ML20041D149
| ML20041D149 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 02/18/1982 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041D146 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-47093, TAC-47463, NUDOCS 8203040363 | |
| Download: ML20041D149 (3) | |
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION j
SUPPORTING AMENDf1ENT N0. 52 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, ET AL CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT NO. 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT DOCKET N0. 50-302 Introduction By applications dated Octcber 8,1981, and December 11, 1981, Florida Power Corporation (FPC or the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-72 for operation of the Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant.
The licensee's October 8,1981 application requested that Limiting Condition f or Operation (LCO) 3.7.8.1 be amended to allow more than one filter bank and more than two exhaust fans of the auxiliary building
. ventilation system to be inoperable for a period no greater than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for the purpose of performing surveillance testing as required by Specifications 4.7.8.1.b, 4.7.8.1.e, and 4.7.8.1.f.
The licensee's December 11, 1981 application requested that surveillance requirements 4.6.4.2.b, 4.6.4.2.d, 4.6.4.2.e, and 4.6.4.2.f be amended to reflect flow rate limitations placed upon the licensee by the NRC's " Interim Position for Containment Purge and Vent Valve Operation Pending Resolution of Isolation Valve Operability."
Background and Evaluation Auxiliary Building Ventilation System The auxiliary building ventilation exhaust y.!9m consists of four filter trains, each train rated at 25% capacity and tso pairs of fans, each pair rated at 100% capacity. Surveillance requirements 4.7.8.1.b, 4.7.8.1.e, and 4.7.8.1.f require the filter trains to be tested so that the system meets the in-place testing criteria of ANSI N510-1975.
In order to perform these tests at the systems rated flow, it is necessary for the licensee to isolate all of the filter banks except the one being tested and to utilize only one fan. The filter inlet manual balance damper is adjusted so that the flow is 39,170 cfm i 10% which is the rated flow for each filter train. Each HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber is tested in-place to ensure the filter banks remove ? 99% of the diocryl phthalate (DOP) and the charcoal adsorbers remove ! 99% of the freon at the rated flow rate. With more than one filter train inoperable and more than two exhaust fans inoperaole, under the present LC0 3.7.8.1, the system would have to be declared inoperable. The licensee is requesting that more than one filter bank and more than two exhaust fans be allowed to be inoperable for a period of up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for the purpose of showing compliance with surveillance requirements 4.7.8.1.b, 4.7.8.1.e, and 4.7.8.1.f so that the system does not have to be declared inoperable for the purpose of testing.
8203040363 820218 PDR ADOCK 05000302 P
The amendment of LCO 3.7.8.1 will not result in any additional releases of airborne effluents. There are no additional releases as a result of the proposed change because the change allows more than one filter bank and more than two fans to be inoperable for the purpose of testing the systen. Tte testing procedure has not been altered. The amount of time that the system is allowed to have more than one filter bank and more than two exhaust fans inoperable is no different as a result of this change and is considered acceptable. The Safety Evaluation Report (SER) issued for the operating license, dated July 5,1974, analyzed a spent fuel handling accident without credit for the auxiliary building ventilation exhaust system filter. The doses presented for this anlaysis were within the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100. The amending of LC0 3.7.8.1 does not alter the conclusion in the SER issued for the operating license that the ventilation exhaust system is designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing of components important to safety (GDC 61).
The proposed change addresses this testing and inspection and will ensure that the system is not considered inoperable when the system is being tested.
Containment Hydrogen rurge System The licensee's December 11,1981 ret 4 cst involves the containment hydrogen purge system. The present surveillance requirements 4.6.4.2.b and 4.6.4.2.d require that the testing be performed at the system's rated flow of 50,000 cfm i 10% while 4.6.4.2.e and 4.6.4.2.f require that the testing of the HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber in each of the two filter banks be performed at a system flow of one half the rated flow (25,000 cfm + 10%). The licensee has been required to throttle the plant's purge valves in order to maintain compliance with NRC's " Interim Position for Containment Purge and Vent Valve Operation Pending Resolution of Isolation Valve Operability." Consequently, the licensee has had extreme difficulty in attempting to obtain the required flow in order to test the containment purge system and in the proposed change has requested to replace the flow rates of 50,000 cfm i 10% and 25,000 cfm i 10% with the terms " rated flow + 10%":and "one half rated flow t 10%" respectively, with the term " rated flow" defined as "the flow" with all fans running and with the purge valves throttled to maintain compliance with the NRC " Interim Position for Containment Purge and Vent Valve Operation Pending Resolution of Isolation Valve Operability."
The amending of surveillance requirements 4.6.4.2.b, 4.6.4.2.d.
4.6.4.2.e, and 4.6.4.2.f does not result in an increase in releases to the environment. The change proposes to test the system at the maximum flow rate allowed by the NRC's " Interim Position for Containment Purge and Vent Valve Operation Pending Resolution of Isolation Valve Operability." This flow rate is less than the flow rate of 50,000 cfm in the present surveillance requirements. It is appropriate that the hydrogen purge system filter banks be tested at the flow rate allowed by the interim position. However, testing the filter banks at a flow rate greater than or equal to the flow that they would encounter during the. course of a hydrogen purge is of most importance. What the licensee has proposed is the flow rate for the exhaust fans and not the flow rate that would actually pass througii the filter banks. We have had discussions
. with the licensee and the licensee has agreed to delete the term
" rated flow" anu to substitute in its place " flow rate ! 1500 scfm".
This flow rate is the maximum that would be expected during the course of a hydrogen purge following an accident. With this change, we find the preposed change to surveillance requirements 4.6.4.2.b, 4.6.4.2.d, 4.6.4.2.e and 4.6.4.2.f acceptable. The proposed change to these surveillance requirements does not negate the conclusions of the SER which was issued for the operating license. The containment hydrogen purge is designed to pennit periodic inspection and testing of its important components (GDC 42 and 43). The proposed change addresses this testing and inspection and will ensure that the system is tested at a flow rate based upon the anticipated release rate.
Environmental Consideration We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types'or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impagt. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 151.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement, or neaative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated: February 18, 1982 Contributors to this SE were John Hayes and Sydney Miner.
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