ML20040H108

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Proposed Tech Spec Changes,Permitting Bypass of Reactor Coolant Pump Power Monitor Trip Function at Less than 40% Full Power for Special Testing
ML20040H108
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/08/1982
From:
FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20040H106 List:
References
TAC-47463, TAC-47884, NUDOCS 8202170194
Download: ML20040H108 (3)


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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST NO. 93 Replace pages 3/4 3-2 and 3/4 3-3 with 3/4 3-2 and 3/4 3-3 provided.

Proposed Change Add the following note to Table 3.3-1: "***For one time only, the reactor coolant pump power monitor trip function may be manually bypassed in Modes 1 and 2 (at less than 40%

Full Power) for the duration of special testing. These tests are to be conducted following startup from the unit outage which began on January 28, 1982."

Reason for Proposed Change Florida Power Corporation installed a reactor coolant pump power monitoring system as part of our recent power level increase. On three occasions (twice in Mode 3 during startup and once in Mode 1 during controlled shutdown), the pump power monitor trip has caused a t eactor trip. Testing in Mode 3 indicated that the monitored parameter (bus power in watts) did in fact go through a very short-lived ( < 1 sec.) transient when energizing an idle reactor coolant pump. It is hypothesized that a similar transient occurred during the switchover from the unit auxiliary to the start-up transformer, and that it could occur when deenergizing an active reactor coolant pump.

Tests have been devised to measure trip function parameters during unit operation and transformer switchover. The results of these tests will be used to determine trip setpoints which will avoid spurious trips while maintaining the reactor coolant pump power monitor safety function. This change will allow such testing.

Safety Evaluation Transients associated with reactor trips are acceptable only wFen they terminate more serious or potentially serious events. Spurious trips, such as these pump power monitor trips are, therefore, not acceptable.

The pump power monitors are designed to terminate events associated with locked rotor accidents at full power. During operation at less than full power (e.g., less than 40% Full Power), the pump power monitors are not essential to insure meeting acceptance criteria associated with transient response (DNBR, etc.). They simply serve as alternate (either anticipatory or backup, depending on the scenario) trips. Therefore, operation with the trip function bypassed is consistent with safe operation.

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.< TABLE 3.3-1 a

> REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION r

h MINIMUM rn TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE f FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION C

z 1. Manual Reactor Trip 1 1 1 1, 2 and

  • S d 1, 2 u 2. Nuclear Overpower 4 2 3 2#
3. RCS Outlet Temperature-High 4 2 3 1,2 3#
4. Nuclear Overpower Based on RCS Flow and AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE 4 2(a) 3 1, 2 2#
5. RCS Pressure-l.ow 4 2(a) 3 1, 2 3#

w 6. RCS Pressure-High 4 2 3 1, 2 3#

7. Variable Low RCS Pressure 4 2(a) 3 1, 2 3#

b 8. Reactor Containment Pressure-High 4 2 3 1, 2 3#

9. Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux and Rate 2 0 2 1, 2 and
  • 4
10. Source Range, Neutron Flux and Rate A. Startup 2 0 2 2## and a 5 B. Shutdown 2 0 1 3, 4 and 5 6
11. Control Rod Drive Trip Breakers 2 per trip 1 per trip 2 per trip 1, 2 and
  • 7#

sysiem system system

12. Reactor Trip Module 2 per trip i per trip 2 per trip 1, 2 and
  • 7#

system system system

13. Shutdown Bypass RCS Pressure--High 4 2 3 2**,3** 6#

4**,5**

14. Reactor Coolant Pump Power Monitors 4 2(a,b) 3 1***,2*** 3#

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1

. TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION With the control rod drive trip breakers in the closed position and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.

When Shutdown Bypass is actuated.

For one time only, the reactor coolant pump power monitor trip function may be manually bypassed in Modes 1 and 2 (at less than 40% Fuli Power) for the duration of special testing. These tests are to be conducted following startup from the unit outage which began on January 28,1982.

  1. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
    1. High voltage to detec:or may be deenergized above 10-10 amps on both Intermediate Range channels.

(a)

Trip may be manually bypassed when RCS pressure i 1720 psig by actuating Shutdown Bypass provided that:

(1) The Nuclear Overpower Trip Setpoint is POWER, 15% of RATED THERMAL (2)

The Shutdown Bypass RCS Pressure--High Trip Setpost of 11720 psig is imposed, and (3) The Shutdown Bypass is removed when RCS pressure > 1800 psig.

(b) Trip may be manually bypassed when reactor power is less than 40% to perform the following operations:

(1) Switchover between Startup and Unit Auxiliary Transformers, (2) Energizing an idle Reactor Coolant Pump, or (3) Deenergizing an active Reactor Coolant Pump.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and/or open the control rod drive trip breakers.

ACTION 2 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided all of the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within one hour.
b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.  :.

CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/43-3