ML20236J286

Annual 10CFR50.590 Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments for Period of 860123-870122

ML20236J286
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	01/22/1987
From:	Shelton D TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20236J292	List: ML20236J286 ML20236J865
References
NUDOCS 8708060123
Download: ML20236J286 (273)

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. ATTACHMENT 1 10CFR50.59

SUMMARY

SHEET NUMBER TITLE-77-137 Plant Modification on'CREVS.

78-024- Addition.of 011 Sight Glass for Containment Spray ,

Pumps  !78-220' Relocation of Test Buttons and Indicating Lights  ;

i for MSIVs

78-436 Removal of Magnetrol Level Switches from SFRCS l 79-143 -4160 VAC. Bus Control Circuit

'79-176 Analysis for Turbine' Generator Trip 79-280 .Setpoint Change for Containment Air Temperature i Controllers .

[

293 Static "0" Ring. Pressure Switches  !79-308 Redundant Minimum Recirculation Line to the BWST 79-349 Replacement of the Four Reactor Coolant Hot Leg l Narrow Range RTDs79-421 Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Exhaust  !80-111 Reactor Vessel 0-Ring Seal Fasteners =l 80-252 -Remove Valve Internals from Service Water Valves SW3 and SW4 j 81-013 Condensate and Demineralized Water Transfer i Storage

81-054 ' Addition of a Backup Service Water Pump 100 Deletion of Old Fire Detection System 82-063 Radwaste Gas Flow 82-074 Relocation of Pressurizer Safety Valves82-123 Additional Thermocouple Input to the Thermostat Meter 82-175 Decay Heat Removal Flow Instrumentation 83-045- Automatic Test Instrumentation Circuitry 83-051. Technical Specification Change for RCS83-080 Hydraulic and Mechanical Snubber. Surveillance 83-087 ECCS Pump Room Thermostats83-095 Modification of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Governors83-103 Freeze Protection Cabinets83-112 New Supply Piping to the Circulating Water Pump Packing Box Water Seals83-135 Change Normal Position of Valves SA501 and SA2010 83-136 Modification to Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Governors83-137 Replacement of Fire Rated Dampers83-141 Removal of Containment Air Cooler Leak Detection 84-008 Removal of Blades from Fire Dampers84-027 Modification of Condensate Piping Structure 84-102 Addition of Fans to SFRCS Cabinets C5762A and C5792 84-111 Raise Setpoints of Pressure Switches on Service Water Strainer Motors 870B060123 870730 PDR R ADOCK 05000346 1 pggg  ;

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ATTACHMENT 1 10CFR50.59

SUMMARY

SHEET NUMBER TITLE 84-125 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (AFP) Room Ventilation Fan Control 84-132 Human Engineering Discrepancy (HED) 4.1.1 84-144 Modification to AFW Pump Room Ventilation Dampers84-147 Modifications to the Service Water Pump Room Ventilation 84-178 Protect Cable ICBE160F from the Effects of Fire Area U 84-183 Isolate Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Circuits84-186 Isolation of the Essential 4.16 KV Switchgear Breaker Control Circuit  !84-189 Emergency Diesel Generator DB Motor Driven Fuel Pump Circuit Modification 84-202 Add Guards to Station Switches85-007 Plant Modification to Add a Sequencer to the Station Air System 85-010 Modification of AFW Piping Support 85-015 Modification to Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System 85-016 Modification of Damper Actuator Supports85-018 Plant Modification to Replace Cables on the Emergency Diesel Generators85-025 Motor Driven Feed Pump (MDFP) Installation 85-039 Plant Modification for HVAC Supports '85-041 Upgrade Monitoring Capability for Storm Sewer Radiation Monitor

$95-042 Insulated Mounts for SFAS Radiation Detectors85-045 Replace Pressure Regulators for Diesel Generator Air Start System SS-059 Electrical Conduit Systems Crossing Seismic Zones85-062 Isolate Control Circuits for 4 KV Switchgear '

Breakers85-071 Modification to Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Supports85-072 USAR Drawing Changes85-090 Plant Modification to Remove Control Power from FW-786 and FW-790 85-092 Inadvertent Spray Analysis85-095 Main Steam Line Anchors ,85-102 Modification to Auxiliary Feedwater Pipe Support 85-103 Change Filtering Circuit of the Reactor Coolant Flow Transmitters l 85-105 Removal of the Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) '

Lifting Handles85-106 RC229A Stroke Time 85-112 Disconnect Space Heaters on Safety-Related i Limitorque Motor Operators ]

85-126 Knowool and Bisco seals I I

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4 ATTACHMENT 1 10CFR50.59

SUMMARY

SHEET NUMBER TITLE 85-131 Install Flanges Down Stream of the Pressurizer PORV 85-134 Torque Switch Settings on Safety-Related MOVs85-138 Modification to the Safety Parameter Display System 85-142 Substitution of Existing 2-watt Rated Heat Dissipation Capacitor Reaistors85-155 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Logic Change 9 85-158 Separation of Steam Generator Level Trips85-159 Trip Logic in the Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System 85-160 Installation of Drain Line on PORV Loop Seal 85-161 Filtering of Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) Input 85-163 Provide Pipe Whip Restraints and Impingement Barriers85-164 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Overspeed Trip - Human Factors Improvements85-168 Plant Modification to Install Tubing for Temporary Air Conditioner 85-171 Additional Pilot-Operated Relief Valve (PORV)

Position Indication 85-176 Modification to Small Pipe Supports85-177 Enhance Safety Features Actuation Systems (SFAS)

Channel Independence 85-181 Alternate Access to Room No. 237 85-183 Plant Modification to Relocate the Emergency Key Locker and Locker Key Box 85-185 Low Speed Setting (LSS) of the Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine (AFPT)85-189 Relocate Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) Switches85-192 Plant Modi 14 cation to Containment Purge System 85-198 Plant Modification for the Clean Waste Receiver Tanks (CWRT)85-201 Integrated Control System (ICS) OTSG Low Lecel Control Setpoint Change 85-216 Incorporate Design Improvements to the Main Steam Safety Valves85-222 Replace Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) Valves85-224 Plant Modification to Add a Snubber to the Main Steam Line 85-226 Modification to Containment Air Cooler 85-229 Lov Voltage Switchgear Room Fan Replacement 3

ATTACHMENT 1 10CFR50.59

SUMMARY

SHEET

_1mMBER TITLE 85-232 Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS)

Alarm Circuits85-238 Plant Modification to Change the Fail Position of a Damper 85-239 Implementation of Local High/ Low Temperature Alarm in the Diesel Generator Room 85-240 Installation of an Indicating Device for the Polar Crane 85-242 Plant Modification to Replace Flow Transmitter Circuit Board 85-243 Plant Modification to Replace Temperature Switcher in ECCS Equipment Rooms85-249 Plant Modification to Add Pressure Switches to AFW Steam Lines85-259 Plant Modification to Install an Inline Air Filter 85-263 Remove Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seal Leakage Instrumentation 85-265 Enhance the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) Controls85-268 Disconnection of Smoke Detector DS5610 85-270 Plant Modification for Correction of RFOs to T-SAT Meters85-272 Piping Lug Attachments for Pipe Support 85-274 Upgrade the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)85-277 Plant Modification for a Makeup System Limitorque Valve Actuator 85-278 Plant Modification to Replace an Auxiliary Boiler Indicator 85-292 Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) Valve and Level Transmitter Insulation 85-296 Removal of Handwheels from Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) Valves85-299 Plant Modification to Change Control Circuitry for the CREVS85-301 Revise Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Air Receiver Setpoints85-302 Change of Operation of Motor Operated Valve MV-11 85-303 Plant Modification for Decay Heat Removal (DHR)

Valve Pit Level Switches85-305 PORV Increased Flow Modification (Feed and Bleed)85-308 Installation of Gaskets to Control Room Doors85-310 Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) Primary Manway and Handhole Studs85-312 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Operation 85-314 Plant Modification for a Station Air Containment Isolation Valve 4

ATTACHMENT 1 10CFR50.59

SUMMARY

SHEET NUMBER TITLE 85-316 Plant Modification for Replacement of In-Containment Limit Switches85-317 Piping Support Inspection and Verification Program 85-318 Piping Support Inspection and Verification Program 85-319 Piping Support Inspection and Verification Program 85-327 Transformer Top Settings85-328 Plant Modification to Replace Make-up System Flcw Transmitters85-331 Piping Support Inspection and. Verification Program 85-335 Piping Support Inspection and Verification Program 85-336 Piping Support Inspection and Verification Program  ;85-337 Evaluation of Acceptability of Main Steam Piping Support  ;85-338 Replacement of Fire Detector Pyrotronics Model l DT-135 CPS85-338, Replacement of Fire Detector Pyrotronics Model ,

Rev. A DT-200 CPS I 85-339 Provide Containment Sump Wide Range Water Level Monitor Enclosures85-340 Replacement of Rosemount Model 1151 Differential Pressure Transmitter i

85-344 Replace Wires in Limitorque Actuators with Environmentally Qualified Wiring 85-347 Addition of Drain Valve and Cap to Main Steam Non-return Valves (NRV) I 85-348 Addition of Drain Line to the In-Containment Nitrogen System 85-349 Revise 4160V Bus High Voltage Alarm Setpoint 85-356 Replacement of Emergency Ventilation System (EVS)

Ductwork 86-001 Resolution of Valve Drawing Discrepancies86-002 Voltage Surge Suppression Device Access Fan Failure Alarm Contacts86-008 Replacement of 8 Pressure Transmitters86-009 Change of Normal Power Feed Alignment for 480V MCC F13 86-016 SIRCS Pressure Switch Conducted Sealing Fitting Addition 86-017 Addition of Qualified Conduit Seal Assemblies for Flow Transmitters86-023 Door No. 215 Casket Modification 86-029 Weep Hole Placement in Instrumentation Flexible Leads86-032 Wiring and Handwheel Changes in Motor-Operated Valves CV-5010E and CV-5011E 5

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ATTACHMENT 1 10CFR50.59

SUMMARY

SHEET NUMBER TITLE 86-041 Modify Low Pressure Injection Control Circuit 86-043 Indicating Lights for Steam /Condensace Auxiliary

} Feedwater Pump Isolation Valves36-046 MV Loop 16 - Response to Loss of NNI tower )86-052 Replacement of Limit Switches in the Auxiliary l Building 86-053 Auxiliary Building Control Room Air Damper Solenoid Valve Replacement 86-054 Recalibration of Integrated Control System (ICS)

Pump Control Circuit Modules86-057 Pipe Support 33A-GCB-8-H9 Shell Anchor Bolt Deficiencies Repair 86-062 Terminal Block Boxes Weep Holes86-064 Increase the Time Delay Settings of Under Frequency Relays ,86-065 SV 5004 Air Line Union Installation j 86-070 Conductor Seals and Weep Holes86-081 Install Larger Cable Termination Box on DH Motor MP-0421 86-084 MFPT Drain Level Switch Adjustment 86-086 Resolution of Drawing Discrepancies86-089 Reconnection of PSH-6777 to Vacuum Pumps86-092 Removal of Limitorque Operator Torque Switch Limiter Plates86-093 Modify Overspeed Trip on Emergency Diesel Generators 1-1 and 1-2 86-097 Station Hot Water Heater Replacement 86-100 Replace Cyclone Separators in Decay Heat Removal Pumps86-101' Repositioning and Removing Main Steam Line Snubbers86-103 Modify Piping Supports86-104 Containment Modifications86-107 Blowdown Panels86-108 Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine (AFPT) Steam Generator Level Control System 86-109 Replacement of Spool Pieces86-115 Reactor Coolant Pump Spare Rotating Assembly 86-116 Modification to Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel 5torage Tanks86-118 Replacement of Temperature Detectors with Qualified Detectors86-124 Correct Errors on Drawing E280A 86-128 Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) Sample Coolers86-130 Modification of Steam Generator Piping Support 86-136 Modify NAMCO Limit Switch Supports86-140 Replacement of EDG Solenoid Valves 6

ATTACHMENT 1 10CFR50.59

SUMMARY

SHEET NUMBER TITLE 86-146- Globe Valves on Containment Air Cooler Inlet Header Drains86-148 Power Source for Press to Test Lights86-152 Revise Item D on Page 6.2-58 of the USAR 86-162 Auxiliary Feedwater Cortrols on Panel C5717 86-164 Submerged Transmitter Modification 86-166 Reset Torque Switch Settings for Limitorque Actuators86-168 High Range Radiation Monitor Detector Mountings86-169 Modification of Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP)

Supports86-170 Cover for Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV)

Control Switch 86-174 Modification to Steam Generator (SG) Level Control Circuit 86-177 Plant Modification to Replace Temporary Fire Detectors86-179 Deletion of ICS Asymmetric Rod Runback j 86-180 Evaluation to Remove Plant Restrictions Due to Raychem Splices86-182 Plant Modification for Replacement of a Makeup (MU) System Valve 86-186 Removal of Interference to Facilitate Reactor Coolant Pump Maintenance 86-187 Removal of Interference to Facilitate Reactor Coolant Pump Maintenance 86-188 Plant Modification to Remove Covers from SFAS Pushbuttons86-193 Modifications of Various Raceways and Enclosures86-195 Emergency Diesel Generator Setpoint Changes86-198 Motor Operated Valve Control Circuit Modification 86-203 Replacement of Check Valve DH-3 86-235 Replacement of Flow Transmitter FT 4909 86-236 Radiation Monitor Check Source Replacement 86-237 RCPM Turbine Trip and SFRCS Full-Trip Alarm Modification 86-239 Essential Load Center Ground Fault Relay Setting Revision 86-245 MS-198 Vent Valve Replacement 86-247 Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump Room Recirculation Dampers86-249 Cabinet Door Safety Hazard 86-262 Piping Restraint at Floor Penetration 86-264 Isolator / Mounting Supports for CREVS Compressors l 86-271 OTSG Tube Plugging 86-276 Liquid Radwaste Discharge Piping Modification 86-282 Replacement of 480 VAC Breaker in MCC E16A 7

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ATTACHMENT 1 10CFR50.59

SUMMARY

SHEET NUMBER TITLE-86-284 Rework Penetration Low Level Instrumentation Shields / Drains86-290 Reactor Coolant Pump Replacement Rotating Assemblies86-293 OTSG Tube Plugging 86-295 Line HBD-68 Pipe Support Upgrade 86-300 SFRCS/AFW Integrated. Test 86-306 Escape Hatch Gasket Modification 66-307 Modification to Main Steam Line Area Doors86-309 Containment Air Cooling System Fusible Link Ratings86-311 Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) Sample Point Relocation 86-319 Time Delay Setting Change for the Letdown Cooler Inlet Valves86-323 Air Compressor 1-1 Water Flow Switch Removal 86-325 Valve FW 106 Administrative Control 86-327 MOV Torque Switch Setpoint Change 86-332 ' Atmospheric Vent Valve Wiring Modification 86-334 Modification to Pressure Safety Valves PSV 2093 and PSV 2119 86-347 Condensate System Piping / Tubing Overstress Problem Corrections86-350 Repair Piping Hanger Support 30-CCA-8-H2 86-352 Repair Piping-Hanger Support 30-GCC-8-H16 86-360 Decay Heat Cooler Valve DH14A and DH13A Lever Arm Replacement 86-363 Station Effluent Monitoring Sample Beach Station Pump Replacement 86-366 Repair of Piping Support 86-378 Steam Generator Level Instrumentation Cabinet (SCLIC) Resistor Deletion 86-404 Removal of Water Treatment Building Sump Pumps SE-86-002 Revision of USAR Section 11.4.3.3.10 SE-86-004 Performance of ILRT Following Replacement of CV624B SE-86-009 Raise EDG Lube Oil Temperature and Revise USAR Section 8.3.1.1.4 SE-86-012 Revise the Maximum Acceptable Leak Rate (MALR) as <

Listed in ST5061.02 SE-86-013 Cycling the PORV 8 Times at Nominally 700 psig and 3 Times at Nominally 2155 SE-86-014 Service Water Throttle Valves on Control Room EVS SE-86-015 Service Water Throttle. Valves on Control Room EVS SE-86-020 Changes to USAR Section 6.3 8

l ATTACHMENT 1 10CFR50.59

SUMMARY

SHEET NUMBER TITLE SE-86-023 USAR Change to Remove Requirement to' Check ids or Fuel Assemblies while in Transit SE-86-025 USAR Update for Offsite Radiological Monitoring

~SE-86-026 Rearrange Tubing on Solenoid Valves for SW1356, SW1357 and SW1358 SE-86-030 Temporary Hose on Casing Relief Valve of an

-Electric Fire Pump SE-86-031 Reroute Chlorination Flush Line Discharge SE-86-032 .USAR Section 3.6.2.7.1.5 Revision SE-86-033 USAR Section 3.6.2.7.1.4 Revision SE-86-034 USAR Section 7.4.1.3.1 Revision SE-86-037 Safety Evaluation for Temporary Mechanical Modifications

-SE-86-039 . Replacement of Relief Valve SE-86-047 Storage of CRD Components SE-86-049 Reduce the counts per second requirement for startup source range SE-86-052 Repair of Door 216 SE-86-053 Relocate DC Cround SE-86-055 Door 501 Modification SE-86-056 Room 235 14" Drain Pipe Absence 9

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ENCLOSURE

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r SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 77-137, REV. A TITLE:

Plant Modification on CREVS CHANGE:

Corrects design drawings to show temperature switches TS 5261 and TS 5262 in their original design location.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Temperature switches were relocated and subsequently returned to their original location.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

An unreviewed safety question does not exist since the proposed change corrects design drawings to show the CREVS temperature switches in their original design location.

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4' SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 78-024, REV. A

- TITLE:

011 Sight Glasses for Containment Spray Pumps Bearing Assemblies s CHANGE:

011 sight glasses' vere added to the containment spray pump bearing assemblies.

REASON'FOR CHANGE:

To enable operations personnel to monitor pump bearing oil levels to '

ensure proper operation of the pumps.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The addition of containment spray pump bearing oil' sight glasc sssemblies does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident'or malfunction of safety-related equipment as evaluated in the  !

USAR. Nor does the addition of oil sight glass assemblies create a  !

possibility for an accident different than any evaluated previously in the'USAR, or reduce.the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any j Technical Specification. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does '

not exist.

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-SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 78-220 i

TITLE:

Relocation'of Test Buttons and Indicating Lights for Main Steam Isolation Valves CHANGE:

Added cable, raceway and juncticn boxes for the relocation of the test pushbuttons and indicating lights for the main steam isolation valves.

I REASON FOR CHANGE:

To improve personnel safety and reliability while performing surveillance testing.

SAFETY EVALUATIO- 'MMARY:

This action-does ,/ increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because there was no change to the system function.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a

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malfunction of equipment important to safety because there was no change to system reliability.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because there was no change to the system function.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the

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basis for any Technical Specification because there was no change to the system or reliability. The system is used only during surveillance testing.

Therefore, this modification does not present an unreviewed safety question.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 78-436 TITLE:

Rem.% 1'of Magnetrol Level Switches from SFRCS

'CHAFGE:

Remove the mechanical magnetrol level switches that'had previously been used as an input to SFRCS Steam Generator Low Level. ,

I REASON FOR CliANGE:

The switches had been replaced by analog transmitters and electronic bistables on a previous FCR. The switches had beea disconnected but left  !

< installed due.to an ALARA concern (i.e., removal of disconnected switches would involve additional man-REM exposure not required for safe operation of the unit.) It is now desirable to remove the switches to eliminate interferences associated with the reactor coolant pump.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the level switches are no longer used, and removal of the switches will not degrade the pressure boundary since all lines will be capped utilizing 1" ASME pipe caps.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety since the equipment was replaced via an earlier FCR and is no lem e used. The deletion of the level switches will not degrade the SG pressure boundary.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the equipment being removed was previously replaced has not been in service for years.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the proposed changes will not affect any Technical Specification Basis margins.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 79-143 TITLE:

4160 VAC Bus Control Circuit Modification CHANGE:

Place a diode across the auxiliary relay coil. The diode is normally back-biased but provides a circuit t<> release the stored energy if the CVE contact were to open.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Welding of the CVE has occurred. This circuit eliminates the possibility of the stored energy releasing across the contact.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The diode modification is functionally compatible with the existing circuit's operation. Installation of the diode eliminates contact arcing and welding. Therefore, system reliability is enhanced. This is not an unreviewed safety question since the function of the circuit is not changed.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 79-176 TITLE:

1 Addition of ' Interim Anticipatory Reactor Trip System i CHANGE:

Addition of Interim' Automatic Reactor Trip when the Turbine-Generator is tripped at reactor power greater than 15% or if feedwater is lost to both )

stream generators. J l

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To reduce the magnitude of pressure and temperature transients in the reactor coolant system caused by loss of feedwater. incidents and main turbine trips. i SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The addition of the automatic reactor trips will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because, currently, the reactor can be manually tripped at any time without any adverse safety consequences. The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident of malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR. The addition of the interim system will have no affect on equipment important to safety.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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I SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 79-280, SUPP. 9 i

TITLE:

Setpoint Change for Containment Air Temperature Controllers CHANGE:

Change existing setpoints for TIC 1356, 1357, 1358 from 50 5 F to 751 5'F.

I REASON FOR CHANGE:

The existing setpoint had been selected due to slow valve stroke time.

Modifications made under FCR 79-280, Supplement 08 eliminated the stroke time-problem.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed. action will not increase the probability or consequences o'f an accident previously described.in the USAR because the change is to a non-safety related setpoint. This modification changes the setpoint for control air inlet temperature to 75 F. This.will effectively reduce the containment air average temperature from 120 F maximum to a valve that is lower. The accident analysis assumes 110-120 F.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the change is to a non-safety related setpoint. A setpoint of 75 F will preclude subcompartments containing safety related equipment from freezing.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the change is to a non-safety related setpoint.

lhe proposed action will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. The relevant Technical Specification (Section 3/4.6.1.5) mandates an upper limit on containment temperature. This change lowers the setpoint by 45 F from the plant's original setpoint (120 F).

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 79-293 TITLE:

Static "0" Ring Pressure Switches CHANGE:

Changed switches with Buna-N diaphrams to stainless steel diaphrams with ports.

REASON-FOR CHANGE:

Improve performance SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The new twitches will automatically reset at a slightly higher pressure due to their higher deadband (50 percent higher than on old "Buna-N" switches). This higher deadband will not degrade the safety anction of l the Auxiliary Feedwater System, the normal operating pressure on the i switches is much higher than their trip setpoint. Therefore, this is not an unreviewed safety question.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 79-308 TITLE:

Installation of Redundant Minimum Recirculation Line to the BWST CHANGE:

' Provide a redundant minimum recirculation line to the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) for High Pressure Injection (HPI) Pump 1-1. i REASON FOR CHANGE:

The provision of redundancy in the HPI minimum recirculation lines

' alleviates the probability of a common mode failure caused by a break in the recirculation line which may render both trains of HPI' inoperable.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed change enhances the overall reliability of the HPI system.

The modification involves piping changes downstream of the HPI recirculation line restriction orifices and as a result does not significantly effect main HPI flow. The change dras not alter overall" system flow since the only change is to route one recirculation line to a s:fs; ate line that discharges directly to the BWST.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 79-349, SUPP. O TITLE:

Replacement of the four Reactor Coolant Hot Leg Narrow Range RTDs CHANGE:

Replace the four Reactor Coolant Hot Leg Narrow Range'(duel element) RTDs with Rosemont RTDs of separable well design.

' REASON FOR CHANGE:

To facilitate replacing elements.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUMeiARY:

The same degree of temperature sensing and protection will be available after the new RTDs are installed. The change, therefore, does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 79-421 TITLE:

Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Exhaust CHANGE:

Provided individual exhaust stack for each auxiliary feedwater pump turbine.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The original exhaust system had a potential for crimping.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does did not increase the probability or consequences of an acuident previously described in the USAR because the function of the system was not changed.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the function of the system was not changed.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the function of the system was not changed.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basi.

for any Technical Specification because the function of the system was not changed.

Therefore, this modification does not present an unreviewed safety question.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 80-111, REV. A. SUPPL. 1 TITLE:'

Reactor Vessel 0-Ring Seal Fasteners CHANGE:

Substitute slotted plate screw retainers with flat washers and eliminate undercut style cap screws.

REASON FOR CHANCE:

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Three of; sixteen of the original undercut cap screws failed because of reduced section'along the undercut style cap screws. j l

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action did not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described'in the.USAR because the clips only serve to hold the  !

"0-rings" in place during head installation. .The pressure boundary is not 1 affected by the clips.

This action did not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the clips only service to hold the "0-rings" in place during head installation. The pressure boundary is not affected by the clips. j This action did not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the clips only serve to hold the."0-rings" .in place'during head installation. The pressure boundary is not affected by the clips.

l This action did not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis c for any Technical Specification because the clips only serve to hold the "0-rings" in place during head installation. The pressure boundary is not affected by the clips.

Therefore, this modification does not-present an unreviewed safety )

question.

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T SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 80-252-TITLE:

Removal of Service Water Valve Internals CHANGE:

Removes internals from Service Water Valves SW3 and SW4. These valves are installed in the two llBD service water lines that provide the service water as the secondary source of water to the Auxiliary Feedwater System.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The valve's design function is not feasible or necessary at the present

-location and will require forward flow testing. Forward flow testing cannot be performed without injecting service water into the Auxiliary Feedwater and Con 6ensate Systems. This might have an adverse long-term effect on the steam generators.

SAFETY EVALUATION. sum!ARY:

The removal of valve internals from service water check valves will not affect the function of the Auxiliary Feedwater System or the backup reliability of the Service Water System. There will be no affect on the '

function,' operability or safety feature of either system if the internals of the valves are removed and the bodies left in place for use as alternate pipe spools. Also, this change will not introduce any new ,

adverse consequence and will not affect any previously anclyzed condition i as evaluated in the USAR. Elimination of valve internals from SW3 and SW4 will also decrease the possibility of long term adverse consequences of service water contaminates into the steam generators. The margin of safety for the system will not be reduced as specified by the Technical Specifications.

I Therefore, removal of the valve internals from SW3 and SW4 is not an j unreviewed safety questiet. {

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 81-013

- TITLE:

Replacement of Solenoid Valve in Demineralized Water Line CHANGE:

Replace solenoid ~ valve SV 6831B with a solenoid valve which has a larger orifice to allow increased air flow when stroking close DW 6831B.

1 REASON FOR CHANGE:

To reduce the stroke time of valve DW 6831B, enhancing the valve's ability I to meet _the required maximum stroke time of 10 seconds.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the new solenoid valve will still function to close containment isolation valve DW 6831B.

The increase orifice size should reduce.the stroke time of DW 6831B.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety since this change will not affect the RCS pressure boundary, and will not inhibit the function of existing Class IE equipment.

The proposed acLion will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because failure mechanisms previously unanticipated or events not bounded by the USAR will not be introduced by this change.

The proposed action will not reduce the margin of safety as ?2 fined in the basis for any technical specification because this modification reduces the stroke time of valve DW 6831B, thus enhancing the valve's ability to meet the required maximum closure time of 10 seconds, i

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 81-054' v_

TITLE:'

Addition of a Backup Service Water Pump CHANGE:,

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-[ This change added a backup service water pump along with the associated m

y. ' cross-connecting piping and manual. valving.

REASON'FOR CHANGE:

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" This change was made to satisfy 10CFR50 Appendix R requirement to meet the separation with fire barrier criteria relating'to fire protection for safe shutdown capability.

f SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This modification to the Service Water System provides the'necessary ,

separation criteria to enable the plant to achieve cold shutdown post fire in the' service water pump room to comply with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R. This change does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 81-100 TITLE:

Removal of,0ld Fire Detection System CHANGE:

Removal of fire detection panels C3006, C3635, C3636, C4705, C4706, C5785A, C5785B; removal of the associated sensors, and removal / sparing of the associated cables. The devices _have already been deenergized.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

A new upgraded system has been installed and is currently in operation.

Removal of the old system provides more physical space, and eliminates the confusion associated with old sensors which are often located near new sensors.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This modification removes the old system which has been replaced with an upgraded system to meet Appendix R commitments. The FCR provides for only the physical removal of the non-functional, obsolete system, therefore, an unreviewed safety question is not involved.

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l SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 82-063 TITLE:

-Incorporate the "As-Built" Configuration for Radwaste Gas Flow

-CHANGE:

' Change print D3060K13-509, Sheet 4 of 18 to reflect actual conditions.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Revise drawing to reflect as-built condition.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

. Updating the' appropriate drawings did not increase the' probability of occurrence or.the. consequences of an accident or malfunction of any safety-related. equipment as evaluated in the USAR. Nor did the change

-create a possibility for an accident different than any evaluated previously in.the USAR or reduce'the margin of' safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications.

.Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 82-074, Rev. A TITLE:

Relocation of Pressurizer Safety Valves CHANGE: ,

1 The pressurizer safety valves were relocated to the top of the pressurizer. In addition, the disc in the valve was replaced by a type suitable for operation without a loop seal.

REASON FOR CRANGE: l Analyses conducted had identified that the previous configuration would 1 cause a valve chattering problem due to a sonic traveling wave formation which would limit the relieving capacity of the valves.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Seismic and stress analyses were perfi nned for the changed configuration as required for Class 1 components and pressure boundaries. Equipment in the vicinity of the discharge was reviewed for jet impingement and environmental effects and found to be acceptable. Pursuant to the above, the changes made by this modification do not involve any unreviewed safety questions.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 82-123 l

TITLE:

l Move Thermocouple Input to the TSAT Meter CHANGE:

l Move Thermocouple input from the location C-6 to D-5 l

REASON FOR CHANGE:

1 Thermocouple cable to C-6 is inoperable SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The safety function of the thermocouple input to the test meter is to provide saturation temperature information for one quadrant of the core to the operator. Changing core location C-6 to D-5 will provide temperature

information from the same quadrant.and thus fulfill the safety function.

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Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 82-175, Supplement 1

'; TITLE:

Correction of "As-Built" DrawingsLfor the Square Root Extractors of Decay

. Heat Removal Flow Instrumentation E

CHANGE:

Revises drawing to showLsquare' root extractors FY-DH02A and FY-DH02B in the Non-Nuclear Instrumentation (NNI) cabinets instead of-the Essential Metering (ESM) cabinets.

REASON FOR CHANGE: 1 There were two stages for upgrading the decay heat removal instrumentation strings. Relocation of the square root extractors to ESM cabinets would have occurred as Stage II. .The drawing incorrectly showed the extractors as being located in'the ESM cabinets.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The' subject' flow monitoring loops provide for post-accident monitoring cand emergency core cooling surveillance as per Technical Specification requirements. These safety functions were not affected by the incorrect "as-built" drawings. No procedures are affected by the square root scales presently in use. Thii FCR addressed changes to drawings only and involved no change to the fa:ility. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 83-045

~ TITLE:

Removal of Automatic Test Instrumentation (ATI) Circuitry from Safety -

Features Actuation System (SFAS) Panels CHANGE:

Removal of previously' disconnected Automatic Test Instrumentation (ATI) circuitry from the SFAS cabinets.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The ATI system performs no safety function. Its original purpose was to continuously monitor the performance of certain portions of the SFAS logic circuits. It has never been used for its intended purpose, nor are their any plans to use.it in the future.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the ATI circuitry has never been used and is disconnected from SFAS. Its removal has no:effect

-on accidents or malfunctions previously analyzed in the USAR. The. proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to. safety since this change involves only the physical removal of previously disconnected equipment.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 83-051,.Rev. B TITLE:

-Technical Specification Change for the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

CHANGE:

J This change. revised Section 3.4.1.2 of the Technical Specifications so that Decay Heat Remov'al (DHR) redundancy is maintained when required to y

'beLoperable. i d

1 REASON FOR CHANGE:

Prior.to the change, RCS pressure and temperature could have exceeded the design conditions for the DHR system with the plant in Mode'3.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

-This change revised the Technical Specifications Section 3.4.1.2.so that DHR redundancy is maintained when required,;and the safety functions.of the RCS or DHR have not been degraded. There is no unreviewed safety question involved with this change.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 83-087 TITLE:

I Reduce the High Set Points on Thermostats in the ECCS Pump Rooms CHANGE:

Reduce the high set points on thermostats TS 5421, TS 5422, TS 5423, TS 5424, and TS 5425 in the ECCS Pump Room from 104 F to 95 F.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To assure that the ambient air temperature in the ECCS pump room does not exceed the room design temperature limits due to inaccuracy of equipment. This change enhances the safety function of ECCS pump and decay heat cooler room coolers to reduce ambient temperature and prevent overheating of equipment.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR , nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 83-095 TITLE:

Modification of the. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Governors CHANGE:

Install independently adjustable high and low speed mechanical stops on

' internal governor linkage. Install a redesigned slip clutch of

' demonstrated ability.

REASON FOR'CHANGEi r Eliminate binding 1in the internal governor linkage and eliminate unreliability of the slip clutc! arrangement.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

i These modifications will increase the reliability of the AFW pump e governors. This will sert.e to' increase the overall reliability of the AFW System, thereby improving its ability to fulfill its safety function.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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i SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 83-095 TITLE:

Modification'of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Governors CHANGE:

Install independently adjustable high and low speed mechanical stops on i internal' governor linkage. Install a' redesigned slip clutch of

-demonstrated ability.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Eliminate binding in the internal governor linkage and eliminate unreliability of the slip clutch arrangement.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

These modifications will increase the reliability of the AFW pump governors. This will serve to increase the overall reliability. of the AFW System, thereby improving its ability to fulfill its safety function.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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f SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 83-103=

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. TITLE:

Drawing Change;for Freeze Protection Cabinets' CHANGE:

't This lLs a " drawing change only" modification which updated vendor drawings to show part: numbers for thermostats and humidistats which were replaced on.an as-fail-basis to replace obsoletefcomponents.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

.This change revised the appropriate drawings to reflect the as-built condition of the. freeze protection ~ cabinets.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

?This. modification consisted of drawing changes:only and did not involve any unreviewed safety questions, e

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l SAFETY EVALUATION'FOR FCR 83-112, REV. A TITLE:

Installation of New Supply Piping to the Circulating Water Pump Packing Box Water Seals CHANGE:

Replace existing 1" seal water. piping with 2" piping.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Due to aEe and the previous water quality, the existing 1" supply pipe has

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scaled to the point of allowing only minimal flow.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This system has no direct nuclear safety related function nor does it affect any nuclear safety related functions. The proposed action replaces exicting piping with new piping. Enlarging the piping along with elimination of the scaling problem will improve water quality and eliminate plugging problems.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR. Nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to

. safety. .The proposed action wi,ll not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction.of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist. .

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4 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 83-135 l i TITLE: i i

Change Normal Position of Valves SA 501 and SA 2010 '

CHANGE:

This FCR changes the normal position.of valves SA 501 and SA 2010 from open to closed.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Required as part of the corrective action for LER 83-044 SAFETY EVALUATION SUMtfARY:

The safety function of SA 2010 is to provide containment isolation on receipt of a safety actuation signal. Closure of this valve during normal operation does not affect this safety function. Valve SA 501 is a gate valve immediately upstream of SA 2010 and has no safety function. Closure of this valve during normal operations will eliminate problems encountered

. with SA 2010 by ensuring that moist air and dirt build-up will not accumulate on valve intervals.

Closing these two valves will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 83-136 TITLE:

Modification to Auxiliary Feedpump Turbine (AFPT) Governors CHANGE:

This modification installed encapsulated motors for the speed setting motors on the governors for the AFFTs.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This change was to eliminate problems associated with the intrusion of oil into the speed setting motors from their operating environment.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does net increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the motor is an improvement over the previous model and manual speed control is possible and procedurally required in the event of a motor failure.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the modifications prevent the occurrence of malfunctions observed in the original design.

i This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because motor failure is addressed in the procedures and can be detected before an accident condition occurs.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the Technical Specifications require operability of the AFPTs and motor failure does not preclude manual-controlled operation of the AFPTs.

Therefore, this modification does not present an unreviewed safety question.

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1 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 83-137, REV. A- 1 TITLE: -

Replace 1 1/2 Hour Fire Rated Dampers with 3 Hour Rated Dampers CHANGE: 1 Replace 1 1/2 hour' fire rated fire damper numbers FD 1085 and FD 1132 with 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire dampers.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The fire barriers in which these dampers are located are 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated per Revision 7 of the Fire Hazards Analysis Report.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The safety function of the dampers is to prevent the spread of fire.

Increasing the rating of the damper is an upgrade, therefore, the proposed action will not' increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.

These modifications will enhance safe shutdown capabilities, therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

l SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 83-141 TITLE:

Removal of Containment Air Cooler Leak Detection CHANGE:  ;

Removal of the containment air cooler leak detection indication and its associated hardware.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The Containment Air Cooler Leak Detection System is not a required system and has served no function (due to plugged tubing) since startup, SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The monitoring requirements per criterion 30 of the General Design Criteria are satisfied by other means. Since the system is not required and has served no function, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce the margin of eafety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 84-008 TITLE:

Removal of Blades from Fire Dampers CHANGE:

This modification removes blades from a fire damper located in the Radwaste Area Exhaust HVAC System ductwork. l REASON FOR CHANGE:

Dampers are not required to be located'in fire barriers, or partitions per NFPA 90A.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

FCR 84-008 includes removal of one fire damper (1157) which is located in a "Q" portion of.ductwork. Fire damper 1157 is located in the Radwaste Area Exhaust HVAC System ductwork between ECCS Pump Room 105 and No. 1 Mechanical Penetration Room 208. The ductwork is routed through an open duct chase. The open duct chase between these two areas is required as a vent path for High Energy Line Breaks and cannot ue sealed for nuclear safety reasons. The removal of the fire damper will not affect the safety function of the open duct chase in which the ductwork is installed or the ductwork itself. Since the damper is located in ductwork which is routed through an open duct chase, it does not function as a fire barrier.

Therefore, the proposed action will not increase the probability or l consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR or of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 84-027

- TITLE:

Modification of Condensate Piping Structural Support CHANGE:

This modification replaces horizontal structural members on pi% ng supports and changes the weld design from all around to three sides only.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

1 The supports must be modified to allow long term operation.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The supports are on the condensate return piping from the Borated Water Storage Tank Heat Exchanger 1-1 to the Condensate Tank. The piping is non-nuclear safety related but is installed seismically due to the 2 over I criteria. The safety function of the supports is to restrain the piping under a postulated' seismic loading. The supports have been analyzed and found to be acceptable for short term operation but must be modified to allow long term operation.

Therefore, an unresolved safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 84-102 b,

l TITLE:

l l Addition of Fans to Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS)

Cabinets C5762A and C5792 CHANGE:

The FCR will add fans to cabinets C5762A and C5792 of the SFRCS.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The purpose of the fans is to provide cooling for components inside the cabinets which will improve the reliability of the system by reducing SFRCS actuations due to component failures.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The fan performs no safety function but its installation would have an effect on the seismic qualification of the cabinets. A seismic analysis was performed and the results indicate that the modification meets the original specification for seismic criteria.

Isolation between the fans and invertor power source will be accomplished by 0.5 amp fuses. Manufacturer experience indicates there has been no electromagnetic interference (EMI) problems reported for the fan. This will be verified by testing.

Based on the above, the addition of these fans will not affect the safety function of the SFRCS, nor does this constitute an unreviewed safety question.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 84-111

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TITLE:

Raise Setpoints of *ressure

/ Switches on Service Water Strainer Motors CHANGE:

Raises setpoints of pressure switches which operate the service water strainer motors to 112 psig.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Strainer motors are currentiy running continuously because the normal service water pump discharge pressure never goes below the setpoint for I normal discharge pressure.

l SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The safety function of the pressure switches is to control the minimum flow circulation path for the service water pumpr . The setpoint change will not affect the safety function. Analysis has been performed to ensure that sufficient margin exists between the new setpoints (112 psig) and the current setpoint (129 psig) for service water relief valves to prevent unnecessary relief valve actuation. Also, the minimum recirculation flow which is required to prevent damage to the pumps will not be violated by these new setpoints.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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I SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 84-125, REV. A TITLE:

Auxiliary Feedwater- Pump (AFP) Room Ventilation Fan Control Logic Modification

' CHANGE:

Modify the control. logic for AFP Room Ventilation Fans 1-1 and 1-2 by replacing the existing pushbutton stop-start switches with two position on-auto switches.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Allow the fans to be manually operated when room temperature is below the high temperature setpoint of the associated temperature switches.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

j The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR since no accident analysis is related to the performance of the AFP room ventilation' fans.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a f malfunction of. equipment important to safety because the new control I switches have only on and auto positions so there is no way for fan l operation to be prevented by an improper switch lineup.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the safety function of the fans is not affected and the means of accomplishing the safety function (automatic start on high temperature) is not changed.

The proposed action will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification since there are no margins specified in the Bases section of the Technical Specifications for equipment covered by this FCR.

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I SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 84-132

' TITLE:

Installation of Covers and Guards for Control Room Switches and CRD Breakers CHANGE:

Adds covers and guards to switches located in the control room and at the CRD breakers.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The Detailed Control Room Design Review [ Human Engineering Discrepancy (NED) 4.1.1] determined that controls which actuate critical functions should be provided with guards to prevent accidental operation.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

These changes will minimize accidental operation of critical systems, and improve plant safety. The function of the controls will not be changed and the safety related functions of the control panels will not be modified.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. . The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR and will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for.any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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I l-SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 84-144 TITLE:

Modification of Aux 1]iary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Room Ventilation Dampers CHANGE:

This modification removed the motor operated dampers HS-4835 and HS-4836 from the AFW pump room ventilation systems retaining only the tecaperature switches to start and stop the ventilation fans, j j

REASON FOR CHANGE a

The change was made in accordance with a 10CFR50 Appendix R Section III.G.2 exemption.

l SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an  ;

accident previously described in the USAR.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a '

malfunction of equipment important to safety.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis-for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety .

question.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 84-147 TITLE:

Modifications to the Service Water Pump Room Ventilation System CHANGE:

1. Move the ventilation fans

2. Install backdraft dampers

3. Install skirting around the fans

4. Install directional vanes

5. Enlarge the ventilation exhaust openings

6. Replace grating

7. Install additional ventilation inlet

8. Install combustion air inlet vents in the diesel fire pump room

9. Seal the opening around the diesel fire pump motor exhaust pipe REASON FOR CHANGE:

1 Improve the operating characteristics of the system.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not. increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the new components, I

except for a.3ouvered penthouse, will be nuclear safety related and installed to seismic category I requirements.

The loss of the penthouse structure due to a seismic event or tornado missile will not adversely affect the safety function of the ventilation system.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the modification improves the reliability of the Service Water Pump Room (SWPR) ventilation system.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the design of the additional system components will not degrade the existing system.

Installation will be in accordance with seismic category 1 reo.uirements where required, and will be nuclear safety related.

The proposed action will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification since the SWPR ventilation system is not specifically covered by the technical specification requirements.

i SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 84-178 1 TITLE:

Cable Re-routing to Protect'from the Effects of Fire ,

l C11ANGE:

Reroute Cable ICBE1602F out of Fire Area U and through Fire Area V and Fire Area DG.

- REASON'FOR CHANGE:

'The safety function of this cable is to provide control of PORV block

' valve RC11. It is currently in the same fire area as circuits for the PORV. A fire could spuriously open the'PORV by damaging it circuits in this area.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

There will be no change in the safety function of the cable. The only change is its routing. All other seismic and environmental requirements will remain the same. This change will not create an adverse environment which would preclude this cable from performing its intended safety function. The operability of the PORV Block Valve RC11 will not be limited or effected.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR-84-0183 REV. A, SUPP. 2  !

TITLE:

Modifications to Ensure Ability to Isolate Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Circuits CHANGE:

Isolation of EDG local controls from the control room EDG control and indication circuits

' REASON FOR CHANGE:

Protection from fire in the control room or cable spreading room.

S'FETY A EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The safety function of the emergency diesel generator is to ensure a reliable, redundant source of power in case of a unit trip and loss of power. The proposed modification ensures that a fire induced short, ground or open circuit in the remote control circuits can be isolated from the EDG local controls. The addition of the disconnect switches and duplicate fusing improves the availability of the diesel generators during a postulated fire.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR. The addition of an item to the control circuitry increases the probability of circuit malfunction marginally, however, this is' balanced against the increased availability of local ~ control should a fire cauce a malfunction of the remote control.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does.not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 84-0186, SUPP. 3 TITLE:

Isolation of the Essential 4.16 KV Switchgear Breakers Control Circuits CHANGE:

Install two new switches per breaker for switchgear breakers AC 107, AC.108,,AC 109, AC 111, AC 112, and AC 113 and rewire the existing switch

'in AC 101. The new switches will provide the capability to clear any faults in the breakers' control circuit caused by the postulated fire and restore control circuit power.

REASON FOR CHANdd:

To provide a means of isolating the subject breakers' control circuits from the effect of a serious fire in the control room or cable spreading room.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because, utilized in accordance with AB1203.26, the switches do not have the ability to activate or degrade systems or equipment such that a Class I, II, or III accident would result. "With the switches in the normal position all systems operate as designed.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to. safety because this modification has not changed any of the designed operating.or failure modes of equipment.

The switches are administratively controlled and operated only under the postulated fire scenario.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident of a different type evaluated in the USAR because this modification does not alter the operation of other systems during normal plant operation.

This modification will disconnect the SFAS activation signal from the breakers' control circuit. Ilowever, the postulated fire will not .

create a LOCA, therefore, the SFAS is not needed for the fire event. '

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because this modification does not change any SFAS activation channel loading times onto the C1 bus or adversely affect the operation of any other safety related systems addressed in the Technical Specifications.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 84-189, SUPP 2 TITLE:

Emergency Diesel Generator DC Motor Driven Fuel Pump Circuit Modifications CHANGE:

l. Remove the speed switch SS4X from the Low Fuel Oil Pressure (LFOP) alarm l

which was installed under supplement 1 of this FCR and modify the EDG DC fuel pump circuit to continue to operate until the unit has actually stopped.

REASCN FOR CHANGE:

This change will allow the DC motor driven feed pump to operate at idle speed and will eliminate the LFOP nuisance alarm.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The safety function of the EDGs is to supply AC power to their respective buses upon loss of the normal and reserve power sources. Since.the modification does not affect the normal fuel pump operation, the EDGs will be unhindered from performing their safety function.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not create a possibility'of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR and will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Basis for any Technicel-Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 34-202 TITLE:

Add Guards t'o Switches CHANGE:

Install a 1/8" inch plexiglass guard around the switch cover plate in

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Hi-Point Vent Switches HIS-4608A, 4608B, 4610A, 4610B.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To prevent accidental activation of the switches which are located waist high on an' inclining panel next to a well traveled area.

SAFETY EVAi[UATION

SUMMARY

These changes will minimize accidental operation of the High Point Vent Switches without affecting their safety function and thus plant safety will be improved.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident

.or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR and will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an,unreviewed safety question does not exist.'

E-o SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-007 TITLE:

' Plant Modification to Add a Sequencer to the Station Air System-CHANGE:

This change adds a sequencer to the station air system and changes the applicable portions of time USAR. ,

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This change will tie the two station air compressors together.

' SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

l All safety related equipment that requires station air will fail in the safe .

condition such that the failure of the station air supply system will not  !

cause an unsafe condition. The station air compressors perform no safety related function and no safety function is affected by changes to the l station air system made by this FCR. I The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase. the probability or consequences of a malfunction offeguipment important to safety. The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident  !

of a different type evaluated in the USAR, or reduce the margin of safety  ;

as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

r SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-010

TITLE

Modification of Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) Piping Support l

CHANGE:

l Rotate the snubber end brackets 90 and rework the support members to permit snubber position in the het condition to be horizontal.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Change resolves a nonconformance report (NCR) which identified interference of a snubber on a piping support with its end bracket. The NCR also identified a discrepancy between the support arrangement as shown on design drawings and the as-built configuration.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

These modifications comply with the original support design criteria and will allow long term plant operation.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The modification will not create a possibility of an accident of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALCATION FOR FCR 85-0015 i

TITLE:- i l

Modifications to Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) i Manual Initiation Switch Layout CHANGE:-

Rearrange the SFRCS manual initiation switches on C5721, install protective guards, install protective shrouds, relabel switches and_ swap location of feedwater main isolation valve switches on Control Panel C5721.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The original SFRCS manual initiation switch layout conflicted with good l human factors engineering practice and had been identified as a discrepancy during the Control Room Design Review (CRDR).

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Relocating the SFRCS manual initiation switches addresses the human factors engineering concerns identified following the June 9, 1985 trip event. Shrouds and guards were added to the manual initiation switches to prevent accidental bumping and a resulting inadvertent actuation of switches. The design basis for the modification was the detailed CRDR summary report. The~ function and operability of the feedwater main isolation valve switches will not be affected by swapping the two switches. The change will minimize the possibility of operator error by standardizing the switch configuration to agree with established procedure. ~

The FCR changes do not create any new adverse condition not previously j evaluated and does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.  ;

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-016 TITLE:

Modification of Damper Actuator Supports for Volume Control Dampers Located'on the CTRM EVS Filter Train CHANGE:

'l The modification involves welding support members to replace C-clamps.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Replace C-clamps.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1 1

The safety function of the subject damper supports is to provide ,

support / stability for the damper shaft-which extends past the shaft bearings to allow the manual actuator attachment to be mounted. This modification will not adversely-affect the safety function of the damper or the.EVS but will insure long term reliability.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The change will not create a possibility of an accident of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce any margin of safety as' defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

faerefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-018 TITLE:

Replacement of Cables on the Emergency Diesel Generators CHANGE:

This change replaces existing unshielded cable with shielded cable for components connected to the electronic governor control box.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To alleviate problems encountered with fluctuations in diesel engine speed.

' SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The replacement shielded cable is superior to previously installed unshielded cable and will transmit truer signals by reducing electrical noise. This change ~will not affect the safety functions of the various EDG components.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The change will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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l l SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-025 l

l TITLE:-

Motor Driven Feed Pump (MDFP) Installation CHANGE:

This change involved the modification of the startup feedwater system by installing a motor driven feedwater pump system to replace the startup feedwater pump system. This change included installation of the associated MDFP controls and subsequent system testing.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This change added a backup to the Main and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems for supplying water to the steam generators in the event of a total loss of-both of these systems. ,

1 SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Installation of the MDFP system increased the reliability of the auxiliary feedwater system by removing potential high moderate energy effects on the system and providing a third, diverse powered auxiliary feedwater train.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR. ,

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. _

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore there is no unreviewed safety question involved with this modification.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-039 TITLE:

Plant Modification for HVAC Supports CHANGE:

This change modifies various supports for the containment purge exhaust,  !

radwaste supply and the radwaste exhaust systems which exceeded the USAR stress allowables but were determined to be acceptable for interim usr..

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To meet all USAR allowable stress levels.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The safety function of the ductwork supports is to provide a stabilizing and/or restraining function to the HVAC ductwork during both normal operations and/or a postulated seismic event. Since the supports were never in an overstressed condition, the integrity of the HVAC ductwork was always maintained. The supports identified by this FCR were analyzed in the "as-found" condition and meet all interim stress allowables.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The modification will not create a possibility of an accident of a different type evaluated in the USAR or ieduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-041 TITLE:

Upgrade Monitoring Capability for Storm Sewer Radiation Monitor

' CHANGE:

The Storm Sewer Radiation Monitor'is'being changed-from an unshielded in-line monitor to an off-line shielded monitor located upstream of the previous location.

REASON FOR CHANGE: )

i Increase monitoring sensitivity in order to meet the Radiological Effluent Technical Specification (RETS) requirement for maximum permissible concentration for off-site discharge.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The modification to the storm sewer radiation monitor will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will_it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will i not create a possibility of an accident of a different type evaluated  !

'in the USAR or reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for I any Technical Specification or Radiological Effluent Technical Specification, j Therefore, an unresolved safety question does not exist.

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P SAFETY' EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-042 1

TITLE:

Installation of Insulated Mounts for Safety Features Actuation System-(SFAS) Radiation Detectors CHANGE:

The change involves installing. insulated mounting slides on all four SFAS Area Radiation Detectors to replace the standard slides.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The change was made to alleviate electrical spiking problems by insulating the detector housings from the steel posts or plates on which they are mounted.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

i The only effect this_ change would have'on the SFAS radiation detectors safety function would be on the seismic qualification of their mechanical mounting arrangement. An evaluation concluded that the detectors meet the applicable seismic requirements with the insulated mountin8 slide and are qualified for use.

The change will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined'in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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.c SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-045 a.

TITLE:

1 Replace Pressure Regulators for Diesel Generator Air Start System CHANGE:

Replace-four pressure regulators used to' maintain pressure from the air reservoirs to the air start motors at approximately 180 psig.

F REASON FOR CHANGE:

Previously installed regulators were not able to meet their design ,

function to limit Diesel Air Start System Pressure.  !

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

~The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because this change is not associated.with an accident previously evaluated in the USAR.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the new pressure .

regulators exceed the functional capability of the replaced regulators to maintain the required pressure setting and increases the system availability and reliability.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the design and safety. function of the Diesel Generator Air Start System remain unchanged.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the pressure regulator settings are not specifically addressed on the basis of the Technical Specification. The pressure regulators were replaced to ensure the design pressure settings were maintained.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-059 TITLE:

Electrical Conduit Systems Crossing Seismic Zones CHANGE:  !

1 This change modifies supports for electrical cond> tits for the 480 VAC MCC System.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The modification is to compensate for the rigid conduit crossing seismic Zones, SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This modification upgrades the supports and conduit system to meet long term operability requirements.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-062 TITLE:

Isolate Control Circuit for 4 KV Switchgear Breakers i

I CHANGE:

Add disconnect switches and duplicate fusing to switchgear breakers AC 107 and AC 109 REASON FOR CIIANGE:

To assure operation of breakers AC 107 and AC 109 under a postulated fire in the service water pump room.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The probability of circuit malfunction increases marginally. However, this is balanced against the increased availability of the switchgears should a fire cause a malfunction of the remote controls.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

.I SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-071 TITLE:

Modification to Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine (AFPT) Supports CHANGE:

This change modified supports on the Main Steam Line to AFPT 1-2 to

-restore them to their original design condition.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Ti..ts modification restored the supports for the piping system to meet long term operability. requirements.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does~not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR.

This action does not-increase the probability or consequences of a malfuretion of equipment important to safety.

This action does:not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical ~ Specification.

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There is no unreviewed safety question involved with this change. _

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' SAFETY, EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-072-

- TITLE:-

USAR Drawing Changes.

CHANGE:

'This safety evaluation was written to encompass various USAR drawings which were affected by plant modifica' ions.

LEASON.FOR CHANGE:

p The; drawings were updated to reflect the as-built condition of the plant.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an-accident previously. described in the USAR.

This action does not increase.the probability or consequences of a

. malfunction of equipment important to safety.

f .

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of

~

a'different type evaluated in the USAR.

This action does.not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

The updating of the drawings involved no physical changes to the plant and an unreviewed safety question is not involved.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-090-TITLE:

Plant Modification to Remove Control Power from FW-786 and FW-790 CHANGE:

Removes power from motor operators for valves FW-786 and FW-790 and adds stem lock to prevent inadvertent manual operation.of the valves.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To enhance Auxiliary Feedwater reliability.by removing valves which could interfere with the normal supply of cooling water from the Condensate Storage Tank to the Auxiliary Feedwater System.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

These changes will increase the availability of the AFW system thus improving its reliability. The overall safety function of the valves AF-1, AF-2, FW-786, and FW-790 have not been degraded.

The regulatiry position as described in FSAR Vol. 9, Item 7.1.1. (4) is not required to be met for these valves (FW-786 and FW-790), since the power to these valves will be removed by lifting the wires from the control switches in the control room and by disconnecting the leads from actuators to the motor, the presence of the valve operators will serve no  !

function and the valves will become regular manual valves.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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l SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-092 l

TITLE- 1 Incorporation of Analysis into the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR)

CHANGE: l This change incorporated an inadvertent spray analysis for the containment into USAR Section 6.2.1.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This change documents the results of an analysis performed for the containment structure.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This accident is a less limiting condition than the original design criteria; therefore, inadvertent spray actuation doer not represent an unreviewed safety question.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-095 TITLE:

Modification of Main Steam Line Anchors ,

i CHANGE: l Place tapered shims underneath the nuts and washers for bolts where gaps exist.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The anchors in the proposed condition will continue to meet all long-term conditions for operability. The addition of tapered shims will help prevent any nuts from loosening.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-102 TITLE: I Modification of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Line Support CHANGE:

This change repaired a pipe support on the Auxiliary Feedwater line from AFW Pump 1-2.

REASON FOR CHANGE:  ;

This change was made to satisfy long term operability requirements for the AFW support. The support in its previous condition had a factor of safety which was greater than required for short term operation but less than required for long term operation.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-103 TITLE:

. Change Filtering Circuit of the Reactor Coolant Flow Transmitters .!

CHANGE- l Change che capacitors in the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Reactor Coolant (RC) Foxboro flow signal conversion modules from a 10 Hz low pass filter network to a 0.4 Hz low pass filter.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To provide electronic signal conditioning of the inherently noisy hydraulic flow signal to remove high frequency noise components from the

'KCS flow signal.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Changing the filtering circuits of the RC flow transmitters will not  !

adversely affect the safety function of the RC flow transmitter input to the RCS. 4 l

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of' an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-105

. TITLE:

Removal of Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) Lifting Handles CHANGE:

This modification removes the MSSV lifting handles and associated hardware.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Removal of the-lifting apparatus is necessary to add certain types of position monitoring systems.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because these changes do not affect the system pressure boundary.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important.to safety because the wall thickness of the valve will remain unaffected by this modification.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated-in the USAR because removal of unused nonfunctional hardware will generally serve to increase the reliability of an assembly by reducing the effects of vibration.

The' proposed action will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the hardware changes do not affect any plant Technical Specifications.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-106 TITLE:

Modification of Solenoid Valve-to-Actuator Control Air Line and i Replacement of Solenoid Valve CHANGE:

i Increase the inside diameter of the solenoid valve-to-actuator control air line and replace SF 229A with the same type of valve which has a larger diameter discharge.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To allow a more rapid discharge of air from the actuators allowing RC 229A to close in less than 10 seconds.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This change will be similar to the installation that exists on RC 229B.

Response time testing has demonstrated that RC 229B has consistently achieved closure in less than 10 seconds with the installation of a similar type solenoid valve proposed by this FCR. Based on the review of similar FCRs and response time testing of RC 229B, it is concluded that the change proposed by this FCR will not adversely affect the safety function of RC 229A. It is, therefore, concluded that this is not an unreviewed safety question.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-112 TITLE:

Disconnect Space Heaters On Safety Related Limitorque Motor Operated Valves CHANGE:

Disconnect the motor and limit switch case space heaters on the safety related Limitorque motor operated valves.

REASON FOR C11ANGE:  !

1 l

Limitorque does not currently recommend (nor have they in the past) the use i of heaters in actuators used for inr.ide containment or outside containment ';

applications in a nuclear plant. The space heaters are provided.for storage purposes only.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

A space heater is a secondary device and disconnecting the space heaters does not degrade the safety function of the Limitorque motor operated valves. The safety function of safety related MOVs will not be adversely affected. Therefore, no unreviewed safety question is involved.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-126 j TITLE:

Replacement of Penetration Seals CHANGE:

Remove the existing sealant material from the penetrations through the west wall of Room #237 and the east wall of Room #237 and replace with approved materials.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

i Documentation is not currently available as to whether the Bisco in the existing installations is high density or low density, therefore, it is i i

unknown if the existing. installations will provide adequate watertight seals. ,

i SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This modification removes questionable sealing material and replaces it with approved materials.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of ,

an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the i probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to l safety. The proposed action will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-131 TITLE:

Install Flanges Down Stream of the Pressurizer PORV CHANGE:

This modification installs a pair of flanges down stream of the

! Pressurizer Pilot Operated Relief Valve (PORV) in the discharge line to the Pressurizer Quench Tank.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This. change will allow improved access to the PORV for removal and installation' of the valve for maintenance.

SAFETY EVALUATION.

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the installation of these flanges does not alter the intended design function of the piping system. The piping system does not perform a safety related function.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the flanges are passive components and are installed to a quality level equivalent to the original piping system.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the stress analysis of_the piping system and pipe supports satisfies all' original design criteria.

The proposed action will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the margin of safety for this piping is not specifically stated in the Technical Specification.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-134 TITLE:

Change Torque Switch Settings on Safety Related MOV's CHANGE:

Increase the open torque switch setting to maximum allowable value for all safety related motor operated gate and globe valves.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Increasing the torque switch setting will also ensure the proper operation of the valve even if the limit switch bypass contact is not set properly.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Test results of Auxiliary Feedwater Valve 599 and 608 indicated that they would have opened with higher torque settings even though the bypass contact was set improperly. The proposed settings will enhance the operation of these valves.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-138 TITLE:

Modifications to.the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)

CHANGE:

Termination patch panels will be added to cabinets C5754K and C3064A, and i each data channel between the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Station will be reassigned.

1 '

REASON FOR CHANCE:

Termination patches are being added so that the' loading on each individual fiber optic line is minimized. Reassigning the data channels will provide the maximum redundancy possible if one fiber optic system fails.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

These modifications to the SPDS do not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of cny safety-related equipment as evaluated in the USAR. Nor do these changes create a possibility for an accident different than any evaluated previously in the USAR or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-142 4 TITLE:

Substitution of Existing 2 Watt Rated Heat Dissipation Capacity Resistors CIIANGE:

Substitution of existing 2 watt rated heat dissipation capacity resistors in the essential and uninterruptable power supply control circuits with 5 watt rated heat dissipation capacity resistors.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The existing resistors had been overheating.and burning frequently in the past because of inadequate cooling and/or insufficient air circulation in the areas of the cabinet where these specific resistors are located. l SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The above modifications increase the heat dissipating capacity of the resistors used in the control circuit of the essential and uninterruptable power supply inverters. This will help operate the resistors at a low operating temperature and this prolong its operating life. These changes do not create any new adverse environment and do not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

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l l SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-155 TITLE:

Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Logic Changes CHANGE:

Provide control logic change for the automatic transfer of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (AFP) suction from Condensate Storage Tank (CST) to Service Water (SW) and a temporary change to the trip logic of AFPs for closing the steam supply valves to the AFP turbine in the event of low pressure on the suction side of the AFPs.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To prevent cycling of the SW valves, to minimize the addition of water from the service water system to the' steam generators, to minimize operator action required to transfer suction supply from SW to CST and to prevent isolation of AFPTs during transfer of suction supply from CST to SW.

SAFETY EVALUATION sui 4 MARY:

The safety function of automatic transfer of AFP suction from CST to SW is to ensure that a diversified water supply is available to the AFPs for the removal of reactor decay heat. The safety functica of the AFP trip on low suction pressure is to prevent serious damage to the AFPs from occurring due to extended pump suction cavitation.

The information provided by the pump manufacturer and MPR Associates, indicates that serious damage to the AFPs is very rare and pumps are very tolerant to inadequate suction-pressure. The AFPs would have to operate for hours under the cavitated condition before any damage to the AFPs would occur. Consequently, the revised time delay to trip the AFPs (60 sec.) would occur early enough to prevent damaging the pump.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-158 TITLE:

Separation of Steam Generator Level Trips CHANGE:

This change modified the initiating logic of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System such that the steam generators will only be isolated and AFW will be initiated when the Steam and Feedwater Rupture control System (SFRCS) is initiated on high steam generator level. Auxiliary Feedwater will be initiated without isolation of the steam generators on low level.

REASON FOR CRANGE:

The purpose of this change was to reduce the frequency of unnecessary isolation of the main feedwater and main steam systems and to eliminate the possibility of isolating all auxiliary feedwater.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the modifications made minimize the conditions for isolating the steam generators but do not reduce the ability of the SFRCS to mitigate the effects of an accident.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a m:' function of equipment important to safety because all logic and wiring changes were made to Class IE requirements and seismically installed.

Separation between redundant channels was maintained and this modification did not violate the existing environmental qualification of other safety-related equipment.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the changes were made to the same quality standards as the equipment which previously existed. In addition, this change did not introduce any anticipated failure mechanism or any events which are not bounded by the USAR.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the logic channels do not affect the basis for limiting conditions or surveillance requirements of the  :

SFRCS and do not reduce the margin of safety as defined for the SFRCS. l i

Therefore, this modification does not present an unreviewed safety '

question.

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l SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-159 1

TITLE:

Modify Trip Logic in the Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System

~(SFRCS)

CHANGE:

1 Modifies the low steam pressure trip logic in SFRCS, such that, low

! pressure in the first steam generator (SG) to depressurize would isolate both SGs and initiate both auxiliary feedwater (AFW) trains to supply AFW to the other SG.

l REASON FOR CHANGE:

This change will reduce the likelihood of isolating both steam generators and preventing auxiliary feedwater from feeding the steam generators. i SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of' an accident previously described in the USAR because this modification improves the ability of SFRCS to perform its function of monitoring the occurrence and mitigating the affects of a main steam line break evaluated in the USAR.

i The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because separation between i redundant channels is maintained and the damage will not violate the '

equipment qualification of any other safety related equipment, thus the possibility of a single failure occurring will not increase.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because this modification does not introduce any unanticipated failure mechanisms i which are not addressed in the USAR. .

The proposed action will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the logic changes do not affect the basis for limiting conditions or surveillance requirements of the SFRCS.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-0160 TITLE:

Installation of Drain Line on PORV Loop Seal CHANGE:

l Install a 1" sch 160 drain line from the PORV loop seal inlet piping to i the pressurizer surge line and the removal of heat tracing.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To enhance operation of the system and bring the system within design requirements without adversely impacting the function of the PORV piping.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This modification to the PORV inlet line will enhance the operation of the system and bring the system within design requirements without adversely impacting the function of the PORV piping.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR, increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety, create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR, or reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. Therefore, this modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-161 TITLE:

Filtering of Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) Input CHANGE:

Addition of a low pass filter circuit for the steam generator water level input to SFRCS.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This modification prevents spurious SFRCS trips on steam generator high or low level due to transient effects which are not indicative of steam generator inventory changes.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because this modification improves the ability of the SFRCS to perform its function by increasing the response time of the SFRCS to detect actual high or low level trips.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the modification meets the quality and standards of the existing system and will not degrade any other equipment.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the change does not introduce any fa11ure mechanisms which were previously unanticipated or any events not bounded by the USAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because applicable equipment affected by this modification will be actuat'd e within the response time requirements of the Technical Specifications.

SAFETY EVALUAT. ION FOR FCR 85-163 TITLE:

I Provide Pipe Whip Restraints and Impingement Barriers  ;

CHANGE:

Provide pipe whip restraints, impingement barriers and relocation or i strengthening, as required of adjacent systems / components to protect adjacent safety related equipment.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The relocation of the steam admission valves requires that an additional portion of the main steam line be considered as high energy piping.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The pipe restraints and impingement barriers are not attached to the main steam line and, therefore, have no effect'on the piping system. The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to

. safety. The proposed action will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-164 TITLE:

' Auxiliary'Feedwater' Pump Overspeed Trip - Human Factors Improvements

' CHANGE:

Inst'all local indication for the operation of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine (AFPT) overspeed trip mechanism (OTM) (trip / reset) and'the Trip ThrottleLValve (open/ closed)

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To enhance-operator ability to locally restart the AFPT and verify proper alignment:ofsthe components.to allow operation of the AFPT for the standby condition.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed added mass.of the~ components to the trip throttle valve.are' less thanLl% of the. mass of the' valve and, therefore, are not'significant

with respect to.the seismic installation. The addition of the handle.

assembly.(<1 lbm.)'to the connecting rod'is considered not significant with respect-to either the operation or seismic response of the component. ,

i Based on the above, the= addition of position indication:for the trip throttle valve and OTM for the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbines will not adversely affect the operation of these components and.the Auxiliary Feedwater System. : No criteria for the determination of an unreviewed safety question are exceeded,.therefore, this proposed change does not involve an unreviewed safety question

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-0168 TITLE: 1 Plant Modification to Install Tubing for Temporary Air Conditioner CHANGE:

This change adds tubing to supply domestic water to temporary air conditioners in the Operations Electrical Operator Study Room.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Personnel comfort considerations SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the domestic water 1 system is not safety related and does not adversely affect any safety  !

related system or component. ,

i The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a l malfunction of equipment important to safety because the domestic water system does not-interfere with any safety related systems or components.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because failure of the domestic water system is not required to be addressed in the USAR.

The proposad action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the modification has no impact on any system governed by a Technical Specification.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-171 TITLE:

' Additional Pilot-Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Position Indication CHANGE:

This change added additional PORV position indication from the acoustic monitors in the Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) to the control section of the control room console. In addition red lens boots were installed over existing white lights for the PORV position annunciator.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This change gives an operator at the pressurizer /PORV control section of the control room console more reliable PORV status indication.

SAFETY EVALUATIl .' JUMMARY:

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the probability of an undetected loss of coolant accident through the PORV will be reduced by the modifications and the consequences of a small LOCA through the PORV will not be affected by the changes.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the modification was installed such that channel separation from redundant acoustic monitors was maintained. A malfunction of equipment installed by this modification will not degrade or impede the function of any equipment important to safety.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the' addition of the modifications will not degrade any existing equipment or system and will not create any new adverse environment.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis-for any Technical Specification because the PORV position indication from the Post-Accident Monitoring System Instrumentation is not affected by the modifications and the PAMS will continue to satisfy the Technical Specification basis for monitoring plant parameters following an accident.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-176 TITLE

' Modification of Small Pipe Supports CHANGE:

This. change will modify 51 small pipe supports so that they meet long-term operability requirements.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

An analysis of the referenced supports indicated that they were acceptable' to meet short term operability requirements but did not meet long term operability requirements.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed repairs will allow the subject supports to meet all short and long term operability criteria.

The proposed action will not increase the probability'or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR ner will it_ increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unresolved safety question does not exist.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-177 TITLE:

Ennatsce Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Channe1' Independence

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CHANGE:

This modification adds new power supplies to each of 4 SFAS sensor channels and removes floating commons between sensor channels 1 and 3, and the floating commons between. channels 3 and 4.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This change' assures that the SFAS, as a four channel system, complies with

- the single failure criteria of IEEE 279-1971 Sections 4.2 and 4.6 (Channel Independence).

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an. accident previously described in the USAR because increasing the electrical independence of SFAS sensor channels improves the overall system reliability.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because this change increases the independence of SFAS components thereby reducing the effects of a fault in the system, as well as, reducing the probability of a malfunction.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because failure of an SFAS sensor channel has been previously eveluated and no new accidents or malfunctions can result from this modification.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because no margins of safety are specified for this equipment in the Technical Specifications.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-181 m TITLE:

Alternate Access to Room #237 CHANGE:

This modification places a new opening in the grating in the ceiling of the south end of the room.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This alternate access is to be used only when access is denied through door #215'9etween Auxiliary Feed Pump Rooms #237 and #238 during an emergency.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

There is no safety function of the items being installed and/or modified.

The grating and new platform are seismically designed.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in { lie basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore,_an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-183 TITLE:

Plant Modification to Relocate the Emergency Key Locker and Locker Key Box CHANGE:

This change relocates the Emergency Key Locker and the Locker Key Box from the Shif t Supervisor's office to the control room REASON FOR CHANGE:

Relocating these boxes allows the shift supervisor or his assistant to access the vital keys withou. having to leave the control room SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

l The Emergency Key Locker and Locker Key Box do not have a safety function.

The mounting of these boxes will not affect any nuclear related systems.

They are mounted to the wall in a location where, if they fall, they will not impact any other equipment.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-185 TITLE:

Low Speed Setting (LSS) of the Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine (AFPT)

CHANGE:

Raise the Low Speed Setting of the AFPT.

REASON Fv;. CHANGE:

Meet the 40 second response criteria for providing auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Raising the LSS TO 1950 rpm will ensure that the 40 second response time for the AFW System is unaffected by leaving valves AF 3870 and AF 3872 open during plant operation. Although the higher LSE would require additional operator action to OTSG water level during plant cooldown below

! 400 psig OTSG pressure when using the AFW System, it should not result in j any conditions that cannot be controlled by appropriate operator actions.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

L SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-189 TITLE:

Relocate Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) Switches CHANGE:

I This change replaces and relocates the Main Feedwater startup control  !

valve SFRCS reset / block switches from the west side wall of the control cabinet room to the control room ~ console.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Allows the operators to reset the startup control valves from the control room instead of their present location.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the replacement and relocation of the switches is a human factors : consideration and will not ,

affect accidents previously analyzed in the USAR. i The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the main feedwater startup control valves circuit is non-Class 1E and provides no safety function.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the original design concept was not changed.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the l basis for.any Technical Specification because the startup control valve SFRCS reset / block switches are not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

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l l SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-0192 TITLE:

Containment Purge Fan Modification CHANGE: i i

Incorporate an additional fail safe open contact feature into the fan interlock design.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To upgrade the safety margin-of the containment purge fan system to prevent operation when an unwanted condition exists.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Operating coils R-1 and R-14 for low temperature and high radiation respectively operate normally closed contacts in the interlock circuit. i These coils are normally in the de-energized state. In the event of low l

temperature and/or high radiation other than post LOCA the purge fan could '

be inadvertently operated if these coils should fail to operate as designed. The original design has been modified by making coils R-1 and R-14 normally energized and the interlock contacts normally open creating a desired fail safe condition.

This upgrades the safety margin of the system by incorporating an additional fail safe open feature into the interlock design.

The design modifications do not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety related equipment as evaluated in the USAR. Nor do the modifications create a possibility i for an accident different than any evaluated previously in the USAR. The margin of safety as defined in any technical specification is not reduced.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-198 TITLE:

Plant Modification for the Clean Waste Receiver Tanks (CWRT)

CHANGE:

This change provides for the permanent installation of a filter to remove particulate matter from liquid stored in the Clean Waste Receiver Tank (CWRT).

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To lower radiation levels in the CWRT rooms and improve water quality in lll the CWRT's.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because installation of the filter has no effect on any accidents described in the USAR.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because there is no critical equipment located in the room which would become inoperable if an accident were to occur.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a difierent type evaluated in the USAR because the filter is located in a water tight room that can be sealed and isolated in the event of a rupture of the filter vessel or inlet and outlet lines.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the filter does not affect any system defined in the Technical Specifications.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-201 TITLE:

Integrated Control System (ICS) OTSG Low Level Control Set Point Change CHANGE:

Increase OTSG ICS low level control setpoint to 40".

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To reduce the possibility of actuating the Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) on the 26 1/2" low level trip.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This change does not effect the hardware design of the NSS or ICS and thus no additional failure modes are introduced. The change does, however, affect the way in which the NSS is operated at low power levels since OTSG 1evels will not be allowed to drop below 40 inches.

To evaluate the effect of this change on the Davis-Besse Safety Analysis, a review of transients analyzed in the USAR was performed. The general result of this review was that there does not seem to be a safety analysis assumption that Davis-Besse will use any particular OTSG Low level limit; further, no analyzed transient was found where the particular low level limit used is expected to change the conclusion drawn about that transient.

This change will effect the post trip response of the NSS slightly since if an NSS trip occurs, OTSG 1evels will now decrease to 40 inches instead of the 35 inch level previously used. This will result in a slightly increased rate of heat transfer from primary to secondary once the OTSG's are on low limits resulting in slightly greater outsurge from the pressurizer after NSS trip; however, this effect should be quite small and be unnoticeable.

This modification will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of any safety related equipment as evaluated in the USAR, nor will this change create a possibility for an accident different than any evaluated previously in the USAR or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-216 TITLE:

Modifications to the Main Steam Safety Valves CHANGE:

This modification adds lift stop collers to the spindles of 3707R orifice valves, drills holes to allow insertion of anti-rotation pins, and to add washers and to the compression screws of 3777Q orifice valves.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To incorporate design improvements to the main steam safety valves.

. SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The USAR does not address specific valve components with the exception of the spring which remains unaffected by this change. The improvements made by this change enhance main steam safety valve reliability.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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' SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-222 TITLE:

Replace Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) Valves CHANGE:

l Solenoid valves in the refrigerant side of the CREVS are being replaced. '

In addition, manual globe valves and check valves are being added to the refrigerant lines.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The solenoid valves which are being replaced because of leakage due to excessive chattering. The manual globe valves are being added to isolate the solenoid valves for maintenance. The check valves act as redundant isolation valves to the solenoid valves.

1 SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1 The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because increasing the integrity of the components will improve the reliability of the system.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because changes made by these modifications will not degrade the system.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the changes conform to the design basis of the system.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the design basis for the CREVS is not affected by these changes.

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Fs SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-224 TITLE:

Plant-Modification to Add a Snubber to the Main Steam Line CHANGE:

This change adds a snubber to the East Main Steam Line for Steam Generator

1. 2.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This change increases the stiffness of Main Steam Line A to bring it into conformance with Main Steam Line B.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

- The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the seismic design criteria remains in effect for the system.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of. equipment important to safety because snubbers are not included as necessary plant support system in the event of a main steam line break.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because' failure of a snubber.or support would return the associated line to a previously analyzed condition.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for_any Technical Specification because the visual and functional inspection frequencies.are unaffected by this modification and no seismic considerations are required.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-226 TITLE: -

Containment Air Cooler Modifications CHANGE:

Modify containment air cooler backdraft damper linkages and replacement of blade seals and side stops with upgraded material.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

If the backdraft damper on a fan which is not running does not close properly the fan will " windmill". The large amount of current required to start a "windmilling" fan could cause the motor to overload. This modification resulted in improved operation.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The modification of containment air cooler backdraft dampers does not increase the possibility of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety-related equipment as evaluated in the USAR. The change does not create a possibility for an accident different than any evaluated previously.in the USAR or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR ECR 85-229 TITLE:

Low Voltage Switchgear Room Fan Replacement i

CHANGE:

Replace the Low Voltage Switchgear Room Fan C71-2 (located in Room 515) with new fan C-133 installed in Room 428. New ductwork will be installed to route the fan discharge directly to the outside.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Ductwork modifications in Room 515 increases the total differential pressure'of the LVSR ventilation system to a print where it exceeds the existing fan design capacity. The new higher capacity fan (C-133) will be installed in Room 428 in lieu of Room 515 due to special limitations.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences'of an accident previously described in the USAR because the purpose of the LVSR Ventilation System'is to mitigate the consequences of various accident conditions. The addition of the new fan and components improves the integrity and reliability of the system.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the change confirms to the design basis of the system.  ;

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis.for any Technical-Specification because the LVSR ventilation system is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

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i SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-232 TITLE:

Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) Alarm Circuits CHANGE:

This modification is to change the SFRCS annunciator / computer alarms for low steam generator pressure, high and low steam generator level, high  !

reverse differential pressure and loss of four reactor coolant pumps to reflect modification made on the associated systems.

REASON FOR CHANGE: i To have the SFRCS alarms reflect the modifications to the SFRCS logic which were implemented by.other facility changes.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the modifications are only to the non-safety-related alarm circuitry and, therefore, will not affect the SFRCS from performing its function.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a- ,

malfunction of equipment important to safety because the work associated with the modifications meets all applicable QA requirements and will not violate the environment qualifications of safety-related equipment.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the changes implemented by this modification will not degrade any equipment and will not prevent the SFRCS or any other systems from functioning as assigned in the USAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the basis for the associated technical specification are applicable only to trip and not alarm setpoints.

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l SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-238

' TITLE:

Plant Modification to Change the Fail Position of a Damper CHANGE:

This change modifies low voltage switchgea'r Room 428 ventilation fan discharge damper so that the damper will move to the open instead of the closed position on loss of electrical power to the damper operator.

. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This change is necessary to provide cooling to Room 428 following a loss >

of power.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because Room 428 is located in non-radwaste are that is not postulated to contain airborn radiation following an accident and no accidents can be caused by equipment affected by this modification.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or. consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because this modification will decrease the probability that the Room 428 discharge damper HV 5314 will fail to perform its intended function to provide a ventilation flow data for the room. ,

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the safety function of the damper is not affected by this modification.

a The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because there are no margins for safety specified for this damper in the bases section of the Technical Specifications.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-239 TITLE:

Implementation of Local High/ Low Temperature Alarm in the Diesel Generator Room CHANGE:

Provides local alarm for high and low temperature in the emergency diesel generator rooms. Also, raises the heater setpoint to 65 F i 5 F from 60 F on EDG room heater thermostats TS5223A and TS5223B.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Improve the reliability of the non nuclear-safety related hot water heating system.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will '

not create a possibility of an accident of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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' SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-240 i

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L Installation of an ' Indicating Device for the Polar' Crane CHANGE:

,This~ change installs a new weight-indicating device-for the Polar. Crane to replace a previous model.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

-The previous model indicator was inadvertently discarded and an exact replacement is no longer available.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The new model weight indicator has additional features which will enhance the capability lof performing safe crane operations, however, the weight indicator performs no specific safety-related functions.

The proposed action'will not increase the probability or consequences of au accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed' action will not' create a possibility of an accident of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

.Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not' exist.

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f s p; SAFETY EVALUATION'FOR FCR~85-242~

TITLE:

' Plani Modification to Replace Flow Transmitter Circuit Boards CHANGE:

This change replaces the existing amplifier and calibration circuit boards in the low pressure injection flow transmitters.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Higher temperatures could exist on the rooms where the transmitters are located due to relocation of the steam admission valves for the auxiliary feedwater system.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences'of an accident previously described in the USAR because the replacement will  :

impose the reliability of the transmitters under accident conditions.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction ~of equipment important to safety because the function of the l transmitters will not change as a result of circuit board replacement.

The proposed action will not create a possibility.of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because no change to the design of the transmitters is being made.

The proposed action will not' reduce any margin of safety as defined in the j basis for any Technical Specification because no technical specification bases are affected.

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• i SAFEI'Y EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-243 TITLE:

Plant Modification to Replace Temperature Switches in ECCS Equipment' Rooms CHANGE:

.This change replaces the existing temperature switches in ECCS equipment Room 105, 113 and'115 with switches environmentally qualified for higher temperatures.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Higher temperatures could exist in the rooms because of the relocation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System steam admission valves.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because replacement of the switches does not affect the manner in which the associated cooling fans perform.their safety function.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the probability of fan failure due to temperature switch failure will not increase as a  !

result of this modification.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or 1 malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the design

, of the fan control logic-is not affected by this modification.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the basis of the technical i specification does not specify a margin of safety for equipment affected by this change.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-249 TITLE:  !

Plant Modification to Add Pressure Switches to AFW Steam Lines CHANGE:

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This change adds two pressure taps and respective pressure switches upstream of main steam valves MS 106A and 107A REASON FOR CHANGE:

To assist operators in detecting the presence of a high energy line break between MS 734 and MS 735 and the 36" main steam line. I SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

l The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the piping and valves being added by this modification comply with the same or equivalent codes and standards-as the existing steam lines.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the change will not violate existing environmental qualification of other safety related j equipment or increase the chance of a single failure occurring.

i The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the modification will not introduce any new failure mechanisms which were previously unanticipated.

The_ proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the Technical Specification i bases are not applicable for plant modification.

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u SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-259 TITLE:

Plant Modification to Install An'Inline Air Filter )

CHANGE:

This . change installs an inline air filter in the station air system to provide filtered containment air. )

1 REASON FOR CHANGE: l Dirt and corrosion product buildup in the station air system were causing the containment breathing air supply to become contaminated.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

'The proposed action'will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the installation of a filter to the non-safety-related station air system will not degrade any existing safety systems.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the installation of a filter to the non-safety-related station air system will not degrade any existing safety systems.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or r malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because no failure ,

mechanisms previously unanticipated will be introduced by this  !

modification.  !

l The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the station air system is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-263 TITLE:

Remove Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seal Leakage Instrumentation.

CHANGE:

This change physically removes RCP seal leakage flow instrumentation that is no longer in use.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Other installed RCP seal leakage instrumentation is performing the function of the instrumentation being removed.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUE %RY:

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because no equipment currently in service is affected by this modification.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the integrity of the RCP Seal leak-off lines will not be affected by removal of the instrumentation.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because no equipment in service are affected by the change.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of" safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the Technical Specifications do not specify a margin of safety for this equipment.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-265 i

TITLE:

- Enhance the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) Controls CHANGE:

Switchover from the water-cooled to air-cooled mode and isolation of a service water to the water coded condenser will be changed from l temperature-flow control to refrigerant head pressure control. Control of l the fan and of the face and bypass dampers for the air-cooled condenser _ j will be changed from temperature control to head pressure control and the j high' compressor discharge flow compressor suction pressure switch will be l replaced with a switch that provides automatic reset.

]

l REASON FOR CHANGE: l; l

To improve the reliability of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation 1 System

)

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because.all new components installed will be nuclear safety related and installed in accordance with Seismic Category I standards. Identical changes will be made to each ,

train of the CREVS to maintain system redundancy. I The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a ,

malfunction of equipment important to safety because the controls for the l system are being simplified and the redundancy is being maintained.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because no  !

previously unanticipated failure mechanisms will be introduced by this j modification. j l

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the I basis for any Technical Specification because the operation of the CREVS will meet the requirements set forth in the Technical Specifications.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-268 TITLE:

Disconnection of Smoke Detector DS5610 CHANGE:

Disconnect the smoke detector from the fan control logic for electrical isolation which has already been jumpered out.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Due to the false operation of this smoke detection system, the fan operation was prevented by the fan control logic. In order to maintain fan operation and ventilation of the buildings, fan operation was accomplished -

by bypassing the smoke detector circuit by jumper connections, c SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The smoke detector, the control valves and the containment purge supply fan are not within any Q boundaries and are not nuclear safety related. c The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR or increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. -

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-270-TITLE:

Plant Modifications For Correction of RTDs to T-SAT Meters CHANGE:

This change modifies the wiring to the T-SAT meters such that Rosemount Reactor Coolant System (RCS), the RTD's feed the T-SAT meters when the meter loop selection switch is in the normal position.

REASON FOR~ CHANGE:

The change provides a fast response, environmentally qualified input to the'T-sat meters to replace slower response RTD's performing the same j function.

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I SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of I an accident previouslyLdescribed in the USAR because the modification only changes the source instrument that supplies input to the T-SAT meter to increase the response time thereby improving the capability of the meter to follow changes in reactor coolant temperature.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the equipment being added will meet the same or better quality and standards as the existing l equipment.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because this modification will not introduce any new failure mechanisms which were previously unanticipated.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the modification does not affect'the operability of the T-Sat meter instrument strings.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-272 TITLE:

, Piping Lug Attachments-for Pipe _ Support

' CHANGE:

Replace fillet welds on Class 1 pipe support 30-CCA-8-H2 with full penetration welds.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

'To bring system into compliance with ASME III subsection NB, 1971 edition.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The existing installed configuration meets'the USAR allowable stress limits. The-full penetration weld is only for compliance with ASME code.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of

.an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident

.of'a different' type evaluated in the USAR or reduce'any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-274

_ . TITLE :

Upgrade the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)

CHANGE:

This change upgrades the CREVS to a ten ton capacity system by the addition of a larger capacity thermal expansion valve in the refrigerant line. In addition a 34" x 12" return air grill was removed.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This change enhances the safety function of the CREVS.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUW1ARY:

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the system is not used as part of normal plant operation and will have more cooling capacity.

which enhances the safety function _of the system.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the expansion valve is being replaced by the original vendor in the same location as the original valve, which is a mild environment. -

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the system upgrade is within the design basis of the system and no new failure mechanisms will be introduced by replacing the expansion valve.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because increasing the cooling capacity cf the system improves the ability of the system to need the TechnicalLSpecification.

e - - - - - - - - - . _ _ - _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR.FCR 85-277 TITLE:

Plant' Modification for a Makeup System Limitorque Valve Actuator CHANGE:

This change adjusts the limit switch bypass contacts to 20% of full open and closed for MOV MU-11 (which is a 3 way valve).

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This change ensures that the valve is unseated in both directions before the torque switch bypass is removed.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Bypassing both open and closed torque switches by 20% of stem movement adds reliability and safety to the system.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not-create a possibility of an accident of.a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist, i

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-278 j d

i LTITLE:

Plant: Modification to Replace An Auxiliary Boiler Indicator

/  ;

CHANGE:  !

.This change replaces the ' indicator used to monitor Auxiliary Boiler i Dearcator pressure. j REASON FOR CHANGE:

This change improves the reliability of the Auxiliary Boiler by allowing the operator to assure that adequate suction pressure exists for the auxiliary boiler feed pumps.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the Auxiliary Boiler is a non-safety system which is not assumed in the mitigation of any accident.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the modification will~

not degrade any existing equipment.

'The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the modification will not introduce any new failure mechanisms which were previously unanticipated.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because no safety margins for the Auxiliary boiler Deareator are specified in the Technical Specifications.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-292

. TITLE:

Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) Valve and Level Transmitter Insulation CHANGE:

This change provides insulation to equipment attached to the_ BWST.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The insulation is part of the freeze protection for the BWST level transmitter housing enclosure and the isolation valves for the liquid level controllers.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of i an accident previously described in the USAR because_the change improves the reliability of the Safety Features Act>aation System (SFAS) related to BWST level control.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the insulation will not affect the Seismic I capability or safety grade integrity of the associated components.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the insulation will have no effect on the BWST's capability to function as an auxiliary to support the High Pressure Injection system, Low Pressure Injection System or Makeup System.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the system itself has not been altered, only the protection of the system. There will be no effect on the SFAS trip setpoints or response times as defined in the Technical Specifications.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-296 TITLE:

Removal of Handwheels From Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) Valves CHANGE:

This modification removes the handwheels from FW 32 and FW 91 from the dearated water storage tank to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To prevent hot dearated storage tank water from being lined up to AFW pump l suction to preclude damage to the pumps.

~ SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability.or consequences of an accident.previously described in the USAR because the USAR does not consider the dearated storage tank as a suction supply source for the AFW System. This change will ensure that the consequences of an accident requiring AFW actuation will not increase.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because this change improves AFW system reliability and in no way degrades AFW system operation.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because no new failure mechanisms'are created as a result of this change.

The proposed action will not reduce'any margin of safety ao defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the margin of safety for these valves is not specifically stated in the technical specifications.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-299 TITLE:

Plant Modification to Change Control Circuitry for the CREVS CHANGE:

This change adds a bypass switch to the control circuitry for the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) air-coded condensing unit face and bypass damper.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The hydramotor activator damper requires a warm up period during sub-zero ambient conditions. The addition of the bypass switch enables the hydramotor activator to operate immediately when required.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the addition of the bypass switch has no impact on any accident analysis performed.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the bypass switch is being added in parallel with an existing automatic interlock and will 1 enhance the response time of the modulating damper in sub zero temperature conditions.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the original design concept remains unchanged.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-301 TITLE:

Revise Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Air Receiver Setpoints CHANGE:

This modification changes the EDG air receiver low pressure alarm setpoint to 215 psig, the'setpoint for starting the air receiver compressors to 220 psig, and the replacement of air start system pressure switches. This modification also sets tolerances for the receiver pressure relief valve.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The setpoints are being changed so that an operator can take action to correct a low pressure situation before the pressure reaches 210 psig and the affected diesel generator has to be declared inoperable.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the modifications did not affee.t the ability of the EDG's to perform their intended safety function..

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the modifications will not degrade any equipment or prevent the EDG's or any other system from functioning as assumed in the USAR.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the modifications will not introduce any failure mechanisms which were previously unanticipated or any events which are not bounded by the USAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the ,

basis for any Technical Specification because the operability of the EDG's j is not affected by these changes. j i

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-302 TITLE:

Change of Operation of Motor Operated Valve MU-11 CHANGE:

Modify the wiring to allow the torque switch to be'used in the open direction instead of the limit switch.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Allowing MU-11 to close tightly-(torque out) in the open direction is the correct method of operation and will add reliability and safety to the system.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the

. probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis'for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist l

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-303 TITLE:

Plant Modification for Decay Heat Removal (DHR) Valve Pit Level Switches CHANGE:

This modification installs level switches and an observation port in the DHR Valve Pit in the containment and imposes more stringent criteria on. .

the valve pit surveillance test.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This change is' required to monitor operational leakage in the valve pit prior to a LOCA.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed att3on will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the installation of these modifications does not affect system design of other safety related systems.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because surveillance requirements will ensure that the integrity of this modification is maintained.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the safety function and configuration of the valves located in the valve pit (DH-11 and DH-12) are not changed.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because there are no margins specified in the bases of the Technical Specifications for equipment covered by this modification.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-0305 TITLE:

PORV increased flow modification (Feed and Bleed)

CHANGE:

Modify PORV nozzle and disc to increase the flow capacity of the PORV.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Enhancement of feed and bleed cooling capability of the Davis-Besse Plant.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the PORV will still function in its previous capacity in that, it still maintains RCS pressure boundary; integrity.

This action does not. increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of' equipment important to safety because the basic configuration and function of the PORV remains unchanged. Only minor changes to valve nozzle and disc dimensions have been altered and would have negligible inspection plant operations.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because there are not significant mechanical configuration or operational changes made to the PORV. This

. change was made merely to allow for more rapid depressurization of the RCS by increasing the flow capacity of the PORV.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-308 TITLE:

Insta11ationi of Gaskets to Control Room Doors CHANGE:

This modification installs air. tight gaskets around the double doors

(#509) to'the Contr'o1 Room.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The doors were not airtight as committed in Section 9.4.1.3 of the USAR.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This modification will limit the inflow of air to the control room during the first four days following a LOCA when the emergency ventilation system (EVS) will be operated in the total recirculation mode and will also maintain the control-room at a positive pressure relative to the rest of the auxiliary building when the EVS is switched to take in fresh-air makeup on the fourth day.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of 1 an accident previously described-in the USAR.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of' equipment important to safety.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-310. '_N. B TITLE:

-Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) Primary Manway and Handhole Studs CHANGE:

Increase the length of primary manhole and handhole studs.

-REASON FOR CHANGE:

To provide uniform length for ultrasonic verification of installed stud load.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed design change will not create an adverse environment nor a decrease in existing design margins. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-312 TITLE:

J Interim Change in Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Operation I: , Methodology.

1 1

CHANGE:

Adjusts the position of the existing . Manual Locked Throttle. Valves in . .j 1 Service' Water Lines. based on predicted post-LOCA and normal pressures in ']

the'11ne and operable refrigerant pressure range.- Installs pressure i differential indicators (PDIs) downstream of condensers. .j 4'

REASON FOR CHANGE:,

j To permit' operation of the water-cooled condenser at all service water )

temperatures-below 110*F until. flow control valves addressed by another 1

FCR can'be delivered and installed. PDIs. enable the two service water .

4 valves to be manually adjusted for proper flow.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

-The only changes being made to the system are the throttle setting of-valves SW132 and SW136 and the addition of PDIs. The valvea are locked throttled and will continue-to be locked throttled but the positions of the valve will be changed to compensate for changes 'in the service water temperature. This is an interim fix and will not be required once the H

.FCVs required by FCR 85-221 are' installed. f The instrument isolation. valves in the tubing upstream of the PDIs will

~

.be kept closed.under strict administrative control in order to maintain the pressure boundary integrity of'the safety related portion of the service water system. These precautions are taken to ensure that the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the USAR and the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. This change will not affect the safety margin as defined by any Technical Specification bases. .]

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATIOP FOR FCR 85-314 TITLE:

Plant Modification for a Station Air Containment Isolation Valve CHANGE:

~This modification replaces the metal to metal seat on containment isolation valve SA-2010.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The new valve trim will provide better shutoff capability.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of l an accident previously described in the USAR because the change only enhances the sealing ability of the existing valve.

The proposed action.will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the soft seated replacement assembly is a direct replacement and no other parameters are changed by this modification.

The proposed action will not create r possibility of an t.ccident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the change only enhances the sealing ability of the existing valve.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the modification will not affect the Technical Specification bases.

)

F SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-316 TITLE:

Plant' Modification for Replacement of In-containment Limit Switches CHANGE:

This modification is to replace in-containment limit switches mounted on containment isolation valves with similar switches fitted with environmentally qualified electrical connectors.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The change improves.the overall pressure and environmental integrity of the limit switches.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because no accident can be caused by failure of these limit switches. This modification'will enhance limit switch reliability and ensure post accident operability.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the new switch and connector provide a complete.environmented seal enhancing the switches' ability to function in a harsh environment.

The proposed action will not; create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the modification will not introduce any failure mechanisms not bounded by the USAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the limit switches are not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

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t SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-0317 .

TITLE:

Piping Support Inspection and Verification Program CHANGE:

Remove pipe support in HPI System.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Reanalysis determined that the pipe support was unnecessary for the system-to perform its design function.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-318, SUPP. 1 TITLE:

Piping Support Inspection and Verification Program CHANGE:

Repair of Service Water System Support H1-HBC-44-H2 REASON FOR CHANGE: 3 1

Remove and. reweld the cup angles to restore support to the as-designed condition.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-0319 TITLE:

Piping Support Inspection and Verification Program CllANGE:

Repair piping support in HPI System.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Support did not meet original design condition.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

T he proposed action will net increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce any margin of safety as. defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore> an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR'85-0327

,7 -TITLE:

Transformer. Tap Settings

,. - .j CHANGE:

y Prepare a controlled. drawing which tabulates plant transformer tap.

. settings and indicates 1 tap requirements during!all plant operating modes;

REASON FOR CHANGE

Initiated as.a corrective action for LER 86-003.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

J This design . change which documents existing transformer tap settings and data on a-controlled drawing does not affect any plant safety functions.

.The proposed' action will not' increase the probability or. consequences of.

an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the.

probability or consequences!of a malfunction of equipment.important to safety. The proposed action will.not create a possibility of an accident of a different type. evaluated in the USAR or reduce any margin of safety as defined Hin the basisLfor any' Technical Specification.-  ;

Therefore, an'unreviewed safety question'does not exist.

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' SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-328 l l~

l TITLE:

l Plant Modification to. Replace ~Make-up System Flow Transmitters -j l'

CHANGE:

This modification is to replace a Bailey. transmitter for flow transmitter FT-MU31 with a Rosemount transmitter capable of encompassing the flow range during operation of both makeup pumps. Additionally the scale on indicator FT-MU31 will be changed to cover the two pump flowrate.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The Bailey flow transmitter which was previously installed was not capable of. indicating the flow rate for two makeup pump, high pressure feed and bleed cooling. The scale on the indicator was changed to meet Regulatory Guide 1.97 requirements for make-up flow indication.

i SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident. previously described in the USAR because no accidents can be initiated by equipment affected by this modification.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the installation is in compliance with Seismic Category I requirements and will not degrade any equipment or prevent any system from functioning as described in the USAR.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the make-up system function will not be affected by this modification.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the bases for the applicable Technical. Specification section does not specify margins.

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- . t SAFETY EVALUATION FOL FCR 85-331 -

3 1

TITLE: -

1 Piping Support Inspection and Verification Program I

CHANGE:

j i To disposition nonconforming items on DHR Pipe Supports to "use as is".

REASON FOR CIIANGE: i i

No design change. 1 1

i SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

i l

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a. malfunction of equipment important to .

safety. The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident (

of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce any margin of safety 1 as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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i SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-335 TITLE:

Piping Support Inspection and Verification Program i

~ CHANGE:  !

To disposition nonconforming items on AFW System Pipe Supports to "use as I is" REASON FOR CHANGE:

No design change.

l SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. .The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-0336,'SUPP 1 TITLE:

Piping Support Inspection and Verification Program I CHANGE:

Provide grout between the base plate and the concrete surface of certain pipe supports.in the DHR System.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Repair excessive gaps between base plate of pipe support and concrete '

surface.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important j to safety. The proposed action will not create a possibility of an '

accident of a~ different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any. Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-337 TITLE:

Evaluation for Acceptability of Main' Steam Piping Support CHANGE:

This evaluation covers minor nonconforming items found during a piping support inspection for main steam piping.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This evaluation determined the acceptability of the piping in the I "as-found" condition. _ Nonconforming items were repaired to meet the original design condition for the support.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probabi.'ity or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident of_a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-0338 1

TITLE:.

3 Replacement of the Fire Detector Pyrotronics Model DT-135 CPS

-CHANGE: i i

Replacement. 'of existing Fire Detector Model DT-135 CPS, Equipment {

ID TS8741J, with Model DT-3P-135.

REASON FOR CHANGE:  !

The present Model DT-135: CPS works improperly, cannot be serviced and is no I longer manufactured. .Model DT-3P-135 is the direct replacement model. I I

..orecommended by the manufacturer.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not' create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce any.

margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-0338, REV. A, SUPP. 1 I

TITLE:

Replacement of Fire Detector Pyrotronics Model DT-200 CPS CHANGE:

1 Replacement of Fire Detector Model DT-200 CPS, Equipment ID TS8741J, with 1 Model DT-200 CL. l 1

REASON FOR CHANGE:

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The present Model DT-200 CPS works improperly, cannot be serviced and is no longer manufactured. Model DT-200 CL is the direct replacement of

, Model DT-200 CPS recomme'nded by the manufacturer.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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I SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-339

.I TITLE: j Containment Sump Wide Rat,e Water Level Monitor Enclosures  !

CHANGE:

Provide enclosures for containment sump wide range water level monitors  !

LT-4594 and LT-4595. I 1

REASON FOR CHANGE:

1 Protect' level transmitters from flooding following postulated LOCA.  !

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will'uot increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously deucribed in the USAR because the protective i enclosures ensure the post-accident operability of the monitors to meet j their intended safety function. i

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The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a '

malfunction of equipment important to safety because the enclosures are passive, will be seismically installed and pressure tested upon ,

installation and each time maintenance is performed. j t

l The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or j malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the safety l function of the level transmitters is unchanged. The enclosures will protect the level transmitters to' ensure that their safety function is perfo rmed .

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the j basis for any Technical Specification. The bases for Technical j Specifications 3/4.3.3,6 pertains to equipment covered by this FCR, i however, no margins are specified. l

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-346 TITLE:  ;

Replacement of Rosemoiint Mode 1 ~1151 Differential Pressure Transmitter CHANGE:

Replacement of Rosemount Model 1151 differential pressure transmitter, Equipment ID PDT 8000, with Rosemount Model 1153.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Rosemount Model 1153 is environmentally qualified for post-accident operation.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident'previously described in the USAR because the modification replaces, an. existing environmentally unqualified transmitter with a functionally equivalent model which is environmentally qualified.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the replacement transmitter is environmentally qualified and, therefore, more reliable in a post-accident harsh environment.

The proposed action will.not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the only modification is to replace the existing transmitter with an environmentally qualified, functionally identical device.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because this transmitter is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-344, SUPP. 2 TITLE:

Replace Wires in'Limitorque Actuators with Environmentally Qualified Wiring CHANGE:

' Replacement of unidentified or unqualified wiring in Limitorque operators ~

with wiring qualified for operation in the post-accident harsh environment. In addition, a method will be provided.to document and control the quality of wiring in Limitorque operators.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Wiring in Limitorque operators performing a safety function in a harsh environment must be environmentally qualified. If inspection can not

. identify the wires as qualified then replacement with qualified wires must be performed.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUl91ARY:

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce any margin of safety as' defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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1 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-347, SUPP. 1 TITLE:

Addition of Drain Valve and Cap to Main Steam Non-Return Valves (NRV)

CHANGE:

An existing drain line will be modified by addition of an isolation valve and pipe cap to permit testing of the NRVs during normal operation while maintaining the pressure boundary. l l

REASON FOR CHANGE: l

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Permit testing of NRVs.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the addition of a drain valve, spool piece and cap will in no way affect the safety function of the NRVs to close.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR. All components will be added consistent with the original piping class and the pressure boundary will be maintained by a normally closed gate valve and a threaded end cap.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because all Technical Specifications will remain in effect following implementation of this FCR.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-0348, SUPP. 1 TITLE:

Addition of Drain Line to the In-Containment Nitrogen System CHANGE:

Route 3/8 Inch SS tubing from valve NN 65 in the nitrogen (N2) system to an existing containment floor drain.

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REASON FOR CHANGE:

Provide a path to bleed off reactor coolant which main back leak from the RCS In the N2 system.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because :

1. The isolation valves which form the boundary of the RCS/N2 system are unaffected.

2. Any break of the tubing, should a breach of the pressure boundary occur, would be within the capability of the makeup system.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the N2 ,

system serves no safety function.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because an existing threaded cap will still be available to measure the rate of any identified leakage.

All technical specifications will remain in force after the FCR is implemented.

L SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-0349, SUPP. 1 TITLE:

Revise 4160V BUS High Voltage Alarm Setpoint

' CHANGE:

. Revise:the 4160V BUS high voltage alarm setpoint to 105% of 4160V.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Based on o" present transformer tap settings to minimize nuisance alarms, the.4160% high alarm setpoint will be increased to 105%. That is within l NEMA MG-1 allowable of 105.8%.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR nor will it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. .The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident of a different type evaluated in the USAR or reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any' Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety quection does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 85-356 TITLE:

Replacement'of Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) Ductwork CHANGE:

EVS Ductwork in Room 427 will be replaced with heavier gauge duct to withstand a 5 PSI pressure differential.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The EVS ductwork in Room 427 must withstand a 5 PSI pressure differential to maintain integrity following a main feedwater line break in Room 314.

This ductwork serves as a barrier such that the harsh environment of Room 314 does not enter Room 427 via a rupture in the duct.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The_ proposed action will not increase the probability o. consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because EVS will continue to  ;

perform its required safety function following a LOCA or fuel handling  ;

accident and the duct work will serve as a passive barrier to protect safety-related equipment following a main Feedwater Line Break.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a

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malfunction of equipment important to safety because the strengthened ductwork will project equipment important to safety from a harsh environment.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the change l

is within the design basis of the system and will extend the capability of the system to provide a passive safety function following a main feedwater line rupture.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the bases for Technical Specification 3/4.6.5.1 requires that site boundary doses are within l l

10 CFR 100 limits and this modification does not effect the operation of the system.

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ll SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR t,6-001 TITLE:

Drawing Change CHANGE: '

i Revise' drawings to reflect as-built conditions. I REASON FOR CHANGE:

Revise discrepancies identified while performing MOVATS inspections.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety equipment evaluated in the USAR is not increused.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different typ2 than previously evaluated in the USAR does not exist. The margin of Aafety as e

defin,4 in the Technical Specifications is not reduced.

Therefere, an unreviewed safety-question is not involved.

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E SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-002 TITLE:

Voltage Surge Suppression Device Across Fan Failure Alarm Contacts CHANGE:

Addition of Voltage Surge Suppression Device across fan failure alarm contacts.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To suppress-spiking on Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channel 1.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This actirn does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the change involves only the addicion of a voltage surge suppression device across contacts used for alarm. The change suppresser, spiking on Source Range Channel 1 to the point that it is no longer a problem to the operators. The modification does r,.ot affect the operation of the fan failure alarm.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the work associated with the change meets all applicable QA requirements. The addition of the capacitors does not violate existing environmental qualifications of r,afety-related equipment and no improper maintenance steps are introduced.

This change does not degrade any equipment and does not prevent any systems from functioning as assumed in the USAR.

1 This action does.not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because this change does not introduce any failure mechanisms which were previously unanticipated or any events which are not bounded by the USAR.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the change does not affect any technical specification basis.

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o SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-008 4

TITLE: )

Replacement of 8 Pressure Transmitters CHANGE:

i Replace four reactor coolant (PT-RC2A3, RC2A4, RC2B3, RC2B4) and four steam generator (PT-SP12A1, SP12A2, SP12B1, SP12B2) pressure transmitters.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To satisfy compliance with 10CFR50.59.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR. The function of the transmitters does not change as a result of this FCR. Replacement of the transmitters at the end of their qualified life improves their reliability i during accident conditions.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because replacement of the transmitters ensures conformance to the Davis-Besse environmental qualification program.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because malfunction of a different type _than previously analyzed in the SAR. The system function will not be affected by this FCR. The transmitters are being repitced to conform with the qualification program.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because this modification enhances system reliability. No technical specifications are affected.

Based on the foregoing considerations, it is concluded that this modification doc- not involve an unreviewed safety question.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-009 TITLE:

Change of Normal Power Feed Alignment for 480V MCC F13 CHANGE:

' Align the 480V MCC F13 normally with 480V SWGR E1.

I REASON FOR CHANGE:

To preclude loss of capability to start AFW Pump #2 and MDFW Pump from the

. control room upon loss of off site power and a loss of Emergency Diesel Generator #2.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This FCR does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of .

any type other than previously evaluated in the USAR. The margin of l safety as defined in Technical Specification is not reduced. The  !

probability of an accident or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the

-USAR has not been increased. Therefore, unreviewed safety question is not involved.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-016 i

TITLE:

SFRCS Pressure Switch Condulet Sealing Fitting Addition.

CHANGE:

Installation of electric conductor seal assembly on conduit entry to SFRCS i Pressure Switches PS3687A-H and PS3689A-H.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To satisfy compliance with 10CFR50.49.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does not increase the probability o consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the change only involves the addition of conduit sealing fittings and has no bearing on the probability of an accident. The change prevents a' failure of the. pressure switches in the event of a high energy line break by preventing moisture from entoring the switches.

This act ion does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because this change does not

. degrade any equipment and does'not prevent any systems from functioning as assumed in the USAR. The quality and standards of the existing' equipment is not affected by this change.

This action does not. create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because this change does not introduce any failure mechanisms which were previously unanticipated or any events which are not bounded by the USAR.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification the' change does not affect any Technical' Specification bases.

Therefore, the above modification of adding condulet seal fittings to the SFRCS Main Steam Pressure switches does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

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SAFETT EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-017' TITLE:

. Addition of Qualified Conduit' Seal Assemblies for Flow Transmitters PT-4630 and'FT-4631 CHANGE:

The function of the flow transmitters is to provide indication of Auxiliary Feedwater Flow to Steam Generator 1 and 2. In order for flow transmitters'to be qualified for their environment, qualified conduit seal assemblies are needed at the conduit entrance to the instrument.

The purpose of these seals is to prevent moisture intrusion to the instruments.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Compliance with 10CFR50.45.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The modification to add electric conductor seal assemblies to flow transmitters FT-4630 and FT-4631 does not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident as previously evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). The change only involves the addition of the  !

electric conductor seal assembly and has no bearing on the probability of an accident, j The modification does not increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the USAR. The change will prevent a failure of the flow transmitters by preventing moisture from untering the trans-mitters.

The modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the USAR. The work associated with the change meets all applicable j QA requirements. The addition of the electric conductor seal assemblies i

does not violate existing environmental qualifications of safety-related equipment and no improper maintenance steps were introduced. As such,.

the chance of a single failure occurring was not increased.

The modification does not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the USAR. This change does not degrade any equipment and does not prevent any systems from functioning as assumed in the USAR. The quality and standards of the existing equipment was not be affected by this change.

This change does not introduce any failure mechanisms which werc previously unanticipated or any events which are not bounded by the i USAR. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any other previously evaluated in the USAR. (

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l Based on the above considerations, it is concluded that the modification of adding electric conductor seal assemblies to flow trans-mitters FT-4630 and FT-4631 does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-023 TITLE:

Door No. 215 Gasket Modification CHANGE:

Replace Door No. 215 gasket material with gasketing composed of Shore A 45 to 55 durometer silicone elastometer.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To meet environmental requirements for pressure and temperature parameters which door No. 215 could be subjected to.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The modification is required in order to make Door No. 215 capable of withstanding the temperatures it is subjected to. The modifications do not increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of any safety related equipment as evaluated in the USAR.

Nor do the modifications create a possibility for an accident different than any evaluated previously in the USAR, or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any' technical specification. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist and the proposed modifications are acceptable.

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1 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-029 TITLE:

Weep Hole Placement in Instrument Flexible Leads 'l I

CHANGE:

Install effective drainage weep holes at the conduit entry to instruments LTRC14-1&3, LTSP9A3, LTSP9B3, and LTSP9B4.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To prevent moisture accumulation and to comply with 10CER50.49 which 4 requites equipment to be qualified for its environment.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident-previously described in the USAR because the change only involves 1 the addition of weep holes and has no bearing on the probability of an accident. The change will prevent a failure of the instruments should moisture be allowed to accumulate and eventually work its way into the instrument.

This action does not increase'the. probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to' safety because this change does not degrade any equipment and does not prevent any systems from functioning as assumed'in the USAR. The quality and standards of the existing equipment  ;

is not affected by this change.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because this change will not introduce any failure mechanisms which were previously unanticipated or any events which are not bounded by the USAR. l This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the change does not affect any technical specification bases.

L SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-032 i

TITLE:

Wiring and Handwheel Changes in Motor Operated Valves CV-5010E and CV-5011E CHANGE:

Change the actuators close control from torque to limit control, and change manual 10" handwheels with 4" handwheels.

REASON FOR CllANGE:

To prevent damage the valve components caused by excessive backseat force.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Utilization of limit controlled closing and smaller handwheels on CV-5010E and CV-5011E adds to their reliability and does not in any way increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated. A possibility for an' accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report is not created. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question is not involved.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-041-TITLE: 1 Modify Low Pressure Injection Control Circuit CHANGE:

Modify Control Circuit to LPI Pump Suction Isolation Valves from the BWST and containment emergency pump DH2733, and DH2734.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To ensure valves will stroke fully open following an SFAS initiation from Mode 3 or 4.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed internal wiring changes moves the limit switch contact originating from DH1517 (KH1518) to a point in the DH2733 (DH2734) "open" contro1' circuit where it cannot isolate the seal-in contact. This permits the motor opening relay to. remain energized until the valve travels fully ,

open, under SFAS initiation when on decay heat cooling. This change does not alter the current operation of the valve control switches, local stop button or indicating lights. The seal-in contact continues to function for normal valve operation via. control switches in addition to SFAS actuation.from all operating modes.

Pursuant to the above evaluation,'no unreviewed safety question results from implementation of this FCR.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-043

'ETITLE:

Indicating Lights for Steam / Condensate Aux. Feedwater Pump Isolation Valves CHANGE:

Replace 120 VAC indicating lamps and scckets associated with valves HV 160, 360, and 3870,'with 120 VDC rated lamps and sockets.

i REASON FOR CHANGE:

To match the indicating lamps to proper voltage type (D.C. vs A.C.) which.

-was changed by FCR 79-077.

l SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

I Replacement of the existing 120 AC lights with 120 VDC lights requires that the sockets and lights be changed to a different part No. and in some cases requires the use of an adapter plate. Therefore, this FCR increases the reliability of the indicating lights. ,

i The changes made by FCR 86-0043 do not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety related equipment as evaluated in USAR. Nor do these modifications create a possibility for s a accident different than any evaluated previously in USAR. The margin of safety as defined in any technical specification is not reduced. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-046

)

TITLE:

MU Loop'16 - Response to Loss of Non-Nuclear Instrumentation (NNI) Power i

CHANGE:

A signal from NNI(Y) for high makeup tank level will be added in series to l the existing NNI(X) high makeup tank level in the Control Circuit for Valve MU 3971.

REASON FOR CHANGE:  !

To prevent unnecessary . ling of Valve MU 3971 upon a loss of power to the NNI.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the change only involves i modifications'to the control logic to prevent the valve from cycling on a loss of NNI Power. No credit is taken for operation of Valve MU 3971 in the mitigation of any accidents analyzed in the USAR.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the change does not degrade any equipment and does not prevent any systems from functioning as assumed in the USAR. The quality of standards of the existing equipment

- is not affected by this change. The Makeup system is non-safety related.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the change will not introduce any failure mechanisms which were previously unanticipated or any events which are not bounded by the USAR.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the proposed change does not affect any technical specification bases.

It is concluded that the proposed modification of changing the control logic to' Valve MU 3971 will not involve an unreviewed safety question.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-052 TITLE: .

Replacement of Limit Switches in the Auxiliary Building CHANGE:

. . i Replace mild environment qualified limit switches with limit switches-fitted with electrical connectors, both qualified for the new harsh  !

environment. '

REASON FOR CHANGE:

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To satisfy compliance with 10CFR50.59.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the only modification is  ;

to replace an existing mild environment limit switch with a similar model I limit switch fitted with an electrical connector, both qualified for a harsh environment. No accident can be caused by failure of the limit switches.  !

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the new switch and connector provide a complete environmental seal enhancing the switches' ability to function during exposure to a harsh environment. The switches are a one for one replacement and the inclusion of the qualified electrical connector enhances the environmental integrity of the switches.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the only modification is to ,

replace an existing switch with a similar switch fitted with an environmentally qualified connector, plus the required in line terminations to the existing cables. No other changes are made that would i introduce failure mechanisms not bounded by the SAR.  !

This actiou does not reduce ny inargin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical specification because no margin of safety is specified for these limit switches in the Technical Specifications bases.

Implementation of this FCR does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-053 TITLE:

Auxiliary Building Control Room Air Damper Solenoid Valve Replacement CHANGE:

j- . Change SV 5301.and SV 5311 Solenoid Valves from ASCO Mcdel 8316D45 to ASCO Model NP8316A75E in the control room air handling units.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

One of the valves failed and replacement with an ASCO NP type solenoid valve was chosen since the previous valves are long lead items and SV 5301A and SF 5311A were already ASCO NP Solenoid Valves.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The installation of the'ASCO Model NP 8316A75 will meet and/or will exceed the system requirements including IEEE Class IE requirements, seismic requirements, environmental qualification requirements and overall syr. tem response time.

This modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or.the consequences of an accident or malfunction of any safety related equipment as evaluated in the USAR. Nor does this change create a possibility for an accident'different than any in the basis for any Technical Specification. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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GAFETY EVALUATION FOR-FCR 86-054 TITLE:

-Recalibration of Integrated Control System (ICS) Pump Control Circuit Modules CHANGE:

Recalibrates modules in the ICS Pump Control Circuit and in the MDT-20 MFPT governor to accomplish a desired failure speed of 4400 R.P.M.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To reduce the potential for overcooling following loss of ICS D.C. Power.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The modification implemented by FCR 86-0054 will reduce the potential for overcooling following loss of ICS power. Pump discharge pressure at 4400 rpm should be sufficiently high to preclude spurious actuation of the SFRCS.

This modification will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of any safety related equipment as evaluated in the USAR. Nor will this change create a possibility for an accident of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-057 TITLE:

Pipe Support 33A-GCB-8-H9 Shell Anchor Bolt Deficiencies Repair.

CHANGE:  !

~ Replace 1/2" diameter shell anchors with 3/4" shell anchors and provide Lj sufficient bearing for the support baseplate. '

i REASON FOR CHANGE:

J Result of shell anchor bolt deficiencies created by perfotming rework for NCR 85-0660.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This repair is required to assure that the support performs its safety function.

Since the repair is intended to assure that the support meets the SAR allowables upon completion of repair, there will be no adverse affects on the LPI system piping.

The repair of this support does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety related ,

equipment es evaluated in the USAR. Nor does the repair create a possibility for an accident different than any evaluated previously in the USAR, or reduce the margin of safety as. defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

1 Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist, j 4

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-062 TITLE:

Terminal Block Boxes Weep Holes CHANGE:

Placement of 1/4" weep (drain) holes in the bottom of-125 safety-related terminal block boxes located in the auxiliary building.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To prevent moisture accumulation and to comply with 10CFR50.49_which requires equipment to be qualified for its environment.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The purpose of the weep holes is to prevent moisture accumulation and to comply with 10CFR50.49 which requires equipment to be qualified for its environment. The safety function of these terminal block boxes is to provide physical protection to the terminal blocks and cables.

Adding weep holes to these boxes does not compromise this safety function.

The modification to add weep holes to the bottom of the terminal block does not increase the probability of occurrence or the. consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety related as evaluated in the USAR. Nor does it create a possibility for an accident different than any evaluated previously in the USAR, or reduce the defined in the margin of safety as bases for any Technical Specifications.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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I SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-064

' TITLE:

Increase the Time Delay Settings of Underfrequency Relays CHANGE:

The time delay associated with the underfrequency relays which monitor'the 13.8 KV plant distribution buses is being increased from 2 cycles (60 Hertz Base) to 20 cycles.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To allow successful fast transfer from one startup transformer to another for all modes of plant operation and allow for testing of the transfer scheme under. plant shutdown conditions.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the change only involves modification to the setpoint to prevent the inadvertent block of the fast transfer during shutdown. No credit is taken for operation of the 13.8 KV system in the mitigation of any accidents analyzed in the USAR. I i

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a  !

malfunction of equipment important to safety because the change will not degrade any equipment and will not prevent any systems from functioning as described in the USAR. The quality of standard of the existing equipment will not be affected. The 13.8 KV system is non-safety related.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the charge will not introduce any failure mechanism which were previously unanticipated or any events which were not bounded by the USAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the proposed change will not affect any technical specificatoin bases.

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1 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-065

-TITLE:

SV 5004 Air Line Union ~ Installation

g. CHANGE:

Install a union between Solenoid Valve SV 5004 and the tee block which is located between SV 5004 and the actuator of CV 5004.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

i To allow the valve to be rotated for removal. Previous configuration '

would not permit rotation due to physical interferences.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident-previously described in the USAR because the only modification under this FCR is to add a union in the solenoid valve air supply line to CV 5004. The safety function of Valve CV 5004 will not be degraded by addition of the union. The ability cf the Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) to mitigate the effects of a LOCA will not be affected by the change. The integrity of the line will not be decreased by this installation.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because CV 5004, upon failure of air. supply, will fail cloced and will mechanically maintain its safe:ty

-position.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of I a different type evaluated in the USAR because installation of this union will not change the safety function of.this valve or the integrity of the air supply line.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the basis for Technical j Specification 3/4.6.5.1 requires EVS operability to meet SAR assumptions j used for the safety analysis and to ensure that site boundary doses are I within 10 CFR 100 limits. This modification will not degrade EVS operability, therefore, no safety margins are affected. 4

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1 It is concluded that the installation of a union in the air supply line j between SV 5004 and CV 5004 will not involve an unreviewed safety question.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-070 a

TITLE:

Conductor. Seals and Weep Holes CHANGE:

Addition of sealing fittings' and placement of weep holes in the raceway to the solenoids of valves SV ICS11A1, A2, B1, B2; SV DH13A, 13B, 14A, 14B; SV.1467, 1469, 4633, 4636, and 4642 located in the auxiliary building.

REASON FOR CHANGE:  ;

To prevent moisture intrusion into the solenoid valve coil.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the change only involves the addition of seals and weep holes and has no bearing on the probability of an accident. The change prevents a failure in the event of a high energy line break by preventing moisture from entering the uolenoids. .

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the change does not degrade any equipment and does not prevent any systems from functioning as assumed in the.USAR. -The quality and standards of the existing equipment are not affected by this change.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of  !

a different type evaluated in the USAR because the proposed change will not introduce any failure mechanisms which were previously unanticipated or any events which are not bounded by the USAR.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the proposed change does not affect any Technical Specification bases.

Based on the above considerations, it is concluded that the proposed modification of adding sealing fittings and weep holes to the solenoid lead flexible conduit or conduit fitting will not involve an unreviewed j safety question. 1 r

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j SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-081 TITLE:

Install Larger Cable Termination Box on DH Motor MP 0421 CHANGE:

Installation of larger cable termination box on Decay Heat Removal System I Pump (DH) Motor MP 0421 i REASON FOR CHANGE: I i

To allow for installation of larger NMCK-8 Raychem In-line Power Cable Termination.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the addition of the new termination box is a one-for-one replacement and ensures the same degree of protection to the terminations as presently provided. The termination box is class 1E and seismically installed.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the addition of the larger termination box and the new in-line terminations improves the overall reliability and availability of the decay heat pump MP 0421. This modification does not alter the operation or function of any other safety system and assured adequate working space to install the new in-line terminations.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the modification to add a larger termination box to MP 0421 does not alter the operation or function of any other plant safety system. The new termination box does not alter the DH motor MP 0421 operation.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because this modification does not adversely affect the operation or function of any other safety related systems addressed in the Technical Specification.

The addition of a larger termination box to DH pump MP 0421 does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-084

' TITLE:

Main Feed Pump Turbine (MFPT) Drain Level Switch Adjustment

' CHANGE:

Adjust the elevations of the MFPT level switches (Nos. LS-1949, LSH-1949, LS-1957, and LSH-1957) to ensure proper activation on high drain system level. Also, sight glasses are to be installed for monitoring the drain system water level.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To ensure proper activation on high drain system level, and to monitor the drain system water level.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an l accident previously described in the USAR because no accidents can be initiated by the instrumentation affected by this FCR.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the function of the level instrumentation will not change as a result of this modification.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the proposed modification will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because no safety margins for the MFPT drain level switches are specified in the Technical Specifications.

This modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-086 TITLE:

Drawing Change ,

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CHANGE:

Revise drawings to reflect as-built conditions.

REASON FOR CHANGE: 1 Revise drawings to reflect as-built conditions.

1 SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety equipment evaluated in the USAR is not increased. 1 The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than j previously evaluated in the USAR does not exist. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question is not involved.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-089 TITLE:

Reconnection of PSH-6777 to Vacuum Pumps CHANGE:

Reconnect PSH-6777 to the suction line of the pumps with stainless steel tubing.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To provide remote annunciation when the suction pressure for the Degasifier Vacuum Pumps P69-1 and P69-2 falls below the setpoint.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

j This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the makeup water treatment system is not interconnected with any safety features system and is not essential for safe shutdown of the station. Upon receipt of a low vacuum alarm at 28.5" Hg in the pump suction header, the operator is only required to place the pump not in service in AUTO, and open its associated suction valve.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the modification will not inhibit the function of existing Class IE equipment. The effect of the change is to reinstate the annunciation capability for high Degasifier Vacuum Pump suction pressure.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because this change will not lead to events that were not previously studied in the SAR. Failure mechanisms previously unanticipated will not be introduced by this change.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because this modification does not affect any of the base >, contained in the Technical Specification.

The proposed modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-092 TITLE:

Removal of Limitorque Operator Torque Switch Limiter Plates CHANGE:

Remove torque switch limiter plates which interfere with attaining increased open settings on valves.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To remove interferences preventing attaining higher torque settings to open valves and thereby increasing confidence of proper opening under maximum Delta P conditions.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The modification to remove the torque switch limiter plates which interfere with attaining higher torque setting dses not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety related equipment as evaluated in the USAR. Nor does it create a possibility for an accident different than any evaluated previously in the USAR, or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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g SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-093 TITLE:-

A Modify Overspeed Trip on Emergency Diesel Generators 1-1, and 1-2 CHANGE:

Replaced 1.1/2" limit switch 1sier arm with 2 1/2" lever arm.

REASCN FOR CHANGE:

To provide. sufficient overlap or movement'so the overspeed trip reset lever will reset the Overspeed Trip Limit Switch (OTS).

U SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The OTS when actuated energizes.the overspeed trip relay (OTR) which energizes.the aiesel shutdown relays SDR, SDK1.', & SDRX1 which shutdown and lockout the emergency diesel generator system. The safety function is the

.llmit switch actuation, not switch reset.

The overspeed' trip reset lever and the limit switch had minimal contact in.

thk reset position. They touched forming approximately a 95 angle in the switch reset direction. This was not enough overlap or movement to reset the OTS.

Ipereasing the OTS lever arm length from 1 1/2" to 21/2" provided sufficient overlap or movement so the overspeed trip reset lever would reset the OTS.

4 The safety function of the OTS to actuate is not affected by.this change and reset capability is provided. "The capability of the overspeed trip switch to mitigate the; consequences of or to prevent an accident are not degraded or affected by this design change. The safety function of the overspeed trip switches is not affected by this design change. A possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report does not exist. The margin of safety as defined in any Technical Specification is not reduced.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety questio2 is not involved.

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t SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-097

\:

TITLE: ,

Station Heating Hot Water Heater Replacement l CHANGE:

l l Replaced hot water heaters for station heating with electric heaters in the Emergency Diesel Generator and Day Tank Rooms.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To preclude a potential harsh environment in these rooms in the event of a pipe break caused by a seismic event.

SAFETY EVALUATION "JMMARY:

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because this change is not related to any SAR accident analysis event.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the potential harsh environment that would be created by a hot water line break was eliminated by removing the hot water Seating system from the rooms. Electric heaters were installed before winter to insure that the ambient temperature in these rooms stayed in compliance with the SAR commitments.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because this change was within the plant design bases. The addition of the new electric heaters has been subjected to a Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) review. Results of the review indicated that no special design criteria were required for installing the electric heaters in these rooms, including the diesel generator day tank rooms which contain number 2 fuel oil.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basir for any Technical Specification because the hot water heating system was replaced and the addition of the new electric heating system are not in the Technical Specifications. The Technical Specification basis (3/4.8) for the Emergency Diesel Generators does not call out an ambient '

temperature requirement.

An unreviewed safety question will not exist as a result of these j modifications. '

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j SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-100 TITLE:

Replace Cyclone Separators in Decay lleat Removal Pumps CllANGE: j Replace existing separators with separators manufactured by Flexibox Inc. l I

REASON FOR CIIANGE: i The, existing separators' manufacturer cannot be deterLined, therefore, replacement with cyclone separators manufactured by Flexibox Inc. was installed.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The modification to replace cyclone separators in decay heat removal pumps will not increase the probability of occurrence on the consequences of.an accident or malfunction of safety-related equipment as evaluated in ,

the USAR. Nor will this change create a possibility for an accident {

different than any previously evaluated in the USAh or reduce the margin '

of safety as defined in the Basis.for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety' question does not exist.

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I i SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-101 )

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TITLE:

Repositioning and Removing Main Steam Line Snubbers CHANGE: j Reposition Main Steam Line Snubbers SR4, SR7, and SPR and-remove Snubber SR9. j REASON FOR CHANGE:

Preclude future snubber failures due to high temperatures in the Snubber Piston Seal Assembly.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Repositioning and removing the main steam line snubbers will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety related equipment as evaluated in the USAR. Nor will this change ~ create a possibility for an accident different than any previously evaluated in the USAR or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist, i

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-103, SUPP. O TITLE:

Modify Main Feedwater Piping Supports CHANGE:

Replace.intulation protection saddles on piping supports 6B-EBD-13-H9 (6B-EBD-9-H21) and'6B-EBD-13-H10 (6B-EBD-9-H22) to return system to original design condition.

l- REASON FOR CHANGE:

l Inspection of the as-found supports revealed that the stress levels exceeded SAR allowables.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Modification to piping supports will not increase the probability of .

occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of 'l safety-related equipment as evaluated in the USAR. Nor will this change create a possibility for an accident different than any previously evaluated in the USAR or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist, a

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-104 TITLE:

Containment Modifications CHANGE:

Piping, hangers, grating, ladders, handrails and platform steel, in containment, were cut and modified. Flanges were added to Instrument Sensing Lines and the RCP Oil Collection System.-

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Facilitate removal of reactor coolant pump.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

.The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the structural integrity and Seismic Category I requiren.ents for all structures and components affected by these modifications will be maintained. Flanges added to sending lines and RCP Oil Collection System will not diminish the effectiveness of the system.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the structure and containment modifications will be Seismic Category I and the flanges will be installed ASME Class I to ensure RCS Pressure Boundary Integrity.

The proposed-action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because no changes are being made outside the design basis of the plant and no new failure mechanisms are being introduced.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the instrument function and redundancy will be maintained as required by Technical Specifications 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-107, REV. A i

TITLE:

Blowdown Panels CHANGE:

1 Blowdown panel between Room 314 and Turbine-Building will be modified to I release at 1.0 psig instead of the present 0.5 psig. l l

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The safety function of the blowout panels is to release following a MSLB but remain intact following a LOCA. An overpressure of 0.8 psig results following a LOCA. Increasing the release to 1.0 psig allows the blowout to remain in place after a LOCA but still release following a MSLB.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability of an accident previously described in the USAR.

The proposed action will not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the only safety related equipment being modified are the six blowout panels. All six panels will be modified in the same manner.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the purpose of the blowout panels is to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

Modifying the panels will not create a new accident.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the blowout pressure for the venting of Room 314 is not addressed in the bases of the Technical Specifications.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-108 (SUPP. 01) .

1 TITLE:

Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine (AFPT) Steam Generator Level Control System CHANGE:

Provide test circuit for AFPT Steam Generator Level Control System.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Provide the. capability to fully verify the operability of the AFPT Steam Generator Level Control System while the plant is in operation.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the changes only ,

involve modifications to the AFPT speed control logic to allow comprehensive functional testing during plant operation and allows the level control circuits to be more fully tested.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the modification will meet all QA requirements and will not violate existing environmental or seismic qualification. ,

l The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or j malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the j reliability of the Auxiliary Feedwater System is increased by the addition  !

of the test circuitry.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the ,

basis .for any Technical Specification because the Technical Specification j Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2c will be more fully verified. i 1

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-109, REV. A TITLE:

Replacement'of Spool Pieces CHANGE:

Replacement of spool' pieces on suction side of the Containment Spray Pumps.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Existing spool pieces h' ave deformed resulting in improper fit-up and leakage.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

I Replacement of spool pieces on suction side of the containment spray pumps will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences ;

of an accident or malfunction of safety-related equipment as evaluated in i the USAR. Nor will this change create a possibility for an accident different than any previously evaluated in the.USAR or reduce the margin  ;

of safety as defined in the Basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FCR FCR 86-115 TITLE:

Reactor Coolant' Pump Spare Rotat.ing Assembly CHANGE:

Modifications to spare rotating assembly prior to installation included:

auxiliary impeller, impelle bolts, impeller drive pins., shaft material and configuration and the journal attachment to the shaft.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

I The FCR provides a detailed analysis justifying in each case that the j modified.part is either functionally equivalent or an improvement upon the  !

original parts.

SAFETY EVALUATION S'JMMARY:

Modifications to the Reactor Coolant Pump Sparc rotating assembly will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety-related equipment as evaluated in the USAR. Nor '

will this change create a possibility for an accident different than any  ;

previously evalur.ted in the USAR or reduce the margin of safety as defined in tAe Basis for any Technical Specification. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-116 j I

I TITLE:

. Modification to Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Storage Tanks CHANGE: j l

Provide locking devices to the tank manway and six capped pipes which i extend above ground from each emergency diesel generator fuel oil storage l tank. Also, the electrical manhole between the tanks will be locked and a '

screen will be installed on the vent piping.

RhaSON FOR CHANGE:

Provide security for the fuel oil tanks located outside the plant security fence, j i

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

-The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the security modifications to Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Storage Tank does not create any accident analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) nor is the change outside the design basis of.the system.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the modifications will not make a single failure more likely nor will it degrade the tuks.

The fuel oil will be safer from contamination.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the modification will protect the tanks from deliberate c.,ntamination making the emergency diesels more reliable.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because this change will not diminish the effectiveness of the emergency diesel generators and will rot degrade the fuel oil storage tanks.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-118 TITLE:

Replacement of Temperature Detectors with Qualified Detectors CHANGE:

Replace RTD's TERC3AS, TERC3B6 with qualified detectors. Since these wide range sensors are dael type RTD's combined with narrow range RTD's, TERC3A3 and TERC3B1, all 4 temperature sensors will be upgraded.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

USAR Sections 7.13.1.12 and 7.13.1.13 state that sensors TERC3A5 and TERC3B6 are Class IE qualified and meet the IEEE-323 and IEEE-344 .

qualifications since.the qualification of the existing RTD's could not be i established these RTD's are being replaced by qualified models.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an' accident previously described in the USAR since the only modification is.to replace the existing RTD's with a similar model which is qualified for the postulated environmental and seismic conditions.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a

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malfunction of equipment important to safety because the replacement RTD's will meet better quality standards and will be seismically installed.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the modification will not introduce any failure mechanisms which were previously unanticipated or any events that are not bounded by the USAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the bases for Technical Specification Section 3/4.3.3.6 ensures the operability of post-accident instrumentation.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-124 TITLE:

Correct Drafting Errors on Drawing E280A CHANGE:

1 Correct label on safety related cable ICY 110A. Correct labeling for non-safety related jumpers #1 and #2. Swap the white and black conductor on non-safety related jumper #1.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Correct drawing and labeling.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This FCR does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of any type other than previously evaluated in the USAR. The margin of safety as defined in any Technical Specification is not reduced.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-128, REV. C TITLE:

Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) Sample Coolers CHANGE:

Sample Coolers (E-144-1 through 4)'are being converted'from demineralized water. cooling to component cooling water cooling. l REASON FOR CHANGE:

To minimize radwaste and to provide improved sample cooling.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The PASS sample cooler will be tied into the nonessential portion of the CCW system. This modification will not adversely impact the operation of the safety related CCW system.

The Spent Fuel Pool is the most significant item impacted by the temporary isolation of this non-essential CCW Loop. This temporary shutdown is not a nuclear safety related change in the facility, it is not a change of any procedures as described in the USAR and it is not a test or experiment.

This safety evaluation addressed the total loss of cooling to the Spent Fuel Pool and the length of time before cooling would have to be restored.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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J SAFEIT EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-130 TITLE:

Modification of Steam Generator Piping Support l l

CHANGE:

This modification involved the repair of a Steam Generator System pipe stanchion so that an attached snubber could be readjusted.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This modification was made to restore the support to function as required by design.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability of an accident previously described in the USAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-136 TITLE:

Modify Namco Limit Switch Supports CHANGE:

Remount limit switches ZS-DH11A~and ZS-DH12A using the holes on the limit switches provided for mounting rather than using the holes on the limit switch provided for cover plate attachment.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To satisfy compliance with 10CFR50.49.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the only modification is to modify a mounting bracket for an existing qualified limit switch thereby improvinF the seal and environmental integrity of the switch.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the existing switches are remonuted in compliance with seismic qualifications and in a manner that ensures a proper seal between the limit switch cover plate and housing.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfnaction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the only modification.is to remount an existing switch.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because Technical Specification 3/4.3.3.6 ensures the operability of post-accident monitoring instrumentation, however, no margins of safety are specified.

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SAFETY EVALUATION'FOR FCR'86-140' TITLE:

Replacement of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Solenoid Valves (SV)

CHANGE:- l This. modification replaced obsolete model solenoid valves for the EDG 1-1 and 1-2 air start system solenoid valves SV-1147B'and SV1148.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The model number for the solenoid valves which previously existed had been obsolete for several years.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The. replacement valves perform the same functions as the previous obsolete valves, therefore:

The proposed. action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR.

=The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of. equipment important to safety.

The proposed action will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction.of a different type evaluated in the USAR.

The~ proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. Therefoie, an unreviewed safety question is not involved.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-146' TITLE:

Globe Valves on Containment Air Cooler Inlet Header Drains CHANGE: )

I Replace globe valves SW 314, SW 316 and SW 320 with gate valves.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The globe valves are presently plugged and require removal of the drain lines for cleaning. The gate valves will allow the use of a pipe cleaning-auger.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The replacement of globe valves with gate valves will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety-related equipment as evaluated in the USAR. Nor will this change create a possibility for an accident different than any previously evaluated in the USAR or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Basis for any Technical Specification. Therefore,.an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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I SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-148 TITLE:

-Power Source for Press to Test Lights CHANGE:

.This FCR adds 2 Class IE wire jumpers on light modules. This provides the power source from the normal light power supply for the push to test function.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Install press-to-test function on D.C. Indicating Lights for valve motors MV-01060, MV-03600 and MV-38700.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The addition of push to test function test lights will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or i malfunction of safety-related equipment as evaluated in the USAR. Nor will this change- create a possibility for an accident different than any previously evaluated in the USAR or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Basis for any Technical Specification. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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I SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-152' TITLE:

Revise Item D on Page 6.2-58-of the USAR CHANGE:

1 Delete the words "(activation from low radiation area)" from item d on pg; 6.2-58 of the USAR.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Radiation fields following a LOCA would preclude access to the valves, and post LOCA access to these valves is not warranted. This change will l eliminate the possible misinterpretation on the capability of post LOCA. '

access to these areas.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The ' proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because-these valves do not require _ isolation following LOCA and need to remain open following LOCA.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the change does not involve any modification to plant' systems.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the change does not involve any modification to plant systems.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the containment integrated leak rate tests are conducted with these valves open.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-162 TITLE:

Auxiliary Feedwater Controls on Panel C5717 CHANGE:

Removal of spare switches (SAM lights) and 2 spare Cutler Hammer Hand Indicating Switches and to' correct labeling inconsistencies.

REASON FOR CHANGE: ,

The spare switch removal and relabeling enhancements will substantially improve the existing human engineering condition.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This design change will not affect the safety function of the human engineering or the SFAS System. This modification will enhance the operators verification of SFAS Level 4 actuation'.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical-Specification.

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L SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-164 TITLE:

Submerged. Transmitter Modification CHANGE:

s TheLpurpose of this FCR is to replace the existing conar connectors in Steam Generator Level Transmitters LT 2P9D3, D4, B3, and B4 with qualified

- connectors with a longer pigtail length.

' REASON FOR CHANGE:

' To allow the electrical junction boxes to be raised above the maximum postulated post-accident flood level.

SAFETY EVALUATION'

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR since the only modification is to replace the conax connector with a similar model which is qualified for the postulated environmental and seismic conditions.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the connector replacement will not degrade any equipment and will not prevent any system from functioning as assumed in the SAR. The work associated with this modification will meet all applicable QA requirements.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because this modification will not introduce any failure mechanisms which were previously unanticipated or any events which are not bounded by the SAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. The bases for 3/4.3.3.5 ensure that capability is available to permit remote shutdown and maintenance of hot standby from locations outside the control room. The bases for 3/4.3'.3.6 ensure the operability of post-accident instrumentation.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-166

)

TITLE:

Reset Torque' Switch Settings for Limitorque Actuator (MOVATS).

CHANGE:

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Setting the close torque. switch to a value such that the Limitorque.

l, actuator is supplying thrust as recommended by the valve manufacturer.

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REASON FOR CHANGE:

The actual thrust applied to torque seated values actuated by Limitorque motor operators is now being measured by a MOVATS testing system during the Davis-Besse valve testing program.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The resetting of the close torque switch, when required, to reflect the required" thrust gives maximum assurance that the affected valves will-function as intended at maximum required closing valves.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a.different type evaluated in the USAR.

i The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-168 TITLE:

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.High Range Radiation Monitor Detector Mountings CHANGE:

Remount detectors RE 4596A and RE 4596B containment high range area detectors, from horizontal to vertical with detector on top.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This is to make the installed configuration the same as that which was tested for environmental qualification and to maintain seismic qualification.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The change of installation configuration will not increase the probability.of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of_ safety-related equipment as evaluated in the USAR. Nor will this change create a possibility for an accident different than any previously evaluated in the USAR or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Basis for any Technical Specification. Therefore, an ucreviewed safety cuestion does not exist.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-169 TITLE:

Modification of Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Supports CIIANGE:

Piping hangers and plat' form steel in the containment and RCP 1-2-2 oil enclosure will be cut to facilitate removal of RCP 1-2-2 for pump maintenance. Some hangers, piping structural steel and pump oil cooler enclosure will be modified to make them more easily removable for any future pump work removal of interference to allow replacement of RCP 1-2-2 motor / rotating' assembly.

REASON FOR CilANGE:

To install a replacement pump rotating assembly.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed. action will not increase the probability or consequences of an' accident previously described in the USAR because the structural integrity and the Seismic Category I requirements of all structures and components affected by these modifications will be maintained.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a l malfunction of equipment important to safety because none of the changes

'are to active components.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because no changes are being made that are outside the design bases of the plant and no failure mechanisms previously unanticipated are being introduced.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the margins of safety for the systems affected by these modifications will not be impaired by adding flanges to the sensing lines and modifying the hangers.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-170 TITLE:

Cover for Power Operated Relief. Valve (PORV) Control Switch CHANGE:

This modification installs a protective cover over hand switch HIS RC2-6 (PORV control switch).

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This change will prevent inadvertent opening or closing of the PORV.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not. increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR.

The proposed action'will not increase the probability or consequences of a C malfunction of equipment important to safety because the modification will not violate existing environmental or seismic qualifications. The change will not degrade any equipment or prevent any system from functioning as assumed in the USAR.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the change will not' introduce any failure mechanisms which were previously unanticipated or any events not bounded by the USAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the change will not affect any Technical Specification bases.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-174 TITLE:

Modification to Steam Generator (S/G1 Level Control Circuit CHANGE:

This modification adds blocking diodes at a common input point to the two controllers for the essential steam generator water level control system.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The interconnection between the two controllers allows interaction between the controllers which results in the possibility of erroneous setpoint valves for S/G level control.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the capability of the Auxiliary Feedwater System to maintain proper S/G level is enhanced.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the two failure modes for the added diodes (open or shorted) will not result in'a common mode failure.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the modification will not introduce any failure mechanisms which were previously unanticipated or any events not bounded by the USAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the Technical Specification bases for limiting conditions for operations and surveillance requirements are not affected by this modification.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-177 TITLE:

plant. Modification to Replace Temporary Fire Detectors CHANGE- -

l This modification permanently installs 2 ionization type fire detectors in the makeup and purification filters room (Room 206) and the corridor to the #1 mechanical penetration room (Room 209).

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REASON FOR CHANGE:

To replace a temporary fire detector and reduce fire watch coverage requirements which existed due to an inoperable fire barrier.

SAF$fY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

l The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of

" , N,q an accident previously described in the USAR because the permanent addition of the fire detectors will not degrade the fire detection system and will result in a more timely detection of the presence of combustibles in the Rooms 206 and 209 referenced above.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because this modification does not modify the operation of any system important to safety or violate

, any single failure criteria identified in the USAR for the fire detection system. I The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the addition of the detectors does not degrade or create an adverse environment for any plant system.

'T'he proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because this change increases the number of operable fire detectors providing coverage for Fire Detection Zone 209.

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SAFEIT' EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-179 TITLE:

Deletion of ICS Asymmetric Rod Runback

' CHANGE:

' Removal of an asymmetric and condition as an automatic load limiting feature of the Integrated Control System (ICS)

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Operating experience since implementation of the slow (3% per minute) runback has. demonstrated that the ICS asymmetric runback feature is no longer needed. Removal of ICS features not required by Operations is consistent with the Babcock & Wilcox Owners Group efforts to simplify the ICS.

SAFhfY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or. consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because all USAR accidents were analyzed without ICS, ICS is not a safety system.

The proposed action will not increase the probability.or consequences of a malfunction'of eqnipment important to safety because all circuit modifications are confined within the ICS cabinets. The USAR safety analysis assumes no credit for any ICS function which might he available.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because a misalignment of control rods as defined by Technical Specification 3/4.1.3, rod withdrawal to the stipulated power level will be accomplished manually. Manual runback has been the preferred mode of operation for asymmetric rod conditions since it is performed in conjunction with RC boration.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-180, REV. A

' TITLE:

Evaluation to Remove Plant Restrictions Due'to Raychem Splices CHANGE:

This evaluation was written to perform a 10CFR50.59 review to remove all-restrictions placed on the plant due to the Raychem insulated splice issue.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Raychem field work has been completed.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the Raychem is now environmentally qualified so multiple failures need not be postulated and no system modifications are made.

The proposed action will not. increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important. to safety because Raychem is now envirc mentally qualified and redurdancy has not been altered.  !

The proposed scLlan will not create a possibility of aa accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because there are no system modifications.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because no limits or setpoints have

~

been altered and the Raychem for equipment in the Technical Specification has been repaired, i

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-182 TITLE:

Plant Modification for Replacement of a Makeup (MU) System Valve CHANGE:

This modification replaces the manual globe valve (MU 216) that is installed in a bypass line around an actuated valve (MU 19) on the makeup pump's discharge header.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The valve was leaking and a determination was made that it was easier and more economical to replace than repair.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR.

The. proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety..

1 The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or i malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR.

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The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

The replacement valve is similar in size and style except for its weld and  !

connections the replacement valve will have butt weld connections. The heavier weight (15 pounds more) or the new valve was investigated and a determination was made that it would not affect the seismic stress analysis of the pipeline. The replacement valve is both ASME and seismically qualified and made of the same material as the previous valve.

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f, SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-186 i

l TITLE:

Removal of' Interference to Facilitate Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Maintenance CHANGE:

Piping, hangers, and conduit in'the containment building and the RCP 1-1-1 oil cooler enclosure will be cut to facilitate removal of RCP 1-1-1 for pump maintenance. Some hangers and piping and the pump oil cooler enclosure was modified to make them more easily removable for any future pump work.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

RCP motor / rotating assembly 1-1-1 will be removed in order to install a replacement pump rotating assembly.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the structural integrity and the Seismic Category I requirements of all structures and components affected by this modification will be maintained.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because none of the changes

'made by these modifications are to active components.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because no changes are being made that are outside the design bases of the plant and no failure mechanisms previously unanticipated are being introduced.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the margins of safety for the affected systems will not be impaired by adding flanges to the sensing lines and modifying the hangers. I l

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1 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-187 )

1 TITLE:

Removal of Interference to Facilitate Reactor Coolant Pump Maintenance 1

CHANGE:

Piping, hangers, and structural steel in the containment will be cut to 1 facilitate removal of reactor coolant pump (RCP) 1-1-2 for pump maintenance. Some hangers, piping and structural steel'will be modified to be more easily removable for any future pump work.

REASON FOR CHANGE: l The reactor coolant pump motor / rotating assembly for RCP l-1-2 will be removed in order to install a replacement pump rotating assembly.

. SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

l The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the' USAR because the structural integrity and the Seismic Category I requirements of all structures and components affected by this modification will be maintained.

The proposed action wil'1 not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because none of the changes made by these modifications are to active components.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because no changes are being made that are outside the design bases of the plant and no failure mechanisms previously unanticipated are being introduced.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the margins of safety for the affected systems will not be impaired by adding flanges to the sensing lines and modifying the hangers.  ;

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i SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-188 TITLE:

Plant Modification to Remove Covers from SFAS Pushbuttons CHANGE:

This modification removes flipguard' covers from the SEAS reset pushbuttons.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This change is per a NRC commitment for Human Engineering Deficiency (HED)-

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9.2.6. The covers were determined to be no longer necessary after relabeling of manual trip and reset pushbuttons.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or. consequences of an accident previously described in the US1;R.

The proposed action'will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Removal of the flipguards on the SFAS reset pushbuttons will not affect the safety function of these devices.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-193 TITLE:

Modifications of Various Raceways and/or Enclosures CIMNGE: 1 l

Modification of various. raceways and/or enclosures as required to facilitate Raychem splices.  ;

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Accommodation of redesigned Raych m connection / splice configurations in existing raceways and enclosures. J SAFETY EVALUAT!0N

SUMMARY

1 This FCR has established a design process which will permit an orderly flow of design information to the field to implement the redesign of new enclosures. It.also ensures that enclosures of proper size are provided 1

) for the' redesigned splices / bolted connections in order:for the connections to perform their intended safety function. This in turn will ensure that QC will have design documents against which the design implementation will be verified. Therefore, the possibility of creating a situation leading to implementation of unsafe design is avoided.

In conclusion this FCR does not create any one of three situations described below:

1. Increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report.

2. Create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report.

3. Reduct margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specifications.

Therefore, implementation of this FCR does not create the possibility of an unreviewed safety question.

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P SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-0195 TITLE:

Emergency Diesel Generator Setpoint Changes CHANGE:

Change immersion heater temperature switch setpoints for the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG).

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Vendor recommended setpoint to enhance EDG operation and reduce the number of nuisance alarms.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

k The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of .

an accident previously described in the USAR because these modifications '

will not affect the capabilities of the EDGs to perform their safety.

function.' The proposed setpoint changes will not affect the EDG capabilities to assume essential loads.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because these setpoint changes will not violate existing environmental qualification of other safety related equipment and no improper maintenance steps will be

' introduced. Also, these setpoint changes will not degrade.any_ equipment and will not prevent the EDGs or any other system from functioning as assumed in the USAR.

The proposed action will not create a' possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the.USAR.because the set-point changes will not introduce any failure mechanisms which were previously unanticipated or any events which are not bounded by the SAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. Although no margin of cafety is specified, these setpoint changes should increase EDG reliability since the chance of the EDGs being declared inoperable due to low lube oil temperature is lessened.

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a SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-0198 TITLE:

Motor Operated-Valve Control Circuit Modification CHANGE:

Modify FW 601 and FW 612 MOV control circuitry to cause these valves to close on' limit switch control rather than torque switch control.

' REASON FOR CHANGE:

To increase valve reliability and preclude potential valve seating surface damage high stresses and inertial loading experienced during valve closure.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously. described in the USAR because the operating I parameters of the valve have not been changed, i.e., stroke time not effected.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because this FCR increases

- the reliability of.the components and will reduce the probability of valve

. disc failure. Also, this FCR does not make any changes to valve operation, hence the malfunction of concern, failure of the valve to close, remains the same.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the basic functions of the valves are not changed.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because no technical specification is modified or changed, therefore, the margin of safety is not changed.

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.l SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-0203 "i 1

I i i l TITLE:

Replacement of Check Valve DH-3 CHANGE:

Replacement of check valve DH-3 with other than an identical check valve a

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The existing valve was leaking, and an identical new replacement valve was-not readily available.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The new valve is both ASME and seismically qualified, and made of the same material as the existing valve.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. i The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-0235 TITLE:

Replacement of Flow Transmitter FT 4909 CHANGE:

i Replacement of FT 4909 flow transmitter with a similar instrument.

REASON FOR CHA!4GE:

The original flow transmitter could no longer be calibrated, and an exact replacement was no longer available.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the ~USAR because the replacement of the transmitter has no bearing on the probability of occurrence of any accident. The new transmitter will still function in the same way as the existing transmitter. The addition of the items on the E.Q. Master List is required as the transmitters are required to operate post LOCA.

Addition to the master list will document that the components are acceptable for the high radiation.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the replacement of the flow transmitter will not affect the RCS Pressure Boundary and will not inhibit the function of existing Class IE equipment. The modification will not degrade any safety related equipment, nor will it pr*vrat any system function as discussed in the USAR.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because failure mechanisms previously unanticipated or events not bounded by the USAR I will not be introduced by this change.

l The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in tSe basis for any Technical Specification because the change does affect any technical specification basis margin.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-0236 TITLE:

Radiation Nonitor Check Source Replacement CHANGE:

Replace the check source in Radiation Monitors RE-1878A & RE-1878B from 8 Micro-curie sources to 100 Micro-curie sources.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To enable response checks to be performed in the presence of expected background radiation levels.

1 SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of

-an accident previously described in the USAR because the changes do not i affect the capability of these monitors to perform their intended function and have no bearing on the probability of occurrence of any accident described in the USAR. The assumption stated in the USAR pertaining to excessively radioactive waste being prevented from entering the primary j water storage tank or discharged to the environment is not affected_by j these' changes, i The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the monitors are safety related, but the modification will not affect any safety function.

The proposed changes do not degrade any equipment and do not prevent the liquid waste system or any other system from functioning as assumed in the USAR. ,

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the changes  ;

do not introduce any failure mechanisms which were previously unanticipated or any events which are not bounded by the USAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the modification does not adversely affect the basis for Technical Specifications pertaining to radioactive liquid effluent or the station's ability to monitor liquid effluent, i

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-0237 TITLE:

RCPM Turbine Trip and SFRCS Full Trip Alarm Modification CHANGE:

Elimination of the redundant turbine and the SFRCS full-trip-alarm coming directly from the RCPM Circuits.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To eliminate redundant trip paths from the RCPM to the turbine trip unit, thereby reducing the probability of false turbine trips.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because removal of the superfluous trip path will enhance operations by reducing the probability of false turbine trips and, therefore, reducing the number of challenges to safety systems.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the modifications will meet all applicable QA requirements and will not violate existing environmental or seismic qualifications and no improper maintenance steps will be introduced. The changes will not degrade any equipment and will not prevent any systems from functioning as assumed in the USAR.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the changes will not introduce any failure mechanisms which were previously unanticipated or any events which are not bounded by the USAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margia of safety as defined in the l basis for any Technical Specification because the changes do not affect l any Technical Specification bases.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-0239B

')'

TITLE:

Essential Load Center Ground Fault' Relay Setting Revision CHANGE:

Modification to allow the affected 15 AMP MCC branch circuit breakers to coordinate with the upstream transformer ground fault relays and load center breakers under a ground fault condition.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To eliminate the' possibility of losing essential MCC power.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the change in the settings will ensure essential power to components required for safe shutdown during a ground fault condition which could possibly occur in the postulated post accident environment.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the change in relay settings will improve breaker coordination on ground fault thereby improving-the reliability of power to essential loads.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the proposed change increases the ground fault relay settings so that the 15 ampere branch breakers.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the relay settings are not specified in any Technical Specifications.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-0245 TITLE:

MS-198 Vent Valve Replacement CHANGE:

Replacement of a vent valve on the high point of the steam generator 1-1 I reference leg.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Replacement of valve due to separation of existing valve's stem separating from its plug / disc. It is easier to replace the valve rather than repair the existing valve. K b

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The replacement valve is identical to the existing one in nominal size and material. It uses a metal diaphragm above the plug to elminate leakage.

Support changes have been made to seismically qualify the piping for all modes of operation.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a -

malfunction of equipment important to safety.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-247 TITLE:

Coruponent Cooling Water (CCW) Pump Room Recirculation Dampers CHANGE:

This modification will add mechanical stops to the.CCW Pump Room recirc-ulation dampers.and will adjust the actuator stroke to fully open and close the damper during operation while preventing over stroking of the damper if power to the actuator is lost.

' REASON FOR CHANGE:

To implement actions and configuration changes to the dampers which will readjust damper actuators to prevent undesirable recirculation of hot room air. -With recirculation of hot room air, the ambient room temperature could conceivably exceed the room design temp of 104*F. The use of mechanical stops has been recommended by the actuator. vendor for eliminating movement between zero and the minimum input signals.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The modification which adds mechanical steps to the CCW Pump Room Recirculation Damper will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety-related equipment as evaluated in the USAR. Nor will this change create a possibility for an accident different than any previously evaluated in  !

the USAR or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Basis for any Technical Specification. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR 2CR 86-0249 TITLE:

Cabinet Door' Safety Hazard CHANGE:

1 Relocation of carbing in the Service Water Pump Room of the Intake

' Structure.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The door on Cabinet CDF12C is unable to be opened fully causing personnel to squeeze between wall and cabinet' door. This prevents work from being completed in a safe manner.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The changes in the Intake Structure will not increase the probability or occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of any safety related' equipment as evaluated in the USAR. Nor will the described

. changes create a possibility for an accident different than any. evaluated previously in the USAR, or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the

-basis for any technical specification. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question'does not exist and the changes are acceptable.

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l SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-262 TITLE:

Piping Restraint at Floor Penetration.

CHANGE:

Install a piping restraint at a floor penetration that will accommodate a flood barrier for negligible flooding into Room #500 and three-hour fire barrier protection seals.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To accommodate a flood barrier for negligible flooding and a 3-hour fire barrier boot seal.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Based on the installation per approved penetration seal details, the results of analysis performed on the pipe support, and the negligible affect the final barrier will have on the pipe support:

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or. consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an' accident or malfunction of a.different type evaluated in the USAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR'FCR 86-0264

..n TITLE:

l Isolator / Mounting Supports for Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) Compressors CHANGE:

Replace the copper tube spacers with steel spacers and upgrade the

-existing 3/8 inch mounting bolts to 1/2 inch bolts with self locking nuts.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The new spacers will raise the motor end of the compressor approximately 1-inch to level the compressor in accordance with the vendor drawings provided in the operations manual.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Replacement of tube spacers and upgrade of mounting bolts for CREVS will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety-related equipment as evaluated in the ,

USAR. Nor will this change create a possibility for an accident i different than any previously evaluated in the USAR or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Basis for any Technical Specification, f Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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. SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-271 TITLE:

Steam Generator. Tube Plugging CHANGE:

. Plugging and stabilization of steam generator tubes as required by Eddy O >

Current examination.

REASON FOR CHANGE:  !

c In'accordance with. Technical Specification 4.4.5, tubes demonstrating imperfections greater than 40% through-wall.shall be plugged.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

.The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because tube break and tube leakage of degraded tubes.is' prevented by plugging and stabilization. The

, steam generator function is not affected.

The proposed action will'not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of. equipment important to safety because the plugs have been .

designed to withstand pressures greater than tube. rupture. .The changes do

.not affect.any other safety related equipment.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of'a'different type evaluated in the USAR because the USAR already. addresses-a tube rupture which conservatively bounds any failure.

of the plugs.

The proposed' action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the

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. basis for any Technical Specification.because the one gallon per minute leak-rate' limit will not be exceeded.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-0276 TITLE:

Liquid Radwaste' Discharge Piping Modification

~ CHANGE:

Modify the combined liquid radwaste. discharge piping and eliminate the tie-in.of the' discharge piping from the Neutralizing Tank Transfer Pump.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To correct leaking piping and reroute to a configuration which will minimize stress damage to weld points, and to disconnect the discharge piping from the neutralizing tank.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This modification eliminates a potential path for uncontrolled releases of radioactive liquids. The proposed modification does not increase the probability of any accident which has or has not been defined in the USAR.

The proposed modification does not effect the operability of the radwaste and make-up water treatment systems; pursuant to the above, this modification does not present an unreviewed safety question. ,

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-0282 TITLE:

l Replacement of 480 VAC Breaker in MCC E16A CHANGE:

Replace existing 480 VAC Breaker in MCC E16A which is not qualified for harsh environment application in accordance with 10CFR50.49.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Breaker BE 1609 in MCC E16A'is not qualified for harsh environment application in accordance with 10CFR50.49.

The replacement breaker will not affect the safety function of 480 VAC essential MCC Power since the breaker has the same ratings as that of existing breaker and is Environmentally Qualified.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for'any Technical Specification.

Based on the foregoing consideration, it is concluded that replacing the original breaker with an equivalent type will not result in an unreviewed safety question.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-0284 TITLE:

Rework Penetration Low Level Instrumentation Shields / Drains CHANGE:

Disconnected the mylar tape shield and drain wires on the pigtails for low level instrumentation penetrations of all cables associated with RPS, SFAS, SFRCS, and PAM transmitter circuits required to function after a LOCA/HELB and other circuits required by the EQ Master Equipment List and determinate using spare conductors within the same penetration.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Postulated that the mylar tape shield could disintegrate under LOCA/RELB Conditions and expose the leare drain wire introducing multiple ground loops resulting in impredictable noise interferences with the monitorcl signals.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in'the USAR.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the shield drain wire modifications will meet all applicable QA requirements and will not violate existing environmental or seismic qualifications and no improper maintenance steps will be introduced. As such, the chance of a single failure occuring will not increase.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the l basis for any Technical Specification.

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b SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-0290 TITLE: .

Reactor, Coolant Pump Replacement Rotating Assemblies CHANGE:

Install replacement reactor coolant pump rotating assemblies and provide an alternate locking mechanism for the RCP Hydrostatic Bearing Bolts.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

A concern was raised regarding Reactor Coolant Pump rotating assemblies installed in Byron Jackson Pumps after a reactor coolant pump shaft fractured in the Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Power Station. Subsequent inspections revealed indications of progressive deterioration on the RCP

, Rotating Assemblies. At Davis-Besse for ALARA considerations as well as time and. financial considerations, the decision was made to replace rather than repair the existing rotating assemblies.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the loss of RC flow due to mechanical failure from any cause has been considered and analyzed-as the RCP locked rotor accident. Also, there would be no increase in the consequences because the reactor is protected by the Reactor Protection System.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because design changes were made to increase the reliability of the RCP's to perform their intended function, and the design of the RCP replacement rotating assemblies / bearing bolt locking clips provides for enhanced loose parts capture, j i

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because loss of forced reactor coolant flow (partial, complete, and single RCP locked l rotor) bounds complete RCP failure. l The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the RCP's are not required  ;

to achieve Cold Shutdown. )

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-0293 1

-TITLE:

OTSG Tube Plugging CHANGE:

Removal of. existing' plug and replacement with a tapered weld cap plug and segmented stabilizer in tube 47-1, Steam Generator 2.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

A bubble test performed 8/12/86 indicated the plug on the upper tube sheet

. tube end was leaking. Subsequent evaluations of the problem revealed that the effectiveness of a repair weld was uncertain because the source of the leak was unidentified. Therefore, the decision to remove the existing plug and stabilizer and replace with a new plug and segmented stabilizer.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an. accident previously described in the USAR because tube break and tube leakage of degraded tubes is prevented by plugging and stabilization.

Also, the steam generator function is not affected.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the plugs are welded to the tube sheet cladding and the stabilizers serve to prevent tube separation and vibration. Also, the changes do not affect other safety related equipment.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the USAR already addresses a tube rupture which conservatively bounds any failure l

of the tube plugs, and tube plugs already exist in the steam generators.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the one gallon per minute limit will not be exceeded as a result of repairing the plug.

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1 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-0295 l

TITLE:

Line'HBD-68 Pipe Support Upgrade CHANGE:

Upgrade of line'HBD-68 supports located in the Diesel Fire Pump Room (51) and Service Water Pump Room (52) to Seismic Category I.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This upgrade of support design will act to mitigate a harsh environment in these rooms due to a potential pipe break caused by a seismic event.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the supports and piping stress levels are within the design allowables. Also these modifications act to prevent failure of the system pressure boundary due to a seismic event and thereby, prevents formation of a harsh environment.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because they act to prevent failure of the system pressure boundary and formation of a harsh environment for safety related equipment.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or i malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because they act to '

prevent failure of the system pressure boundary and formation of a harsh environment.-

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because they act to maintain piping stresses within allowables and prevent formation of a harsh environment.

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i SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-0300 TITLE:

SFRCS/AFW Integrated Test CHANGE:

'None, 50.59 review only REASON FOR CHANGE:

FCR 86-0300 is written to ensure Test Procedure TP 850.18.00 is evaluated for any unreviewed. safety questions in compliance with 10 CFR 50.59.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUEMARY:

The test will not increase the probability of any accident since the  ;

analyzed event assumes the reactor is initially critical at zero or full power and reactor safety has been demonstrated, and this test requires l positive reactor shutdown conditions.

Since there is no increased probability of experiencing any analyzed accident, and even if any should occur, with the procedurally limited plant conditions and the immediate availability of operators, the consequences of the accidents are bounded by the USAR evaluated events.

The proposed test will not increase the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety since all actions are testing the oprability of the equipment within design conditions.

The proposed test will not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the test conditions are clearly limited and multiple alternate methods of overcoming equipment malfunctions exist.

The proposed test will not create a possibility for an accident of a differer.t type than previously analyzed in the USAR since the only possible accidents are all analyzed events in the USAR.

The proposed test will not create a possibility for a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than any evaluated in the USAR because no abnormal or unusual operations are being performed with the equipment which could cause malfunction.

The proposed test will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the

-basis for any Technical Specification because the initial conditions and limitations set in the procedure were established to be inside the bounds of all probable events which could affect margins to safety. All probable events have been previously analyzed.

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l SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-0306 TITLE:

Escape llatch Gasket Modification CHANGE:

Replace Neoprene Gasket Material on Escape Hatch with Shore A Silicone -

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The old gaskets on the hatch and doors were made of closed cell neoprene, which was capable of withstanding temperatures up to 230 F. The new gas'het material is a Shore A, Silicone Elastomer Meeting ASTM D2000 requirements capable of meeting both the 10 psig and the 373'F requirements of specification 7749-A-2.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The described modification is required in order to make the hatch and doors capable of withstanding the temperatures it could be subjected to.

The modifications will not increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of any safety related equipment as evaluated in the USAR. Nor will the described modifications create a possibility for an accident or malfunction different than any evaluated previously in the USAR, or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist and the proposed modifications are acceptable.

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i SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-307 l I

TITLE:

Modification to Main Steam Line Area Doors CHANGE:

1 Flat washers (shims).were installed in the door clutch assemblies for l Door No. 601, which separates Room No. 602 (East Main Steam Line Area) '

from Room No. 603 (Air Conditioning Equipment Room), and for Door No. 602, which separates Room No. 601 (West Main Steam Line Area) from Room No. 603.

REASON FOR CRANGE:

This modification was made to minimize the damage to the internal parts of the doors caused by improper adjustment to the door clutches.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

i This action doew, not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the installation of 1 shims in the door clutch assemblies will not affect the function of the l doors.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a asifunction of equipment important to safety because the installation of shims in the door clutch assemblies improves the function of the door clutch assemblies and makes the deoro reliable.

Thts action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the change did not_ affect the function of the doors.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the change did not affect the function of the doors.

Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

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Containment Air Cooling System Fusible Link Ratings CHANGE:

Revision of Fusible Link Rating from 160 F to 165*F REASON FOR CHANGE:

Changes in industry standards regarding acceptable temperature ratings on fusible link material have made it necessary to change the rating of fusible links from 160 F to 165 F. This ensures the availability of acceptable fusible links.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the modification does not adversely impact the function of the Containment Air Cooling System or any other Nuclear Safety Related System. Also, the change in fuse link ratings does not adversely impact the dropout register actuation time.

Therefore, the change does not impact the USAR accident analysis.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the actuation time of the' fuse link is still within the bounds of the assumptions made in the USAR. Also, the modification has no adverse impact on the operation of equipment important to safety.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the modification will not introduce any failure mechanism which are previously unanticip6ted or events which'are not bounded by the USAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the modification does not adversely affect the operation of the Containment Air System and will not affect any Technical Specification basis.

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o SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-0311 TITLE:

Post ~ Accident Sampling System (PASS) Sample Point Relocation CHANGE:

Relocated PASS Sample Points from downst- ;m of DHR Coolers to the DHR Pump discharge line, upstream of the DHn toolers.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Under post accident conditions when the RCS is depressurized, there may not be enough pressure downstream of the DHR Coolers and control valves to provide a representative sample to the PASS.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed. action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the PASS and DHRS are not associated with the initiation of any design basis accident. Also the piping being added will meet ASME AND Seismic Support Requirements.

Therefore, the effectiveness of the DHRS to mitigate the consequences of an accident will not be impaired.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because BTP MEB 3-1 states one inch diameter piping is exempt from postulating breaks or cracks. No active components have been modified, only piping and manual valve changes, which are seismically supported. Therefore, thi shange does not increase the probability of a break in the system.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because two sample points were simply relocated. This change is within the system design basis.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the safety margin in the bases of Tech Specs covering operation of ECCS, and DHRS during various modes of operation and refueling will not be reduced by relocating the sample connections.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR'FCR 86-0319 TITLEi Time Delay Setting Change for the Letdown Cooler Inlet Valves CHANGE:

' Change'the settings from 10 seconds to 5 seconds for: the time relays located in the closing control logic circuitry of the Reactor Coolant Letdown Cooler. Inlet valves MU1A and MU18.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

With the time relay set to 10 seconds, the valves will not operate as

' designed.

' SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Maintaining the time relay at 10 seconds creates the consequences of a malfunction of the letdown cooler inlet isolation valves, MU1A and MU1B, by not ensuring proper valve operation. The postulated pipe break of the RC Letdown System would not be isolated on high letdown line temperature.

The time relay does not affect the function of any other safety or non-safety related systems.

Changing the time relay setting to 5 seconds ensures the valves will operate as designed. With proper valve operation, the probabilities of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment to safety as previously evaluated in the Safety-Analysis Report is not increased. This does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report. This change does not affect the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specification. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-323 TITLE:

Air Compressor 1-1 Water Flow Switch Removal

'I CHANGE: j I

Removal'of Water Flow Switch from Station Air Compressor 1-1.

l REASON FOR CHANCE:

i Redundancy of alarms which are not necessary, f

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The' proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of

-an accident previously described in the USAR because no accidente can be

' initiated by the station air system and no credit is taken for its operation.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the station air system performs non-safety related functions. The functions will not change as a result of this modification. This modification will not degrade the operation or qualification of any safety related equipment.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the modification will not introduce any failure mechanisms which were previously unanticipated or any events which are not bounded by the SAR.

Therefore, the proposed modification will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type.than any previously evaluated in the SAR.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because no safety margins are  ;

specified in the Technical Specification for the station air system. t c

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-325

- TITLE:

Valve FW 106 Administrative Control CHANGE:

. Lock closed kW 106 to prevent inadvertent pressurization above 275 psig.

during modes 1, 2, and 3.

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- REASON FOR CHANGE.  ;

Protection of' nuclear safety related auxiliary feedwater equipment from a moderate energy line break.

SAFETY EVALU (ION

SUMMARY

The locked closed condition of valve FW 106 will provide assurance that the AFW system will perform its safety function and will not affect the safety function of the main feedwater system.

The modification does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated or which has not been defined in the USAR Nor does it increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. As a result this FCR does not decrease the margin of safety which is the basis of a Technical Specification.

Pursuant to the above, this FCR does not present an unreviewed safety question.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-327 TITLE:

MOV Torque Switch Setpoint Change CHANGE:

. Change present torque switch setting on MOVs SW 2929, SW 2930, SW 2931, and SW 2932. Limitorque recommendations are: 2.5 open and closed for i SW 2929 and 1.75 open and closed for valves SW 2930, 2931, and 2932.  !

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Correction of erroneous MOV Torque Switch set points supplied by a vendor.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the operating parameters of the valves have not been changed, i.e., stroke or safety function time has not been affected.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because this FCR does not make any changes to valve operation. It protects the valves against the operator damaging the valve in case of jamming in the opening direction and insures the torque switch is set to close against the maximum design differential pressures.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the proposed action only returns the setpoints of the subject torque switches back to the original values, also the basic operation and function of the valves is not changed.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because no technical specification is modified or changed, therefore, the margin or safety is not changed."

Based on the above review and evaluation, there is no unreviewed safety question involved.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-332 TITLE:

Atmospheric Vent Valve Wiring Modification CHANGE:

Modify the wiring to the " closed" limit switches on the atmospheric vent-valves so that the "not closed" computer point and the " closed" indicating lights-in the control room are actuated by the same limit switch.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To eliminate the conflicting status information caused by using different actuating devices.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the wiring change will not effect the AVV's function, but will improve the validity of the valve position information provided to the operators. The limit switches perform no safety functions and only control the ICS input which removes the MV error signal from the calibrating integral in the integrated master control system.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the work associated with the wiring change will meet all applicable QA requirements. The work will be performed considering the existing environmental qualification of the switches and will not degrade this qualification. The ability of the limit switches to provide valve position to the operator during normal and accident conditions will be improved by this modification.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the proposed change will

. not introduce any failure mechanist.:s which were previously unanticipated  :

or any events which are not bounded by the USAR.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because no Technical Specification margin of safety is specified for these limit switches.

Based on the above considerations, it is concluded that these setpoint l changes do not involve an unreviewed safety question, i

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-334, SUPPL. 2 TITLE:

Modify Pressure Safety Valves PSVs 2093 and PSV 2119 from Welded Connections to Flanged Connections CHANGE:

To modify Pressure Safety Valves connection from welded to flanged connections to facilitate removal. The installation of the flanged

. connection will also protect the valve from excessive heat which may be generated during the cutting of the pipe to remove the valves for maintenance.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

These valves are welded into the piping and must be cut out for servicing. By rewelding the connections to the PSVs every time they are serviced, the steel may become weakened and the potential for failure increases. Therefore, the flanged connections are more reliable and require less maintenance than welded connections.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

l This action does not increase the probability or consequence of an accident l previously evaluated in the USAR because the Station and Instrument Air

System is not safety-related.

l This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the PSVs are redundant and are on redundant trains.

This action does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR because flanged connections will fail in the same way that welded connections fail in this case.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications because the Station and Instrument Air System is not required for safe shutdown.

Therefore, this FCR does not present an unreviewed safety question.

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l SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-347 l

TITLE:

Condensate System Piping / Tubing Overstress Problem Corrections

' CHANGE:

Modify piping support configuration on condensate system.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To reduce stress limits on condensate system piping / tubing to be within the SAR allowables.

SAFETY EVATJJATION

SUMMARY

Based on design changes, including the evaluations performed, the pipe support and tubing modifications does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety related equipment as evaluated in the USAR. Nor does the modifications create a possibility for an accident different than any evaluated previously in the USAR, or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. Therefore, an'unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR'86-350 h ,

-TITLE:

' Repair Piping Hanger Support 30-CCA-8-H2 CHANGE: ,

Addition:of a;stif^ 2er plate to the base plate on the ceiling, for pressurizer relief. piping.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

AS' found evaluation determined repairs. necessary for stress levels to be ,

within SAR allowables. l

'. SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

UK ' Based on the calculation performed, the repair of this supports does not increase the probability of occurrence on the consequences of an accident "or malfunction of safety related equipment as evaluated in the USAR. Nor

. does the nonconforming condition create a possibility for an accident different than any evaluated previously in the USAR, or.redace the margin of safety'as defined in'the basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore,.an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-352

' TITLE:

Repair. Piping Hanger Support 300CC-8-H16 CHANGE:

r Addition of a stiffener plate to the base plate on the ceiling, for .

pressurizer relief piping.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

As found evaluation determined repairs necessary for stress levcAs to be within SAR allowables.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Based on the calculations performed the repair of this support does not increase the probability of occurrence on the consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety related equipment as evaluated in the USAR. Nor does the nonconforming condition create a possibility for an accident different than any evaluated previously in the USAR, or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. l Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist. '

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SAEETY. EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-360 TITLE:

Decay Heat-Cooler Valves DH 14A and DH 13A Lever Arm Replacement.

CHANGE:

Replace lever arms on o,tlet and bypass valves DH 14A and DH:13A with improved design lever arms.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To eliminate problems of rotational and lateral slippage, thereby reducing potential for mechanical binding.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the new design levers perform the identical function as the levers presently installed.

Valve operation is unaffected by this change, both for the normal Decay Heat Removal and Low Pressure Injection modes of operation.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the valve manufacturer has provided certification that the new lever arms do not degrade previously evaluated valve capability and that they do remain seismically qualified. Failure of the new lever creates identical consequences as failure of the existing lever.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the modified levers are superior to those presently installed. The new levers are an improvement over the previous design, performance of the valves is enhanced. This reduces the possibility of malfunction.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis

-for any Technical Specification because the ability to establish and regulate core cooling during shutdown and to provide emergency injection during a LOCA is unaffected. This modification ensures the continued ability of the Decay Heat System to provide its safety functions.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-363 TITLE:

Station Effluent Monitoring Sample Beach Station Pump Replacement CHANGE:

Replace existing Beach Station Pumps with larger capacity pumps and install flanges and reducing flow orifice to facilitate future maintenance and reduce flow rate to original system flow rate.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Poor performance and excessive corrective maintenance. Also, flanges are installed to facilitate future maintenance.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This' action does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the station effluent monitoring system is not safety related and does not-adversely affect any safety related system or component. The Beach Station effluent monitoring system serves as a backup to the Service Water System effluent monitoring system and accident related effluents would be isolated prior to discharging to the Discharge Channels.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the station effluent monitoring system is not an essential safety system nor does it interface with any safety related systems or components.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because a failure of the station .;'

effluent monitoring system which is a non-essential system is not required to be addressed in the USAR.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the modification has no impact on any system governed by a Technical Specification.

Pursuant to the above, this FCR does not present an unreviewed safety question.

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SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-366

j. TITLE:

-Repair.of Piping Support-CHANGE:

This repair involves removing a small portion of a weld returning a Containment Hydrogen Analyzer Piping Support to its original design intent.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This change is the resolution to a Potential Condition Adverse to Quality (PCAQ) initiated as a result of inspection on normal maintenance activity which identified small nonconforming items.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The piping support repair to containment hydrogen analyzers will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety-related equipment as evaluated in the USAR. Nor will this change create a possibility for an accident different than any previously evaluated in the USAR or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Basis for any Technical Specification.

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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7 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-378 TITLE:

Steam Generator Level Instrumentation Cabinet (SCLIC) Resistor Deletion CHANGE:

Removal of resistor from test circuitry used to simulate steam generator level transmitter inputs into the high and low level trip bistables.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The built in resistor is not checked as part of the M&TE Program.

Therefore, to ensure the trip set point accuracy during monthly calibrations, an external 100 ohm precision resistor issued from M&TE usino ine existing test jacks will be used in lieu of the resistor currently installed.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because using a 100 ohm precision resistor issued from M&TE makes the test circuit identical to the previous test circuit. The system has not actually been changed, thus no accident evaluated in the USAR is affected.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because with the use of the M&TE resistor, the circuit is identical to the previous design. The test circuit is identical schematically to the test circuit previously in existence, thus equipment important to safety is not affected.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because with the use of a resistor from M&TE for testing purposes, the circuit is identical to the previous test circuit. Since the circuit is identical there is no possibility for an accident of a different type to be created.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the use of precision resistors issued from M&TE ensures a more accurate calibration. This also ensures trip setpoint and thus margins of safety are properly met.

Based upon the above, removing the test resistor in the steam generator level instrumentation cabinets to allow use of M&TE issued precision resistors does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

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1 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FCR 86-404 TITLE:

Removal of Water Treatment Building Sump Pumps CHANGE:

This change removes the Water Treatment Building sump pumps along with the associated instrumentation and electrical connections.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Sump pumps were removed for the installation of a new permanent sump pump.

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SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or' consequences of-an accident previously described-in the USAR because the sump pumps are not safety.related and do not adversely affect any safety related system or component.

.The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because there are no essential components located in the Water-Treatment Building.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because flood protection of the Water Treatment Building is not required.

The-proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the modification has no impact on any system governed by a Technical Specification.

l SAFETY EVALUATION 86-002 l l

TITLE:

Revision of USAR Section 11.4.3.3.10 CHANGE:

Revise Section 11.4.3.3.10 of the USAR to reflect as-built conditions.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The circulating water chemical control system which utilized sulfuric acid to minimize scale formation was replaced with a system that uses an organic phosphate compound.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The circulating water chemical control system performs no safety related functions. This safety evaluation is only to revise the USAR to reflect as-built conditions.

The currently installed system does not represent an unreviewed safety question.

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SAFETY EVALUATION 86-004 TITLE:

Performance of ILRT Following Replacement of CV624B CHANGE:

ILRT is not required for this valve per Technical Specification Table 3.6-2.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Type C test will be performed following replacement.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Penetration 72C (CV624B) is not subject to a Type C (ILRT) test per Tech.

Spec Table 3.6-2. -

10CFR50 Appendix J, IV.A, Special Testing Requirement, requires that any replacement of a component which is part of the primary reactor containment boundary shall be followed by either a Type A (IRLT), Type B or C (ILRT) test.

This test will meet the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix J, Section IV. A and therefore is not an unreviewed safety question.

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SAFETY EVALUATION 86-009 TITLE:

Raise EDG Lube Oil Temperature and Revise Section 8.3.-1.1.4 CHANGE:

Revise USAR Section 8.3.1.1.4, page 8.3-9 to state that lube oil tempera-ture should be maintained above 85 F. Currently the USAR states that temperature should be approximately 80 F.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Per discussion with vendor during System Review and Test Program, it was determined that the operability of the EDG should be based on lube oil temperature staying above 85 F.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Changing the EDG lube oil prerequisite from greater than 80 F to greater than 85 F is a change in the conservative direction and does not affect the safety function of the EDGs. The change will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety-related equipment as evaluated in the USAR. Nor will this change create a possibility-for an accident different than any l previously evaluated in the USAR or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Basis for any Technical Specification. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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i SAFETY EVALUATION 86-012 TITLE:

Revise the Maximum Acceptable Leak Rate (MALR) as listed in ST 5061.02 CHANGE:

Remove the MALR as' listed in ST 5061.02 REASON FOR CHANGE:

The purpose of the revision in:the MALR is to take into account the system design, manufacturing recommendations and to limit unnecessary valve maintenance.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed revision will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated'in the USAR because the Technical Specification 3.6.1.2 limiting condition for operations will not be exceeded.

The proposed revision will not increase the probability or consequence of-a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the Technical Specification 3.6.1.2 limiting condition for operations will not be exceeded.

i The proposed. revision will not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously identified in the USAR because the Technical Specification 3.6.1.2 limiting condition for operations will not be exceeded.

The proposed revision will not decrease the margin of safety as defined in the basis of Technical Specification 3.6.1.2 because the limiting condition for operation will not be exceeded.

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SAFETY EVALUATION 86-013 TITLE:

Cycling the.PORV 8 times at nominally 700 psig and 3 times at nominally 2155 psig CHANGE:

Proposed TP 851.27.will verify that the PORV will operate properly and  !

that the PORV block valve can close against full system pressure required for a successful feed and bleed 'peration.

o i REASON FOR CHANGE:

See above.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The safety concern for this test is that RCS pressure could be decreased below the low pressure trip setpoint. Also, if there is a failure of the PORV to close, there may be a large pressure and temperature decrease in the RCS.

A Relap model was developed and six cases-describing expected modes of operation and possible malfunction were run. Based on the analysis of the modeling results, it was determined that no unreviewed safety questions exist, i

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l SAFETY EVALUATION 86-014 L j TITLE: l Service Water Throttle Valves on Control Room EVS CHANGE: I

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ST 5076.05 has been written to verify / sets the discharge throttle valve )

for control room EVS cooler 1-1. I l

l REASON FOR CHANGE: '

This procedure verifies / sets the correct valve position of SW 136, control room EVS throttle valve, in accordance with the methodology provided in FCR 85-221.

. SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1 1

The action in this procedure does.not exceed the limits postulated _in the Safety Evaluation of FCR 85-221. Therefore, the procedure does not j increase the probability or consequences of_the accidents the control room EVS has been evaluated for in the USAR, or create the possibility of a different type of accident. The performance of this procedure will not reduce the margin of safety since it does not render either train of EVS inoperable.

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I SAFETY EVALUATION 86-015 TITLE:

Service Water Throttle Valves on Control Room EVS CHANGE:

ST 5076.06 has been written to verify / sets the discharge throttle valve for control room'EVS cooler'l-2.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This procedure verifies / sets the correct valve position of SW 136, control room EVS Throttle Valve, in accordance with the methodology provided in FC9 85-221.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The action of this procedure does not exceed the limits postulated in the Safety Evaluation of.FCR 85-221. Therefore, the procedure does not increase the probability or consequences of the accidents the control room EVS has been evaluated for in the USAR, or create the possibility of a different type of accident. The performance of this procedure will not reduce the margin of safety since it does not render either train of EVS inoperable.

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l SAFETY EVALUATION 86-020 TITLE:

Changes to USAR, Section 6.3 CHANGE: I l

Page 6.3 Change identifies that power to core flood tank isolation i valves is removed immediately.

Page 6.3 Clarification of test method.

Page 6.3 Corrects valves identified to be leak tested, the test 4

method, and acceptance criteria. s Correct valves that are used to provide overpressure protection.

Clarification of summary statement concerning limiting condition leak rates versus allowable leak rates. ,

I REASON FOR CHANGE:

A review of the portion of the USAR dealing with the core flood system identified several open items. The resolution of several of these items identified the need for the USAR changes.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Implementation of these changes will not result in an increase to the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the USAR. The changes do not involve any physic.a1 changes to the plant, only modification of wording within the USAR.

The possibility for an accident'or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR will not be created. The changes do not effect the operating mode of any equipment and therefore do not effect the current safety analysis.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be re Sced by this procedural change. The changes provide consistency between the Technical Specifications and the USAR.

Pursuant to the above evaluation, the proposed changes do not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

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SAFETY EVALUATION'86-023 TITLE:

USAR Change to Remove Requirement to Check ids or Fuel Assemblies While in Transit ~

' CHANGE:

Deletions of USAR Section 4.3.4.3.3(b)(ii) which states fuel assembly identification markings will be checked while the fuel assembly is in  ;

transit to and from the' reactor.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Verification of ID during transient is impractical due to (1) looking through 23 feet of water, (2) poor work' quality, (3) inefficient under-water lighting, and (4) size of ID numbers.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

As stated in USAR 4.3.4.3.3(c), the core loading is independently verified by two persons visually (i.e. TV camera) surveying the core and recording the fuel assembly numbers versus core location.

Elimination of the fuel assembly ID check during transit to or from the reactor will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident as previously evaluated in the USAR since the ID numbers will be checked after refueling.

No margin.of safety has been reduced by the elimination of fuel assembly ID checks during transit. Safety has actually been been improved as reading of the ID's by camera is more positive and clearer and the tapes can always be reviewed if questions come up in the future.

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SAFETY EVALUATION 86-025 TITLE:

USAR tipdate for off-site Radiological Monitoring CHANGE:

Update USAR sect:fon 11.6.

REASON FOR CHANGW:

Incorporate revisions to our current radiological monitoring program, changes required by Amendment No. 86 to the Radiological Technical Speci-fications (RETS) and proposed changes in our radiological monitoring contract.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Safety Evaluations based on the RETS. Amendment No. 86 by Toledo Edison, NRC and the Franklin Research Center have concluded that there are no unreviewed safety questions as a result of the amendment. Since the proposed revisions to the USAR including the sampling program exceed the requirements of Amendment No. 86, there are no unreviewed safety questions as a result of this amendment.

SAFETY EVALUATION 86-026 TITLE:

Tubing,on Solenoid Valves for SW 1356, SW 1357-and SW 1358 CHANGE:

The. tubing arrangement specified in the temporary mechanical modification and subsequent revision to-FCR 79-280 will allow control air from the Bailey positioner-to modulate the control valve and improve the time required of the control valve to stroke to the fail open position.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

l The copper tubing arrangement as installed does not allow modulating control air from the Bailey positioner'to enter the control valves (SW 1356, 1357 or 1358).

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR will not be increased.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR will not be created.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical j Specification has not been reduced.

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-@ SAFETY EVALUATION 86-030

^ TITLE: -l

, Temporary Hose du(Casing Relief Valve of an Elect Ac Fire Pump CHANGE:

Place a high pressure rubber hose in the cming relief valve of the electrf.c fire pump mounted near the north Vdl- on Elevation 366.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Due to the recent failure of.nlt.ransformer in the water treatment facility and the subsequent contamination of the sumps uith PCBs, it has become necessary to limit all source of flow into the sumps.

V.

SAFETY EVALUATI0ii .RWiARY:

The probability'bf occurr nce or the consequehbes of an accident or mal-function of equijment important to safety evaluated in the USAR will not be increased. The casing relief valve discharge pressure-is more than adequate to overcome the head corrected by the temporary discharge line.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction 01 a different type than

., any previously evaluated in the'USAR will not bq created. Any failure of

, the discharge line would drain into the sumpr/.

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The inargin of' safety as defined in the basis for any Technical i> Specification has not been reduced. The installation of this modification will allow the electric fire pump to become operable and comply with

y. .

Technical Specification 3.4.7.9. ,

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SAFETY EVALUATION 86-031 TITLE:

Reroute Chlorination Flush Line Discharge CHANGE:

Temporarily modify the discharge from the station chlorination system flush line to discharge to the intake structure instead of the backwash sump. i 1

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Due'to the recent failure of a transformer in the water treatment facility and the subsequent contamination of the sumps with PCBs, it has become necessary to limit all source of flow into the sumps.

- SAFETY EVALUATION-

SUMMARY

The proposed action will.not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the amount of chlorine in the effluent is dissolved and small in quantity and will be discharged to an area designed for chlorinated water.

The proposed act. ion will not increase the probability or consequences of as malfunction of equipment important to safety because the discharge water will mix with other chlorinated water and will not effect the operation of any equipment important to plant safety.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than evaluated in the USAR because the

. change does not alter the required operation of any equipment involved.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the modification will not ,

reduce the effectiveness of operation of any affected equipment. i l

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SAFETY EVALUATION 86-032 TITLE:

USAR Section 3.6.2.7.1.5 Revision CHANGE:

Revise USAR Section 3.6.2.7.1.5 to be consistent with Sections 7.4.1.3.1 and 7.4.1.3.7 and the as-built conditions.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

USAR Section 3.6.2.7.1.5 does not accurately describe the plant response to a differential pressure trip.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

No physical changes to the facility are being made. The USAR is being

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revised to reflect the "as-built" condition of the plant.

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR will not be increased.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than evaluated previously in the USAR will not be created.

The margin of safety as' defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fications has not be reduced.

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SAFETY EVAL 0ATION 86-033 TITLE:

=USAR Section 3.6.2.7.1.4 Revision CHANGE:

'The statement "...or manual switchover if necessary, to the same steam generator" will be removed.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

~

Statement is incorrect. The SFRCS provides . interlocks to prohibit manual or automatic override of the protective action until the initiating signals of the station parameters are returned to normal.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

No physical changes to the facility are being made. The USAR is being revised to reflect the "as-built" condition of the plant.

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR will not be increased.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than evaluated previously in the USAR will not be created.

'The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-

'fications has not be reduced.

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1 g SAFETY EVALUATION 86-034 L l TITLE:'

Revision to USAR Section 7.4.1.3.1 CHANGE:

Addition of two annunciators which exist but are not identified in the USAR.

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- Low Main Steam Pressure - Steam Generator High Level

~ REASON FOR CHANGE:

The annunciator alarms provide indication of SFRCS trip conditions. Low Main Steam Pressure has always been an input to the annunciator system.

Steam Generator high level was added under FCR 80-110.

- SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

No physical changes to the facility are being made. The USAR is being revised to reflect the "as-built" condition of the plant.

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR will not be increased.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than evaluated previously in the USAR will not be created.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fications has not be reduced.

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SAFETY EVALUATION 86-037 TITLE:

Safety Evaluation for Temporary Mechanical Modifications CHANGE:

Remove isolation valve DH5B including the pipe nipple connecting it to the pump discharge valve and replacing it with swagelock fittings to the existing instrument tubing.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

This temporary repair is required to restore on Train 1-1 to operability following a crack in the pipe nipple and resultant coolant leak. A perm-anent repair will be implemented prior to changing modes.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the

'USAR will not be increased. The higher pressure rating and lighter weight of the new fittings will reduce the likelihood of failure.

.The consequences of an accident previously evaluated will not be increased since the instrumentation will remain full operational.

The probability or consequences of a malfunction will not be increased since the replacement piping will have a higher pressure rating and lower.

weight than the original equipment and will perform identically to the original equipment.

The probability of an accident or malfunction different than described in the USAR will not be created since the replacement piping will perform identically to the original.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications will not be reduced since the repiscement piping will perform identically to the original equipment.

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a l-SAFETY E/ALUATION 86-039 TITLE:

Replacement of Relief Valve CHANGE:

Defeating safety function of decay heat (DH) to purification system relief

. valve, DH 2797.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Relief valve will not reseat.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This temporary change does not represent a change to procedures or to the facility as described in the USAR. It does not represent a test or experiment not described in the USAR, does not reduce the margin of safety nor does it require a change in the Technical Specifications.

i SAFETY EVALUATI')N 86-047 7

TITLE:

Stocage of CRD Components CHANGE:

Storage of CRD Stator Spares and PI tubes in containment.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The equipment hatch has been closed and the items cannot be brought out

'through the personnel hatch.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an' accident previously described in the USAR because the storage of these

. items will not impact any safety related systems.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a  ;

malfunction of equipment important to safety because the storage.of these-items will not impact any safety related systems.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the storage of these items wi.11 not impact any safety related systems.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the-basis for any Technical Specification because the storage of these items will not impact affect any safety related systems.

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SAFETY EVALUATION 86-049 TITLE:

2 Counts Per Second (CPS) Startup Requirement l

CHANGE:

Reduce the CPS required for startup from 2 to 1/2 on the source range detectors.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

The most recent revision of Regulatory Guide 1.68 requires only 1/2 cps.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the change meets the guidance presented in R.G. 1.68.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the change meets the guidance presented in R.G. 1.68.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because the ability of the source range detectors to indicate a positive reactivity change has not been altered.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the accuracy of the detectors has not been changed.

SAFETY EVALUATION 86-052 TITLE:

Repair of Door 216 CHANGE:

Replace latch pins and roll pins in Door 216.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

Door does not seal.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of  !

an accident previously described in the USAR because this modification, )

necessary to achieve full seal around the door, will permit the door to '

perform its safety function.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of eqnipment important to safety because this modification, necessary to achieve full seal around the door, will permit the door to perform its safety function.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or l malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because this modification, necessary to achieve full seal around the door, will permit the door to perform its safety function.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of rafety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the door will perform its intended safety function to prevent flood waters from entering the service water pump room or the diesel fire pump room.

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l SAFETY EVALUATION 86-053 TITLE:

Relocate DC Ground CHANGE:

Relocate DC Ground for normal range and high range containment Vessel Atmospheric Radiation Monitoring System.

REASON FOR' CHANGE:

Detectors are sensitive to the noise characteristics of the station ground. Shifting the ground will prevent the detector from sensing that i

noise.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because this action will improve the monitor's ability to provide accurate Information or reducing the noise level.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety because the modification still provides a single grounding point which minimizes common mode voltnge noise generation.

The proposed action will not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because these monitors are passive and do not influence the operation of any plant system.

The proposed action will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the change will enhance the system's ability to satisfy the Technical Specification Reactor Coolant Leakage Detection Requirements.

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SAFETY EVALUATION 86-055-L

- TITLE:

J is , Door 501 Modification CHANGE:'

. Mill.and/or shim' hinge plates.

REASON FCR CHANGE:

' To ensure proper. door to door frame fit.and thereby achieving a better '

l - SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

a - This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an

. accident previously described in the USAR because the modification restores the door to its. original design and safety function, q This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a  !

- malfunction of equipment important to safety because'the modification rectores the door to its original design'and safety function.

' This action does not create a possibility of an accident orLmalfunction of; a'different type evaluated in the USAR because the door. manufacturer (Presray) has been contacted _ on a similar door (Door 216) for the same

, problem and Presray has concurred that milling and shimming the hinge

' plates isl anLacceptable method of eliminating the sealing problem and,.

thereby, restores the door.to its original: design land' safety function This action does not. reduce any margin of safety as defined'in the basis for any Technical Specification because the door will perform its intended safety. function'of preventing rater and steam from flooding the Control Cabinet Room from Room 501.

Based on the above determination, an unreviewed safety question does not

- exist.

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SAFETY EVALUATION 86-056

' TITLE:

Room 235 14" Drain Pipe Absence CHANGE:

USAR Sect. 3.6.2.7.1.7.

REASON FOR CHANGE:

To reflect actual as built configuration ;hich prevents flooding of Room 227 from a critical crack in the AfW discharge piping, and a rupture of the door between Rooms 235 and 227.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the USAR because the presence or absence of a drain line does not create an accident uhich is presently not evaluated in the USAR.

l Also, a critical crack need not be postulated as described in the USAR.

It is shown that the maximum flood level in Room 235 is approximately 3.5' and the safety related equipment in Room 227 will not be affected by this flood level. Since no hardware change is being made in the plant, the proposed action does not increase the consequences of a flooding accident.

This action does not increase the probability or consequences of a

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malfunction of equipment important to safety because there is no flooding concern in Room 235 from the AFW System that could cause safety related equipment in Room 227 to be flooded. The existing floor drain in Room 235 and blockout in the wall will handle any flooding that might occur in Room 235, and there are no design basis flooding concerns that require the 14" drain in Room 235.

This action does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated in the USAR because a crack in the AFW discharge line does not need to be postulated because no hardware change is being proposed, and a critical crack in the AFW discharge line does not need to be assumed with the AFW Pumps running.

This action does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification because the drain lines in the Boric Acid Evaporator Room are not part of the Technical Specifications. Also, a crack in the AFW discharge line need not be postulated.  !

Based upon the evaluation provided above it is concluded that the absence of the 14" drain in Room 235 does not represent an unreviewed safety question.

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