ML20040A318
| ML20040A318 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000561 |
| Issue date: | 10/22/1976 |
| From: | Parr O Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Suhrke K BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML111090060 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-80-515, FOIA-80-555 NUDOCS 8201200756 | |
| Download: ML20040A318 (8) | |
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UNITED STAi IS
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af gv p CCT 2 2 E 5 Docket No. STN 50-561 Babcock & Wilcox Company ATTN:
Mr. Kenneth E. Suhrke Manager, Licensing Nuclear Power Generation P. O. Box 1260 Lynchburg, Virginia 24505 Gentlemen:
RCt ND 2 POSITIONS AND REQUESTS FCR INFORMATION As a result of our continuing review of the Babcock & Wilcox Standard Safety Analysis Report BSAR-205, your response to certain Regulatory staff positione and requests for information is required. The specific informatien required is detailed,in the Enclosure. Regulatory Positions are identified by (RSP) underneath the position nu=ber shown in the Enclosure. We ara prepared to meet with you to discuss further any of cur positions to e ssure complete understanding of the f actors at issue and tae bases for our positions; however, we do not believe extended or iterative debate sould be useful.
You requested in your letter of June 18, 1976 that the staff issue a preliminary assessment of the acceptability cf the proposed B&W design provisions to meet current Regulatory Guide 1./5 guidelines. You submitted material regarding this subject in response to Request No. 033.20 issued by the staf f on this proj ect.
In response to your request, we are able to make a.;celiminary statement regarding the acceptability of the B5b' separstion criteria. Based upon the inform.icion received to date, the additional information expected as a result of Request No. 033.51 of the enclosure, and the commitments for further testing documented in 3SAR-205, we conclule th'erc is reasonable assurance that the measures outlined by S&W to co= ply with current separation criteria are acceptable. Final acceptability, however, must await the successful test results which are not expected to be available prior to the stheduled staff decision date on a Preliminary Design Approvsl.
In order to maintain our licensing review schedule, we need your ccc.;1ete respenses to the Enclosure items by November 30. 1976. Please inforn us within seven days after receipt of this letter of ;he date on which : ou 8201200756 810403
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. OCT 20 276 plan to respond so that we =ay revise our schedule if necessary. If you plan to appeal to licensing management on any of these positions, please advise us of your intentions within two weeks.
Please contact us if you have any questions.
Sincerely.
0 arr hief Light Water Reactors Branch No. 3 Divisica of Project Management Enclosure Positions and Requests for Additional Information
ashington Public Power St'pply System Mr. A.
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a ATTN:
Mr. J. J. Stein Ohio Edison Company Managing Dirdctor 47 North Main Street P. O. Box 968 Akron, Ohio 44308 3000 George Washington Way Richlar.d, Washington 99352 Mr. W. E. Kessler Commonwealth Associates, Inc.
!!r. Robert Borsum 209 East Washington Bethesda Representative Jackson, Michigan 49201 Babcock & Wilcox Suclear Power Generation Division Robert J. Kafin, Esq.
Suite 5515, 7735 Old Georgetown Road 115 Maple Street Mthesda, !!aryland 20014 Clan Falls, 1;ew York 12601 B. G. Shultc Project Engineer Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.
P. O. Box 2325 Bosten, Massachusetts 02107 e
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INCLOSU.1 POSITIONS AND REOUESTS FOR 53DITIONAL INFORMATION f
BSAR-2G3 i
r 033.0 ELECTRICAL I STRUMENTATION AND CTROL SYSTD!S
'033.41 Amendaent 2 to ESAR-205 effectcu the deletion of many post-
. I accident monitoring information displays from Section 7.5.
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These deletions encompassed the BSAR-205 scope and the BCP scope of supply. The net result appears to be a significant reduction in the amount of information supplied to the reactor operator.
We request that justification be provided to support these deletions. State explicitly your basis for deletion of each
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display originally included in ene SAR.
033.42 The response to Request Mc. 033.25 did not address electrical faults as requested. Our major concern in this area is that
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a hot short appearing downstream of the trip breakers may negate gp\\b the scram function. Your responsa shouai include a description v
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of any electrical and physical protection provided and any interf ace requir enants.
033.43 heqcest Nos. 033.27 and 033.29 cddress the Auxiliary Feedwa:er System (AFS) and Decay Heat Removal System (DERS) respectively.
The issue in each case is that thare are two lines with two series valves in each and there is a requirement to =ect the single failure criterion at the system level for both initiation (valves opened) and isolation (valves closed). The responses to these items do not appear to reflect a consistent approach.
The AFS description requires four independent motive poaer supplies for the four valves. The control instru=entation is
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I 033.43 divided into cnly two redundant groups, the SRCI X and Y (reference Figure 10.1-1).
On the other hand, the DERS i
description provides more than two independent sets of
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control instrumentatien but only two divisions of =otive Further. details on both designs are required to explain power.
the apparent inconsistencies noted above and to demonstrate i
that each system will neet the single failure,requirt=ent i
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I The following applies to the DHR5 only. The first sentence r
of Response No. 033.29 requires clarification.
Figure 9.3-5 has an apparent discrepancy directly related to this subject. According to Section 8.3.1.9 valves.VilA, 7
V113, and VI B have independent cont: 1 channels, however, V12A has the same vital bus power source as VilA. To b e -- - --
I consistent it wculd appear that V12A should be associated with ES?AS Analog D instead of ESFAS Analog A.
Please resolve.
033.44 The core flood tank (CFT) isolation valve interlocks use (RSP) pressure signals frem the Safety Related Control Instru=enta-l t
- t. ion (SRCI). It is the staff's positic: that these pressure signals be present when required. We request verifi-cation that the SRCI pressure signals will be available t
during all operating codes which require the CFT isolation valves to be open. Your response shculd be supple =ented with a preliminary design drawing (elementary if available) t'o facilitate review.
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t 033.43 Reques: No. 033.34 has ne been fully answered in that a naticum i
allowable frequency decay rate was not provided. We are t
concerned with underfrequency transient (s) that would
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affect reactor coolant pu=p speed, i.e., the assured reactor l
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coolant pump constdown ficw rate.
I Given the assumption that the reactor coolant pu=p notors remain connected to the power syster, identify the frec,uency j-decay rates that would result in a braking action on the pu=ps resulting in flow rates belcw that required to main-tain the DNBR above the 1.3 limit. Translate these fre-quency decay rates into a plot of reactor coolant flow versus time and discuss the nethod by which t'.as was accomplished.
Provide this infor stien for the wors case core life condition.
Identify possible initir1 grid operating conditions that cculd be expected and tha would a110w significant frequency decay rates or other undesir.ble influences that could adversely affect the design basis reacter coolant coastdown flew rate.
Identify the maxi =u: frequency decay rate for which a Reactor Coolan Pump (RCP) motor speed could be expected to re= sin in synchrenizatien with the jewer syste:.
If RCP =0:cr pt.11-out could occur at any decay frequency, discuss the expected pump speed and the associated reae:c ccolan: syste flew rate as a result of pull-out.
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033.46 Your response to Request No. 033.38 did not specifically address whether the times provided (e.g., time to open/close a valve) included the consideration of operating at the li=iting power quality conditions, described in your interface criteria require-i ments, Please amend your response to explicitly address this aspect of Request No. 033.38.
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033.47 Figure 8.3-1 does nct supper the descripticn of how power is sapplied to the vital busses found in Section S.3.1.7.
i Please correct this discrepancy.
033.48 The interface requirements fer the emergency standby power system do not include voltage and frequency recevery require- - - - - _
ments such as are found in Regulatory Guide 1.9.
Please provide an acceptable envelope for the ESAR-205 supplied loads.
033.49 Your response to the single red withdrawal accident (Request No.
033.39.1) cencern states that analysis has been performed.
We request that this analysis be incorporated by reference or amendment into BSAR-203.
033.50 Section 3.11 does not address the potential for submergence of electrical equipment within the containment as a resul:
of an accident. S:ste whether or not your equip ent quali-fication program will include sub=ergence; if not included, we require an interface be prcvided to assure tha: this equip:ent will be able to perfers the safety functices as i
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4 033.S1 Request No. 033.20, which deals with independence, was not
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fully addressed by your response. We require that th'c test plans, test set-ups, and acceptability goals for the isolation devices qualification be provided prior to the PDA issuance. Accepqable test results cust be provided prior to FOA issuance, f
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The following are based upen your respense to Request No. 033.20:
(1) ESFAS and RPS reactor coolant pressure taps are located 90* apart around the pipe circunference. This is not in confomance with Se: tion 5.8 of IEEE Std 384-1974 as stated.
The IEEE Standard s:ctes that. redundant pressure taps located on opposite sides of a large pipe may be censidered to be separated by the pipe, but the linas leaving the pipe must be protected. We require tha: this criterien be s:rengthened by suitable design or interface provisions.
(2) Section S.2.3.6 states that RCP nonitors are provided with physical and electrical separation. Provide a detailed description or change the wording "provided" :o " required" to assure prope'; interface with the BCP.
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033.51 (3) The SRCI reactor coolant cold leg temperature sensors
, for the X and Y channels are inferred to use the same RTD penetration. Provide an amended description that requires separation such as by location on opposite sides of the pipes or provide further details and justificatien 1
i for the design as presented.
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Section 7.1'.2.2.2b states that separation vill be in 1
accordance with Section 5.6.2 of IEEE Std 384-1974.
I This referenced section provides three options for seeting j
the requirements. Provide additional infor=ation to s
describe the manner of your conformance.
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Provide further details of how the SRCI controls within i
B5W scope of supply acet Section 5.7 of IEE Std 384-1974 as stated.
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With respect to the photo-optic devices, the di-elettric strength of a 1000 VAC (MIS) is an input to cutpu't break-down rating only. To demonstrate the acceptability cf the isolation device, verify that no credible fault of the control wiring (isolator output) will propagate through the isolator itself. Also state whether the output can be electroc-cagnetically coupled into the input of th isolator.
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