ML20045D329

Forwards Ssar Markups to Chapter 8 Matls Resulting from Ge/ NRC 930621 Conference Addressing Listed Confirmatory Items. W/Exception of App 1C (Station Blackout) Responses Should Closout All Remaining Chapter 8 Outstanding Items

ML20045D329
Person / Time
Site:	05200001
Issue date:	06/22/1993
From:	Fox J GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Poslusny C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 9306280235
Download: ML20045D329 (15)

Text

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GENuclearEnergy General (sectric Company 175 Curtact Amt:. San Joze. CA 95125 June 22,1993 Docket No. STN 52-001 s

Chet Poslusny, Senior Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors

, and License Renewal Office of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Subject:

Submittal Supporting Accelerated ABWR Schedule - Chapter 8 Modifications

Dear Chet:

Enclosed are SSAR markups to Chapter 8 material that resulted from the GE/NRC conference call on June 21,1993. The following items are addressed:

Confirmatory Items 833.1-1,8.33.2-1,833.14-1,83.4.4-1; and COL Action Items 8.233-2 and 833.14-1.

It is our understanding that, with the exception of Appendix 1C (Station Blackout), these responses will close out all remaining Chapter 8 outstanding items.

Please send copies of this transmittal to John Knox and Dale Thatcher.

Sincerely, Y

ack Fox Advanced Reactor Programs i

cc: Cal Christensen (GE)-

Norman Fletcher (DOE)

Bob Strong (GE)

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9A0060 9306280235 930622 PDR ADOCK 05200001 s I

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23A6100AE Standard Plant nrv n 3.2.5 Non-Safety Related Structures, the health and safety of the public; Systems, and Components (9) Following a control room evacuation, provide 3.23.1 Definition of Non-Nuclear Safety an acceptable environment for equipment re.

(NNS) Category quired to achieve or maintain a safe shut-down condition; Structures, systems, and components that are not SC-1, -2, or -3, are non nuclear safety- (10) Handle spent fuel, the failure of which related (NNS) and are identified with "N' in the could result in fuel damage such that sig-Safety Class column of Table 3.2-1. nificant quantities of radioactive material could be released from the fuel; Some NNS structures, systems and components have one or more selected but limited, require- (11) Ensure reactivity control of stored fuel; ments that are specified to ensure acceptable performance of specific NNS functions. The (12) Protect safety-related equipment necessary selected requirements are established on a case- to attain or maintain safe shutdown follow-by-case basis commensurate with the specific NNS ing fire; and function performed (see Table 3.2-2). The func-tions performed by this subset of NNS structures, (13) Monitor variables to:

systems, and components are:

(a) Verify that plant operating conditions (1) Process, extract, encase, or store radio- are within technical specification active waste; limits (e.g., emergency core cooling water storage tank level, safety related (2) Ensure required cooling for the stored fuel cooling water temperature);

(e.g., spent fuel pool cooling system);

(b) Indicate the status of protection sys-(3) Provide cleanup of radioactive material from tem bypasses that are not automatically the reactor coolant system or the fuel removed as a part of the protection storage cooling system; system operation; (4) Monitor radioactive effluents to ensure that (c) Indicate status of safety related equip- j release rates or total releases are within ment; or l limits established for normal operations and  ;

transient events; (d) Aid in determining the cause or conse-quences of events for post accident (5) Resist failure that could prevent any SC-1, investigation.

-2, or -3 equipment from performing its

{Mp/ V'h nuclear safety related function (see Table 3.23.2 Design Requirements for NNS 3.2 2); Structurts, Systems and Components (6) Structurally bear the load or protect NNS The design requirements for NNS equipment are equipment providing any of the functions specified by the designer with appropriate listed in this Subsection 3.2.5.1; consideration of the intended service of the equipment and expected plant and environmental (7) Provide permanent shielding for protection conditions under which it will operate.

of SC 1, 2, or -3 equipment or of onsite personnel; Where appropriate, the Seismic Category 1, ASME Code Section III, or IEEE Class 1E require-(8) Provide operational, maintenance or ments are specified for NNS equiptnent in Table post-accident recovery functions involving 3.21. Generally, design requirements are based radioactive materials without undue risk to on applicable industry codes and standards. Where Amendment 3 3.2-4

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ac' cess to one onsite and two offsite power sources. An additional offsite

} power source is provided by the combustion turbine generator (CTG). A description of the CTG is provided in Section 9.5.11.

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Each of the two normally energized offsite power feeders (i.e., normal preferred and alternate preferred power) are provided for the Divisions I, II Normally two divisions are fed from the normal and III Class 1E systems. 4 preferred power source and the remaining division is fed from the alternate -

4 preferred power source. Both feeders are used during normal plant operation to I prevent simultaneous de-energization of all divisional buses on the loss of

, only one of the offsite power supplies. The transfer to the other preferred ,

l feeder 's manual. During the interim, power is automatically supplied by the l

diesel generators.

f The redundant Class 1E electrical divisions (Divisions I, II, and III) are

provided with separate onsite standby ac power supplies, electrical buses, distribution cables, controls, relays and other electrical devices. Redundant ,

j parts of the system are physically separated and electrically independent to 1 the extent that in any design basis event with any resulting loss of equipment, j the plant can still be shut down with the remaining two divisions. Independent

raceway systems are provided to meet cable separation requirements for

! Divisions I, II, and III.

Divisions I, II, and III standby ac power supplies have sufficient capacity j to provide power to all their respective loads. Loss of the normal preferred

. power supply, as detected by 6.9Kv Class 1E bus under-voltage relays, will i

cause the standby power supplies to start and connect automatically, in j sufficient time to safely shut down the reactor or limit the consequences of a a design basis accident (DBA) to acceptable limits and maintain the reactor in a safe condition. The standby power supplies are capable of being started and j stopped manually and are not stopped automatically during emergency operation unless required to preserve integrity. Automatic start will also occur on receipt of a level 1 1/2 signal (HPCF initiate), level 1 signal (RHR initiate)

and high drywell pressure.

The Class 1E 6.9Kv Divisions I, II, and III switchgear buses, and associated 6.9Kv diesel generators, 480 Vac distribution systems, 120 Vac and l 125 Vdc power and control systems conform to Seismic Category I requirements.

This equipment is housed in Seismic Category I structures except for some

)j control sensors associated with the Reactor Protection System (see 9A.5,5.1],

and the Leak Detection. System (see 9A.5.5.7]. Seismic Qualification is n accor with IEEE Standard 344(See Section 3.10) Ay hf 8.1.3.1.1.2 Safety System Logic and control Power Supply System Design Bases In order to provide redundant, reliable power of acceptable quality and availability to support the safety logic and control functions during normal,

- abnormal and accident conditions, the following design bases apply:

(1) SSLC power has four separate and independent Class 1E inverter constant i voltage constant frequency (CVCF) power supplies each backed by separate Class 1E batteries.

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1 In addition, non-safety-related equipment are designed to resist failure that

! could prevent any safety-related equipment'from performing its nuclear

} safety-related function (see 3.2.5.1, item (5)] .

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the normal over current tripping of these load breakers, Class lE zone selective interlocking is provided between them and the upstream Class 1E bus feed breakers.

If fault current flows in the non-Class lE load, it is sensed by the Class lE current device for the load breaker and a trip blocking signal is sent to the upstream Class lE feed breakers. This blocking lasts for about 75 milliseconds. This allows the load breaker to trip in its normal instantaneous tripping time of 35 to 50 milliseconds, if the magnitude of the fault current is high enough. This assures that the fault current has been terminated before j the Class lE upstream breakers are free to trip. For fault currents of lesser magnitude, the blocking delay will time out without either bus feeder or load breakers tripping, but the load breaker will eventually trip and always before the upstream feeder breaker. This order of tripping is assured by the coordination between the breakers provided by long-time pickup, long-time delay and instantaneous pickup trip device characteristics. Tripping of the Class lE l feed breaker is normal for faults which occur on the Class lE bus it feeds.

Coordination is provided between the bus main feed breakers and the load ,

@16.stomv.. _+" "). i d'al" e zone selective interlock is a feature of the trip unit for the breaker and is tested when the other features such as current setting and long-time I 1

delay are tested.

l Power is supplied to each FMCRD load group from either the Division I Class i 1E bus or the non-Class 1E PIP bus through a pair of interlocked transfer l switches located between the power sources and the 6.9kV/480v transformer i feeding the FMCRD MCC. These transfer switches are classified as Class 1E associated, and are treated as Class 1E. Switch-over to the non-Class lE PIP bus source is automatic on loss of power from the Class 1E diesel bus source.

Switching back to the Class lE diesel bus power is by manual action only.

The design minimizes the probability of a single failure affecting more i

than one FMCRD group by providing three independent Class 1E feeds (one for each group) directly from the Division I Class 1E 6.9 kV bus (see sheet 3 of Figure 8.3-1).

The Class 1E load breakers in conjunction with the zone selective interlocking feature (which is also Class 1E), provide the needed isolation between the Class 1E bus and the non Class 1E loads. The_feejier. circuits on the upstream side of the Class 1E load bre aia Class 1E. The FMCR6 circuits on the load side of the Class 1 load breakers down to and including the transfer switches are Class 1E Assoc ated. The feeder circuits from the

,' non-Class 1E PIP bus to the transfer swi ch, and i cuits downstream of the tr ~ f- are non Class 1E. C.onTrel poaer 6 +ue ten she fre m Otwson L

} ss 1E oads being supplied from a Clas SOifckM is P N V' s exists only in ,

Division I, as described above for the FMCRD'::. Non Class Lt. Acads--ar+ me _ ,/

permitted on Livisions II or III. This prevents any possibility of interconnection between Class 1E divisions.

8.3.1.1.2 Lov Voltage Class 1E Power Distribution System 8.3.1.1.2.1 Power Centers c:\ow62\ch8/ch8 draft.wp march 30, 1993 26-

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• tem .2.2. -1 per 5-2  ; phone c 1) f i

The no al a d alternate fsite pre - ed power c cuits designed with

{ fficie capaci and cap ility to mit riatio of the . ating voltage j o the nsite power str ution syst to a ra e ppropria to sure 1) 1 nor. and safe steady ate operat n of all pl loads, ) start g and l 5

ac ation of the li . ng drive system with e emain r of the lo s in

! s rvice and 3) rel ble erat n of the con ol a p otection syste under  ;

see 8.3.1.1.7 8)). Sp ifically, the nit

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, onditio of degr ed volta i

l auxiliary ansf mers and th eserve auxi ary tran fo er are des'gned to i limit the vo- e variation f th onsite ower dis ibuti syste to plus or N ,

, minus 10 perc of load r ed vol ge d ing all des of s .ady state j operation a a 1tage p of no mo tan 20 pe cent during or starting."

IN _RT (NRC req .s to close it_m 8.2. .6 per 5-28-93 hone ca )

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Volt g levels a the low- olta terminals o the auxil ry and rese e j tr sfo ers wi be analyz determin the aximum d minimum ad e ndition th are expected roughout e anti pat range of v tage j ariations the offsite tr ns ssion stem and main gener or. Separat analyses w 1 e performed or ea po sible circui onfigura on of the j offsite p er su ly syst . ,

3 l J 'R AF (NRC reque to close em 8.2. .6- per 5-28 3 one call) i j Pe orma and op rating c ra eristics o e norm and alte te .eferred j p er circu a e required t ieetoperabpiity d sign-basis re rements, 1 l r ch as 1) the ility to wit s d short-circuits, ) equipment c a ty, 3) l oltage and f equ cy trans' nt res se i 4) voltag'e egulation 1 its, ) step load capabil ty, 6) ordi tion of pr ective relaying f nd 7)/ grounding.

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IN (FEC n ; p c1 w icem S-3.^ ^ 9 p^r 5 6 phr. ::11) - s l G-i The fault interrupt capability of all Class IF., breakers, fault interrupt j coordination between the supply and load breakers for each Class 1E load and

! the Division 1 non-Class 1E load, and the zone selective interlock feature of ,

i the breaker for the non-Class 1E load all have the capability of being tested /

(see 8.3.4.29). /

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, MARK-UP TEXT INSERTS

' INSERT X (h eded to backup tech specs)**  ;

i The signals gen ated from high drywell pressure and low reactor ssel level

{ are arranged in t -out-of-four logic combinations, and are uti zed to sense i the presence of a L A condition and subsequently start the esel. These

! signals also initiate he emergency core cooling systems.

t The loss of voltage condi n and the degraded voltage ondition are sensed by

! independent sets of three un rvoltage relays (one each phase of the 6.9 kV bus) which are configured such hat two-out-of-th e trip states will start the

! diesel generator. The primary si of each of e instrument potential transformers (pts) is connected phas -to-pha.. (i.e., a " delta" configuration) such that a loss of a single phase wil ca e two of the three undervoltage 4

relays to trip, thus satisfying the two- t-of-three logic. (For more 1 information on the degraded voltage co iti and associated time delays, etc.,

j see Subsection (8) of 8.3.1.1.7.)

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j INSERT Y (NRC request to clo new item 8.2.3.8-1 pe 5 7-93 phone call) i j Switching and lightning rge protection is provided by th station grounding -

and surge protection s tems described in Appendix 8A, and b the independent

feeds (i.e., normal d alternate preferred power circuits des ibed in 8.2.1.2). Maximum d minimum voltage ranges are specified in 8. 3(2) and transformers are esigned per 8.2.1.2. Allowable frequency variat n or t stability limi tions are addressed in 8.2.3. Surge and EMI protect. n for ,

Class 1E sys ms, equipment and components is described in. Appendix 7A.

.; Protection or degraded voltage conditions is discussed in 8.3.1.1 7(8).

/

INSERT Z (NRC request to close item 8.3.4,4-2-per 5-18-93 phone call) -

j Each rncxu power train has current limiting features to limip th,e FMCRD motor \ 3 ,

fault current. Continuous operation of the FMCRD motorge the 1 miting fault N 737 l j current will not degrade operation of any Class 1E load'6*t ksg, he Division I A \

i dieselgeneratorhassufficientcapacitymargintosydpyAoverlo currents up j l to the trip setpoint of the Class 1E feeder breaker o the FMC s. /

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--- Q independent from inverter which, in turn are normally s static sw ch from a rect ier which rece es 480V divisi al power. liedpowervia/a 125V c battery rovides an alte nate source of ower through e static s tch./

i The capacity of each of the four redundant Class lE CVCF power supplies is base 6 on the largest combined demands of the various continuous loads, plus the largest combination of non-continuous loads that would likely be connected to the power supply simultaneously during normal or accident plant operation, whichever is higher. The design also provides capability for being tested for adequate capacity (see 8.3.4.34).

(72- ryxk For ivisions I, II, and III, th AC supply is from a 480 V CC for eac divisi The backu de supply is i'a a static f6 itch and a d /ac inverte from e 125 Vdc ce tral /distribu on board fo r the division A second s tic swi ch also is ca able of trans tring from t e inverter to,a direct fee t rough a volta regulating e ansformer fr a 480V moto control cent r for ach of the t ee divisions.

l Since ere is no 480 ac Division power, Divi ion IV is fe from a Division I motor contro center. Ot rwise, the a supply for t Divisiop IV CVCF po r supply is s ilar to the ther three di sions. The e supply for Rivisi n IV is backed m 5 saoarate Divimirm T harterv.

The CVCF power supply buses are designed to provide logic and control power to the four division SSlC system that operates the RPS. (The SSLC for the ECCS derives its power from the 125 Vdc power system (Figure 8.3-4)]. The ac buses also supply power to the neutron monitoring system and parts of the process radiation monitoring system and MSIV function in the leak detection system.

Power distribution is arranged to prevent inadvertent operation of the reactor scram initiation or MSIV isolation upon loss of any single power supply.

ou i m enance can be conducted on equipment associated with the CVCF power supply. Inverters and solid-state switches can be inspected, serviced and tested channel by channel without tripping the RPS logic.

8.3.1.1.4.2.2 Components Each of the four Class lE CVCF power supplies includes the following components:

(1) a power distribution cabinet, including the CVCF 120 Vac bus and circuit breakers for the SSLC loads; (2) a solid-state inverter, to convert 125 Vdc power to 120 Vat. uninterruptible power supply; (3) a solid-state transfer switch to sense inverter failure and automatically switch to alternate 120 Vac power; (4) a 480V/120V bypass transformer for the alternate power supply; (5) a solid-state transfer switch to sense ac input power failure and automatically switch,to alternate 125 Vdc power. ]

(6) a manual transfer switch for maintenance, j c:\o 62\ch8/ch8 draft. g fierch 30, 1993 28-

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• l MARK-UP Tl INSERTS INSERT X Needed to backup tech spec **

The signals ge erated from high d well pressure a low reactor vess level are arranged in o-out-of-four ogic combinations, a are utilize ( to sense the presence of a CA conditi and subsequently start e diese These signals niso initiat the em gency core cooling systems.

The loss of voltage cond ion and the degraded voltage cond are sensed by independent sets of thr e dervoltage relays (one on eac hase f the 6.9 kV bus) which are config ed su that two-out-of-three tr states w 1 start the ,/

diesel generator. e primary ide of each of the ine rument potent 1 <

transformers (pts) s connected p se-to-phase (i.e , a " delta" config ation such that a loss f a single phase 11 cause two f the three undervol e relays to trip, hus satisfying the t -out-of- ree logic. (For more in ormation on he degraded voltage con tio and associated time delays et ,

see ubsectio (8) of 8.3.1.1.7.)

INSERT Y 'RC request to close new em 8.2.3. -1 per 5-7-93 pho call)

Switc g and htning surge pr ection is provide by the a tion grounding and/urgeprotect n systems d cribed in Appendix 8A and b the independent feeds (i.e. , normal d alte aate prefecred power circu ts described in f2.1.2).Maximumand ni > voltage ranges are specifi in 8.2.3(2) and transformers are designe er 8.2.1.2. Allowable freq ncy variation or stability limitations ea essed in 8.2.3. Surge nd EMI rotection for class It systems, eq pment an components is dese ed in App dix 7A.

Protection for deg ded voltage c ditions is di ussed in 8.3.1 1.7(8).

ICSERT Z (N request to close item 8.3. -2 per 5-18-93 phone cal l Each FMCR power train has current lim sing ures to limit the FMCRD otor I fault c rent. Continuous operatio of the FMC otors at the limiting ault curre will not degrade operatio of any Class _lE 1 s. Also, the Divis nI l dies generats" has sufficient apacity margin to supp overload currents l to he trip g int of the C ass lE feeder breaker to the CRDs.

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l INSERT AA (NRC reques to close item 8.3.3.14-1 per 5-24-93 phon call)

I The function of the Class lE Vital ac Power Supply System is to provide h N  :

l reliable 120V uninterruptible power to the individual : rip systems of the SSLC \

system. The system consists of four 120V ac uninterruptible constant voltage, i constant frequency (CVCF) power supplies (Divisions I, II, III, IV), each including a static inverter, ac and de static transfer switches, a regulating step-down transformer (as an alternate ac power supply), and a distribution

panel (see Figure 8.3-3). The primary source of power comes from the Class lE h19 j 480 Vac motor control centers in the same Class lE division, except for Division IV, which is powered from Division II.. The secondary source is th e Class lE 125 Vdc battery in the same division.

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t Eu  %.Shd i TherearethreeautomaticswitchingmodesfortheCVCFpowersupplies,any\'

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j of which may be initiated manually. First, the frequency of the output of the i j inverter is normally synchronized with the input ac power. If the frequency of g

the input power goes out of range, the power supply switches over to internal synchronization to restore the frequency of its output. Switching back to l external synchronization is automatic and occurs if the frequency of the ac }

power has been restored and maintained for approximately 60 seconds.

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} The second switching mode is from ac to de for the power source. If the }

voltage of the input ac power is less than 88% of the rated voltage, the input  !

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i is switched to the de power supply. The input is switched back to the ac power . f-8 I after a confirmation perind of approxitately 60 seconds.  !

"The third switching' mode is between the inverter and the voltage regulating

transformer, which receives power from the same bus as the primary source. If 5 any of the conoitions listed below occur,Athe power supply is switched to the l voltage regulating transformer. [an 'a.munciafde /5 acts'veted' i n ) '

1 Qthe mas *1 control No*f and _J l (a) Output voltage out of rating by more than plus or minus 10 per cent ( 72 (b) Output frequency out of rating by more than plus or min 2s 3 per cent

(c) High temperature inside of panel /

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(d) Loss of control power supply i

j (e) Commutation failure f (f) Over-current of smoothing condenser i

(g) Loss of control power for gate circuit j (h) Incoming MCCB trip (i) Cooling fan trip l

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('7) Containment penetrations are so arranged that no design basis event can disable cabling in more than one division. Penetrations do not contain cables of more than one divisional assignment.

(8) Annunciator and computer inputs from Class 1E equipment or circ.:'sts are treated as Class 1E and retain their divisional identification up to a

- Class 1E isolation device. The output circuit from this isolation device is classified as non-divisional. l Annunciator and computer inputs from non Class 1E equipmc.nt or circuits do I not require isolation devices.

I 8.3.3.7 Electrical Penetration Assemblies ,

1

" When the vendor-unique characteristics of the penetrations are known, the  ;

following will be provided:

i 1) fault current clearing-time curves of the electrical penetrations' u interrupting devices plotted against the primary thermal and secondary capability (I 2t )rrentcurve of the penetration, along with an I analysis showing proper coordination of these curves; l

2) a simplified one-line diagram showing the location of the protective devices in the penetration circuit, with indication of the maximum available fault current of the circuit; 4

3) specific identification and location of power supplies used to provide i external control power for tripping primary and backup electrical penetration breakers (if utilized);

4) an analysis demonstrating the thermal capability of all W-: triculd

- +-~.a*'" penetrations is preserved and protected by one of the

! / following:

1 a) The maximum available fault current (including single-failure of an

" upstream device) is less than the maxioum continuous current capacity of Oe

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penetration; or 1

' b) Redundant circuit protection devices are provided, and are adequately designed and set to interrupt current, in spite of single-failure, at a value below the maximum continuous current capacity Feen d er. r.. 4 i

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Such devices must be located in separate panels or be separated by barriers and must be independent such that failure of one will not adversely affect the other. Furthermore, they must not be dependent on the same power su m-k'

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chve) devices designed to protect the penetration

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l Q h2 CQfdhle & betssg 8.3.3.8 Fire Protection of Cable Systems g g* g qspected (see 8 3.y y),

c:\ou62\ch8/ch8 draft.up merch 30, 1993 -- ___ .

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l The technical specifications require periodic testing of the diesel ]

l generator loading capabilities by operating the diesel generators in parallel j with the offsite power source. Interlocks which restore the units to emergency standby on event of a LOCA or LOPP shall also be tested.  !

Appropriate procedures shall rduiMMirduration of A mumccion etween the preferred power supply and the standby power supply shall be ~

h t, l inimized in accordance with Section 6.1.3 of IEEE 308, 8.3.4.22 Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Protective Relaying l

l Appropriate plant procedures shall include periodic testing of all diesel f generator protective relaying, bypass circuitry and annunciation. l 1

8.3.4.23 Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Synchronizing Interlocks

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Appropriate plant procedures shall include periodic testing of diesel j generator synchronizing interlocks (see 8.3.1.1.6.4). l i

8.3.4.24 Periodic Testing of Thermal Overloads and Bypass Circuitry Appropriate plant procedures shall include periodic testing of thermal overloads and associated bypass circuitry for Class lE MOVs. The testing shall be performed in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.106 [see 8.3.1.2(2)(g) and 8.3.2.2.2(2)(f)].

8.3.4.25 Periodic Inspection / Testing of Lighting Systems Appropriate plant procedures shall include periodic inspections of all l

lighting systems installed in safety-related areas, and in passageways leading to and from these areas. In addition, lighting systems installed in such areas which are normally de-energized (e.g., lamps) shall be periodically tested.

]

8.3.4.26 Controls for Limiting Potential Hazards into Cable Chases Appropriate plant procedures shall provide administrative control of operations and maintenance activities to control and limit introduction of potential hazards into cable chases and the control room area.

8.3.4.27 Periodic Testing of Class lE Equipment Protective Relaying Appropriate plant procedures shall include periodic testing of all protective relaying and/or thermal overloads associated with Class lE u tors and switchgear.

8.3.4.28 Periodic Testing of CVCF Power Supplies and EPA' (j ec}vd H aldFM5}; O l Appropriateplantproceduresshallincludeperiodictesting[oftheCVCF power supplies and associated electrical pr. w cion assemblies (EPA's) which provide power to the Reactor Protection Systee l 8.3.4.29 Periodic Testing of Class lE Circuit Breakers c:\ow62\ch8/ch8 draft.wp March 30, 1993 l

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) _ -MARK =tiP itAT ddERTS INSERT D (NRC request to close item 8.2.2.6- l per 5-28-93 phone call)

) I Then\

l orgal and alternate offsite preferred power circuits are designe with s4fficient c acity and capability to limit va ciations of the operating 1tage the onsite er distribution system to a. range appropriate to ensu 1) rormal and safe eady-state operation of all lant loads, 2) starti e,and zcceleration of th limiting drive system with the remainder of the oads in s ervice, and 3) rel able operation of the con rol and protection stems under c onditions of degrade voltage [see 8.3.1.1-.7(8)). Specifically, the unit a uxiliary transformers d the reserve auxiliary transformer ar designed to l inait the voltage variati n of the onsite pown distribution e stem to plus or n irius 10 percent of load r ed voltage during 11 modes of s ady state cperation and a voltage dip no more than 20 percent dur g motor starting." .

j M ERT AE (NRC request to close tem 8.2.2.6 1 per 5 %8-93 phone call)

V ltage levels at the low-voltage te inals o the nit and reserve auxiliary t ansformers will be analyzed to deter ne t m imum and minimum load c nditions that are expected throughout e nt cipated range of voltage v lations of the offsite transmission sys e nd the main ge__n_erator - Separat'e I

an lyses will be performed for each no= _ trcuit configuration of the of si.te-power supply system.

N INS _RT AF (NRC request to close ite .2. .6-1 p 5-28 93 phone call) l Performance and operating charact istics f the nor al and alternate prefer ed pow r circuits are required to et opera lity and d sign-basis requirement ,

such as 1) the ability to with and short circuits, 2) quipment capacity, 3 I volt age and frequency transi t response, 4) voltage re lation_ limits, 5) ep load capability, 6) coordi tion of prot etive relaying, d 7)_ grounding.

INSE:RT AG (NRC reques to close item 8 3.4.4-2 per 5-28-93 p one call)

The fault interrup capability of all C ass 1E breakers, fat.lt terrupt coo :dination betw en the supply and lo.d breakers for each Class E load and the Division I on-Class 1E load, and he zone selective interlock feature of  ;

the breaker f the non-Class 1E load 11 have the capability of be g teste d I (se s 8.3.4. ). '

i INSERT H (NRC request to close COL Ltem 8.2.3.3-2 per June phone call a l Car l/hristensonwhileIwasonvacat ion. This insert replaces the last j payhgraph of 8.3.4.21.) g c AH Appropriate plant procedures shall require that each diesel generator set be g operated independently of the other sets, and be connected to the utility power system only by manual control during testing or for bus transfer. Also, such )

procedures shall require that the duration of the connection between the preferred power supply and the standby power supply shall be minimized in

( accc.rdance with Section 6.1.3 of IEEE 308 (see 8.3.1.1.8.1).

r -

^

l': 23A6100AG any o Standard Plant copper loop which encircles all buildings (See Figure 8A MISCELLANEOUS ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 8A.1-1) 8A.1 Station Grounding and Surge Each building is equipped with grounding systems connected to the station grounding grid. As Protection a minimum, every other steel column of the building 8A I.1 Description perimeter will connect directly to the grounding grid.

The electrical grounding system is comprised of: The plant's main generator is grounded with a neutral grounding device. The impedance of that device willlimit the maximum phase current under (1) an instrument grounding network, short circuit conditions to a value not greater than l (2) an equipment grounding network for grounding that for a three. phase fault at its terminals.  !

Provisions are included to ensure proper grounding electrical equipment (e.g. switchgear, motors, distribution panels, cables, etc.) and selected of the isophase buses when the generator is mechanical components (e.g. fuel tanks, disconnected. ,

l i chemical tanks, etc.),

l The onsite, medium voltage ac distribution i

system is resistance grounded at the neutral point of (3) a plart grounding grid, and the low-voltage windings of the unit auxiliary and (4) a lightning protection network for protection of reserve transformers.

structures, transformers and equipment located outside buildings. The neutral point of the generator windings of '

te onsite, standby power supply units (i.e., the diesel generators and the combustion turbine generator),it i The plant instrumentation is grounded through i a separate insulated radial grounding system through distribution type transformers and loading resistors, sized for continuous operation in the event  !

comprised of buses and insulated cables. The l instrumentation grounding systems are connected to of a ground fault.

l the station grounding grid at only one point and are _

insulated from all other grounding circuits. Separate The neutral point of the low voltage ac l l distribution systems are either solidly or impedance l instrumentation grounding systems are provided for plant analog (i.e. relays, solenoids, etc.) and digital grounded, as aecessary, to ensure proper instrumentation systems.

coordination of ground fault protection. The de systems are ungrounded.

a n e.

The equipment grounding network is such that all major equipment, structures and tanks are The target value of ground resistance is404fd grounded with two diagonally opposite ground -ohmior leas for the reactor, turbine, control, service gj connections. The ground bus of all switchgear and radwaste buildings. If the target grounding assemblies, motor control centers and control resistance is not achi ed by the ground grid, auxdiary ground grids, ow buried ground rods or cabinets are connected to the station ground grid deep buried ground rods be used in combination through at least two parallel paths. ' Bare copper risers are furnished for all underground electrical as necessary to meet th : r et ground resistance -

ducts and equipment, and for connections to the value. TWs u caeffo# M8 Secte 12.l of /M FC. '

grounding systems within buildings. One bare The lightning protection system covers all major cooper cable is lastalled with each underground el .trical duct run, and all metauie hardware in each plant structures and is designed to prevent direct lightning strikes to the buildings, electric power manhole is connected to the cable.

equipment and instruments. It consists of air terminals, bare downcomers and buried grounding A plant grounding grid & hing of bare copper electrodes which are separate from the normal cables is provided to limit step and touch potentials grounding system. Lightning arresters are provided to safe values under all fault Miaat Tbc buried for each phase of all tie lines connecting the plant grid is located at the switchyard and connected to electrical systems to the switchyard and offsite line.

systems within the buildings by a 500 MCM bare These arresters are connected to the high. voltage l BA,1 1 Amendment

't .

gg 23A6100A0 REV B Standard Plant t

terrninals of the main step up and reserve trans- (3)IEEE Std 665, Guide for Generation Station  !

Grounding formers. Plant instrumentation located outdoors or connected to cabling running outdoors is provided with surge suppression devices to protec'. the (4) NFPA-78, National Iire Protection Association's equipment from liah'ning induced surges.

Lightning Protection Code i

' )

8A.I.2 Analysis IS ed for the j No SRP or regulatory gui . egr ,

grounding and lightning prothetionjtystem. It is designed and required to Wstalled to the applicable sections of the following codes and standards. .

(1) IEEE Std 80, Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding  !

(2) IEEE Std 81, Guide for Measuring Earth Resistivity, Ground Impedance, and Earth Surface Potentials of a Ground System (3) IEEE Std 665, Guide for Generation Station Grounding (4) NFP A 78, National Fire Protection Association's Lightning Protection Code This code is utilized as recommended practices

- only. It does not apply to electrical generating ts.

(6)N clear ergy Property Insurance ssociation Basic Fire (7

IA) document title /

ection for Nuclear Powe ts" ,

8A.1.3 COL LJcense Infonnation It is the responsibility of the COLjpplicant to perform ground resistance measqe3e ts to determine that the required value OltFo or W

. s less has been met and to make a dition(to the system if necessary to meet the target ance.

8A.1.4 Resenmees (1) IEEE Std all, Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding (2) IEEE Std 81, Guide for Measuring Earth Resistivity, Ground Impedance, and Earth Surface Potentials of a Ground System 8A.12 Amendment