ML20059E835
| ML20059E835 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1989 |
| From: | Shelton D TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 1850, NUDOCS 9009100353 | |
| Download: ML20059E835 (54) | |
Text
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1 TOLEDO EDISON-A Cemerar Enerw ccevany DONAd) C. SHELTON Docket Number 50-346 *** *'""*-***"-
[419] P40 2300 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1850 August 31, 1990 l
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
. Document Control Desk '
Vashington, D. C. .20555 i i
Subj ec t : 1989 Annual 10 CFR 50.59 Report of-Facility Changes, Tests'and Experiments ,
1 Gentlemen:
The Toledo Edison Con.oany hereby submi ts, pursuant - to 10 CFR 50.59(b)(2), the j 1989 Annual 10 CFR 50.59 report of facility changes, tests-and experiments for J Davis-Besse Nuclear Pow 0r Station, Unit Number 1.; 1 1
Those changes, tests and eximriments identified via the safety review process 1 during the reporting period of January 23, 1989 through January 22 1990-are enclosed. Attachment 1 provides an executive summary of those_ changes;, tests- !
and experiments contained in the enclosure.
If you have any further questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr.-R. V. Schrauder, Manager - Nuclear Licensing, at (419) 249-2366. l.
Very truly yours,
/
JCS/mmb 1 Enclosure !
1 cc: P.M. Byron DB-1 NRC Senior Resident Inspector A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator, NRC Region III'(2 copies)
- h. D. Lynch, DB-1 NRC Senior Project Manager Utility Radiological Safety Board of Ohio 9009100353 891231 *
/ !
PDR ADOCK 05000346 '
/
R PDC t
THE TOLEOO EDISON COMPANY EDISON PLAZA 300 MADISON AVENUE TOLEDO, OHtO 43652 w
'; Docket Nu:ber 50-346 Lic:ns] Nulb2r NPF-3~
~ Serial Nuxbsr 1850
Attachment:
1
' Page 1 ATTACHMENT 1 10 CFR 50.59
SUMMARY
SHEET NUMBER TITLE FCR 77-0180A BVST Pipe Tunnel Ventilation System j
- FCR-80-0057, Supp. 10 MSR Drain Filter /Demineralizer System.
FCR 81-0165,'Supp. 10 Boric Acid Evaporator Vacuum Pump Discharge Piping Drains ,
FCR 81-0217, Rev. A condenser Hotwell Sampling System ,
FCR 85-0120 Cooling Vater.for~ Condensate Pump Bearings FCR 85-0143, Rev. B., Supp. 14 Replace Statf Ring Pressure Switches l FCR 85-0157, Supp. 3 Revision of ,,S OTSG No. 2 High Vater Level Trip Setpoint .
- FCR 86-0177 Fire Detectors in' Room 206 and 209 FCR 86-0206 Upgrade Fire Dampers FCR 86-0200 Upgrade Fire Dampers-FCR 86-0210 Upgrade Fire Dampers FCR 86-0215 Upgrade Fire Dampers-FCR 86-0217- Upgrade Fire Dampers.-
FCR 86-0219 Upgrade Fire Dampers FCR 86-0362 Kaman Process Radiation Monitors L MOD 87-1138, Supp. 2 Station and Instrument Air Upgrade l
L MOD 87-1193, Supp. 5. Enhancement of the Chemical Sampling and' i l On-Line Monitoring. System
. MOD 87-1217 Makeup' Vater Alarm Removal MOD 87-1280 Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start' System Modification l
MOD 87-1322 Modifications to Diesel Engine Driven Fire-Pump-1-1 h
,. Dockat Nu ber 50-346-
- 6 Lictns2 Nuxbbr NPF S:: rial Nu:bar 1850 Attachment 1 i Page-2 ATTACHHENT 1 (Continuad) 10 CFR 50.59
SUMMARY
SHEET-NUMBER TITLE H0D 88-0052- Reroute Class IE Conduit .
H00.88-0143. Supp. 00 Conversion of Preaction to Vet ~ Pipe Sprinkler .f Systems l H0D 89-0010 Replacement of Smoke Detector DS8694G MOD 89-0079 Hodify Twenty-one Existing-Sprinkler Systems H0D 90-0022 Hodification of Tubing end Supports for the' l- Nitrogen Supply Lines to CTHT Penetrations SCC 88-0210 Add Pressure Gages to Main Feed Pump Turbine.
Drain Receivers SCC 89-0385 Hakeup Vater Treatment System Lov Point Drain l SCC 89-0516 Replace Carbon' Steel Piping of Service Vater l Pump Cland Drains l'
SCC 89-0684 Replace Condensate Traps on SAC (Station Air Compressor) 1 i SCC 89-0853 & SCC 89-0934 Station Air Compressor 1-1 Cooling System- -j
. Improvements l SCC 89-0920 Vater Treatment Building Backvash Line- ;
Replacement SCC 89-1035 Install Electrical Heat Tracing on: Radiation Monitoring' Sample Lines SCC 89-1427 Test Connections-for Turbine Bypass Valves !
SCC 89-1936 Install Electrical-Heat Tracing on Radiation
]
Honitoring. Sample Lines !
d UCN 89-089 Change Control Valve Testing Frequency 1.
UCN 89-104 Emergency Core Cooling System Sump Pump High-High Level Alarm Setpoint -
UCN 89-121~ Sealing the Pipe Chase Opening in the Vall of the Condensate'Demineralizer Holdup Tank Room i
Dock;t Nu ber 50-346 ;
:Licinri Nu;b;r NPF-3' S;rici Nu;b2r 1850 Attachment 1 .
Page_3-ATTACHHENT 1 (Continued) ,
SUMMARY
SHEET.
NUMBER . TITLE UCN 89-124 Consolidation of the Safety Review Process as Delineated in USAR Section 17.2.3.2 UCN 89-135 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
-UCN 90-030 Updating USAR Section 6.3.4, ECCS Test and Inspection DB-PF-10008, Rev. O Test Procedure DB-PF-10008 "MPP/ Reactor Runback Test" 4
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 77-0180A TITLE: ,,
BWST Pipe Tunnel Ventilation System OHANGE:
Abandon-the BVST Pipe Tunr.el Ventilation System in place.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
This system was designed to reduce humidity levels in the Pipe Tunnel shich are-no longer being observed. It is likely that during construction of the Auxiliary Building moisture accumulated in the tunnel and this.resulted in a=
humid environment. This condition was observed only temporarily until'the moisture dissipated. .Since the high humidity conditions are no longer being observed, the ventilation system need not be installed.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
This modification does not adversely affect the safety of the plant based on an HVAC system analyels because the system-(BVST Pipe Tunnel Ventilation.Gystem):
.vaa never operable and wu; not designed to perform a safety function..
As summarized above, the proposed action vi11 not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in.the USAR. 'The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction i of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications ~.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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l DBP 5302K/36
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1 SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR i FCR 80-0057, SUPP. 10= I
. TITLE:
MSR Drain Filter /Demineralizer System CHANGE:
Permanently connect the MSR Drain (from MSR D' rain Tank 1-1)Lto a high' temperature filter /demineralizer system.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
To -tlleviate the problem of ionic contaminants and . corrosion products in the-steam cycle and to improve the unit's heat rate.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
~
- d This system has no direct nuclear safety related function. It will shutdown on both high flow and high temperature. . Influent and effluent valves also-fall closed. The modifications do not affect any nuclear safety related systems.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an' accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR.
The proposed action will'not create the possibility for an accident or ,
i malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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l' DBP 5302K/1 l
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 81-016.i, SUPP. 10 TITLE:
Boric Acid Evaporator Vacuum Pump Discharge Piping Drains CHANGE:
Install two'lov point drains in the Boric Acid EvaporatorL1-2 Vacuum Pump discharge piping.
REASON FOR CHA!!GE:
Water carryover from the air / water separator downstream of the vacuum pump accumulates in the low points of the discharge piping and restricts vacuum-pump discharge gas flow. These drains allow the accumulated water to be removed prior to vacuum pump startup.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The proposed change does not affect the safe operation of the plant. The evaporator vacuum pump discharge line is a non-essential line, and is not required for safe shutdown of the plant.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not'-increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility.for an accident or malfunction.
of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety queotion does not exist.
l DBP 5302K/37 1
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR.
FCR 81-0217 REV. A' ;
TITLE: ]
Condenser hva sl1 Sampling System CHANGE Add four condenser hotwell samplers to continuously monitor the condenser. .
hotwell'for sodium ion concentration and cationic conductivity, j REASON FOR CHANGE:
.The continuous sampling will allow rapid detection of leaks:and also identify' i the location of the leaks this could allow a' reduction in load rather than a unit shutdown to perform repairs.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
t The condenser hotwell sampling system is not nuclear safety related.and does not interact with any safety related systems or components.: .,
As summarized above. the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR..
The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the-Technical-Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does'not-exist. '
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4 DBP 5302K/2
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
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-FOR FCR 85-0120 TITLE: .
Cooling Water For Condensate Pumps Bearings CHANGE:
Provide permanent piping for condensate pumps 1, 2 & :L bearing cooling water supply and return temporary piping. ,
1 REASON FOR CHANGE:
I To replace the temporary cooling water piping with permanent piping.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
This modification does not involve a nuclear safety releted' system and does not affect any system that is nuclear safety ~related.
As sumn,_rized above, the proposed action will not increase-the probability'or.
consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated'in the.USAR. ;The proposed action will not crette the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any, evaluated previously in the USAR,-and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined'in the Technical Specifications ~ .
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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DBP 5302K/33
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SAFETY EVALUATION SUMARY FOR FCR 85-0143, REV. B,-SUPP. 14 (SE88-0487) ,
t
. TITLE:
Replace Static 0-Ring Pressure Switches CHANGE:
Replace the Static 0-Ring pressure switches currently utilized for PSL 106 A-D and PSL 107 A-D with the manufacturer's new model.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
The existing switches (SOR$ 6TA-B4 NXClA-JJTX8) have repeatedly failed during '
performance of surveillance test S1L5071.13 and 5071.23. The root cause of the failure has been traced.to leakage' of the Viton 0-rings, which-resulte-in' the formation of a gas bubble between the layers of the diaphragm that prevents switch actuation. The new model pressureiswitches incorporate a welded diaphragm sensor assembly. The stainless steel diaphragm is fusion-welded between the two components that form the' sensor body, and no 0-rings are required.
SAFETY EVALUATION'
SUMMARY
Neither the seismic response nor the environmental qualification of the switch-are adversely affected by the modification to the pressure' sensor. SOR, the-manufacturer of the pressure switches, recommends the change and continues to support the qualification of the-switch. TED personnel have analyzed the design and determined that switch qualification is not af fected by the change.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or l consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR.
The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or
! malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any' margin of safety as defined. in the Technical l Sp(cifications.
i There' ore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
1 L-DBP 5302K/3
-i SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 85 0157, SUPP. 3 (SE 88-0673) j TITLE:
Re-ision of SFCRS OTSG No. 2 High Water Level Trip Setpoint CHANGE:
The SFRCS High Level Trip for both OTSG's is to be set to actuate at 225 inches-on the Start-up (SU) Range level instrumentation. Currently the No. 2 (A) OTSG is set to trip at el5 inches and the No. 1 (B) OTSG is set to trip at 225 inches. The current setpoints are based on a recommendation from Babcock &
Wilcox, and.were justified in'FCR 85-0157 Rev. A, Supp. 2.
REASON FOR CHANGES-It is desired to reset the A OTSG High Level trip to 225 inches to improve the human engineering of the system.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The OTSG High Water Level SFRCS trip does not provide a USAR required ;afety function. 'However, the trip enhances the reliable operation of the plant. . As stated in Safety Evaluation 88-0593, for FCR 85-0157, Rev. A, Supp. 02, the selection of the high level setpoint should provide assurance that the setpoint will be effective in providing automatic termination of main _feedwater in the event of an overfill condition without significantly increasing the possibility of a high level SFRCS trip during normal plant operations.
The current setpoints of 215 inches in SG A and 225 inches in SG B were calculated by B&W utilizing plant specific, steam generator information. The.
difference in the setpoints is attributed to different. amounts of fouling and
- . frictional pressure drops in each steam generator. The setpoints were chosen to be at least 30 inches above normal operating level and to be below the SU level-corresponding to a 1002 level on the operating Range (OR) during full power feed flow conditions.
1 If the setpoint on SG A is raised 225 inches, a margin of more than 30 inches is- ,
maintained.
The consequences of a feedwater system malfunction occurring and covering the OTSG feedwater nozzles have been compared to the_ consequences of experiencing a
- i. trip due to a lower setpoint and a transient that would otherwise have been L
within the capability of the plant control systems, Based on this safety evaluation, it is concluded that the revised setpoint 13 cceeptable since 1
operation of the plant within the assumptions of the safety analysis report is l- maintained. Further, the revised setpoint still provide overfill protection for L a wide' range of overfill transients while minimizing unnecessary challenges to l plant safety systems.
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l SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR l FCR 85-0157, SUPP.-3 (SE 88-0673) (Continued)
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create t'ne possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, raising the OTSG High Water Level SFRCS trip to 225 inches for OTSG A is acceptable and does not create any unreviewed safety questions.
DBP 5302K/30
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SAFETY EVALUATDN SUFDiARY
-FOR FCR 86-0177 t
TITLE:
Fire Detectors in Rooms 206 and 209. f CHANGE: ,
Permanently install the temporary fire detector now covering room 206.
l Install a fire detector in room 209.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
To make the temporary-fire. detector'in room 206 a-permanent-installation-and to
- provide additional coverage by installing a fire detector in room 209.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
This modification has no direct impact on the safe shutdown systems of the ,
plant. The Fire Detection system at Davis-Besse is designed to detect-a fire condition quickly, have a high level of reliability and provide timely-information to the control room in such a manner that operators can,make intelligent decisions as to the necessary course of action to' handle the fire. ,
emergency and maintain essential plant safety functions.
As. summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. .The
, proposed action will not create.the' possibility for an accident or malfunction L of a different type than any evaluated previously in.the USAR and does not reduce any margin of cafety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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DBP 5302K/34
SAFETY EVALUATION SUHHARY FOR FCR 86-0206 TITLE:.
Upgrade Fire Dampers I CHANGE:
- 1. Replace ten fire dampers (FD-1044 FD-1050. FD-1052, FD-1056, FD-1057 FD-1062. FD-1066 PD-1114. FD-1154 FD-1155).
- 2. Remove two fire dampers (FD-1054 FD-1058).
REASON FOR CHANGE:
- 1. The ten dampers being replaced were not originally installed per-manufacturer's and NFPA Code requirements.
- 2. Fire dampers FD-1054 and FD-1058 are no. longer required.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
Modification of the fire dampers installed in the Non-Radwaste Area Ventilation System providing normal ventilation toLthe High and Low Voltage Switchgear Rooms does not adversely affect the safety of the plants based on an HVAC system analysis. The fire dampers do perform a safety' function by virtue of their presence in fire barriers protecting redundant: trains by' virtue of their presence in fire barriers, protecting redundant trains of safe shutdown (App. R) equipment.
4 Fire' dampers FD-1054 and FD-1058 were removedLdue to the fire' area Optimization Effort. The-justification for removal of these two fire dampers is provided in the Fire Area Optimization Report. Removal cf these two. fire i.
dampers from the Non-Radwaste Area Ventilation System has no adverse effects on system operation because the dampers were installed for fire protection reasons only.
As summarized above, the proposed. action will not increase ~the probability.or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR.
The proposed action will not create the lossibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as lefined in the Technical-Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety questjan does not-exist.
DBP 5302K/4 i
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5 SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
-FOR FCR 86-0208 TITLE:
Remove tire Damper FD-1004 CHANGE:
FCR 86-0200 is removing one fire damper, FD-1004.
REASON FOR' CHANGE:
Fire damper FD-1004, located in Fire Area F which is comprised of the <
Auxiliary'Feedwater Pump #1 Room #238. An exemption (Serial No.~1255) has:
been requested from section III.G.2 of Appendix R to-10CFR50 due to an unprotected opening in its ceiling which leads to Fire Area II. This- _t unprotected vent opening is required in case of a HELB.- Fire damper FD-1004 is located in the same barrier separating the same two fire areas. Since the- -
fireLprotection capabilities of_the barrier would not be significantly enhanced by replacing this fire damper, FD-1004 has been removed.. i SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
- 7 The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report is not increased due to this modification because removal of fire damper FD-1004 does not adversely affect plant safety,_any existing seismic analysis.or introduce an unacceptable pressure drop-to the HVAC system. An evaluation has been completed.that concludes plant' safety is
- not degraded due to these facts
- FD-1006 does not protect redundant trains of '
safe shutdown components: the low combustible loading in the. areas the ;
presence of ductwork in the penetration opening ands the proximity of-detection and suppression to the opening.
I As summarized above,.the proposed action will not increase the probability or r
consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR.
The proposed-action will not create the possibilitytfor an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the-Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist. 1 l
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.DBP 5302K/5
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
POR FCR 86-0210 ;
TITLE:
Upgrade Fire Dampers 4 CHANGE:
- 1. Replace four fire dampers-(FD-1085, FD-1087, FD-1097, FD-1105)
- 2. Remove three fire dampers (FD-1072, FD-1080, FD-1081)
REASON FOR CHANCE:
- 1. The four fire dampers being replaced were not originally installed per; manufacturer's and NFPA Code requirements.
- 2. Fire dampers FD-1072. FD-1080 and FD-1081'are no longer required.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
Modification of the fire dampers installed in the Ra' dwaste Area Ventilation System.does not adversely affect the safety of the plant based on an HVAC system analysis because the system does not perform a safety function. The fire dampers do perform a safety function by. virtue of their presence in fire barriers. protecting safety related equipment.
Fire dampers FD-1072, FD-1080 and FD-1081'are no longer required. These dampers are not needed due to the fire area reorganization taking. place. The Fire Area optimization Report providee' justification for combining fire areac CC. G U, UU, V and I so that these three fire dampers'are no' longer required.
As summarized above. the propoced action vill not increase the' probability or.
consequence of an accioent or malfunction previously evaluated'in the USAR. The L proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident;or malfunction l of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not ,
l reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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N SAFETY EVALUATION SUHHARY FOR FCR 86-0215 TITLE: .
Upgrade Fire Dampers CHANGE: -
- 1. Replace eight fire dampers (FD-1126 FD-1134 FD-1135, FD-1136 -FD-1137 FD-1139, FD-1140, FD-1148).
- 2. Remove four fire dampers (FD-1129, FD-1131',-FD-1141, FD-1159).
REASON FOR CHANCE:
The eight dampers being replaced were not originally-installed per
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manufacturer's and NFPA Code requirements. ;
- 2. Fire dampers, FD-1129, FD-1131, FD-1141,.and FD-1159 are no longer required.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
Modification of the fire dampers installed in'the Turbina Building Ventilation System and in the_ Control Room Normal Air Conditioning: System does not: affect plant safety based on an HVAC system analysis because the systems do not. perform a safety function.
Removal of fire' dampers FD-1129, FD-1131, FD-1141, and FD-115911s' justified by i the Fire Area Optimization Report (FAOR)._ This report reviewed the. existing-fire area layout to determine which were the necessary fireibarriers and.how.the fire areas could be restructured to reduce:their number. This~ report concluded that the 69 existing' individual fire areas could be reduced-to 42. individual fire areas and 8 Hega fire areas. 'This reduction in:the number.of fire: areas resulted in the derating of several fire barriers. Fire dampers located'in:the
- derated fire barriers are not necessary and can be removed. The fire' damper blade packages associated with dampers FD-1129. FD-1131', FD-1141, and FD-1159 1 were removed and the fire damper frames retired in place.-
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability-or-consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an tmreviewed safety question does not exist. I I
DBP 5302K/39
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
.FOR FCR 86-0217 TITLE:
Upgrade Fire Dampers t
CHANGE: ;
- 1. Replace six fire dampers l
- 2. Remove three fire dampers
, REASON FOR CHANGE:
- 1. The six' fire dampers being replaced were not originally' installed per manufacturer's and NFPA Code requirements.
- 2. The three fire dampers being removed are no longer required. J SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
Modification of these. fire dampers which were installed in'the Turbine Building Ventilation System does not affect plant safety based on an HVAC system. analysis because the system does not perform a safety function.
As summarized above, the proposed- action will' not. increase the: probability or ~
consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not: create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the.USAR, and-does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the-Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does.not exist.- .
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e SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 86-0219- l i
TITLEi Upgrade Fire Dampers CHANGE:
1 Remove fire damper FD-ll65.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
This fire damper is not located in a barrier required to serve a fire protection function.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The removal of fire damper FD-1165 installed in the Radwaste Area Ventilation System does not affect plant safety based on an HVAC system analysis because the system does not perform a safety function.
Removal of fire-damper FD-1165 is justified because the damper is not installed in a fire barrier per Revision 8 of the Fire hazards Analysis Report (FHAR). Since this barrier is not required to perform a fire-protection function, the fire damper is not required and has been removed.-
As summarized above. the proposed action will not increase the probability or i consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. j The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR. and ;
does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in_the. Technical j Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist "
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DBP 5302K/6 i
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 86-0362 (SE 88-0270)
TITLE:
f Kaman Process Radiation Honitors CHAl",E s
- 1. Reroute sample lines within RE4597AA/AB/BA/BB and RE4598AA/AB/BA/BB so each gas sample chamber and associated fitt ings/ valves are downstream of the sample pumps. Install compound pressure gauges for each monitor.
2.- Reroute the station vent monitor RE4598AA/AB/BA/BB sample stream exhausts back to the vent stack.
- 3. Add moisture traps to the purge air inlets for RE4597AA/AB/BA/BB and RE4598AA/AB/BA/BB.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
- 1. To improve sampling system performance without any-response time delays #
expected.
- 2. This modification is being made to respond to NRC open item 84-30-02,
- 3. This change will prevent equipment failure / contamination from moisture carry-over during purge.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
- 1. There is no detrimental effect on safety by the noted reroute of sample lines within the monitor skids. There-is minor weight redistribution within the skids resulting from use of the plumbing kits furnished by Action Systems and Instruments, Inc. (ASII).
- 2. There is no detrimental effect on safety by the noted reroute for the sample stream exhaust. The routing for sample return is the same as the l sample inlet as far as poesible. This will allow use of most existing L supporte with minor modifications. The installation is seismic for the I
entire length of the run.
- 3. There is no detrimental effect on safety-by the noted addition of moisture traps to purge air. The traps are installed outside the seismic / safety i related boundaries of the monitors and do not effect qualification. This l moistute removal operates as a continuous drain requiring minimal maintenance.
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DLP 5302K/40
.c _,; -- i SAFETY. EVALUATION.
SUMMARY
j FOR.
FCR 86-0362 (SE 88-0270) (Continued). -
As summarir.ed above, the; proposed action vill not increase'the probability or ,
c.onsequence.of an accident or malfunction previously. evaluated in the USAR. The i proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction; a l-of a different type <than.any evaluated previously in;the USAR, and does not li
- l. reduce-any margin of, safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
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Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist... f l d- -
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DBP 5302K/41
m SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR ]
MOD 87-1138 SUPP. 2 (SE 88-0407)_
TITLE:
Station and Instrument Air System Upgrade CHANGE:
This MOD supplement accomplishes the following:
- 1. A coalescing type air filter with manual bypass was installed in the Station air Header (JBD-10) in the Turbine Building to reduce moisture carryover to equipment served. by station air.
- 2. ' Instrument air taps with isolation valves are provided at the locations identified below to increase the air supply availability 'nr Local Leak ;
Rate Testing (LLRT): s
- a. Piping will be extended to allow easier access to valve IA708 which is-located in the pipe chase between Mechanical Penetration Room No. 1 (Room 208) and No. 3 (Room 303) in the. Auxiliary Building.
- b. An instrument' air source will be provided in the Personnel Lock Area (Room 426) to facilitate the volur.etric testing of the. door seals,
- c. An instrument air source will be provided in the No. 2 Electrical Penetration Room (Room 427). This will facilitate'LLRT on the 48-inch containment purge line. .
= REASON FOR CHANGE:
To upgrade the Station and Instrument Air System by increasing the quality of the service air and providing greater availability of compressed air throughout the plant.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The Station and Instrument Air System modification does not~ adversely affect the plant because of the following:
l
- 1. None of the engineered safety features depends on the supply of instrument air for its' operation.
l l 2. The changes being implemented will in.no way affect the operation of the containment isolation valves.
l
- 3. Piping routed inside the Auxiliary Building will be supported seismically, where applicable, to aesure that no safety-related component can be i damaged. Additionally, all new piping added in Rooms 303 and 314 of the Auxiljary Building is seismically installed to prevent-any violation of the negative pressure boundary which could result from a pipe. break in these-rooms.
DBP 5302K/42 i u ,
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR HOD 87-1138, SUPP. 2 (SE 88-0407) (Continued)
- 4. The new instrument air taps are designed for use as LLRT connections only.
Piping caps and normally shut valves are provided for these connections to prevent inadvertent air usage.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of'a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical: Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does.not exist. ,
a
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4 DBP 5302K/43
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR HOD 87-1193, SUPP. 5 (SE 88 0120)
TITLE:
Enhancement of the Chemical Sampling and On-Line Monttoring Capabilities.
CHANGE:
Plant Secondary Water Chemistry !
i
- 1. Modify the Feedwater and Steam Sampling System sample cooling to more accurately control and maintain sample temperatures.
- 2. Replace the on-line monitors presently: sampling the secondary water -
sampling system with more representative chemistry information, j l
Primary Sampling System i Replace the existing Primary Sampling System panel,'C1705, with a new mechanically enhanced grab sampling panel.
REASON FOR_ CHANGE: ;
The original Feedwater and Steam Sampling-System sample cooling system consisted ]
of 17 primary sample coolers and an isothermal bath,' located _in the sample panel This original design did not provide sufficient cooling for these C-3401.
samples which caused erroneous readings-by the on-line monitors and difficulty in extracting a usable sample.
The new Primary SamplinB System panel improves the collection of samples and ]
maintenance of the valves. This modification installs a new HEPA/ Charcoal l filter and. pressurized sampling arrangement. It also provides connections for I future on-line continuous sampling monitoring. j l
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The functir of the 71 ant Secondary Water Chemistry Sample System is to provide' consistent, high quality samples of secondary side. fluids in order to allow accurate chemical analysis and better chemical control of the affected fluid systems. Typical analyses performed determine, dissolved gas content and corrosion product concentrations. This system does-not perform a nuclear safety '
related function. This modification improves sample cooling and provides a more representative view of the secondary side water chemistry.
This modification affects the non-essential header of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) System. This header is isolated at CC1495 from the essential header ,
when necessary to maintain CCW to vital loads. Since only the non-essential header is affected no safety functions of CCW are affected.
The Primary System grab sampling panel vents to the Auxiliary Building Exhaust ventilation header. The new fan installed in the panel was sized by the Vendor ;
to meet the required face velocity across the grab sample plate. The new fan performs the same functions of the previous fan with a lower flowrate. No safety re!
- functions are affected.
DBP $302K/31
?
f f
6AFETY EVALUATION SUHHARY ,
FOR j MOD 87-1193. SUPP. 5 (SE 88-0120) (Continued) [
t The existing Primary System Grab Sampling Panel ncn-recoverable sample drains are drained to the Auxiliary Building Sump 1-5 area. This modification has not ,
changed the intent of the original design. Since this MOD does not involve any j changes to the cue nt design, this modification does net affect any safety l function of this system.
l The current Primary System Grab Sampling Panel recoverable sample drains and ,
safety relief valves discharge are drained to the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank l (RCDT).- These sample drains to the RCDT are made through the non-essential- ;
3/4*-HSC-71 line. This modification does not change the intent of the original !
design. Since this modification does not involve any changes to tne original :
design, this modification will not affect any safety function of this system.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or [
consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The !
prcrosed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction l of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not f reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications. :
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist, t
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DBP-5302K/32 t
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Safet> Evaluation Summary l for H0D 87-1217 (SE87-0's8C) l i
TITLE:
Hakeup Water Alarm Removal CHANGE:
Remove Makeup Water System Alarms TAL-6708 and LAHL-6707.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
These alarms were for the Neutralizing Tank (7-53, which has been removed from servlee and is no longer used.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
There its no detrimental ef fect upon safety as a result of removing the above alarms, because none of the equipment is safety related. The deleted alarms are not interconnected with any safety system and are not required for safe shutdown of the station.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evalnated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than a'a .ivaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety ta defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
I s
4 1
r sb e/2 i
w .m Safety Evaluation Summary for HOD 87-1280 (SEB8-0084)
TITLE:
F aergency Diesel Generator Air Start System Hodification CHANGE:
- 1. Replaced the existing EDG Air Start Compressors. C11-1. -2, with two new Dresser-LeRoi compressors with air cooled aftercoolers.
- 2. Installed a third, new. Dresser-LeRoi compressor with air cooled aftercooler, C11-3 near the existing C11-1 compressor in Room 318 of the Auxiliary Building with the capability of operating in place of Compressor C11-1 or C11 2.
- 3. Installed four new pressure switches to allow automatic operation of Compressor C11-3 after the compressor is placed on line manually. The pressure switches will senne the pressure of each air receiver.
- 4. Installed a moisture separator with a trap and pulsation dampener in each compressor discharge line.
- 5. Made other modifications to the system piping to improve reliability of the EDG air start system.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
The purpose of this H0D is to upgrade the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Air Start System by improving the quality of the air and system reliability. The existing compressors and traps require frequent maintenance.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The EDG Air Start System is not ddversely affected by this modification because of the following:
- 1. The replacement comprossors have a greater capacity than the existing compressors. Both tre 2-stage with a rated capacity of 26.5 SCFH and a discharge pressure of 250 psig.
2, The third compressor C11-3. will be the same model as the replacement compressors. The discharge piping from Compressor C11-3. will be installed in accordance with Seismic Category I requirements which is consistent with j the design for the existing compressors. The compressor start and stop setpoints are the same as the existing compressor. All three compressors 1
are seismically mounted.
N ab e/2 l k
j "LL397 - -l
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Safety Evaluation Summary for H0D 87-1280 (SE88-0084) (Continued)
- 3. The new pressure switches added to allow operation of the third compressor does not affect the proper operation of the existing pressure switches which control the operation of Compressors C11-1 and C11-2.
- 4. Deleting the existing air traps at the outlet of the air receivers and providing new moisture separators and traps provides for improved moisture removal from the EDG Air Start System. Removing the loop seal from the drain piping of receivers 3 and 4 (T86-3, T86-4) eliminates water collection in the loop seal piping when the air re.1 elver is drained.
thereby reducing the probability of localised corrosion. Since the moisture trap was removed, the bynass line, isolation valves. and check valve become unnecessary and were removed and rvplaced with an ASME Section III (Q) valve to maintain the pressure bov dary of the air receiver. These changes should improve the quality of the air and enhance system reliability.
As summarised above. the proposed action will not increase the probab.11ty or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in th" USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of cafety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed .afety question does not exist.
P i
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SAFETY EVALUATION SUHHARY FOR ,
HOD 87-1322 (SE89-0178)
TITLE:
Modificatione to Diesel Engine Driven Fire Pump 1-1 CHANGE:
- 1. Install a flusning type strainer inmediately upstream of PCV 1041. The strainer will be provided with a cleanout valve and hose to the sump.
- 2. Replace PCV 1041 with a new model regulator.
- 3. Remove solenoid valve SV 1043 and associated wiring.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
PCAQR 87-0441 identified a malfunction of the engine cooling system for tie Diesel Engine Driven Fire Pump. The problem appeared when high engine jacket coolant temperature was detected during a weekly surveillance test During resolution of the P0AQR it was found that the raw water engine cooling system did not have a flushing type inline strainer upstream of cooling water pressure regulating valve PCV 1041. This strainer is required by NFPA 20
' Standard for the Installation of Centrifagal Fire Pump".
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The function of the new flushable strainer is to prevent clogging of the pressure reEulator mechanism, and to provide the capability of flushing the strainer with the system prescurized and the system valves in their normal lineup. The existing pressure regulator valve iaes contain an integral strainer, but this strainer cannot be flushed with the system in operation and must be physically removed from the regulator housing to be. cleaned, currently, the strainer is being removed and cleaned weehly during the performance of DB-FP-03001 '7 Day Diesel Fire Pump Test". Implementation of this H0D f acilitates performance of tPe seven day fire pump test without disassembly of the regulator.
The proposed modification does not alfect the function of the Diesel Fire Pump or the Fire Protection System. Installation of the strainer and removal of the solenoid valve will upgrade she system and increase its reliability. Once these modifications have been made, the diesel fire pump engine cooling system will comply with the 1974 Edition of NFPA 20.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction oreviously evaluated in the USAR. ;
The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or I malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR. and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
DBP 5302K/7
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR HOD 88-0052, SUPP. 0 (SE88-0349)
TITLE:
Reroute Class IE Conduit CHANGE:
Class 1E conduit 1-36582A-2 presently installed and routed threugh the Turbine Building is to be rerouted through the Auxiliary Building via rooms 322 and 324.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
The Turbine Building is a non seismic structure. ;
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The ronduit 1-36582A-2 has been rerouted thru the A axiliary Building and seismically supported per drawing E-302A and FSK-E-067. Thcrefore, the referenced cables can withstand seismic events.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR.
The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously .in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
1 DBP $302K/8 {
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Safety Evaluation Summary for HOD 88-0143 Supp. 00 (SE89-0202) '
TITLE:
Conversion of Preaction Sprinkler Systems to Wet-Pipe Sprinkler Systems CHANGE:
Permanently convert nine preaction sprinkler systems located in the Turbine Building and Heater Bay to wet pipe sprinkler systems.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
The permanent conversion of the nine systems will satisfy Terms No. A09307 which '
is a commitment to the NRC to perform this work prior to startup from the Sixth Refueling Outage. !
i SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
- s t
The permanent conversion of the preaction sprinkler systems to wet-pipe sprinkler systems enhances the systems' ability to respond to and control a fire in the affected areas.
The conversion to wet-pipe systems doe; not impact safety related equipment. "
The effect of flooding in the Turbine Building and Heater Pay is bounded by other systems previously analyzed in the USAR (reference USAR Sections 3.6.2.7.2.13. Circulating Water System, and 3.6.2.7.2.14, Condensate System) where the potential for large amounts of water leakage exists. The effects of flooding in the event of a pipe break and sprinkler discharge on the Hotor Driven Feedwater Pump has been previously reviewed during the addition of the Pump.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or ,
consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an> accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
.sb e/2
SAFETY EVALUATION SUHHARY FOR.
MOD 89-0010 (SE88-0488)
TITLE:
Replacement of Smoke Detector DS 8694G CHANGE:
Replace ionization smoke detector DS8649G. Pyrotechnics Model DI-20, located in FDZ-113 with a new detector, Pyrotechnics Model DI-A3. i REASON FOR CHANGE:
The detector model currently installed is not suitable because the air flow through the area when the Containment Purge System is operated on the mechanical penetration room flow path is higher thEn the rating of the detector. ;
A replacement detector (Pyrotronics model DI-A3) is available and is i equivalent to the current model except for.its capability to operate in atens of high air flow rates (0-1200 Ft./ min.).
SAFETY EVALUATION S'sHHARY:
The ability of the fire detection system to provide adequate early warning capability is enhanced by replacement of the current model detector with the new model. The new model detector with its base has the same form. fit and function as the originally installed model but le capable of operating-in a higher air flow environment (0-1200 ft./ min.).
As summarized above, the propoeed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR.
The proposed action w11! not create the poesibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
l l Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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DBP $302K/9
o o ;
Safet/ Evaluation Summary for HOD 84-0079 (SE89-0171, R$) i TITLE: r Hodify Twenty-one Existing Sprinkler Systems ;
CHANGE:
Replace / modify the wet-pipe sprinkler systems that serve Rooms 52, 124, 208, 227, 236, 303, 310/313, 314, 328, 402, 405, 422A, 4?? and 501. Modify the converted preaction systems serving Turbine Building Elevations $5, 585' and 603'.
f.EASON FOR CHANGE: f 1
These twenty-one (21) systems, which are required for compliance with Appendix R Section 111.0, do not presently meet the requirements of NFPA 13, 'ftandard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems'.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The sprinkler systems are hydraulically designed to apply the System Water Diacharge Densities specified in Appendix A to Spe:ification H-149F. These i discharge densities are consistent with the design of the existing systems.
These densities are conservatively high when compartd to NFPA requirements for the present occupancy classification of the affectet rooms and therefore provide assurance that the systems will contain and suppress a fire originating in these areas.
The USAR Section 3.6.2.7.2 indicates that portions of Seismic Class Il fluid systems located in the Auxiliary Building and the intake structure were seismically supported where necessary to prevent damage to safety-related !
systems from the effects of falling pipe, flooding, or the loss of the negative pressure area. USAR Section 3.6.2.7.2.1 also indicates more specifically that j approximately 75% of the Fire Water system has been seismically supported to prevent falling pip ~e or flooding from affecting safety related equipment.
Fourteen of the systems to be modified are located in the Aux 111ery Building or intake structure. These fourteen systems have been designed to seismic Category I requirements to prevent falling pipe or flooding from affecting safety related equipment.
The sodifications to the systems located in the Auxiliary Building and intake l structure requires, in most cases, adding sprinklers to meet the spacing, ;
position and obstruction criteria of NFPA 13 and Specification H-149F. The !
addition of sprinklers potentially increases the total water discharge for any
~
given room / system. For purposes of evaluating the impact of flooding in the Auxiliary Building and intake structure, the expected flow rate from any of these systems is based on the followings sb e/2
i 1
i Safety Evaluation Summary for HOD 89-0079 (SE89-0171 RS) (Continued)
- 1. For systems lecated in rooms exposed to elevated temperatures caused by a !
HELB where the maximum expected room temperature exceeds the temperature rating of the sprinklers, all of the sprinklers in the room will be assumed to actuate. The rooms exposed to tunperatures sufficient to actuate all sprinklers include: 124, 236, 303, 310/313. 314, 405, and 501.
affects do not produce temperatures sufficient to actuate the sprinklers, fire actuation is assumed to result in a maximum of seven sprinklers operating. The NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, 14th Edition-and U.S.
Department of Energy data provide the basis for this assumption. According to the above sources, approximately 9 5% of all fires are controlled or extinguished by operation of seven or fewer heads. These rooms. include <
$2, 208, 227, 328, 402, 422A and 427.
Based on the expected flow, the impact of trooding in the Auxiliary Building and intake structure has been evaluated and there is no affect on the safety related function of any system.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR HOD 90-0022 (SE90-0080)
TITLE:
Modification of Tubing and Supports for the Nitrogen Supply Lines to Containment Electrical Penetrations CHANGE: ,
Hodify the existing nitrogen supply tubing supports and reroute the nitrogen supply tubing upstream of the check valve for penetration P2C5G. This :
modification also incorporates pressure indicators into the P&lD which have been installed since initial operation.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
To provide flexibility to the tubing configurations as required to prevent failure of the tubing-to-header plate connection due to the post-LOCA thermal expansion of the containment vessel. ,
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The proposed changes, identifying the Q boundary, tubing rerouting and support modifications, do not adversely affect containment integrity, seismic qualification of the tubing, or the capability of the cables to conduct electricity.
The proposed modification does not adversely affect the following: '
o The probability of a nitrogen line break o The quality requirements for material o The integrity of the containment vessel o The current carrying capability of electrical conductors o The consequence of a line break The nitrogen system upstream of the check valves may fall during a seismic I event, but the check valve will ensure that the penetration itself remains. i pressurized.
l As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or l consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. l The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
DBP 5302K/10
o .
l SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR SCC 88-2010 (SE89-0155) i TITLE:
Add Pressure Gages to Main Feed Pump Turbine (MFPT) Drain Receivers CHANGE:
Add two compound pressure gages (PI 4983 for Drain Receiver T-165-1 and PI 4984 for Drain Receiver T-165-2) to the Main Feed Pump Turbine Drain Receivers. ,
REASON FOR CHANGE:
To aid in system monitoring.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
There are no safety functions associated with the MFPT drain receivers. The <
pressure gages will aid in system monitoring, and will affect no existing control or alarm functions associated with the HFPT Drain Receivers.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or-consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR.
The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accid".it or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously An the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety es defined in the Techotcal Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist, f
DBP 5302K/11
o .
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR SCC 89-0385 (SE89-0207)
TITLE:
Hake-up Water Treatment System Low Point Drain L
CHANGE:
- 1. Remove isolation valve WT-230, drip pot isolation valve.
- 2. Install a low point drain line and isolation valve.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Valve number WT-230 was originally installed as an isolation valve for the drip pot. Since the drip pot has been removed this valve is no longer required.
With the drip pot and drain removed it is now nscessary to install a new low point drain to aid in system maintenance. Adding the drain line and isolation valve does not adversely affe;* system operation. The drain line and valve-were chosen based on the operating environment. The isolation valve is a call valve (Nil-Cor 500-T-TS) specifically designed for acid service. Line and fitting thickness has been increased to allow for additional corrosion. The drain line increases personnel safety by providing a means to drain the acid out of this line prL.r to performing work.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
i The changes made by this SCC will not adversely affect plant safety because no safety related systems are affected.
An analysis was performed on this line to ensure that the changes made by this SCC do not create unacceptable stresses. This analysis showed that the changes are acceptable.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR.
The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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-DBP 5302K,12
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l SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR SCC 89-0516 (SE89-0161)
TITLE:
Replace Carbon Steel Piping of Service Water Pump Gland Drains CHANGE:
Remove carbon steel piping of service water pump gland drains and replace it with a reinforced rubber hose that catches the leak-off and delivers the water to the floor drains.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Presently installed service water pump packing gland drain is made of 3/8' SCH 80 carbon steel socket welded piping that is threaded into pump motor base.
When plugged up the drain piping has to be cut out near the motor base to be cleared. Replacing the piping with an easy connect / disconnect reinforced-rubber hose that catches the leak-off and delivers the water to the floor drains will eliminate this problem.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
For the maximum service conditions of drain water at 1400F temperature and atmospheric pressure, a reinforced rubber hose drait is suitable replacement for carbon steel piping drain. The loads on the motor base nozzle tre negligible since only approximately 3 feet of the 3/8 inch rubber hose will hang down supported by the nozzle and the rest of it will be-laying on the floor.
An easy connect /discennect rubber hose enables frequent cleanout of the drains preventing them from plugging.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR.
The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical ,
Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed-safety question does not exist.
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DBP 5302K/13
i l
SAFETY EVALUATION SUHHARY i 70R SCC 89-0684 (SE 89 0143)
TITLE: !
i Replace Condensate Traps on SAC (Station Air Compressor) 1-2 i i
CHANGE: !
Replace the existing mechanical condensate traps on SAC 1-2 inter- and !
aftercoolers with solenoid actuated drain valves. ,
f REASON FOR CHANGE: I Presently installed traps are unreliable and are a high maintenance item due to misapplication.in that they are ideally suited as steam traps.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The Station and Instrument Air System has no safety function. All safety system functions which require air have either stored air or nitrogen backup supplies.
l The replacement of the mechanical condensate traps with solenoid actuated drain l
valves improves SAC 1-2 availability by reducing the periodicity of corrective j and/or periodic maintenance due to condensate trap failure.
l As summarized above, the proposed action will not incresse the probability or ,
consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident'or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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l l-DBP 5302K/14
SAFETY EVALUATION SUHHARY FOR SCC 89-0853 and SCC 89-0934 (SE 89-0342)
TITLl1 Stat:.on Air Compressor 1-1 "-oling System Improvements CHANGE,:
SCC 119-0853 An AiCO, 1 -inch fail open solenoid valve will be installed to stop cooling water flow to the compressor when the compressor has shutdown and cooled down.
SCC B9-0934 Install a t-inch bypass line around the cooling water thermostatic valve to the TPCW return line.
REA!ON FOR CHANGE:
These have been numerous problems with the Cooling Water system associated with Stat. ion Air Compressors 1-1. The problems include undercooling of the air compressor during hot summer weather, failure of the thermostatic valves to open after periodic maintenance on the Cooling Water System and excessive cylinder and ring wear due to continual Turbine Plant Cooling Water (TPCW) flow.
SCC 89-0853 The manufacturer, Joy Industries, recommends that a solenoid valve be installed to stop cooling water flow to the compressor when the compressor has shut down and cooled down. Continuous flow causes condensation of water vapor and subsequent rust formation on the cylinder walls.
SCC Pa.0934 The root cause of the failure of the thermostatic valves to open appears to be insufficient bypass flow. Joy Industries plugged the bypass port on the 3-way valve and utilized a 1/8-inch drill hole in the temper ;ure element for bypass flow. The bypass line allows the temperature valve to reach its regulated flowpoint earlier reducing the likelihood of a temperature trip of the compressor.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The installation of a solenoid valve and the changes to the thermostatic valves on the cooling water lines to Station Air Compressor 1-1 will have no adverse affect on plant safety. These changes impact no safety related systems or components. Installation of a threaded 1 \-inch solenoid valve in line 1
' ilBD-14 is acceptable because of the low maximum pressure (120 psig) and temperature (950F) conditions in this line. The hazards associated with fire, flooding and pipe breaks for Room 334 are not increased by these minor piping changes.
DBP 5302K/15 ,
1
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'8; 4 SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
j FOR j SCC 89-0853 and SCC 89-0934 (SE 89-0142) (continued) ,
6 As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in-the USAR. The l proposed action will not create the possibility for an' accident or malfunction l of a different type than any evaluated previously in'the USAR, and does not !
reduce.any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
i Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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DBP 5302K/16
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SAFETY EVALUATION SUHHARY FOR SCC 89-0920 (SE 89-0132)
TITLE:
Water Treatment Building Backwash Line Replacement CHANGE:
The 6' carbon steel piping near the Water Treatment Building was replaced with a different material. The replacement pipe is Ultrahlgh Holecular Weight High Density Polyethylene Pipe. This matorial was selected because it is virtually chemically inert, is more abrasive resistant than carbon steel. Iow cost, and is suitable for buried 'plications.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
There were several recent failures of the 6*-HBD-281 underground discharge line from the Water Treatment Building sump to the settling basins. Failure has been caused by internal wear of the carbon steel pipe. The external surfaces of the pipe are coated and show no sign of wear. The internal wear has been attributed to the acidic quality of the backwash. However, there are also indications that abrasive materials are carried thru this line, and that erosion may have contributed to the failures.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The change in material for the 6-inch discharge line has no adverse effect on plant safety. This change impacts no safety related systems or components, nor does it impact any system / component important to safe operation of the plant.
The line in question is undergroundt therefore, the hazards due to fire, flooding, and pipe breaks are not increased.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluat9d in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefort, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
l l
DBP $302h/17
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
TITLE:
Install electrical heat tracing on Radiation Monitoring Sampling Lines CHANCE:
Install electrical heat tracing on the piping downstream of the sample coolera for Radiation Monitor RE1003B.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
To alleviate a recurring maintenance problem caused by condensation in the sample to the RE Skid.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUFNARY:
The proposed changes do not have any adverse effects on the safety functions of tha systems involved. The changes serve to enhance the affected systems by reducing maintenance of RE1003B caused by the condensation of the measured sample in the monitor.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
i DBP 5302K/18 4
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Safety Evaluation Summary for i SCC 89-1427 (SE89-0272) i TITLE: r i
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Test Connections for Turbine Bypass Valves CHANGE: ,
Install test connections on pneumatic tubing for each of the six Turbine Bypass Valves (TBV): SP-13A1, SP-13A2,_SP-13A3, SP-13B1, SP-13B2, SP-13B3. ;
I REASON FOR CHANGE:
To monitor TBV performance without disconnecting the existing pneumatic tubing connections to the valves.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The TBVs are not safety related. By enhancing the ability of maintenance
_ personnel to monitor TBV performance without disconnecting existing pneumatic tubing connections to the valves or their actuatir.g hardware, the proposed change reduces the potential for pneumatic air leaks caused by repeated-manipulation of compression tube fittings. Removal of obsolete pressure switches further reduces the potential for air leaks.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or ,
consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR. and does not I reduce any margin of safety in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION SUHHARY FOR ,
TITLE:
Install electrical heat trace on Radiation Monitoring Sampling Lines CHANGE:
Install electrical heat tracing on the piping downstream of the sample coolers for Radiation Monitor RE1003A.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
To alleviate a recurring maintenance problem caused by the condensation in the ,
sample to the RE Skid.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The proposed changes do not have any adverse effects on the safety function of the system involved. The change serves to enhance the affected system by i reducing maintenance of RE1003A caused by condensation of the measured sample in the' monitor.
As summarized above. the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The ;
proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not ez DBP 5302K/19
l SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR UCN 89-089 (SE 89-0203) ;
TITLE: !
Changing Control Valve Testing Frequency i CHANGE:
In USAR Section 10.2.4.1.a.2, change the testing frequency for the main turbine stop valves from ' weekly' to 'r.onthly'. j REASON FOR CHANGE:
Davis-Besse's practice ias to test all Main Turbine Stop. Control, and Combined Intermediate Valves (whi h consists of an Intercept Valve and an Intermediate Stop Valve) as follows: the Stop Valves were tested monthly if the plant is at :
a power level greater than 85 percent, nd weekly if at 85 percent power or less: the Control Valves were tested weekly, and the Combined Intermediate Valves tested weekly. These test are performed in accordance with procedures DB-SS-04150, Main Turbine Stop Valve Test: DB-SS-04152, Main Turbine Combined Intermediate Valve Test. However, it is desirable to extend these testing intervals. This reduces the probability of inducing plant transients, and the burden on the operators. In order to achieve these reductions, it is desirable to change the stated USAR Control Valve testing. frequency from weekly to monthly. The USAR presently states in 10.2.4.1.a.1 that the Stop Combined Stop and Intercept Valves are tested closed periodically.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
This USAR Change Notice to change the control Valve testing frequency from ;
l weekly to monthly does not have an adverse affect on the Main Turbine System. -
This USAR Change Notice will not change how the affected equipment is operated: ,
it changes the frequency that this equipment is tested.
Changing the test frequency of the Main Turbine Control valves does not have an adverse affect on the Main Turbine System because General Electric, the turbine manufacturer, has recommended in TIL 969 that the Main Turbine Control Valves be tested monthly. Furthermore, this change will not have an adverse affect on the >
l plant because ' testing intervals are no longer the majcr contributing factors in .
! determining hypothetical turbine missiles. The overall probability of a hypothetical missile by increasing the test interval of the valves is bounded by USAR analysis 10.2.5.4.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not_ create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
DBP $302K/20
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR UCN 89-104 (SE 89-0200) -
TITLE: ;
Emergency Core Cooling System Sump High-High Level Alarm Switch Setpoint.
CHANGE:
- 1) Raise the high-high sump level alarm setpoint in ECCS sump: 1-1 and 1-2 to the same setpnint as that in sump 1-3, i.e., the high-high level alarm setpoint will be above the pump starting setpoint in all three sumps.
running lights, instead of the high-high level alarms, as indications to the operator of possible leaks, cracks or rupture causing flooding in the sump.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
- 1) The setpoint change makes the alarm setpoints in all three sumps the same thereby removing the confusion that existed when the alarms were at different levels, and conforms these alarms with other sump high-high level alarm configurations throughout the plant (high-high level alarm above the pump starting level).
- 2) To clarify the significance of the indications provided by the sump pump running lights and the level alarms.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The deviation between the alarm setpoints for sump 1-3 and sumps 1-1 and 1-2 has caused confusion among operators. Operators have difficulty remembering that an alarm for the DH Cooler room should be considered valid (an indication of a problem), whereas the alarms for tie ECCS pump rooms are not valid (a natural indication of normally rising sump level due to various leakages). Receiving computer alarms for normal operations tends to instill complacency.
The USAR is currently taking credit for a high-high level alarm switch which only provides a non-Qualified (non-Q) indication via the plant computer. By relying on the qualified (Q) pump running lights to serve as the indication to the operators of possible leaks instead of the non-Q high-high level alarm, she safety function is improved. Furthermore, the high-high level alarm will now provide indication of increasing water level, beyond the capabilities of the sump pumps (pipe rupture, sump pump failure, level control switch failure), and alert the operator of flooding conditions which could' jeopardize safety- related equipment in the ECCS sump rooms. Currently, the high-high level alarms in sumps 1-1 and 1-2, by alarming before the pump start level, do not provide that indication.
This setpoint change does not affect the performance of the ECCS sump pumps or prevent them from performing their intended safety function.
DBP $302K/21
.O e , i SAFETY EVALUATION SUHHARY l FOR j UCH 89-104 (SE 89 0200) (Continued) ,
r i
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the' probability or ;
consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The
- proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction .;
of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not- i reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications. i Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist. !
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. DBP 5302K/22
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l SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
[
L FOR UCN 89 0121 (SE 90 0044)
TITLE:
Sealing the Pipe Chase Opening in the wall of the Condensate Demineralizer Holdup Tank Room.
CHANGE:
Under SCC 89-1313, the pipe chase opening in the wall between the Condensate Demineralizer Holdup Tank Room and the service water tunnel was sealed.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
This change affects the flood level in the condenser pit following a rupture of a main condenser expansion joint. Prior to closing the opening at el. 572'9' ,
between the condenser pit and the service water tunnel, the condenser pit would fill to el. 581 from this system break. After closing the wall opening, the level in the condenser pit will reach el. 582.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The purpose of this Safety Evaluation is to show that sealing the pipe chase opening and deleting reference to this opening from the USAR and consequently any reference to flooding the service water tunnel from the Circulating Water System detailed in UCN 89-0121 does not involve an unteviewed safety question.
There are no safety functions affected by this change, because there are no essential components located in the Turbine building except Motor Driven Feedwater Pump (MDFP). The HDFP is not nuclear safety related but is required for safe operation of the plant. Motor Driven Feedwater Pump has been evaluated for internal flooding in ' Hazard Study for the MDFP System' and this change will i
not impact that study.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction l of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not I
reduce any margin of safety.as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
DBP $302K/23
i SAFETY EVALUATION SUMHARY FOR UCN 89-124 (SE 89-0247)
TITLE:
Consolidation of the Safety Review Process as Delineated in USAR Section l 17.2.3.2. j CHANGE:
Incorporate changes to NG-EN-00304, Safety Review and Evaluation and NG.NL-00801, Operating License Amendments, into USAR Section 17.2.3.2 by deleting items a. 'A change to Q systems, structures 01 components', e. 'A change to the Technical Specificatione', and f. "Radwaste Systems,' and changing the wording of ittas b. 'A change to the Pacility as described in the USAR*, and
- c. 'A change to procedures as described in the USAR* to be consistent with the requirements of 10CFR50.*9.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
USAR Section 17.2.3.2, items a. through f. correlate with the six questions required to be answered during the conduct of a safety review as required by NG-EN-00304, Revision 0, Safety Review and Evaluation. NG EN-00304 is being revised (Revision 1) to delete the questions which correlate to items a. and f.
In addition, changes to NG EN-00304 and NG-NL-00801, Operating License Amendments, have deleted the requirement to conduct a written safety evaluation for License Amendment Request (LAR). The LAR process is utilized for initiating changes to the Technical Specifications. . Therefore, safety evaluations (10FFR50.59) are no longer required for changes to the Technical Specifications.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The change to the safety review process consolidates item a. (A change to Q-systems, structures, or components) and item f. (Radwarte systems) with item b.
(A change to the facility as described in thw USAR). Q systems, structures, and components are part of the facility described throughout the USAR. Radwaste systems (Liquid, Gaseous, and Solid) are part of the facility described in USAR Sections 11.2 Liquid Waste Systems 11.3 Gaseous Waste System, and 11.5 Solid Waste System. Though the above statements were-removed, proposed changes involving changes to Q systems, structures, or components and radwaste systems l described in the USAR still require an evaluation to determine whether the change involves a change to the facility as described in the USAR.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore. an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
l DSP 5302K/24
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR UCN 89-135 (SE 90 002) i TITLE:
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program !
I CHANGE:
Revise ?!SAR Sections 11.6.3, 13.1.2.5, 13.1.3.2.2, 13.6.7, and 17.2.1 to show the transfes of the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) from l Technical Services to Radiological Controls. .
REASON FOR CHANGE:
The responsibility for the Rediological Environmental Monitoring Program was transferred from Technical Services to Radiological Controls. t i
SAFETY EVALUATION SUHHARY:
The transfer of responsibility for conducting the REMP does not involve any modifications to the program. The proposed USAR changes do not affect any systems or components. The changes are administrative only.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not '
reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist..
i DBP 5302K/25
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR UCN 90 030 (SE 90-0072)
TITLE: f Updating USAR Section 6.3.4 ECCS Tests and Inspections 4 CHANGE: ,
Revise USAR Sections 6.3.4 to reflect actual testing performed by plant '
procedures to adequately test the Core Flooding System. Change the leakage acceptance criteria described in the USAR for CF28 and CF29 from 'a six inch ,
rise in CFT level during a 12-hour period' to '5.0 GFH.'
REASON FOR CHANGE: ,
Section 6.3.4. of the USAR presently identifies tests on the Core Flooding System that have been superseded and identifies an incorrect acceptance criteria !
for CF28 and CF29 leak testing. It is noted that existing procedures reflect i testing with the correct acceptance criteria. USAR Change Notice (UCN)90-030 I will change section 6.3.4 to reflect correct system testing and correct acceptance criteria for leak testing CF28 and CF29.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUHHARY:
The proposed changes will not have any adverse affects on the safety function of any system or components.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The l
proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
l Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
I DBP 5302K/26
u 4'as.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR DB-PF-10003, REV. 0 (SE 89-0019)
TITLE: t Test Procedure DB-PF-10008, 'MFP/ Reactor Runback Trip Test' DESCRIPTION:
Test Procedure DB-PF-10008, "MFP/ Reactor Runback Trip Test", Rev. 0, is an intograted plant test to-demonstrate the'overall plant response.to two different plant transients. Although the plant transients to be tested are bounded by '
descriptions e.nd-analyses described in the USAR, this evaluation has been. '
prepared to document these' analyses and further support performance of this.
test. This is required by 10CFR50.59, since this test is not explicitly.
described in the USAR.
PURPOSE OF THE TEST: I The first-transient-to be undertaken in this test is a main for vetet (MFW) . pump &
trip f ,a'high power level with an automatic power = runback da: :o action of the Integrated Control System (ICS). The purpose of this portion f the test is.
to obtain data on the primary and secondary plant response to a one MFW pump-trip from a high enough power leve', that it also involves an ICS rutback in power while minimizjng the probability.of a reactor trip. Conseque..tly, the inltial plant power level is-chosen as.2 value that challenges the appropriate '
plant systems without a Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip of the reactor.
Data from this test is used for the following:
- Analyze and evaluate the performance of ICS'during.a plant runback following a MFW pump-trip to' allow for optimization of ICS operation Analyze and evaluate the performance of the operating MFP during the .
transient caused by the tripped MFP
- Identify 2ny potential plant modifications to improve the ability of l the plast to survive a MPW pump trip without a reactor trip from-
- higher power levels >
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The second rs JLAon of DB-PF-10008 involves a reactor. trip from a high power
-level ( >'9e o , The reactor trip was initiated by tripping of the main turbine.
The turbine 'rlp will cause an Anticipatory Reactor Trip-System.(ARTS) trip of
~
the reactor. It will.also cause the secondary steam side to pressurize up to the setpoint of the refurbished main steam code safety valves. -This. challenge of the code safety valves will allow gathering of data for evaluating the response of these refurbished valves to a reactor trip scenario. . This data will be reviewed to ascess the impact of'the various design changes.made to the main steam safety valves and their.ahility to withstand repeated actuations following a reactor trip. Additionally, data will be gathered on the dynamic response of y the main steam piping as well as the refurbished valves to this type of transient. This data will be reviewed to determine if'these dynamic effects i i
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
i FOR DB-PF-10008, REV. 0 (SE 89-0029) (Continued)-
could have concributed to the failure of safety valves to completely resent at Davis-Besse.- An evaluation of this data will determine the effectiveness of the-changes made to the main steam safety. valves to date as well as identifying if any additional changes to the safety valves or the main steam piping need to be made to improve the reliability of the safety valves to completely resent J following actuations.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The consequences of conducting-the proposed test are within the bounds of previously evaluated transient and accident analyses summarized within the USAR.
Partial or complete loss of main fee &ater and a main turbine trip are both Class 1 events described in 18%1 Sectionr 15.2.8 and 15.2.7 respectively, By.
definition Class 1 events are' anticipated operational occurrences which do not result in fuel fallere (damage), breach of the fuel cladding or RCS preseure boundary, ECCS actuation, significant off-site radiation exposure, or propagation into a nore severe (Class 2 or 3) event. Both of these transiente represent plant trausients which are reasonably expected to occur over the life of the plant. It is espected that'the plant will respond to these transients without any significau n rturbation in plant operation. The most severe consequence that would be expected.is a reactor trip from the turbine trip portion of the test. A reactor trip may occur in the MFW portion of the test: ;
however, based upon analysis this is not expected to occur. !
Since the turbine trip portion of this test represents a test explicitly described in the USAR, a 10CFh50.59 review is not required for this test.
Therefore, this section will only review the one MFW pump trip portion of.the test for the potential for an unreviewed safety question.
The tripping of a MFW Pump represents an operational transient that is expected to occur during normal operetion. Performance of the test allows verification of proper tuning of ICS and a proper integrated plant response including interaction of the controls of the operating MFW Pump.with ICS. As such this test is similar to the ICS tuning tests performed during. initial plant start-up as part of test TP 800.08. The test demonstrates the integrated plant response in a closely monitored condition. Performance of this' test to verify proper-plant response will provide additional assurance that the plant systems function-satisfactorily during certain operational transients analyzed in the USAR.
As sunmiarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the-possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical SpecificL. ions.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR DB-PF-10008 REV. 0-(SE 89-0019) (Continued) could have contributed to the failure of safety valves to completely resent at Davis-Besse. An evaluation of this data will determine the effectiveness of the changes made to the main steam safety valves to date as well as identifying if any additional changes to the safety valves or the main steem piping need to be made to improve the reliability of the safety valves to completely rescat following actuations.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The consequences of conducting the proposed test are within the bounds of previously evaluated transient and accident analyses summarized within the USAR.
Partial or complete loss of main feedwater and a main turbine trip are both Class 1 events described in USAR Sections 15.2.8 and 15.2.7 respectively. By definition Class 1 events are anticipated operational occurrences which do not result in fuel failure (damage), breach of the fuel cladding or RCS pressure boundary, ECCS actuation, significant off-site radiation exposure, or !
propagation into a more severe (Class 2 or 3) event. Both of these transients represent plant transients which are reasonably expected to occur over the life of the plant. It is expected that the plant will respond to these transients without any significant perturbation in plant operation. The most severe consequence that would be expected is a reactor trip from the turbine trip i portion of the test. A reactor trip may occur in the MFW portion of the test:
however, based upon analysis this is not expected to occur. j Since the turbine trip portion of this test represents a test explicitly described in the USAR, a 10CFR50.59 review is not required for this test. ,
Therefore, this section will only review the one MFW pump trip portion.of the i test for the potential for an unreviewed safety question.
The tripping of a HFW Pump representi, an operational transient that is expected ,
to occur during normal operation. Performance of the test allows. verification !
of proper tuning of ICS and a proper integrated plant response including interaction of the controls of the operating MFW Pump with ICS. As such this test is similar to the ICS tuning tests performed during initial plant start-up as part of test TP 800.08. The test demonstrates the integrated plant response in a closely monitored condition. Performance of this test to verify proper plant response will provide additional assurance that the plant systems function R satisfactorily during certain operational transients analyzed in the USAR.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or i' consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question doec not exist.
DBP 5302K/28 y