ML20039H096
| ML20039H096 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000561 |
| Issue date: | 05/11/1976 |
| From: | Lainas G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Deyoung R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML111090060 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-80-515, FOIA-80-555 NUDOCS 8201190539 | |
| Download: ML20039H096 (8) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
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tlAY 111976 '
j Docket No.:
50-561 R. C. DeYoung, Assistant Director for Ligh eactors, DPM REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION F B-SAR-205 y' Plant Name:
Babcock & Wilcox Standard Nuclear Steam Supply System B-SAR-205 Docket No.:
50-561 Milestone No.:
05-21 Licensing Stage: CP NSSS Supplier: B&W Responsible Branch & Project Manager: LWR-1; T. Cox Requested Completion Date: April 26,1976 Applicant's Response Date: June 28,1976 Review Status:
Incomplete The enclosed request for additional information (Q-1) for B-SAR-205 has been prepared by the Containment Systems Branch after having reviewed the appli-cable sections of the SAR.
In the course of our review, we have identified the following significant review areas:
c 1.
Containment Minimum Backpressure B&W has not provided the mass and energy release data for the minimum containment pressure analysis. We will require that this information be provided.
2.
Containment Isolation Based on our current understanding that the B&W Topical Report BAW-10067,
" Containment Isolation Valves." will be withdrawn, we will require that the applicable information regarding the containment isolation provisions be included in B-SAR-205.
3.
Hydrogen Generation Analysis l
The acceptability of the hydrogen generation analysis needs clarifying and the interfaces identified.
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Gus C. Lainas, Chief Containment Systems Branch, DSS i
Enclosure:
As stated
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%E9 ENDO-515 pop
R. C. DeYoung IIAY 111976 i
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R. Heineman S. Hanauer R. Boyd R. Tedesco W. Mcdonald i
J. Stolz
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T. Cox i
S. Varga J. Shapaker J. Kudrick T. Greene i
J. Glynn
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1 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR B-SAR-205 CONTAINMENT SYSTE:45 BRANCH DOCKET NO. 50-561 i
020 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 022.1 To pennit an evaluation of the minimum containment backpressure, provide the mass and energy release to the containment as a function of time used in the ECCS evaluation. Also, specify the containment backpressure that was assumed.
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l 022.2 Figure 6.2-4 shows the containment vapor temperature as a function of time.
Since this figure is not mentioned in the text, discuss the purpose of the figure, and describe the an2 lysis that was done to generate the curve.
022.3 The information provided in Section 6.2-4, " Containment Isolation Systems,"
is inadequate to complete the review of the containment isolation provisions within the scope of B-SAR-205.
Provide the following:
1.
Discuss the bases for the design of the containment isolation system including:
a.
The governing conditions under which containment isolation becomes mandatory; b.
The criteria used to establish the isolation provisions for
. fluid systems penetrating the containment; 9
The criteria used to establish the isolation provisions for c.
fluid instrument lines penetrating the containment; and, d.
The design requirements for containment isolation barriers.-
2.
Provide a table of design information regarding the containment isola-I tion provisions for fluid system lines and fluid instrument lines penetra-
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Include the following in' formation in this table:
a.
Containment penetration number; b.
General design criteria or regulatory guide recommendations that have been met or other defined bases for acceptability; t
c.
System name; d.
Fluid contained; i
e.
Line size (inches);
f.
Engineered safety feature system (yes or no);
g.
Reference to figure in SAR showing arrangement of containment isolation barriers; h.
Isolation valve number; 1.
Location of valve (inside or outside containment);
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- j. Type C leakage test (yes or no);
k.
Length of pipe from containment to outermost isolation valve; 1.
Valve type and operator; m.
Primary mode of valve actuation; n.
Secondary mode of valve actuation; o.
Normal valve position; p.
Shutdown valve position; q.
Postaccident valve position; r.
Power failure valve position; s.
Containment isolation signals; t.
Valve closure time; and, e
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Power source.
3.
Specify the plant prctection system signals that initiate closure of the containment isolation valves or refer tb the section in the SAR where this information can be found.
4.
Provide justification for any containment isolation provision: that differ from the explicit requirements of General Design Criteria 55, 56, and 57.
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5.
Discuss the bases for the containment isolation valve closure times.
6.
Discuss the design requirements for the containment isolation barriers regarding:
a.
The extent to which the quality standards and seismic desi5n classification of the containment isolation provisions follow tde recommendations of Regulatory Guides 1.26, " Quality Group Classifi-cations and Standards for Water, Steam, and Radioactive-Waste-Containing Comsonents of Nuclear Power Plants " and 1.29 " Seismic Design Classification";
b.
Assurance of protection against loss of function from missiles.
jet forces, pipe whip, and earthquakes; c.
Assurance of the operability of valves and valve operators in the containment atmosphere under normal plant operating conditions and postulated accident conditions; d.
Qualification of closed systems inside and outside the containment as isolatien barriers;
i i Qual'ification of a valve as an isolation barrier; e.
f.
Required isolation valve closure times; g.
Mechanical and electrical redundancy to preclude common mode failures; h.
Primary and secondary modes of valve actuation.
8.
Discuss the provisions for detecting leakage from a remote manually controlled system (such as an engineered safety feature system) for the purpose of determining when to isolate the affected system or system train.
9.
Discuss the design provisions for testing the operability of the isolation valves.
- 10. Describe the environmental qualification tests that have been or wil,1 be performed on the mechanical and electrical components that may be exposed to the accident environment inside the containment. Discuss the test results. Demonstrate that the environmental test conditions (temperature, pressure, humidity, and radiation) are representative of conditions that would be expected to prevail inside the containment following an accident. Graphically show the environmental test condi-tions as functions of time or refer to the section in the SAR where this information can be found.
- 11. Identify the codes, standards, and guides applied in the design of the containment isolation system and system components.
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- 12. Provide an evaluation of the functional capability of the contain-ment isdlation system in conjunction with a fajlure mode and effects analysis of the system.
- 13. Provide evaluations of the functional capability of isolation valve seal systems and of fluid-filled systems titat serve as seal systems.
022.4 General Design Criteria 53 and 54 require that the containment penetrations and associated containment isolation barriers be designed to permit periodic leakage rate testing. For those containment penetrations within the scope of B-SAR-205, provide the following infonnation:
1.
Discuss the design provisions for leakage rate testing of the contain-ment isolation barriers, and show on system drawings the design provisions for testing. Discuss the design and functional capability of associated containment isolation systems (such as isolation valve seal systems)'
that provide a sealing fluid or vacuum between isolation barriers and
. of fluid-filled systems that serve as seal systems.
2.
Provide a listing of all containment penetrations.
Identify the contain-ment penetrations that are exempt from leakage rate testing and provide justification.
3.
Provide a listing of all containment isolation valves.
Identify the containment isolation valves that are exempt from leakage rate testing and provide justification.
!I 022.5 The following questions pertain to Section 6.2-5, " Combustible Gas Control in Containment":
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Discuss the analysis, including assumptions, th'at was done to detennine the radiolytic hydrogen generation rate shown in Figure 6.2-1.
Compare parameter values to the guideline valves of, Branch Technical Position CSB 6-2, " Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in C'ontainment Following a LOCA."
2.
Figure 6.2.2 shows the total hydrogen generated for three aluminum inven-tories. Clarify how the balance' of plant designer is to use this figure.
Discuss the components that are included in these aluminum inventories.
3.
Discuss the contraints on the balance of plant design for the following sources of hydrogen:
a.
aluminum corrosion; and, b.
zinccorrosion(includingpaints).
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[/ 'WV Robert L. Tedesco, Assistant Director for Plant Systems, DSS THRU: Gus C. Lainas, Chief, Containment Systems Branch, DSS PROPOSED POSITION ON B&W CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM Standard Review Plan 6.2.4, Containment Isolation, specifies in Item II.6 of the Acceptance Criteria that there should be diversity in the parameters sensed for the initiation of containment isolation. We have noted that B&W plants do not satisfy this criterion. With your concurrence, we plan to implement this acceptance criterion on B&W plants beginning with the Greene County Nuclear Power Plant and BSAR 205 which is the B&W Standard NSSS design.
A brief description of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) for the Greene County Nuclear Power Plant will demonstrate the lack l
of diversity in the parameters used for B&W plants. The ESFAS is the pro-l tection system that initiates action of various engineered safety feature devices to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA or secondary system rupture.
The ESFAS initiates, in part, the following:
1.
Emergency core cooling injection, and secondary system isolation and cooling (ECCI initiation), and 2.
Containment isolation and cooling (CIC initiation).
For ECCI initiation, the ESFAS monitors reactor coolant system pressure, containment pressure (4 psig), and steam line pressure. Upon detection of out-of-limit conditions for these variables, the only lines that will be isolated are the main steam and main feedwater lines, the decay heat l
removal system return line, and the makeup and purification system letdown and seal return lines. Also, safety related lines will open.
For CIC initiation, the ESFAS monitors containment pressure.(4 psig). Upon detection of out-of-limit conditions for this variable, the remainder of the lines penetrating containment that are not safety related will be isolated.
It should be noted that the Westinghouse containment isolation philosophy is just the opposite of B&W's, in that the bulk of the lines penetrating contain-ment are isolated by diverse signals, including low containment pressure and safety injection, and only a few lines are isolated on high containment pressure. We believe that B&W should adopt a similar approach and isolate
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essentially all lines penetrating the containment using diverse signals, especially those lines that could potentially be open to the containment atmosphere such as the containment purge system lines. We therefore plan to enforce our position as stated in Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 and require B&W plants to provide diverse containment isolation signals.
With your approval, we will inform B&W of our intentions via the Greene County and BSAR 205 applications.
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' James W. Shapaker, Section Leader Containment Systems Branch Division of Systems Safety cc:
J. Glynn G. Lainas J. Kudrick F. Eltawila T. Greene l
FILE: Greene County BSAR 205 i
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