ML20039H133

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Suppl Input to SER,re-evaluation of Facility Design Assuming Dual Containment.Related Documentation Encl
ML20039H133
Person / Time
Site: 05000561
Issue date: 08/23/1977
From: Vollmer R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Vassallo D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML111090060 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-80-515, FOIA-80-555 NUDOCS 8201190615
Download: ML20039H133 (8)


Text

.-

M

, %,*g UNITED STATES

./

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON p

j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 1

~t

%,*****/

. )

AUG 2 S 1977 i

Docket No.: STN 50-561 MEMORANDUM FOR: Domenic B. Vassallo, Assistant Director for Light -

Water Reactors, DPM i

FROM:

Richard H. Vollmer, Assistant Director for Site Analysis, DSE

SUBJECT:

ACCIDENT ANALYSIS BRANCH SER SUPPLEMENT INPUT ON B-SAR-205 i

PLANT NAME: Babcock and Wilcox Standard Nuclear Steam Supply System LICENSING STAGE: PDA DOCKET NUMBER: STN 50-561 MILESTONE NUMBER: 24-31 RESPONSIBLE BRANCH: LWR tio. 3; T. Cox, LPM REQUESTED COMPLETION DATE: August 25, 1977 REVIEW STATUS: AAB SER Supplement Input Complete

~

The attached SER supplement input re-evaluates the BSAR-205 design assumi_ng a dual containment.

If additional ~ input is required from AAB as a result of a future ACRS letter, we will respond at the appropriate time.

s-N1)J~

l ichard H. Vollmer, Assistant Director e

for Site Analysis Division of Site Safety and Environmental Analysis l

Enclosure:

BSAR-205 SER Supplement cc:

see attached sheet l

4 f

l 5

l l

g i g 15 810403

~

i MADDEN 80-515 PDR

,,._,e.,

,. Domenic B. Vassallo AUG 2 3 w y t

I cc:

S. Hanauer

+

H. Denton

'l

9. Muller L. Crocker

'i R. Vollmer

~

W. Mcdonald (w/oencl.)

D. Bunch G. Chipman i

O. Parr T. Cox J. Wing 1

i e

5 b

i L

k l

+

i 8

i r

e

. 'E '

t

- +

s f

-l l

~*'

7

= = em e..

-+--,.g'.

~

. ~, ~,

.A

m 15.X.2 Loss-of-Coolant Accident 5'ince the BSAR-205 design encompasses only a nuclear steam supply system, it is necessary to postulate the properties of the remainder of a complete i

plant under accident conditions in order to evaluate the limiting atmospheric dispersion conditions of possible sites of such a plant. These limiting i

atmospheric dispersal conditions are those which would limit accidental dose l

consequences to the maximum guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.4.

In the SER l

we evaluated the BSAR-205 design assuming a single containment with sprays.

However, because it is likely that on many sites in the U.S. the BSAR-205 balance-of-plant would require a dual containment, we have evaluated the I

limiting dispersion conditions assuming it to be housed in a full dual con-l tainment building, having the engineered safety features and the leakage rates l

described in Table 15-1.

The dual containment was assumed to be without f

forced convection mixing and to require 40 seconds for the' reduction of the secondary containment pressure to negati"e 1/4" w.g., above which the staff generally assumes all activity leaks directly to the environment without holdup or treatment by the secondary containment.

I The assumptions used in our dose evaluation for the loss-of-coolant accident t

are summarized in Table 15-1, including the assumptions for spray effective-ness and the containment leakage paths. With these assu nptions, in the case i

of a dual containment with filtered exhaust, the 0-2 hour whole body dose is generally controlling. To provide an indication of the range of sites where a BSAR-205 with the assumed containment and spray systems would be acceptable we calculated the 0-2 hour X/Q that would result in a whole body dose of 20 rem. This limiting atmospheric dispersion factor is a product of the local dispersion conditions at the site and the specific distances from the plant to the outer boundaries of the exclusion area. Thus, the maximum allowable 0-2 hour X/Q for a BSAR-205 plant utilizing a dual containment as described above, is 1.3 x 10-3 sec/m.

If a proposed site has worse atmospheric dis-3 persion characteristics (X/Q values greater than 1.3 x 10-3 sec/m),contain-3 ment systems with effectiveness retaining fission products better than that assumed in our analysis will be required or the size of the exclusion area would have to be increased. Of those sites we have previously evaluated, approximately 20 percent had 0 to 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> atmospheric dispersion values greater than 1.3 x 10-3 seconds per cubic meter at the exclusion area boundary.

R

r i

j We have not evaluated the limiting dispersion characteristics for the BSAR-it 205 design regarding potential offsite doses at the low population zone distance during the 30-day period following the postulated loss-of-coolant accident. These characteristics are determined by different dispersion factors for four consecutive time intervals during the 30-day period, such that the combination of these factors as a set rather than any individual factor for a particular time interval will establish the limiting character-istics. However, we do not expect these meteorological conditions to be more limiting that the short-term atmospheric dispersion factor.

We will require a utility applicant referencing the BSAR-205 design in a construction permit application to provide the appropriate exclusion boundary and low pcpulation zone distances and the meteorological character-istics applicable for the specific site. We will evaluate the potential l

offsite doses for the postulated loss-of-coolant accident during our review of such a construction permit application on the basis of the specific site characteristics and on the basis of the specific balance-of-plant engineered safety features design.

L e

+

i

/

l l

- i

' - ' r

~

b

.w-

.K-

TABLE 15-1 LOSS-0F-COOLANT ACCIDENT l

- T4 j ASSUMPTIONS AND INPUT PARAMETERS jj{'

TO DETERMINE LIMITING ATMOSPHERIC DISPERSION FACTORS (X/Q VALUES) i (1)

Power Level 4100 megawatts thermal (2) Operating Time 3 years (3)

Fraction of Core Inventory Available for Leakage:

Iodines 25 percent Noble Gases 100 percent (4)

Initial Iodine Compositlon in Containment:

Elemental 91 percent Organic 4 percent Particulate 5 percent (5)

Effective Containment Volume (85 p::rcent of total net free volume) 2,924,000 cubic feet (6)

Containment Spray System Effectiveness Decontamination Factor,.

Elemental Iodine 100 Removal Coefficients:

Elemental Iodine 10 per hour Particulate Iodine 0.53 per hour Organic Iodine 0

(7)

Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System Filter Efficiency, Iodine Removal 95 percent (8)

Primary Containment Leak Rate Leakage Rate Leakage

~

Time (percent per day)

Type 0-40 seconds 0.2 direct, unfiltered 40 seconds - 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 0.0023 bypass, unfiltered 0.2 indirect, filtered j;t '

e x.n..

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP i

TO (Neere, ettsee ermbol or location)

      • s'

s'*suun i

84 TE c.c..t. Aft..

.. _ p

(

p2 i

+ -...

c..

I g

intTRALS F I LE

/L mY t

a

... r.. t.

g T a,_

v an sa ra.m

  • '~

e

.. r. u saa ws t.

o6 /7 77 Ah j

a=^m f oao a.m.

AAB F

h kj o

3. o next 2./m-r/ s A.

7

< D. l $d-@-

i l

Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, 4

disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions F ROM (Neme, ottoce erubal or location)

.sts s

t e.o s OPTIONAL FORM 41

.4s-to-ensee-a ass-nos eso 5041-101 auGustses7 8

Gs4 FPMR ( elCFR) 300 St.20s i,

M-'

ay-1 S"yi,. A e s

, e

[

as M.'6

. j 79 _

4, '

  • p., y 5

q-

-.a 2 -

c+/n/'7

< G> F MB,

[

g

-[f Y.

A LsAn~

u.a~f 9 7,L lf L se W ~.g r c i.1 y '

? MM~ -

3 Q

j 9,d4 d&y w954e3 uk w y w

se ds d < ~ t.

-lo HL2f au. A Ma~.1 a ore <A y.1,,49 w 9.3 C.oakt 2d 1p /r~ L.

f u d d 'b/A A.J s p a 4. y ~" u B4 m

~~?

M CQ~y w, q w-w e e u '. 3 A4 J ua

- ua 3

@ Ta4

/sf 61.3) Cm u fuon,7 f aAA6sa y cLg L aumyh - c, -/ h, E & e k 2 49/6 u 4

clp-g yn L -

9 (fcuJ' % aasen x, g b. Aa aA.

m yv*"M$$L &, ae &&.s~% n.i/;ch7.

l

i a.

e e

)

TREATMENT OF ACRS GENERIC CONCERNS FOR

~

B-SAR-205 BY AAB The B-SAR-205 SER input for AAB's treatment of the ACRS generic concerns

" dated April 16, 1976 is listbd'below.

Group I NA Group IA NA Group IB Item 7.

Control Rod Ejection Accident resolved for PWR's by Regulatory Guide 1.77. ' See Shetion 15.X.3.

Group II Item 1.

Turbine missiles - not directly applicabic to standard

~

~

j NSSS.

Interface addressed in Section 3.5.1.4.

{

Item 2.

Effective, operation of containment sprays in a LOCA - the.

I containment spray system is outside the scope ~of B-SAR-205.

Item 11. Instrumentation to follow the course of an accident -

This class of instrument is reviewed in Section 7.5 " Safety-Related D i

ay ! -

Instrumentation".

The instrumentation identified by the applicant has been determined to meet the functional and qualification requirements described

.in the,.St,andard' Ecvt' ew. Plan Isaction.2 5) gnd in the applicable 2 sect 7

f j

_RegulatoryGuide1.97"InstrumentationforLight-Water-CooledNucle

.n a p 3 :,. Plants,to.Asshss Rlhnti Conditions:Durinj;"and Foil'odinfdS" Sed 5d5 e

5

[

The Regulatory Positions 1, 2, and 3 of Regulatory Guide 197 w implemented in the B-SAR-205 review.

ere not Implementation of these positions are scheduled for those applications received af ter issuance of Revi i of the guide (due about February 1977).

s on 1 on the BOP portion of the plants We plan to implement these positions incorporat'ing the B'-SAR-2'05 NSSS that are submitted after issuance of the guide.

M

.[Y 4g UNITED STATES

  • 4, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON
  • y; 4

g g

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20565 -

j p

FEB 2 41977-Docket No.:

STN 50-561 MEMORANDUM FOR:

Domenic B. Vas_sallo, Assistant Director for Light Water Reactors, D'PM FROM:

Richard H. Vollmer, Assistant Director for Site Analysis, DSE

SUBJECT:

CHANGE IN ACCIDENT ANALYSIS BRANCH SER INPUT ON B-SAR-205 i

PLANT NAME: Babcock and Wilcox. Standard Nuclear Steam Supply System l

LICENSING STAGE: PDA DOCKET NUMBER: STN 50-561 MILESTONE NUMBER: 24-31 j

RESPONSIBLE BRANCH: LWR #3; T. Cox, LPM i

REQUESTED COMPLETION DATE: N/A REVIEW STATUS: AAB SER Input Complete AAB has reviewed Amendment Nos. 8, 9, and 10 to the B-SAR-205 application.

Based on this review some-additions and changes to-the SER have been'made.

Please incorporate the attached material into the SER.

{

d(

ichard H. Vollmer, Assistant Director for Site Analysis Division of Site Safety and Environmental ~ Analysis

Enclosure:

Changes to B-SAR-205 SER cc:

S. Hanauer H. Denton D. Muller F. Miraglia J. Miller l

R. Vollmer W. Mcdonald (w/o encl.)

J.Panzarella(w/oencl.)

D. Bunch G. Chipman

0. Parr T. Cox i

l K. Murphy L

c @_+

,7

\\

l w

-j e

/

5 e

r

+

AAB UPDATE OF THE B-SAR-205 SER February 18, 1977 Add the following section:

7

'~

i F

F e

i a

f

  • 1 e

1 9

~

i h

t s

l s.

y A

1 i

O

+

e