ML20054H709

Testimony of Rs Jurkowski Re Emergency Evacuation Plan

ML20054H709
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	06/16/1982
From:	Jurkowski R WESTCHESTER COUNTY, NY
To:
Shared Package
ML20054H706	List: ML20054H705 ML20054H709 ML20054H710 ML20054H712 ML20054H716 ML20054H717 ML20054H720 ML20054H723
References
NUDOCS 8206240350
Download: ML20054H709 (14)

Text

e

. Y.

if Testimony of Westchester County Deputy Commissioner of Transpor-tation Raymond S. Jurkowski on the Evacuation Plan for Indian Point, given before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in June / July 1982.

Introduction My name is Eaymond Jurkowski. I am the Deputy Commissioner of Transportation for Westchester County, New York and I am here today to advise you that the Indian Point Evacuation Plan as pre-sently constitutef is woefully inadequate.

For two full years we have participated in numerous meetings, have submitted critiques on draft and revised plans and find, as we move through each phase of the " planning, simulation and acceptance process," that not only do our original concerns remain unanswered but new problems and questions continue to surface.

As of this date we are still dependent on untrained and potentially unavailable part-time and full-time bus drivers who are outside the c:= mand and control of the County Department of Transportation. As of this date we have not received the finan-cial resources or informational materials that we need to give the mass-transportation component even a chance of working.

Simply stated, as of today the transportation plan is not any more workable than it was wo years ago.

Westchester County's Transit System -

A Public/ Private Partnership Before I go into the detail of our concerns, I think it is-essential that yc: have an understanding how public transportation is provided in Westchester County.

$2j6g0 SO O206160 K 050002g T

n- .

2 In most communities, public transit is a purely governmental function. In most com= unities, when rising costs and declining g

ridership squeezed the local bus company out of business, local government became the cwner and operator. Bus drivers became civil servants.

Faced with the sare problem, Westchester steered a middle course, establishing a partnership with privately-owned bus companies.

Today the County provides the overall management and policy direction for a unified transit system currently operated by eleven private companies. The County has control over the routes, schedules and fares and provides central planning, budgeting, marketing, public information and other support services.

The County owns 198 buses and is in rhe process of purchasing additional buses and equipment for 11 private operators. The County also provides oper-ating assistance that, while not guaranteeing profitability, makes it possible to insure financial stability.

The transit companies on the other hand, are responsible for f

the negotiation of labcr contracts and the day-to-day operation of the buses. Bus drivers, mechanics, and supervisors continue to be employees of the private sector.

Under our public-private partnership, bus ridership has increased from about 21 million in 1977 to over 27 million in 1981.

Today the Westchester transit system is the third largest in the State and the thirty-third largest in the nation. This public-private partnership is working so well that our cover ratio--the

3 k

9 percentage of costs covered by passenger fares--is about 60%, the most favorable of any transit' system in the State.

This partnership signifies that Westchester County government recognizes the social and economic value of high-quality reasonably-priced public transit service, and at the same time understands that, given the resources, the private bus companies can get the job done.

Reinforcing Westchester's philosophical approach are long-term operating assistance contracts, identifying the level of service to be o~perated, the vehicles required, and the personnel needed.

Vehicles, equipment and garage leases have also been negotiated with the private bus companies to insure delivery of bus service to the riding public.

Differences between Transit Services and Proposed Evacuation Plan In contrast to the provision of mass transit service, no similar arrangement exists between the State and the private bus companies with regard to the evacuation plan. In contrast, no formal arrangement exists clearly identifying the role the bus com-panies and their personnel are to play. Moreover, no arrangements exist addressing compensation issues for expenses incurred by the companies in the performance of their planned responsibilities.

In contrast, no arrangement exists identifying the specific personnel who are willing to participate in an emergency or the number of buses and yans required to implement the evacuation plan.

I have deliberately referenced the State as the party respon-sible for negotiating and executing such arrangements because it is the State who has " accepted" the Evacuation Plan for " planning

_ . . . - _ . _ _ . _ __ ___ __ c .- - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _

,- 4 k

purposes", it is the State which has control over the resources to implement the plan, and it is the State, not the County, which has jurisdiction over school bus operators--a group that plays a very significant role in the transportation component of the evacuation plan.

The Transportation Component of the Evacuation Plan The current evacuation plan requires the availability of approximately 490 vehicles and drivers in crder to resp:nd to a full scale evacuation. Seventy-two percent of the vehicles re-quired are to be operated by private school bus companies and school districts. The other twenty-eight percent are c erated by one transit company. For comparative purposes, the current evacu-ation plan will require twice the number of buses o'pera ed during rush hours in Westchester County's transit system.

Drivers Approximately 57% of the volunteer pool of drivers needed for the evacuation are part-time employees of the bus companies. Many of these drivers are retired people, single parents or 'r ousewives driving buses to supplement their incomes. In the case of Vanguard Tours, Inc. , a private school bus company required to provide 31%

of the vehicles and drivers for the evacuation, a significant number of drivers fall into these categories. It is very reason-l able to assume that these drivers are more likely not te volunteer because they will place a higher priority on personally evacuating their own f amilies rather than driving buses for strangers during an evacuation.

l

[

t L.

5 k

The driver situation is further complicated during the non-school months when school bus companies lay-off the majority of their drivers, severely limiting the supply of needed drivers. In the case of Vanguard, approximately 90% of the drivers are laid off during July and August. These drivers either find other jobs, I

take vacations or collect unemployment. Whatever their activity during these months, they cannot be counted on to drive a bus.

Still other factors, like statements found on page III-29 of the plan, must be assessed and taken into account since they will have an impact on the degree of volunteerism. Specifically, item #3 states that in selecting rescue personnel for lifesaving activities the following criteria should be used:

Category C states "If practical, women capable of repro-duction should not take part in these actions" and Category D ,

states, "If practical, volunteers above the age of 45 should be

~

selected." While exact demographic statistics are not available, I am very concerned that a significant number of bus drivers would be excluded by one of these suggested guidelines.

Training Concerns To date, no satisfactory training of personnel required to implement the transpor ation component of this plan has taken place. On less than sixteen hours notice the County Department of Transportation was informed by the State that the " professional trainers" we expected at the February 24, 1982 training session for the simulation exercise were not coming. Although a repre-sentative was sent from the N.Y. State Health Department to discuss

6 i

e

" risk and control measures," our Departmental liaiscns, the bus company managers and drivers'who attended, all felt that the pre- l sentation was too long; too technical; did not address what a bus

~

driver is likely to encounter and most importantly would not have enlisted volunteers from the group to participate in a real emer-gency.

Since training sessions will require the attendance of private sector employees, the issue of compensating bus company personnel still hasn't been addressed. Certainly no private hus company wil1 ,

solely bear the cost of paying hundreds of employees to attend daylong training sessions.

Similarly compensation should be negotiated with each bus company if future more intensive drills than the March 3, 1982 simulation are envisioned. Although all bus companies, except one, cooperated commendably and donated a bus and driver for the exercise, no one feels confident that the five buses used during the situ-lation were indicative of a 490 bus operation.

Operational Concerns Under the scenario of " School In Session" the plan calls for a two wave evacuation. In the first wave, buses move from their garages and/or staging areas to schools in the affected E RPA ' s . Students board the buses and are taken to reception centers outside the ten mile radius. Students are then discharged and buses are required under the plan to re-enter the EPZ and begin the second wave evacuation of the general public along de-signated bus routes or evacuate people housed in special facilities.

l.

. 7

=

Under the two wave evacuation scenario the general public and special facilities' population will not be evacuated until all students have been evacuated to reception centers.

Student Evacuation / General Population Evacuation Delays Although the plan does not address the issue, the Department feels that significant delays will occur in the evacuation of students because it is our opinion that the natural reaction of parents will be to drive to schools themselves to rescue their own children. We therefore envision the possibility of buses tied up in traffic trying to get in and out of the schools. The effect.

of this particular problem will be to add incalculable delay time in the evacuation scenario.

Re-Entry Problems During one of the pre-simulation meetings we were advised by the consultants who developed the plan that re-entry into the affected zones will not be a problem--that people sitting in traffic will not cross the yellow line of a two lane highway to _.

escape traffic jams, accidents or broken down vehicles.

I must reiterate now, what we expressed then. The Department still believes re-entry will be difficult and that buses will  : -

encounter contra-flow traffic travelling in the wrong lanes. .

Furthermore, it is uncertain at this time'whether bus drivers will be willing to re-enter areas that people are evacuating because of their concern about their own exposure to radiation.

Commandeering of Buses During the preparation for the drill, the UtiliU /'s consultant indicated that after the first wave, reception center personnel N

• 1

, -e ~.- i-4,,, p .e.,,-.e-o,.,e, -..,_ __, ,_ .-y

%. y , .y,..- , , -e y- , ,,,M

. _ - . . . = . - - . .. . - . .

. 8 w

may commandeer buses to transport any overflow of evacuees to other reception centers or congregate care centers.

I cannot stress more strongly that under no circumstances should anyone other than WCDOT staff or bus company personnel control the movement of buses. Without the sole control of the buses, " pre-assigned" general population evacuation routes are not feasible. Without " pre-assigned" routes, there will be sig-nificant delay in the evacuation of the general population.

Necotiable Roads Although we were assured in meetings with the Utility's trans-portation consultant that all roads are negotiable by bus, Ms.

Nancy Knowles, a State evaluator for the simulation exercise, com-mented in her March 3, 1982 Critique Report on Bus Route #32 (See Exhibit 1, pg. 3). "It seemed apparent to them (Mr. Morgan and

'the bus driver) that whoever put these routes together had not actually travelled these routes. In some cases not only could a bus not maneuver at certain places, but routes continued through dead end roads, wrong way down one-way streets, and at one point not much more than a footpath next to a pond.

These evacuee routes for the most par seem impractical and should be revised with the input and general knowledge that these local people have for this area and its roadways. "

Bus Route Maps -

.To date, only 50 of the 96 evacuation bus route maps have been submitted to the Department. Of those submitted, some are

. 9

=

incorrect and others are not easy to follow. Also, no cap shows the rcute the bus should follow to operate from the garage to the assigned school if a two wave evacuation becomes necessary.

In State observer Joan Geraci's " Critique Report" on the simu-lation, (See Exhibit 1, pg. 6) Geraci commented, . . . Bus driver couldn't understand the map and thought it was all backwards, he said any bus driver who was unf amiliar with the area would never find the stops (The map can be followed but one would have to understand the concept of connec:ing numbers as it is not laid out te geographic set.le.) I strongly suggest new maps that the average person could follow easily."

state observer Danny Ravite commented in his March 3, 1982 Critique Report, (See Exhibit 1, pg. 7) "The maps and rcutes pro-vided to the bus company . . . contained some discrepancies in street nanes. These should be corrected."

• Marked" Street Sicns Ebnilarly we were assured in the pre-simulation meetings that all reads and intersections were marked with " street signs" when the censultants selected the evacuation routes. Eowever, State cbserver Pat Bradley commented in his March 3, 1982 Critique Report on Bus Route #3, (See Exhibit 1, pg. 2) . . . The 6th and 7th stops (Tate Ave. & Henry and Tate & Kings Ferry Road) had no designation i

signs."

Without a verification as to which roads are or aren't nego-ciable, proper route maps and adequately " marked" street signs, the pr:bability of drivers getting lost and adding delay increases

h

. . 10

=

alarmingly--especially since many of them will be driving in un-familiar territory during times of extreme emotional and environ-mental stress.

Coast Guard During the simulation, the Department was notified by a re-presentative of the Coast Guard that they would not send in a cutter to clear pleasure craft from the affected area of the Hudson River unless the Coast Guard received protective clothing and were equipped with an on-board monitoring team to analyze the levels of radioactivity.

The Coast Guard's position raises a real concern as to whether protective clothing should be issued to bus drivers and similar emergency personnel.

At present, I am only aware of the fact that bus drivers will be carrying " dosimeters" which in addition to " chargers" aren't available for all bus drivers or dispatchers who must stay behind in the EPZ to maintain radio communication and dispatch vehicles.

Contaminated People and Vehicles Also, during the simulation our Department was notified that one of the buses was carrying contaminated people. It is our understanding that if drivers and buses become contaminated; drivers, depending upon the level of radiation exposure, will at least be required to shower and the interiors and exteriors of the buses washed before they can re-enter the EPZ and evacuate the general public.

11 a

Since the potential for contamination exists, I am very con-cerned as to its impact on whether or not a driver will volunteer to re-enter the zone.

Even if the rate of volunteerism is acceptable, it is my understanding that none of the reception centers have automatic washers. Depending on what wave the contamination occurs in, added delay time will be encountered in washing the buses if they are needed for a second wave.

Coordination of School Districts Outside the EPZ Pages TRl-22 and 23 of the plan state that "various school districts outside the EPZ" are responsible for providing buses to evacuate people at the BOCES-Yorktown Heights Center and Fox Meadow Center.

The current plan does not identify: the names of the school districts responsible for supplying the buses, the number of buses needed, and what agency has the responsibility to notify them of the evacuation.

e General Concern Verification and Up-dating of Planning Information Earlier in my testimony I expressed the need to verify whether all proposed bus routes can be negotiated by bus. Similarly, field inspections should be conducted by the Utility's transportation consultant to correct any errors in the plan regarding automobile evacuation routes. Page TRl-62 of the plan shows vehicular movement from'the Saw Mill River Parkway (southbound) to I-287 eastbound--a vehicular movement that is not possible because there is no such ramp.

12 n

Also, during the simulation, errors were also discovered in the plan regarding underestimates of institutional populations and a number of schools were shown as "open" when in reality they

, were permanently closed.

These situations again not only point out the need for inde-pendent verification of evacuation routes but demonstrate a real need to develop a computerized tracking system to keep tab on any changes which will affect the number of buses required in the evacuation plan.

Communications Based on our experience from the March 3rd simulation, it is clear that the communication arrangements for notifying bus eva-cuees needs streamlining. Although we have been successful in obtaining the assistance of a local radio station to broadcast bus information, the absence of documented bus travel times in the plan makes it very difficult to plan and co-ordinate advanced public notices telling people when the buses will be arriving at the individual bus stops during the evacuation of the~ general population.

Telephone Information Assistance Although no bus transportation information number appears in the brochures distributed to the public, it is our opinion that individuals who need assistance or who have lost or mislaid the brochure will call our 682-2020 information number to find out what bus route to take for the evacuation.

I'

13

=

At present the Department's Information Bureau doesn't have maps showing the evacuation routes overlaid on a street grid so that Information Assistants can advise callers which evacuation route is closest to their homes.

Range of Radio Coverage During the simulation, it was discovered that a number of reception centers are located outside the range of radio coverage for five of the eight bus companies. The impact of this situation is two-fold.

1) Since a number of reception centers are outside the area of radio coverage, drivers will have to communicate with their dispatchers by telephone. Under the two wave evacuation scenario the driver will have to call the dispatcher upon arrival at the reception center and a second telephone call will have to be placed back to the driver giving in-struction on when to leave to begin the evacuation of the general population. This cumbersome cummunication procedure will require a dedicated phone at each of the designated reception centers and will require dispatchers to operate both a radio and telephone communication systen.

2) Since many of the bus drivers will be operating in unfamiliar territory, the possibility of some drivers getting lost, as happened in the simulation, is a very real possibility. Similar occurrences during a real evacuation, breakdowns, or accidents happening outside of the coverage area of the radios, like in

Putnam and Dutchess Counties, will require the driver to abandon the vehicle in search of a telephone.

. sm Conclusion  ;

Although we have spent two years working co-operatively with our local utility companies, their consultants, and New York State officials, as of today I must advise that no one can guarantee the most fundamental requirement of any plan--that it works.

For two years our basic concerns regarding the unpredictability of the " human response factor" still exist--whether it pertains to volunteers or the general population's reaction to an orderly eva-cuation or whether parents will react to rescuing their own children from schools within the EPZ. It is this unpredictability of under-standable human behavior and its incalculable impact on evacuation time that nurtures the absence of any confidence we have in this plan.

Compounding the " human response factor" are a host of major con-corns, that while some people may perceive as being solvable by the application of time, personnel and financial resources, have, none-theless remained elusive and unresolved for too long a period.

As of today, we have no workable plan. Rather than an accept-able "end" product, we only have requests from the Utilities for more time to continue the " planning process". As the County Exe-cutive stated in his letter to Mr. Nunzio Palladino, Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " People are being asked to hope that it will eventually be made workable rather than being assured that it will work by a given date", a position that is totally unacceptable to the County.

In conclusion, there are just too many " ifs", too many new problems surfacing while our original concerns remain unanswered.

We, therefore, must remain skeptical about the feasibility of the evacuation plan.

L