Text

NRC Staff Response in Oppositon to Georgians Against Nuclear Energy Amended Petition for Leave to Intervene.* Petition Should Be Dismissed Due to Contentions Not Meeting 10CFR2.714(b)(2) & 2.714(d)(2).W/Certificate of Svc
	ML20059L838
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	09/14/1990
From:	Barth C; NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)
To:	; Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
	CON-#490-10830 90-617-03-OLA, 90-617-3-OLA, OLA, NUDOCS 9010010326
	Download: ML20059L838 (50)
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,3 September 14l{1gD l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '90 SEP 17 A9 :47 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARDS $[MQMy[ !

liHANpi l In the Matter of )

) '

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-424 ,, p t.g ,

) 50-425 !

(Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, ) i Units 1 and 2) '

) ASLBP No. 90 617 03 OLA

)

Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 )

Amendment No. 31, July 10,1990 )

and )

Facility Operating License No. NPF 81 )

Amendment No.11, July 10,1990 )

NRC STAFF RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO GEORGIANS AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY'S AMENDED PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE

1. INTRODUCTION By a Memorandum and Order of August 16,1990, this Licensing Board permitted Georgians Against Nuclear Energy (hereinafter GANE) to amend the petition it filed on l July 23,1990, to intervene concerning the captioned license amendments issued for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. At 6. These amendments were approved by the NRC and allow the high jacket water temperature (HJ%T) trip for the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) to be bypassed when the diesels are started in emergency situations. 55 Fed. ' Reg. 25756 (June 22,1990).

Georgia Power Company had applied to the NRC to amend the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications, Appendix A to Operating Licenses NPF-68 and NPF 81, on May 25,1990, stating:

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Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2h(6)(c) !

requires verification that all automatic diesel generator trips, except engine :

overspeed, low lube oil pressure, high jacket water temperature and !

generator differential are automatically bypassed upon loss of voltage on the :

emergency bus concurrent with a Safety Injection Actuation Signal. The proposed amendment would allow the high jacket water temperature trip to be bypr.ssed to minimize the potential for spurious diesel generator trips ,

in the emergency start mode.V l

The proposed change would add a footnote to Specification 4.8.1.1.2h(6)(c) that states 'The high Jacket water temperature trip may be bypassed." The change will allow the diesel generators to be operable with the high jacket water temperature trip bypassed.

Ucensee's Request, Enclosure 3. i Pursuant to the Ucensing Board's Memorandum and Order of August 16, 1990, [

t GANE filed its " Amendment to Petition for Leave to Intervene", including affidavits in ;

support of its petition and proposed contentions on September 4,1990. The NRC Staff- ;

here responds to the Amendment opposing the petition to intervene on the grounds that this Board does not have jurisdiction to grant the relief sought, GANE does not show -

it could be adversely affected by the amendment and the contentions proposed cannot- .

be admitted for litigation under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(d)(2).

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V Letter Application of. Georgia Power Co. to Nuc' ear Regulatory Commission, May 25,1990, headed 'Vogtle Electrical Generating Plant, Request To Revise- ;

Technical- Specification 4.8.1.1.2h(6)(c)" (hereinafter "Ucensee's Request"). See also

Safety Evaluation By the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to .

Amendment No. 31 to Facility Operating Ucense NPF 68 and Amendment No.11 to Facility Operating Ucense NPF 81", dated July 10,1990 (hereinafter " Staff ,

Safety Evaluation"). Both documents are attached to the. affidavit of David Matthews submitted herewith.

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11. BACKGROUND i The license amendments here involved would allow the HJWT trip on the l

emergency diesel generators to be bypassed in emergency start situations. Licensee's Request; Staff Safety Evaluation. Enclosure 2 of Licensee's Request states: l This proposed change is to allow the emergency diesel generators to be ,

started by an emergency signal with the high jacket water temperature trip ;

bypassed. This is in addition to the other trips which are already bypassed !

by an emergency start signal (Safety Injection (SI), Loss of offsite power !

(LOSP), or Emergency Manual start). A modification will be made to add isolation valves in the instrument tubing between the DG [ diesel generator)

high jacket water temperature elements and the local DG control panel. ;

The valves will normally be closed so that high jacket water temperature :

sensors will not proside input to the engine trip logic, but may be opened to allow additional engine protection when performing a non emergency manual start or surveillance of the diesels. In order to close these valves the Technical Specifications are being revised to indicate that the jacket water temperature trip may be bypassed.

, However, to increase the reliability of the diesel generators, Georgia Power $

!. Company has determined, and the NRC has approved, that the trip on high !

I jacket water temperature should also be bypassed during an emergency start. Reg. Guide 1.9, Rev. 2 allows this trip to by bypassed under accident y I

conditions provided the operator has sufficient time to react appropriately to an abnormal diesel generator condition. In addition, the bypass circuitry

l. should satisfy the requirements of IEEE 2791971 at the DG system level and should include the capability for (1) testing the status and operability of the bypass circuits, (2) alarming abnormal values of all bypass parameters l

l in the control room, and (3) manually resetting of the trip bypass function.

(Capability for automatic reset is not acceptable.)

This proposed change meets the intent of Reg. Guide 1.9. Abnormal values of high jacket water temperature will continue to be alarmed locally and in the control room. Low jacket water pressure is also alarmed. From the time of the high jacket water temperature alarm, the operator will have sufficient time to react appropriately to abnormal diesel generator condition.

If the valves are closed, the trips will l'e bypassed. Operating procedures will assure the correct position of the vabes, i The Staff Safety Evaluation, in evaluatir g these proposed changes, followed the L Licensee's analysis and stated:

4 The criteria which govern whether an EDG trip can be bypassed for emergency or normal EDG starts are provided in Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.9. Position 7 of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Revision 2, states that all diesel generator protective tnp should be either bypassed when the diesel generator is required for a design basis event or implemented with two or more independent measurements with coincident logic provisions. All protective trips are allowed during periodic testing. The allowed exceptions to the above requirements for bypassing are diesel engine overspeed and generator differential current. Currently, all the protective trips on the VEGP EDGs except engine overspeed, generator differential, low lube oil pressure, and HJWT are bypassed during an emergency start. The low lube' oil pressure and HJWT trips are implemented by three independent measurements for each trip parameter. Actuation of these trips is initiated by two out of three coincident log. The current design satitfied the requirements of Position 7 of Regulatory Guide 1.9.

Regulatory Guide 1.9, Revision 2, allows the HJ%T trip to be bypassed under accident conditions provided the operator has sufficient time to react

- appropriately to an abnormal diesel generator condition. The proposed TS change and associated plant modification would bypass the HJWT trip for all emergency starts while maintaining the local and control room alarms for abnormal jacket water temperature. The alarms would ?rovide the operator with _an indication of abnormal conditions and provice sufficient time for the operator to take actions to mitigate the concitions. Although there is an increased potential for diesel generator damage due to loss of engine cooling during emergency starts, the operating experience to date at Vogtle indicates that it is outweighed by the increased EDG reliability achieved with the commensurate benefit to overall plant safety.

Accordingly, the NRC staff finds that the proposed TS change to Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2h(6)(c) and the associated plant modification meet the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Revision 2, and are acceptable.

With regard to the impact of the proposed TS change on events postulated in the updated VEGP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), the bypassing of the HJWT trip will not affect the capability of the EDG to mitigate those design basis events in which the preferred offsite power source is postulated to fail. The accident analyses postulated in the VEGP FSAR do not take credit for a restart of an EDO. If an EDO should fall from a loss of engine cooling (worst single failure), emergency onsite AC power would be provided by the redundant EDG and associated electrical train.

Consequently, the proposed TS change does not impact plant safety as analyzed in the updated VEGP FSAR.

Staff Safety Evaluation, at 12.

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, 5-111. DISCUSSION A. Jurisdiction Under 10 C.F.R. I 2.714(a), one wishing to intervene in an NRC proceeding must also set forth *the specific aspect or specific aspects of the subject matter of the !

proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene." In Wuconsin Electric Co. (Point l

Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), AIAB 739,18 NRC 335,339 (1983), the Appeal i Board emphasized that a Licensing Board considering a license amendment only has jurisdiction to consider matters germane to the license amendment and may not consider other safety improvements which petitioners wish to have imposed on the licensed facility.

It there stated:

In a license amendment proceeding a licensing board has only limited jurisdiction. The board may admit a party's issues for hearing only insofar as those issues are within the scope of matters outlined in the Commission's

- notice of hearing' on the license action. Ponland General Electric Co.

(Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB 534, 9 NRC 287, 289 n.6 (1979); Public l Service Co. ofindiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and i 2), AIAB 316,3 NRC 167,170171 (1976). See Commonwealth Edison Co. ,

(Zion Station, Units 1 and 2), AIAB 616,12 NRC 419, 426 (1980).

(footnote omitted)

In Point Beach, the proposed amendment provided for the repair of steam generator tubes by sleeving and the operation of the facility with sleeved tubes. Contentions relating to general adequacy of the steam generator tubes and the public health and l safety were belo to be beyond the jurisdiction of the Licensing Board absent a basis to believe that the proposed repair would cause untoward safety consequences that would L

not otherwise be present.

1 One may not seek to litigate matters not germane to the permission or license amendment sought. See, e.g., Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI 83 25,18 NRC 327, 33132 (1983) (qualification of a Commissioner not

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germane to facility restart proceeding); Nonhem Indiana Public Senice Co. -(Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear 1), ALAB 619,12 NRC 558, 565 (1980) (notice of application to extend construction permit does not allow litigation of health and safety !

issues generally); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Carroll County Site), AIAB 601,12 NRC 18,24 (1980) (notice of application for early site resiew does not allow litigation of issues !

not germane to that review). Similarly, one may not intervene in an enforcement action ;

without showing that they would have an interest adversely affected by the action. 'The scope of the action initiated by the Commission may be limited and defined by the Commission." Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI 8216; 16 NRC 44, 45 (1982), affinned sub nom. Bellotti v. NRC, 725 F.2d 1380 (D.C. Cir.1983). There the Commission limited the issues to whether the facts in the enforcement order were t

true and whether the remedy was supported by those facts. Other concerns and the need :

for stronger action were viewed as beyond the scope of the proceeding. Id. at 46.

Here the proposed amendment to bypass the HJWT trip in an emergency l increases the availability of the emergency diesel generators in such a situation. 55 Fed.

Reg. 25756 (June 22,1990). To the extent that the contention might raise issues .

concerning the adequacy of the diesel generators,F they are beyond the jurisdiction of this Licensing Board which was solely constituted to consider the safety of license l

amendments which allow HJMT trips to be bypassed in emergency situations.

l v See Proposed contentions 2(d)&(e),3,5,6,7 and 8 which seem to question the adequacy of the diesel generators and not whether safety is degraded by allowing bypass of the subject trips.

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B. Standing i

In Florida Light & Power Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), I l

CLI 89 21,30 NRC 325,329 (1989), the Commission reemphasized the tests for standing to intervene in NRC proceedings, stating:

f Initially, the Petitioner fails to satisfy the Commission's " interest" l requirements. We have consistently applied

contemporaneous judicial j concepts" of standing to determine whether a petitioner has a sufficient interest in a proceeding to be entitled to intervene as a matter of right. J Ponland General Electric Co. (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and '

2), CL176 27,4 NRC 610,614 (1976); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI 83 25,18 NRC 327, 332 33 (1983). '

"These concepts require a showing that (a) the action will cause ' injury in fact'_ and (b) the injury is arguably with the zone of interests' protected by ,

the statutes governing that proceeding." Three Mile hland, CLI 83 25, supra, 18 NRC at 332.

In order to show " injury in fact" a petitioner must show that it *might be adversely affected if the proceeding has one outcome rather than another." Nonhern Engineering Co. (Sheffield, Ill, lew Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site),7 NRC 737,743 (1978).

1 l Here the petitioner fails to meet this test. Under 10 C.F.R. f 2.714(d)(1)(iii) a board in determining whether to grant a petition to intervene must consider "the possible effect of any order that may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest."

GANE's amended petition offers Mr. Fred Points as having the requisite interest since he lives approximately 45 miles from the Vogtle facility. They offer no more than l

'He is threatened with injury to his health and property in the event the proposed application is not as safe as Georgia Power contends." The GANE proffer of Mr. Points is not sufficient under the Commission's rules.

The issue before the Board is whether to approve or rescind the license amendments which authorize bypass of the HJWT trip switch, i.e. whether operation of s

the facility under the amendment is safe. Neither GANE or Mr. Points reveal any l

t 8-scenario by which bypassing the HMT trip switches will more likely cause him br>dily harm than not bypassing them. Neither give any basis upon which the Board could conclude that they are more likely to be injured if the trip is automatically overridden !

than if it is not. Neither shows how the EDGs would be more available with the trip :

than without the trip. Both have failed to show the requisite

interest" to become an i inten enor.

A petitioner's residence within 50 miles of a nuclear facility is not sufficient, of ;

itself, to establish standing to intervene in a license amendment proceeding. As the Commission also stated in St. Lucic, CLI 89 21,30 NRC st 329 30:

It is true that in the past, we have held that living within a specific distance from the plant is enough to confer standing on an individual or group in proceedings for construction permits, operating licenses, or significant amend.aent thereto such as the expansion of the capacity of a spent fuel pool. Sce, e.g., Virginia Eicctric and Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2), A1.AB 522, 9 NRC 54, (1979). However, those cases involved the construction or operation of the reactor itself, with clear implications for the offsite emironment, or major alterations to the facility with a clear potential for offsite consequences. Sec, c.g, Gulf States Utilitics Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), AIAB 183, 8 AEC 222, 226 (1974). Absent situations invohing such obvious potential for offsite consequences, a petitioner must allege some specific " injury in fact" that will result from the action taken: here, the granting of the exemption. In this case, the Petitioner has not alleged any " injury in fact" that he will suffer because of the [ exemption). Thus, we find that he has not satisfied the Commission's " interest" requirements. s GANE for itself, and as a representative of its member Mr. Points, has failed to demonstrate an " injury in fact" which could be caused by the two license amendments I identified in the Notice of Hearing which cause the EDGs to be more available. GANE l

! therefore lacks standing to intervene. The Petition and Amended Petition For 1.4 ave To l

l Intenene should be denied and this proceeding dismissed.

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. 9 C. Standards Governing Admissibility of Contentions On August 11,1969, the Commission issued amendments to 'The Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings Procedural Changes in the Hearing Process" which revised the standards of admissibility for contentions in licensing proceedings. 54 Fed.

Reg. at 33168,33180-81. In order for GANE's contentions to be admitted as matters in controversy, the contentions must satisfy the requirements of 10 C.F.R. I 2.714(b)(2).

These requirements are:

(2) Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall proside the following information with respect to each contention:

.(i) a brief explanation of the bases of the contention.

(ii) A concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing, together with references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion.

(iii) Sufficient information (which may include information pursuant to paragraphs (b)(2)(i) and (ii) of this section) to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of lew or fact. This showing must include references to the specific portions of the application (including the applicant's em'ironmental report and safety report) that the _

petitioner disputes and the supporting reasons for each dispute, or, if the petitioner believes that the application fails to contain information on a relevant matter as required by law, the identification of each failure and the supporting reasons for the petitioner's belief. On issues arising under the National Environmental Policy Act, the petitioner shall file contentions based on the applicant's env5nmental report. The petitioner can amend those contentions or file ne .ontentions if there are data or conclusions in the NRC draft or final emironmental impact statement, environmental assessment, or any supplements relating thereto, that differ significantly from the data or conclusions in the applicant's document.

10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(b)(2). The Licensing Board may refuse to admit a contention if: (1) the contention and supporting material fail to satisfy the requirements of 10 C.F.R.

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I 10 - i f 2.714(b)(2), or (2) the contention, if proven, would be of no consequence in the e proceeding because it would not entitle petitioner to relief.10 C.F.R. f 2.714 (d)(2); see also " Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings Procedural Changes in the Hearing Process," " Supplementary Information", 54 Fed. Reg. 33168 (August 11, 1989).

The threshold for admission of contentions has been raised by the Commission's new regulations. 54 Fed. Reg. 33168. The Commission has stated that:

Under these new rules an intervenor will have to provide a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which, at the time of filing, the intervenor :ntends to rely in proving the contention at hearing, together with references to the specific sources and documents of which the intervenor is aware and on which the intervenor intends to rely in establishing the validity of its ;

contention. This requirement does not call upon the intervenor to make its case at this stage of the proceeding, but rather to indicate what facts or expert opinions, be it one fact or opinion or many, of which it is aware ,

at that point in time which provide the basis for its sontention.

i In addition to providing a statement of facts and sources, the new rule will l also require intervenors to submit with their list of contentions sufficient i information (which may include the known significant facts described above) <

l to show that a genuine dispute exists between the petitioner and the applicant or licensee on a material issue of law or fact. This will require the intervenor to read the pertinent portions of the license application, including the Safety Analyn Report and the Environmental Report, state the applicant's position and the petitioner's opposing view. Where the intervenor believes the application and supporting material do not address a relevant matter, it will be sufficient to explain why the application is deficient.

l 54 Fed. Reg. at 33170.

The changes to 10 C.F.R. f 2.714 raised the threshold for the admission of contentions in licensing proceedings. Commission case law, which is consistent with the amendments to 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714, remains unchanged. The purposes of the basis requirements of 10 C.F.R. f 2.714(b)(2), as amended, are to assure that the contention in question raises a matter appropriate for adjudication in a particular proceeding, (2) to

11 establish a sufficient foundation for the contention to warrant further inquiry into the ,

subject matter addressed by the assertion and, (3) to put the other parties sufficiently on notice of the issues so that they know generally what they will have to defend against or oppose. See Philadelphia EIcetric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB 216, 8 AEC 13, 20 21 (1976); Texar Utilities Generating Station Co., et al. !

(Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP 83 75A,18 NRC 1260,126',

(1983). A proffered contention must be rejected where: (1) it constitutes an attack on applicable regulatory requirement.. (2) it challenges the basic structure of the ,

Commission's regulatory process or is an attack on the regulations;(3)it is nothing more than a generalization regarding the intervencr's views r# what applicable policies ought to be; (4) it seeks to raise an issue which is not proper for adjudication in the proceeding or does not apply to the facility in question; or (5) it seeks to raise an issue which is not ,

concrete or litigable. Id. l The Commission rejected the Appeal Board's holding that a petitioner need not describe facts supporting its proposed contention has been overturned by the amendments. 54 Fed. Reg at 33170; cf. Allens CreeA, supra,11 NRC at 546-49; l

l Mississippi Power and Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-l 130, 6 AEC 423, 425 26 (1973). 10 C.F.R. I 2.714 now requires the submission of alleged facts sufficient to show a genuine dispute of law or fact exists. Sec 54 Fed. Reg. ;

at 33170. .

The Appeal Board ir.terpreted i 189a of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. ,

i 2239, and 10 C.F.R. f 2.714 of the Commission's regulations to prohibit "the filing of

a vague, unparticularized cemention, followed by an endeavor to flesh it out through discovery against the applicant even before the Commission revised 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714.

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Duke Power Co. et al. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-687,16 NRC p .460, 468 (1982), vacated in part on other grounds, CLI 8319,17 NRC 1041 (1983). This -

remains ' unchanged. See 55 Fed. Reg. 33170.- A petition that provides a'long and '

detailed list of omissions and problems dces not, without more, set forth a basis for

' believing;that there is a safety issue. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), A1.AB 819,22 NRC 681, 725 (1985); Texas Utilities Generating 3

Co., et al. (Comarche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83 75A,18 NRC 1260,1263 64 n.6 (1983). A petitioner also has an obligation to examine the publicly l available documents relevant to a proceeding which could serve as a basis for a-4 contention. 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(b)(2)(iii). A sufficient basis for a contention is not ~

established by simply referencing a large number of documents. Instead, an intervenor must clearly identify and summarize the facts being relied upon, and identify and append specific portions of the documents referenced. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP 85 20,21 NRC 1732,1741 (1985), rev'd and

. remanded on other grounds, CL186 8, 23 NRC 241 (1986); Tennessee Valley Authority N (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP 7610,3 NRC 209,216 (1976).

The Commission's conclusion that a member of the public has no absolute right to intervene in a nuclear plant licensing proceeding under the Atomic Energy Act also remains unchanged under the revised regulations. 54 Fed. Reg. at 33170; 6189a of the ,

Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. I 2239); see BPI v. AEC,502 F.2d 424,428 29 (D.C. Cir. i 1974). Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. I 2.714, "a ' proper request' by a member of the public shall include a statement of the facts supporting each contention together with references and documents on which the intervenor relies to establish those facts." 54 Fed. Reg. at i 33170. Moreover, no independent right to intervene in nuclear licensing proceedings is e

. a. j established by the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. 66 551, et seq.; Easton i

- Utilities Commission v. AEC, 424 F. 2d 847, 852 (D.C. Cir.1970)(en banc).- !

To set forth an e.dmissible contention under the new rule GANE must provide -

, r,ome factual basis for its position and that there exists a genuine dispute behveen it and the Applicant. 54 Fed. Reg. at 33171. The new rule "will preclude a contention from being admitted where an intervenor has no facts to support its position and where the:

intervenor contemplates using discovery or cross examination as a fishing expedition- 3 which might produce relevant supporting facts " Id.; see also BPI v. AEC, srmra,502 F.2d at 429. A person _or organization seeking admission to a licensing proceeding is expected to have read "the ~ portions of the application (including the applicant's safety and 4

-r emironmental reports) that address any issues of concern to it and demonstrate that a dispute exists between it and the applicant on a material issue' of fact or law." 54 Fed.

Reg. at 33171.

Standards for admissibility of contentions, that are similar to the Commission's new rule, have been supported by the federal courts in the past. Vermont Yankee Nuclear L

Power Corp. v. NRC, 435 U.S. 519, 523 24, 544 55 (1978); independent Bankers Ass'n. v.

Board of Gover.nors, 516 F.2d 1206,1220-27 (D.C. Cir.1975); Connecticut Bankers Ass'n.

v. Board of Gover wis, 627 F.2d 245, 251 (D.C. Cir.1980). The Connecticut Bankers court stated that 'a protestant does not become entitled to an evidentiary hearing merely on request, or on a bald or conclusory allegation that such a dispute exists."

Connecticut Bankers, supra, 627 F.2d at 251. The petitioner is required' to set forth . ;

material facts in dispute, at a minimum, to show that further inquiry is warranted. Id.

The Commission states that the revision to 10 C.F.R. E 2.714 is consistent with these decisions. 54 Fed.' Reg. at 33171. In addition, the Commission found that agency h

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>k procedural requirements which - merely . raise the ' threshold for. the admission of contentions are reasonable when regulations are revised to' prevent unnecessary delay in -

the bearing process. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI -

8319,17 NRC 1041,1047 (1983).

Pro se or lay person intervenors are required to provide a sound basis for each'.-

contention to ensure the issues warrant adjudication. Consolidated Edison Co. of New T York (Indian Point, Unit _2), and Power Authority of the State of New York (Indian Point, Unit 3), LBP-83-5, .17 NRC 134,136 (1983).

D. GANE's Contentions -

The License Amendments here at issue authorize bypassing the HJWT trip switch-

. in an emergency situation and continue to provide for HJWT alarms in the control room.

Staffs Safety Evaluation, at 2.

GANE filed eight contentions with their Amended Petition. Not one single contention or subpart-thereof complies with the Commission's standards set forth in 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(b)(2) as discussed above. Each _and every contention and subpart thereof must be denied admission in this proceeding. All eight contentions and_ each subpart thereof share the same defects. No contention (except contention' 4 which will be separately addressed' below) references or identifies the specific' portions of the application which they dispute. See 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(b)(2)(iii). There are no cogent brief explanations of the basis for each contention. See 10 C.F.R. I 2.714(b)(2)(i). No expert opinion, expert authority, or factual basis is cited or referenced by GANE in support of their contentions. See 2.714(b)(2)(ii).

The only authority for the contentions is the self serving ipsi dirit of non expert laypersons. This failure is exacerbated by the failure to deal with and recognize matters I

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.- q set out in the Licensee's Request and the Staff Safetv Evaluation, such as the presence- ,

of HJ%T alarms in the control room, or the justification'for removing the trip, or the-redundant diesel generators. Their allegations' do not rise to the dignity of " matters in controversy" among the parties. The_ Petitioner's contentions .are, at best, vague. I generalizations, Catawba, ALAB-687, supra,' or what GANE thinks are problems, Limerick, ALAB 819, supra, and must therefore be rejected. For example contention 4:

is that GANE does not know "who ' determined' that the trip (on the HJWT] should be :

bypassed." Georgia _ Power determined that the HJ%T trip switch should be bypassed -

- see its application dated May 25, 1990 enclosure 2. In addition - to this, "who; determined" that the HJWT trip switch should be bypassed is not relevant or germane to the Licensee's Request or to the NRC authorized license amendment.- And finally.

-none of the contentions of GANE identify competent sources or expert opinion upon which they will rely e ,

Ng, if any, to support their allegations. All of the above are a

required by the ree '

'.R. s 2.714(b)(2) and therefore all of GANE's contentions must be denied admistua into this proceeding. t

-Since none of the contentions conform to the Commission's standards set forth ;

a in 10.C.F.R. s.2.714(b)(2) or actually raises a factual issue in dispute which could affect the health and safety of Mr. Fred Points who lives 45 miles from the site of the Vogtle -

facility, each and every contention and all of their subparts must be rejected and this a

. proceeding dismissed.

1. GANE's Contentions Seriatim

= Contention 1 GANE contends the high jacket water temperature trip should not be bypassed during emergency starts because it involves a significant hazard.

The switch is designed to prevent the generator engine from overheating

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1 during an emergency. The Applicant's evaluation (enclosure 2,4 with its

. May 25 letter to the NRC) does not explain what will alert the operator to potential overheating.

Staff Resoonse GANE does not set forth a cogent explanation of why bypassing the HJWT trip in an emergency creates a significant hazard as. required by revised 10 C.F.R. -

6 2.714(b)(2)(i). The switch is no.1 designed .to prevent the diesel generator from:

overheating in an emergency (see Affidavit of David B. Matthews attached hereto). The Licensee's Request of May 25,1990 does state that an alarm will be maintained in the control room.- It seems that GANE has failed to read, or understand. the Licensee's Request or the NRC': Safety Evaluation.

In addition to the foregoing, GANE's contention fails to reference the specific portion of Georgia Power Company's May 25,1990 Application for Amendment which it challenges. GANE's contention is not supported by a concise statement of facts, a reference to specific sources, or expert opinion. .GANE fails to set forth the expert opinion upon which they would rely if a hearing were held.

GANE has not here

. demonstrated that it can prove a set of facts that would sustain its position.

~

See 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(b)(2)(ii) and (iii). And, of equal importance, GANE's contention here, if proven, would not entitle it to the relief which this Licensing Board could grant. The only relief possible would involve the license amendment which permits bypassing the HJWT trip switch in emergency conditions, a matter which in the judgment of the NRC staff would degrade the public health and safety. This contention does not set forth or raise a significant issue in controversy in regard to the subject amendments which could affect the public health and safety. It may not be admitted.

Contention 2

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. q

We believe= the high jacket water temperature trip of the T.D.I. diesel ~ q generator in Plant Vogtletis. designed by the manufacturer / not to be .-

' bypassed. +

a. We expect TDI has reason for said trip, and we contend the Applicant has not shown a reasonable basis to change the device.

.b. We contend it is safer to have this essential trip operate automatically, ,

so as to eliminate the possibility 'of operator error.-

'c.~ We wonder what additional operating procedures and. training, the . t Applicant is planning to provide to its personnel to prevent or respond to j over heating during emergency. ';

(d) "Plata operating experience" (See Enclosure 1 of the May 25 letter to the NRC) suggests the Applicant has had difficulties getting the jacket - 1 water high temperature sensor to function (See " Loss of Vital AC' Power '

and the= Residual Heat Removal System During Mid loop. Operations.at /

l Vogtle Unit 1 'oni March 20,1990", NUREG 1410, Appendix .I). We $

contend that rather than bypass the switch, the Applicant must demonstrate i the reason the sensor " spuriously trips", and correct the failing(s)/ l4 (e) If the Applicant can demonstrate the sensor can safely by bypassed, 3 we contend that the Applicant must provide reasonable assurances that the generator. will not overheat in an emergency, without some warning to the operator.

t

'(f) We do not understand how the Applicant will be forewarned of the-generator overheating, other than by the ultimate failure of the generator.

We contend the Applicant's " evaluation" is inade'quate because it fails to provide such an analysis.

(g) We. contend the proposed bypass is unsafe because .it does not provide automatic indication and prevention of emergency . generator' ,

overheating.

Staff RespQuS2

. Contention 2 does not present a predicate for litigation. The contention does not deal with whether the plant would be safer with or without the.HJWT trips or set out any basis upon which it could be concluded that licensee's reasons for wishing to bypass-the trips is an emergency are fallacious. The " belief" that the diesel was designed with

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a- trip does not' go. to the issue. of whether the diesel's configuration with the trip.

1 bypassed would -ibe ' less . safe. The contention,- even if proven, "would_ be of no' consequence" and may not be admitted. See 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(d)(2)(ii).

Contention 2(a) is irrelevant. Whether or not TDI had a reason for the trip is not germane. The reasons for the change are set out in the Licensee's Request and the ,

broad statement that the " Applicant has not shown.a: reasonable basis to change: the device," is without basis or foundation. No portion of the application is cited, and no expert opinion is given. A bald statement cannot support a contention. 10 C.F.R.

I 2.714(b)(2)(ii) and. (iii).

Contention 2(b) goes beyond the scope of the Notice of Hearing. Possibility.of.

operator error was not a part 'of the licensee's application or the NRC Staff's approval.'

Moreover, no statement of expert opinion or fact and the of those opinions or facts is' provided, as required by 10 C.F.R. 2.714(b)(2)(ii).

Contention 2(c) is simply a general inquiry. It points to no defect in the-application for amendment. GANE seeks to inject other issues in this proceeding without L - providing a factual or expert basis for its concerns. Although, not germane to the license 4

amendment, GANE apparently in unaware that ther: are two diesel generators, offsite

. power and other means to compensate Br any loss of power. See affidavit of David f

L Matthews, attached hereto.

Contention 2(d) is beyond the scope of the hearing. GANE alleges that the

.1 licensee "must demonstrate the reasons the sensor " spuriously trips, and correct the L

failin6)." These issues are beyond the scope this proceeding which involves the safety of the HJWT trip bypasses and not whether some other change is needed.

L .

19 - ;

i Contention 2(e) does not raise a factual matter in controversy. The licensee's p

application clearly states that

Abnormal values of high jacket water temperature will l-

[ . continue to be alarmed locally and in the control room." Licensee's Request, Enclosure 2, at E2-2. Petitioner sets out no basis, fact or expert opinion to dispute this statement-as required by 10 C.F.R. I 2.714(b)(2)(ii) and (iii).

Contention 2(f) is the same as contention 2(e). The control room has an alarm, and GANE provides no factual or expert basis for its concern. There is no matter of fact in dispute.

Contention 2(g) states two concerns. As we responded to contentions 2(e) and 2(f), there is an alarm in the control room. The second part, prevention of emergency j t

diesel generator overheating is not an issue presented by the license amendments which provide for. bypassing the HJWT trips in emergency situations so as.to increase the -f availability of the EDGs Further, the premise of the contention is not supported by any factual or expert which would show that it is safer to avoid overheating rather than not have the EDGs operate in an emergency.

GANE's contention 2(a)-(g) fails to reference to specific portion of the application for amendment which it challenges. GANE's contention 2(a)-(g) is not supported by a .

concise statement of facts, or a references to specific sources of information or expert

. opinion on which it relies. GANE fails to set forth the expert opinion upon which they ;

would rely if a hearing were held. GANE has not here demonstrated that it can prove a set of facts that would sustain its position. And, of equal importance, GANE's contention 2(a)-(g) here, if proven, would not entitle it to the relief which this Ucensing Board could grant. See 10 C.F.R. 2.714(d)(2)(ii). The only relief possible could pertain only to the license amendments which permits bypassing the HJWT trips in emergency

.1 20 -

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conditions. This contention 2(a)-(g) does not set forth or raise a 'significant issue in-controversy which could affect the public health and safety and which could be resolved by a public evidentiary hearing. It may not be admitted.

Contention 3 GANE agrees that a reliable diesel generator makes for a safer nuclear plant. Georgia Power proposes = that to increase the " reliability" of the .

diesel generator. it is nect.ssary to bypass the manufacturer's trip on high jacket water temperature. GANE agrees this bypass will permit the generator to run with less risk of shutting down as Georgia Power states now occurs. However, GANE contends reliability will be decreased since the diesel generator can overheat without the automatic trip. The results of the generator overheating during an emergency would cause an impermissible power station black out which could lead to a meltdown.

Staff Response Contention 3 does not raise an issue in controversy. Since GANE agrees in the contention that the amendments will permit the emergency diesel generators to run with less risk of shutting down this should end the matter, There is nothing in this contention which would warrant a hearing.

Possible overheating of the diesel generator is not germane. The petitioner fails to set forth any factual or expert basis to support its assertion that bypassing the trip and-having the EDG more available in an emergency is less safe than having the trip making-the generator unavailable in case of an emergency.

~

GANE also fails to set forth any factual predicate for its suppos! tion'that the failure of one diesel generator could lead to station black-out let alone meltdown. See 2

Staff Safety Evaluation at 2. See also 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 17 (providing for redundant and independent sources of onsite and offsite power). 4 In addition to the foregoing GANE's contention 3 fails to reference the specific portion of the application for amendment which it challenges. GANE's contention 3 is 1

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f not supported by a concise statement _ of facts or specific sources of information on which GANE intends to rely. GANE fails to show that any expert opinion supports the contention. GANE fails to set forth the expert opinion upon which they would rely if '

a hearing were held. GANE has not here demonstrated that it can prove a set of facts '

that would sustain its position. And, of equal importance, GANE's contention here, if proven, would not entitle it to the relief which this Licensing Board could grant. The j only relief possible would pertain solely to the license amendments which permits ;

i bypassing the HJWT trips in emergency conditions, a matter which in the judgment of the NRC staff would degrade the public health and safety. Contention 3 does not set forth or raise a significant issue in controversy which could affect the public health and safety and which should be resolved by a public evidentiary hearing. The Contention f may not be admitted. I u '

L Contention 4 GANE contends the application for amended license is defective in at least two regards. The apphcation does not explain who " determined";that the -

trip on the' high jacket water temperature "should" be bypassed during an j emergency start (see Enclosure 2, 4 of the 5/25/90 letter to the NRC). 1 Also, Georgia Power does not explain what empirical data was the basis for j this determination.

7 SL ff Response h' Who determined that the HJWT trip switch should be bypassed is not relevant to the matter at issue. See 10 C.F.R. I 2.714(d)(2)(ii). Nor is any factual issue raised here.

However, to put the matter to rest, Georgia Power determined, in conformity with Reg -

Guide 1.9 Rev. 2 position 7, that the HJWT trip switch should be bypassed. See Licensee's Request, Enclosure 2; Staff Safety Evaluation.

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In addition to the foregoing GANE's' contention 4 fails to reference.the specific portion of the application for amendment which it challenges. GANE's contention 4 is- >

not supported by a concise statement or facts. GANE fails to show any sources of information or expert opinion that support the contention. GANE also fails to set forth ,

the expert opinion upon which they would rely if a hearing were held. GANE has not f demonstrated that it can prove a set of facts that would sustain its position. And, of _ :j equal importance, GANE's contention 4, if proven, would not entitle it to the relief which this Ucensing Board could grant. The only relief possible would pertain solely to the license amendments that permit bypassing the HJWT trips in' emergency conditions. ]

Contention 4 does not set forth or raise a significant issue in controversy which'could affect the public health and safety and which should be resolved by a public evidentiary hearing. The contention may not be admitted. :;

Contention 5 j GANE contends there is no automatic redundancy provided for the high jacket water temperature trip at Plant Vogtle, GANE contends this is inadequate and does not address the potential problem that the generator ,

engine may overheat.

Staff Response '

The redundancy of HJWT trip switches was not part of the request for amendment j

. and is' beyond the scope of the Notice of Hearing. No facts or expert basis 'is given in support of the contention, or even to show that redundancy of- the HJWT trips are necessary for safety. 'Moreover, redundancy is provided for the EDGs and other sources m of electric power. See Staff Safety Evaluation at 2. See also 10 C.F.R. Part 50,

. Appendix A, GDC 17. No facts, supported by requisite documents or expert opinion, are alleged to dispute this matter. The contention may not be admitted, c

_:__L: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . - . - - i

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- Contention 6 GANE contends that Enclosure No. 2 of the Applicant's May'25_ L-tter to. -i the NRC is inadequate. A full analysis of the generator in question nmst i be undertaken before Georgia Power may be permitted to bypass a safety.

device.that the generator's designers and manufacturer included on the '

specific model used at Plant Vogtle.

Staff Response "

Analyzing the TDI diesel generators at the Vogtle facilities is not connected to the [

May 25,1990 application for license amendment. No 2nalysis of the diesels is necessary as the predicate for an action which only involves bypassing the HJWT trips. See Point i Beach, supra.

-}t GANE's contention 6 fails to reference the specific portion of the application for- -

3 amendment that it challenges.

GANE's contention 6 is not supported by a concise I

.i statement of facts. GANE fails to show any sources of information or expeit opinion 3 that support the -contention. GANE fails to set forth the expert opinion upon which u

they would rely if a hearing were held. GANE has not demonstrated that it can prove .0 a- set of facts that would sustain its position. And,.of equal iniportance, GANE's contention 6 here,if proven, would not entitle it to the relief which this Licensing Board j could grant. The only relief possible could pertain only to the license amendments that permit bypassing the HJWT trips in emergency conditions. This contention 6 does not ;

r set forth or raise a significant issue in controversy which could affect the health and-safety of Fred Points and which should be resolved by a public evidentiary hearing. This contention may not be admitted.

Contention 7 I I

On November 25, 1985, the Atomic Safety and Licensing . Board of the NRC (Docket No. 50-4240L and 50-4250L) held as follows:

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o "The Board concludes that Applicants have undertaken a well considered, l in depth approach to qualifying their TDI EDGs for reliable nuclear service 1

, , ; at the - VEGP. The Board further concludes the program provides - '

L reasonable assurance that the emergency diesel generators manufactured by.

TDI to be used at Plant Vogtle:will provide a reliable ~ dependent source K of onsite power as required by 10 C.F.R. Part 50 App A, General Design o Criteria 1 and 17, Whereas evidence of the ultimate success of Applicants' '

E efforts must await the results of preoperational testing of the VEGP EDGs, '

we find no basis at this time to challenge the likelihood of that success."

(Memorandum and Order p. 6).

As yet the Applicant has not provided to GANE reasonable assurance that '

the emergency diesel generator will function reliably. The Applicant's pre- ,

operational testing did not anticipate the critical failures that occurred on !

n March 20,1990. L L - .

! GANE contends the Applicant must provide reasonable assurance by either p operational: testing, a more complete evaluation (than enclosure 2 to the

' Applicant's May .25 letter- to the NRC), or other_ evidence that the Applicant's_ proposed modification to the high jacket water temperature trip will permit the generator to function reliably in an emergency.

Staff Response Contention 7 challenges the reliability of the -Vogtle TDI diesel generators.

GANE has failed to show why that' issue is germane to the application to bypass the HJWT trip switches in an emergency situation. See Point Beach,. supra.

In addition-to the foregoing, GANE's contention 7 fails-to reference the specific portion of the application for amendment which it challenges. GANE's contention 7 is

. not supported by a concise statement of facts. GANE fails to show that any sources of ,j information or expert opinion that support the contention. GANE fails to set.forth the -

f 4

expert opinion upon which they would rely if a' hearing wre held. GANE has not demonstrated that it can prove a set of facts that would sustain its position. And, of equal importance, GANE's contention 7 here, if proven, would not entitle it to the relief which this Licensing Board could grant. The only relief possible could pertain only to

~

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. , 1 25 - l the license amendments which permits bypassing the HJ\VT trips in emergency conditions. -

1 This contention'7 does not set forth or raise a significant issue in controversy which could . ,

affect the public health and safety and which could be resolved by a public evidentiaryc hearing. The contention may not be admitted.

Contention 8

[

All of the parties to this proceeding are well aware of the myriad design' flaws with the TD1 generator line and the general unreliability of the TDI ,

generator does provide a background basis for our contention that there is' '

a real possibility that must be explored that failure of the TDI generator '

may occur if the high jacket water temperature switch is bypassed, This situation could leave Plant Vogtle completely without power to its nuclear-safety systems.' GANE contends that until the question of why the TDI- .

generators at Plant Vogtle are unreliable is resolved that the Applicant is <

not-in ' compliance with the conditions of.its license to operate- Nuclear Plant Vogtle. GANE contends the Applicant must not operate the power ;

plants at Vogtle until?such ' time as these ' serious safety questions are '

resolved.

?

Staff Resoonse .

p Contention 8 simply raises no issue relevant to the May_25,1990 application for amendments by Georgia Power Company. The issue here is the affect on safety of p allowing bypass of- the HJWT trips, and not the question concerning the -use of TDI diesels. See Point Beach,' supra (amendment licensing proceeding limited to affect of .;

I- amendment).

In addition to the foregoing GANE's contention 8 fails to reference the specifics m

portion of the application for amendment which it challenges. GANE's contention 8 is - I

- not supported by a concise statement of facts. GANE fails to show that any sources of j, information or expert opinion that support the contention. GANE fails to set forth the-expert opinion upon which they would rely if a hearing were held. GANE has . not h demonstrated that it can prove a set of facts that would sustain its position. And, of

-r-

26 equal importance, GANE's contention 8 here, if proven, would not entitle it to the relief.

which this Licensing Board'could grant. The only relief'possible could pertain solely to the license amendment permitting bypassing the HJWT trip switch in emergency conditions, a. matter which in the judgment of the NRC staff would degrade the public< l health and safety. This contention 8 does not set forth or raise a significant issue in controversy which could affect the public health and safety and which should be resolved

[

by a public evidentiary hearing. The contention may not be admitted. 't t

.o IV. CONCLUSION ;

The petition to intervene should be dismissed as this Licensing. Board does not '

have jurisdiction .to provide the relief sought, GANE has not shown it is adversely affected by the subject amendments, and the contentions proposed do not meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. f 2.714(b)(2) and (d)(2).

]

J Respectfully submitted, Charles A. Barth a Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Rockville, Maryland -

this 14th day of September,1990:

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. September 14, 19901 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING' BOARD j .

In the Matter of ) ,

)_ d GEORGIA POWER COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-424 .

) 50-425 (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, )

Units 1 and 2)- ) ASLBP No. 90-617-03-OLA

) 1 Facility Operating License No, NPF 68 )

Amendment No. 31, July 10,.1990 )

and .

)

Facility Operating License No. NPF 81 ) ~;

Amendment No.11, July 10,1990 )

AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID B. MATTHEWS IN SUPPORT OF NRC STAFF RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO GEORGIANS AGAINST 'l NUCLEAR ENERGY'S AMENDED PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE o

I, David B. Matthews, having first.been duly sworn, hereby deposes and states as y follows.

4 ,a I am employed as Director, Project' Directorate 113, Office of Nuclear Reactor

. Regulation, U.S. NRC, Washington, D.C.

. I attended the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, and- received a B.S.

- degree in Electrical Engineering in 1970. I then attended Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, and received an M.S. degree with a major in Electrical Engineering in 1972.-

.? In my present position I direct and supervise personnel responsible for the -

U regulatory oversight and licensing reviews for eleven nuclear units operated by Duke

\

Power Co. and Georgia Power Company. These responsibilities include review and i

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, approval of safety evaluations of licensee submittals irivoMng plant modification and related changes to the technical specifications issued with each operating license.

Prior to assuming my present assignment in 1988, I supervised personnel .

responsible for review of applicant and li:ensee plans' prepared in response to' those portions of 10 C.F.R. Part 50 related to emergency preparedness at nuclear facilities. I: j was also responsible- for managing and ' directing the onsite review of emergency

~

preparedness programs to assure compliance with Commission requirements -- both as.

they applied to operating reactors and as they are required to be implemented prior to - ,

F issuance of an operating license.

Prior to 1981, I served as Chief, Reactor Security Section, Division of Safeguards, U.S. NRC In this capacity I was responsible for supervising the review of reactor -

security programs developed in response to the requirements contained in 10 C.F.R. Part 1

73.55. These requirements include provisions for physical security hardware and. . ;

programs, contingency plans, and guard training and qualification programs. My previous - .

assignments within the NRC, prior to May of 1980, included duties of increasing.

responsibility in the area of nuclear power plant and fuel facility security, safeguards and ~ -

contingency planning. These duties began with my initial assignment as an NRC plant protection analyst in August 1975.

i Between 1972 and 1975 I was employed as an electrical engineer with Westinghouse Electric Corporation in Hunt Valley, MD. My final position with '

Westinghouse was with the Nuclear Instrumentation and Control Department.

I have been requested to review the Georgians Against Nuclear Energy (GANE) !

petition to intervene dated July 23,1990 and its undated Amendment To Petition For i Leave To Intervene. I and other members of the NRR staff have particularly reviewed F

_m.___ _ ..__ . _ , _ _ __.__.m.m_ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ ,,~,.r , ,. ~ 4.,_,. ,_. - ,

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- the proffered contentions as they may relate to the amendments to revise technical -

i specification 4.8.1.1.2h(6)(c) requested by the licensee on May 25,1990_and granted by -

the NRClon July 10, 1990. 55 Fed. Reg. 32337 (Aug. 8,1990). That request was for permission to bypass the high jacket water temperature (HJ%T) trip switches on the diesel generators.

The following is the Staff's technical analysis of GANE's specific concern with Georgia Power Company's " request to bypass the high jacket water temperature switch on the backup generator that caused the March 20,1990 accident at Plant Vogtle" and the contentions proffered by GANE. l The following should be recognized:

l. For each Vogtle Unit there are two emergency diesel generators sDG)-

(four on the site) that provide power to the plant in the event that normal offsite power (the preferred source of power) is lost to the plant site.

2. Each Vogtle EDG is aligned to its own electrical power train (i.e. an independent and separate set of electrical equipment capable of supplying power to the equipment necessary to safely shut down the Unit).

3. This design of two EDGs aligned to separate and independent trains ensures I: that in the event a failure occurs in either an EDG or its associated train, L

' the other EDG and its associated train remain available to supply emergency power to the facility. In addition to the two EDGs, each Vogtle h

L Unit can be supplied power from offsite through either of two redundant L " reserve auxiliary transformers." As a result, there are four different means L

of supplying power to the plant equipment necessary to safely shut down the .

Unit.

e

a , s . . a, s#. m,__. _a _ _. .

3 1

4. . The EDGs have an elaborate array of " protective trips" which are ' designed-to protect the EDG and its constituent components from damage. One of' these protective trips is the high jacket water temperature' trip. This EDG ;

trip consists of three' temperature sensors that sense EDG jacket water temperature and " trip"if the water temperature rises to 200*F 24*F. If two -

~

out of three of these sensors trip, the EDG is shut down. On March 20,'

'990, the root cause for the Unit 1 "A" EDG trip- is believed (not.

conclusive) to be intermittent actuation (failure) of two out ~of the three ; .

t L sensors. The actual water temperature is not believed to have been 200*F. .

L It should also be noted that these switches do not control the flow of jacket water to the EDG as GANE alleged in its earlier Petition.

0 GANE's concern also states that "if this switch is bypassed theLpotential forL generator engine to overheat is increased." "If the generator engine were damaged no .

-l power would be available for the plant site." With regard to this portion of GANE's l i- concern it should be recognized that:

e ,

0

- 1. The GPC request to manually bypass (i.e., installing valves which are closed and prevent the sensors from tripping the EDG) the'high jacket water

(

L temperature sensors is likely to increase the potential that the.EDG could.

i be damaged due to overheating. This is because if there is a failure within the EDG jacket water cooling system, the EDG would no-longer be ,

automatically tripped and shut down. Instead, operator action would be relied upon in response to the EDG high jacket water temperature alarm located both locally (EDG room) and in the main control room. As mentioned above, the Vogtle design incorporates two redundant and :

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5-separate EDGs which provide power to two separate electrical power trains.

q If an'EDG problem occurred in which operator action failed to prevent. .

EDO damage, the redundant EDG:and its associated power train are -

designed and capable of providing sufficient power to plant equipment.to i

safely shut down the plant.-

p

' 2. . Contrary to what GANE seems to allege,1by manually bypassing the high.

jacket water temperature EDG trip and thus preventing spurious trips of the EDG due to sensor failures, overall EDG reliability is increased.

3. However,-it is recognized that bypassing the high jacket water temperature trip does prevent automatic EDG trips that result from valid failures in the-EDG cooling system. This, therefore, does represent a finite increase in the-possibility of.EDG damage and failure. The probability of a valid EDG.

failure (in the cooling water system) occurring coincident with an emergency L start of: the EDG is considered to be small. The risk of potential:EDG- 'I

[ !

damage in an emergency is acceptable given the availability of a redundant EDG and given the increased reliability of the EDG (prevention of spurious 7 a EDG failures stemming from jacket water temperature sensor failures) with l

l the resultant: enhancement to plant safety.

1 4. Although there may be an increased potential for diesel generator damage due to loss of engine cooling (real failure) during emergency starts, thel operating experience to date at Vogtle indicates that this potentiality. is .

I1 outweighed by the increased EDG reliability achieved and the commensurate E benefit to overall plant safety.

a I

6

.I have attached the Licensee's Request of May 25, 1990 To Revise Technical-Specification 4.8.1.1.2h(6)(c), the Staffs SE and Reg Guide 1.9 Rev.' 2 to my affidavit for additional information. It is the Staffs view that undoing or reversing the associated' ,

. amendments to the technical specifications for the two Vogtle facilities would degrade the ,

public health and safety.

t DAVID B. MATTHEWS Subscribed and sworn to before me this. day of September,1990 Notary Public l

1.

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Aren:a Guoa 3030! j 1repho 4 Cds263191 U,= Ma4ng Ace ess -

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e unasess ceme va .ua r 1

' Post o":e Ea 1735 8mesta- A.ata .a 35201 le ep%ose 205 8081521 May 25,1990 m sww ee"< sys'em w, amen, m Senc' V.:e Pres ce '

over operens ELV-01713 0402 Docket Nos. 50-424 50-425'-

1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission- 1 ATTN: Document Control Desk I y Washington, D. C.- 20555 Gentlemen:

V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT RE0 VEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.8.1.1.2h(6)Ic) ,

In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.59, Georgia Power Company (GPC) hereby proposes to amend the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units-1 and 2 Technical Specifications, Appendix A-to Operating

Licenses NPF-68 and NPF-81.

l E

Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2h(n)(c) requires-verification that all automatic diesel generator trips, except engine overspeed. : i low lube. oil pressure, high Jacket water temperature and generator differential l are automatically bypassed upon loss of voltage on the emergency bus concurrent '

with a Safety Injection Actuation Signal. The proposed amendment would-allow .(

the high jacket water temperature trip to be bypassed to minimize the potential

for spurious diesel generator trips in the emergency start mode.

.The proposed change and its basis are described in Enclosure l. .'Our evaluation y

. pursuant to to 10 CFR 50.92 showing that the proposed change does not involve-significant hazards considerations is provided as' Enclosure 2. Instructions for incorporation of-the proposed change into the Technical Specifications and a -

mark-up of the affected page is provided as Enclosure 3'.

GPC requests that this proposed amendment be processed as an emergency Technical Specification change. The modification which allows the jacket water high temperature trip to be bypassed has become necessary to-alleviate a continuing problem of spurious trips caused by the jacket water temperature switches. 6 )C believes that this' modification needs to be made'as soon as-possible to increase diesel generator reliability.

l

' Georgia PUaer1 U. S. Nuclent. Regulatory Comission ELV-01713 Pace Two- ..

f In accordance'with 10 CFR 50.91, the designated state official will'be sent a copy of this letter.and all enclosures.

Mr. W. G. Hairston, !!! states that he is a Senior Vice President.of Georgia i

' Power Company and is authorized to execute this oath:on behalf of Georgia Power Company and that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth j in this letter and enclosures are true. '

GEORGIA-POWER COMPANY i 3

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By: (42./b Y E W. G. Mairston, 111 i Sworn to and subscribed before me this&5 day of A , 1990. 'I U

l L

$2 &WSn

. Notary Public I

.i WGH,lll/NJS/gm' ) pgggggggscymtsJELl*

Enclosures:

1. Basis for Proposed Change '

2. 10 CFR 50.92 Evaluation . 4 L '

3.

Instructions for Incorporation and Revised Pages-c(w): Georcia Power comoany Mr. C. K. McCoy i

Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr. ;

Mr. R. M. Odom '

Mr. P. D. Rushton NORMS Southern Comoany Services Mr. L. B. Long 1

L U. S. Nuclear Reculatory Comission 1 Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator . ,

Mr. T. A.. Reed, Licensing Pro.iect Manager, NRR l- Mr.-R. F. Aiello, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle I State of Georcia Mr. J. L. Ledbetter, Commissioner, Department of Natural Resources

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ENCLOSURE 1 V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT .

l RE0 VEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.~8.1.1.2h(6)(

RAS 15 FOR PROPOSED CHANGE I Procesed Chance This proposed change will-add a footnote to Specification 4.8.1.1.th(6)(c) that i states 'The high jacket water temperature trip may be bypassed.'

will temperature allow thetrip diesei generators to be operable with the high jacket waterThis change bypassed.

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Regulatory Guide 1.9 requires that all diesel generator protective trips except engine overspeed and generator differential be either automatically-bypassed under accident conditions or implemented with two or more. independent -'

measurements'for each trip parameter. Sufficient operator reaction time should .

be available for bypassed trips. The Vogtle Electric-Generating Plant diesel 1 bypassed.

These are the loss of lube oC pressure and high jacket water' g temperature trips.

Plant operating experiesco has shown'that the high jacket water' temperature trip system is a source of unnecessary diese1' generator trips...

Therefore, to_be bypassed. GPC is preparing a modification that will allow this trip function 4 the Technical Specification to indicate that-this. trip function m

-The effects of this change have been evaluated to determine whether o r not it- ~ ;

involves any significant hazards consideration., This evaluation is presented in Enclosure 2.

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, . ' ENCLOSURE 2-e -!'

V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT RE00EST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.-8.1.1.th(6)(c)

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10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION '

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Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92, Georgia Power Company (GPC) has evaluated the attached ,

proposed amendment and has detemined that operation of the facility in 1 accordance with the proposed amendment would not. involve significant hazards 1 considerations.

BACKGROUND This proposed change is to allow the emergency diesel generators to be' started i by an emergency signal'with the high jacket water temperature trip bypassed.

This is in addition to the other trips which are already bypassed by an emergency start signal (Safety Injection (SI), Loss of offsite power (LOSP), or ={

Emergency Manual start). A modification will be made to add isolation valves in ,

the instrument. tubing between the DG high jacket water temperature elements and 1 the local OG control panel. The valves will normally be closed so that high jacket w v temperature sensors will not provide input to the engine trip logic, be ^ay be opened to allow additional engine protection when performing a non-emergency manual start or surveillance of the diesels. In order to close these valves the Technical Specifications are being revised to indicate that the- !

Jacket water temperature trip may be bypassed. :

S Position 7 of Reg. Guide 1.9, Revision 2, states that all diesel generator protective trips should be.either bypassed when the diesel generator is required for a design-basis event or implemented with two or more independent :

measurements with coincident logic provisions. All protective trips are allowed during periodic testing. The allowed exceptions to the above requirements for bypassing are diesel engine overspeed and generator differential current.

Currently, all the protective trips except engine overspeed, generator differential, low lube oil pressure', and high jacket water temperature are a*

bypassed during an emergency start. The low 1ube oil pressure and high jacket water temperature trips are implemented by three independent measurements for r each trip parameter. Actuation of these trips is initiated by two-out-of-three coincident logic. These provisions satisfy the requirements of Position 7 of Reg. Guide .l.9 and. :as documented in section 8.3.1 of the SER, were found by the y

, NRC to be: acceptable. ~

6 However, to increase the reliability of the diesel generators, it has now been determined that the trip on high jacket water temperature should also be bypassed during an emergency start. Reg. Guide 1.9, Rev 2 allows this trip to be bypassed under accident conditiens provided the operator has sufficient time i to react appropriately to an abnormal diesel-generator condition. In addition, i the bypass circuitry should satisf'~ " equirements of IEEE 279-1971 at the DG '

system level and should include tf ty for (1) testing the status and operability of the bypass circuits aing abnormal values of all bypass parameters in the control room, r .lally resetting of the trip bypass function. (Capability for automr is not acceptable.)

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ENCLOSURE 2 (CONTINUED)

V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT RE0 VEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.8.1.1.2h(6)(c) 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION BACKGROUND (Continued)

This proposed change meets the intent of Reg. Guide 1.9. Abnomal values of high jacket water temperature will continue to be alamed locally and in the control room. Low jacket water pressure is also alarmed. From the time of the high jacket water temperature alam, the operator will have sufficient time to react appropriately to abnomal diesel generator condition. If the valves are closed, the trips will be bypassed. Operating procedures will assure the correct position of the valves.

ANALYSIS In order to accomodate the current design, the Technical Specifications require verification that all automatic diesel generator trips are automatically bypassed upon loss of voltage on the emergency bus concurrent with a Safety Injection Attuation signal, except for engine overspeed, generator differential, low lube oil pressure and high jacket water temperature. The proposed Technical Specification change will note that the jacket water temperature trip tay be bypassed. The high jacket water temperature trip is designed to protect the diesel generator from a loss of engine cooling. For such an event, the safety function would be provided by the diesel for the other train. During an accident, the advantage of the automatic trip is small relative to the increased reliability achieved by reducing the possibility of a spurious trip.

RESULTS This change will not increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated because it does not affect any of the design basis events that have been previously evaluated in the FSAR. The analyses of accident consequences do not take credit for the ability to restart a diesel following a diesel generator trip. Therefore, this change will not affect the previously evaluated consequences.

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l ENCLOSURE 2-(CONTINUED) '

V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENECe 'dG PLANT RE00EST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFkATION 4.8.1.1.fhf6)(c) .

10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION '

RESULTS (Continued)

-The revision to the Technical Specification will not create the possiblity of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. No unction.as

.will continue todesigned.new perform their 1 modes of operation are beinfimposed o l

The revision does not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety provided for events involving a loss of electrical power. The proposed revision will allow the implementation of a modification which is intended to improve the .c reliability of the diesel generators by minimizing the possibility of. spurious trips. l CONCLUSION Based on'the preceding analysis, GPC has determined that the proposed change to l

the Technical Specifications does not involve a~significant intrease in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated

! possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any prev. iousl create the l

or involve a significant reduction in a margin of. safety.. Therefore,y evaluated-GPC does not involve significant hazards considerations, concludes that th a

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, ENCLOSURE ~3~.- -

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l' V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT REDUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.8.1.1.fh(6)(c) l L

INSTRUCTIONS FOR INCORPORATION The proposed amendment to the Technical Specifications would be incorporated as-

'follows: -

Remove Pace Intert Pace i l -3/4 6-7* 3/4,g 7 N

1 Overleaf page containing no changes i

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59 or w l rw ms8 Menrr untTric trWet ArvH prtip ,ew y b M1 f4 55 tp .

AVtVE!LtAw*t REOL0aEMENTS

(' auto start signal; the steady-state generator voltage and frequency test; shall be maintaWd within these limits during this t

6) Simulating a less of-offsite power in conjunction with an E5F

{ -Actuation test signal, and:

4) Verifying deenergitation of the energency busses and load y

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shedding from the energency busses; b) i Verifying the diesel starts on the auto start signal ;

onergites the emergency busses with permanently conne,cted

(- loads within 11.5 seconds,* energizes the auto connectee emergency (accident) leads through the lead sequencer and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its ,

generator is loaded with the emerpency loads. After the emergency, busses shalltage beand frecuency ofatenergitation t maintained 4160 +170,

-410 volts and 60 + 1.2 Hz during this test; and 4

c) Verifying that all automatic diesel generator trips, except

- engine overspeed, low lube oil-pressure, high jacket water temperaturePant! generator differential, are automatically bypassed upon loss of voltage en the emergency bus concurrent with a Safety Injection Actuation signal. ;

7) Verifying the diesel generator operates for at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

(, .

During the first 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months of this test, the diesel generator shall i be loaded to an indicated 7600 to 7700 kW ** and during the remaining 22 hours2.546296e-4 days 0.00611 hours 3.637566e-5 weeks 8.371e-6 months of this test, .the diesel gene-ator shall be leased to en indicated 6600 7000 kW.** The generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160 + 170, - 135 volts and 60 1 1.2 Hz within 11.4 seconds after the start signal; the steady-state generator voltage and frequency sgall be 4160 + 170, ~410 volts and 60 1 1.2 Hz during this test. Within 5 minutes after coe-pleting this 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months test, perfore Specification 4.8.1.1.2h.6)b);,,

8) Verifying that the auto connected loads to each diesel generator do not exceed the continuous rating of 7000 kW; ,

9) Verifying the diesel generator's capability to:

"All engines starts for the purpose of surveillance testing as required by Specification 4.8.1.1.2 may be preceded by an engine prelube period as recommended by the manufacturer to einioite mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine.

( "This band is meant as guidance to avoid routine overloading of the engine 1

I Loads in excess of this band or momentary variations due to changing bus ioads shall not invalidate the test. ,

Failure to maintain voltage and frequency requirements due to grid disturbances does not render a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months test 43 a failure, f ##If Specification 4.8.1.1.th.6)b) is not satisfactorily completed, it is not

necessary to repeat the preceding 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months test. Instead, the diesel cenerator may be operated at the load required by Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a5 kW fot I hour or until operating temperature has stabilized.

V0GTLE UNITS 1&2 3/4 8 7

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5 f- 7 UNITsD sTATss g( f NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIT $10N usamoton.o e co66s

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.jyETY EYAyLAT!0k By THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR RE l REL ATED TO AM ;NDNINT NO. 31 TO FACILITY OPfRATING LICER$f NPF-68 AC AMEOPJ hi NO. 11 s

L TO FACILITY DPf4ATING LitM5f NPF-81 GEORGIA POWER COMPANY. ET AL, V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT. UN275 1 AN

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DDCKET NOS. 50-424 AND $0-426 '

!.0 W C i20N I ff letter catee Fay 25, 1950

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recuestte a Technical Specification (TS) amensment to all i Gererating Flatt (YEGP) Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) high ja!

ter.;eratsre (F.*L'i' trip to be bypassed to rinimite the pctential diesti for spur i

chan;e generatcr tripc in the enstgency start moot.

ble revise ous high Ja: t Let water ter.;erature trip my be bypassoc." ge The ;

resbits frer GPC's desire to install a podification that seds isolation va in the ;nr.tl.

contrcl inst *wtent tuoing tetween the EDG NWT elements and the. local5 The insta11ec valves would then be morea11y closeg so that th ;

HNi setsers woule not provice input to the EDG trip logicartfor emerge signals. t for non.erergency The iscletion manual valves myEDG starts or be opente surveillance to enable tests. the .Deket water tri i

2.0 EQLtTW The criteria w

h govern whether an EDG trip can be bypassed for emer norr.a1 ELG starts cre provicec in Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.9. gency or ef Feguistery Guice 2.9, Revtsion 2. states that al? diesel Position 7 generator p trips s*oult be either bypassed when the diesel generdter is required for a i' design coincider.t tesis logicevent or implemented with two or apre independent seasure provisions.

testing.

The allowe# exceptions to the above requirements fo eiesel engine overspeed and protective trips on the VE6f' generator differential current. Currently all the EDGs except engine overspeed low lube oil pressure, and N#T are bypassed during an eme,rgency startgen The low lube for each oiltrippressure parameter.and NWT trips are implemented by three independen ^

coincident logic.

of Regulatory GuiseThe 1.9. current design satisfies the requirements of 1

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Regulatery Guice 1.9 Revision 2, allows the HNT trip toer be bypasse ;

acticett concittens priately,to an abnormalprovides diesel generator the opertter condition. has sufficient time to react !

The proposed 75 change anc while wintaining the local and control room alams f L i tetterature.

i The alarms would provide the operator with an indication of 4

abnormal to citi ate 6 theconditionscondition. and provide sufficient time for the operator tot Although there is an increased potential for diesel generater camage due to loss of engine cooling during emergency starts!

4 -

operating experience to date at Vogtle indicates t safety. i

!' Accordingly, the NRC staff finds that the proposed 73 change to :

Surveillance Re;ctrement 4.4.1.1.th(6)(c) and the associates plant m i

meet the intent of Regulatory Gutee 1.g. Revision 2, and are acceptable. '

hith re;4re te the impact of the proposed TS chan i

kpcstec VEGr finel Safety Analysis Report (F$Ak),ge the bypassing on events of pcstulated the NJWTin 4he events in dich the preferred offsite power source The is p ,

accicent cf an EM. aralysts postulated in the VEGP FSAR ce not take crecit for a r failure,', emergent) If en EDG should fail from a loss of engine cooling (worst single asscciatet electrical onsite train.AC power would be provised by the reduncant EDG ant. ,

1 it;a:t plart safety as analy2ed in the updated VIGP F$AR. Consequently, t 3.0 (2:GB' C UCUF.STMCES }

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amenerents uten the usual 3D day publicOnen9tice of special exception is an exigency. type teriod '

licensee invoh e a plar.tneec shutdown to act promptly, but failure te act promptly does derating, or delay in startup. As described belon, the retutstec enhan:emert. *S amenamen,t and associated plant seeification repres ,

L with TS 3.6.;

Ruu t rements. af ter the Unit 1 '8' ED6 failed the applica Troubleshooting and seditional EDG testin

^

most likely cause for the foi vre was the NNT switches.g indicated that the i

These switches were procedere (incorporating the lessons ter the revised learnes calibration from Given tie Wyle i that the mest probable root cause for the EDG failure was the same as).

the root cause (NWT switches) for the March 20,1990 given the repeated difficulties the licensee,has experienced with N !

3 thealllicensee for energency ceterminet' starts. that the best resolution was to bypass the N#7 trip The Itcensa: promptly notifies the NRC of its neee for an expeditte TS change to TS 4.8.1.1.th(6)(c). intention subse;wer,tly expeditious adnner. processed the TS change request and plant modification in anThe

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Operation 3.8.1 on May 25,1990,The licessee lett r the 72 houri i

sf ter having reinstalles the original HJWT testieg.

switches into the 16 EDG anc successfully performing the requi!

' However, gaen recent operating experience, particular1 1990 evert, arid the sifficulties experienced with NJWTthetrips March 20, thought cn an expecited it procent basis. in tere.s of enhanced plant safety th licensee to reque,st the t ge '

ar.c providec e Ternporary The Waiver kRC staff concurred of Cocp11ance on with May the licensee's ass '

(6)(c) until such time that 4 T$ amenment could be processed.25, 1990, fr ..

The Cor ission notifive the public b .

kecistee on June 22, 1990 (55 FR 257)56). publishing a notice in the federal The notice provides an natier et ne significant hazares constoeration.for ettermi-tearing arc a it respnst to the notice published in the Federal Resister.There were no public c 4.0 rihr. NO SIGhiF7 CANT HA2ARDS CONS 10 ERAT 10N DETER '

4 .

4.E.1.1.2Mi>(c) to acc a note that allows u.

the hJWT i signal ;

Emer;ena($afety !njection (51) signal, loss of Of llanual Start signal) with the NJWT trip bypassec.

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The Corrission's regulatieric in 10 CFR 50.92 state that the Consis

' sake t final determinattun that a license amendment irvolves no significant amencur.t consiceration hartres =0.1c not: if eparatton of the facility in accorsance w'th the (1) Irveh e a significar.:

any actice;,t previously evalbsted; orincrease in the probability or conse .

)

( 2 ,'

Creatr. the possibility cf a new or different kind of accident from any accicent previously evaluated; or (3)

Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The A licensee has provided the following analysis regarding no significant 42 ares consideration using the Cossission's standards.

In order to acconsnodate the current design ;

all automatic diesel generator trips are au,tomaticelly bypasses upon l

except for engine overspeed, generator differential, l HJWT.

may be bypassed. The proposed The NJWTTStrichange will note that the jacket water toeperature tr

! frorr a less of engine cooling.p is designed to protect the diesel generator .

be providte by the diesel f or the For suchtrain.

other an event, the safety functions would During an accident, the achieved by reducing the possibility of a spurious trip. advanta

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l evehntee tectuse it does not affect anThis char.;e y =111 riot inc been previeusly evaluates in the FSAR. y of the design basis events that have i

L to net take generator trip. credit There for the ability to restart a diesel following a diThe evalutted consequences. fore, this change will not affect the esel previously '

The kind ofrevisien accicent tc from theany T5s will net accident createevaluates.

previously the possibility of a new o No new endes of operatiet te prfore their arefunction being as impesed designed. en the plant anG the diesel generators i

The redewn will nct result in a significant reduction in the margin c s a f et,v grc.icec for egents involving a loss cf electrical power. The proposed re.tsien will allow the implementation of a modification which is intendec ir;reve cf speric6$the trips.teliatility of the diesel generators by minimizing the basec et the ;rttecing analysis, the licensee determined that the prop change tc the 75s oculd not involve a significant increase in the pr or consecuences of an accident previously evaluttac, create the possib e re or cuferert significara reesttiunkind of accioent ir a margin of safety. free any previously evaluated or invclve a

deterr.itatier arc agrees with the licensee's analysis.The finch that the censiceratier, re: uested amenGments do not involve a significant hazards 5.0 $?t*! CChSULTATION fn accorcar.:e contactec en F,ay 25, with litC.the Corrission's regulations, the State of Georgia was The state represent 6tive had no comments.

LC Ih.T.WL'nTAL CONSIDEUT10h These amencrents involve a change to a TS Surveillance Requirement has ceterminee that the amendments involve no significant The increase. staff arounts, and no significant change in the types in the releasec offsite and that there is no sign of any effluents that any be cumulative occupational radietton exposure.ifican,t increase in fadividual or The NRC staff has ande a final setereination A8corcingly that the amongrents involve oc significant hasards constsera the atendments teet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusionse,tforthin10CFR51.22(c)(91 environmar.tal impact statement orPursuant to 10 CFR 51.22 b no environmental assessment need be pr cont.tction with the issuance of these amendments.

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We teve conc 1Leec, based en the considerations a- eiscussed abov (1)thereisrecsonableassurancethatthehealthan6safetyofth e public will net be encangered by operation in the proposed , and 2 such manner

etc the isstttee of these anenesents will not'be ini . ,

esfense er.c security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Centributor:

T. Reed PD!l-3/DRP-!/II S. Jaba, SEL8/037 i

Date: My 20,1990 ,

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. es'N'9 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATGRY COMMISSION Dem mtw tePe j

cV ( "l. REGULATORY GUIDE l b . . . . . **# OPRCE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMEW REGULATORY GUIDE 1.e i

SELECTIDN, DESIGN, AND QUALIFICATION OF DIESEL. GENERATOR UNITS USED AS j

.l STANDBY (ONSITE) ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS' i

A. INTRODUCTION equipment needed to maintain the plant in a neft condition I if an entended loss of offsite power occurs.

General Design Cntenon 17, " Electric Power Systems,"

of Appendix A," General Design Cntens for Nuclear Power i IEEE Std 3871977, "lEEE Standard Criteria for Daewl- !

Plants." to 10CF A Part $0," Domestic 1.icensing of Produc.

Generator Units Appbed as $tandby Power Suppbes for Nu.

tion and Utihtstieri Facihties," includes a requirement that -

clear Power Genersting Stations,"8 delineates Principal the onsite electne power system have sufficient capacity ,

and estability to ensure that (1) specified steertable fuel design criteria and quahfacation testing nquirements that,if ,

design hmits and design conditions of the reactor coolant followed, will help ensure that selected dieselgeneratot ;

units meet their performance and reliebihty requirements. I pressure boundar) att not exceeded as a result of anticipated IEEE Std 3871977 was developed by Working Group 4.2C operatzonal occur 7ences and (2) the core is cooled and con- .

tainment integnt) and other vital functions are maintained of the Nuclear Power Engineenng Committee (NPEC) of I in the event of postulated accidents. the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.

i (IEEE), approved by NPEC, and subsequently approved by the IEEE Standards Board on September 9,1976. IEEE Std '

Cntenon !!', "Demgn Control," of Appendis B,"Quabty .

387 1977 is supplementary to IEEE Std 3081974, "IEEE Assurance Cnteria for Nuclest Power Plants and Fuel l Standard Critena for Class IE Power Systems and Nuclear Reprocess ng Plants," to 10 CFR Part $0 includes a require-Power Genercting Stations,"3 and specifically amplifies '

ment that steasures be provided for verifysag or checking paragraph 5.2.4, " Standby Power Suppbes," of that docu-the adeqrm of demgr. by design rev>tws, by the use of -

( alternative or umphfied calculational methods, or by the ment with nspect to the application of dieselgenerator i performance of a suttable testing program, units. lEEE Std 306 1974 is endorsed, with certain excep.

tions, by Regulatory Guide 1.32,"Critene for Safety Related Electric Power Systems for Nuclear Power Plants." '

Diesel-generator units have been widely und as the power source for the onsite electne power systems. This A knowledge of the characteristics of each load is regulatory guide describes a method acceptable to the NRC ;

essential in estabhshing the bases for the selection of a staff for complying with the Commission's requirements i dieselgenerator unit that is able to accept large loads in ,'

that dieselgenerator units intended for use as onsite power rapid succession. The maiority of the emergency ioeds are sources in nuclear power plants be selected with sufficant large induction moton. This type of motor draws, et full i capacity and be quahfied for this service. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has been consulted voltage, a starting current five to eight times its rated load l <

curnnt. The sudden large increases in curnnt drawn from "

concerntng this guide and has concurnd in the regulatory position, the diesel generator resulting from the startup of induction motors can result in substantial voltage reductions. The S. Ol%US$10N lower voltage could prevent a motor from starting, i.e.,

accelersting its load to reted speed in the required time, or A dieselgenerator unit selected for use in an onsite cause a running motor to coast down or stall. Other loads .

electtic power system should have the capability to (1) start might be lost if their contactors drop out. Recovery from r tite transient caused by starting large motors or from the and accelerate a number of large motor loads in rapid ;

succession and be able to susta2n the loss of all or any part loss of a large load could cause diesel engine overspeed i cf such loads and maintain voltage and frequency within which, if eacessive, might result in e inp of the engtne. )

acceptable limits and (2) supply powet continuously to the

, , Cop 6.s sn.y be obt.An.d f,.en Doctroew erie.)and M k w An.c., Yorkin.tti.e. . .eCD.. g

Uts.: indic.t. sutst.ntiv. ch.nges tr m R.ve.ior: 1. Unis.d n. orang nt.r. Ms asi 47th Str..e Engineers, t,i'c leet USNRc Rtout.* TORY cuiDEs Comm.nts .n. t. m. .eni to tw secret.,v .' tu

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__________.__-+v---+.. - - ve r s - m-1 o++m-v=>

Deee same eeneequences een also fosatt frgm the tum> system should he genereted to have a continuuus lued uties lative effect of a sequence of more moderate treatients if (as defined in Section 3,*.I of IEEF Std 3311917)squal _

. the system is not permitted to recover sufficiently between to or poeter that the sum of the soneenatively estimated suseess!ve steps in a loading esquence. Leeds needed to be powered by that unit et any one time, la the absence of fully substantiated performente chorectet-Courally it has been indvetry practice to specify e latice for mechemical equipment ouch en pumps the electric manimum voltage toduction of to to 15 percent when motor drive retings should be calculeted using conservative starting large motors ftom larpeal,acity pewer systems and estimetos of these shetteterie,ies, e.g., pump runout condi-a voltage foguetion of 30 to 80 percent when starting these tions and motor efficionales of 90 percent et lees and Colete from limited espacity power sourses such as diesel- power factore of $$ permat orless.

generatet unita. Large induction actors saa tehleve rated speed in less than $ escondt

hen powered from adequately 2. At the operating 11eense stage of review,the predicted eined dieselger4ratet units that are sepaMe of postorlag the needs should not oneoed the ahort. time reting (as defined in voltage to 90 percent of nominalin about I escend, Settien 3.1.2 of ItE! Std $g11977) of the diesel generator unit.

Protection of the diosalgenerefor unit from easseelve ,

oeerspeed, which can result from a loss of load. is afforded 3. In Section 5.1.1,"Ceneral"of IEEE Std 3871977,the l by the immodate operation of a dienal$enerator unit trip, requirements of IEEE Std 303 lM4 thould be used subject usually set et 115 pereen of nominal opetila addition, to the regulatory position of Regulatory Guide 1.32, the 369eratet differential int must operett immediately in order tc' prevent substantial dareage to the generator.There 4. Section 5.1.2,'hischanical and ElectrieelCapabihties,"

are other protective trips provided to protet, the diesel- of IEEE Std 3371977 pertains,in part, to the starting and pnerator units from possible damage et depadation. loadeceepting espebilities of the dieselgenerator unit in However, these tnpa could interfere with the eucosesful conjunction with Section $.l.2, each diesel $enerator unit functioning of the unit when it is moet needed.i.e.,during should be espable of starting and steelerating to rated accident conditions. Batenance has shown that there have speed, in the required sequence, all the needed engineered been numerous recesjons ohen these trips have needleanly esfety feature and emergency shutdown loads. The diesel-Cut down diesel-generator units because of epurious peerator unit design should be such that at no time during operation of a tnp circuit. Consequently, it le important the loading sequence should the frequency and voltage that measures be taken to ensure that spurious actuation of decrease to les than 95 percent of nominal and M percent these other protective trips does not preveal the diesel- of nominal, respectively. (A larger dec:ssee in voltage and generator unit from performing its function. frequency may be justified for a dieselgenerator unit ti.at carnes only one large connected load.) Frequency should The uncertainties inherent in estimates of safety loads at be restored to within 2 percent of nominal, and voltage the construction permit stage of design are sometimes of such should be restored to within 10 percent of nominal within magnitude that it is prudent to provide e avbstantial margin 60 percent of each load sequence time interval. (A grantet in selecting the load capsbihties of the diesel generatet unit. Percentage of the time interval may be used if it can be

%s mars n can be r ovided by estimating the loads conser- justifad by analysis. However, the lood esquence time estively and selecting the continuous rating of the diesel- interval should include sufficient margin to account for the generator unit so that it exceeds the sum of the loads needed occuracy and repeatabibty of the load eequence timer.)

at any one time. A more accurate estimate of safety loads is During recovery from transients caused by ster load increases possible dunna the operating license stage of review because or resulting from the disconnection of the largest smale

. detailed designs have been completed and preoperational loed, the speed of the dieselgenerator unit should not test data are evallable, This permits the ceneideration of a eaceed the nominal speed plus 75 percent of the difference somewhat less conservative approach, auch as operation between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint with safety loads withtn the short time rating of the diesel- or 115 percent of nominal,whicheverislower Further,the pnerator unit, transient following the complete loss of load should not cause the speed of the unit to attain the overspeed tnp C. REGULATORY pollTION setpoint.

Ce e armance with the requirements of IEEE Sid 3371977, 5. In Section 5.4," Qualification,"ofIEEE Std 3371977, "IEEE Standard C:stene for Diesel Generator Units Applied the qualification testing requirements ofIEEE Std 3231974, as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Generating "!EEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Stations," dated June 17.1977, is acceptable for meeting Nuclear Power Generating Stations,"' should be used the requirements of the pnncipal design criteria and qualifica- subject to the regulatory position of Regulatory Guide 1.g9, tion testing of dieselgeneratot units used as onsite electric " Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear power Power systems for nuclear power plants subject to the Piants."

followmg:

6. Section 5.5 " Design and ApplicationConsiderations"

1. When the characteristics of loads are not accurately of IEEE Std 337 1977 pertains to design features for con-known, such as during the construction permit stage of sideration in dieselgenerator unit design. In conjunction design, each diesel generator unit of an onsite power supply with Section 5.5, diesel-generator units should be designed 1.92

t s

C) be testable funnd eptistion of the nuclear power plant Queuflection of Clem it Stulpment for Nuolent Power i g as well as while the plant le shut down. The design should Gen'ereting Stations," for esiamic analysis or seismic testing tacluse provisions so that the testing of the units will

'(

/

by equipment manufactutore should be used subj6ct to the almulete the parameters af operation (outlined in Regule. regulatory position of Regulatory Guide 1.100 "Setemic tory Cuise 1.104, " Periodic Testir.3 of Dioesl4enerator Ous11fication of Electric Equipment for Nuclear Power i l'nf ts t' sed 6 Onsite Electric Power $yetems at Nuclear Plants." '

Power plants") that would be espected if actual demand were to be pieced on the system.

10. The option indicated by "may"in Section 6.3.2($Xc) of Ittt Std 3871p77 ahound be treated as 4 requirement. :

, ToeteWty should be considered in the selection and loostion of instruinentstion sensen and critical componente

11. Section 6J,* Site AseeptanesTesting,'and Settlea 666, (e.g., Severnor, starting pystem componente), and the " Periodic Testing," of Ittt $td 387/1977 should be supple.

overall assigr. should ladude status indication and alarm mented by Regulatory Guide 1.108, features. Instrumente tien eenson should be readily assessible l and, where practicable, designed so that their inspection 12. Sectien d,"Referesseltendards,"st M 8td af71977 avid cabbration can be verified in place, +

liste additional appliosble itEt standards.The speelfic app 11 seWty or aeseptability of these referossed standards has

7. Section 3.6.2.2, " Automatic Control," of IEE Std been or wit! be covered esperately in other regulatory guides, 367 1977 pertains to automatic etartup requirements ans where appropriate, their relationship to other operating modos.In eenjunction with 5echen s.6.2.2, engine overspeed and genereter differ.

13. Section 6.3.2, " Start and 14ed Asseptanes Quellfi.

ential ints me) be implemented by a single channel trip. All estion," pertains to test requirements for diesslgefterotor other dieselgenerator protective trips should be handledin one of two ways: Either,(1) a trip thould be implemented unit quellfscetion. la sondanction with Section 4.3.2, with two or rnore independent measurements for each trip fewer successful start and<lood teste and allowed fallwes than that specified-300 valid tests whh so mate than 3 parameter with coincident logic provisione for trip actustion, failures-may be justified for a dieselgeneretor unit that i or (2) e tnr may be bypassed under eccident conditions, carries only one large connected lead tested under setual '

provided the operator has sufficient time to react appro- oonditions, provided an equivalent rehability/confidense priately to att abnorrnal diesel generetor unit condition. The ,

levelis demonstrated.

design of the bypeis circuitry should satisfy the requirements of IEEE 5td 2791971 et the dieselgenerator systern level

14. In Section 6.3.1, " Load Capability Qualification,"of and should include the carabibty for (1) testing the status IEEE Std 3371977, the order of sequence of load teste and opereMhty of the bypass circuits,(2) alarming in the described in parts (1) and (2) should be as fouows: Lead control room abnormal values of all bypass parameters, and equal to the continuous reting should be apphed for the

. (3) manually resetting of the trip bypass fursticm.(Chpebibty l for automatic reset is not acceptable.) time required to reach engine temperature squilibrium, at ,

which time, the rated short time load should be applied for -

( e period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . Immediately fouowing the 2 bour

8. Section 5.6.3.1, " Surveillance Systems," of IEEE Std

'387 1977 pertejns to status indication of dieselgenerator short time load test, load equal to the continuous reting abould be appbed for 22 hours2.546296e-4 days 0.00611 hours 3.637566e-5 weeks 8.371e-6 months , unit conditions. In corgunction with section 3.6.3.1, iri order to facibtete trouble diagnosis,the survelliance eystem should andacate which of the dieselgenerator protective D. IhrLth4ENTATION trips is activated first.

Encept in those cases in which the applicant proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specirsed

9. In Section 6.3 " Type Qualification Testing procedures portions of the Commission's regulations, the method de.

at d Methods," of IL TE Std 3871977, the requirements of IEEE Std 344 1975, Recommended practices for Seismic scribed berein will be used la the evaluation of applications for construction permits docketed after Deesmber 1979.

I l

l l

D 1

l.93 1 1

l

P Il0LP.L IL'D UNITED STATES OF AMERICA * !

NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION '

'90 SEP 17- A9 :47 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BO g g 37g;;i g,y ,

vout ig! nvia i In the Matter of ) :

) Docket Nos. 50-424 :

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY ) 50 425 l

)

(Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, ) ASLBP No. 90 617-03-OIA '

Units 1 and 2) )

) '

Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 )

Amendment No. 31, July 10,1990 )

and )

Facility Operating License No. NPF 81 ) ,

Amendment No.11, July 10,1990 )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO GEORGIANS AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY AMENDED PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE" in the above captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, or as indicated by an asterisk through '

l deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, or as indicated by L a double asterisk by use of express mail service, or as indicated by a triple asterisk by hand delivery, this lyth day of September,1990.

r l Charles Bechhoefer, Chairman *" Emmeth A. Luebke l Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing 5500 Friendship Boulevard Board Panel Apartment 1923N :

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chevy Chase, Maryland 20815 Washington, D.C. 20555 ,

l James H. Carpenter"* Trautman, Sanders, Lockerman Administrative Judge and Ashmore Atomic Safety and Licensing Candler Building, Suite 1400 Board Panel 127 Peachtree Street, N.E.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta, Georgia 30306 Washington, D.C. 20555

t I

2 !

Ernest L Blake. Jr. Adjudicatory File' (2) i Shaw, Pittman, Potts, and Trowbridge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board l 2300 N Street, N.W. U.S. Nuclear Regulator / Commission i Washington, D.C. 20037 Washington, D.C. 20555 Director, Office c' the Secretary * (2) i Emironmental Protection Division U.S. Nu . car Regulatory Commission !

Department of Natural Resources Washington, D.C. 20555 !

205 Butler Street, S.E. Attn: Docketing and Rervice Section [

Suite 1252 i Atlanta, Georgia 30334 Georgians Against Nuclear Energy ** !

P.O. Box 8574 Atomic Safety and Ucensing Atlante, GA 30306 !

Board Panel * (1) .

LIS. Nuclear Regulatory Ms. Glenn Carroh !

Commission 139 Kings Highway l Washington, D.C. 20555 Decatur, GA 30307 Atomic Safety'and Licensing _ Mr. James A. Bailey **

. Appeal Panel' (6) Manager - Ucensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Georgia Power Company Commission Post Office Box 1295 !

Washington, D.C. 20555 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 l

) Stewart D. Ebneter, Esq.* ;

Regional Administrator !

USNRC, Region 11 101 Marietta St., N.W., Suite 2900 i Atlanta, Georgia 30303 l

$A&$8 Charles A. Barth Counsel for NRC Staff L

, . - .-- ,

ML20059L838

Text

Enclosures:

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