ML20045B396
| ML20045B396 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 05/31/1993 |
| From: | Sarah Turner HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045B367 | List: |
| References | |
| HI-92912, NUDOCS 9306170295 | |
| Download: ML20045B396 (25) | |
Text
-_
A l.
I CRITICALITY SAFETY EVALUATION OF THE L MILLSTONE UNIT 2 SPENT FUEL STORAGE RACKS WITH ALTERNATIVE STORAGE CONFIGURATIONS ,
1 Prepared for NORTHEAST UTILITIES NUCLEAR Co.
f bY Stanley E. Turner, PhD, PE May 1993 Holtec Project 20960 Holtec Report HI-92912 230 Normandy Circle 2060 Fairfax Ave.
Palm Harbor, FL 34683 Cherry Hill, NJ 08003 9306170295 930610 I PDR ADOCK 05000336 {
P PDR g
t i
i TABLE OF CONTENTS 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
AND
SUMMARY
............................. 1 .
2.0 CRITICALITY SAFETY ANALYSES .......................... 4 2.1 Region A ....................................... 4 -
2.2 Region B ....................................... 4 '
2.3 Region C ....................................... 4 2.4 Region D ....................................... 5 2.5 Consolidated fuel .............................. 6 2.6 New Fuel Elevator .............................. 7 3.0 ACCIDENT CONDITIONS ................................. B ,
3.1 Temperatuare Effects ........................... 8 3.2 Mis-Loaded Fuel Assembly ....................... 9 ;
3.2.1 Region B ................................ 9 3.2.2 Region C (or Region D)................... 9 3.2.3 Dropped Fuel Assembly ................... 10 P
4.0 ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY .............................. 11 4.1 Storage Rack Design and Fuel Specifications .... 11 4.2 Calculational Techniques ....................... 11 4.3 Axial Burnup Distributions ..................... 12
5.0 REFERENCES
.......................................... 13 I
i
't i 1
l i
i i t
]
?
I t
List of Tables Table 1
SUMMARY
OF CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS FOR ALTERNATIVE STORAGE ARRANGEMENTS IN MILLSTONE UNIT 2 .................................... 13 Table 2 LIMITING BURNUP VALUES FOR VARIOUS INITIAL ENRICHMENTS IN REGIONS C AND D FUEL ASSEMBLIES ...... 14 List of Floures Fig. 1 BURNUP REQUIREMENTS FOR STORAGE IN REGIONS C AND D (4 OF 4 ARRAY) .............................. 15 Fig. 2 NEW FUEL ELEVATOR AND SURROUNDING FUEL ASSEMBLIES ... 16 Fig. 3 AXIAL BURNUP DISTRIBUTION FOR HIGH BURNUP FUEL ...... 17 t
Fig. 4 CORRECTION FACTOR FOR THE EFFECT OF AXIAL DISTRIBUTION IN BURNUP ............................. 18 ,
11
~. I L
i i
l
t
1.0 INTRODUCTION
and
SUMMARY
A previous evaluation of the Millstone Unit 2 fuel storage racks with gaps in the Boraflex neutron poison mater 3 al (Reference 1) was made for specified fuel storage arrangements in regions of the pool designated as Region A and Region B (being part of the older Region 1 designation). For these designations, Region A was l evaluated for spent fuel with specified fuel burnup and Region B was evaluated for storage of fresh fuel of 4.5% enrichment in a 3-out-of-4 loading pattern. The present evaluation does not affect the previous evaluation of Region A but does consider the use of '
spent fuel of a specified burnup as an alternative to the empty cells of Region B (using the space under the cell-blockers).
Region C of the pool was evaluated for the use of borated steel (poison) rodlets inserted into the spent fuel assemblies, with a linear orientation of the rodlets. An alternative to the use of the poison zoalets was evaluated to define the minimum burnup of the spent fuel required for safe storage. For convenience, this alternative to the use of poison rodlets is designated as Region D, although the assemblies may be intermixed with assemblies containing poison rodlets (Region C assemblies), provided each assembly satisfies the minimum burnup requirements identified in Figure 1. Thus, Region C and Region D assemblies are interchangeable. Accident conditions, the effect of the new fuel '
elevator, and the interfaces between regions were also evaluated.
Calculations for different orientations of the three poison rodlets did not show any difference in reactivity within the statistical accuracy of KENO-Sa calculations. Therefore, Region C assemblies may be stored in any orientation of the poison rodlets.
l l
i 1
I The previously evaluated case of consolidated fuel storage, as ,
reported by Combustion Engineering, was confirmed for one enrichment. Consolidated fuel bundles (2-to-1 consolidation ratio) :
are therefore acceptable for storage in any region of tihe storage i rack, within the burnup limits reported by Combustion Engineering. !
i i
The principal evaluation results are given below and in Figure 1. ;
Maximum k m ;
Case (Includina Uncertainties) !
- 1) Region B with 4.5% ANF fuel in 0.949 3 locations and 2.36% CE fuel burned to 22.3 MWD /KgU in the i 4th location. ;
- 2) Region C with poison rodlets 0.940 (see Figure 1 for burnup requirements) t
- 3) Region D (without poison rodlets) 0.946 ;
(see Figure 1 for burnup requirements)
- 4) Worst Case Accident Condition, <0.91 with 800 ppm soluble boron i
These calculations include the evaluated uncertainties due to manufacturing tolerances and an allowance for uncertainty in depletion (burnup) calculations. The effect of axial burnup distributions are also included.
In Regions A and B, the temperature coefficient of reactivity is negative and the design basis temperature was taken as that of maximum water density (4*C or 39'F). However, the temperature coefficient of reactivity for Regions C and D is positive and the nominal maximum temperature of 150*F was assumed. Temperatures above 150' F are considered as accident conditions for which credit for soluble boron in the pool water is permitted (Double contingency principle).
In calculations of the reactivity effect of interf aces between the various regions, no adverse effects were observed. In addition, accident evaluations showed that for the worst case (fresh fuel assembly of 4.5% enrichment accidentally installed in "a Region C or D cell), a soluble boron concentration of 800 ppm (Tech Spec limit) would limit the maximum k,,, to approximately O.90, which is well within the regulatory limit. The consequences of accidentally omitting the poison rodlets from a single Region C assembly was a significantly less severe accident condition (maximum k,,, less than 0.95 without credit for soluble boron).
,n The reactivity consequences of a heavy load (cask) drop accident M was not specifically calculated. However, with Region C (or Region D [) storage cells, any crushing would reduce the water-to-fuel ratio and therefore redupce the reactivity. Soluble boron is also present to maintain the reac{tvity at a low value. Therefore, the heavy load drop accident would not adversely affect the crit /icality safety of the racks with Region C or D fuel.
i 4
r 2.0 CRITICALITY SAFETY ANALYSES 2.1 Reaion A Region A, (utilizing all of the cells in a 4-of-4 cell arrangement with credit for fuel burnup) has not changed from the previous analysis. None of the rearrangements affect the results of the prior analysis and the burnup-limit curve for Region A remains valid.
2.2 Recion B Region B was previously analyzed for fresh fuel of 4.5 % average enrichment ( ANF fuel) in a 3-of-4 arrangement (fourth cell empty) .
The new arrangement uses spent fuel in the fourth cell as an option to the cell remaining empty. The analysis assumed spent fuel of 2.36% initial enrichment (CE fuel design) burned to 22.3 MWD /KgU or ,
more in the fourth cell. With this arrangement, the maximum k,,, is calculated to be 0.949 including all uncertainties, as indicated in Table 1 attached. This is within the USNRC guidelines and is '
therefore an acceptable option. The fourth cell can therefore safely contain spent fuel of the specified enrichment and burnup (or higher burnup) under the cell-blocker.
2.3 Reaion C Region C is designed to use borated stainless steel rods or rodlets ]
inserted into the control rod thimbles (3 rods per assembly !
arranged in a diagonal line), utilizing all cells (4-out-of-4
, arrangement). The rodlet specifications, provided by NNE, are as follows:
0.D. inches 0.87 i 0.015 Composition 2.0 1 0.1 Boron in SS 304 ;
4 W - - J - a a4 W e si a --A- -.
l Analysis of this arrangement resulted in a maximum k,,, of 0.940 including calculational- and manufacturing uncertainties. The analysis also includes the effect of axially distributed burnup in the assembly, based upon the nodal calculations (51 nodes) provided l by NNE. Table 1 summarizes the calculations for Region C'with the specified poison rodlets. i i
Calculations were also made to define the burnup limit curve as a ,
function of the initial enrichment. Figure 1 gives the limiting burnup curve, yielding.at each enrichment the same . maximum k,,, ;
(0.940). This burnup-limit curve identifies the burnups required 1 for acceptable storage of spent fuel in Region'C. ..The calculated-enrichment-burnup data is shown in Table 2. For convenience, a l polynomial fit to these data have been developed, as follows:-
l cLimiting'Burnup-(Bu) For Region C -
2
'Bu = -19.'2717 + 15.9571
- E - 0.4136721*: Ec
' ~
For enrichments, E, between 1.9%.and'4'.5%. !
f No effect of the assembly'(and rodlet) orientation was observed, f
within the statistical accuracy of KENO-Sa calculations.- ;
Furthermore, the CASMO-3 calculation conservatively bounded the KENO-Sa calculations for all orientations. Therefore, the Region C l fuel assemblies may be stored without regard for the assembly or f rodlet orientation.
-i l
2.4 Reaion D fl Region D is a subset of Region C storage cells, designed to safely f accommodate spent fuel without any poison rodlets and utilizing all l
)
l l
l t
, , , , . . - - - , ,.,,-n. ., ,, - --
l l
cells (4-of-4 arrangement). This, of course, requires a higher !
4
~
burnup and the burnup limit curve is shown as the upper curve in Figure 1. The maximum calculated k,,, in Region D is 0.946, as indicated in Table 1, including uncertainties and thet estimated reactivity consequence of the axial burnup distributions. The calculated enrichment-burnup data is shown in Table 2. For convenience, a polynomial fit to these data have been developed, as follows: ,
Limiting Burnup-(Bu) For Region D Bu = -12.6532 + 17.4279
- E - 0.499188'*E [
For enrichments, E, between 1.9% and 4.5%
i 2.5 Consolidated Fuel Calculations were also made for consolidated fuel (2-to-1 ratio) at an enrichment of 1.9%, which in a previous CE calculation gave a k,,, of 0. 9 3 0. The storage cannister, based on' dimensions provided by NEU, is a stainless steel box, 8.575 inch outer dimension and 0.120 inch thick. Based upon this cannister design, a KEND-Sa calculation yielded a (bias-corrected) k, , , of 0.9248. This calculation reasonably confirmed the CE calculation and lends credibility to the CE calculations for consolidated fuel at other enrichments. Consolidated fuel bundles would therefore be
., acceptable for storage in any region of the storage rack, within the burnup-limits reported by CE.
r t
2.6 New Fuel Elevator ,
The new fuel elevator and surrounding fuel assemblies-(Region C or D) are shown schematically in Figure 2. Calculations *-(3-dimen-sional KPNO-Sa) resulted in maximum k,,, values essentially the same as that of the storage rack (except for minor neutron leakage at the edge of the pool) as shown below:
With Region D cells and new fuel elevator k,,, = 0.9436 With Region C cells and new fuel elevator k,,, = 0.9362 Infinite Array of Region D cells k, = 0.9459 Infinite array of Region C cells k, = 0.9402 With Region D cells but without fuel in the new fuel elevator, the maximum k,,, was calculated (0.9429) to be within the statistical uncertainty of the calculation with fuel in the new fuel elevator.
This data indicates very weak neutron coupling between the new fuel in the elevator and the bulk Region D or Region C fuel. Therefore, i manufacturing tolerances for the new fuel elevator would have a negligible consequence of the system reactivity. Analytically removing the c1csest spent fuel assembly in the storage rack did ,
not materially alter the calculated reactivity, thus confirming that the new fuel in the elevator and the fuel in the rack are not significantly coupled neutronically. ,
3.0 ACCIDENT CONDITIONS 3.1 Igaperature Effects i The temperature coefficient of reactivity For Region C or Region D I fuel storage cells is positive as listed below: ,
8k ;
Temperature. *C Reaion C Reaion D 20 -0.0.0007 -0.0044 50 -0.00002 -0.0012 '
65.56 (150'F) Reference Reference 90 +0.0003 +0.0031 120 +0.0006 +0.0065 The temperature variation with Region D fuel is more pronounced than for Region C fuel. In both cases, the nominal design temperature is 150 *C and higher temperatures ara considered to be accident conditions for which soluble boron credit is allowable. {
For Region C, at 120 *C in the absence ' of soluble boron, the maximum k, would be 0.9408 which is still below the regulatory ,
guideline. Region D , however, would slightly exceed the 0.95 reactivity limit with a maximum k, of 0.9524 in the absence of ,
soluble boron. Credit for the inconel spacer grids would reduce l the k,, to below the regulatory guideline (calculated to be a maximum k, of 0.9481). Consequently, the Region C and Region D I storage cells are acceptable regardless of temperature, without necessarily requiring credit for the soluble boron that is present
' in the pool water.
t I
l l
t 3.2 Mis-loaded Fuel Assembly The conditions with the potential for exceeding the Regulatory limit are the accidental mis-loading of a fuel assembly of the highest permissibic reactivity (4.5% Westinghouse fuel) into a cell intended to receive a spent fuel assembly. Under accident conditions, credit for soluble boron present in the pool water is permissible under the double contingency principle.
3.2.1 Region B The accidental loading of a fresh unburned assembly into one of the Region B cells intended to receive only spent fuel (or remain empty) has the potential for exceeding the ' regulatory limit on reactivity in the absence of soluble boron, but would not reach criticality (maximum reactivity of 0.963). However, calculations show that a soluble concentration of 100 ppm Boron is adequate to maintain the maximum reactivity within the Regulatory limit. ;
3.2.2 Region C (or Region D)
The worst case accident condition would be the accidental loading of a fresh fuel assembly of the highest permissible reactivity into a Region C or Region D cell. Calculations with 800 ppm Boron in the pool water (Tech Spec limit) show that the maximum reactivity would not be higher than 0.910. Therefor this accident condition i
. would be acceptable under current regulatory guidelines.
I l
l
3.2.3 Dropped Fuel Assembly The accident of a dropped fuel assembly of 4.5% enrichment, assuming the assembly came to rest on top of a filled rack module, would not result in exceeding the Regulatory limit on reactivity.
The reactivity of an isolated fuel assembly in water was calculated (k,,, = 0.9040 i O.0024) to be less than the reactivity of the fuel in storage. In its final assumed position on top of the rack, the dropped assembly is separated from the fuel in the racks by more than 12 inches, which is adequate to preclude any neutronic coupling. Thus, the reactivity of the system would be the same as that of the fuel in storage as previously evaluated.
1
(
9 e
"4 i
4.0 ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY ;
f a
I 4.1 Storage Rack Designs and Fuel Specifications l' The storage rack design for Regions A and B were presented in the f previous reportN. Region C (and Region D) storage cells are'un- 'l poisoned and consist of- 0.135 inch thick stainless steel boxes arranged on a 9.00 inch lattice spacing.
r i
Specifications for the three types of fuel utilized (ANF,-CE and Westinghouse) were also given in the previous report.
4.2 Calculational Techniques i In the fuel rack analyses, the primary criticality analyses of the high density spent fuel storage racks were performed with a.two- '
dimensional multi-group transport theory technique, using- the !!
CASMO-3c2) computer code and a Monte Carlo technique utilizing the NITAWL-KENO-Sa computer packagem. NITAWL was used with the'27-
}
group SCALE 1 cross-section library N and the Nordheim integral treatment for U-238 resonance shielding effects. Benchmark- '
calculations (Reference 1) have been updated with more histories !
(Appendix A) and indicate a bias of 0.0000 with an uncertainty of d 1 0.0024 for CASMO-3 and 0.0101 i 0.0017 (95%/95%)N for NITAWL- !
KENO-Sa. An interpolation routine is .available to allow f temperatures other than those inherent to the SCALE library to be ;
used in NITAWL. Previous calculations have c'onfirmed a continuous ;
reduction in reactivity with storage time (after Xe decay) due t primarily to Pu-241 decay and Am-241 growth.
1" SCALE" is an acronym for Etandardized Computer Analysis'for !
Licensing Evaluation, a standard cross-section set developed by ORNL for the USNRC.
f
l CASMO-3 was also used both for burnup calculations as well as for j the determination of the small reactivity uncertainties associated with manufacturing tolerances. In the geometric model used in the
]
calculations, each fuel rod and its cladding were' described explicitly in both the CASMO-3 and KENO-Sa models. Reflecting ;
boundary conditions (zero neutron current) were used in the radial direction, which has the effect of creating an infinite array of storage cells in X-Y directions. In the KENO-Sa model, the actual fuel assembly length was used in the axial direction, assuming a thick (30 cm) water reflector.
Monte Carlo (KENO-Sa) calculations inherently include a statistical uncertainty due to the random nature of neutron tracking. To minimize the statistical uncertainty of the KENO-calculated reactivity, a minimum of 500,000 neutron histories in 1000 generations of 500 neutrons each were accumulated in each calculation.
4.3 Axial Burnup Distributions The reactivity consequences of the axial burnup distributions were evaluated with three-dimensional KENO-Sa calculations, using CASMO-3 to determine equivalent enrichments for .the 10 axial zones ;
assumed in the calculations. The axial distribution in burnup was derived from nodal calculations (51 nodes) for in-core fuel burnup.
Figure 3 shown the axial burnup distribution and the division into l 10 zones for calculational purposes. The difference between the e
KENO-Sa calculations with uniform burnup distribution (average) and -
with the axial distribution in equivalent enrichments provided an additive correction factor for the burnup-dependent axial
~, distribution. Figure 4 shows this correction f actor as a f unction of the average fuel assembly burnup.
i 4
I
5.0 REFERENCES
- 1. Holtec International, " Fuel Rack Analyses for Millstone Unit 2 (with Gaps in The Boraflex)", Holtec Report MI-92777, April ,
1992.
- 2. A. Ahlin, M. Edenius, H. Haggblom, "CASMO - A Fuel Assembly Burnup Program," AE-RF-76-4158, Studsvik report (proprietary) .
A. Ahlin and M. Edenius, "CASMO -A Fast Transport Theory Depletion Code for LWR Analysis," AliS. Transactions, Vol. 26,
- p. 604, 1977.
M. Edenius et al., "CASMO Benchmark Report," Studsvik/ RF 6293, Aktiebolaget Atomenergi, March 1978.
"CASMO-3 A Fuel Assembly Burnup Program, Users Manual",
Studsvik/NFA-87/7, Studsvik Energitechnik AB, November 1986 M. Edenius and A. Ahlin, "CASMO-3 : New Features, Benchmarking, and Advanced Applications", Nuclear Science and Enaineerina, 100, 342-351, (1988)
- 3. R.M. Westfall, et. al., "NITAWL-S: Scale System Module for Performing Resonance Shielding and Working Library Production" in SCALE: A Modular Code System for performino Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensino Evaluation,, NUREG/CR-02OO, 1979.
L.M. Petrie and N.F. Landers," KENO Va. An Improved Monte Carlo Criticality Program with Supergrouping" in Scale: A Modular Code System for performina Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensina Evaluation, NUREG/CR-02OO, 1979.
- 4. R.M. Westfall et al., " SCALE: A Modular Code System for performing Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation," NUREG/CR-02OO, 1979.
- 5. M.G. Natrella, Experimental Statistics National Bureau of Standards, Handbook 91, August 1963.
I l
l l
l
.e Table 1. i
-t I
Summary of Criticality. Safety calculations for .;
' Alternative Storage Arrangements in Millstone Udit 2 i
.i Item Reaion B Reaion C Recion D. j
=f Calculated kdf 0.9241 0.9252 0.9243. j Temperature 68'F 150" F 150" F j j
.t Calculational Method KENO-Sa CASMO3 CASMO3
-f Bias 0.0101 0.0000 0.0000 !
Uncertainties:-
Uncertainty in Bias i 0.0018 i 0.0024 i 0.0024 KENO Statistics 0.0025 NA NA !
B-10' Loading i 0.0040 NA NA l Boraflex Width' i 0.0001 NA NA {
Rodlet Diameter NA i 0.0012 NA. !
Rodlet B-10 loading NA i 0.0008 NA :
Enrichment i 0.0018 1 0.0054 1 0.0054 !
UO, Density i 0.0019 :t 0.0035 't 0.0039 j LatticeJSpacing 0.0137 0.0052- i O.0065 SS Box ID- i 0.0009 (Spacing) (Spacing) [
SS wall thickness i 0.0003 1 0.0024 1 0.0025 :
UncertaintyinDepuletion 1 0.0007 1 0.0119 i 0.0175 !
Calculations j Statistical Average 1 0.0149 i 0.0150 0.0201 l Axial Burnup Distribution U) 0.0 0.0 0.0015 f Calculated Reactivity 0.9342 0.9252 0.9258 i 0.0149 i 0.0150 0.0201 3 I
Maximum reactivity 0.9491 0.9402 0.9459 i
- 0) Evaluated for 3% enriched Westinghouse fuel at 25 MWD /KgU l for Region C and 35 MWD /KgU for Region D. -Other i enrichments and burnups evaluated for appropriate values,' !
all yielding the same maximum reactivity (kg ,). l l
?
a l
i Table 2 i LIMITING BURNUP. VALUES FOR VARIOUS INITIAL ENRICHMENTS [
IN REGIONS C AND D FUEL ASSEMBLIES r
MWD /KgU Limit For '
Inmitial Enrichment Region C Region D- ,
i 1.9 9.45 18.58 I 2.5 18.19 27.99 i
3.0 25.00 35.00 !
3.5 31.33 42.29 4.0 37.84 48.96 ;
i 4.5 44.26 55.72 ;
i
.1 P
i
?
t i
[
r
i l
1 60_
l ,
1 P ss_
50[ g 3 -
a 45 y -
ACCEPTABLE BURN!JP
[.
o 2 40
~
DOMA:'N
?
g/
f f
- *g-/ c a$
- 35 ^
b 9 qo 30 y -
f,/ J r
s c
8 Z 25-m r
g UNACCEPTABLE
- #o BURNUP DOMAIN 20 -
l /
15 -
5 /
10[ /
5~ .... .... .... ..... .... .... ....
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 INITI AL EtRICHT.NT. WTA U-235
't FIG. 1 BURNUP REOUIREMENTS FOR STORAGE IN REGIONS C AND D C 4 OF 4 ARRAY) 1
= 1.n ro.u ..nu.i in certionar u.e.: ; .
o i
a
?O
?>
5 o
.s i r 515/ts" 2 t New fuel
! g .5.. 3 Assem.
- = ;
e : e.u- saw.
1 g
E9 ae rdd4 i
, ! 13t/ts-
- 4.5" -
1' 1
I 3: ,
r L
Fig. 2 NEW FUEL ELEVATOR AND SURROUNDING FUEL ASSEMBUES r9
i 4
1.20_
1.15 -
1.10: r _
- _1 ___ _
o 1.05_
/ \__ ,
. __ _u n 1.00_ i w
f o -
3 x 0.95: -
I i l
0.90: \
\
v 0.85_
t
\
h z
l g 0. 80 _ ,
l m : '
g 0.75_ y
~
- ii
~
l H
< 0.70_ -
i 4
_J - N00't CALILATI 14
@ 0. 65 '_ lj
- t ZmI APPRXIMATION fj 0.60_~
2 l 0.55 "fl t'
~
0.50_ A i
0.45'...........>>>>''' '' ' ' '
O 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 AXIAL NODE F ig . 3 AXIAL BURNUP DISTRIBUTION FOR FOR HIGH BURNUP FUEL
y 0.020 O.018
- 0. 01 6 L -
3 o 0.014 b 7 c
3 0.012 a
~
E 0.010 a .
/
i O.008 /
3 ~
i O 0.006
_ /
0.004 0.002 f 0.000 .... . . . . . .... .... ....
30 35 40 45 50 55 Fue1 Burnup, MWD /Kgu Fto. 4 CORRECTION FACTOR FOR THE EFFECT OF AXIAL DISTRIBUTIONS li' BURNUP
_ 19.-
I 1
L. ;
1 Docket No. 50-336 B14497 i
I l ?
( 'I 1
i Attachment 2 :
l l
l Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 j I
Response to Request for Additional Information (TAC No. M86361)
Spent fuel Seismic Report, Rev. 01 j i
Spent Fuel Rack Structural Report, Rev. 01 !
Fuel Pool Cooling Report, Rev. 02 l
l '
l l
1 l
l l !
)
i i
i l
l l June 1993 i
I l i
- l. ,
r i
i t
e e a
F r
4 t
I i
1 f
5 t
Spent Fuel Seismic Report .
Rev. 01 ;
r
'I l
6 h
t i
i E
f
- i f
t i
~b 5
r a
h I
1 i
" l 4
4
k COMBUSTION EMINEERING
~
MP2-85-207 ,
June 18,1985 i
Mr. J. F. Opeka
, :j ;
Senior Vice President
Northeast Utilities Service Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, CT 06101
SUBJECT:
NUSCD/EPRI Fuel Consolidation Demonstration Program, I Submittal of Revised Detailed Rack Seismic Subtask Report I ll ENCLOSURE: Spent Fuel Rack. Seismic Analysis Subtask Design Report, !!
Rev. 01, dated Jurie 12, 1985 fi i
Dear Mr. Opeka:
The enclosed revision to the Detailed Rack Seismic Subtask Report is i submitted herein for your final approval. This revision clarifies that !
the seismic analyses performed apply to intact fuel and consolidated fuel storage. The revision further clarifies that the floor loads given_ ;
in Table 2 do not include vertical loads due to the vertical seismic component or the horizontal seismic component in the north-south direction. Reference is made to Appendix III of the Detailed Rack Structural Subtask Report for vertical loads itemized by seismic component. Lines in the right margin indicate areas of revision. ;
- Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions. >
I Very truly yours,
)
COMBUSTI ' ENGINEERING, INC.
~
/ ,_ _
R. . Jacques $
', Project Manager ,
RCJ/RLM:amb !
CRD-85-205 ,
cc: G. N. Betancourt (W-24) !
T. J. Mawson (W-24) ;
R. T. Harris .l G. L. Johnson i J. J. Kelley i E. J. Mro:2ka '
C. F. Sears W. H. Stairs !
Power Systems ,
1000 Prospect Combuscon Engineenng. Inc. Post Ofce Bo:
Winesor, Conr