ML20041G381

Application to Amend License NPF-3,allowing Rector Startup W/O Trip & Changing Tech Specs for safety-grade Anticipatory Reactor Trip Sys

ML20041G381
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	03/05/1982
From:	Crouse R TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20041G380	List: ML20041G379 ML20041G381 ML20041G382 ML20041G383
References
TASK-2.K.2.10, TASK-TM 787, TAC-45184, TAC-48044, NUDOCS 8203220173
Download: ML20041G381 (5)

Text

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APPLICATION FOR MIEND: LENT t TO 1

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO NPF-3 l FOR DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT NO. 1 Enclosed are forty-three (43) copics of the requested changes to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-3, together with the Safety Evaluation for the requested change.

The proposed changes include:

1. Cycle 3 Reload Report (BAW-1707 February, 1982),

2. Tables 3.3-15 and 4.3-15 and By fs/__ R. P. Crouse Vice President, Nuclear Sworn and subscribed before me this 5th day of March, 1982.

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Notary Public LAURIE A. ERUDZlNSKI IWry Miic. State cf Chio lay Ccanimen E91res Itay 16.1935 P

Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Serial No. 787 March 5, 1982 Attachment 1 I. Change to Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, Appendix A Technical Specifications to reflect Cycle 3 reload report.

A. Time required to Implement This change is to be effective upon NRC approval B. Reason for Change (Facility Change Request 80-268 Supplement 1) to reflect changes in the Cycle 3 core.

C. Safety Evaluation i

See Attached I

Safety Evaluation The proposed reloading of new fuel and shuffling of fuel and control elements to facilitate nuclear power generation for Cycle 3 is in accordance with the limits and analysis proposed in the attached reload report. The safety function of the reload report and affected Technical Specifications is to ensure operation of the core within safety limits.

Per Section 7 of the attached reload report, each FSAR accident analysis has been reexamined with respect to changes in Cycle 3 parameters. This examination has concluded that thermal performance during hypothetical transients is not degraded. In addition, thermal-hydraulic and kinetics properties have been evaluated and it has been determined that this core reload will not adversely affect the ability of DB-1 to operate safely.

The transient evaluation of Cycle 3 is also bounded by previous analyses.

Based on the above, it is concluded that the changes proposed as outlined in the reload report do not involve an unreviewed safety question.

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Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Serial No. 787

, March 5, 1982 l Attachment II I. Change to Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, Appendix A Technical Specifications Tables 3.3-15 and 4.3.15 i

A. Time required to Implement This change is to be effective upon NRC approval and installa-tion of the Anticipatory Reactor Trip System.

B. Reason for Change (Facility Change Request 79-283) The previously proposed Amendment Request requires operability of the main feed pump turbine (MFPT) trip in Modes 1 and 2 for the ARTS system.

MFPT cannot be started until sufficient steam is available (approximately 1% full power in Mode 2) to run the turbine. A revision is required to allow reactor start up without trip.

l C. Safety Evaluation See Attached i

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Safety Evaluation This amendment request proposes changes to the previously proposed Technical Specifications for the safety grade Auticipatory Reactor Trip System (ARTS). The changes relate to the main feed pump turbine trip input to this system. The safety function of this input to ARTS is to trip the reactor on a loss of main feedwater (trip of main feedwater pump turbines) so as to reduce the likelihood of primary system pressure transients and challenges to the reactor protection system.

At Davis-Besse 1, the main feed pump turbines (MFPT) cannot be started up to a power level of approximately 1% (Mode 2) to supply feedwater to steam generators since sufficient steam is not available (by running reactor coolant pumps alone) to run the main feed pump turbine. In that event, the electric motor driven startup feedwater pump acts as a normal supply of feedwater. However, since the MFPTs cannot be started, normal startup of the unit cannot progress owing to the ARTS trip of control rod drive breaker on " loss" of both main feed pump turbines. Therefore, the changes attached herewith propose that operability of MFPT trip functional unit and its associated surveillance requirements not be applicable during those times in Mode 2 when the main feed pumps are not running.

It is noted that with the ARTS-MFPT trip unavailable during these condi-tions in Mode 2, if a loss of feedwater (loss of startup pump) were to occur, the safety grade SFRCS will be actuated on low steam generator level or high steam generator-feedwater reverse differential pressure.

This will initiate the auxiliary feedwater system, one train of which provides more than twice the secondary side cooling as that provided by the startup pump. Thus, adequate heat removal capability will be main-tained at all times.

Based on the above, it is concluded that changes proposed herewith do not involve an unreviewed safety question.

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