ML20024B666
| ML20024B666 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinch River |
| Issue date: | 07/08/1983 |
| From: | Hibbitts H, Sliger E, Strawbridge L ENERGY, DEPT. OF, JOINT APPLICANTS - CLINCH RIVER BREEDER REACTOR, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024B656 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8307110164 | |
| Download: ML20024B666 (32) | |
Text
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i 7/8/83 i'T s
i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.J UL' 81983 >
j BEFORE THE omee ot the sec.
ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD g
ogne & se.
N m
)
In the Matter of
)
)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
)
)
PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
)
Docket No. 50-537
)
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
)
)
(Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant) )
)
APPLICANTS' TESTIMONY CONCERNING BOARD AREAS OF INTEREST RELATED TO EMERGENCY PLANNING Dated:
July 8,1983 8307110164 830708 PDR ADOCK 05000537 PDR
Ql.
What does this testimony address?
Al.
This testimony addresses Board areas of interest related to emergency planning.
These are:
a) Board Questio,n 9, b) emergency responses at DOE facilities, and c) Board Question 7.
Q2:
How do LWRs and CRBRP compare in regard to the kinds of 1
potentially released materials?
A2:
The principal difference in kind of potentially released radioactive materials in CRBRP relative to LWRs is that CRBRP contains radioactive sodium and the released materials could be accompanied by sodium oxides and hydroxide aerosols.
The radioactive sodium contributes less than 1% of any of the HCDA doses reported in CRBRP-3, Volume 2, Table 4-3.
The ef fect of the sodium aerosols is to enhance agglomeration and settling in containment, and thus reduce of fsite doses.
Sodium is also important from the standpoint of its strong af finity for iodine.
During accident situations, iodine would be released from the fuel to the sodium, where it would react to form sodium ic3ide j
(NaI).
Any subsequent release of iodine would be in the chemically bound f orm (not free iodine).
This chemically bound iodine would be released to the containment as particulate, where the release would be attenuated by
i agglomeration and f allt, t of the aerosol and by scrubbing in the containment cleanup system (for HCDAs).
It is concluded that the kinds of potentially released 1
radioactive materials are similar between CRBRP and LWRs, j
and the principal difference, the presence of sodium in CRBRP, has the effect of reducing offsite consequences.
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Q3:
How do LWRs and CRBRP compare in regard to the amounts of potentially released materials?
A3:
The following table compares the releases for comparable meltdown accidents in CRBRP and two LWRs.
COMPARISON OF RADIONUCLIDE RELEASES TO ATMOSPHERE FOR CRBRP WITH LWRs FOR A COMPARABLE MELTDOWN SCENARIO Radioactivity Released (curies)
Element CRBRP RER(3)
BHE(3) 8 2.1 x 108 Xe-Kr 3.6 x 107 1.0 x 10 6
5 6
1.1 x 10 I
2.1 x 10 2.0 x 10 2
0 0
Na 9.4 x 10 Cs, Rb 5.2 x 101 1.2 x 104 7.6 x 104 5
4 2.2 x 105 8.6 x 10 Te, Sb 4.8 x 10 Ba, Sr 7.5 x 102 3.3 x 104 2.2 x 105 Ru(1) 2.8 x 103 3.9 x 104 3.3 x 105 La(2) 4.1 x 103 2.9 x 104 2.9 x 105 (1)
Includes:
Ru, Rh, Co, Mo, Tc.
(2)
Includes:
U, La, Zr, Nb, Ce, Pr, Nd, Np, Pu, Am, Cm.
(3)
From WASH-1400, Appendix VI, Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences, October 1975.
The LWR scenarios used for comparison here are PWR-6 and BWR-4 described in Section 2 of WASH-1400, Appendix VI.
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f The CRBRP release given for each element group is the largest release for that group considering all four HCDA cases analyzed (re:
CRBRP-3, Volume 2, Table 4-3).
For each element group except sodium, the CRBRP releases are lower than those for the LWRs.
It is reasonable to compare the sodium radioactivity to that of iodine since both are strong gamma ray emitters.
The sodium radioactivity f
released is small compared to that for iodine (only 0.4%).
Therefore, the sodium radioactivity would have a negligible ef fect upon the overall core melt consequences.
04:
Where are Protective Action Guides (PAGs) for Emergency Planning specified?
A4:
The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, in conformance with a Federal Register notice of interagency responsibilities for nuclear incident response planning, dated January 17, 1983, is responsible for establishing Protective Action Guides.
These have been published in the
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" Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions f or Nuclear Incidents," EPA-520/1-7 5-001.
This manual was published in 1975 and revised in 1979 and 1980.
05:
What Protective Action Guides have been established for plume exposure?
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A5:
For whole body exposure, the range of PAGs has been established by the EPA as 1 rem to 5 rem.
For thyroid exposure, the range of PAGs has been established as 5 rem to 25 rem.
The State of Tennessee has adopted th,ese same ranges.
The plume exposure pathway includes:
(a)
Whole body external exposure to gamma radiation from the plume and f rom deposited material; and (b)
Inhalation exposure from the passing radioactive plume.
The ranges recognize that different actions may be l
appropriate for difterent levels of projected exposure.
At the lower end of the range, actions such as sheltering might be most appropriate.
At the higher end of the range, stronger actions such as evacuation would be more appropriate.
06:
Considering HCDAs, are PAGs required for other organs for CRBRP emergency planning?
A6:
No.
The controlling doses for HCDAs are whole body and thyroid.
Other organs are less limiting; therefore, PAGs for other organs are not required for emergency planning for CRBRP.
- 1 Q7:
What analyses lead to that conclusion?
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l A7:
The radiological consequences of HCDAs are provided in CRBRP-3, Volume 2, Table 4-3.1 This table includes whole body doses and doses for the following organs:
- thyroid, bone surf ace, red bone marrow, lung, and liver.
Case 2 in that table includes the effects of an energetic HCDA, followed by the longer term effects of complete core melting with penetration of the reactor vessel and guard vessel.
It is an appropriate case to assess the controlling doses for emergency planning.
The predicted doses for whole body and each organ were compared to the 10 CFR 100 guidelines or their equivalents, and the ratio was calculated for each organ.
For two-hour doses at the Exclusion Boundary, the most limiting dose was whole body (3.3% of guideline).
All organ doses were less limiting by at least an order of magnitude.
For 30-day doses at the Low Population Zonc, the most limiting dose was thyroid (28% of guideline); the next most limiting dose was whole body (8.4% of guideline).
All other organ doses were less than the limiting dose by at least an order of magnitude.
The whole body dose results, in large part, from the release of noble gases.
The thyroid dose results, 1
This table is also included in Applicants' Exhibit 46 (TR:5410).
in large part, from the release of halogens (principally iodine).
Plutonium releases are not controlling.
Consequently, the emergency planning related to BCDAs in CRBRP can be based on considerations of whole body and thyroid doses, which are also the limiting doses for LWRs.
Q8:
If PAGs were considered for other organs, what would be reasonable ranges for them?
A8:
For purposes of analysis, one could derive a reasonable range of PAGs for other organs by applying the ICRP-26 tissue weighting factors.
The ICRP-26 approach is intended to limit the risk from the irradiation of all organs involved to a value equivalent to the risk from whole body exposure.
Thus, the whole body weighting f actor is given a value of one, and the sum of the weighting f actors for all organs is one, as indicated below:
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- l l ICRP-26 TISSUE WEIGHTING FACTORS TISSUE Wy Gonads 0.25 Breast 0.15 Red Bone Marrow 0.12 Lung 0.12 Thyroid 0.03 Bone Surfaces 0.03 2
i Remainder 0.30 l
l 2
W 0.06 for each of the five organs or tissues of the rim =inder receiving the highest dose equivalents.
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. For those organs for which PAGs have not been established, a reasonable range can be estimated by assuming that the PAGs can be scaled using ICRP-26 weighting f actors.
This could be done in two ways:
1.
Use the whole body established PAG range (1 to 5 rem) and scale from that.
This gives:
Lung 8.3 to 41.7 Liver 16.7 to 83.3 Bone Surfaces 33.3 to 167 Red Bone Marrow 8.3 to 41.7 2.
Use the thyroid established PAG range (5 to 25 Rem) and scale from that.
This gives:
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Lung 1.25 to 6.25 Liver 2.5 to 12.5 Bone Surfaces 5
to 25 hed Bone Marrow 1.25 to 6.25 The more restrictive PAG ranges for other organs are those determined from scaling the thyroid PAG range.
It should be noted that the values so derived for bone surf ace are the same as the existing PAGs for thyroid.
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, l Q9:
Would the application of these derived PAGs for other organs have any impact on emergency planning considerations for CRBRP?
A9:
No.
The derived PAGs for other organs were scaled from the thyroid PAGs using the ICRP-26 tissue weighting f actors.
The equivalent 10CFR100,11(a) guideline values were scaled from the thyroid guideline value also using the ICRP-26 tissue weighting f actors.
In Q/A 7 it was shown that the whole body and thyroid doses were controlling for HCDAs when compared to the 10CFR100.11(a) guidelines or equivalent guidelines values.
It follows that the whole body and thyroid doses would also be controlling when compared to the PAGs for whole body and thyroid and the l
derived PAGs for other organs.
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. Q10:
With respect to finding number 52 of the Board's February 28, 1983 Partial Initial Decision, have the.
Applicants considered emergency responses at the three major DOE Oak Ridge f acilities?
A10:
Yes.
The Oak Ridge DOE facilities will receive specific consideration in CRBRP, State and local emergency planning.
The present high level of emergency preparedness at these facilities, however, is expected to result in.a minimal additional planning and implementation ef fort; none of these f acilities constitutes a significant impediment to evacuation.
The preliminary evacuation time estimates for CRBRP have included consideration of these three specific plants.
Q11:
What are these f acilities?
l All:
The three major Oak Ridge DOE facilities are the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant (ORGDP), the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and the Y-12 Plant.
1 Q12:
What are the pertinent characteristics of ORGDP?
A12:
The Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, located 2.5 to 3.5 miles f rom the CRBRP, enriches uranium for commercial power reactors and develops advanced isotope separation
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techniques.
The total plant population is presently about 4300 with about 90 workers on each of f-shif t.
Q13:
What are the pertinent characteristics of ORNL?
A13:
The Oak Ridge National Laboratory, located 4.5 to 5.5 miles from CRBRP, is a research establishment which contains nuclear reactore, particle accelerators, chemical processing and waste disposal facilities, and laboratory experiments.
Its total population is presently about 4200 with from 50 to 160 workers on each of the various off-shifts.
i Q14:
What are the pertinent characteristics of Y-12?
A14:
The Y-12 Plant, located 9 to 11 miles from the CRBRP, is a weapons production plant which also houses a substantial number of additional ORNL employees.
The present total population including Y-12, ORNL, UCC-ND corporate staf f, and construction workers is about 8000.
Evening shifts have about 1000 workers, midnight shif ts about 450, and holidays and weekends about 125.
Q15:
What is the nature and status of existing emergency programs at these facilities?
- l A15:
Each of these facilities has had long standing emergency programs which include the following elements:
1 1.
Organization - Plant shif t superintendents are the designated emergency directors having authority over not only the emergency squads, but also all plant personnel af fected by the emergency.
Emergency squads generally consist of 10 to 15 shift workers including fire, security, operator, utility, and safety personnel.
Specialized organizational support is l
provided, as needed, in such areas as analytical services, environmental monitoring, engineering, security, waste disposal, decontamination, heavy equipment utilization, medical, transportation, nuclear criticality control, health physics, and industrial hygiene.
Emergency staff are on duty 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day, seven days per week.
Support personnel are on call during off-shifts.
2.
Plans and Procedures - Emergency plans are in effect at each plant.
These plans identify credible emergencies; specify authorities, responsibilities, and actions to be taken by facility personnel; identify required emergency procedures; identify emergency resources; identify conditions for shutdown or placing of facilities or operations in a safe condition during an
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emergency; establish recovery organizations; etc.
Procedures are in effect to instruct personnel in such areas as personnel evacuation and accountability, emergency notification, personnel monitoring and decontamination, medical requirements, damage control, reentry, and damage assessment.
3.
Resources - Each plant has extensive emergency resources which are available to assist each other and the public.
DOE's Oak Ridge Operations Office is responsible for coordinating Federal radiological assistance in the eight state region encompassing Tennessee, Kentucky, Virginia, West Virginia, Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Missouri.
The resources utilized for this purpose come primarily from these three plants with supplemental assistance from other DOE locations and the U. S. EPA's Eastern Environmental Radiation Facility in Montgomery, Alabama.
Assistance to others is coordinated by DOE from the Regional Radiological Response Center in the Federal Building, Oak Ridge (approximately 12 miles f rom the CRBRP).
Emergency environmental monitoring and overall accident response coordination is conducted from this same facility.
I Q16:
What are the emergency planning needs at these facilities
. for response to CRBRP accidents?
A16:
The emergency planning needs for CRBRP accident response differ somewhat from plant to plant.
The Oak Rid,ge National Laboratory has no inherent constraints to prevent rapid sheltering or evacuation of "non-essential personnel," or even " essential personnel," should circumstances warrant.
It is estimated that the Laboratory facilities themselves could be evacuated in 15 minutes.
Shelter spaces for 12,000 people with a protection f actor of 100 to 600 have been identified at ORNL.
(Several years ago shelter spaces for 75,000 people were identified in Oak Ridge with a protection factor exceeding 100.
Most of these spaces were at these three plants.)
The Laboratory is beginning work on a new Laboratory Emergency Response Center (1987 completion) which will provide a protected location to monitor plant activities including radiation levels, utilities, security monitors, and other operations.
The Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant is not constrained from prompt sheltering of all personnel, or from evacuating the large majority of the plant's population.
It is desirable, however, to maintain a small operating and support staff to avoid shutting down the diffusion cascade unless clearly necessary.
Sheltering or evacuation could be accomplished in 15 to 20 minutes.
Emergency planning
for the ORGDP would emphasize those methods necessary to continue plant operation while providing radiation protection to the few remaining plant operators and support staff.
At the present time, a considerable level of protection is believed to be available due to the location of the various control rooms and the inf requent need for outside maintenance.
The 9 to 11 mile distance of the Y-12 Plant from the CRBRP and the resulting low doses makes it unlikely that emergency evacuation would be needed.
Nevertheless, evacuation or sheltering could be accomplished promptly, as at the other two DOE f acilities.
If dhat should be necessary, a small security staff would be maintained.
This would not present a significant impediment to effective contingency planning since the lower doses at the Y-12 Plant would allow for implementation of suitable protective measures.
Emergency planning for all three sites will include common elements such as obtaining a clear understanding of the 1
consequences of likely and unlikely accidents, establishing a prompt CRBRP/ DOE facilities notification procedure, conducting drills and exercises simulating CRBRP accidents and testing plant emergency personnel response, providing for the needs of essential personnel (e.g., radiation
. I protection, decontamination, transportation, food / water, etc.), and assuring that plant personnel are f amiliar with State / county evacuation / relocation plans so that if the plants are ever evacuated, the employees clearly,pnderstand l
their responsibilities in complying with these related emergency plans.
Q17 :
What conclusions have you drawn about emergency planning for the DOE facilities?
A17:
Each of the DOE plants has extensive emergency planning, preparedness, and response experience which forms an excellent basis for assuring compatibility with CRBRP emergency planning.
An evaluation of possible impediments to effective planning reveals that few exist and none are insurmountable.
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. i Q18:
Applicants are requested to discuss commercial and recreational river traf fic (if any) from two points of interest:
a.
Practical methods of controlling same during,
off-normal plant conditions.
b.
The potential for hazardous cargo posing a threat to the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project.
A18:
a.
During periods of off-normal plant operations, commercial and recreational river traffic within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) will be controlled by the Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency (TWRA),
assisted as necessary by the U.S. Coast Guard from Knoxville or Chattanooga, Tennessee.
Upstream lockage through Melton Hill Dam will also be controlled by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE).
Implementation criteria for this control will be described in the CRBRP and State of Tennessee Radiological Emergency Plan.
For that portion of the Clinch River immediately adjacent to the CRBRP, within the Exclusion Boundary, appropriate and effective arrangements
,. will be made with TWRA and the U.S. Coast Guard to i
control traffic and provide for prompt warning and removal of persons present in the area.
Such arrangements would allow plant operators to immediately deploy sufficient personnel to control the river portion of the exclusion area.
Implementation criteria for this control will be described in the CRBRP and State of Tennessee Radiological Emergency Plan.
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b.
No hazardous materials have been transported by barge past the site in the past, and none are anticipated in the future.
Barge traffic past the CRBRP site would be either going to or coming from the Melton Hill Reservoir since there are no origins or destinations between the site and Melton Hill Dam.
According to records, steel is essentially the only commodity that has been shipped through the Melton Hill Lock I
since it was opened.
Most of this traf fic was generated by Allied Steel which' has the only active terminal on Melton Hill Reservoir.
Recent traffic has consisted of 16 loaded barges in 1979, 16 in 1980, 27 in 1981, and 11 in 1982.
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I The COE maintains two reporting systems which document the kinds of commodities being shipped on the waterway:
a vessel operations report identifing the commodities shipped which is required monthly from carriers, and a vessel log report (which also identifies commodities) that is submitted by the towboat captain to the lockmaster as each tow goes through the lock.
In the foreseeable future, coal is the commodity having the greatest potential for increased movement through the Melton Hill Lock.
There is currently one partially constructed coal terminal on the Melton Hill Reservoir.
Completion of this terminal has been postponed at least in part because of the existing poor coal market.
Molton Hill has only a few potential industrial sites large enough to accommodate an industry which would either use or produce commodities in l
l large enough quantities to take advantage of water transportation.
Therefore, it is unlikely that hazardous materials will be shipped through Melton Hill Lock in the future.
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In the unlikely event that a new industry which would ship hazardous materials locates on the Melton Hill Reservoir, plans for a barge terminal must be submitted to the Corps of Engineers and TVA for review and approval.
The information requirements for the permit includes identification of materials to be shipped if they are known.
If the materials are not known, such as in the case of a public use terminal, the permit will be issued for the handling of nonhazardous materials only.
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STRTEMENT OF QUALIFICATIONS r
Names H. Wayne Hibbitts Education:
B. A. Physics 1963, University of South Florida M. S. Physics 1966, Vanderbilt University (AEC Health Physics Fellowship)
Work Experience:
May 1982 to present - Chief, Safety and Environmental Branch, Public Safety Division, CRBRP/PO, U.S.
DOE, Oak Ridge, TN October 1980 to May 1982 - Emergency Prepared-ness Directc.', Safety and Environmental Control Division, Oak Ridge Operations Office, U.S. DOE August 1970 to October 1980 - Environmental Health Physicist, Saf ety and Environmental Control Division, ORO, USAEC/ERDA/ DOE June 1968 to August 1970 - Occupational Health Physicist, Safety and Environmental Control Division, ORO, USAEC September 19'65 to June 1968 - Occupational Health Physicist, Oak Ridge National i
t
Laboratory, Union Carbide Corporation--Nuclear Division l
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4 STATEMENT OF QUALIFICATIONS j
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i Eric K. Sliger Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 I received a Bachelor of Science degree in Nuhlear Engineering from the University of TennesEce, Knoxville, in 1970.
While attending the University of Tennessee, I worked as a co-op student at the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant.
I have completed all course work towards a Master of Science degree in Engineering Administration through graduate work at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville anh Chattanooga campuses.
Upon graduating from the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, in 1970, I joined the Tennessee Valley Authority as a nuclear engineer in the Division of Power Production..
In 1971, I joined the U. S. Navy, receiving a commission in November 1971.
I completed the U. S. Navy Nuclear Power School training in November 1972, and U. S. Navy Submarine School training in February 1973.
From February 1973 to August 1975, I served aboard the fleet ballistic missile submarine USS Ethan Allen (SSBN608).
During this time, I was a qualified Engineering Officer of the Watch in a ref ueling overhaul, sea trials, and two deterrent patrols, during which I held the various jobs of Reactor Controls, Electrical, and Auxiliary Division Officer.
In September 1975, I joined TVA as a project engineer assigned to the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project, responsible i
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for contract management of various LMFBR system components.
In 1977, I transferred to Watts Bar Nuclear Plant as a preoper-S, a
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ational test engineer responsible for development and conduct of preoperational tests of various nuclear plant systems.
In 1978, I transferred to TVA's Division of Power Production Reactor Engineering Section as a PWR licensing engineer responsible for coordination of division input into licensing efforts for 1
Sequoyah, Watts Bar, and Bellefonte Nuclear Plants.
In 1980, I became supervisor of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Section, Division of Nuclear Power, and presently hold that position.
I am responsible for the radiological emergency preparedness program for all TVA nuclear plants.
8
. STATEMENT OF QUALIFICATIONS Lee E. Strawbridge Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Westinghouse Advanced Energy Systems Division Madison, Pennsylvania 15663 Since 1980, I have been Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing with responsibility for directing safety analyses and licensing activities perf ormed at the Westinghouse Advanced Energy Systems Division, Waltz Mill site for CRERP and other nuclear projects.
I received a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from Pennsylvania State University in 1958 and a Master of Science degree in Nuclear Engineering from Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1959.
Following graduation from M.I.T.,
I joined Westinghouse Electric Corporation in 1959 as a Scientist in the Atomic Power Division and was in the position of Senior Scientist from 1962 to 1964.
In these positions, I performed nuclear design analysis for Pressurized Water Reactors and a wide range of advanced reactor concepts including thermal, epi-thermal and f ast r eactor s.
From 1964 to 1966, I was Manager of Nuclear Development with responsibility for developing analytic techniques and applying them to the nuclear analysis of Pressurized Water Reactors and advanced reactors concepts.
This included conceptual nuclear design analyses of a modular 1000 MWe LMFBR.
Upon formation of the Westinghouse Advanced Reactors
Division in 1966, I was named Manager of Nuclear Development, with responsibility for all nuclear design analyses within the division.
This consisted totally of work on sodium cooled fast reactors.
I continued in this position until 1968.
From 1968 to 1971, I was Manager of FFTF Nuclear Design, with responsibility for the nuclear analysis and nuclear design of the Fast Flux Test Facility.
From 1971 to 1974, I was Manager of LMFBR Safety and Licensing, with responsibility for the saf ety and licensing activities associated with the LMFBR Project Definition Phase, which formed the basis for the Westinghouse proposed for CRBRP.
The conceptual design activities for CRBRP were completed during this period and the initial specification of structural margin beyond the design base loads was made.
From 1974 to 1976, I was manager of Safety Analysis with responsibility for directing many of the safety analyses reported to the CRBRP Environmental Report and the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report.
In addition, safety analyses were performed and substantial input was provided to the FFTF Final Safety Analysis Report.
From 1976 to 1980, I was Manager of CRBRP Margin Analysis and Design, with responsibility for directing the analyses of hypothetical core disruptive accidents.
This included the specification of structural and thermal margin requirements to mitigate the consequences of accidents beyond the design base and the preparation and submittal to NRC of the
document CRBRP-3, " Hypothetical Core Disruptive Accident Considerations in CRBRP."
I am a Professional Engineer, registered in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania since 1967.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
')
In the Matter of
)
)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
)
)
PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
)
Docket No. 50-537
)
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
)
(Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant)
)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Service has been effected on this date by personal delivery or first-class mail to the following:
Marshall E. Miller, Esquire Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East-West Towers 4350 East-West Highway Bethesda, Maryland 20814 (2 copies by hand)
Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr.
Director Bodega Marine Laboratory University of California West Side Road Bodega Bay, California 94923 (Air Express)
Mr. Gustave A. Linenberger Atomi'c Safety & Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East-West Towers 4350 East-West Highway Bethesda, Maryland 20814 (by hand)
. Stuart Treby, Esq.
Sherwin E. Turk, Esq.
Elaine I. Chan, Esq.
Geary S. Mizuno, Esq.
Office of Executive Legal Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Maryland National Bank Building 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, Maryland 20014 (2 copies by hand)
- Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Bohrd
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
- Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
- Docketing & Service Section Office of the Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 (original, 3 copies, and return copy)
William M. Leech, Jr., Attorney General William B. Hubbard, Chief Deputy Attorney General Michael D. Pearigen, Assistant Attorney General State of Tennessee Office of the Attorney General 450 James Robertson Parkway Nashville, Tennessee 37219 Oak Ridge Public Library Civic Center Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 l
Herbert S. Sanger, Jr., Esquire l
Lewis E. Wallace, Esquire W. Walter LaRoche, Esquire James F. Burger, Esquire Edward J. Vigluicci, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Tennessee Valley Authority 400 West Summit Hill Drive Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 (2 copies)
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- l Lawson McGhee Public Library l
500 West Church Street Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 William E. Lantrip, Esquire Attorney for the City of Oak Ridge Municipal Building Post Office Box 1 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Leon Silverstrom, Esquire William D. Luck, Esquire U. S. Department of Energy 1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Room 6B-256--Forrestal Building Washington, D. C.
20585 (4 copies by hand)
Commissioner James Cotham l
Tennessee Department of Economic l
and Community Development l
Andrew Jackson Building, Suite 10007 Nashville, Tennessee 37219 George L.
ar '
Attorne or Project Management Corporation DATED: July 8, 1983 l
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Denotes hand delivery to 1717 "H" Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
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