ML20054H716
| ML20054H716 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point, 05000347  |
| Issue date: | 06/16/1982 |
| From: | Curran A WESTCHESTER COUNTY, NY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054H706 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8206240358 | |
| Download: ML20054H716 (5) | |
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TESTIMONY OF WESTCHESTER COUNTY COMMISSIONER DR. ANITA S. CURRAN - DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH i
My name is Dr. Anita S. Curran, and I am the Commissioner of Health for Westchester County, New York.
I am licensed to practice r
medicine and surgery in the State of New York and I also have a Masters Degree in Public Health.
I have been Commissioner of Health for this County for four years.
The Westchester County Department of Health has been designated to perform a variety of tasks in the Nuclear Emergency Response Plan which was developed by consultants to th'e utilities to protect the public'in the event of any untoward incident at the Indian Point Installations.
We are charged with the follcwing responsibilities:
1.
Accident assessment 2.
Dose assessment 3.
Monitoring and decontamination of nuclear response team members 4.
Monitoring and decontamination of evacuees from the area surrounding Indian Point 5.
Monitoring and decontamination of vehicles leaving the evacuation zones 6.
Assuring a safe water and food supply The drill conducted on March 3, 1982, to test the Emergency Nuclear Response Plan, afforded us the opportunity to identify problems in implementing the plan.
The deficiencies noted fall into four major categories, each of which I shall discuss separately.
First:
Communications - This includes access to key officials in Albany and other counties in this area, as well as the ability to communicate with Health Department field personnel and other emergency respondors.
8206240358 820616 PDR ADOCK 05000247 T
PDR J
2, Direct contact could not be made with Dr. David Axelrod,
)
New York State Commissioner of Health.
It is essential for me to have frequent and uninterrupted conversations with Albany to facilitate the decision making process on both sides.
In many instances, the Westchester County Emergency Operations Center was in possession of pertinent information prior to its being received in Albany.
This not only created confusion, but in a real emergency, could mean the difference between effective protective action and ineffective or inappropriate action.
The ability to consult and exchange information with the Health Commissioners in Orange, Putnam and Rockland Counties is essential for the same reasons.
The ability to communicate with field monitoring staff only by means of police radio was cumbersome and inefficient.
This could result in the unnecessary exposure of personnel to radio-activity should the wind direction suddenly shift.
The potential for delay in receipt of field readings also has serious implications for the decision making process and therefore the safety of residents of Westchester County.
This use of police radio as the sole means to communicate with monitoring personnel leaves us without the ability to notify our staff immediately upon notification of an emergency during the course of a work day.
Our staff are in the field the majority of the time, and we would be unable to reach them promptly.
A dedicated direct radio link between field team members and the coordinator at the Emergency Operations Center (hand talkies and a base station) would serve the dual purpose of staff notification and facilitation of communications during an emergency.
Problems of communication with decontamination center personnel also exist.
The phone lines availc.ble are not adequate to handle the
3 traffic between these centers and the Emergency Operations Centers.
Additionally, the role of the New York State Health Department Regional Office must be clarified.
It was providing information to the de-contamination centers a;though the Regional Office was not designated this role in the Response Plan.
An extremely serious ccmmunications problem was the delay in the receipt of data from the nuclear facility required to ' perform dose projectica calculations.
Had our own staff person not been on site, serious problems could have arisen.
Again, we must have up-to-date information at all times in order to implement this plan.
Also a procedure must be provided, whereby the liaison officer is notified by the utility each time the red phone is used by the utility.
We need a means by which he can monitor each message as it is being transmitted.
The se:ond major deficiency noted was grossly inadequate equipment, both in type and nu ber.
I have already mentioned the need for communication equipment.
Personal dosimeters are not available in sufficient number to equip the field teams called for in the plan.
Moreover, those dosimeters which are available are not of -the appro-priate range.
In addition, the Civil Defense monitoring equipment needs calibration by equiptent we do not have.
No provision for containing contaminated wastewater at decontimation sites is made in the plan.
Third - A critical deficiency in transportation must be noted.
Health Department staff have cars available to them from the County motor pool during the work day, but only a handful of employees have these vehicles at their disposal on twenty-four hour basis.
Therefore, on off hours, while persrnnel might be reached at home in the event of an emergency, transper:ation may or may not be available.
During
4 the work day the vehicles are available, but as previously noted, there is no way to notify employees of an emergency if they are already in the field since the cars do not have radios.
The fourth problem highlighted by the drill, concerns the need for further training.
Members of the dose assessment team must be trained regarding Indian Point Nuclear Reactor Plant layout and location of monitoring equipment in order to understand their significance in determination of plant status.
These same personnel require additional extensive training so as to increase their flexibility to assume other functions and roles in dose assessment should any'one team member be unavailable.
Specific training is required in the area of field monitoring and sample collection.
While the plan calls for the Health Department to provide radiological monitoring, there are not enough personnel trained to staff the field monitoring teams, or to provide second shift capa-bility.
Of the minimum number of personnel required by the emergency respcase plan to staff the five decontamination centers,- the field monitoring teams and the EOC, the Health Department has only 102 out of the minimum 113.
Taking into consideration the necessity for perscnnel trained in radiological emergency procedures, the Health Department has only 59 out of an available 102 staff persons trained in radiological emergency procedures.
This training should include periodic reviews and exercises for all personnel involved in the Respcase Plan including cross-training for purposes of flexibility and understanding.
Overall, the Westchester County Department of Health has the expertise needed to discharge its responsibilities as outlined L
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in the Nuclear Emergency Response Plan; but we cannot feel com-fortable in the assumption of that responsibility until the problems of communication, equipment, transportation and the training of adequate numbers of personnel as discussed above are addressed, and resolved in a satisfactory way.
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