ML20049H161
| ML20049H161 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/26/1980 |
| From: | Bickwit L NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20049A457 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-92-436 SECY-A-80-186, NUDOCS 8110300064 | |
| Download: ML20049H161 (89) | |
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-0FFICIAL USE ONLY UNITED 3TATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SECY-A-80-186_
Noyember 26, 1980 iVASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 CONSENT CALEMDAR ITEM ADJUDICATORY:
The Commissioners Fort Leonard Bickwit, Jr., General Counsel From:
RESPONSE TO DUKE POWER COMPANY AND TEXAS
Subject:
UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION OF DiERGENCY PLANNING RULE
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Purpose:
Discussion:
On October 10, 1980, the Duke Power Company and the Texas Utilities Generating Company (hereinafter " Duke Power") sued the Com-
' mission in the D.C. Circuit over its final rule on emergency planning.
The petition for review indicated that Duke Power would. seek Commission reconsideration of the specific aspects of the final rule which it found objec-tionable, and on November 12 such a motion for reconsideration was filed together with a requested stay of the rule pending reconsidera-tion.
The motions for reconsideration and a stay are attached for the Commission's con-sideration (Attachment 1.)
They are limited to the 15-minute notification requirement.
Duke Power indicated that unless its motion were acted upon favorably by November 26. it would ask the D.C.
Circuit for a stay.
p for the leasons discussed below believe that 9
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rec'ommend that the/
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M Stephen F. Eilperin, GC, X-4146s SECY NOTE:
This paper is identical to j
Contacts:
advance copies which were harid carried Mark E. Chopko, GC, X-43224 by an OGC representative to Comission offices on Hednesday, November 26, 1980.
<Js information in thjs record was de'eled sN-i c! OU "f
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in accordance with the freedom of nformation DLL'- - h1 Act, exehtions _ __I
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We recommend that We expect k
Leonard Bickwit, Jr.
General Counsel Attachments:
1.
Motion for Reconsideration
& Motion for Stay 2.
Proposed Memo. & Order w/ Staff Technical Analysis
7 Comissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Wednesday, December 3,1980.
Comission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Cornissioners NLT December 1,1980, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and corrnent, the Comissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when cocinents may be expected.
DISTRIBUTION Conmissioners Comission Staff Offices Secretariat
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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NUCLEAR. REGULATORY COMMISSION yb D
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FINAL RULE ON EMERGENCY PLANNING, D,ocket No.
o 45 Fed. Reg. 55402 (Aug. 19, 1980)
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MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Duke Po.wer Company and Texas Utilities Generating Company (" Duke /TU") hereby move that the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission reconsider that portion of Appendix E to its August 11, 1980 final rule on emergency planning which requires that there exist "the capability to essentially complete the initial notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes."
45 Fed. Reg. 55402, 55412-(Aug. 19, 1980).
Concurrent with the filing of this motion'for reconside-ration, Duke /TU have moved for a stay of effectiveness of that portion of the final rule, pending consideration of the l
new evidence proffered herein and pending any subsequent judicial review.
Duke /TU respectfully request that the Commisson act upon this motion for reconsideration by Wednesday, November'26, 1980.1/
1/ Immediate action is requested because of the emergent i
necessity for Duke to order equipment to meet the notifi-cation requirement. A more detailed explanation is contained in the Motion For Stay filed with the Commission.
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g-Since the Commission promulgated the final rule on August 11, 1980, significant events have transpired and new information has become available which challenge the techn-ical basis for the fifteen minute notification requirement, and which raise serious questions about the practicability of the rule.
First, an August 14, 1980 letter to Chairman Ahearne from W.R. Stratton of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, and from A.P. Malinauskas and D.O. Campbell of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory casts doubt on the technical basis for the notification requirement.
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In the letter, a copy of which is enclosed herewith as Appendix A, these scientists outline their findings th a t:
the behavior of iodine during nuclear reactor accidents is not correctly described by existing NRC models and Regulatory Guides.
Iodine volatility is grossly overestimated by these models for accidents in which substantial amounts of water are present. (p.1).
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Since iodine releases are " extremely small," the scientists conclude that:
i the risk to the general public presented by iodine is lower than estimated, perhaps by j
orders of magnitude. (p. 1).
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Dr. Stratton was formerly Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.
He now serves as an ACRS consultant.
Duke /TU did not receive a copy of this letter until October,1980 af ter it was distributed with a cover memorandum written by the Chairman of the Depart-ment of Energy Task Force for NRC Coordination.
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Because iodine constitutes a significant early release identified in the WASH-1400 study, which was the basis for the 15-minute notification requirement, the conclusions of the Stratton, et al. letter cast considerable doubt on the need for such a requirement.
Ind e ed, Stratton, et al.
recognized this.
Their letter specifically calls for a reexamination of the fission product escape assumptions in the WASH-1400 study and of safety criteria based on those assumptions:
The frequently quoted fission product escape assumptions ( from TID-14844 in 1962 to the more recent Regulatory Guides 1.3 and 1.4, and the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400) should be reexamined.
The present assumptions' grossly overstate iodine release from a reactor site in many types of loss-of-coolant accident, and safety criteria based on these assumptions should be reevaluated.
The impact of a reduction of iodinc risk on the requirements for evacuation is parti-cularly important at this time.
(pp.3-4).
Such constitutes a fundamental challenge to both the require-ment and its underlying technical basis by respected authori-ties, one of whom is a former senior official with ACRS.
In addition, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(" FEMA"), the federal agency with the greatest amount of experience in emergency preparedness and the agency charged by the President with primary responsibility for of f-site radiological emergency planning, has publicly indicated its
_4 support of a phased notification procedure, rather than the current requirement for a fifteen minute notification capability for the entire 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ.
In testimony before the Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee on August 18, 1980, John McConnell, PEMA Assistant Associate Director for Plans and preparedness, questioned t
the practicability of providing public notification for the entire 10-mile EPZ within the initial 15 minutes.
A copy of the relevant portions of the transcript of that hearing is enclosed as Appendix B.
Mr. McConnell stated, in his tes timo ny:
Now, the one thing that has been of most concern was the number of people who were supposed to be warned within that 15 minutes, as described in the criteria:
a hundred percent of the people within 5 miles of the plant and 90 percent of the people within 10 miles of the plant.
This is a virtual impossibility within 15 minutes, and, in fact, it would be impossible to assure a hundred percent notification of any segment of the population.
So we have arrived at a general appr oa ch, which will be something like thi s, that within 15 minutes, within th e initial 15 minutes notification, there must be assurance of relatively a hundred percent notification within 2 to 3 miles of the plant, there must be a public media notification at the same time which can reach beyond that, and then a phased assurance of notification beyond the 2 to 3 miles, out to the 10 mile, in a slightly longer period of time.
I think
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~5 with sirens in the highly populated areas and with the various methods that can be made available around the close-in portions around the plant, we can have effective notification systems a lot cheaper than was implied originally.
Transcript of Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee Public Hearing 74-75 (Aug. 18, 1980).
A revised draft of the joint NRC/ FEMA emergency planning criteria document (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1) was issued on September 12, 1980, but it does not reflect the phased notification approach suggested by Mr. McConnell.
- Instead, that document perpetuates the form of the rule characterized by Mr. McConnell as a " virtual impossibility."
The views of FEMA of ficials deserve additional consider-ation by the Commission for three basic reasons:
(1) FEMA and its predecessor agencies have had extensive practical experience in dealing with all types of emergency evacuations; (2) FEMA is the federal agency having special expertise in these matters; and (3) FEMA will be responsible for evaluating State and local radiological emergency notification plans.
If the federal agency with expertise and ultimate responsibility for the adequacy of offsite emergency plans concludes that notification of 100 percent of the population within the initial 15 minutes is " impossible" and that a more realistic phased approach will provide an ef fective notification the reasonableness of continuing to pursue the
- system, policies established in the final rule is called into sharp dispute.
Duke /TU recognize that the NRC rules of procedure do not explicitly provide for the reconsideration of a final rule which has been promulgated.
A provision for reconsider-ation is contained at 10 C.F.R.
$ 2.771 (1980), but that provision relates only to petitions for reconsideration of a final decision in adjudicatory proceedings.
Duke /TU assert that they meet any reasonable prerequisites for the granting of a motion for reconsideration at this time. 'Since the Commission has not established standards specifically dealing with this situation, a review of the standards applicable to analogous situations may be helpful.
This motion for reconsideration is analogous to a motion to reopen a licensing proceeding before the NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board.
Decisions of the Appea Board hold that a successful motion to reopen must show that (1) the issue is timely raised, or that good cause exists for a untimely filing; (2) that the issue is significant; and (3) based on materials submitted in support of its motion, that a different result would have been reached had such material been considered initially.
See Kansas Gas & Electric Company (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-462, 7 NRC 320, 338(1978);. Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.
2), ALAB-486, 8 NRC 9, 21 (1978).
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If similar considerations are applied to this motion for reconsideration, Duke /TU clearly meet these standards.
With regard to the timeliness issue, this motion is clearly f
timely since the deadline for compliance,with the fifteen minute notification requirement has not yet passed.
That date is July 1, 1981. Even if the motion is considered untimely, there is good cause for not raising the issues at an earlier date.
Both items of evidence now proffered were unavailable when the Commission was considering the final rule. The Stratton, et al. letter was not completed until three days after the final rule was issued and it did not become available to Duke /TU until October, 1980.
Duke /TU became aware of the McConnell statement in late l
August but it only became apparent in mid-September that revised NUREG-0654 would not reflect FEMA's thinking.
Clearly, the issues presented in this motion are
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significant.
The choice of an appropriate notification period is significant with regard to the planning for public protection in the event of an accident at a nuclear facility.
The newly proffered evidence raises issues concerning the technical basis and practicability of the period established in the final rule.
Finally, the information proffered by Duke /TU would, if accepted by the Commission, alter the results currently embodied in the emergency planning rule.
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If, as indicated by the proffered evidence, the current requirement lacks an adequate technical basis and is
" impossible" to fulfill, changes in the final rule are clearly mandated.
Duke /TU respectfully request that the Commission consider this motion for reconsideration as expeditiously as possible.
The final rule became effective on November 3,
1980, and the capability for a fifteen minute notifi-cation must be in place by July 1, 1981.
45 Fed. Reg. at 55412. Because equipment must be ordered and personnel employed within a short period to time to meet these require-ments, a Commission decision by November 26, 1980 is neces-sary.
In the event that the Commission has not acted in a timely fashion, Duke /TU intend to pursue this matter in the courts, so that it may be resolved in time for necessary 5
licensee actions to be taken.
Duke /TU respectfully request that the Commission set a date for an adjudicatory hearing to address the issues raised by this motion.
These issues are of such gravity that a notice and comment proceeding is insufficient.
Duke /TU submit that a full resolution of this matter can only be brought about if the Staff and its experts are subject to cross-examination.
Duke /TU further request l
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the opportunity to submit documents, testimony and any other pertinent information bearing upon the issues raised by the Stratton, et al. letter and McConnell testimony.
Duke /TU recognize that a hearing may require an additional period of time.
Since the hearing would involve a discrete topic, there should be no undue delay, however.
During the interim, Duke /TU are fully willing to adopt the approach t
suggested by FEMA, that is, a fifteen notification capability out to a 2 or 3 mile radius of a nuclear facility and phased notification beyond that out to 10 miles.
Respectfully submitted, r
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By l
.A Richkrd C.
Browne J. Michael McGarry, III Nicholas S.
Reynolds i
Dale E.
Hollar DEBEVOISE & LIBERMAN
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1200 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 (202) 857-9800 t
Counsel for Duke Power Company and Texas Utilities Generating Company of Counsel:
William L.
Porter Associate General Counsel Duke Power Company 412 Church Street Charlotte, N.C.
28242 November 12, 1980
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF
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Docke t No.
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FINAL RULE ON
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EMERGENCY PLANNING
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45 Fed. Reg., 55402
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby_ certify that copies of the foregoing " Motion for Reconsideration" in the above-captioned matter were served upon the following persons by hand delivery, this 12th day of November, 1980:
John F.
Ahearne Leonard Bickwit, Esq.
Chairman General Counsel U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory l
Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Joseph M. Hendrie Stephen F.
Eilperin, Esq.
Commissioner Of fice of the General Counsel U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Peter A.
Bradford Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 i
Victor Gilinsky Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
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Dale E.
Hollar Counsel for Duke Power Company and Texas Utilities Generating Company
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERG pad SEP 1 L 1930 g
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EV131/ SED 168 ruancT Chemical Fom of Iodine Release To R. Clusen, EV 1 G. Dix, EV '
W. Hott,
-13 W. Burr, EV-30 G. Cunningham, NE-1 J. Crawford, NE-2 A. Pressesky, NE-510 H. Feinroth, NE-551 J. Kane, ER-10 D. Rich =an, ER-32
_J. Jicha, DP-72,
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Attached is a letter to Chair =an Ahearne of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission from W. R. Stratton,.Los Alamos Scientific 1.aboratory, and A. P. Malinauskas ind D. O. Campbell, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, dated August 14,193C, This letter questions the amount of iodine that is released to the atmosphere during nuclear accidents when water or condensing water is available.
If it can be determined that an insignificant amount "of iodine is reler. sed to the atmosphere during accidents-such as Three Hile Island, it xill have a cajor impact on current NRC models and Regulatory Guides; and may favorably impact site locations, construction requirements, and op'erhting requirements placed on comercial reactors and DOE test reactors.
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I believe that the letter may be of vital interest to you'.
If the Nuclear Please note Applications Branch can be of assistance, please call upon us.
that the initial themodynamic studies leading to.the conclusion that cesium iodide is famed duri.ng nuclear reactor accidents where water is available was sponsored by DOE's Office of Energy Research.
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Robert W. Barber, Chairman - '
DOE Task Force for HRC Coordination-i Attachment cc:
L. Brothers, EV-2 1
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY Commission wAsMiwDTCiw.D. c. 20555
.i SEP 5
'a50 Dr. R. Hobbins i
EG&G Idaho, Inct P. O. Box 1625 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401
Dear Dr. Hobbins:
Chemical Fem of Iodine Release
Subject:
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The enclosed letter questions NRC asstaptions a We would appreciate your considering this suggestion in the 2
light of information EGAG cay have accumulated.on iodine relea iodide.
Is the infomation.you'have obtained fuel failure in PET experiments. confirmatory, contradictory, or e If you We would appreciate a letter from you by the end of September.
have any questions, call D::n Hoatson at FBRB.
Sincerely,
/hF M.
. Pichiesimer, Acting' Chief Fuel Behavior Research Branch i
Division of Reactor Safety Research i
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Enclosure:
As stated ec w/ enc 1:
D. Rose DOUID R. Barber, DOUHQ/
R. Ti1Ter, DOUID
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August 14,19BT
. Chairnan John Ahearne Es. thselear P.agulatory Co-t ssion 1717 3 5:reer Washingtap, A C 20555-t har Chair =an Ahmarna:
importmu: devel-T;e wish to bri=g to your attention a r.atter that zny be a veryWe believe that opmen; in reactor safety analysis.
l if ' reactor accidents ac=u=alated to shov that the behavior of iodine during r C ides.
Iodine volatility is groskly overesgi=ated by these nedels for accand escape of iodine is em:
s:an:ial a=ounts of water are present,was at Three P.ile Island) as long as reasonable yrill be ex:remely s=all '(as i:
As a consequence, the r1sk to the V contain=ent is:egrity is also raintained. general public h
by orders of sagnitude.
h al Our concern vich this issue origina:ed with our involvement in t e seve Three Technical Staf f Analyses for the President's Comn l and
~ derived fro = those analyses, fro = furthe.; exa=ination of experime 1 tile Island.
d d cesium fission pro-theoretical studies involving the che=istry of io ine an i
f dacts in ligh: va:er reactor fuel and syste=s, and from the obs to fuel fanures during accidents and incidents ait o:ber reac We telieve that the explanation presented here vill change th icdina subseq - t to reactor acciden:s l ment concepts of the banards involved during and t=r sizes.
h hazards and d safeguards are iciaks are calenlated, and the criteria to which engineere designed and installed.
N f
133 and
'Although the Three l'.ile Island ('nII) r'esctor core inventories o. meno d
i iodine-131 were comparable, be:veen 2.4 and 13 nillion curies o during the accident, while only 13 to 16 j
to the environnen:
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importance early in the investigation by the President s Consias sinilarly escapad!
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effort was made to. find the explanation.until this discrepancy (a factor of 10 5 e, 10 ) y,,
to understand the acciden: yurther, it was recogniced that the physical and(We at *td1 tsay not have been L.dque.
explained satisfactorily.
chemical conditions during the acciden: generally, radiciodin is d operation cf to site safety analysis as well as the design an note that, with respec:
ce tain engineered saf eguards.)
August 14, 1 920
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1:ation for the very lov escape of iodine that developed during t eas the D e c=pl:
investigation by the Presiden:'s Co 'ssion was that,of the fuel rods through the fai core increased, iodine diffused ouhe iodine cataping, if not already in the iodide De geneountered a chemically reducing environment thrich and vaporized.
iodide subsequa=tly vent into solution as iodide ion when it contacte 1: vas recogni =d that additismal experimental vork.vas needed to description of the iodine bbvior.
ras observed a: 2CI con-
"quantita tive occounted for the euch sre. aller escape of iodine tha:a=ount pr as pared to thz y casu=ed in the 7.agulatory Cuides.
i['5bedefinitive.
that this description can be stremithened and. mi e r TJe believe iodide.
ibe reactor 7Although the presentemerged frem the fuel as cesium iodide, already reduce syste= environ =ent then sustained this che=ical state.
to iodide.
have converted other iodine species, should they have been present,
" plate-out" vnen 1: reached metal l
. Cesiu= iodide vould be expected to condense oror belov 400 to SDD*C, and it w r
oun-i surfaces at te=peratures a:into solu:. ion as iodide ion as soon as wate uter, and the fec:
The re. actions of iodine species iniodine volatiliry will be,very s=211 tered.
is the do=inant species, ensure that A ruction (compared to that i= plied by the Regulatory Guides, for exa=ple).
l ility of l
oxidatien of iodide vould be necessary to in:rea's causin ih description of iodine beh2vior, but this qualita:ive picture is consi iM*-
b vas pre-the s=212 escape of iodi=e observed in a ra=ber of incidents v en water such as a: TC.
- aent, his rechanism is supported by the following observations, as well as by measure =ents nade at tiI:
i Iodine and cesie= are released congruently from WR lenkers during p transients (the iodine spiking, phenomenon).
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several sites indicate' that Cs1 is D ermodynamic calculations perfor=ed.a Further, the fission yield of cesiu:
2.
[ the stable for= of iodine in INR fuel.
and cesium is alvsys presen: in g eat (about is larger than that of iodine, tenfold) excess over iodine.
lated accident conditions, and the iodine rele 3.
nantly as CsI rather than as colecular 1 '
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l Augus: 14, 1 920 Chairman J. ^hearne l*
Se chenistry of iodism is such that, if water is accessible, iodina v 1
interact with the' vater so that its concentration 4.
its concentration in the water.
such naller thm, that have led to the destruction of fuel in unter systens (NRX, Sper:-1, Snaptrat-3, SL-1, M17., ORR, and PRIR), we un In other incidents:
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than vould be pro-zuch m31ar anount of iodine eacaped from the syste=2Dsta are hard to come jected by tha ea:isting models.
In tarked ancidents and e:= peri:wrnts, and eq; 1=vestigation is conden%
contras=, a large frac:fondaring the Whasmh accident, which occurred under r
enviro =ne n conditiona and in the absence of water.
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of this nerbn%u for iodine e. scape and transpo'rt can hardly k that the uoexpectedly low release of radiciodine in g n e sig=ifinancs be generali:'ed to other postulated V overe=phasi:= d.. Ve asser:
the El-2 acniden: is now understood and can We believe that an acciden:
accidents and to other designs of water reac: ors. fuel and a vater or.s vill have the sane t=
he controlling chee.ical conditions as did the 7EI-2 core and. pri=.ary sys e.
involving h :
d enter i=to the iodine vill e=erge as CsI (and possibly so=e other iodides) an I: vill persis: in solu-solution as soon as v_.t steen or water is cocountered.
ditions do not prevail.
ties a.s non-volatile iodide ion as long as c=idizing con the evidence is rufficiently strong to. justify this Iodine che=istry. is very r--Although we feel that ler:er, it in d_-.portant to qualif7 c.sr position.
f iodine behavier ce= plex, and definitive experi= ental and analytical studies o Nonetheless, 1: is duri_g and f olleving less-of-noolant accidents are lacking.
ides is vro:g.
the behavior projeered fron the enisting 7.egulatory Guth clear that radiciodi== released, is regarded as a conservatism, but in this cas hRC assu=ption, Tbs enrren hich ha.s co=-
assu=ption of a vraag che=ical form tust be regarded as an error w y hg eldseta.
d If, af ter due consideration, the h'RC is sa:isfied that our desc k rade of reconsend thit an urgen: study and assessmen:
k With due behavior is valid, v:
all available i=f ormation, and appropriate actions b 4E44 in 7he frequently quoted fission product escape assump 1.
1562 to the more recen:
The presen' sumptions Safety S:udy, #JASE-1400) should be reexanised.
types of less-grossly overstate iodine release from a reactor site inand SXf e an accidentm
_of-coolant be reevaluated.
August 34 195
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' 4 chat aan J. Ahmarne dominate and i'he dispersal of, radiciodine in the biosphere may f
te=>.
2 ne sequences ::ust be ree=a=ined in de: ail.reviously lisny, if to: tost, acciden:
h iodine risk to the general public s:ay, in fact, be lower t an pne _ Levac 3.
estimated, possibly by ordars of negnitude, 6n is particularly importan:...
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io?%e risk en the reqM-e---nts for evanuti N t.Lse.
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'Jhe e=sinnerea s.a.f eguards designed for iodisa con:
l iodine behavior
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rather th.an thz behavior currently assu:::md.
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a unjor. revision of NE assu=p: ions reistive te acci-his should to: take place Finally, we re=mz that analyses, deze calculations, and design of safeguaas d theory, and dem:
h especially t=ril the Co=_-ission. itself is co=v1=ced t atof iodi=e transpor vinhou:
ac ept a revised physical and chemical d _seriptio: ef vrong assu=p.J.ons is se On the other hand, che i=pa::
to the enviro==en:.
should be made to establish the facts..
perious that a= intensive e.ff or:
hould the i
We are ready to off er ecre detailed infor=ation or further a FM reques: it.
We vill be
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tees yeu may appoint.
Sin =erely,
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W. I. S::st on-Los Ala:>os Scientific 1.abcira:ory
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.. A. P. Halinasiskas Oak Ridge lh:ional Labo atory pigg D. O. Campbell Oak Ridge !brional Laboratory C, W. Cunningha=, DOE--VASE ec-D. E Xerr, IASL E. Post:.2, ORNL W
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APPENDIX B I
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NUCLEAR SAF~~'*~~ 7.~ERS GH~' CO:E*ITTEE
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3e PU5LIC HEARING l
l4 5.,
Rocr. 2008 New Executive Offices Building 6'j Washiniten. D.C.
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7 a
Mondayr t
August 1., 1980
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8 !;
y The hearing was convened, pursuant-to notice, 9 li
- i. at 9 : 30 A.M., GOVERNOR BRUCE BABBITT, Chairr.an, presiding.
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1' APPEARANCES:
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11 ;!
GOVERNOR BRUCE BABBITT E
12 Chairman
,i 13 DR. HAL LEWIS E
Mecher t
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h MR. PATRICK EAGGERTY r
- s 15 Merber 16 DR. STEVEN EBBIN Staff Director t
e 17 r
NEIL PROTO, Escuirc
.l General Counsel 18 ;;
19 STAFF ME!4BERS PRESE"*.'.
'h 20 DR. AUSTIN KIBLER i
+
21 DR. RAPEALL K.2LSPER I
i 22 DR. WILLIAM KASTE:: BERG 23 r,
nR. ANDREu rErEr n.
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NEAL R. GROSS
f:
i Fasader.a, who is the Director.cf the Radiological Emergency
.?reparefness Divis' ion, a'_so fr:.. ?E:%.
2 Mr.'McConne'll, it is your show.
I would ask you 3
simply, in whatever way you care to, to make 'a few prelimina:
4 comments and particularly to address wh'ere we are generally 5
6 and what hurdles you see that lie ahead"that we might assess 7
and possibly be of some help with..
8 ORESENTATION OF MR. JOHN McCONNELL 9
10 MR. McCONNELL:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like it to be known at the outset that I 11 I
a nuclear physicist nor an engineer of any type.
12 am not so to speak, under which this pEogra!
13 am the general manager, of radiological emergency preparedness has been placed in 14 I guess I acquired the placement of that responsibily
~
15 FEMA.
16 because of the involvement that my office had with the previous ef forts of NRC over the past five or six years to 17 develop plans in support of possible accidents at nuclear 18 19 power plants in that I was the Director of Plans and Opera ;
tions for the Defense. Civil Preparedness Agency in the Defe 20 had programs under my jurisdiction which were 21 Depa r tment,
22 applied to that effort, both a laboratory.for radiological instrumentation and the radiological planning against atta:
23 24
- n the United States.
I also had programs under my jurisdiction that gz 25
Si
= -icse working relati -ships with th,e states in supporting
.1 7 preparedness offices at
.:. federal funds ths 4:crgan:
2 3 f
- he state and local level, and werking with them on all the 1
they need for preparedness against any kind of 4 I programs that 1
5 energency.
l We are at the point of refining our mission to the !
li 6
- oint uhere we can be of much more specific. help to the -
l 7
As you know, we acquired j;
states than we have in the past.
f 8
i li!i this assignment mid-year, in the middle of the fiscal year, I
9 and there had been no special staff nor funds available or u
10 and in fact we appropriated specifically for this purpose, 11 same position in FY ' 81 since '
hj are f aced with relatively that 12 in our budget had already been submitted to the President 1
t 13 a I
H December when we received the assignment.
14 We have developed a very close working relation-15 We have gotten a great deal of help from the ship with NRC.
16 initially with the detail of 11 professionals who helped us 17 the division organized that would have this as a sole 18 ge:
We do plan to expand its. responsibility mission initially.
in during fiscal year '81 to the analysis of the need for prote:
20 so to speak, around other than tion outside defense, 21 commercial nuclear power plants, other nuclear reactors, 22 and study the need for special 23 both government and private, pre:e::irn areund all k nds of instal'_a-icns that have any 24 such as waste disposal, c s s hi'.ity of radiation releases, i
6.
1' perhaps.
r We are aise _c.:eres-ti ir.
etting m:re involvel 2
from a standpoint of coordinaticn and cooperation in the 3
federal government's efforts to' deal with hazardous naterial 4
i spills involving radiation materials.
l 5
I think to sum up where we are, although I am sure 6
you are well f amiliar with our report to the President which 7
was rendered on the 30th of June, not "too many states' plans' 8
have been formally reviewed by FEMA for the process of 9
determining whether or not they meet the jointly agreed-upon l
10 11 criteria between NRC and FEMA.
One state, in fact, has
?
12 received this.
That ~ is Tennessee for the Sequoia plant.
13 That occurred about a month ago.
Our activity of the past weekend was involving 14 i
observing an exercise by the State of Virginia surrounding 15 the Scrth Anna nuclear pcwer plant for purposes of giving 3
i 16 f
17 NRC a status report of conditions in that state for their censideration in a license application for North Anna 2.
18 for that We did have to modify our formal procedures somewhat 19 20 event because the state was not quite ready with its state an local plans in accordance with the new criteria to submit 21 22 them for formal review, so on the 15th of July we sat down 4
f with VEPCO, NRC and the state and agreed upon an expedited 23 Frecedure which would cause the glans to be enhanced ir. a 24 length of time and the excrcise to Sc held on short 25 shrr:
s'e s t e conce
\\
% s, i
n:: ice ;ending the f:rar.'_ sutrissi:n of the plans at a la*.e r I
2-date.
I and I am sure your staff, I think from what we saw, 3
i.
four of whom were there and very conspicuous during the i
l 4
events and worked very cooperatively with me and our cbservag
.5 tions staf f which was headed by our Region' 3 office out of 6
7 Philadelphia, would find that there was a great deal of i
a great deal of attention 'to this 8
enthusiasm by the state, and their plans and procedures are in fairly good f;
9
- problem, I
the formal report on that exercise frem 10 shape.
We will get l l t i 11 our Region 3 office tonight.
We will put a cover letter on !
That will be 12 it giving FEMA headquarters' assessment.
~
l rendered by my superior who is Mr. Frank Cam, the Associate
!1 13 Director for Plans and Preparedness, and NRC will then ':se 14 i
15 that in their licensing -consideration.
.:..e I
16 Overall, however, I think it is safe to say that, this moment submitted their l
17 thougn not many states have at 18 plans for formal review, a great deal of progress has been
!j is e
made in every state with a nuclear reactor or one that 19 t i The 20 within the 10-mile EP: of a reac:cr in another state.
1 21 effort is substantial, it is sincere, and it is progressing.
l l
As I said Our standards and criteria are extrerely high.
22 23 yesterday in a summation in a public reating in the vicirdty 24 cf the ::rr:n Anna plant, i: :s dene:fu'. in my mind whether
oa+
.krea etan53r 9 23rfectly and main:2:
6*
1 t ' := that way.
The situs:icr. is of that character, that at 2
a..ft me plans need :: he updated, people change, come and 4.o.,
3 ar.d officials responsible for things come and go, so at any 4
given time I doubt that we,will have perfect plans or 5
perfect preparedness measures.
l 6
We have made a great deal of progress, and when we ;
put our stamp of approval on a set of state and local plans 8
af ter having observed their exercising those plans, I think 9
they and the nation can be assured that we and the states havc 10 done just about all we can under the circumstances as 11 described by NRC and EPA as a threat stemming from an acci-I 12 dent at a nuclear power plant has been pretty well attended.
13 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
14 15 PRESENTATION OF MR. SHELDON SCHWART 16 MR. SCHWARTZ:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members e f l 17 the committee.
le Since I met with you last, there have been a numbe 19 of items that'have taken ' lace.
Principally, I am happy to.
p 20 see that the Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee now has a 21 full staff.
I wish that we could move as quickly as you 22 have in getting a full-tine staff.
2:1 To update what I reported to you also in our meeti 21
- r T a s c.
- e n a, 2: tha:
i wa :.c f a raquc;- in Congres s for i
25 5?.9 -1. lien supplemental appropriatien for fiscal year 19E;
- r..-
l' for E::A to carry cut :ne job that was directed by the p.:.
hat 'Ocagress has appropria e:
2
.tresicen..
I can rey:r- :
3 1.9 million to FEMA to get the job going.
A good portion of
~
4 that money will be funds that are,' going back into the FEMA 5
program offices who were so gracio'us in allowing us to spend 6
some of their funds to get this program going, and now we are I
able. to spend some of that money' back in FEMA and then move i
8 en to the program with the state. and local governments to I
9 upgrade their radiological emergency.prepa' redness.
10 Let me just give y,ou a schedule of some highlights 11 of some things that are coming up in the future and then 12 perhaps the committee would like to ask some questions.
~
13 We talk about the joint criteria for radiological 1
3 I
14 emergency preparedness that was developed and published in 15 January of this year with the cooperation of NEC and FEMA.
3_
16 We have received a significant amount of comments on that l
17 document and we are currently in the throes of revising the 18 document, taking all the comments into consideration.
What fthat means is we are accepting sete and rejecting some.
19 20 We will be holding a public meeting with state 21 officials sometime in September, probably around September 22 i 24 th or 25th, to go through all the comments that were 23 received and discuss with them hcw NRC and FEMA have dealt 24 cth these comments.
We hope :: frilev..; rapidly after tha:
25 rae:ing and try and stabilize the guid:.r.ce by putting out n-nee
64 final criteria for radiol,o#gical emergency preparedness soon 1
2 af ter that meeting.
I will say Sepjeiber 30th is the date we should go to print to get it out on the street.
3 At the same time, there are probably two other 4
major pieces of business that are necessary to ' stabilize our '
5 evaluation of preparedness and also to stabilize what is 6
expected of the state and local governments in their prepared :
I 7
i.
8 ness.
In addition to the guidance, there. are the standard 9
for exercises and the standard of performance 10 of performanc 4
for the observers who will evaluate those exercised, and 11 those are two pieces of businesses that are currently going 12 to two separate contractors, one contractor 13 on under contract who was available and augmenting the FEMA staff doing the u
15 evaluation at :; orth Anna.
Another piece of business that is critical, and 16 is the stabilization of the procedures that FEMA will
~
1; that in reviewing and approving state and local preparedness, 18 use as I am sure many of you have copies of, that 19 and that is, is the the proposed FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 which is currently 20 21 out for comment and the comment period closes the 24 th of 4
22 August.
I understand we have not received much comment on the rule and I don't know whether I should be happy or sad.
21 28
- f *:e don' t pe: any co.- cnts en :he rule, I presume that is se rerfect that nobody has any comments--and I ;
67
,^1
-a elieve that--sc, theref:re, maybe people don't urder-2 stand what we are trying to.d'o, and mayb'e the latter is the 3
truth.
ButTut will go forward as soon as the comment period 4
closes to stabilize that rule.
I i
5 Two other pieces of business.
One is the National}
6 Response Plan for radiological emergencies which is a mandated completed date in the -- I believe it i's the NRC 8
FY '80 authoritation bill supplement.
That is, by September 9
30th FEMA will have completed and have in place a national 10 plan for radiological emergency preparedness and we intend 11 to have a full draf t of that plan for comment, which I think 12 will satisfy both the congressional intent and satisfy all 13 'i the FEMA of ficials and the federal agencies who were involved l
14 and will respond under that national plan.
i 15 I think that is it at this time.
16 CHAIRMAN BABSITT:
One question:
What do you i
17 perceive to be the intent of Congress in requiring that 18 National Response Plan?
How does that differ from all of 19 this other process that you have been going through?
20 MR. SCHWARTZ:
I think it is a lot of the testimony 21 a lot of studies, and a lot of discussions as to what 22 happened at Three Mile Island; who was in charge, who was to 23 advise the governor; who was to provide the monitoring 24
.e:assary, t.e meni:Ori:
n-f..
ans'.ys J Tad the rap;rtine 25 c f data in a credible f ashion instead of seme of the catch as
..r.,
ennee
6?
1
- < tch can dans gather c.y that we-had.
There is concern, and 2
celle. s the ::r.:-r..
a s;;
. aced, tha t there is a need 3
for a' national plan to assure that if there is an accident 4
at a nuclear pcuer plant again, that it is already'preplanne 5
as to who is in charge, what technical age'ncies are necessar 6
to advise protective actions.
i 7
CHAIRMAN SA3BITT:
Anybody else?
8 Steve?
)
9 DR. EB' BIN :
In light of that criteria that you 10 just s tipula ted-- tha t is, the preplanning of emergency 11 planning so as to assure the interaction of federal and sta:
12 and local of ficials and the utilities officials--would you--
13 and maybe the question is really directed to John--describe 14 for us how you saw the interact. ion, that sort o'f interaction 15 being tested by the drill that took place this past weekend?
16 MR. McCONNELL:
Yes.
It was obvious, as I am sure,
1~
you knew, that we did not invcive the operational interf ace 18 of the federal response other than NRC's involvement with 19 the utility.
I think in the future we do have to include 20 more specific criteria which shows at least the Department c ;
21 Energy response to a request for monitoring, which is the 22 first action that should be requested by the state or local 23 government or the utility--it can be re' quest'ed by either--an 24 we must have, fron that point :n, a very specific under-25 stancing as to what the relati:nship is be tween NRC and DOE i
NEAL R. GROSS enon ence m an emre..re
q.
< 1-and FE::A.
FEMA will atte, mbt to refine this to the point wher:
2 there is no question fr:.. the f rst eve lnt. that requires mere 3
than one federal agency.
4
- Now, I would restrict probably involvement of 5
FEMA in the coordinating role at a point where NRC is dealinc 6
only with the utility and there is no threat of an off-site 7
release; but as soon as it goes 'beyond that point'and there 8
is more than one federal agency involved, there must be a 9
coordinating mechanism.
10 DR. EBBIS:
Well, now, you do have in some kinds 11 of emergencies Department of Agriculture, EPA, DOE as you 12 said, certainly HSS, and a number of other agencies, NIOSH, 13 for example.
In this simulated emergency the other day you 14 had a worker on the plant site 'that was killed and also the 15 technical support site which was highly irradiatec and.
16 necessitated it being moved, as I understand, and yet I am 17 not aware that there were any observers there from NIOSH.
18 Is that correct?
19 MR. McCONNELL:
I am not familiar.
You are 20 probably right.
I am.not aware, either.
Perhaps Mac can 21 answer that question since it was a site responsibility.
22 CHAIRMAN BABBITT:
Raph?
23 DR. KASPER:
In areas other than radiological 24
- rotection, presumarly e ergenc', plans SA*/c been acti'ented 25 any times.
Has FEMA or anyone done a careful job of NEAL R. GROSS
determining or examini..1 h:w well the implementation of 1-t 2
er.ergen:y plans in ether areas, the ways' in which emergenc.
plans actually work, differ or agree with emergency pl~ans on 3
^
4 paper, and what is the experience?
Ii That has,been a very substan-l
.5 MR. McCONNELL:
Yes.
tial part of our ef forts,of.all the agencies that are now 6
7 combined into FEMA.
The Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, which has deal,t with all the disasters that '
8 l
have been presidentially declared d'isasters, has made it a 9
t practice to critique each o.f those events to see how they 10 i
11 ccmpared with the paper plans.
I think a conclusion that always reach and that I mentioned to Commissioner Hendrie 12 we 13 as he was going out the door--we talked briefly about the i.o Nor'th Anna experience of Saturday--there will never be a 34
>..o 15 perfect set of plans, and the more exercise, either the simulated emergency or the emergency itself, will always 16 17 point up improvements tha t can be made and mistakes that occur which can be corrected by = ore practice and better 18 19 planning.
CRAIRMAN BABBITT:
When you have a simulated 20 21 exercise, is the event scenario handed out in advance?
22 Everybody understands what the specific scenario will be?
23 MR. McCONNELL:
That has not been too highly 24 ror.trelled by FE::A.
It has best up tr -his point an option 2.5 of the state in working with the utility insofar as the vr4r e e.e cu
71 1
- intrio is cc.:er..e.-
2 NRC di::atea :: tne utility the kind of scenario
~
3 they want in order to determine actions that take place insid 4
the plant.
I think FEMA is going to have to.be more atten-5 tive to exactly how that scenario.is described in advance.
I Saw a need at the North Anna exercise to lean.more to the 6
7 decisionmaking process than was evident there.
They describe this scenario a little too specifically so that the decision- ;
~
8 9
1.akers knew in advance what their decision had to be.
I 10 think that is one thing we have to test.
11 DR. KASPER:
Are there any.other instances whe~re 12 there is legislation which rectires emergency plans or 13 emergency planning before proceeding with that technology or p
14 with that endeavor, or is this unique?
15 MR. McCOWNELL:
To the best of my knowledge, this 16 is unique.
Now, keep in mind that 17 MR. SCHKARTZ:
The commercial endeavor.
1 18 DR. KASPER:
Right.
This is unique.
1 19 MR. McCONNELL:
Yes.
As you know, the law does 20 not make the existence of emergency plans candatory to the 21 states.
It is only to the utility insofar as the licensing 22 process is concerned.
23 DR. KASPER:
Right.
24 MR. McCO::':TL :
The r e f. r a,
'<r e ".a'te to de a l
- 1:h the states in our usual manner ef guidance, persuasion and 25 WFM R GROSS 1
i i
~:
I assistance.
j CHAIR *1AN SA35:IT:.:-: t.. is that working out?
How 2
Is would you characterize the respense of the states?
3 I know one state in which there is a strain 4
there -- well, of critics who are saying that FEMA is bo'otstrapping the i
5 states into compliance by going in a. circle which goes back l 6
through the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to the ut'ility, t
7 with the utility then applying the pressure, because it is 8
i in fact a regulated entity, while the state has no legal 9
I responsibility of any kind.
10 causing problems or do the states readily 11 Is that l,
l 12 accept th at sort of compulsion?
l I would say it is very, very 13 MR. McCONNELL:
I cenerally accepted by the states. ' There may be some l
14
~
i since we are reluctance by some states to move ahead, but l
15 so highly overworked with the tasks at hand, we are allowing 16 17 some states to take their own time.
We certainly have enough i
indication f rom most of the states that they are sufficiently 18 the health and welf are of their people to 19 concerned about
)
20 move ahead.
And there is no objection, 21 CRAIRMAN BA3BITT:
to the level of detail in 06547 22 for example, there is always objection to 23 MR. McCONNELL:
- Yes, at:ere:in: to tell the states hew to 23 t're federal goternren 25 de their work, and I think we almost do that in this decur.cr:
I rnnec l
4 ceen a substantial resistance.
1 But se far it has nes 2
CHAIRMA!; E. 'il-Ai'. right.
Has 0654 been 3
incorporated into the rule that was promulgated last Tuesday 4
MR. McCONNrLL:
Yes.
'The 16 planning objectives 5
that are described in the O'654 ar.e in the rule in a narrative 6
sense.
As you know, we are rewriting the criteria in 7
accordance with the : ublic comment and they will becoce 8
standards rather than objectives in the future.
9 CHAIRMAN BanBITT:
All right.
But the rule at 10 this point does not incorporate the checklists, for example, 11 that are in 0654.
12 MR. McCONNtL :
That is correct.
13 CHAIRMAN BnG3ITT:
But ultimately it will, 14 presumably, as a matter of fact'.
...c:a 15 MR. McCONNr LL:
I presume that NRC will publish in 16 their usual form a --
17 MR. SCHWARr;:
The Reg. Guide.
the Reg. Guide, which will 18 MR. McCONN r LL :
19 include the checklist.
FEMA will publish a document similar 20 to that with more ext.lanation and guidance.
21 CHAIP EN BanBITT:
I take it the debate on the 22 15-minute notificati..n continues?
I think we have arrived at a 24 cc grerise with NRC '" concer
- h the :erments we received 25 There is no questic-:i that it is advan:ageous and advissb"c :
s I
have a capability to trigger a notification system within
.2 15 minutes.
When'that.15 mine:;s iegins is at some questi.n 3
Obviously, it will not begin until the state and local.
4 authorities who are responsible for issuing the notification) d 5
have made a decision to do so.
j 6
Our concern is that they may be faced with a very l 7
short decisionmaking time and, therefore, the ' system must be !
i 8
ready to go.
9 Now, the one thing that h,as been of most concern 10 was the number of people who were supposed to be warned with j 11 that 15 minutes, as described in the criteria:
A hundred
~
12 percent of the people within 5 miles of the plant at 2 90 j
13 percent of the people within 10 miles of the plant.
This 1
14 is a virtual impossibility within 15 minutes and, in fact, i) 15 would be impossible to assure a hundred percent not'ification 16 of any segment of the population.
17 So we have arrived at a general approach, which 18 will be something like this, that within 15 minutes, within l 1
19 the initial 15 minutes notifica tion, there must be assurance )
20 of relatively a hundred percent notification within 2 to 3 21 miles of the plant, there must be a public media notificatic 22 at the same time which can reach beyond that, and then a-23 phasedassuranceofnotificationbeyondthe2to3 mile,out) 24 to the 10 mile, in a slightly ::ncer perird cf time.
I thir) 25 with sirens in the highly pcpuisted areas and with the NEAL R. GROSS p
em 1
varicus methods that can be made available around the closc '
2 in portions around the plant, vi can have' effective notifica 3
tion systems a lot cheaper than was implied originally.
4 CEAIRMAN BABBITT:
I wonder, Mr. McConnell, if you i 5
could describe for us your interpretation of what.tlua new 6
rule says about the relative roles of FEMA and NRC in the 7
approval of off-site plans.
8 MR. McCONNELL:
!!r. Chairman, I believe I will.hav' 9
to incorporate the conference committees' comments that went 10 behind what was actually stated in the law that was finally
- 11 passed.
12 It was stated by the conference committees that 13 they--the conference representatives--that they understood r
14 that there was a working relationship between NRC and FEMA 15 that gave FEMA the responsibility for providing for the stat :
16 and local emergency plans and caking findings and deter-17 minations on the adequacy of those plans for NRC to use in 18 their licensing process.
The conferees concluded that they 19 did not want to infer a disruption of this relationship.
20 The law itself states that NRC, in cooperation 21 with FE:!A, will make a determination on both the adequacy of 22 the off-site plans and the on-site plans with regard to the:
23 licensinc process.
So the law which is provided by the 24 At:-i Energy Act, which c i ce s "..:.
tha re s rensibiliti-for 25 assuring the public heal:h and safety of people in the vici:
--nac
I t
-an s-s been aborted.and probably should of nuclear plants, has no 1
00t.be 2 2-conditions, FEMA is acting as So under 'the presant i
)
3 a professional consultant to NRC for the of f-site condit ons i
l 4
CHAIRMAN BABBITT:
Anybody else?
1 5
n Mr. Blush?
6 MR. BLUSH:
Do I take it, then, that the meaning i
in a sense, FEMA does not l
of what you just stated is that, t
8 l
really judge the adequacy of off-site planning?
l 9
That is not true.
1 i
10 does judge the adequacy of the off-site planning.
1 11 1,would take your comments to CHAIRMAN BA3BITT:
12 FEMA judges the adequacy of off-site planning.
3 rean this :
13 although it has the legal power to throw that in the
- NRC, 14 in fact has said to you, your judgment of waste basket, 15 l, absent adequacy will set up a presumption which we wil 16 follow.
unusual circumstances, presume t' 3-a f air characterization?
Is that 16 L'
And when this MR. McCONNELL:
That is correct.
19 first Commissioner Hendr relationship first began to develop, 20 the staff and then followed. by Chairman Ahearn, specified to 21 duplica-they wanted a relationship which would prevent 22 that FEMA sheu3 d be given this responsi-icn of effort and that 23 en: sc tha i-would not have :c
'rility and should carry it 24
1 MR. FEDERE.;R:
My concern is the activation o tr.e i
.curic,us as to what scrt c f
~
2 3 merger.:; planning s;.=:e..
I 1.-
t guidance FEMA is providing in determining sets of guidelin'es,l 3
benchmarks when certain procedures are to.be taken, the 4
5 obvious fear being that once you blow Ehe air raid sirens 6
five or ten times, people stop listening to them,.
How do
~
I you go about providing that sort of assistance to the states?
8 MR. McCONNELL:
Well, the classes of accidents are' t'
9 described in appendix to the criteria, the planning criteria, 10 to be used both by the plant for notification of the state
.' 1 11 and local authorities of events that are transpiring in the 12 plant and for planning purposes for the state and local
~
fi 13 authorities.
So that is the triggering mechanism which 14 causes a decision by the state and local governments as to 15 what actions should be taken.
......c.
16 As to how often they do this and whether or not a
17 state or local government notifies the people everytime 18 there is an unusual event inside the plant is certainly thei:
- de cision.
Governors and mayors and county commissioners P
19 20 live with this kind of situation all the time with regard to 21 many kinds of emergencies.
22 CHAIRMAN BABBITT:
Mr. Blush.
23 MR. BLCSH:
I just want to follow up on that 24
.ues icn Of adecuacy.
The poin: -ha anted to address the states are faced with a ser cf criteria in 0654 wh::,
25
- tas, ce,e n cence
73 s
l'
- :en: to, I think, s -
.-2 98 criteria.
My nderstanding of 2
e precess at this
.: is tha: FEMA wil~. make a set of findings and determinations as to the adequacy of the plan.
3 I guess the question that'I have is, what guide-4 lines are in place for determining the relative weight of 5
6 these criteria?
I mean, if we have a situation where there are some -- where the state meets some parcentage of these 7
I' 8
criteria, but not all of them, then how do we judge whether i
the plan is adequate if not all criteria are essential."
9 or not 1,
W 10 met?
l 11 MR. McCONNELL:
Well, I think all elements of the l'
12 criteria will have to be attended in some f ashion.
Now, as to the method by which the state or local authorities actuall; l 13 ii of the criteri*a may be different from state '
14 perform that part 15 te state, and the way that fits into their overall emergency 16 planning process may cause it to be more or less important.
I think this is a natter of judgment which only 17 i
people who deal with emergency preparedness all the time can 18 19 judge, and that includes state and local people as well as 20 f ederal peop'.e who follow the task.
21 MR. BLUSH:
But, of course, it is FEMA who will be 22 making the findings and determinations.
My question really j
\\
l 23 is, are there a set of guidelines by which FEMA, in deter-21 rinin. -- in saying it _s adez.2:e or in dequate in certain of cuidelines which address that 25 resyc :s, are there a se:
h i
.r
. ', ' [
1; ques ti:n as to whethar :: not.:he plan itself is adequate af I
~
2
- artain ele:ents are : :lequa:37 l
~
3 MR. McCON; ELL:
If you are asking if the elements. f
. ii 4
are weighted, the answer is nc.
I don't think we are at the i 5
point. where we have to do that.
We may decide 1.ater that wel 1
6 have.to, but I hope not.
7 CHAIRMAN BA33ITT:
Anybody else?
t 8
Neil?
9 MR. PROTO:
John, according to pour proposed ~
i r
10 regulations governing the process by which FE1A will review
{
c i
11 and approve plans, there is a certain time sequence that is j
12 involve'd, presumably based on enough time so that everyone 3
13 has notice of what is going on and enough time for the staff l l
14 to make a proper evaluation.
l i
15 How does that time secuence then cesh with the timq 3,,,y 16 secuence th at the NRC cill use to make licensing decisions?
t 17 MR. McCONNELL:
That is inconsequential.
We'are I
18 going through the process of upgrading the state and local l
19 plans to meet the new criteria, and the state will have to j
20 he advised of the criticality of that influence on the l
21 licensing process.
22 As you know, the new rule causes all plants, all 23 operating plants, to be accorpanied by approved off-site 24 emergenc'* plans on the 1st cf..rril 1931.
Any plant that is, 25 applying for a license between new and :he.1 will be expectc;;
NEAL R. GROSS j
t t
s.:
s
[1 NRC :o have approv3C Off-site p'lans.
So the states are 2
.ided 3.:r rfi.-:~y an'
.e are accer.nodating them as nearly i
3 as we can following their formal submission of a request for j 4
review.
5 CHAIR'4AN BABBITT:
the c'apacity to handle the 6
stuff that comes through the pipeline.
7 MR. McCONNELL:
We will find a way.
We have a 8
hump of activity coming up in our schedule during the next' t
9 six to nine months that will give us a great ~ deal of trouble, 10 but we will find a way to accommodate them.
1 11 liR. PROTO:
But the critical time f actor, then, i.
12 as far as the states are concerned are not the sequence of l-13 requirements set forth in your regulations, but rather the 14 timing decisions that NRC makes telative to the license
?
1 15 application.
i e
?
16 MR. McCONNELL:
If the. state is interested in the II plant being licensed, yes, I think they would be --
i 19 MR. PROTO:
Does that suggest, then, that it is --
i 19 is it likelv that there will be more of these sort of 1
20 expedited procedures that we utilized in reference to North I
21 ganay 22 MR. McCONNELL:
I saw that kind of reaction in 23 Tennessee and in North Anna in Virginia.
There is obviously concerr i-California f r r D i ab".
Canyon 1 n in New Jersey 24 25 for the Salem plant.
I am not sure that the state reactien NEAL R. GROSS
W-1 15 the same in all ' case.=, but they know of the problem.
i MR. EdHWA !':
fir. Prt:c, in the near term I bel _e]-
2 3
there are nine f acilities that will be coming up for opera-4 ting. licenses.
These are clearly the ones that will be 5
hanging in the balance on the FEMA determination by NRC.
kie are staffing up and we are prepared to review the plan either 6
7 cn our own motion, because it is necessary for the NRC 8
licensing proceeding, or, if the plan'~is tendered according' 9
to that rule, by the state for a formal. FEMA review and 10 approval.
So it is either one of those tracks.
11 MR. PROTO:
So there may be occasions where FEMA 12 will not in ef fect be able to meet the requirements set out 13 in this rule, the timing requirements.
14 MR. SCHWARTZ:
If a s' tate does not tender Obe plan 15 for fernal review and approval, and NRC needs an evaluation r
16 of ' d:e status of preparedness for the licensing proceedings, 17 TEIA on its own motion will then provide that based on our 18
- e. aluation by the regional systems committees that are 19 working in the region.
20 Once we get the formal review and approval, I 21 think there -- I guess there are two time periods you are 22 talking about there, the first time period being the time s
23 period that the regional director receives the plan for 24 fer 31 re tie.: and 2pprr ni, 3rl there is a 30-day time 25 peri:d for public notificatien.
And then there is another Wut D GROSS
g_
'l ti.;e period i.n there, I bplie e, that says once the regione',
2 director makes his findings and determinations.and passes -
3 up to the Associate Director for Plans and Preparedness, there is a 30-day time period that a decision must be.made 4
5 at headquarters.
6 Now, there is a f ar dif ference between -- there c.
I be a significant amount of time between those two time 8
periods because there may be iterations on reviews of the D
plans at the regional level where deficiencies are noted an :
10 the FEMA regional people will meet with the state and local 4
governments to upgrade and cure the deficiencies noted befo>
11 12 it gets passed up to headquarters for final review and 13 approval.
14 MR. PROTO:
But that time period does not always 15 coincide with SRC's licensing decisions.
16 RR. SCHWARTZ:
It does not and it was not designe, II ro.
16 MR. PROTO:
Your time period is not related, ther 19 to the need for FEMA to have a formal input into the 20 licensing process.
21 MR. SCHWARTZ:
Not in the rule.
That rule was nc r
designed to be a schedule for FEMA decisions for NRC 44 23 licensing process.
That is a matter that NRC and FEMA are :
2I negattattng en ' hen -- yr. :::ed is :s.*aan a FC:!A 25 de:2rmination would be necessary based en their licensing
6 I
srhedules.
For instance,,bednesday and Thursda'y there will 2
he Commission meetings cn-Nor'th Anna and Sequoia, and PEMA 3
has provided determination on both of those facilities which 4
will be used in the Commission meetings.
5 CHAIRMAN BABBITT:
!r. Easper?
On network television,sometime in 'the l 6
DR. KASPER:
7 last couple of weeks there was a rather inflammatory repo'rt l
8 on emergency procedures and planning near the Zion plant.
9 Two questions about th a t'.
t 10 First of all, is Illinois or the Zion plant one
?
11 of the places where you have already done a review of i
do you have any -- these kinds of newh l'
=dequacy; and, second, 13 reports obviously raise public concern of various sorts.
1 1
14 Does FEMA have a public information program or a public 15 education program?
16 MR. ?!cCONNELL:
Let me answer the first question I
17 first.
Zion is -- well, the Illinois plan and the Zion 18 surrounding plans have not been formally submitted by the i
19 governor for review.
Our regional of fice out of Chicago has 20 been working closely with the responsible state official to help him enhance his plans according to the new criteria, and 21 to my knowledge they are being aggressively attended to.
22 23 I think you can get specific information from the 24 s:a:e preparedness dirce:::
h-s a f ternec n.then he appears
l 83 1
- 31c;:Fical emergenry than there would be if they were 2
deali..? with a flood dr a fire er a chemical spill or a.
3 truck tipping over, and so on, with toxic materials.
i 4
I wonder if yeu would discuss for the committee 5
what differences you perceive in the approach to different 6
kinds of emergencies--that. is, the approach to a radiological I
emergency--that might make it different from dealing with I
8 a different kind.
9 Now, evidently the area for evacuation was deter-10 mined by the levels of radiation and the plume that came 11 from the plant and so on, but other than that I can't --
12 that sort of replaced the fire s but I can't determine 13 whether there was anything in that plan that would have dealt ;
14 with a raciological emergency any differently than it would
.c
~
15 have dealt with any other kind.
16 MR. McCONNELL:
You are absolutely right, the II generic plan, the basic emergency operations configuration 18 that every state prepares to deal with any emergency is 19 utilized for all types of emergencies normally, with vari-i 20 ations toward the particular type at hand.
It is pretty 21 obvious tnat the first thing that is unique about a 22 radiation accident is the radiation itself, and relatively 23 the only reason a state would have radiological response 23 22 s :.;emselves, mehile teams :: gr - _:. ;n o the area art 25
.g,.s;rs radiation, would he for :hi s. ::J.'s e, er for l
SE s
l ansportation accide..:s or wherever it happens.
Naturally l
2
.ere is a specia'. n* l f:r :
m; mica: ions to this ins ta111-3 tien, to the utility.
That is a special requirement.
One of the things that was not really tested during 4
this exercise that we saw was the protective drugs applica-5 Ir 6
tion as a protective measure.
They do have such a plan in I;
Virginia and they have prepositioned some potassium iodine, 7
8 but they --
9 DR. EBBIN:
That was not evident in the recent l
10 drill.
l 11 MR. McCONNELL :
That is correct, because the i
12 release did not contain radicactive iodine.
I think we in our observation comments that we should specify 13 comment 5 e 14 that as one of the measures tnat should be included in the 15 scenaric so that that is tested.
16 DR. EBBIN:
I just have one more follow-up ques-The approach that was used in the Virginia exercise 17 tion.
te be more a training exercise or drill than 18 appeared to me 19 it was a test of anything.
I noticed, for example, that the State Emergency Center, nac '
20 the people at the Center, at 1
scripted telephone calls and had scripted presentations that 21 I
22 had been prepared prior to the emergency.
Everyone knew precisely where they were supposed to be at a particular 23 f
24 tire.
ne radic cperatcrs,
- f. r exa:F o, --
talked with ther j l
tney were sitting there waiting for the call a:-
25
- 13 me that
f 31 r.-..
. ',1 i' ' they were all dressed and so on.
~
2 New, that' is.. : :ne wsf c..ergencies take placc.
Iwonderif,inyourfuturetes'ts,houaregoingtoapproach,
3' the same way or is there to be some differentiation j
it 4
between the training exercise and a test of emergency 5 l 6 :
procedures?
We have not specified, as you know) s 7
MR. McCONNELL:
i Wnat we vant to see is a i
8 to date that this be a test.
i Whether or not a test is a more clear 9
demonstration.
n, I
demonstration than a training exercise is up for grabs, 10 r,
i 11 guess.
I think we will probably require a more realistic i
12 i
involves the decisionmaking process.
We still; 13 scenario that i
have to have in any exercise scripted inputs in order to 14 i
are provided by contro'1ers of the' exercise, 1
15 make the -- that 16 to make sure that things are triggered at the right time and l j
think they probably overdid that a
I 17 by the right people.
I in th'a Virginia exercise because they were trying l 18 little bit i
i f
As you know, to do too much in too short a period of time.
19 In they ec= pressed about.a 24-hour period into 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
20 So they had to it was a little bit more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
21
- fact, through all of the produce some artificiality in order to get 22 should be exercised.
23 elements that we specified that An'f :dy else?
t 24 CF.AI.C : 3A35!!T:
~
25 (No response)
NEAL R. GROSS i
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o
. \\, " 1 CHAIP;Ues SAEE !T:
If not, thank you very much, f
2 r en..tl e 6...
3 We will new recess fer lunch.
I believe the t
4 schedule calls for us to be back at 1:30, 5
(Whereupon,~at 12:25 p.m., the ' luncheon ' reces s 6
was held.)
7 I
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8 3:'
9 I
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11 I.i 12 l
13 14 o..o 15 il 16 17 i
IS 19 k
20 4
21 22 1
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df occxETc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Q
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION mI.., g.g.
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Ofre cfc33:. c y Nl Dcf2:;3 Drir:cs - 6' !
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~' D*;d l
IN THE MATTER OF
)
l
)
e G
)
l FINAL RULE ON EMERGENCY PLANNING,
)
Docket No.
45 Fed. Reg. 55402 (Aug. 19, 1980)
)
}
MOTION OF DUKE POWER COMPANY AND l
TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY FOR STAY PENDING CONSIDERATION OF NEW EVIDENCE AND PENDING APPEAL Duke Power Company and Texas Utilities Generating i
Company (" Duke /TU") hereby move the Commission for a stay of effectiveness of the fifteen minute notification require-p f
ment in the emergency planning rule, 45 Fed. Reg. 55402 (Aug. 19, 1980), pending Commission action upon Duke /TU's Motion for Reconsideration based upon new evidence, and pending any subsequent judicial review of the final rule.
Duke /TU are challenging that portion of Appendix E to the final rule which requires that there exist "the capability to essentially complete the initial notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes."
45 Fed. Reg. at 55412.
Duke /TU have petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of the emergency planning rule.
Because of the emergent i
s e.,
l e -
need to order equipment, explained infra, Duke /TU request that the Commission act on this Motion for Stay by Wednesday, November 26, 1980 in order that Duke /TU may have the oppor-tunity to request similar relief from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbi,a Circult if the instant Motion is denied.
The facts and reasons in support of this request for stay are ar, follows:
ARGUMENT Although the Commission's rules of practice do not contain specific provisions governing the granting of a stay pending reconsideration or judicial appeal of a Commis-sion rule, standards developed by the courts and analogous commission rules do provide guidance.
Section 2.788 of the Commission rules provide for the granting of a stay of decisions by presiding officers and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Boards pending review by the Commission.
That section provides that the Commission will consider four standards in determining whether to grant a stay:
(1) Whether the moving party has made a strong
~.
showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits; (2) Whether the party will be irreparably in-jured unless a stay is granted; (3) Whether the granting of a stay will harm other parties; and i
_3-(4) Where the public interest lies.
10 C.F.R. { 2.788(e)(1980).
These rules reflect the traditional standards applicable to granting a stay set forth in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v.
F.P.C.,
259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
SeePortlandGeneralElectricCompany(TrojanNuIlear o
Plant), ALAB-524, 9 NRC 65, 69 n.6 (1979). -Subsequently, the first Virginia Petroleum Jobbers standard (likelihood of success on the merits) was modified in Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
The court in Holiday Tours substantially relaxed the first requirement, holding that a litigant need not show a mathematical probability of success.
The court reasoned that:
An order maintaining the status quo is appropriate when a serious legal question is presented, when little if any harm will befall other interested persons or the public and when denial of the order would inflict irreparable injury on the movant.
There is substantial equity, and need for judicial protection, whether.or.not movant has shown a mathematical probability of success.
Id. at 844 (emphasis added).
In this regard, Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that motions for stay
]
"must ordinarily be made in the first instance
s i
-4 to the agency" which issued the challenged order.
As the court in Holiday Tours explained:
Prior recourse to the initial decisionmaker would hardly be required as a general matter if it could properly grant interim relief only on a prediction that it has rendered an erroneous decision.
What is fairly contemplated is that tribunals may properly stay their own orders when they have ruled on an admittedly difficult legal question and when the equities of the case-suggest that the status quo should be maintained.
Id. at 844-45.
In the instant proceeding, the equities are clearly on the side of Duke /TU.
Duke /TU will demon-strate that they meet each of the four requisite standards for the granting of a stay.
(1)
Irreparable Harm to Duke /TU Absent a stay, Duke /TU will be required to expend several million dollars to purchase a notification system at each of their nuclear power plants.
The affidavit of B.B.
Tucker, attached hereto as Appendix A, details the estimates of expenditures which would be incurred by Duke Power Company to comply with the rule as presently cast.
These figures are believed to be typical of costs to other utili-ties, including TU.
For Duke Power Company, which presently has two nuclear power stations in operation or in the advanced stages of construction, 1/ expenditures will be from S2,842,800 to $5,660,560, depending upon the sound 1/
Duke's three unit Oconee Nuclear Station is presently operating.
The two unit McGuire Nuclear Station
~
is in the advanced stages of construction.
i level of the sirens, for the initial purchase and instal-
[
lation of notification equipment out to a 10-mile radius.
System wide maintenance, repair, connection charge and training costs over a thirty year period are estimated at an f
a?ditional $1,196,000 to $2,359,840.
TU's two unit Comanche Peak Nuclear Station is not expected to come on line until late 1981 or afterward.
TU's costs, therefore, would not be as immediate as those of Duke.
Since the siren systems which must be purchased to comply with the Commission's requirements have no other useful purpose to a utility, the harm associated with such expenditures by Duke (immediately) and by TU (in the near future) would be irreparable.
Duke /TU will be unable to recover any of the costs to install siren systems.
Addi-tional expenses will be associated with the removal of unnecessary equipment.
If the Commission later concludes i
that installation of such a system throughout a ten mile radius is unwarranted, Duke /TU will probably be able to recover only a fraction of the original cost of the equip-ment through its resale because there will be no readily available market for the notification equipment.
(See Tucker Affidavit at 4.)
The potential harm which,will be suffered by Duke /TU is immediate and not merely speculative.
If Duke and other utilities are required to meet the July 1, 1981 deadline for assurance of a fifteen minute notification capability,
4 they must begin almost immediately to contract for the purchase of notification equipment.
As stated in the Tucker Affidavit, Duke must award the contract for notification systems at its Oconee and McGuire stations by December 1, 1980. In addition, personnel must be employed to begin installation of notification systems within a very few months.
With regard to TU, it must develop and incorporate into its construction plans and order equipment for the notification system if it is to avoid delays in bringing its plant on line as scheduled.
Duke /TU's request for Commission consideration of the newly proffered evidence and judicial review, if necessary, of the e.mergency planning rule are not likely to be acted upon finally by the Commission and the courts within this time period (i.e., by December 1, 1980 in the case of Duke).
(2)
No Harm to Other Parties The Nuclear Regulatory Commission will suffer no harm by granting a stay in this proceeding.
Even though the effective date of the 15-minute notification requirement.is stayed, the remaining elements of the e=ergency planning rule will be fully effective.
Duke /TU intend to comply with these requirements during the interim period while the issues raised in this proceeding are considered.
If the stay is granted, and if Duke /TU are ultimately unsuccessful on the merits, the NRC will be free fully to enforce the fifteen minute notification requirement.
Whatever delay is l
I
7_
occasioned in implementation of the requirement will be more than offset by the value associated with a more thorough examination of the basis for the notification requirement.
The Commission's interest is best served by developing an orderly, well-reasoned approach to amergency notification.
This will only occur if the Commission considers the new material submitted by Duke /TU.
(3)
No Harm to the Public Interest The public interest lies in providing adequate noti-fication should an emergency occur at a nuclear power plant, while simultaneously preventing unnecessary public alarm andunnecessaryexpensetoratepayers.fDuke/TUdonot object to providing a fifteen minute notification capability 1
out to two or three miles in radius from each nuclear power plant.
Duke /TU would also provide a phased notification i
capability over a somewhat longer time period, as suggested for the remainder f
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, of the area in the ten mile plume exposure EPZ.
Duke /TU
\\
I would adopt this system during the pendency of judicial and commission consideration of the matters raised herein.
i t This approach will protect the public interest by assuring adequate notification during the interim peri;d in which Duke /TU's challenge to the NRC final rule is considered.
u Information in the record from responsible industry and state emergency planning officials indicates that
-e_
notification of the entire public within a ten-mile radius of a nuclear power plant within the first fifteen minutes can cause serious and unnecessary public alarm. State officials have indicated that a phased notification approach would be more orderly by permitting the notification and evacuation, if necessary, of those closest ~to the plant first. [See e.g., Letter from Frank T. Cox, Coordinator, Division of Disaster Emergency Services, Texas Department of Public Safety to NRC Chairman Ahearne, dated May 28, 1980 3 The public interest in preventing undue public alarm can only be served by a thorough examination of the new evidence presented by Duke /TU in their Motion for Reconsideration.
Finally, staying the effectiveness of the fifteen-minute notification requirement pending examination of the issues raised by Duke /TU would protect the public interest As indicated in the by avoiding unnecessary expenditures.
Tucker Affidavit, installation of the equipment required for a fifteen-minute notification capability within the entire ten-mile radius would cost from S2,842,800 to $5,660,560 for Duke Power Company, depending on the sound level of the sirens.
In contrast, the adoption of a phased notification approach, with the fifteen minute notification capability limited to three miles in radius, would cost only $438,080 to $1,047,040 These expenditures would be included in Duke's rate base as necessary expenses of operating
its plants, and ultimately the cost will be borne largely by Duke's ratepayers.
Thus, if the approach suggested by the Duke /TU is adopted upon the Commission's consideration of the newly proffered evidence, the public within Duke Power's service area would save approximately $2,400,000 to F4,600,000.
Comparable savings can be expected by other utilities, including TU.
Only by granting a stay at this time will these savings begin to be realized.
(4)
Presentation of Serious Legal Questions The court in Holiday Tours, supra, 559 F.2d at 844, modifying the Virginia Petroleum Jobbers test, required that a movant for stay show that he has presented a " serious legal question" to be addressed by an administrative agency.
This formulation abrogates the need to show a mathematical probability of success on the merits of an appeal.
- Rather, if a balancing of the equities, considering the other three factors, favors the movant and if serious legal questions are presented, the agency should grant a stay.
The Commission is not required to determine at this point that its initial imposition of a fifteen minute notification requirement was erroneous.
Rather, it is sufficient that evidence submitted by Duke /TU raises legi-timate doubts about the basis for the notificatio'n require-ment.
See Holiday Tours, supra, 559 F.2d at 844.
Materials submitted by Duke /TU raise two, distinct legal issues.
- 10 i
First,_ Duke /TU have sought reconsideration by the Commission bauad upon two serious evidentiary developments which call into question the factual underpinninos for the
. rule.
Ultimately, the NRC's stated basis for'this require-ment can be traced back to the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400, which concluded that there could be emissions of radioactive material into the atmosphere within 30 minutes after an initiating incident at a nuclear reactor.
However, Duke /TU have presented new evidence from respected scientific sources which seriously challenges that conclusion.
An August 14, 1980 letter to Chairman Ahearne from W.
R.
et al. concludes that the iodine releases during a
- Stratton, nuclear reactor accident, which are a significant component of the early releases, have been grossly overestimated by the WASH-1400 study and other NRC models.
The letter specifically calls for a reevaluation Of safety criteria based on the data in WASE-1400, and notes pointedly that the conclusions may have a particular impact on requirements for evacuation.
Those criteria obviously include the emergency planning notification requirement.- Dr. Stratton formerly Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Reactor was Safeguards and is currently associated with the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory in addition to serving as an ACRS consultant.2/
2/
See " Motion for Reconsideration" filed concurrently herewith.
e The second item of newly discovered evidence consists
- /
of testimony by John McConnell, Assistant Associate Director
_for Plans and Preparedness of the Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency (" FEMA"), before the Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee.
Mr. McConnell stated that it would be " impossible" to assure notification of one hundred percent of the popu-e lation within fifteen minutes.
He proposed that the fifteen minute notification capability be limited to 2 or 3 miles of a nuclear plant, and that a phased notification approach be used further away.
This testimony, from a responsible FEMA official, is particularly significant because FEMA is the federal agency with greatest expertise in emergency pre-paredness and the agency charged with primary responsibility for assessing the adequacy of State and local radiological emergency plans.
Such highly credible evidence is clearly a fundamental challenge to the viability of the notification goal in the NRC final rule.
In view of the apparent materiality of this new evidence, its responsible source, and its previous unavailability, there is a substantial likelihood that the Commission will wish to reconsider the rule in view of such evidence.
A second significant legal issue will arise if the Commission _ fails to consider or rejects the newly proffered evidence.
On judicial review, a court would be required 9
C,
A to address the legal issue of whether the Commission's findings in this regard are " arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law" under Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. $ 706.
Even without conceding that its initial determination to impose a fifteen-minute notifica~ tion e
requirement is unsupported by evidence in the record, the Commission must recognize that the evidence now submitted by Duke /TU is of sufficient substance to render this a "signi-ficant legal issue" for purposes of the Holiday Tours requirements governing the granting of a stay.
CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the Commission should grant Duke Power Company's and Texas Utilities Generating Company's request for a stay of the fifteen-minute notification requirement in the NRC's emergency planning rule pending the outcome of consideration by the Commission of newly proffered evidence, and pending judicial review, if any, in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit.
Respectfully submitted, By to -a +2 Richay C.
Browne J. Micu el McGarry, III Nicholas S. Reynolds Dale E. Hollar DEBEVOISE & LIBERMAN 1200 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 (202) 857-9800 Counsel for Duke Power Company and Texas Utilities Generating Company Of Counsel:
William L.
Porter Associate General Counsel Duke Power Company 422 S.
Church Street Charlotte, N.C.
28242 i
November 12, 1980 l
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l l
i i
..p UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF
)
)
)
)
)
Docket No.
)
FINAL RULE ON
)
EMERGENCY PLANNING
)
45 Fed. Reg., 55402
)
(Aug. 19, 1980)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing "Hotion of Duke Power Company and Texas Utilities Generating Company for Stay Pending Consideration of New Evidence and Pending Appeal" in the above-captioned matter were served upon the following persons by hand delivery, this 12th day of November, 1980:
John F. Ahearne Leonard Bickwit, Esq.
Chairman General Counsel U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Joseph M. Hendrie Stephen F. Eilperin, Esq.
Commissioner Office of the General Counsel U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Peter A.
Brad fo rd Commissioner U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Victor Gilinsky Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 D
Dale E.
Hollar Counsel for Duke Power Company and Texas Utilities Generating Company
4 i
9 9 e
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$_O g g
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e APPENDIX A
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4 2
4 5
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8 f
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AFFIDAVIT OF H. B. TUCKER I, H. B. Tucker, being duly sworn, do depose and state:
I am employed by Duke Power Company and have the title of Manager, Nuclear Production, in the Steam Production Department.
I am qualified by both my training and experience to develop project cost estimates and analyze those estimates prepared under my supervision.
A copy of my professional qualifications is attached.
This affidavit addresses, quantitatively, the cost to our company that will be incurred if the Ndelear Regulatory Com-mission or the courts do not grant a, stay of the 15 minute notification requirement in the emergency planning rule.
The costs for purchase and installation'of a system capable of notifying areas out to ten miles from.a nuclear station are considerably higher than the cost of a system capable of notification out to three miles.
The maintenance costs of these two scenarios are vastly different.
The equip-ment must be ordered within the next five weeks to meet the proposed July 1, 1981 deadline.
If the NRC should decide in the future that.the original basis was unnecessary, Duke would be unable to resell the equipment.
A larger system presents a greater chanc'e for lawsuits' surrounding its use.
7
1
\\
.e
~
~2-For a system based on large sirens with either a 68 db or 60 db sound level at the exterior edge of an individual siren's coverage, the following costs have been developed at my direction:
One Site Installed Cost Esttmates Installation Cost Total Equipment (Including Poles, Installed System Cost Spares, Labor)
Cos'c 68 db-10 mile
$1,215,000
$200,140
$1,415,140 60 db-10 mile 607,500 103,200 710,700 68 db-3 mile 240,000 21,760 261,760 60 db-3 mile 100,000 9,520 109,520 Duke Power System Installed Costs (1980 $)
System Oconee McGuire Catawba Cherokee Total 68 db-10 mile
$1,415,140 $1,415,140 $1,415,140
$1,415,140
$5,660,56C.
60 db-10 mile 710,700 710,700 710,700 710,700
$2,842,80C-68 db-3 mile 261,760 261,760 261,760 261,760
$1,047,04CI 60 db-3 mile 109,520 109,520 109,520 109,520 438,08('
This analysis indicates a ten mile notification system would cost $2,400,000 to $4,600,000 more than a three mile system for equipment and installation on the Duke system now under con-
^
l struction and in operation.
i Under the same assumptions as stated above, the following are the estimated. annual costs for one station and the entire system:
)
One Site Maintenance, et al. Cost Estimates Maintenance Repair. -Electrical Con-System Cost /Yr.
Cost /Yr.
nection/Yr.
Training Total 68 db-10 mile
$7,923
$2,064
$8,824
$1,000
$19,811 60 db-10 mile 3,990 1,032 4,444 500 9,966 68 db-3 mile 912 344 1,904 333 3,493 60 db-3 mile 399 172 444 167 1,182, System Maintenance, Repair, Connection Charge k Training 30 Year Life - All Duke Plants Item Oconee McGuire Catawba Cherokee Total 68 db-10 mile
$589,960
$589,960
$589,960
$589,960
$2,359,84C 60 db-10 mile 299,000 299,000 299,000 299,000 1,196,00C 68 db-3 mile 78,150 78,150 78,150 78,150 312,60C 60 db-3 mile 35,460 35,460 35,460 35,460 141,84C Total System Cost Comparisons - 10 Mile versus 3 Mile Systems Maintenance Installed et al.
Total Item Cost Costs Costs j
68 db-10 mile
$5,660,560
$2,359,840
$8,020,400 60 db-10 mile 2,842,800 1,196,000 4,038,800
~ 68 db-3, mile 1,047,040 312,600 1,359,640 60 db-3 mile 438,080 141,840 579,920 This chart indicates that the total esttmated costs for a ten i
mile system would be $3,500,000 to $6,700,000 more than a three mile system over an assumed 30 year equipment lifetime.
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9
~
Our schedules for implementation of this requirement at Oconee and McGuire Nuclear Stations indicate the contract must be awarded on December 1, 1980.
I would note that if at some time after these systems are installed, the NRC should decide that the original basis was _
,in error and three miles was an appropriate degree of coverage, then the siren market (or whatever means was~ employed) would be glutted with equipment.
The cost of this expensive equip-ment will be borne by the consumer since the sytem is necessary for operation of the facility.
Also, if these large systems are required, the potential for personal lawsuits over their use is greater than if a smaller system is necessary.
f C/./ -,
",, /,
c w
H. B. Tucker Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day of November, 1980.
N10 $-
DAL Notary Public My Commission expires: r/,u/Ja 4 As / f ffY
~-
i rwu h[o Date DUKE POWER COMPANY BIOGRAPHICAL DATA SHEET i
Hal Beall Tucker Full Nome Address _._.'
+
i Date and Ploce of Birth -
l r
Parents' Nomes; Address, if livine m
Schools, Co!!eges, Degrees, G<odvetion Dates j
Ocilla High School - 1945' Georgia Institute of Technology, Bachelor of Electrical Engineering - 1949 t
University of Michigan - Reactor Engineering Course - 1968 Business Bockground: Positions held, Firms, Octes Duke Power Company i
i INDUSTRY RELATED ACTIVITIES:
AIF - Steering Con =tittee, Nuclear Plan Design, i
Construction and Operation; Southeastern Electric Exchange - Production Section; For er EPRI - Nuclear Power Divisional Coc=itteel Former cember ASME Boiler &
Pessure Vessel SCI Duke Power Company Title and De:ortment Manater. Nuclear Forduction Division
~
When First Employed: First Jeb 7/1/49 - Testr.an. Clif fside Station
$ weeding Jobs 10/1/49 - Test =an. Dan River Steam Station 7/1/50 - Test Engineer, Riverbend Steam Station 2/1/53 - Plant Engineer, Riverbend Steam Station.
t 4/1/57 -- Plant Engineer, Allen Steam Station j
s 3/1/59 - Assistant Superintendent - Riverbend Steam Station 9/1/62 - Superintendent - Riverbend Steam Station-7/1/67 - System Production Engineer, Steam Production l
4/1/71 - Manager, Operations & Maintenance Steam Production 10/1/74 - Manacer. Nuclear Production Division Stea= Production.
PR Department Pega 2 Eli!!tNry 5'rvice: Dates, Bronch, Renk, Decorations, Theater, Job Assignment,
- n Reserve')
U. S. Ar=v Res erves, Signal Corps., July 1949 - June 19 54 Active duty as 2nd Lt. & 1st Lt., June 22, 19 51 - Jan. 19, 1953 Comanding Officer 838 Signal Radio Relav Coccany Church, Lodges, Ovic, Professional, Fratemol, Social, Honorary ond Other Cubs, Offices Held Myers Park United Methodist Church - Charlotte Church School Superintendent - Sunday School Teacher, Council on Ministries.
Charlotte, Civitan Club:
Me=ber American Society of Mechanical Engineers:
Member A=erican Nuclear Society Me=ber Sports, Hobb;es. Sidelines Sports:
Golf - Swinning Bobbv:
Furniture refinishing Spouse, Hometown, Morrioge Cote Louis e Go db e e, Vidalia, Ga. - October 14, 1950 Nomes and Addresses of Children Julia Elizabeth - Married Marv Louise - Married 4
Other Personal Doto
N STAFF TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Sumary of the Action Requested On November 12, 1980, the Duke Power Company and the Texas Utilities Generating Ccopany (hereinafter " petitioners") coved the Cocnission for recon-sideration of its requirement that applicants and licensees aJst demonstrate that a public notification system exists designed "to have the capability to essentially complete the initial notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway [10 mile emenjency planning zone] EPZ within about 15 minutes
[of notice by the facility of a severe accident]."
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, 9 IV, D, 3, 45 Fed. Rm 55402, 55412 (Aug.19,1980).
The instant rotion is not based on any alleged inadequacy in the record of the emergency planning rulemaking itself, but is based wholly on information that post-dates the pro-mulgation of the final rules.
First, petitioners argue that infomation gener-ated by Drs. Stratton, Kalinauskas, and Campbell, sent to the Chaiman in a letter dated August 14, 1980, suggesting an overestimation of the quantity of iodine released in an accident supports a substantial modification of the 15-minute notice requirement.
Petitioners argue that the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) figures, which fom part of the basis for the 15-minute rule, identify radioactive iodine as a significant early contributor to accident risk.
Petitioners conclude that this new evidence, which suggests a smaller early accident risk to the edlic, casts substantial doubt on the continuation of the 15-minute requirement for the full ten-mile EPZ and proposes to apply it only to the closest two to three miles.
Second, petitioners point to testimony
2 given by a senior FEMA official on August 18 to the Nuclear Oversight Com-mittee, that the design criteria proposed in January 1980 for the 15-minute rule are impossible to meet in practice. The FEMA official expressed his view that a 15-minute rule could be applied to a smaller distance effec-tively, about three miles from the plant, with a somewhat longer notice time out to 10 miles from the plant. Petitioners concede that,-to succeed in their motion, they cust demonstrate that the inforr,ation presented is so significant, that, had it been considered initially, the II-cinute require-ment would have been different.
Motion for Reconsideration at 6.
The tech-nical staff -- representatives of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement and the Office of Standards Development -- in conjunction with the Office of the General Counsel and Office of the Executive Legal Director, has analyzed the new information raised by petitioners, compared it to the record of 1
rulemaking underlying the final rules, and recommend that the motion be denied on the merits.
The following discussion explains the basis for the Commission's action in prceulgating the 15-minute requirement and why the infomation offered by the petition is insignificant to warrant modification of that requirement.
Commission Consideration of 15-Minute Notification Capability Requirement A basic requirement for licensee emergency plans is a notification system, to assure bot'h that the lice'nsee has the means to notify' appropriate govern-mental officials in a timely manner and that those officials, in turn, have the capability to notify the public in a timely manner. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, 5 IV, D,1, supra.
In addition, the NRC requires that the public be kept generally infomed of basic emergency planning infomation such as notification
=
procedures and protective actions to be taken.
Id._, i IV, D, 2.
In an accident situation, the licensee is required to be able to notify responsible govern-mental officials within 15 minutes of deciaring an mergency of the seriousness and nature of the event.
Id., i IV D, 3.
In turn, the licensee must show that those officials are able to provide effective notice to residents within 10 miles of the facility within 15 minutes of notice by the licensee.
Id. This notice to the public, by means of an alert system, would cause the public to turn to emergency broadcast or other systems for further instructions.
In effect, the NRC requires a complete procedure that would enable the public to be notified that a serious accident may be in progress within about 30 minutes of the licensee declaring an mergency.
The latter 15 minutes of this time -- in which actual public notice by responsible governmental officials may be given --
is the sole focus of the instant petition.M i
M The full text of the requirement is set out here:
- 3.... The licensee shall demonstrate that the State / local officials have the capability to make a public notification decision promptly on being informed by the licensee of an emergency condi-tion.
By July 1,1981, the nuclear power reactor licensee shall demonstrate that administrative and physical stans have been estab-lished for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the public within the pitne exposure pathway EPZ. The design objective shall be to have the capability to essentially complete the initial noti-fication of the public within the pitne exposure patkay EPZ within about 15 minutes. The use of this notification capability will range from immediate notification of the public (within 15 minutes of the time that State and local officials are notified that a situation exists requiring urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial time available for the State and local goevemental officials to make a judgment dether or not to activate the public notification system. Where there is a decision to acti-vate the notification system, the State and local officials will detemine whether to activate the entire notification system simul-taneously or in a graduated or staged manner. The responsibility for activating such a public notification system shall remain with the appropriate government authorities.
4 The Commission discussed the 15-minute notification capability require-ment in detail at open public meetings with the NRC staff and with representa-tives of the industry and affected goverrrnents in deciding what the require-ment should be.
On June 18, 1980, the Coccission met with the staff and discussed at length the feasibility of a 15-minute notification time (as opposed to 30 minutes or some other longer time).
Public Heeting, Staff Presentation of Final Rulemaking to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, pages 17-42 (June 18,1980). The staff explained that it had concluded, after study and evaluation and an analysis of the comments received, that a public notice system should be designed to provide the maximum degree of time within which to take protecti e actions.
For example, v
the staff noted that in a very severe accident, when releases of radiation could occur within about 30 minutes time, immediate notice and action would be necessary.
In addition, the staff described that an accident's potential for severe consequences might not be recognized until several hours into the acci-dent, leaving only a short time actually available to effect protective actions. Where a system exists for prcrnpt notice, governmental officials will have more options available for protective actions, including evacuation itself which may take from two to ten hours. June 18 Transcript, at 18-19. The dis-cussion also focused on whether the State and local governments could take appropriate protective actions during the 15 minutes that was initially allotted to their decisiorrnaking process.
Id., a t 31 -32.
The Cocnission decided at the
~.
ivn June 18,1980 meeting, after reviewing the rule:naking record to date$ hat (1) more flexibility was needed for the State and local government decisionmaking J
~
5 i
process, (2) that the Supplementary Infomation should include a provision for the acceptability of a staged or segmented notification system thereby per-mitting the use of only part of the 10-mil'e notification system, and (3) that the final rule expressly recognize that an absolute (1005 effective) notifica-tion of every individual within the emergency planning zone is not required and is probably impossible; but that the NRC's objective is to come as close to that as possible.
See, e a, id., at 26-27, 31, 39-42.
Finally, the Commission noted that the Federal Emergency Panagement Agency (FDiA) would make deter-minations on the adequacy of the offsite notice system to sneet the criteria and that the NRC would rely on that judgment.
Id. at 26-27.
At a public meeting on June 25, 1980, the Commission discussed the proposed final rules with three panels, one each representing the nuclear industry, State and local governments, and special interest groups. The areas of concern raised by the Duke Power and Texas Utilities motions were discussed at length at that meeting.
Public Meeting with Industry, State and Local Governments and Special Interest Group Panels on Emergency Planning and Preparedness Rulemaking, pages 12-19, 31-34, 39-46, 78 and 79 (June 25,1980).
ChJring the panel discus-
~
sions, industry spokesmen, including one of petitioners' counsel and a Duke Powr executive, agreed with the need to upgrade emergency plans and prepared-ness but were strongly opposed to the requirement for the 15-mintrte notification capability.
Their arguments were based on (1) the apparent lack of a strong technical basis and/or justification (2) the possible negative effects on the protection of the public health and safety, and (3) cost.
6 In a dialogue with the Industry Panel, the Commission noted that the 15-t minute requirement was not as stringent as initially characterized by the Panel, that it only required that the equipment or other means be installed capable of effective public notice within 15 minutes and that it does not pre-clude independent State and local decisions on when or to what extent the system will be actuated.
Jane 25 Transcript, at 14-17.
The industry panel noted that they would prefer deferring the 15-minute rule for the full 10-mile EPZ but would not object to such rapid notice to about "two to three miles, as an interim situation." Id. at 40.
In response to a Commission question, the representative from Duke Power indicated the principal objection was " expense at this time with no technical justification for having to make that expense."
Id.
I at 42.
That panel also indicated that State and local officials opposed it.
l
)
Id. at 42-43.
At this same meeting, however, the panel of State and local goverrnent officials considered that the 15-minute notification capability requirement, with some modification and clarification, was appropriate.
Id. 77-79.
On July 3,1980, the NRC staff responded to the panel presentations at the June 25 Commission reeting. At this meeting, the staff presented the Com-mission with n:>difications to t!e proposed final rules to accommodate many of
~
the suggestions made by the Panels.
The Commission again discussed the appro-priateness of 15 minutes notification capability (as opposed to some longer time) and how the system might be used in practice. Public Meeting with NRC f
Staff (July 3,1980).
At that time, the Commission accepted modifications to provide more flexibility to State and local governments.
7 Lastly, the Commission held a public meeting on July 23,1980 for a discussion and vote on the Emergency Preparedness Final Regulation. After lengthy discussions the Commission voted on the final regulation that was published in the Federal Register on August 19, 1980 (45 Fed. Reg., supra at 55407).
The Final Rules included the following explanation in the Supple-mentary Information that reflected the significant deliberations concerning the 15-minute notification capability requirement:
Among the possible alternatives to this requirement are a longer notification time, a notification time that varies with distance from the facility, or no specified time.
In detennining what that criterion should be, a line must be drawn somewhere, and the Commission believes that providing as much time as practicable for the taking of protective The Commission action is in the interest of public health and safety.
recognizes that this requirement may present a significant financial impact and that the technical basis for this requirenent is not without dispute. Moreover, there may never be an accident requiring using the 15-minute notification capability. However, the essential rationale i
behind energency planning is to provide additional assurance for the The 15-minute public protection even during such an unexpected event.
notification capability requirement is wttolly consistent with that rationale.
The Commission recognizes that no single accident scenario should form the basis for choice of notification capability requirements for offsite authorities and for the public.
Emergency plans must be de-veloped that will have the flexibility to ensure response to a wide spectrum of accidents. This wide spectrum of potential accidents also reflects on the appropriate use of the offsite notification capability.
The use of this notification capability will range from imediate noti-fication of the public (within 15 minutes) to listen to predesignated radio and television stations, to the oore likely events where there is substantial time available for the State and local govermental officials to make a judgment whether or not to activate the public notification system.
Any accident involving severe fuel degradation or core melt that results in significant inventories of fission products in the containment wuld warrant imrediate public notification and consideration, based on the particular circumstances, of appropriate protective action because of the potential for leakage of the containment building.
In addition, the warning time available for the public to take action may be substantially t
~
8 less than the total time between the original initiating event and the time at which significant radioactive releases take place.
Specification of particular times as design objectives for notification of offsite authorities and the public are a means of ensuring that a system will be in place with the capability to notify the public to seek further infor-nation by listening to predesignated radio or television stations. The Coccission recognizes that not every individual wuld necessarily be reached by the actual operation of such a system under all conditions of system use.
However, the Cocnission believes that provision of a general alerting system will significantly improve the capability for taking protective actions in the event of an emergency. The reduction of noti-fication times from the several hours required for street-by-street notification to minutes will significantly increase the options available as protective actions under severe accident conditions. These actions could include staying indoors in the case of a release that has already occurred or a precautionary evacuation in the case of potential release thought to be a few hours away.
Accidents that do not result in core melt may also cause relatively quick releases for which protective actions, at least for the public in the immediate plant vicinity, are desirable.
Some comments received on the proposed rule advocated the use of a staged notification system with quick notification required only near the pl ant.
The Commission believes that the capability for quick notification within the entire plume exposure energency planning zone should be pro-vided but recognizes that some planners may wish to have the option of selectively actuating part of the system during an actual response.
Planners should carefully consider the impact of the added decisions that offsite authorities wuld need to make and the desirability of estab-lishing an official communication link to all residents in the plume exposure emergency planning zone wt:en detemining whether to plan for a staged notification capability.
i 9
t The motion before the Commission does not fault any aspect of the Commis-t sion's deliberations on the ruleE ut only cites "new infomation."
b Response to "New Infomation" The new infomation (Stratton, et al. on iodine release and the FD(A official's statement) and other factors (such as cost impact) raised by peti-tioners are insufficient to support the relief requested.
i A.-
Petitioners rely on the August 14 letter of Drs. Stratton, g al.,
which suggests an overestimation of radioactive iodine released in specific kinds of accidents.
The Commission has been briefed on this subject by Drs. Stratton, et al. and other experts from the technical staff, the Electric Power Reactor Institute, and Princeton University. Thus, in responding to this infomation, the staff has considered, not only the evidence in the motion itself, but also the public record created by the briefing (see SECY-80-504, Iodine Releases During Reactor Accidents" (November 13,1980) and E
In the consideration of the emergency planning final rules the Commis-sion's staff outlined the cost of installation and maintenance of a 15-minute notification system out to 10 miles.
In the Environmental Assess-ment for the Final Rules, NUREG-0685 at 7 (August 1980), the following discussion of those costs appears:
._y.
[An earlier NRC Staff Cost Analysis] did not contain estimates of i
j of notifying (within 15 minutes) ystems that would have a ca the costs of installing warning s everyone within 10 miles that a site emergency was in progress.
Estimates provided by commenters on the draft Envirornental Assessment indicate an installed cost of around $500,000 plus a nominal yearly maintenance cost. 'This will bring typical costs to about one million dollars per plant. Costs incurred in regard to multiple-unit plants will result in lower per unit costs.
Costs per unit in areas with more individual govern-mental authorities involved and/or higher populations will be higher.
Thus, in promulgating the requirement the Commission considered that the cost could be as much as $1 million per site for the life of the facility based on average industry submissicas.
\\
10 Transcript and Meeting Memoranda for November 18,1980).
The staff believes that petitioners' reliance is misplaced, given the authors' restriction of their theory to only certain core melt sequences and due to the role of isotopes, I
other than iodine, in calculations of health effects in the worst accident sequences. -See NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016. " Planning Basis for the Develop-ment of State and Local Government Radiological EMrgency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," at 22-23 and Appendix I (Dec.
1978).
First, the Stratton theory is limited by its authors only to those cases where containment integrity is maintained.
See Stratton letter p.1 and Staff Memorandum of W. Pasedag (October 30, 1980) attached to SECY-80-504.
The emer-gency planning rule is not so limited.
Containment failure cases are among those situations where prompt public notification is important because the potential for offsite health effects would warrant immediate measures offsite to minimize the impact of the releases on the public.
See NUREG-0396, Appendix I, 45 Fed. Rec. at 55407.
See also November 18 Briefing Transcript, at 140.
suld the theory of Stratton, g al. prove correct, it could affect offsite consequences from at least some core melt sequences in which contaircent integrity is maintained by reducing the amount of airborne iodine available for release from the facility. Whether this theory is correct may affect the com-putation of total risk to the public from a nuclear power plant (considering both consequences of the accident and the probability of such a release) but m.
does not affect the range of contingencies which emergency plans are Meitgned to mitigate.
.]
~
11
.Second, the staff concludes that the presence or absence of iodine would not affect the timing of emergency response in severe core melt sequences.
Decisions on offsite actions during severe emergencies are based on actual plant conditions. The knowledge of whether certain isotopes, such as iodine, are in the containment atmosphere and potentially available for release is an important facet of decisions which must be made on precautionary offsite protective actions. The ability to make this detemination is an important part of post-TMI in-plant requirements.
However, in worst-accident sequences, because other radioactive isotopes, (e.o., noble gases, tellurium and ruthenium),
also contribute to the potential risk (NUREG-0396, at 22-23), the presence or absence of iodine, by itself, does not warrant a change to the 15-minute rule.
Finally, in some cases, the timing of energency actions is also affected by how quickly an accident's potential severity is recognized and not by the presence or absence of particular isotopes.
See, n, June 18 Commission lieeting Tran-That rationale for prompt notification is unaffected by the script, supra.
Stratton, g al. infomation. The staff believes that this infomation raises generic concerns that require general comprehensive treatment and inti.nds to Imnediate modification of the 15-minute requirement is treat it in that way.
not justified.
Extensive reliance is placed by petitioners on an opinion of a FEMA B.
official, expressed in August 1980, questioning the practicality of a 15-minute notification capability within 10 miles. The Supplementary Infomation for the NRC final rules sets forth at some length the rationale for the Commission's decision. The Final Rule acknowledged that 100% effective notification is not l
e
.n of use lly allow o long as I
rules pecifica10 milesalso provide 12
~
s s
Mareover, the full the than i
f r less if needed s requireme t. and o n
cussion.
romptly dis is a phased mannertotal system p this ole in deter-w to othing ne HRC's ed, r
.n activate the ial adds the primacy o requir n
f is for to the FEMA offic recogniz which offsite pla the distances ning ed n
. of and leases letters be-NRC have
.MA and ard for of timing of re exchange nt of the haz ase, the example, the ning emergen y c
s not cxte does of rele concer test mony g,for 14, 1980, cited design i
the types should e laid. on Februa ylicenses. The kind of r
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weve,
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. Denton nts for lo -po whether to the testim notifica-e and wer som w
questions Subsequent n the publiced to FEMA's ig requiremen but only be better. f guidance o
vis notice
public system ten-ria for the NRC and to NUREG 065nce to delete system ve a
the ystem ha 3epte be, theility, Appendix lier guidaobjecti insisted public r
3 s
m the that capab modifying ear had s to 90% of the the initial an a design earlier guidancewithin 15 minute atisfactioneness figure as expect l or now d an instructiona re cies effectiv Thus, he w
agen 15 n tice he mile distance.
ovide the plant, talert signal an sure EPZ within o
to pr ility s from expo 100% of the capab mile th an the plumeof essentiallyrangements the to ten to provide bo of five in the populat o verage cial ar en betwe tem otification ys sage to may n t ave ct co de pe s
h s
dire o
informational mes should assure site,and provi osure EPZ. No:
Iwho n
the populat on, i
ntir plume'exp within thE]
sytem of the min tes. Thiswithin fiv 45 minutes miles of e
e of population u
e within ion, within thecentage
/
population rage assure 100% co itial notificat for the per ve
/
set ceived the inhas been mber re nu "4 tative l
2 g:
13
'4 fkve-to ten-mile plume exposure EPZ who must be notified within the initial 15 minutes.
NUREG-0654, Rev.1, at 3-3.
The lack of specific percentage is to permit flexibility in system design and permits planners to install a cost-effective system consistent with the general objective.
Ih.at3-4.
Ibre-over, while there may be a cost difference between systems designed to cover three miles and systems designed to cover 10 miles, there is no technical or conceptual difficulty in designing the system for the larger area. The NRC, however, has always recognized that, in practice, the ifcensee could not guarantee 100" effectiveness. Thus, the FEMA testimony is insufficient to warrant the relief requested.
C.
The other factors raised in petitioners' motions are likewise in-sufficient to justify a change.
The cost information in the motions for reconsideration and for stay are claimed as impacts to Duke Power as a consequence of a failure to stay the rule.
In fact, however, only two of the sites require immediate action because of the existence of operating units or a decision on a new operating license.
Furthermore, costs are quoted for a siren coverage at both a 60 decibel (db) level and a 68 db level.
NRC/FDiA guidance applicable to siren sytems is for a 60 db coverage.
The lower bound of the cost range quoted would therefore appear more appropriate. On a per-site basis these costs are well within the range considered by the Commission during the development of therule.M M
Using both the lower bound of the Duke figures (that is, a 60-decibel (db) figure) out to 10 miles distance for the Oconee (three-reactor) site and the McGuire (two-reactor) site [ Tucker Affidavit at 2-3], it is expected that installation cost will be $710,700 and maintenance and other costs will be $299,000 for a 30-year life or about $1 million total for each site.
These projections are equivalent to the figures considered average for a site and found acceptable by the Comission.
In addition, only a fraction of the $710,700 figure constitutes an imediate expenditure for the purchase of equipment. The other costs will be expended for installa-tion and over the life of the system.
. y' 14 In addition, the system described by petitioners is only one way of satisfying HRC requirements.
For example, only costs for a siren systern are presented although a siren system is not handated by the HRC rule or staff In areas of low population, tone alert units located in guidance in this area.
individual homes may be core cost-effective.
The HRC certainly does not forbid that or any other alternative system.
Even if the NRC were to accept the petitioners' proposed interim system, some notification system for the three-to ten-mile distance would be provided and that cost must be subtracted from the claimed impact costs.
No specifics of such an alternative system or justification of its adequacy with respect to timing are provided.
It is highly unlikely that such a system would be without significant cost and an appropriate judgment of the net impact of the 15-minute design objective would, of course, be reduced by the cost of any al ternative, lloreover, while there is a direct cost impact of the NRC rule in this area, the rule does not specify who should bear the cost and certainly does not pre-Peti-clude purchase of public notification systems by offsite authorities.
tieners have also not demonstrated that they must expend these sums because off-site authorities cannot or will not do so, or, in any case, that these costs are not recoverable in the State rate systems.
Finally, costs of offsite pre-paredness resulting from the NRC rule are a small fraction of in-plant related costs resulting from THI-related Commission requirements (perhaps 10% of the in-plant costs on a single-unit site and proportionally less on multi-unit sites).
This is not an unreasonable burden for emergency preparedness, a safety area 45 whose importance has been deemed vital to plant operation by the Commission.
Fed. R m at 55407.
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