ML20081A504

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Supplemental Citations Supporting Thesis That Following Hydrodynamic Core Disruptive Accident,Reactor Vessel Closure Head Is More Susceptible to Failure than Reactor Vessel Head.Certificate of Svc Encl
ML20081A504
Person / Time
Site: Clinch River
Issue date: 10/25/1983
From: Edgar G, Luck W
EDGAR, G.L., ENERGY, DEPT. OF, PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORP.
To:
References
NUDOCS 8310260292
Download: ML20081A504 (7)


Text

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'83 DCT 25 P350

,_ _ 10/25/83 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY )

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PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION ) Docket No. 50-537

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY )

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(Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant) )

APPLICANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL CITATIONS The United States Department of Energy and Project Management Corporation, for themselves and on behalf of the Tennessee Valley Authority (the Applicants), hereby file their supplemental citations. On October 20, 1983, the Applicants were requested by the Board's Secretary "to supply citations to the record in support of the thesis that following an HCDA, the reactor vessel closure head is more susceptible to failure than the reactor vessel itself." The Applicants hereby provide the requested citations, as follows:

1. The reactor vessel closure head provides the barrier between the reactor core and the containment building. S Exh 41 at 11, TR 8282, Figs. 1 and 2, TR 8279-8280. If the closure head remains intact following an HCDA: a) the disrupted core will be retained within the primary system, or b) the reactor vessel will 8310260292 831025 d PDR ADOCK 05000537 /

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fail and the debris will eventually be discharSed to the reactor j

cavity where it will be isolated from the containment building environment. S Exh 41 at 11, TR 8282, at 28, TR 8300. In either event, the integrity of the containment would not be challenged early. Jd. The consequences of discharge of the debris to the reactor cavity following failure of the reactor i vessel itself have been extensively analyzed, and are judged to be acceptable. S Exh 41 at 99-100, TR 8377-8378; A Exh 89 at 59-60, TR 7821-7822.

2. If the closure head fails following an HCDA, radioactive material and sodium would be released directly to the containment building environment, with the results that: a) materials are available for leakage from the containment to the atmosphere, and/or b) sodium fires or missiles could provide an early challenge to containment integrity. S Exh 41 at 11, TR 8282, at 19, TR 8290, at 28, TR 8300. Extensive analyses have been conducted to show that HCDA's with energetics sufficient to l

fail the reactor vessel closure head are physically unreasonable (highly unlikely), and not a significant safety concern for CRBRP. S Exh 41 at 6, TR 8275, at 47-49, TR 8321-23.

3. All major components connected with the primary system, which include the reactor vessel itself,- are being considered by the a
  • / Failure of the reactor vessel due to energetic behavior at locations other than the closure head would result in discharge of the primary coolant and debris to the reactor cavity just as in the case of failure by thermal attack. S Exh 41 at 29, TR 8301.

1, Applicants with regard to their capability to accommodate the dynamic loads produced by HCDA's. S Exh 41 at 13-14, TR 8284-85; A Exh 90, SSS.2-5.4; A Exh 89 at 131-32, TR 7893-7894. The load requirements imposed are conservatively high, the analytical methods acceptable, and although deformation may occur, the applicable evaluation criteria can and will be met. IdL; S Exh 27, App. A at A.3 .3-5, A.3-13. The NRC Staff analyses con-cluded that approximately 2550 MJ would be required to produce a slug impact kinetic energy close to the head design capability.

S Exh 27 at A.2-5; S Exh 41 at 48, TR 8322. This corresponds to approximately a $200/second driving reactivity ramp rate. Id.

At this $200/second reactivity ramp rate, the reactor vessel wall would not be expected to fail. S Exh 46 at BII.2-2. Therefore, the reactor vessel closure head is expected to be as susceptible or more susceptible to failure by HCDA energetics than the reactor vessel itself. !

Respectfully submitted, Gedrge . Edgar Attorn for Project Management Corporation

  • / The closure head and reactor vessel itself will be the subject of additional scale model testing and analyses tc confirm the capability of both to meet the dynamic load requirements imposed for HCDA conditions. S Exh 27, App. A at A.3 .3-15; A Exh 89 at 143, TR 7905; 5 Exh 41 at 34-36, Tr. 8307-8309.

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's b ') . Vln William D. Luck Attorney for United States Department of Energy DATED: October 25, 1983 I

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

)

In the Matter of )

)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERCY )

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PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION ) Docket No. 50-537 j

)

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY )

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(Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant) )

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Service has been effected on this date by personal delivery or first-class mail to the following:

Marshall E. Miller, Esquire Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East-West Towers

,4350 East-West Highway Bethesda, Maryland 20814 (2 copies by hand)

Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr.

I Director Bodega Marine Laboratory University of California West Side Road i

l Bodega Bay, California 94923 (Air Express) l Mr. Gustave A. Linenberger Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i

East-West Towers 4350 East-West Highway Bethesda, Maryland 20814 (by hand) l

e

) Stuart Treby, Esq.

Sherwin E. Turk, Esq.

Elaine I. Chan, Esq.

Geary S. Mizuno, Esq.

Office of Executive Legal Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Maryland National Bank Building 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, Maryland 20014 (2 copies by hand)

  • Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
  • Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
  • Docketing & Service Section Office of the Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 (original, 3 copies, and return copy)

William M. Leech, Jr., Attorney General William B. Hubbard, Chief Deputy Attorney General Michael D. Pearigen, Assistant Attorney General State of Tennessee Office of the Attorney General 450 James Robertson Parkway Nashville, Tennessee 37219 Oak Ridge Public Library Civic Center Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Herbert S. Sanger, Jr., Esquire Lewis E. Wallace. Esquire W. Walter LaRoche, Esquire James F. Burger, Esquire Edward J. Vigluicci, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Tennessee Vallev Authority 400 West Summit' Hill Driv'e i

Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 (2 copies) y ?ir--- r: -Tw e - --n w -ye ,y-:e- m - - w --u-er- - - - - - g ,-, - ,

Lawson McGhee Public Library 500 West Church Street Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 William E. Lantrip, Esquire Attorney for the City of Oak Ridge Municipal Building Post Office Box 1 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Leonkilverstrom, Esquire William D. Luck, Esquire U. S. Department of Energy 1000 Independence Avenue,-S.W.

Room 6B-256--Forrestal Building Washington,' D. C. 20585 (2 copies by hand)

Commissioner James Cotham Tennessee Department of Economic and Community Development Andrew Jackson Building, Suite 10007 Nashville, Tennessee 37219

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George L. gar "

Attorney or Proj ect Management Corporation DATED: October 25, 1983

  • / Denotes hand delivery to 1717 "H" Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.