y
- t t e uf 2
h ad&
li;!
SS e1 t
ena X
I f wl v aoei e
SdRD
-p i.
y un
- t y
qw t e l
eo uf n
d h ado st SS e X
X i u t2 hh ena t s f wl v aoei re SdRD ef ha t s e
hrwo y
,f
- t y
's y t e l
er uf n
l a h ado X
X X
b s SS e as t 1 ce ena c
f wl v.
r e aoei o n SdRD t s ni ems
. 2 pe d&
il ye1 ub t t X
X X
X qa ea.
ec f l v aei d r SRD eo t/
ad l n ea r
d 1
t ye3 yn t t E
t e ea
.y L
em f l vl B
f p aein A
ai SRDO T
s uq ne ias 3
ti d&
nh ye2 ot t t
. y X
c ea f
f l vl si aein e
SRDO nd on za e2 3
r d&
i r ye1 f o t t
/
ea. y X
hd f l vl cn aein i a SRDO h
w1 sn wo oi hs p
si i
v u
ei q
ld yE s b
t e
as edl X
X ti f eb at a st S aC in l
he oer Tn NR o O
eno Z
0 4
4 6
8 9
1 2
3 5
6 7
1 2
3 5
7 1
1l e
1 I
I I
l 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 r
i F
3.
A 4
A A
A A
A A
A A
A A
A A
A A
l1l 1
l 1
1ll
i)
,Il)lj ll l
l y
- t t e uf 2
h ad&
SS e1 t
ena f wl v.
X X
aoei SdRD
-p i.
y un
- t y
qw t e l
eo uf n
d h ado st SS e X
X X
A X
i u t2 hh ena t s f wl v.
aoei re SdRD ef h a t s e
hrwo
,f y
- t y
sy t e l
er uf n
l a h ado X
X X
X X
x b s SS e as t1 ce ena c
f wl v.
re aoei on SdRD h
t s ni ems 2
pe d&
il ye1 ub t t X
qa ea.
ec fl v
.aei d r SRD eo t/
ad l n ea r
d 1
t ye3 yn t t E,
t e ea
.y em f l vl i
t f p aein t
A ai SRDO T
suq ne ias 3
~
ti d6 nh ye2 ot t t y
y c
ea f
fl vl si aein e
S R D 'J nd on za c2 3
r d6 I r ye1 f o t t X
/
ea y
hd f l vl cn aein i a SRDO hw1 sn a
wo oi h s p
si i
v u
ci q
id yEs b
t e
as edl ti f eb at a st S aC i n l
h e oer Tc NR o i
Or e
l l
f ll no Z
1 2
1 2
4 5
6 2
3 4
5 6
7 1
1 3
7 1
1 e
r 2
3 3
3 3
3 3
2 3
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 I.
i F
A A
A A
A A
A A
A A
A
\\,lA A
A
- A A
D l
1l
y
- t t e uf 2
h ad6 SS e1 t
- a 'v.
X X
f i<
4!
wl f
aoei S d l' D Od i
y f
un
- t y
qw t e l
eo uf n
d h ado st SS e i u t2 hh ena t s f wl v.
aoei re SdRD ef h a t s eh r wo f
y
- t y
sy t e l
er uf n
a.
h ado l
b SS e as t1 ce enn c
f w i v.
re aoei on SdRD f
t s ni ems 2
pc
.d &
ye1 i]
i b
t t p
s a
ea.
ec f l v
.aei d r SRD eo t/
I ad n lea r
d t
ye3 yn t t e
ea. y X
tem f l vl f p aein
- i. i SRDO suq ne i
an 3
ti d6 nh ye2 ot t t X
X X
c ea. y
.X f
f l vl ni aein e
SRDO ni t
on za e2 3
r d6 ir ye1 f o t t X
X X
X X
X
/
ea. y hi f l vl t
cn aein a
SRDO i
hw1 sn wo oi h s p
=
si i
=
v u
ei q
=
l d yE s b
t e
X x
X X
an edl LI f eb at a 6
t S aC l n l
he uer
- m NR o i
eno Z
0 1
2 3
2 3
4 5
6 8
9 2
3 4
5 0
7 1
1 1
1 1
e r
1 1
1 1
1 l.
1 2
2 2
2 1
1 1
1 1
2 i
F D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D b
y
- t t e uf 2
h ad6 SS e1 t
ena il I;
f wl v.
aoei SdRD 1,
p y'
i.un
- t y
qw t e l
eo uf n
d h ado st SS e u
t2 i
hh ena t s f wl v.
aoei r e SdRD el h a.
t e
h r wo y
,f
- t y
sy t e l
er uf n
a.
h ado l
SS e b
t is t1
- ee ena c
f wl v.
r e aoei on SdRD
.I t s ni e
,2 ms pe d&
ye1 il ub t t qa ea ec f l v
.aei d r SRD eo t/
ad n lea r
d g
t ye3 yn t t t e ea
.y y,
em f l vl ggg.
i i SRDO f p aein
- u q
ne i
as 3
d6 t i nh ye2 ot t t X
X X
X y
c ea f l vl
.f i
acin e
SI DO md i n z a e2 3
r d6 i r ye1 f o t t X
y
/
ea hd f l vl cn aein a
SRDO i
h wI nn wo oi h s p
si i
v u
ei q
b t
e X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X d
yE s l
an edl ti f eb at a st S aC n
l l
e oer
'il m NR o eno Z
0 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
0 1
2 6
7 8
9 2
2 2
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
e 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 r
2 2
2 F
D D
D D
D..
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
i
y
- t t e uf 2
h ad6 SS e1 t
ena f wl v.
ii i
- i!
aoei SdRD p
y i.un
- t y
qw t e l
eo uf n
d h ado st SS e i u t2 hh ena t s f wl v.
aoei r e SdRD ef h a t s e
h r wo
,f y
- t y
sy t e l
er uf n
l a h ado X
b s SS e as t 1 ce ena c
f wl u.
r e aoo$
o n SdPD t s ni eas 2
pe d&
il ye1 ub t t X
qa ea ec fl v aei d r SRD eo t/
I;4l ad l n ea r
d 1
t ye3
) n t t E
t e ea
.y X
X L
em fl vl B
f p aein A
ai SRLO T
suq r, e i
at 3
e ti d&
nh ye2 ot t t y
X X
X c
ea.
f fl vl si aein d
e SRDO nd on za e2 3
r d5 ir ye1 f o t t X
/
ea
.y X
hd fl vl cn aein ia SRDO hw1 sn wo oi h s p
si i
v u
ei q
ld yE s b
t e
X X
X X
X X
X X
as edl ti f eb at a st S aC in l
he oer Tm NR o eno 4
5 6
7 8
9 0
0 Z
2 2
2 2
2 2
3 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
1 e
r 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
i F
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D j
l l
y
- t t e uf 2
h ad&
SS e 1, t
ena f wl v.
aoei SdRD O.
p i
y un
- t y
qw t e l
eo uf n
d h ado st SS e i u t2 hh ena t s r wl v.
aoei re dRD ef ha t s e
h r wo y
,f
- t y
sy t e l
cr uf n
i a i ado h s PS e as t1 ce ena wl v.
ru f
aoei on SdRD
.s t
ni ems 2
ne y, d 5 X
e1 i l ub t t X
X.
x
(
qa ea ec fl v
.aei
'd r SRD eo t/
ad l n ea r
d 1
t ye3 yn t t E
t e ea
.y X
L em f l vl r
B f p aein A
ai SRDO T
suq ne ias 3
ti d6 nh ye2 ot t t y
X X
X c
ea f
f l vl si aein e
SRDO nd on za e2 3
r d6 ir ye1 f o t t y
/
ea y
hd f l vl cn aein ia SRDO hw1 sn wo oi h s p
si i
v u
ci q
id yEs b
t e
X X
X X
X X
X X
X as edl ci f eb at a st S aC in l
he oer Tm NR o o
e no 1
2 3
4 0
1 2
3 4
Z 1
1 1
1 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
1 1
1 1
1 er 3
3 3
3 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 i
F D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D j
l
- llll, llll l
1
t e iE 2
h ad6 SS e1 t
ena X
X X
f wl v.
aoei SdRD Op-y i.un
- t y
qw t e l
eo uf n
d h ado st SS e i u t2 hh ena t s f wl v.
aoei re SdRD ef h a t s e
h 'r wo y
,f
- t y
sy t e l
er uf n
l a h ado b s SS e as t1 ce ena c
f w l' v.
re aoei on SdRD 1
t s ni ems 2
pe d6 il ye1 ub t t qa ea.
ec fl v aei d r SRD eo t/
ad l n ea r
d 1
t ye3 yn t t c
t e ea. y X
X o
em fl vl
. m, f p aein ai SRDO 1
suq ne ias 3
ti d&
nh ye2 ot t t y
ea.
c,f fl vl si aein e
SRDO nd on za e2 3
r d6 f r ye1 f o t t x
. y
/
ea hd f l vl cn aein
. ia SRDO hw1 sn wo oi h s p
si i
v u
ei q
l d yE s b
t e
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X as edl ti f eb at a st S aC in l
he oer Tn NR o
_ o e
i!
no 5
6 7
1 9
0 1
2 3
4 5
1 Z
1 1
1 1
2 2
2 2
2 2
1 2
3 4
5 e
6 er 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
5 5
5 S
5 5
i F
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D 4
j' l!!'
i) 1' j
i
l f
(
f 7
t G
- t uf 2
h ;d6 SS s1 t
f wl v.
X X
x a n i.
aoei SdRD
,i I
y
.n
- t y
w t e l
co uf n
d h ado ct SSe i u t 2 hh ena
~
t s f wl v aoei re SdRD ef ha t s e
h r wo y
,f
- t y
sy t e l
er uf n
l a h ado b s SS e as t1 X
ce ena c
f wl v.
e aoei r n SdRD o
1 t s ni ems 2
pe dA il yeI ub t t qa ea.
ec f l v
.aei d r SRD eo t/
ad l n ea r
d 1
t ye3 yn t t X
I X
I E
t e ea
.y L
em fl vl 1
1 f p aein A
ai SRDO T
suq f
ne ias 3
ti d6 nh ye2 ot t t X
y c
na
- u. l ' v l f
si tein e
SI DO nd on za e2 3
r d6 i r ye1 f o t t
/
ea y
hd f l vl X
X cn aein i a SRDO hw1 sn wo oi h s p
si i
v u
ei q
ld yE s b
t e
as edl X
X X
X X
X ti f eb at a st S aC in l
he oer Tm NR o ca o
0 1
2 1
4 5
6 7
Z 7
8 9
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 2
3 4
5 o
e 5
5 S
5 S
5 5
5 5
5 5
6 6
6 6
6 6
r LD i
5 F
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D lill j'
l l
l t e h
uf 2
h ad6 SS e1 t ena f wl v.
X aoei SdRD
-p y
.n
- t y
qw t e l
eo uf n
d h ado st SS e X
i u t2 hh ena t s f wl v.
aoei re SdRD ef h a t s e
hr wo f
y
- t y
sy t e l
cr uf n
i 1 h ado h s SS e as t1 X
ce ena f wl v.
- r r
e aoei o
n SdRD 1
t s ni ems 2
pe d6 il ye1 ub t t X
qa ea.
ec f l v
.aei d r SRD eo t/
ad l n ea r
d t
ye3 yn t t
~
t e ea y
em f l vl f p aein ai SRDO suq ne l
ias 3
ti d5 nh
'ye2 ot t t c
ea. y f
fl vl si aein e
SRDO nd on za e2 3
r d6 f r ye1 f o t t
/
ea. y X
hd f l vl X
cn aein i a SRDO h
w1 sn wo oi h s p
si i
v u
ei q
ld yEs b
t e
as edl X
X X
X X
X y
X X
X ti f eb at a st S aC in l
he oer Tn NR o 9
eno 1
Z 7
8 9
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 l
I 1
1 2
i er 6
6 6
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
2 2
i F
n D
D F
F F
F F
F F
F F
F F
F F
F l
l l
1l1 l
1!
0 0
d y
- t t e ef 2
h ad6 SS e1 t ena f wl v.
X aoei l
l I
SdRD
[.
y un
- t y
=
qw t e l
eo uf n
d h ado at SS e i u t2 hh ena t s f wl v.
aoei r e SdRD ef 1
ly h a t s e
h r wo y
,f
- t y
sy t e l
er uf n
l a h ado b s SS e as t1 ce ena e
c f wl v.
r e aoei on SdRD t s A
ni ems 2
pe d6 il ye1 ub t
t-qa ea.
ec f l v
.aei d r SRD eo t/
ad l n ea r
d t
ye3 yn t t t e ea
.y em fl vl f p aein ai SRDO suq ne i
as 3
ti d6 nh ye2 ot t t c
ea
.y f
fl vl
~
si aein e
SRDO nd on za c2 3
r d6 I r ye1 X
( o t t X
X X
X X
X
/
ea. y hd fl vl cn aein ia SRDO h
w1 sn wo oi h s p
si i
v u
ei q
ld yE s b
t e
X X
X X
X X
as edl ti f eb at a st S aC in l
he oet Tm NR o m
e no Z
e 2
4 6
1 1
1 2
1 2
1 2
3 5
7 S.
S.
5 5
S 5
o 4
4 S.
r 1
1 2
1 3
i F
C C
C C
C C
C C
C C
C C
C C
,I lif li y
- t t c uf 2
h ad5 SS e1 t
ena f 's,l v;'
i aoei SdRD i.
y un
- t y
qw t e l
eo uf n
d h ado nt SS e i u t2 hh ena t s f wl v aoei r e SdRD ef ha l
t s e
h r wo f
y
- t y
sy t e l
er uf n
l a h ado b s SS e as t 1 ce ena c
f wl v.
e aoei ro n SdRD f
t s ni ems 2
pe d6 il ye1 t
X ub qa ca ec f l v
.aei d r SRD eo t/
ad l n ea r
d 1
t ye3 yn t t X
E t e ea
.y L
em f l vl B
f p aein A
ai SRDO T
suq j'
ne ias 3
ti d&
nh ye2 X
ot t t c
ea y
f fl vl si aein e
SRDO nd on z a c2 3
r d&
J r ye1 f o t t X
/
ea
.y hd f l vl x
cn aein i a SRDO hw1 sn wo oi h s p
si i
v u
ci q
i d yE s b
t e
as edl x
x X
X X
X X
X X
X x
ti f eb at a st S aC in l
he oer Tm NR o eno 0
1 Z
3 4
5 6
7 1
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 1
1 e
2 2
2 2
2 3
1 I
1 1
1 l
1 1
l 1
1 r
i F
F F
F
'F F
F M
M M~
M M
M M
M M
M
J TABLE 1.1 PRIMARY SYSTEMS FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN OF REACTOR Gb REDUNDANT REDUNDANT FUNCTION METHOD METHOD PURPOSE
- 1
- 2 SYSTEMS Reactor Scram Normal Scram Scram Button Decay Heat Removal and SRV Division 1 ADS Division 1 Reactor Water Makeup RCIC RHR Loop C,(LPCI)
Suppression Pool Cooling RHR Loop A RHR Loop B INSTRUMENTATION Reactor Vessel Pressure PT 1C61 N006 Nuclear Boiler In-strumentation Div. 2 Reactor Vessel Level LT 1C61 N010 Nuclear Boiler In-strumentation Div. 2 SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN HVAC -
ECCS Equipment Room HVAC Div. 1 Div.,2 Shutdown Service Water Pump Room HVAC Div. 1 Div. 2 Diesel Room HVAC Div. 1 Div. 2 Essential Switchgear Heat Removal Including Refriger-ation Div. 1 Div. 2 Service Water System Shutdown Service Water Div. 1 Div. 2 Electrical Div. 1 Div. 2 Diesel renerator Div. 1 Div. 2 Ootese1 rue 1011 01v. 1 01v. 2 AC Power System Div. 1 Div. 2 DC Power System Div. 1 Div. 2
TABLE 1.2 I
O O
,f UNIT 1 - SHUTDOWN METHOD NO. 1 - MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT LIST i
Component' Number Elevation Colmn/ Row Fire Zone Cor: Rents RHR Pump 1A lE12C002A 707.'6" V-Z/117-121 A.l.5 Discharge to Radwaste Valve lE12F040 739'0" U6/107-110 A.2.2 NC/C/C i
RIIR Pump Suction Valve lE12F004A 720'0"'
Z-AB/117-121 A.l.6 NO/0/C IIeat Exchange Shell Side lE12F048A 734'5" U-U6/114-ll7 A.l.5 NO/C/C Bypass Valve Injection Shutoff Valve lE12F027A 781'0"3 AB-AC/121-123 A.3.5 NO/C/O ll2/A 0 -90' C.3.2 NC/C/O RilR Injection Valve lE12F042A 761'3.5" 3
ll2/A 148*-10' C.5.1 NC/C/C Containment Spray Valve lE12F028A 847'6" 3
112/A 65*.45' C.S.1
-NC/C/C Shutoff Upper Pool Cooling Valve lE12F37A 805'0" 3
Shutdown Cooling Valve lE12F006A 712'6" X-Y/119 A.l.5 NC/C/C Shutdown Cooling Valve lE12F006B2 710'6.75" V-Z/105-107 A.l.3 NC/C/C RHR Pump Minimum Flow Valve lE12F064A.
707'6"3 V-Y/ll7-121 A.l.5 liO/C/C Heat Exchanger Shell Side lE12F047A 790'0" U-U6/ll4-ll7 A.3.6 NO/O/O Inlet Vlave IIeat Exchanger Shell Side lE12F003A 734'5" U-V/ll4-ll7 A.l.5 N0/0/O Outlet Valve Inboard Suction Isolation lE12F0092 747'9" 112/A 0*
C.l.1 NC/C/D 3
Valve Outboard Shutdown Isolation lE12F008 755'0"3 X/112 A.3.2 NC/C/0 4
TABLE 1.2 UNIT 1 - SHUTDOWN METIIOD NO. 1 - MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT LIST - (Cont'd)
Number Elevation Column / Row Fire Zone Comments!
Component lE12F053A 792'6" X-V/ll4-117 A.3.6 NC/C/C RHR Injection Valve Rl!R IIcat Exchanger Flow to RCIC 1E12F026A 739'0"
~ U6/114-117 A.2.6 NC/C/C Steam Line Isolation Valve lE12F052B2 790'0" U-V/107-110 A.3.7 NC/C/C Steam Line Isolation Valve lE12F052A 790'0" U6-V/114-117 A.3.6 NC/C/C RHR Heat Exchanger Flow to lE12F011A 739'0" U-U6/ll4-117 A.2.6 NC/C/C Suppression Pool Valve RHR Test Line Valve lE12F024A 713'0" AC-AD/123-124 A.l.6 NC/0/C lleat Exchanger Cooling Water lE12F068A 707'6" X,--Z/ll4-ll7 A.l.5 NC/0/0 Outlet Valve Heat Exchanger Cooling Water lE12F014A 707'6" V/ll4-ll7 A.l.5 NC/0/0 Inlet valve lE12B001A 707'6" V-X/ll4-ll7 A.l.5, RHR IIeat Exchanger 781'0" A.2.6, A.3.6, RCIC Connection Valve 1E12F023 739'0",
U6/107-110 A.2.2 NC/C/C 4
lE51F010 707'6"3 X-Z/ll2-ll4 A.l.4 N0/0/0 Pump Suction from Condensate Storage Valve f
4 Pump Suction from Suppression lE51F031 707'6"3 X-Z/110-112 A.l.4 NC/C/C l
Pool Valve 4
RCIC Injection Shutoff Valve lE51F013 755'0"3 V-X/110-ll2 A.3.2 NC/0/C 4
Lube Oil Cooling Valve lE51F046 707'6"3
'U6-V/ll2-ll4 A.l.4 NC/C/C Minimum Flow to Suppression lE51F19 737'0"3 Z/ll4-ll7 A.2.6 NC/C/C Pool Valve 4
lE51F022 767'0" X-Z/114-ll7 A.1.5 NC/C/C Test Bypass to Condensate Storage Tank Valve
Tatum
.t. 2 UNIT 1 - SIIUTDOWN METHOD NC). 1 - MECilANICAL EQUIPMENT LIST -(cont'd)
O Component Number Eleva; ion Column / Row Pire Zone CommentsI Test Bypass to Condensate lE51F059 763'9" X-Z/ll4-117 A.l.5 NC/C/C4 Storage Tank Valve Steam to Turbine Valve lE51F045 710'11.25" V-X/ll2 A.l.4 NC/0/C4
(
4 RIIR Cond. IIeat Exchanger lE51F064 755'0" X/110-ll2 A.3.2 NO/O/0 Steam Line Isolation Valve Steam Supply Line Isolation lE51F063 761'2 7/8" 'll2/AZ0*
Col.1 NO/O/04 Inboard Valve-Turbine Exhaust ;o Suppression lE51F068 743'.125" X-Z/ll2-ll4 A,2,12 NO/O/04 Pool Valve Vaccum Breaker Isolation lE51F077 741'6" X-Z/112-ll4 A.2.12 NO/C/04 Outboard Valve Vaccum Breaker Isolation lE51F0782 737'0"3 X-Z/ll4-ll7 A.2.6 NO/CO4i Inboard Valve 4
Steam Line Warm-up Line lE51F0762 755'0"3 112/AZ270*-360*
C.l.1 NC/C/C Isolation Valve RCIC Storage Tank 1RIO1T 736'0" AH-AM/124-130 1
RCIL Pump lE51C001 707'6" U6/112-114 A.1.4 l
RCIC Turbine lE51C002 707'6" V/ll2-ll4 A.1.4 4
710'11.25"' V/112-114 A.l.4 NO/0/0 RCIC Turbine Trip / Throttle Valve Shutdown Service Water Pump IA 1SX0lPA 699'0" C/6-8 M.1.10 Diesel Generator Cooling Water ISXO63A 744'2" 128-129/AF-AG D.2.3 NC/0/O Valve f
Plant Service Water /SSW 1SX014A 699'0" 241/C M.1.10 NO/C/C System Interconnection Valve e
E
TABLE 1.2 c3
(;)
UNIT 1 - SHUTDOWN METHOD NO. 1 - MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT LIST - (cont'd)
(_/
l Component Number Elevation Column / Row Fire Zone Comments 5
M.1.10 NO/O/O SSWS Strainer Outlet Valve 1SX004A 699'0"3 2-1/C SSWS Strainer Inlet Valve 1SX003A 699'0"3 2-1/C5 M.1.10
'NO/O/O SSWS Strainer Bypass Valve 1SX008A 699'0".3 2-1/C5 M.J.10 NC/C/C j
Fuel Pool Make-up Motor Valve 1SX016A 738'9" AM-AL/116 F.2.1 NC/C/C NC/C/C SSWS Div. 1/2 Crosstie 1SX0llA Isolation Valve Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger 1SX012A 738'9" AM-AL/112.1-116 F.2.1 NC/C/C Inlet Valve Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger 1SX062A 739'3" A'Ri-AL/109.5-
't, F.2.1 NC/C/C 112.1 Outlet Valve RHR-A heat Exchanger Deminer-ISX082A 726'0" V-X/ll4-117 A.l.5 NO/C/C alizer Water Inlet. Valve SGTS Train A Charcoal Bed ISX073A-702'0"3 1,28/AC-AD D.l.1 NC/C/C Water Supply Valve Control Room HVAC Unit A ISXO76A 826'6" 132/T-V D.6.2 NC/C/C Deluge Valve Control. Room HVAC Unit A ISX197A 826'6" 132-133/V-Y D.6.2 NC/C/C I
Deluge Valve Diesel Generator lA Heat 1DGllAA 737'0"3 128-129/AC-AG D.2.3 1DG12AA Exchangers Diesel Generator Vent Fan lA lVD01CA 762'0"3 125-128/AF-AG D.3.5 Diesel Generator Vent Oil lVD02CA 737'0"3 125-128/AG-AJ D.2.25 Room Exhaust Fan lA
v
.4 TABLE 1.2 r3 c
\\_)
UNIT 1 - SHUTDOWN METHOD NO, 1 - MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT LIST - (conttd)
Component Number Elevation Column / Row Fire Zone _ Commer.ts l Switchgear Heat Removal Fan IVXO3CA 781'0"3 AC/121-124 A.4.6 Battery Room Exhaust Fan IVX05CA 781'0"3 U-S/114-117 A.4.3 ECCS RHR Pump Room A Supply Fan IVY 02C 707'6"3 X-V/117-119 A.l.5 ECCS RHR Heat Exchanger A lVYO3C 707'6"3 X/114-ll7 A.1.5 l
i ECCS RCIC Pump Room Cooling coil IVf04A 707'6"3 X-V/110-112 A.l.4 ECCS RCIC Pump Room Supply Fan IVYO4C 707'6"3 X-V/110-112 A.1.4 ECCS RCIC Pump Room Coil IVYO4S 707'6"3 X-V/110-112 A.1,4 Cabinet
~1 SSW Pump Room A Supply Fan IVH01CA 699'0"3 1/C M.1.10 Switchgear Heat Removal IVXO6CA 781'0" Y-AA/121-124 A.4,6
-r-Condensing Unit 1
SRV Valve 1B21-F051C 764'0"3 ll2/AZ83*
C l.1 l
SRV Valve 1B'21-F051G 764'0"3 ll2/AZ59' C l.1 SRV Valve 1B21-F051D 764'0"3 ll2/AZ270*-360' C,1,1 l
D.
G.
Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 1D00lPA 712 0" AF-AG/125 D.l.6 r-D. G.' Fuel Oil Valves 1DOOO3A
~12'0" AF-AG/128-129 D.l.6
-e-f D.
G.
Fuel Oil Valves 1DOOO6A
" 37 ' 0" AG-AJ/128-129 D.2.25
- e --
i Switchgear Heat Removal IVX08AA 781'0" AC/121-124 A.4.6 i
Cooling Coils Switchgear Heat Removal IVX12CA 781'0" V-Y/126-129 r 4.2 l
Eeturn Fan l
l
+ }l, e
s tn
')s e
t r
m o
C eno Z
2 1
e
)
r 3
6 d
i F
D D
tno
'c
(
e T
8 S
2 I
w 5
1 L
o 2
R 1
5 T
/
/ 2 N
n D
1 E
m A
/
M l
T 5
G P
o C
e e
4 9
I C
A S
UOE n
S L
o A
i C
t I
a 0
0 N
v 4
2 A
e 2
5 H
l 6
2 1
C E
7 8
E E
M LB-B B
A T
1 A
A r
C C
e 5
4 o
e O
b 0
0 N
m A
A u
V V
D N
O O
O HT B
E M
A N
s W
B n
O a
D A
f TU n
y H
a l
S F
p e
p t
u s
S 1
ua t
T h
n I
x e
N E
V U
t g
g e
n d
d 0
e l
l n
B B
op m
x x
o u
u C
A A
Ti.BLE 1.2 UNIT 1 - SIIUTDOWN METIIOD NO. 1 - MECllANICAL EQUIPMENT LIST - (cont'd)
Notes:
1.
Valve positions are listed for normal mode / hot star:dby/ cold shutdown.
2.
Division 2.
3.
Floor elevation.
l 4.
Cold shutdown position based on design system function; to be reviewed.
5.
Valve locations unlabeled; given location based on SSW'utrainer location on drawing
]
M01-lll6-2 and Figure FP-30.
I i
e e
3 j
i 9
a om
x x
TABLE 1.3
)
O O
i l
UNIT 1 - SHUTDOWN METHOD NO. 2 - MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT LIST
- 4.
Component Number Elevation Column / Row Fire Zone Comments)
- h 4
s RHR Pump 1B lE12C002B 707'6" V-Z/105-107 A.l.3 RHR Pump Suction Valve lE12F004B 720'0" Z-AB/105-107 A.l.3 NO/O/C f
~
Heat Exchanger Shell Side lE12F048B 734'5" U-V/107-110 A.l.3 NO/C/C
(
1 Bypass Valve 3
Injection Shutoff Valve lE12F27B 737'0"2 Z/107-110 A.2.2 NO/C/O 7
i
)
PJIR Injection Valve lE12F042B 750'0" ll2/A 180 -270*
C.3.2 NC/C/O j
3 i
Shutoff Upper Pool Cooling lE12F037B 805'0" ll2/A 270*-360*
C.5.1 NC/C/O 3
Valve Containment Spray Valve lE12F028B 833'6" 112/A3148*-10' C.5.1 NC/C/C 3
Shutdown Cooling Valve lE12F006A 712'6" X-Y/119 A.1.5 NC/C/C Shutdown Cooling Valve lE12F006B
. 710'6.75" V-Z/105-107 A.l.3 NC/C/C RHR Pump Minimum Flow Valve lE12F064B 720'0" V-Y/105-107 A.l.3 NO/C/C Heat Exchanger Shell Side lE12F047B 790'0" U-V/107-110 A.3.7 NO/O/O Inlet Valve i
Heat Exchanger Shell Side lE12F003B 734'5" U-V/107-110 A.1.3 NO/O/O.
Outlet Valve RHR Injection Valve lE12F053B 792'6" V-X/107-110 A.3.7 NC/C/C RHR Heat Exchanger Flow lE12F026B 739'0" U-U6/107-110 A.2.2 NC/C/C l-to RCIC
- 1 i
3 j
Steam Line Isolation Valve lE12F052A 790'0" U-V/ll4-ll7 A.3.6 NC/C/O.
jL i
'. j I
D r
TABLE 1.3
)
bI
'~'
UNIT 1 - SHUTDOWN METHOD NO. 2 - MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT LIST (cont'd) f Component e
Number Elevation Column / Row (
Fire Zone-(
Commenta l i
Steam Line Isolation Valve lE12F052B 790'0" U-V/107-110 A.3.7 NC/C/C)i R3R Heat Exchanger Flow to IE12F0llB 740'6" X/107-1.10 A.2.2 NC/C/C3 Suppression Pool Valve a
RHR Test Line Valve lE12F024B 752'0" X-Z/107-110 A.l.3 NC/0/Cj IIeat Exchanger Cooling Water lE12F068B 707'6"2 U-V/107-110 A.l.3 NC/O/Oj Outlet Valve q
lleat' Exchanger Cooling Water lE12F014B 707'6" V/107-110 A.l.3 NC/0/0 Inlet Valve RHR Heat Exchanger lE12B001B 707'6" V-X/107-110 A.1.3 781'0" A.2.2,A.3.7 Discharge to Radwaste Valve lE12F049 739'0" U-U6/107-110 A.2.2 NC/C/C' RCIC Connection Valve lE12F0233 739'0" U6/107-110 A.2.2 NC/C/C Inboard Suction Insolation 1E12F009 747'9" 112/A 0' C l.1 NC/C/O 3
Valve Outboard Shutdown Isolation lE12F008 3 755'0a 2 X/ll2 A.3.2 NC/C/O Valve b
0
TABLE 1.3 UNIT - SHUTDOWN METHOD NO. 2 - MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT LIST (cont'd)
-Co:nponent Number Elevhtion Column / Row Fire ZC,ne Commentsl 4'
Shutdown Service Water Pump 1B 1SX0lPB 699'0" 2-1/C M.l.9 l
Diesel Generator Cooling 1SX063B 737'0"2 AF-AG/129-130 D.2.4 NC/0/0,)
Wafar Valve l
Plant Service Water /SSW ISX014B 699'0"2 2-1/C M.l.9 NO/C/Ci Systems Interconnection Valve SSUS Strainer Outlet Valve 1SX004B4 699'0"2 2-1/C M.l.9 NO/0/Of 4
SSWS Strainer Inlet Valve 1SX003B4 699'0"2 2-1/C M.1.9 NO/O/01 SSNS Strainer Bypass Valve 1SX008B4 699'0"2 2-1/C M.l.9 NC/C/C Fuel Pool Make-up Motor Valve 1SX016B 713'6" AL-AM/106.8 F.1.1 NC/C/C HC/C/C' SSWS Div 1/2 Cross-tie Iso-ISX0llB lation valve Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger 1SX012B 713'6" AL-AM/104.5-F.1.1 NC/C/C Inlet Valve 106.8 Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger 1SX062B 737'0"2 AL-AM/1,06.8-F.211 NC/C/C Valve 109.8 RHR-B Heat Exchanger 1SX082B 726'9" V-X/107-110 A.1.3 NO/C/C Demineralizer Water Inlet Valve SGTS Train B Charcoal Bed 1SX073B 719'0"2 129/AE-AD D.l.12 NC/C/C Water Supply Valva 4
i
TABLE 1.3 G0 UNIT 1 - SHUTDOWN NO. 2 - MECHANICAL' EQUIPMENT LIST (cont'd)
Number Elevation Column / Row Fire Zone Comments Component Control Room IIVAC Unit B 1SX076B 826'6" 129/T-V D.6.2 NC/C/C Deluge Valve Control Room IIVAC Unit B ISX107B 826'6" 128-129/V-Y D.6,2 NC/C/C Deluge Control Valve Diesel Generator 1B IIeat 1DGllAB 737'0" 129-130/AC-AG D.2.4 Exchangers Shutdown Service Water Pump 1C 1SX0lPC 699'0" 2-1/C M.1.8 SSWS Strainer Bypass Valve 1SX008C" 699'0"2 2-1/C M.l.8 NC/C/C SSWS Strainer Inlet Valve ISX003C' 699'O 2-1/C M l.8 NO/0/C 2
SSWS Strainer Outlet Valve 1SX004C" 699'0" 2-1/C M.1.8 NO/O/O Plant Service Water /SSW 1SX014C 699'0"8 2'-1/C M.l.8 NO/C/C Systems Interconnection Valve l
Diesel Generator 1C lE225001 737'0"'
124-125/Al-AG D.2.2 Switchgear lleat Removal IVXO6CC 781'0" 128-129/AA-AC D.4.10 Condensing Unit Diesel Generator IC IIeat 1SX006C 741'4.375" 124-125/AF-AG D.2.2 NC/0/0 Exchanger Outlet Valve Diesel Generator Vent Fan 1B IVD01CB 762'0"2 129-130/AG-AF D.3.7 Diesel Generator Vent Oil lVD02CB 737'0"2 129-130/AJ-AG D.2.26 Exhaust Fan 1B Diesel Generator Vent Fan 1C lVD01CC 762'0"2 124-125/AG-AF D.3.3 Diesel Generator Vent Oil lVD02CC 737'0" 124-125/AF-AG D.2,24 Exhaust Fan 1C o
9 9
0 n
q
TABLE 1.3
(:)
(_~)
UNIT 1 - SHUTDOWN METHOD NO. 2 - MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT LIST (cont'd) 3 Number Elevation Column / Row Fire Zone Comments Component i
Switchgear Heat Removal Fan IVXO3CB 781'0"2 ACtAB/102-104 A.4.1 Battery Room Exhaust Fan lVX05CB 790'0"2 U-S/107-110 A.4.2 ECCS RHR Pump Room B Supply Fan IVYO6C 707'6"2' X-V/106-107 A.l.3
~--
t ECCS PHR HX Room 1B Cooling IVYOSAA,B 707'6"2 X/107-110 A.l.3 Coil A&B ECCS RHR Heat Exchanger B IVYO5C 707'6" 2 X/107-110 A.l.3 Room Supply Fan ECCS RHR HX Room 1B Coil IVY 05S 707'6"2 X/107-110 A.l.3 Cabinet ECCS HPCS Pump Room Supply Fan IVY 08CA 712'0"2 AH-AF/l'04.5 F.1.2 ECCS HPCS Pump Room Supply Fan IVYO8CB 712'0" 2 An Apf;04.5 F.1.2 5
2,l/C M.l.9 SSW Pump Room B Supply Fan IVH01CB 699'0"2 M.l.8 SSW Pump Room C Supply Fan IVH01CC 699'0"2 2-1/C Switchgear Ucat Removal IVXO6CB 781'0" Z-AE/102-105 A.4.1 Condensing Unit D.
G. Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 1DOO1PB 712'0" AF-A3/128 D.l.7 D. G. Fuel Oil Trans#er Pump 1D00lPC 712'0" AP-AG/129-130 D.l.5 D. G. Fuel Oil Valve ID0003B 712'0" AF-AG/129-130 D.l.7 D. G. Fuel Oil Valve 1DOOO6B 7 T. ' 0 "
AG-AJ/129-130 D.2.26
--e i
4
ThDLu 1.J
()
()
UNIT 1 - SHUTDOWN METHOD HO. 2 - MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT LIST (cont'd)
Comments Number Elevation Column / Row Fire Zone Comments!
D.
G.
Fuel Oil Valve 1D0003C 712'0" AF-AG/124-126 D.1.5 D.
G.
Fuel Oil Valve IDO.006C 737'0" "AG-AJ/124-126 D.2.24 Safety Relief Valve 1B21-F047B 764'0"2 112/AZ270*
C.l.1 Safety Relief Valve 1B21-F047C 764'0"2 112/AZ70' C.l.1 Safety Relief Valve 1B21-F047D 764'0"2 ll2/AZ270'-360' C l.1 RHR Pump 1C IE12C002C 707'6" 102-105/V-X A.1.2 RHR Injection Valve lE12F042C 752'6" 105/AB-AC A.2.ll NO/O/O RHR Pump Suction Valve lE12F105 725'0" 105/Z-AB A.l.2 NO/O/O Outlet to Supp. Pool Valve lEl'2F064C 713'1" 102-105/V-X A.l.2 NO/C/C Out let to Suppl Pool Valve lE12F021 728'8" 102-103/AC-AD A.l.7 NC/C/C RHR C Pump Room Supply Fan IVYO7C 707'6'?
102-105/X-Z A.1.2 i
RHR C Pump Room Cooling IVYO7AA 707'6" 102-105/X-Z A.l.2 Coil A&B IVYO7AB RHR C Pump Room Coil Cabinet IVYO7S 707'6" 102-105/X-Z A.l.2 Switchgear Heat Removal lVX08AB 781'0" AC/102-105 A.4.1 l
f Cooling Coils Switchgear Heat Removal IVX12CB 781'0" V-Y/126-129 D.4.2 Return Fans 1
TABLC 1.3 U
o m
UNIT 1 - SilUTDOUN METHOD NO. 2 - MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT LIST (cnnt'd)
Notes:
1.
Valve Positions are listed for normal mode / hot stendby/ cold shutdown.
2.
Floor elevation.
3.
Divison 1.
Valve locations unlabeled; given locations based on SSW strainer location on drawing 4.
M01-lll6-2 and Figure FP-30.
Th'is equipment is part of the High Pressure Core SprayvSystem which is redundant to the 5.
Low Pressure Core Injection System.
l I
l O
e 6
0 o'
.~
TABLE 1.4 Unit 1 - Safe Shutdown Electrical Equipment List Elevation Component Numbe_r_
(floor)
Column / Row Fire Zone A. Division 1 4.1 Kv SWGR 3Al LAP 07E 781'0" V-U/122 A.4.6 480V Substation lA 1APllE 781'0" Z-X/ll7-121 A.4.6
,AB MCC 1A1 1AP72E 781'0" X/119-122 A.4.6 CB MCC El OAP54E
-825'0"
~
132-133/V-Y' D.6.2 DG MCC 1A 1AP60E 737'0" 128/129/AA-AC D.2.1 SSW MCC 1A 1AP29E 699'0" 2-1/C M.l.10 AB MCC'lA2 LAP 73E 781'0" V-U/119-121 A.4.6 AB MCC 1A3 1AP74E 781'0" V-U/119 A.4.6
. i 125V Battery 1DC06E 781'0"-
121/V-Y A.4.6 Charger lA 125DC Battery lA 1DC01E 781'0" 114-117/S-U A.4.3 i
ll7 l21/V A.4.6 i
125 DC MCC 1A 1DCl3E 781'0" 125V DC Dist Pnl 1A 1DCl3E 781'0" 117-121/V A.4.6 120V AC NSPS Bus lA' C11-P0dlA 781'~0" 129-130/V-Y D.4.9 I
120/280V Instrument LAP 72E 781'.0" X/119-122 A.4.6 Transformer (AB MCC 1A) 120/208V Dist. Trans-OAP54E 825'0" 132-133/V-Y D.6.2 former (CB MCC E2) 120/208V Dint. Trans-LAP 29E 699'0" 2-1/C M.l.10 former (SSW MCC 1A)
I Diesel Generator 1A 1DG0lKA 737'0" 128-129/AD-AF D.2.3 O
,,---,.,..-w.,,e---..
-y.-.----
m
,,..y,-r--+-*'-~*---+-e
-cv m-
-n=
w--
+w-
- - - - - - + - - - - *== *-
t----
-- +, - '
TABLE 1.4 ( cont '_d)
Elevation Component Number (floor)
Column / Row Fire Zone A.
Division 1 (cont'd)
DG Starting Air com-1DG06SA 737'0" 128/AF-AG D.2.3 pressor Skid DG Cooling Water 1DG20PB 737'0" 128-129/AD-AF D.2.3 pumps 1DG20PA 737'0" 128-129/AD-AF D.2.3 1DG29PB 737'0" 128.129/AD-AF D. 2. 3
- 1DGl9PA 737'0" 128-129/AD-AF D.2.3 DG Heat Exchanger 1DGilAA 737'0" 128-129/AD-AF D.2.3 1DG12AA 7.37'0" 128-129/AD-AF.
D.2.3 DG Oil Cooler 1DG14AA 737'0" 128-129/AD-AF D.2.3 1DG15AA 737'0" 128-129/AD-AF D.2.3 DG Expansion Tank 1DG17TA 737'0" 128-129/AD-AF D.2.3 1DGl7TB 737'0" 128-129/AD-AF D.2.3 DG Fuel Oil Day Tank 1DG0lTA 737'0" 128/AG-AJ D.2.25 DG Fuel Oil Pump 1D00lPA 712'0" 128/AF-AG D.l.6 DG Fuel Oil Storage 1D00lTA 712'0"'
128-129/AE-AJ D.'l.6 Tank NSPS Inverter 1C71-S001B 712'0" 129-130/V-Y D.4.9 O
TABLE 1.4 (cont'd)
Elevation
')
Component Number (floor)
Columg/ Row Fire Zone
\\_./
B. Division 2.
4.1. KV SWGR 1B1 1AP09E 781'0" V-U/104 A.4.1 480V Substation 1B 1AP12E 781'0" Z-X/105/107 A.4.1 AB MCC 1B1 1AP75E 781'O."
X/102-106 A.4.1 CB MCC F1 OAP55E 825'0" 128-129/V-Y.
D.6.2
'DG MCC 1B 1AP61E 737'0" 129-130/AA-AC D.2.1 SSW MCC IB 1AP30E 699'0" 2-1/C M.l.9 AB MCC 1B2 LAP 76E 781'0" V-U-106 A.4.1 AB MCC,lB.3 1AP77E.
791'.0".
V-U/105-106 A.4.1 AB MCC 1B4 1AP94E 781'0" Z-X/102-106 A-4.1 125V DO Bat.ter 1DC07E 781'0" 105/V-X A.4.1 Charger 1B 125V DC' Battery 1B 1DC02E 781'0" 107 110/S-U A.4.2 8
125V DC MCC 1B 1DCl4E 781'0" 10.5-107/U-V A.4.1 125V DC Dist Pnl 1B 1DCl4E 781'0"'
105-107/U-V A.4.1 120V AC NSPS Bus 1B C7],-P001B 781'0" 129-130/T-V D.4.7 120/208V Instrument LAP 75E 781'0" X/102-106 A.4.1 Transformer (AB MCC 1B3) 120/208V Dist. Trans.
OAP55E 825'0" 128-129/V-Y D.6.2 former (CB MCC F2) 120/208V Dist. Trans.
LAP 30E 699'0" 2-1/C M.l.9 former (SEW MCC 1B)
Diesel Generator 1B 1DG0lKB 737'0" 129-130/AD-AF D.2.4 O
a
TABLE 1.4 (cont'd)
Elevation Component Number
( floor)
Column / Row Fire Zone B. D_ivision 2 (cont'd)
DG StartinJ Air 1DG06SB 737'0"'
129-130/LF D.2.4 Compressor Skid 4
DG Cooling Water 1DG20PC 737'0" 129-130/AD-AF D.2.4 Pumps 1DG20PD 737'0" 129-130/AD-AF D.2.4 1DGl9PC 737'0" 129-i30/AD-AF D.2.4 1DGl9PD 737'0" 129-130/AD-AF D.2.4 Heat Exchanger 1DGilAB 737'0" 129-130/AD-AF D.2.4 1DG12AB 737'0" 129-130/AD-AF D.2.4 Oil Cooler 1DG14AB 737'0" 129-130/AD-AF D.2.4 1DG15AB
.737'0" 129-130/AD-AF D.2.4 i
Expansion Tank 1DG17T7 737'0" 129-130/AD-AF D.2.4 1DGl8TB 737'0" 129-130/AD-AF D.2.4 DG Fuel Oil Day 1DG0lTB 737'0" 129-130/AG-AJ D.2.27 Tank DG Fuel Oil Pump 1D00lPB 712'0" 129-130/AF-AG D.l.7 DG Fuel Oil Storage 1D00lTB 712'0" 129-130/AE-AJ D.l.7 Tank NSPS Inverter 1C71-SOGlB 712'0" 129-130/T-V D.4.7 t
N li
()
4 0
O TABLE 1.5 a
UNIT NO.1 - SHUTDOWN METHOD NO.1 - INSTRLhENT LIST 3
14 CAL 1ACAL LOCAL 4
INSTRU-INSTRUMENT PANEL FIRE CONTROL ROOM j
MENTATIOW
_NLMBER __
NdfBER ELEV.
COL / ROW 20'iE.
INSTRTHENTATION NLHBER NUMBER CD!etENT AREA /.
OR RSP INSTXUMENT PANFL Speed IE51-N577 Locally 707'J6" v/131-114 A.1.4 Speed IC61R003 1C61-P001 RCIC Tur.
Element Mounted Indicator Speed Speed IE51R$80 1H13-P601 Indicator Temperature 1E51-H578 Locally 707'-6" v/112-114 A. I.4.
High Temperature IC61-P001 BCIC Tur.
Switch Mounted Alarm Cov. End Bearing 01 High Temp-rature IH13-P601 Alarm l
Temperature IE51-N579 7.scally 707'-6" v/11 '14 A.I.&
High Tempetsture IC61-P001 BCIO Tur.
1 Switch Nounted Alarm Coupling E 1
-~
Bearing 01
~
High Temperature 1H13-P601 Alana Pressare IE51-N580 Locally 707'-6" v/112-114 A.1.4 Low Pressere Switch i
Mounted IC61-P001 '
Oil Low Alarm Pressure Low Pressure IH13-P601 Alara Trip Throttle 707'6" v/112-114 A.I.4 Position Alarm Valve IC61-P001 RCIC Tur.
Closed Trip Valve Position Alarm 1H13-P601 Closed Flow IE51-N003 1H22P017 707'-6" u-v/110-112 A.I.4 Flow Indicating IC61-R001 1C61-P001 RCIC Tur.
Trar.saitter Controller Speed Con-trol Flow Controller IE51-R600 1H13-P601 Flow Indication
~ IE51-R606 IH13-P601 Level IC61-N505 Locally 736'-0" AH-AM/124-130 F.2.1 Level Indicator IC61-R505 1C61-P001 RCIC Storage Transmitter Mounted Tank 14 vel Level IE51-NO35E Locally 736'-0" AH-AM/124-130
.F.2.1 Level Alarm Low Transmit ter Mounted 1H13-P601 Level 1E51-N35A Locally 736'-0" Mi-AM/124-130 F.2.1 1
Transmitter Mounted
TABLE M l' NIT NO. 1 - SHUTDOWN MET 110D NO. 1 - INSTRL NT LIST (cont'd)
LOCAL LOCAL LOCAL FIRE CONTROL ROOM INSTRU-INSTRLMENT PANEL AREA /
OR RSP INSTRUMENT PANEL MEN 1ATIOM NLHSER NLHBER ELEV.
_ COL / ROW ZONE INSTRlHENTATION NLHBER NUMBER COMMENT Level IC61-N504 Locally 715'0" 117-121/AB-AC A.1.6 -
Level Indicator IC61-R504 1C61-P001 Suppression Transmitter Mounted Pool level Level 1E51-NO36A Locally 740'-0" AB-AC/121 A.2.10 Level Alarm 1H13-P601 i
Transmitter Mounted High
~
level IE51-NO36E Locally 740'-4" AB-AC/121 A.2.10 Transmitter.
Mounted Pressure IC61-N006 1H22-P004 755'-0" AC-AD/1 M-121 C.3.2 Pressure IC61-R011 1C61-P001 RPV Pressus Transmitter Indicator Level IC61-N010 1H22-P004 755'-0" AC-A:rJ117-121 C.3.2 Level IC61-R010 IC61-P001 RPV Level Tr.insmit te r Indicator Pressure IC61-NS03 Locally 699'-0" 2-1/C M.I.10 Prea n te IC61-R503 1C61-P001 SSWS Transmitter Mounted Indicator S.:rainer Discharge Pressure Pressure IP1-SX022 ISX11J 699'-0" 2-1/C M.I.10 Press. Differ-IC61-DS501 1C61-P001 SX Strainen Differential (note 1) ential Alarm Switch High Pressure 1Pl+SX022A ISX11J 699'-b" 2-1/C M.1.10 -
j Indicator (note 1)
Pressure IP1-SX0228 ISX11J 699'-0" 2-1/C M.1.10
=
Indicator (nute 1)
Temperature IC61-N501 Locally 741'-6" 112/AZ45' C.1.1 Temperature IC61-R501 1C61-P001 Lower Dry-Element Mounted Indicator Temp.
Tempe ature IC61-N502 Locally 172'-4" 112/AZ317*
C. P.1 Temperature IC61-R502 1C61-P001 L'pper Dry-Elen.ent Mounted Indicator well Temp.
Level 1821-N081A Ill22-P004 755'0,"
112/A20*-90*
C.3.2 Level Relay 1821-N681A RPV Level Transmitter Level Recorder IB21-R623A IH13-P601 f
Pressure IB21N078A 1H22-P004 755'0" 112/AZ0*-90*
C.3.2 Prc.Aure Relty 1821-678A RPV Pressur l
Transmitter Pressure Recorder 1821-R673A IH13-P603 l
l l
1
~
,. _. - ~.. _.
i l
b i
l TABLE 1.5 i
l UNIT NO. 1 - SHUTDOWN METif0D NO. 1 - INSTRUMENT LIST (cont'd)
[
thCAL LOCAL LOCAL FIRE CONTROL ROOM l
INSTRU-INSTRLHENT PANEL ARLA OR RSP.
INSTRUMENT PANEL
--MlWTATION-
- NtHBER NUMBER ELEV.
COL /k_OW ZONE.
INSTRUMENTATION NUMBER Nt%$ER _
ColGEENT 4
Flow 1E12-N007A 1H22-P018 707'6" 117-121/Z A.1. 5 [
Flow indicator 1E12-R602A 1H13-P601 SSWS A transmitter i
)
Temp. Element ITE-CM007 Locally 736'0" 112/AZ83*
C.1.2 Temp. Relay ITY-CM001 1H13-P862 Supp. Pool I
]
Pounted Temperatus 4
1
(
Temp. Element ITE-CM003 Locally 736'0" 112/AZ59*
C. I.,2 Temp. Relay ITY-Ot003 1H13-P862 j
l Mounted I
Temp. Element ITE-CM001 Locally 736'0" 1121 AZ20-360*
C.1.2 Temp. Rele ITY-CM007 1H13-P862 l
l Mounted C.I.2 Temp. Recorder ITR-CM017 1H13-P601 i
High Temp. Alarm 1H13-P601 Temp. Element ITE-CM007 M calip 736'0" 112/AZ83*
C.1.1 ',
Temp. Relay IC61-K567 1C61-P001 Hounted Temp. Indicator IC61-R503 1C61-P001 j
Temp. Element ITE-CM003 Locally 736'0" 112/AZ59' C.1.1 Temp. Relay IC61-R508 1C61-P001 i
Mounted i
Temp. Indicator IC61-R508 1C61-P001 Temp. Element ITE-CM001 Locally 736'0" 112/AZ270*-360*
C.1.1,*
Temp. Relay IC61-K506e IC61-P001 a
i Hounted L
Temp. Indicator IC61-R506 1C61-P001 Flow IE12-N015A 1H22-P018 707'6" Y-AA/117-121 A.1.5 Plow Indicator IE12-R603A 1H13-P601 RHR A Flos j
Transmitter Flow 1C61-N001 1H22-P014 707'6" Y-iA/117-121 A.1.5 Plow Indicator IC61-R005 1C61-P001 Transmitter I
r Temp. Element WP033C Locally 741'6",
112/AZ45' C.1.1 Temp. Indicator ITIU-VP0335 1H13-P801 Lower Dry-Mounted well temp.
Temp. Element VP033D Locally 772'4" 112/AZ117*-130' C.1.1 Tee:p. Indic,ator 1TIU-VP031B 1H13-P801 Upper Dry-Mounte.'
well temp.
1 i
e- -
_n n - --
- - _ - e TABLE 1.5 o
)
LHIT No.1 - SMUTDOW METitOD NO. 2 - INSTRtHENT LIST 7
6 i
i
/
I thCAL LOCAL LOCAL FIRE 1::STRU-I!STRtHENT PANEL AREA CONTRCL ROOM INSTRt: MENT -
- PptL ColmENT MENTAT10N nth.3ER NLHEER ELEff.
COL / ROW 20NE INSTRtHENT ATION NLHBER nth 8ER CO?ttENT Pressure 1PT-SXO30 Locally 699'-0" 2-1/C M.1.9 Pressure IP1-SX030 1H13-P601 SSWS StFafner Transmitter
!b unted Indicator Dthharge Pakssure Pressure IP!-GX024A ISX12J 699'-0" 2-14C M.1.9 Indication (noce 1) 1H13-P601 SdS Div 2 Pressure 1PI-SXO2f.5 ISX12J 699'-0" 2-1/C M.1.9 Alarm High St ainer InJ1cticn (note 1)
I--
Pressure 1PDS-SX024 ISX12J 699'-0" 2-1/C M.1.9
(
Differc*ntial (note 1)
Sultch l
(-~
Pressure IPI-SXO26A ISX13J 699'-0" 2-1/C M.1.8 Indication IK13-P601 SSUS Div 3 Pressure 1PI-SX026B ISX13J 699'-0" 2-1/C H.1.8 Alare Eligh Strainer Indication I
~
fressure 1PDS-5J026 ISX13J 699'0" 2-1/C M.1.8 i,
Differcatial i
Suicch I~
Temperature ITE-CM002 Locally 736'0" CNT/AZ26' C.1.2 Temp. Relay ITY-CM002 1H13-P852 Supp Pr.o1 Temp.
Element Mounted t
Temperature
.I W CM10 tocally 736'0".
CNT/AZ190*
C.1.2 Temp. Relay ITY-CM0010 1H13-P852 Element Mounted Te=perature ITE-CM016 Locally 736'0" C::T/AZ33*
C.1.2 Temp.. Relay ITi-CM0016 1H13-P852 Element Mounted Temp. Recorder ITY-CM018 IH13-P601 J
1H13-P601 High Temp. Alarm i
4 i
i t
e i
e i
O 4
i i
_. - - ~
~
TAF' E 1.5 LNIT NO.1 - SHUTDOM4 PET 180D N0. 2 - I"STRLitENT LIST (coat'd)
LOCAL.
LOCAL FIRE LCCAL INS TRL'-
INS TRL'XENT PANEL
- TEA /
CONTROL ROOM INSTRUMENT PANEL MENTATICM NL?tER NLMBER ELEV.
COL / ROW ZONE INSTRLHENTATf018 IsLHBER NJHSER COf9 TENT 1
Flow 1E12-N015C 1H22-P055 707'-6" V-Z/102-105 A.1.2 Flow Indicator IE12-R603C 1H13-P601 RHR C Flow.
Transmitter Flow IUZ-N0155 1H22-P021 707'.,"
V-X/105-107 A.I.3 Flow Indicator IE12-R6035 1H13-P601 RNR 5 Flow :
Tran.nitter riow IE12-N0078 IH22-P021 707'-6" 105-107/V-Z A.1.2 Flow Indicator IE12-R6025 1HP13-6CL SSW5 8 Transmitter Level 1821-N0815 1H22-P027 755'0" 112/AZ180*-270*
C.3.2 Level Relay 1821-N6815 1H13-P662
- RFV Level' I
Transmitter Level Recorer 1821-R6238 163-P601 RPV Level Pressure IB21-N0793 1H22-P027 755'0" 112/AZ180*
C.3.2 7tessure Reley IB21-N6785 1H13-P662 RPV Piunsur T ransmit te r Pressure Recorder 1?ll3-P601 Lower dry.;
Temp. Element ITC-VP034C Locally 741'6" 112/AZ180*-270*
C.1.1 Temp. Indicatbr ITIU-VP0338 1H13-P801 j well temp.
Mounted Temp. Eleme n.
1TC-VP03&C Locally 772'4" 112/AZ180*-270*
C.1.1 Temp. Indicator ITIU-VP0335 1H13-P801 Upper dry-l
~
well teep.
Mounted IM13P601 Suppres lor Level 1E22N055C Locally 741'0" AF-AN/116-222 F.2.1 Level Alarm higt:
Transmitter Mounted Pool t'ater Level Level IE22N05SC Locally 741'0" AF-AH/116-121 v.2.1 Leve1 Alarm High 1Y13P601 Sappreselor:
Transmit ter Mpunted Tool Eater Level Note 1: The shutdown esrwice water instrumentation kor Division 1 is located in fire sone M.1,10 and Division 2 fire zone M 1.9.
Eact+ zone is surrounded by a wall with a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rating. Therefore, a fire sone in one zone will not dawge the instrumentation in the other fire gone.
i i
t I
i 1
a, i
l i
0 a
i 1
TABLE 1.6 The following fire zones contain no divisional' cable and/or safe shutdown equipment.
A.2.3 D.2.16 D.4.15 D.6.9 M.l.7 1
D.4.16 F.1.4 M'. l. 8 A.2.4 D.2.17 I
C l.2 D.2.18 D.4.17 F.1.5 C.5.2 D.2.19 D.4.18 F.1.6 1
C.S.3 D.2.20 D.4.19 F.1.7 C.5.4 D.2.21 D.4.20 F.1.5 C.5.5 D.2.22 D.4.21 F.1.9 C.S.6-D.2.27 D.4.22 F.1.10 C.S.7 D.2.28 D.4.23 F.1.ll D.l.8 D.2.29 D.4.24 F.2.4 D.l.9 D.3.9 D.4.25 F.2.5 D.l.10 D.3.10 D.5.12 F.2.6 D.2.5 D.3.ll D.5.15 M.l.1
?
1 D. 2. 6 -
D. 3.-12 D.5.17 M.1.2 D.2.7 D.3.13 D.6.3 M.l.3 0. 2.'9 D.3.14 D.6.4 M.l.4 D.2.12 D.4.4 D.G.5 M.l.5 D.2.13 D.4.13' D.6.7 M.l.6 i
D.4.14 O
TABLE 1.7 O
The following fire zones contsin only cable and/or equipment associated with only one divisi'on and/or shutdown method.
A.l.7 D.2.15 D.6.1 A.2.10 D.2.24 D.6.6 A.4.2 D.2.25 F.2.2
-A.4.3 D.2.26 M.l.8 A.4.7 D.2.30 M.l.9 i
D.l.2 D.3.3 M.l.10 D.l.3 D.3.4 F.1. 2 -
C r
D.l.4 D.3.5 F.1.12 D.l.5 D.3.7 F.2.7 D.l.6 D.3.8 D.l.7 D.4.1 D.l.12 D.4.6 D.l.13 D.4.7 D.2.2 D.4.9 D.2.3 D.4.10 D.2.4 D.4.ll D 2.8 D.5.3 D.2.10 D.5.4 D.2.ll D.5.6 D.2.14 D.5.8 O
TABLE,1.8
,U, nit 1 - Safe Shutdown Panel Locations Panel Number Location Elevation Fire Zone Division 1H13-P601 Main Control Room S00'0"
-D.' 5 ' 2 1,2 1H13-P870 Main control Room 800'0" D.5.2 1,2 1C61-P001 Auxiliary Building 781'0" A.4.6 1,2 1H13-P801 Main Control Roo.n 800'0" D.5.2 1,2
'1H13-P862 Main Control Room 800'0" D.5.1 1
1H13-P877 Main Control Room 800'0" D.5.2 1,2 1H22-P004 Containment Building 755'0" C.3.2 1
Circulating Water
.699'0" M.l.10 1
1SX11J Screen House lH22-P018 Auxiliary Building 707'6" A.l.5 1
ISX13J Circulating Water 699'0" M.1.9 2
Screen House 1H22-P017 Auxiliary Building 706'6" A.l.4 1
lH22-P021 Auxiliary Building 706'6" A.1.2 2
1H22-P027 Containment Building 755'0" C.3.2 2
lH13-P852 Main Control Room 800'0" D.5,1 2
S
N Attachment *'C" O
Requested Exemptions to Section III.G of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R Clinton Power Station l
l l
0
_ ~ -
Fire Zone A.2.1
(}
This zone is comprised of a general access area in the auxiliary building at elevation 737 '-0".
The zone is made up of two large open areas on the east and west side of the building connected by a 16'-6" wide corridor.
The floor ar ea is approximately 2
6620 ft Located within the zone are safety-related Division 1, and 2 electrical cables and instrumentation and Division 1 valves.
The electrical cables are located in conduit and cable trays.
The Division 1 cable trays are located on the east side of the auxiliary building.
There are both horizontal trays and vertical risers.
The vertical risers are located between columns V and T near row 124.
The Division 2 horizontal trays and vertical risers are located on che west side of the auxiliary building.
Location of the vertical risers is between columns V and U near row 102.
There are Division 1 cables, in conduit routed through the west side of the building.
These cables are part of the MSIV leakage control, component cooling water, cycled condensate and residual heat removal nystems.
Except for the RHR cystem none of these systems are required to bring the reactor to a cold shutdown.
Even though portions of the RHR system are required for safe shut-down the cables routed through this part of the building (;RH45A and B), which service valve 1E12-F074B, are not required for safe shutdown since the operation or malfunction of this valve is not required for or will not interfere with obtaining and maintaining a safe cold shutdown.
On the east side of the building the only
(}
Division 2 cables, in conduit, belong to the standby gas treat-ment system.
Following a fire and during the shutdown procedure
Fire Zone A.2.1 (Cont'd) operation of the standby gas treatment system is not required.
The Division 1 and 2. cable trays containing safe shutdown related cable are routed no closer than 136 feet and the conduit no closer than 72 feet.
The instruments and valves located within this zone are not required to ob'tain and maintain cold shutdown.
The combustible material in the zone consists of 34,320 lb. of 2
lEEE 383 cable insulation and 1109 ft of two-inch thick.3 lb/ft fiberboard.
This amount of cable insulation amounts to a fire loading of 274,560,000 Btu and the fiberboard to a loading of 842,840 Btu (the fire rating for fiberboard is 760 Btu /f t). This is
" equivalent to a total fire load of 41 602 Btu /ft which is a severity of less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
However, it should be noted that cable insulation will burn only if a flame is maintained on it and the fiberboard is covered with NFPA fire retardant coating.
In the corridor between the east and west sides of the zone are several balance-of-plant (BOP) cable trays.
These trays are routed next to the ceiling.
Fire detectors are provided over the BOP cable trays.
In the zone there are 2 hose systems and one portable Halon extinguisher.
i I
o -
Fire Zo11e A. 2.1 (Cont'd)
The hose stations are located between rows 107 and 110 near O
column U (west end of the corridor) and row 117 and column U (east end of the corridor).
Based on distance of separation between the Division 1 and 2 l
safe shutdown related cables, the fact that there are no safe shutdown valves or instruments located in this zone, the low
~
fire loading of the fire and the location of fire detectors and hose stations in the corridor between the Division 1 and 2 areas of the zone fire damags would be limited to a single division.
Therefore, it is unnecessary to provid,e an automatic suppression system in order to comply with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R Section G paragraph 2 item 6.
l O
w
Fire Zone D.2.1 O
This zone is comprised of a general access area at elevation 737'0" of the control building.
This zone provides access to all the diesel generator rooms and the radiation-chemistry 2
hot laboratory.
The floor area is approximately 8440 ft with a secondary floor area of 9250 ft (roof of the radiation-chemistry hot laboratory).
Within the zone are Division 1 and
~
2 electrical cables located in both conduit and cable trays and Division 1 and 2 motor control centers.
The electrical cables are part of the. auxiliary power, shut-down service water, diesel generator and diesel generator HVAC systems.
These cables are located in Division 1 and 2 cable trays which are less than 20 feet apart.
There is, however, a 3-hour fire barrier separating the Division 1 and 2 cable trays when they approach to within 50 ft of one another.
Part of this barrier is a false ceiling located below the Division 2 cable trays and extends from a point between the Division 1 and 2 cable trays (at this point the false ceiling extends to the concrete ceiling at elevation 760'-0") to column 130.
The other part of the barrier is a wall located on top of the slab at eleve. tion 751'-0" along row AA, extend-ing from column 130 to column 125.
Beginning at Row AA and continuing ta row U the Division 1 and 2 cable trays are separated by a distance of 50 feet.
There are 0,
l I
l
7_ _ _ _ _ __
Fire Zone D.2.1 (Cont'd)
()
no combustibles, between the trays with the exception of a few cables in conduit.
Also, no combustible materials will be stored on top of the elevation 751'-0" slab.
Located on the floor of this zone are four motor control centers.
Two of these MCC's are Division 1 (LAP 60E and OAP24E) and two are Division 2 (LAP 61E and OAP25E).
The Division 1 MCC's are located between columns 128 and 127 and between rows AA and AC.
Division 2 MCC"s LAP 61E and OAP25E are located between column
~
130 and 132 and rows Y and AA.
This location places the MCC's no closer than 46 feet from their divisional counterpart.
The zone cor.tains 105,898 lb. of IEEE-383 cable insulation and 2
3 1099 ft of two-inch thick, 3 lb/ft fiberboard.
This amcunt of cable insulation corresponds to a fire loading of 847,184,000 Btu and the fiberboard to a loading of 335,240 Btu (fire loading due to fiberboard 760 Btu /ft ).
This is equivalent to a fire 2
loading of 47,938 Btu /ft which corresponds to a severity of less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
However, it should be noted that cable insula-tion will burn only if a flame is meintained on it and the fiberboard is covered with NFPA fire retardant coating Located within the zone is a fire detection system, Eive hose stations and one portable Halon extinguishcr.
One of the hose stations is located along row AA between column 128 and 129
(}
which is in close proximity of the Division 1 cable trays and MCC's.
A second hose station is located along row AA between l
Fire Zone D.2.1 (Cont'd) column 129 and 130.
This location places the hose station between the Division 1 and 2 MCC's and near the Division 2 cable trays.
Based on the fact that the Division 1 and 2 cables are separated by either a distance of 50 feet or a 3-hour fire barrier, that the MCC's are separated by a distance of 46 feet, the lack of P
combustibles'between the cable trays and MCC's and the presence of fire detection in the vicinity of the false ceiling and the l
Division 1 and 2 MCC's and manual fire suppression systems fire damage would be limited to a single division.
This being the i
case, it is not necessary to install an automatic suppression system to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section G, paragraph 2,
item b.
e t
=
f O
l t
Fire Zone D.3.2 This zone is comprised of a general access area and a heating,
(
ventilation and air conditioning equipment area of the control building.
The floor area is approximately 11,950 ft Located within the zone are Division 1 and 2 electrical cables in conduit and Division 1 and 2 diesel generator room HVAC dampers.
Division 2 diesel generator room IIVAC system cables, which serve the dampers, are routed no closer than 46 feet of either the Division 1 diesel generator cables or the Division 1 diesel generator HVAC system cables.
Combustible materials in the zone consist of 19,790 lb of 3
IEEE 383 cable insulation,9000 ft of two-inch thick, 3 lb/ft fiberboard and OL Class I bag filters (26 elements).
The cable
~
insulation contributes 158,320,000 Btu to the total fire load-ing for the room.
The fiberboard 6,840,000 Btu and the bag filters 188,500 Btu.
This is equivalent to a total fire load-2 ing of 13,837 Btu /ft which corresponds to a severity of less 7
than 30 minutes.
However, it should be noted that the cable insulation will burn only if a flame is' maintained on it and the filerboard is covered with a NFPA fire retardant coating and the bag filters are located inside plenums.
l Within the zone there are four hose stations and two portable
!!alon extinguishers.
All four hose stations are located along row AF between columns 125 and 135.
The portable extinguishers
'~'
Fire Zone D.3.2 (Cont'd) l
()
are located along row AC,one between columns 128 and 129,and the other,between columns 132 and 133.
Since the separation distance of the Division 1 and 2 cables is greater than 50 feet, the fire loading of the zone is low and manual fire suppression equipment is present, fire damage would be limited to a single division.
Therefore, the installation of an auto-matic suppression system is not necessary in order to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section G paragraph 2 item b.
O O
f I
l l
O
=
Fire Zone D.3.6
.This zone is comprised of the Unit 1 Division 1 diesel-generator O
room air inlet missile wall room.
The floor area is approximately 2
505 ft Located within the zone are the Division 2 diesel I
generator feeds to the 4.lkV switchgear and Division 1 diesel generator IIVAC dampers.
The cables, in two 5-inch conduits, are located next to the ceiling along the south wall and meet the requirements of IEE-383.
The only combustible material in the zone is the insulation on
~
the two power cables.* Fire loading for these cables is 2,811,304 Btu or 5567 Btu /ft Since the cable,is in conduit; flames of a fire originating in the room will not come in contact with the cables, thereby, preserving the integrity of the Division 2 shutdown systems.
If a short in the cables were to ignite the insulation the conduit would contain the smoke thus eliminating the possible contamination of the Division 1 diesel generator room through its HVAC system.
For protection against a fire there is a hose station and one portable Halon extinguisher which are accessible to the zone.
They are located in cone D.3.2.
The hose station is located along row AF between columns 129 and 130 in fire zone D.3.2.
The portable extinguisher is located in fire zone D.3.2 along row AC between columns 128 and 129.
Based on the lack of combustibles in the zone, the fact that
()
the Division 2 cables are in conduit,and location of manual l
Fire Zone D.3.6 (Cont'd) fire protection systems a fire is a highly unlikely event in j
O this zone.
However, if one did occur only a single division l
would be lost.
Therfore, it would not be necessary to install an automatic sprinkler system in order to comply with the requirements of 10CFR Part 50, Appendix R.
Section G paragraph 2 item b.
G e
I i
1 j
l
)
i j
i l
I i
1 0
~ -
Fire Zone F.3.1
()
The zone is comprised of the fuel building floor at clevation 755'-0" and the mezzanine level at elevation 781"-0".
The floor is approximating 18,014 ft.
Located within this zone are Division 1, 2 and 3 electrical cables, the fuel pool cool-ing and cleaning surge tanks and Division 1 and 2 valves.
Only the diesel generator and shutdown service water systems among the systems present in the zone are required to achieve cold shutdown.
The service water cables service valves ISXO88A and 1SX097A.
Neither the operation of nor the malfunc-tion of these valves is required or w6uld impede the shutdown of the reactor or of maintaining it.in a cold shutdown mode.
t
. The only saf; shutdown cables, in the zone are the Division 1 and 2 diesel generator power feeds to the 4.1kV switchgear.
Divisional cables are in conduit and are routed no closer than 50 feet of one another.
At their closest point of separation they are located over different floor elevations.
The Division l
I cables are located only over the mezzanine at elevation 781'-0" l
(between columns AD and AF near row 124), therefore, the flames of a fire on elevation ?SS'0" could not impinge on the Division 1 cables.
The Division 2 cables are routed through the fire l
zone so that they do not pass over the mezzanine level until they reach the cable trays (the cables dc not enter the trays) near row 102 (west wall of the fuel building).
These cables
()
enter the zone in conduit at row 124 near colmn AJ and are routed along column AH until they reach the Division 2 cable
Fire Zone F.3.1 (Cont'd)
()
trays.
At the point where the cables, in conduit, pass over the mezzanine floor the Division 1 and 2 cables are 150 feet apart.
The combustible material is made up of 46,910 lb. of IEEE-383 cable insulation and 2400 ft of two-inch thick, 3 lb/ft fiberboard.
This amount'of cable insulation corresponds to a fire loading of 375, 280, 000 Btu and for the fiberboard to a loading of ly824,000 Btu.
This equivalent to a total fire loading 20,934 Btu /ft which corresponds to a severity of less than 30 minutes.
However, it should be noted that cable will burn only if a flame is maintained on it and the fiberboard is c cuered with a NFPA fire retardant coating.
There are nine hose stations and two portable Halon extinguishers located in the zone.
Seven of the hose stations are located on
~
elevation 755'-0" with three of these located directly below the Division 2 diesel generator cables.
One elevation 781'-0" there are two hose stationc.
One is located directly beneath the Division 1 diesel genrator cables the other is located on the west wall of the fucl building between columns AE and AF near 4
the Division 2 diesel generator cables.
The portable extin-guishers are located on elevation 755'-0" on the south wall of
()
the fuel building.
a Fire Zone F.3.1 (Cont'd)
Based On the fact that the cables approach no closer than 50 feet, in conduit, when located over different floor elevations and no closer than 150 feet when they are located on the same floor, the low fire loading of the room and the existence of a manual fire protection system, fire damage in the zone would be limited to a single division.
Therefore, it is not necessary j
to install an automatic fire protection system in order to comply with 10CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section G paragraph 2 item b.
l O
b 4
1
- O 1
7
Attechm:nt "D" Listofelectricalinstallationh cable pan, and cable pan routin Fire Zone A.2.1 drawings for fire zones A.2.1,
(}
E26-1001-OlA-EI She,et 1 of 2 j
?.26-1001-OlA-EJ
,seE'2 of 2 E26-1001-02A-EI oncet 1 of 2 E26-1001-02A-EI Sheet 2 of 2
~
E26-1001-02B-EI E26-1001-03A-EI E26-1001-04A-EI 4
E26-1001-05A-EI Sheet 1 of 2 E26-1001-05A-EI Sheet 2 of 2 E26-1001-05B-EI E26-1605-EI E26-1606-EI E26-1607-EI E26-1608-EI E26-1614-EI E26-1615-EI Sheet 1 of 2 E26-1615-EI Sheet 2 of 2 E26-1001-OlA-CP E26-1001-02A-CP E26-1001-03A-CP J
E26-1001-05A-CP
. E26-1101-OlA-CP Eld-1101-02A-CP
~
E26-1101-03A-CP
~
' ~~~~ "-
E26-1101-03B-CP
~
~
~
~-
~-
E26-1101-03C-tP E26-1201-01A-CP E26-1201-OlB-CP E26-1400-CP E26-1401-CP E26-1402-CP l
E26-1403-CP l
E26-1404-CP E 2 6-10 01-9 0 A-CPR
Fire Zone D.2.1
-(])
E30-1001-OlA-EI E30-1001-OlB-EI E30-1001-02A-EI E30-1001-02B-EI
)
E30-1001-03A-EI E30-1001-03B-EI E30-1001-04A-EI E30-1001-04B-EI E30-1001-05A-EI E30-1001-05B-EI E30-1001-06A-EI E30-1001-01A-CP E30-1001-02A-CP E30-lool-03A-CP E30-1001-04A-CP E30-1001-05A-CP E30-1001-06A-CP E30-1101-OlA-CP
- E30-1101-0 2A-CP
~
~
E30-1101-05A-CP E30-120.1-01A-CP E30-1201-OlC-CP E30-1201-02A-CP i
E30-1201-04A-CP E30-1201-04B-CP f
i E30-1201-04C-CP E30-1201-05A-CP E30-1400-CP E30-1405-CP l
E30-1406-CP 1
E30-1451-CP E30-1457-CP E30-1465-CP E30-1001-00A-CPR 6
=.
~_
2 Fire Zones D.3.2 and D.3.6
(
E29-1002-01A-EI E29-1002-02A-EI E29-1002-03A-EI E29-1002-04A-EI i
E29-1002-05A-EI E29-1002-06A-EI E29-1603-01-EI E29-1603-02-EI E29-1603-03-EI E29-1603-04-EI l
E29-1603-05-EI E29-1603-06-EI E29-1603-07-EI E29-1603-08-EI E29-1603-09-EI E29-1603-10-EI E29-1603-ll-EI E29-1603-12-EI
~ E29-1603-13-EI E29-1603-14-EI E29-1603-15-EI E29-1002-OlA-CP E29-1002-02A-CP E29-1002-03A-CP
~~~
~~
E29-1400-CP
~
E29-1401-CP E.'9-1402-CP I.*20-1403-CP E29-1404-CP t
E30-1002-00A-CPR 1
4
Fire Zone F.3.1
()
E28-1002-OlA-EI E28-1003-05A-CP E28-1002-02A-EI E28-1101-03B-CP E28-1002-03A-EI E28-1101-03C-CP E28-1002-04A-EI Sheet 1 of 2 E28-1101-04B-CP E28-1002-04A-EI Sheet 2 of 2 E28-1101-05B-CP E28-1002-05A-EI Sheet 1 of 2 E28-1201-OlA-CP E28-1002-05A-EI Sheet 2 of 2 E28-1201-02C-CP E28-1002-06A-EI E28-1201-03A-CP E28-1002-07A-EI Sheet 1 of 2 E28-1201-04B-CP E28-1002-07A-EI Sheet 2 of 2 E28-1201-05C-CP E28-1002-08A-EI Sheet 1 of 2 E28-1201-05D-CP E28-1002-08A-EI Sheet 2 of 2 E26-1002-00A-CPR E28-1003-OlA-EI E26-1003-00A-CPR E28-1003-02A-EI E28-1003-03A-EI E28-1003-04A-EI E28-1003-05A-EI E28-1202-OlA-EI
' E28-1202-03A-EI E28-1202-04A-EI E28-1202-05A-EI E28-1202-06A-EI E28-1202-07A-EI E28-1:32-08A-EI
~ ~
~ ~~
E28-1203-02A-EI E28-1203-03A-EI E28-1203-05A-EI E28-1002-OlA-C,P E28-1002-02A-CP E28-1002-03A-CP
'E28-1002-05A-CP E28-1003-01A-CP E28-1003-02A-CP E28-1003-03A-CP E23-1003-04A-CP
^/
h
' D Attachm:nt "E" Emergency Lighting h
\\/
At the November 5, 1981 meeting between Illinois Power Company and the NRC at Bethesda, Maryland ID identified nine working stations at which personnel may be required to mitigate the consequences of an event.
The type of lighting at each of these stations was identified.
The NRC requested that IPC further commit to providing flashlights for emergency use by the 2 ire brigade and other operations personnel required to achieve safe plant shutdown.
These agreed upon changes were included in the response to NRC question 040.24 which was incorporated into the FSAT. in Amendment 12.
This, however,
. ontrary to the NRC statement in the Safety i
Evaluation Report
? 9-30 paragraph 9.5.3).
In that report the NRC states "The aff icant has installed an 8-hour battery-l pack emergency lighting unit in all areas of the plant needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment..."
Illinc'!s Power believes the type of lighting available at each working station identified, plus the availability of flash-lights fully meets the intent of Appendix R to 10CFR Part 50 Section III.J.
This is based on the NRC's acceptance of the response to question 040.24 at the. November 5 meeting, s
f
(
9 O
e O
o e
9 l
- -.