ML20040A682
| ML20040A682 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000495, 05000561 |
| Issue date: | 03/23/1977 |
| From: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Mazetis G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML111090060 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-80-515, FOIA-80-555 NUDOCS 8201210411 | |
| Download: ML20040A682 (3) | |
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I W 2 3 877 Docket No. STN 50-495 MEMORANDUM FOR:
G. Mazetis, Section Leahr, Reactor Systems Branch FROM:
Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief, Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch, DSS
SUBJECT:
ECCS AND DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM REVIEWS IN THE I&CSB AREAS FOR B-SAR-205 In response to your memorandum on this subject dated March 1,1977, we have enclosed the results of our review in this area. We have used the guideline format presented in your request.
QCvh Thomas A. I polito, Chief Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch Division of Systems Safety
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Contact:
R. Fitzpatrick X27276
Enclosure:
As Stated cc:
D. Ross T. Novak T. Cox S. Newberry R. Tedesco F. Rosa R. Fitzpatrick
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ENCLOSURE
. B-SAR-2,05 ECCS REVIEW FOR INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS AREAS
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gl..ECCS actuation system meets the single failure criterion.
(Reference SER Input Section 7.3) 2./ Onsite Emergency Power System will meet the single failure M# gg f
criterion when implemented in accordance with the B-SAR-205 interface requirements.
(Reference SER Input Section 8.4) 3.
Environmental and Seismic Qualification of the Class lE
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p f/ electrical equipment is under generic review as topical
'ZE report BAW-10082. All electrical equipment of interest to your f
'l request is included therein.
(Reference SER. Input Section 7.8) 4.
There will be no B-SAR-205 supplied Class lE equipment that
'.h will become submerged due to a LOCA. B-SAR-205 also Ir{'
provides the interface requirement that no B0P safety loads should be submerged as a result of an incident.
(Reference Response to Item 033.50) n 5.
Review of critical single electrically-operated fluid system J
i ]tf components should be done when the B0P design is mated to lo
}6 B-SAR-205. We have imposed BTP EICSB 18 as an interface p
requirer.ent.
(Reference SER Input Table 7-1) j'f) g#
We have identified the interlocks on the deca rfT e
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&y g s suction valves a ceptabYfollowing verbal concurrence from
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(Reference SER Input Section 7.6) We found no disablina
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if interlocks during our B-SAR-205 review. This topic should also be pursued when the BOP design is mated to B-SAR-205.
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We have found the B-SAR-205 separation criteria and the
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associated interface requirements on the 80P b6 be acceptable.
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and 9.
These items do not apply to B-SAR-205.
They pertain to-
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""" operating reactors that may have had to m< dify their design to meet Appendix K requirements.
I NOTE: SER Input referenced above was transmitted by memorandum dated February 28, 1977, from Robert L. Tedesco to Domenic B. Vassallo.
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. R. A. Purple, Chief, Operating Reactors Branch 1, OP.
D. L.- Ziemann, Chief, Operating Reactors Branch 2, OR
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G. E. Lear, Chief, Operating Reactors Branch 3. CR R. W. Reid,gChief Operating Reactors Branch 4, OR
'R. L. Baer, Chgf, Reactor Safety; Brcnch, OR THRU:
D. C isedut ssistant Director for Operational Technology, OR ECCS REVIEWS IN ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS AREAS
'The attached " Generic Infomation Request for Reviews 'of ECCS in the l
~~ ' Electrical Instrumentation and Control Areas" defines the information i
requirements for and the scope of PSS review in these areas. The develop - -
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, ment of this.'.nformation request was coordinated with the Reactor Safety i
i Branch and the Electrical, Instrumsntation and Control Systems Branch,
' DSS.
Its purpose is to insure a complete and uniform ECCS single failure I
review in the areas indicated.
( ~ The information request addresses the following specific concerns:
1.
ECCS actuation system conformance to single failure criterion.
2.
Onsite E=ergency Power System confomance to singic failure criterion.
'3.
Environcental and seismic qualification of electrical equipment.
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,4.
Submerged electrical equipneht (due to LOCA). - *r, 5.
Critical single ciectrically-operated fluid system components, including canually-controlled electrically-operated valves.
- 6. ' Interlocks between redundant portions of ECCS and supporting sub sys tems.
7.
Electrical and physical separation criteria 8.
Proposed codifications.
9.
Required drawings.
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s HAR 1215i5 R. A. Purple 2
m D. L. Ziemann
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. G. E. Lear R. W. Reid' e
j R. L. Baer t.....
r The PSB reviewer will require this information to be available from the licensee.
this information request which
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It should be understood that a response t >
.f references (and thus verifies the validity of) information presently on the
.i docket is acceptable as 'a basis for our review.
Thereforeg if there is any
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doubt with regard to the completeness or validity of existing docketed information, the complete information request should'be transmitted to the i
Licensee.
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.c A."$chwencer. Chief i_
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Plant Systems Branch l
Division of Operating Reactors
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Enclosure:
As stated V. Stello J
cc:
R. Tedesco I
D. Ross T. Ippolito (4)
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1 T. Novak (4)
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F. Rosa P. Atherton J. Knight D. Mcdonald' P. Shenanski i
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PAR.I 2 ft10 CT.5TJ;1C INTOTJ'ATIC:; T2 QUEST FOR T2 VIEW OF ECCS IN THE ELECTRIC.E, INSTRU.'III;TATION N:D CONTROLS AREAS 4
Th Acccptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for I.ight Water Nuclear Power Reactory,10 CFR Part 50.46, retiuires that an analysis of
.-Possible failure modes of ECCS equipment and of their effects on ECCS per-formance be perforced. This analysis should demonstrate that your ECCS and
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,' supporting subsystems meet tha single failure criterion.. We require that doc-umentation of this analysis be provided in sufficient detail to. enable the staff to (1) verify that the analysis demonstrates that the ECCS and supporting subsystems neet the, single failure criterion as defined in IEEE Std 279-1971,
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'd (2) determine the acceptability and verify the implementation oI-any-an proposed design modification required as a result of your analysis. Therefore, we require that the following information be submitted to support the single failure analysis of the ECCS and supporting subsystems:
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, 1.
Describe the design of the ECCS actuation system.
Identify any non-
, conforcance of this design with the single failure requirements of s
IEEE Std 279-1971. Describe any changes proposed for meeting these require:ents.
c 2.
Describe the design of the onsite emergency pouer system, a-c and d-c.
Identify any non-conformance of this design with the single failure require ents of IEEE Std 279-1971.
Describe any changes proposed'for ocetIng these requirements.
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3.
Identify all the electrical equipment required for the ECCS and supporting subsyste s to enabic performance of the ECCS safety function.
De-fine the qualification status (ability to withstand the design basis i
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. seismic and environmental conditions) of this equipment, and the basis for such qualification, to provide reasonable acsurance that the l
equip:ent vill be capable of performing its safety function. Describe l
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I 2 UIb any proposed design codifications, analyses, or test programs for meeting the environsental and seiscric qualification requirements.
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- 4., Identify all electrical ' equipment, both safety and non-safety, that may become submerged as a result of a 1~A.
For all such equipment
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'that is not qualified for service in such an environment, provide an
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analysis to determine the following:
(1) the safety significance of
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the failure of the equipment (e.g., spurious operation, loss of function.,
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loss of accident / post-accident nonitoring, etc.) as a result of s
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flooding. (2) the effects on Class IE electrical Power Jsources serving
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" ".'". "~ this,_ equip;nent as a result of such failures, and (3) the proposed design changes resulting from your analysis. Your response to item (2)
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should specifically address breaker and fuse coordination and the isolation capabilities of this aspect of your design.
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Identify any singic electrically operated fluid system component, 5.
including manually-controlled electrically-operated valves, whose failure could result in loss 'of capability of the ECCS to perform its safety function. Failure in both the " fail to func, tion" sense and in the " undesirable function" sense should be considered, and this should apply even though the component cay not be required to function in a given safety operational sequence.
6.
k'ith regard to the equipment identified in item (5), provide a detailed description of a.ny proposed design changes decced necessary by your analysis for teetics the sinc e failure criterion. Your response l
should specifically address but should not be limited to changes made to caet the single failure criterion by conforcance to Branch Technical Position EICSB 18, " Application of the Singic Failure Criterion to g
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I Manually-Controlled Electrically-Operated Valves", of Appendix 7A of the Regulatory Standard Review PIEn. This position establishes t'.se acceptability of disconnecting power to the electrical cocponents of a
, fluid system as one means of n2eting the single failure criterion.,
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', _ 7. ' Identify any electrical interlocks between redundant portions of the ECCS and supporting subsystems. Define thc consequence of failure of
' any interlock on the capability of the ECCS to perform its safety
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function.
Describe any proposed design nodifica,tions resulting from this review.
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Provide the electrical and physical separation criteria for your design of redundant safety equip =ent and functions.. Include the features in your design that einimize the vulnerability of the ECCS and supporting
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subsystecs to conson failure modes.
m 9.
Provide the following drawings for the ECCS aiid supporting subsystems:
a.
Piping and Instrucent Di*agrans' (P&ID).
b.
blectrical Control Schenatic Diagrams.
c.
One Line Diagran of the Onsite AC Power Distributio6 System.
d.
One Line Diagran of the DC Power Distributior} System.
One Line Diagram of the Vital Instrument Power Distribution System.,
e.
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