ML20054B749

Statement of Position Re NRDC Contentions 1,2 & 3

ML20054B749
Person / Time
Site:	Clinch River
Issue date:	04/15/1982
From:	Bergholz W, Edgar G ENERGY, DEPT. OF, PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORP.
To:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
NUDOCS 8204190163
Download: ML20054B749 (22)

Text

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OQUgTED 4/15/82

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i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

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In the Matter of )

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY )

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! PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION ) Docket No. 50-537 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 4

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N 1-APPLICANTS' STATEMENT OF POSITION ? SD IN REGARD TO $

NRDC CONTENTIONS 1, 2, AND 3 6;f

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Pursuant to the Board's instructions at the 1

.Prehearing Meeting of Counsel on April 6, 1982 / the United ,

States Department of Energy and Project Management Corpora-tion, acting for themselves and on behalf of the Tennessee Valley Authority (the Applicants), hereby file their State-ment of Position in regard to NRDC Contentions 1, 2, and 3.

The Board directed the parties to present their specific positions on which subparts or issues within NRDC Contentions 1, 2, and 3 should be deferred until af ter the tySci3 1] Tr. 464-65; 467. r

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8204190163 820415 PDR ADOCK 05000537 PDR G

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3 OWA hearing /- This, in turn, must rest upon a determina-tion as to what issues within Contentions 1, 2, and 3 are legally and factually necessary for an LWA decision.

, In what follows, the Applicants will address:

(1) the legal principles and framework which define the issues encompassed within an LWA decision, and (2) their specific positions as to each element of NRDC Contentions 1, 2, and 3.3 /

I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK For purposes of analysis, the legal framework for these proceedings can be divided into three stages: (1) the I limited work authorization (LWA), (2) the Construction Permit (CP), and (3) the Operating License (OL). The following discussion identifies the specific factual and legal elements necessary for a decision at each stage, and i

the pertinent distinctions between those necessary elements at each successive stage. This, in turn, will establish the

! legal foundation for the Applicants' position as to each part of Contentions 1, 2, and 3.

For an LWA decision, the Board must make the following findings:

2/ Tr. 434; 464-65; 467.

i 3/ As a point of reference for the analysis, the Aapli-( cants have considered the approach recommended by the

! NRC Staff (Tr. 442-43), and after review, are in l essential agreenent with the Staff.

I_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _- _ . __ _ _ _ _ _- - - . - . _ .- . . _ - - - - - . .

1. Environmental findings - all of the findings required by 10 C.F.R.

S 51.52(b) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); 4f

2. Site Suitability findings ...

that, based upon the available information and review to date, there is reasonable assurance that the proposed site is a suitable location for a reactor of the general size and type proposed from the standpoint of radiological health ana' safety considerations under the Act and rules and regula-tions promulgated by the Commission pursuant thereto." 5/

As to the environmental findings, the NRC's Final L1 ironmental Statement and the Board's decision must include consideration of the " probable impact of the 6/

proposed action on the environment.'"- In NRC practice, the assessment of impacts has traditionally included the prob-7/

able impacts associated with' postulated accidents.- The CRBRP FES included detailed consideration of the probable i

4/ 10 C.F.R. S 50.10(e)(2)(i) .

5/ 10 C.F.R. S 50.10(e)(2) (ii)s

-6/ See 10 C.F.R. S 51.20(a); S i i , s ia ) ; S 51.26(a);

T'T1.52 (c) (1 )-(c) (3) .

-7/ See Fir.al Environmental Statement related to Construc-tion and Operation of Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant, February 1977, Docket No. 50-537 (NUREG-0139)

[ hereinafter, "CRBRP FES"), Chapter 7 at 7 7-11; see also, 36 Fed. Reg. 22851 (December 1, 1971); 39 Fed. Reg. 26279 (July 18, 1974).

impacts associated with postulated accidents, including accidents beyond the design basis -- so called Hypothetical Core Disruptive Accidents ("HCDAs"). There are, however,

, specific limitations on the scope of this analysis and review.

First, the scope of review is limited by a rule of 8/

reason.- The probable impacts must be considered; not those which are remote, hypothetical, and speculative.

Second, and as a corollary to the first limitation, the probable impacts should be quantified where possible.

Where precise quantification is not possible, it is appro-priate to use analyses which provide reasonable estimates of

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impacts.-

Third, in assessing the impacts of accidents one should employ methods of analysis and assumptions which are 10/

as realistic as the state of knowledge will permit. In i

I l -8/ Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1972) cited with approval in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S.

519, 551 (1978); Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC (SIPI), 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

1 l 9/ 10 C.F.R. S 51.20(b).

~~~10/ See 36 Fed. Reg. 22852 (December 1, 1971); citizens for Safe Power v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 524 F.2d 1291, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1975); SIPI, supra, 481 F.2d at 1093; Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), LBP-78-34, 8 NRC 470, 480 (1978).

contrast, the conservative methods of analysis employed in the NRC safety evaluation process are not appropriate in the environmental context.

As to the site suitability finding, it must be emphasized that this finding is not a definitive, plant -

specific or design - specific finding which requires a complete safety review for support. Rather, the following principles apply:

1. the finding does not require a complete safety review, but can be " based on the available information and review to date."

2. the finding does not require definitive evi-dence, but only a showing of " reasonable assurance that the

. proposed site is a suitable location."

3. the finding does not presuppose a completed, detailed design, but merely a " reactor of the general size and type proposed."

~~-11/ Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. (Indian Point Station, Unit No. 2), ALAB-188, 7 AEC 323, 343 (1974),

remanded on other grounds, CLI-74-23, 7 AEC 947; Gulf States Utilities (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2),

LBP-75-50, 2 NRC 419, 447-48 (1975); Perkins, supra, 8 NRC at 480.

12f 10 C.F.R. S 50.10(e)(2)(iii) .

13/ Id.

14/ Id. Compare 10 C.F.R. S 50.35(a) discussed below.

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As to both the environmental and site suitability findings, the LWA decision is neither irrevokable nor with prejudice to the succeeding safety review at the Construc-tion Permit stage. In this regard, the applicable NRC regulation states

(4) Any activities undertaken pursuant to an authorization granted under this paragraph shall be entirely at the risk of the applicant and, except as to matters determined under paragraphs (e)(2) and (e)(3)(ii), the grant of the authorization shall have no bearing on the issuance of a construction permit with respect to the requirements of the Act, and rules, regulations, or orders '

promulgated pursuant thereto. J5f Thus, the applicable legal principles contemplate that should the subsequent safety review bring about a need-for modifications in the facility or previous findings, the Applicant bears the risk. This reinforces the notion that information necessary for environmental and site suitability 4

{ (LWA) findings can and should be substantially more limited than those for the CP, and that LWA findings can rest upon threshold considerations of design feasibility.

15] 10 C.F.R. S 50.10(e)(4) .

~~~16/ Similarly, the NEPA cost-benefit balance at the LUA stage can be structured to accommodate the potential for change resulting from the subsequent CP safety

< review by including information to show that: (1) the

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effects of accidents are not significant in relation to those associated with normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences, and/or (2) post-LUA design or procedural modifications are practicable and would not Continued.

Not only is the LWA decision limited in scope, but even the subsequent CP review is subject to substantial limitations. 42 U.S.C. S 2235 [S 185 of the AEA) provides:

All applicants for licenses to construct or modify production or utilization facilities shall, if the application is otherwise acceptable to the Commission, be initially granted a ccnstruction permit.

Upon the completion of the construction or modification of the facility, upon the filing of any additional information needed to bring the original application up to date, and upon finding that the facility authorized has been constructed and will operate in conformity with the application as amended and in conformity with the provisions of this Act and of the rules and regulations of the Commission and in the absence of any ,

, good cause being shown to the Commission j why the granting of a license would not

! be in accordance with the provisions of 1

this Act, the Commission shall thereupon issue a license to the applicant. For all other purposes of this Act, a construction permit is deemed to be a

' license'.

The Supreme court has directly addressed the scope of and limitations upon CP findings in Power Reactor Development Corp. v. International Union of Electrical Workers (PRDC), 367 U.S. 396 (1961). In PRDC the court considered the question of whether the Commission's safety finding at the CP s tage, i.e., ... information sufficient significantly effect the cost / benefit balance. See CRBRP FES, Chapter 7.

to provide reasonable assurance that a facility of the general type proposed can be constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public," must be " backed up with as much conviction as to the safety of the final design of the specific reactor in operation as the second, final finding

[i.e., for issuance of an operating license] must be."

PRDC, 367 U.S. at 807. The Court concluded:

We think the great weight of the argument supports the position taken by PRDC and by the Commission, that Reg.

50.35 permits the Commission to defer a definitive safety finding until opera-tion is actually licensed. The words of the regulation themselves certainly lean strongly in that direction. The first finding is to be.made, by definition, on the basis of incomplete information, and concerns only the " general type" of reactor proposed. The second finding is phrased unequivocally in terms of

" reasonable assurance," while the first speaks more tentatively of "information sufficient to provide reasonable assur-ance." The Commission, furthermore, had

, good reason to make this distinction.

For nuclear reactors are fast-developing and fast-changing. What is up to date now may not, probably will not, be as acceptable tomorrow. Problems which seem insuperable now may be solved tomorrow perhaps in the very process of construction itself.

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The principles enunciated in PRDC, supra, remain valid today. The applicable NRC regulations define the scope of the CP review as follows:

Sec. 50.35. Issuance of construction permits.

(a) When an applicant has not supplied initially all of the technical informa-tion required to complete the applica-tion and support the issuance of a con-struction permit which approves all proposed design features, the Commission may issue a construction permit if the Commission finds that (1) the applicant has described the proposed design of the facility, including, but not limited to, the principle architectural and engi-neering criteria for the design, and has identified the major features or compo-nents incorporated therein for the pro-tection of the health and safety of the public; (2) such further technical or design information as may be required to ,

complete the safety analysis, and which can reasonably be left for later con-sideration, will be supplied in the final safety analysis report; (3) safety features of components, if any, which require research and development have been described by the applicant and the applicant has identified, and there will be conducted, a research and development program reasonably designed to resolve any safety questions associated with such features or components; and that (4) on the basis of the foregoing, there is reasonable assurance that, (i) such safety questions will be satisfactorily resolved at or before the latest date stated in the application for completion of construction of the proposed facil-ity, and (ii) taking into consideration the site criteria contained in Part 100 of this chapter, the proposed facility

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can be constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. 17/

Thus, it is readily apparent that even the ultimate CP findings do not contemplate a final resolution of all safety issues. Rather, it is sufficient to find that certain issues can be left for later consideration, that research and development programs are reasonably designed to achieve timely resolution of those issues, and on this basis, there is reasonable assurance that, taking into consideration the site criteria contained in Part 100 of this chapter, the proposed facility can be constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

In view of the foregoing, the legal principles which should govern the litigation of Contentions 1, 2, at 3 and the LWA stage can be summarized as follows:

1. The analyses of the environmental impacts of postulated accidents should (a) consider the most probable impacts, (b) utilize analyses which provide reasonable estimates of impacts, and (c) employ methods of analyses and assumptions which are as realistic as the state of knowledge will permit.

11/ 10 C.F.R. S 50.35(a).

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In contrast to 10 C.F.R. S 50.10(e) (2) , the CP finding under 10 C.F.R. S 50.35(a) contemplates a more specific analysis of the facility, rather than findings concern-ing a reactor of the general size and type proposed.

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2. The analysis of site suitability

'j should be based on (a) the available information and review to date, (b) a standard of reasonable assurance, and (c) a reactor of the general size and type proposed.

3. The applicant proceeds at his own

. risk upon grant of an LWA, or even a CP.

4. The review of safety issues should be undertaken at the CP stage, and even

, then, unresolved issues can await timely resolution at the OL stage.

5. LWA findings should be predicated uaon feasibility of design measures, waile detailed review of specific design measures are appropriate for the subse-quent CP or OL stages.

II. SPECIFIC POSITIONS IN REGARD TO NRDC CONTENTIONS 1, 2, AND 3

] Given the foregoing principles, the Applicants' ,

4 positions as to the appropriate stage for litigation of each 4

element of Contentions 1, 2, and 3 are as follows:

A. General Position The Applicants base their positions concerning which parts of Contentions 1, 2, and 3 should be litigated l at the LWA stage upon the following central logic:1. Site suitability - Site suitability findings require: (a) postu-lation of a radiological source term for site suitability j analysis which is appropriate for a reactor of the general size and type proposed (350 MWe LMFBR), (b) assumption of the expected containment leakage rate, and (c) specification of meterological conditions appropriate to the site, in

order to determine that the proposed reactor would conform with the guideline values of 10 C.F.R. S 100.11. In the context of Contentions 1, 2, and 3, these findings should be based upon the following elements:

1) The postulated source term should envelope the consequences associated with accidents considered credible i (i.e., design bases accidents). 20f

2) Hypothetical Core Disruptive Acci-dents (HCDAs) can be made sufficiently improbable that they need not be con-sidered within the spectrum of design bases accidents.

3) There is reasonable assurance, based on the available information and review to date, that the site suita-bility source term postulated by the NRC Staff envelopes design basis accidents for a reactor of the general size and type proposed.

4) There is reasonable assurance that the containment can be designed such l that, given the source term and meteoro-logical conditions appropriate to the site, the proposed facility would conform to the guideline values of 10 C.F.R. S 100.11.

2. Environmental - Environmental findings require that the probable environmental impacts associated with accidents be reasonably estimated using realistic methods of analyses and assumptions.

19/ See 10 C.F.R. S 100.11; 10 C.F.R. S 50.10(e)(2) .

20/ See 10 C.F.R. S 100.11, Note 1.

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i B. Specific Positions Contention la):

! 1. The envelope of DBAs should include the CDA.

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a) Neither A)plicants nor Staff have demonstrated tarough reliable data that the probability of anticipated tran-sients without scram or other CDA ini-tiators is sufficiently low to enable

CDAs to be excluded from the envelope of i DBAs.

While Contention la) broadly questions whether or not HCDAs should be included in the envelope of design basis accidents, the scope of the contention must be limited for I

the purposes of an LWA decision. It is only necessary for that decision to determine whether there is reasonable assurance that initiators of HCDAs can be made sufficiently improbable that HCDAs are excluded from the envelope of design basis accidents. Specifically, the inquiry should be confined to consideration of whether it is feasible to design CRBRP to make HCDAs sufficiently improbable that they can be excluded from the envelope of design basis accidents for a reactor of the general size and type proposed, in light of the following:

1. The major class <.s of accident i initiators porantially leading to

.l HCDAs.

i 2. The relevant criteria to be imposed for the CRBRP.

l 3. The state of technology as it relates to applicable design characteristics or criteria.

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4. The general characteristics of the CRBRP design (e.g., redundant, diverse shutdown systems).

Conversely, the scope of inquiry would not include examina-tion of whether the detailed design will meet the criteria imposed. That is properly deferred to the CP or OL stage.

Contention Ib):

1. b) Neither Applicants nor Staff have established that Applicants'

" reliability program" even if imple-mented is capable of eliminating CDAs as DBAs.

(1 ) The methodology described in the PSAR places reliance upon fault tree and event tree analysis.

Applicants have not established that it is possible to obtain sufficient failure mode data per- -

tinent to CRBR systems to validly employ these techniques in pre-dicting the probability of CDAs.

(2) Applicants' projected data base to be used in the reliability program is inadequate. Applicants have not established that the pro-jected data base encompasses all credible failure modes and human elements.

(3) Even if all of the data described in Applicants' projected data base is obtained, Applicants have not established that CDAs have a sufficiently low probability that they may be excluded from the CRBR design bases.

(4) Applicants have not estab-lished that the test program used for their reliability program will be completed prior to Applicants'

projected data for completion of construction of the CRBR.

Subpart 1 b) broadly questions Applicants' design, their reliability program, its methods, and its data base as bases for excluding HCDA's from the design basis. For the reasons stated in regard to 1 a) above, this subpart involves matters of detailed design review and safety evaluation which are appropriately considered at to the CP or even OL stages. In addition, the reliability program is a confirmatory R & D Program, examination of which is appropriately considered at to the CP or OL stages.

Contention 2a) - c):

2. The analyses of CDAs and their con-sequences by Applicants and Staff are inadequate for purposes of licensing the

. CRBR, performing the NEPA cost / benefit '

anal ys is , or demonstrating that the radiological source term for CRBRP would result in potential hazards not exceeded by those from any accident considered credible, as required by 10 C.F.R.

S 100.11 (a), fn. 1.

a) The radiological source term analysis used in CRBRP site suitability should be derived

! through a mechanistic analysis.

'; Neither Applicants nor Staff have based the radiological source term on such an analysis.

b) The radiological source term i analysis should be based on the assumption that CDAs (failure to

scram with substantial core dis-ruption) are credible accidents within the DBA envelope, should place an upper bound on the explosure potential of a CDA, and

should then derive a conservative estimate of the fission product release from such an accident.

Neither Applicants nor Staff have performed such an analysis.

c) The radiological source term analysis has not adequately con-sidered either the release of fission products and core materials, e.g. halogens, iodine and plutonium, or the environmental conditions in the reactor contain-ment building created by the release of substantial quantities of sodium. Neither Applicants nor Staff have established the maximum credible sodium release following a CDA or included the environmental conditions caused by such a sodium release following a CDA or included the environmental conditions caused by such a sodium release as part of the radiological source term pathway analysis. -

Subparts 2a) through 2c) broadly question the validity of the NRC Staff's postulated radiological source i term for site suitability analysis. The basic premise of the subpart is that the source term should envelope HCDAs and be derived from a mechanistic analyses which includes

HCDAs. As discussed above in connection with their central I logic and Contention la), Applicants will present their case to show that HCDAs can be excluded from the design basis envelope on the basis of design feasibility. On that basis, if the NRC Staff's postulated source term enveloped design basis accidents, then Contentions 2a), b), and c) would be resolved for the purposes of the LUA. The inquiry would i

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then be confined to consideration of whether the NRC Staff's source term is likely to envelope the design basis accident

envelope, as defined under la), for a reactor of the general size and type proposed. In regard to subparts 2a) - 2c) and l HCDA/ source term issues, the scope of discovery and litiga--

tion for an LWA decision should follow the scope set forth in regard to Contention la).

, Contention 2d):

d) Neither Applicants nor Staff have

demonstrated that the design of the containment is adequate to reduce calculated offsite doses to an acceptable level.

This contention broadly questions the adequacy of the containment design. As noted previously, the proper scope of inquiry at the LWA stage encompasses feasibility of' design, and not the detailed design review. Thus, for LWA purposes, the contention must be limited to consideration of-the feasibility of designing the containment to meet the expected leakage rate assumed for purposes of site suitabil-ity analyses under 10 C.F.R. S 100.11. The inquiry must not 4

extend to consider further elements of the containment

) design, since that is properly considered at the CP or OL j stage, i Contention 2e):

, e) As set forth in Contention 8d),

neither Applicants nor Staff have adequately calculated the guideline i

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values for radiation doses from postulated CRBRP releases.

NRDC has represented that this contention dupli-cates Contention 11d) (old 8d)). Contention 11d) should be i

litigated at the LWA stage as admitted.

Contention 2f) - h):

f) Applicants have not established that the computer models (including computer codes) referenced in Applicants' CDA safety analysis reports, including the l

PSAR, and referenced in the Staff CDA safety analyses are valid. The models and computer codes used in the PSAR and 1

the Staff safety analyses of CDAs and their consequences have not been ade-quately documented, verified or vali-dated by comparison with applicable experimental data. Applicants' and Staff's safety analyses do not establish that the models accurately represent the -

physical phenomena and principles which control the response of CRBR to CDAs.

g) Neither Applicants nor Staff have established that the input data and 2 assumptions for the computer models and I codes are adequately documented or verified.

I h) Since neither Applicants nor Staff have established that the models, com-puter codes, input data and assumptions are adequately documented, verified and l

validated, they have also been unable to establish the energetics of a CDA and

thus have also not established the ade-quacy of the containment of the source term for post accident radiological analysis.

f These subparts broadly question the computer models, input data, and assumptions used for analyses of l

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HCDAs for purposes of the Safety Analysis Report and radio-logical analyses. Matters addressed in the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) are clearly related to the CP .21/ Thus, the major portion of the subject matter of the subpart is clearly appropriate for the CP stage and/or OL, and not for the LWA stage. As discussed above, it is only necessary for purposes of an LWA decision to consider whether the probable environmental impacts of postulated accidents are reasonably estimated using realistic methods and assumptions. This inquiry need not extend to consider the HCDA analysis codes in detail.

. Contention 3a):

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3. Neither Applicants nor Staff have given sufficient attention to CRBR

. accidents other than the DBAs for the '

following reasons:

a) Neither Applicants nor Staff have done an adequate, comprehen-sive analysis comparable to the Reactor Safety Study ("Rasmussen Report") that could identify other t CRBR accident possibilities of l greater frequency or consequence than the accident scenarios analyzed by Applicants and Staff.

This contention broadly questions the need for and

- adequacy of a probabilistic risk assessment for CRBRP. As discussed in la) above, it is sufficient for LWA purposes to address the matter of exclusion of HCDAs from the design ly 10 C.F.R. S 50.34 - 50.35.

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O e e basis on the threshold level of feasibility. In contrast, the subject matter in this subpart involves studies which are confirmatory in nature, and detailed design considera-tions. Both are appropriately considered after the LUA.

b) Neither Applicants' nor Staff's analyses of potential accident initiators, sequences, and events are sufficiently comprehensive to assure that analysis of the DBAs will envelop the entire spectrum of credible accident initiators, sequences and events.

l This issue is appropriate for the LWA, subject to the limitations set forth in la) above.

Contention 3c):

c) Accidents associated with core meltthrough following loss of core -

geometry and sodium-concrete inter-actions have not been adequately analyzed.

This issue is appropriate for the LWA, subject to the limitations set forth under subparts 2f), g), and h) above.

Contention 3d):

d) Meither Applicants nor Staff have adequately identified and analyzed the ways in which human l error can initiate, exacerbate, or interfere with the mitigation of CRBR accidents.

i This issue should be considered at the CP, or even

the OL stage.

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CONCLUSION The NRC review process, as noted above, encom-passes three successive and increasingly more detailed levels of review. In recognition of the limited activity permitted under an LUA, as well as the fact that such activities are undertaken at the Applicants' risk, the Commission regulations regarding the issuance of an LWA require only: 1) a reasonable and realistic review of environmental impac t s , and 2) a finding, based on informa-tion sufficient to provide reasonable assurance, that the site is suitable from the standpoint of radiological health and safety issues. More detailed findings should be deferred to the CP stage and even then unresolved safety issues can await timely resolution at the OL stage.

Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that consideration of Contentions 1, 2 and 3 be limited in the manner set forth in II above for purposes of an LWA decision.

Respectfully submitted ,

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GeorgC L. Edgar v

Attorney for Proj ec t Management Corporation

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Warren E. Berghol-# /

Attorney for Department of Energy DATED: April 15,1982 I

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