ML20054H710
| ML20054H710 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/16/1982 |
| From: | Delbello A WESTCHESTER COUNTY, NY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054H706 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8206240351 | |
| Download: ML20054H710 (4) | |
Text
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i TESTIMONY OF WESTCHESTER COUNTY EXECUTIVE ALFRED B. DEL BELLO My name is Alfred B. DelBello.
I have been County Executive
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of Westchester County, N.Y.
Since January, 1974.
Prior to that I wa's Mayor of the City of Yonkers for four years.
By education I am an attorney and I practiced law prior to my election as County Executive.
As an elected Mayor and as Chief Executive Officer of Westchester County I have been called upon to coordinate or lead the response to a number of emergencies in Westchester County requiring the deployment of emergency services, for disasters such as fires, flooding, aircraft crashes, a train wreck, and others.
Never have we been called upon, or have we planned or equipped our-selves for a disaster of the scope and magnitude contemplated as possible by the nuclear radiological response plan, required by the NRC, and produced by consultants to the utilities during 1980-1981.
I organized the Four County Nuclear Safety Committee in May of 1979 to work on safety issues associated with Indian Point.
Our Committee is made up of the County Executives of Westchester, Orange, Putnam and the Legislative Board Chairman of Rockland County.
In addition the Health Commissioners and Disaster and Emergency Services Directors of the Four Counties are standing members.
This is purely a voluntary ad hoc committee, not bound together by contract or law.
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Our igenda has been to analyze Indian Point safety issues, worP or state legislaticn that would improve power plant safety operations and emergency management statewide, and to seek strict regulation by the NRC regarding Indian Point.
We have offered co. operation, consultation, and advice to the utilities, their consultants, state and federal officials during the writing of the emergency response plan from mid-1980 on.
The plan was required by the NRC as a regulation imposed on the licensees and not on the counties.
The licensees chose the means and the consultants who drafted the plan, and controlled the project from the beginning until April 1, 1982, when the state assumed this responsibility on their own initiative.
I have approached this issue from two basic policy positions.
One is the need to maintain absolute faith and credibility with the public of Westchester County who look to us for leadership on the issue of safety.
The second policy position is the need to internalize the cost of nuclear power plant safety within the nuclear industry itself.
These costs should not be borne by local taxpayers, since in Putnam, Rockland, and Orange counties local taxpayers or ratepayers receive absolutely no benefits of the plants -
no electrical energy, no property taxes, and few, if any, jobs.
There are no benefits and only hazards to these counties associated with these plants.
By the same token, our requests for equipment, training, staffing, and further plan revisions, all at utility expense, does not mean we are looking for a windfall er back door funding for general emergency response preparedness that we should be buying ourselves.
We have only sought the incremental costs associated with specific duties outlined in these e=ergency plans.
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However, even minimal funding has so far not been forthcoming
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from the state.
State legislation was enacted last year to create a $1.2 million annual fund, paid by the nuclear operating utilities, to cover state and county costs associated with these emergency radiological response plans.
However, at our meeting on May 24th in Albany with all ten counties in the state involved in emergency radiological response planning, we all concurred that the Sl.2 million per year is completely inadequate to meet the total statewide need.
Then there is the issue of the emergency response plans them-selves, as they were drafted, modified, and tested in the Indian Point #3 drill on March 3rd.
My key department heads have provided testimony on their experiences and their considered judgements regarding these plans are their own professional opinions.
I concur that many of the exposed weaknesses of this 10 mile radius plan are correctable with an infusion of the resources needed.
What remains questionable, however, from either a planning, a resources, or a management standpoint, is the ability of the County or the State to conduct a 10 mile radius evacuation of 130,000 l
people in Westchester County in seven hours in the face of possible or actual major offsite radiological release.
My own experience with emergencies is that nothing ever goes exactly according to plan, that problems develop within problems, and even minor complications become most difficult to manage, especially if stress and confusion are also part of the scenario.
Under any conditions and based on the recent drill, I do not believe we could evacuate all of the Westchester residents, the special populations of handicapped and disabled persons, the school children, the hospitals, nursing homes, and other immobil
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persons, all in 7 to 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> time.
The evacuation plan as a plan is flawed for reasons presented in Mr. Jurkowski's testimony regarding lack of centralized command and control, lack of training, equipment, and enough drivers in the summer time, plus the two wave evacuation concept.
Under the best meteorlogical circumstances, under the best devised plan and with the recent drill experience behind us, I do not believe the County could evacuate major portions or all of the 10 mile radius EPZ in under something approaching 30 to 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
I say that because of all the problems associated with a plan of major complexity, with such population density, our narrow roads, and limited resources available to evacuate.
This militates against any rapid movement out of the area by car, bus, and special vehicle.
A rapid evacuation would mean chaos.
A completely pre-planned yet slow, step by step evacuation is all that could be hoped for at best.
For all of these reasons, and since in the worst case scenario where a major offsite release might occur, I understand that such a release would occur well before 30 to 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> into the accident.
Thus, the ability to guarantee safe haven for everyone inside the 10 mile zone in Westchester is not there.
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