ML20054K407
| ML20054K407 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1982 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054K404 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-47523, NUDOCS 8207020038 | |
| Download: ML20054K407 (10) | |
Text
t Ef1 CLOSURE 3 EflVIR0f1MEfiAL IMPACT APPRAISAL BY THE OFFICE OF fiUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATI0ft RELATIfiG TO THE MODIFICATION OF THE SPEflT FUEL STORAGE P0OL FACILITY OPERATIflG LICEfiSE fl0. NPF-8 ALABAMA POWER COMPAfiY JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 DOCKET N0. 50-364 1
8207020038 820623 PDR ADOCK 05000364 P
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i CONTENTS b
1.0 INTRODUCTION
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1.1 Description of Proposed Action
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1.2 Need for Increased Storage Capacity l.3 Radioactive Wastes l.4 Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup System 2.0 ENVIORNMENTAL IMPACTS OF PROPOSED ACTION 2.1 Non-radiological 2.2 Radiological 2.2.1 Introduction 2.2.2 Radioactive Material Released to the Atmosphere 2.2.3 Solid Radioactive Wastes 2.2.4 Radioactivity Released to Receiving Waters 2.2.5 Impacts of Other Pool Modifications 3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF POSTULATED ACCIDENTS 3.1 Cask Prop Accidents 3.2 Fuel Handling Accidents 3.3 Conclusions 4.0
SUMMARY
5.0 BASIS AND CONCLUSION FOR NOT PREPARING AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
AND DISCUSSION
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A Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement (FGEIS) on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel (NUREG-0575, Volumes 1-3) was issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) August 1979.
The NRC staff evaluated l
and analyzed alternative handling and storage of spent light-water power-reactor I
fuel with emphasis on long range policy.
Consistent with the long range policy, the storage of spent fuel addressed in the FGEIS is considered to be interim storage to be used until the issue of permanent disposal is resolved and implemented.
One spent fuel storage alternative considered in detail in the FGEIS is the expansion of the onsite fuel storage capacity by modification of the existing spent fuel pools (SFPs).
On the date of issuance of the FGEIS (August 1979),
40 applications for SFP capacity expansions were approved with the finding in each case that the environmental impact of the proposed increased storage was negligible.
However, since there are variations in storage pool designs and limitations caused by the spent fuel already stored in some of the pools, the FGEIS recommends that licensing reviews be done on a case-by-case basis to resolve plant specific concerns.
In addition to the alternative of increasing the storage capacity of the existing SFPs, other spent fuel storage alternatives are discussed in detail in the FGEIS.
The finding of the FGEIS is that the environmental impact-costs of interim storage are essentially negligible, regardless of where such spent fuel is stored. A comparison of the impact-costs of the various alternatives reflect the advantage of continued generation of nuclear power versus its replacement by coal fired power generation.
In the bounding case considered l
in the FGEIS, where spent fuel generation is terminated, the cost of replacing nuclear stations before the end of their normal lifetime makes this alternative uneconomical.
This Environmental Impact Appraisal (EIA) incorporates the appraisal of environmental concerns applicable to expansion of the Farley Unit 2 SFP.
For additional discussion of the alternatives to increasing the storage l
capacity of existing SFPs, refer to the FGEIS.
This EIA consists of three major parts plus a summary and conclusion. The three parts are:
(1)descrip-tive material, (2) an appraisal of the environmental impacts of the proposed action, and (3) an appraisal of the environmental impact of postulated r
accidents.
1.1 Description of the Proposed Action.
3 By application dated December 18, 1981, as supported by letters dated February 1, i
March 19, April 5, and April 21, 1982, Alabama Power Company (APCo) (the licensee) requested an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 for the Joseph M.
Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (Farley Unit 2). The proposed amendment would allow an increase in the storage capacity of the Farley Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) from 675 to 1407 storage locations.
In order to avoid any unnecessary personnel radiation exposure and to eliminate the generation of additional large quantities of radwaste, APCo has proposed a schedule for re-racking the Farley Unit 2 spent fuel pool prior to the first refueling outage (currently scheduled to begin November 1,1982).
This schedule will allow the pool to be re-racked under dry conditions utilizing conventional construction practices without the possibility of radiation exposure to instal-lation personnel.
Re-racking, prior to the first refueling will also eliminate the remote possibility of a fuel handling mishap or damage to a spent fuel assembly which could occur during wet re-racking after the first refueling due to the necessity to shuffle spent fuel within the pool.
The environmental impacts of Farley Unit 2 as designed, were considered in the Final Environmental Statement (FES) issued in December 1974.
The purpose of this EIA is to determine and evaluate any additional environmental impacts which are attributable to the proposed increase in the SFP storage capacity of the plant.
1.2 Need for Increased Storage Capacity Farley Unit 2 is a pressurized water reactor with a licensed power of 2652 MWt.
The reactor core contains 157 fuel assemblies.
The modifications evaluated in this EIA are the proposals by the licensee to increase the SFP storage capacity from 675 to 1407 spaces.
The proposed increase would be accomplished by replacing the existing fuel storage racks with new, more compact, neutron absorbing racks.
The proposed rack design uses a nominal 10.75-inch center-to-center spacing in each direction.
The old racks had nominal 13-inch center-to-center spacing in each direction.
This modification would extend spent fuel storage capability in the SFP to the year 2009 compared to the year 1994 with the current design.
The increase in capacity would extend the capability for a full core discharge from 1991 to 2006.
This added capability, while it is not needed to protect the health and safety of the public, is desirable in the event of a need for a reactor vessel inspection or repair.
Such off-load capability would reduce occupational exposures to plant personnel.
Currently, spent fuel is not being reprocessed on a commercial basis in the United States.
The Nuclear Fuel Services (flFS) plant at West Valley, New York, was shut down in 1972 for alterations and expansion; on September 22, 1976, NFS informed the Commission that they were withdrawing from the nuclear fuel repro-cessing business. The Allied General Nuclear SetTices (AGNS) proposed plant in Barnwell, South Carolina, is not licensed to operate.
The General Electric Company's (GE) Morris Operation (MO) in Morris, Illinois, is in a decommissioned condition.
Although no plants are licensed for repro-cessing fuel, the storage poci at Morris, Illinois, and the storage pool at West Valley, New York (on land owned by the State of New York and leased to NFS through 1980), are licensed to store spent fuel.
The storage pool at West Valley is not full but NFS is presently not accepting any additional spent fuel for storage, even from those power generating facilities that had contractural arrangements with NFS.
GE is accepting additional spent fuel for storage
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at the M0 only from a limited number of utilities.
Construction of the AGNS j
receiving and storage station has been completed. AGNS has applied for, but has not been granted, a license to receive and store irradiated fuel assemblies in the storage pool at Barnwell prior to a decision on the licensing action e
i relating to the separation of facility.
The future of this facility is i
uncertain, i
1.3 Radioactive Wastes i
The station contains waste treatment systems designed to collect and process I
the gaseous, liquid and solid waste that might contain radioactive material.
The waste treatment systems are evaluated in the Farley Unit 2 FES dated s
December 1974.
There will be no change in the waste treatment systems described in Section 3.2.3 of the FES because of the proposed modification.
i 1.4 Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup System I
f The SFP Cooling and Cleanup System consists of two cooling trains, a purifi-cation loop, a surface skimmer loop, and piping, valves and instrumentation.
The pumps draw water from the pool. Tnis flow is passed through the heat J
exchangers and then returned to the pool. While the heat removal operation i
is in process, a portion of the SFP water is normally diverted through a i
demineralizer and a filter to maintain SFP water clarity and purity.
j We find that the proposed expansion of the SFP will not appreciably affect the '
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capability and capacity of the existing SFP cleanup system. More frequent t
l replacements of filters or demineralizer resin, required when the differentia 1' pressure exceeds a predetennined limit or demineralization effectiveness is 3
reduced, can offset any potential increase in radioactivity and impurities in the j
pool water as a result of the expansion of stored spent fuel. Thus, we have determined that the existing fuel pool cleanup system with the proposed high density fuel storage (1) provides the capability and capacity of removing radio-active materials, corrosion products, and impurities from the pool and thus meets f
the requirements of General Design Criterion 61 in Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 50 i
as it relates to appropriate systems to fuel storage; (2) is capable of reducing occupational exposures to radiation by removing radioactive products from the pool i
j water, and thus meets the requirements of Section 20.l(c) of 10 CFR Part 20 as it relates to maintaining radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable; 1
(3) confines radioactive materials in the pool water into the filters and demin-eralizers, and thus meets Regulatory Position C.2.f(c) of Regulatory Guide 8.8, as it relates to reducing the spread of contaminants from the source; and (4) removes suspended impurities from the pool water by filters, and thus meets Regulatory Position C.2.f(3) of Regulatory Guide 8.8, as it relates to removing i
crud from fluids through physical action.
4 On the basis of the above evaluation, we conclude that the existing SFP cleanup system meets GDC 61, Section 20.l(c) of 10 CFR Part 20 and the appropriate sections of Regulatory Guide 8.8.
Therefore, the system is acceptable for the proposed 4
high density fuel storage.
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. 2.0 EliVIR0fiMEf4TAL IMPACTS OF THE PROPOSED ACTI0f4 2.1 Non-radiological For the Farley Unit 2 SFP expansion, the new racks will be fabricated offsite, and transported to the facility by truck. Because of this, no unusual terres-trial effects are anticipated or considered likely. An estimate of the maximum mately 6.3X10ge rate of heat addition to the cooling water system is approxi-increase in t BTU /hr.
This additional thermal output from the expanded fuel pool is the value which would occur at 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after shutdown with all storage cells filled. The rate would decrease exponentially with time after placement in the pool.
The ienlarged SFP heat rate is less than 1% of the total heat load of 6.5X109 BTU /hr rejected by the station to the atmosphere by the cooling towers and to the receiving water as blowdown. No increase in service water usage is proposed. Thermal effects in the receiving water body will not be measurable by this small increase in the heat output rate.
The licensee does not propose any change in chemical usage or any change to the NPDES discharge permit.
We conclude that the SFP expansion will not result in non-radiological environ-mential effects significantly greater or different from those already reviewed and analyzed in the FES for Units 1 and 2.
2.2 Radiological 2.2.1 Introduction The potential offsite radiological environmental impacts associated with the expansion of the spent fuel storage capacity was evaluated and determined to be environmentally insignificant as addressed below.
During the storage of the spent fuel under water, both volatile and nonvolatile radioactive nuclides may be released to the water from the surface of the assemblies or from defects in the fuel cladding. Most of the material released from the surface of the assemblies consists of activated corrosion products such as Co-58, Co-60, Fe-59 and Mn-54 which are not volatile.
The radionuclides that might be released to the water through defects in the cladding, such as Cs-134, Cs-137, Sr-89 and Sr-90, are also predominantly nonvolatile.
The primary impact of such nonvolatile radioactive nuclides is their contribution of radiation levels to which workers in and near the SFP would be exposed.
The volatile fission product nuclides of most concern that might be released through defects in the fuel cladding are the noble gases (xenon and krypton), tritium and the iodine isotopes.
Experience indicates that there is little radionuclide leakage from spent fuel stored in pools after the fuel has cooled for several months. The predom-inance of radionuclides in the SFP water appear to be radionuclides that were present in the reactor coolant system prior to refueling (which becomes mixed with water in the SFP during refueling operations) or crud dislodged from the I
surface of the spent fuel during transfer from the reactor core to the SFP.
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j During and after refueling, the SFP purification system reduces the radio-activity concentrations considerably.
It is theorized that most failed fuel j
contains small, pinhole-like perforations in the fuel cladding at the reactor 1
operating condition of approximately 800 F.
A few weeks after refueling, the spent fuel cools in the SFP so that the fuel clad temperature is relatively.
cool, approximately 180*F. This substantial temperature reduction should reduce i
the rate of release of fission products from the fuel pellets and decrease the i
gas pressure in the gap between pellets and clad, thereby tending to retain the fission products within the gap.
In addition, most of the gaseous fission products have short half-lives and decay to insignificant levels within a few months. Based on the operational reports submitted by the licensees or dis-cussions with the operators, there has not been any significant leakage of fission products from spent light water reactor fuel stored in the M0 (formerly 1
Midwest Recovery Plant) at Morris, Illinois, or at the NFS storage pool at West Valley, New York.
Spent fuel which had significant leakage while in operating reactors has been stored in these two pools. After storage in the onsite SFP, i
this fuel was later shipped to either M0 or NFS for extended storage. Although the fuel exhibited significant leakage at reactor operating conditions, there was no significant leakage from this fuel in the offsite storage facility.
2.2.2 Radioactive Material Released to Atmosphere l
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With respect to gaseous releases, the only significant noble gas isotope attri-butable to storing additional assemblies for a longer period of time would be Krypton-85. As discussed previously, experience has demonstrated that after spent fuel has decayed 4 to 6 months, there is no significant release of fission products from defective fuel. However, we have conservatively estimated that an additional 220 curies per year of Krypton-85 may be released when the Farley-2 modified pool is completely filled. This increase would result in an additional total body dose to an individual at the site boundary of less than 0.003 mrem / year.
This dose is insignificant when compared to the approximately 100 mrem / year that an individual receives from natural backgound radiation.
The additional total body dose to the estimated population within a 50-mile radius of the plant is less j
that 0.004 man-rem / year. This is less than the natural fluctuations in the dose l
this population would receive from natural background radiation. Under our i
conservative assumptions, these exposures represent an increase of approximately 1% of the exposures from the station evaluated in the FES for the individual at the site boundary and the population. Thus, we conclude that the proposed modifi-cation will not have any significant nor measurable impact on exposures offsite.
Assuming that the spent fuel will be stored onsite for several years, Iodine-131 releases from spent fuel assemblies to the SFP water will not be significantly increased because of the expansion of the fuel storage capacity since the Iodine-131 inventory in the fuel will decay to negligible levels between refueling.
Storing additional spent fuel assemblies is not expected to increase the bulk water i
temperature above 150 F during normal refuelings as used in the design analysis.
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Therefore, it is not expected that there will be any significant change in the i
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ annual release of tritium or iodine as a result of the proposed modification from that previously evaluated in the FES. Most airborne releases from the station result from leakage of reactor coolant which contains tritium and iodine in higher concentrations than the SFP. Therefore, even if there were a higher evaporation rate from the SFP, the increase in tritium and iodine- ---
released from the station as a result of the increase in stored spent fuel would be small compared to the amount normally released from the station and that which was previously evaluated in the FES.
If it is desired to reduce levels of radioiodine, the air can be diverted to charcoal filters for the removal of radiciodine before release to the environment.
2.2.3 Solid Radioactive Wastes The concentration of radionuclides in the pool is controlled by the SFP Cleanup System filter and the demineralizer and by decay of short-lived isotopes. The activity is highest during refueling operations while reactor coolant water is introduced into the pool, and decreases as the pool water is processed through the filter and demineralizer.
The increase of radio-activity, if any, should be minor because of the capability of the SFP Cleanup System to remove radioactivity to acceptable levels.
The licensee does not expect any significant increase in the amount of solid waste generated from the SFP Cleanup System due to the proposed modi fication. While we generally agree with the licensee's conclusion, as a conservative estimate we have assumed that the amount of solid radwaste may be increased by an additional six resin beds (180 cubic feet) a year due to the increased operation of the SFP Cleanup System.
The annual average volume of solid waste shipped from J.M. Farley, Unit 1 during 1978 through 1981 was 21,400 cubic feet.
If the storage of additional spent fuel does increasenthe amount of solid waste from the SFP Cleanup Systems by about 180 cubic feet of dewatered spent resin per year, the increase in total waste volume shipped would be less than 1". and would have no significant additional environmental impact.
We have reviewed the licensee's plan for the removal and disposal of the low density racks and the installation of the high density racks.
Since the SFP for Farley Unit 2 has never had spent fuel stored in it and is currently dry, clean and uncontaminated, there will be no additional radwaste generated by the removal of the low density racks.
2.2.4 Radioactivity Released to Receiving Waters There should not be a significant increase in the liquid release of radionuclides from the plant as a result of the proposed modification. Since the SFP cooling and cleanup system operates as a closed system, only water originating from cleanup of SFP floors and resin sluice water need be considered as potential sources of radioactivity.
It is expected that neither the quantity nor activity of the floor cleanup water will change as a result of this modification. The SFP demineralizer resin removes soluble radioactive matter from the SFP water. These resins are
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periodically flushed with water to the spent resin storage tank. The amount of radioactivity on the SFP demineralizer resin might increase slightly due to the additional spent fuel in the pool, but the soluble radioactivity should be retained on the resins.
If any activity is transferred from the spent resin to the flush water, it will be removed by the Liquid Waste Processing System since the sluice water is returned to that system for processing. After processing in the system, the amount of radioactivity released to the environment as a result of the proposed modification would be negligible.
2.2.5 Impacts of Other Pool Modifications r
As discussed above, the additional radiological environmental impact in the vicinity of Farley Unit 2 resulting from the proposed modifications are very small fractions (approximately 1%) of the impacts evaluated in the Farley Unit 2 FES.
These additional impacts are too small to be considered anything but i
local in character.
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i Based on the above, we conclude that a SFP modification at any other facility
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should not significantly contribute to the environmental impact at Farley Unit 2 and that the Farley Unit 2 SFP modification should not contribute significantly to the environmental impact of any other facility.
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j 2.3 Summary l
l On the basis of this review we conclude that the environmental impacts i
associated with modification and operation of the expanded spent fuel pool i
j will have negligible adverse effects.
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF POSTULATED ACCIDENTS I
3.1 Cask Drop Accidents The licensee states in the December 18, 1981 submittal that " Protection against i
a cask drop is assured by the Seismic Category I, single failure-proof lif ting device, and by the interlocks and administrative controls described in the Farley FSAR subsection 9.1.4."
The staff has concluded that the spent fuel cask crane design, inservice inspection program, and proof test program are at i
j least equal to the staff's requirements in NUREG-0554, May 1979, " Single Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants." The staff concludes, therefore, that, with respect to a cask drop accident, the likelihood of such an occurrence is sufficiently small that the proposed SFP modification is acceptable, and no additional restrictions on load handling operations in the vicinity of the SFP are necessary.
3.2 Fuel Handling Accidents 4
l The new high-density racks will be installed prior to the first refueling outage; the spent fuel pool is not dry and contains no spent fuel. Even if.
there were spent fuel in the pool, the maximum weight of loads which may be i
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. transported over spent fuel in the pool would be limited to less than 3000 pounds by Technical Specification 3.9.7.1.
The proposed SFP modification does not, therefore, increase radiological consequences of fuel handling accidents considered in the staff Safety Evaluation of May 2,1975, since this accident would still result in, at most, release of the gap activity of one fuel assembly due to the limitations on available impact kinetic energy.
3.3 Conclusions Based upon the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the likelihood of a cask drop accident resulting in radionuclide released is sufficiently small that this accident need not be considered. Additionally, a fuel handling accident would not be expected to result in radionuclide releases leading to offsite radiological consequences exceeding those of the fuel handling accident in the staff Safety Evaluation of May 2, 1975 (9 Rem to the thyroid and 3 Rem whole body at the Exclusion Area Boundary); these conservatively l
i estimated doses are less than a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 guideline values and are acceptable.
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SUMMARY
The Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement (FGEIS) on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel concluded that the environ-mental impact of interim storage of spent fuel was negligible and the cost of the various alternatives reflect the advantage of continued generation of nuclear power with the accompanying spent fuel storage. Because of the differences in SFP designs the FGEIS recommended licensing SFP expansions on a case-by-case basis.
For Farley Unit 2, expansion of the storage capacity of the SFP does not significantly change the radiological impact evaluated in the FES. As discussed in Section 2.2.2 above, the additional total body dose that might be received by an individual or the estimated population within a 50-mile radius is less than 0.003 mrem /yr and 0.009 man-rem /yr, respectively, and is less than the natural fluctuations in the dose this population would receive from background radiation.
Operation of the station with additional spent fuel in the SFP is not expected to increase the occupational radiation exposure by more than one percent of the total annual occupational exposure at the station.
5.0 BASIS AND CONCLUSION FOR NOT PREPARING AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT We have reviewed the proposed modifications relative to the requirements set forth in 10 CFR Part 51 and the Council of Environmental Quality's Guidelines, 40 CFR 1500.6. We have determined, based on this assessment, that the proposed license amendments will not significantly affect the quality of the human environment. Therefore, the Commission has determined that an environ-mental impact statement need not be prepared and that, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.5(c), the issuance of a negative declaration to this effect is appropriate.
Cated: June 23, 1982 NRC
Participants:
Dr. T. Cain, M. Fecteau, M. Lamastra, C. Miller, E. Reeves