ML20039F097
| ML20039F097 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000561 |
| Issue date: | 03/01/1977 |
| From: | Mazetis G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML111090060 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-80-515, FOIA-80-555 NUDOCS 8201110851 | |
| Download: ML20039F097 (1) | |
Text
e p
UNITED STATES 7
f 9, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMtSS10N 3
m.ssiNGTON D. C. 20553 g
y MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas Ippolito, Chief, Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch, DSS THRU: Thomas M. Novak, Chief, Reactor Systems Branch, DSS [
FROM: Gerald R. Mazetis, Section Leader, Reactor Systems Branch, DSS
SUBJECT:
ECCS AND DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM REVIEWS IN THE EI&C AREAS FOR B-SAR-205 The attached quidelines have been utilized in the past by your branch to ensure conformance to ECCS Aopendix K single failure criteria.
It is requested that the acceptability of B-SAR-205 to this guideline be confirmed.
In addition, it is requested that you confim that the B-SAR-205 Decay Heat Removal System meets the single failure acceptance criteria described in Standard Review Plan 5.4.7.
(As you know, additional criteria associated with the cooldown of a plant are still under development.)
To maintain the present schedule, your response by March 16 is requested.
Ab
/G. R. MHze is /Section Leader Reactor Systems Branch Division of Systems Safety
Enclosure:
Guideline cc:
D. Ross T. Novak S. Israel G. Mazetis T. Cox 8 S. Newberry
Contact:
S. Newberry, NRR x27911 8201110851 010403 PDR FOIA MADDEN 80-515 PDR
I
- f... c. ~%
UNITED s7 Arts
[. g
./*.
NUtL EAR R E GULANORY CC"'.t!U!ON
'Y b E fv A0HIN:,T oN. D. C. MiES e
M k*****
Q.121976 i
R.'A. Purple, Chief, Operating Reactors Eranch 1, Op.
D. L.- Ziemann, Chief, Operating Reactors Branch 2, OR C. E. Lear, Chief, Operati.g Reactors Branch 3. OR R. W. Reid,schief, Operating Reactors Branch 4, OR R. L. Baer, Chyf, Reactor Safety Brcnch. OR 211RU:
D. C is ssistant Director for Operational Technology, OR ECCS REVIEWS IN ELECTRICAL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS AREAS The attached " Generic Infornation Request for Revievs'of ECCS in the
' Electrical Instrumentation and Control Areas" defines the information requirements for and the scope of PSS review in these areas. The develop -
ment of this information request was coordinated with the T.eactor Safety Branch and the Electrical, Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch, DSS.
Its purpose is to insure a complete and uniform ECCS single failure-review in the areas indicated.
The inforcation request addresses the following specific concerns:
1.
ECCS actuation system conformance to single failure criterion.
2.
Onsite E=ergency Power System conformance to singic failure criterion.
' 3.
Environcental and seis=ic quclifi:ation of electrical equipment.,
4.
Submerged electrical equiptent (due to LOCA).
5.
Critical single electrically-operated fluid system components, including canually-controlled electrically-operated valves.
6.
Interlocks between redundant portions of ECCS and supporting subsys ters.
7.
Electrical and physical separation criteria h
8.
Proposed codifications.
9.
Required drawings.
l C
s 1%E 12l's70
- 2. A. Farple D. L. Ziemann C. E. Lear
~
~
R'. W. Reid R. L. Baer The'PSB reviewer vill require this information to be available from i
the licensee.
It should be und'erstood that a response to this information request which references (and thus verifies the validity of) information presently on the docket is acceptable as a basis for our review.
Therefore, if there is any doubt with regard to the completeness or validity of existing docketed informa tion, the complete information request should 'be transmitted to the licensee.
.... ~.
a.
. m ;f- _.
+
.-v
. q't.? Lastg t/ f& 2 7 i
t A.'Schwencer, Chief I
Plant Systems Branch Division of Operating Reactors
(
Enclosure:
As stated cc:
V. Stello R. Tedesco D. Ross T. Ippolito (4)
~
T. Novak (4)
~
F. Rosa
. P. Atherton J. Knight D. Mcdonald P. Shemanski
. me e
e
(
e g
g
.m.Whe
k=. 1 2 2 :. C Cil;U.1C 1:;TCTJu!!CS T.ER'.'EST FOR TiVIE;i 0F LCCS 15 TriE ELECTRICAI.,
< ISSITEd' ;;IATION AMD COSIROLS AFIAS The Acesptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light Water Nuclear Power Reactory,10 CFR Part 50.46, requires that an analysis of Possible failure modes of ECCS equipment and of their effects on ECCS par-formance be perfor=ad.
This analysis should deoonstrate that your ECCS and supporting subsyst. ems meet tha single failure criterion. We require that doc-umentation of this analysis be provided in sufficient detail to. enable the staff to (1) verify that the aualysis demonstrates that the ECCS and supporting subsystems meet the single failure criterion as defined in IEEE Std 279-1971,
' an'd (2) determine the acceptability and verify the implementation of'any-proposed design modification required as a result of your analysis. Therefora, we require that the following information be submitted to support the single failure analysis of the ECCS and supporting subsystems:
{
, 1.
Describe the design of the ECCS actuation system.
Identify any non-
, conforcance of this design with the single failure requirements of IEFE Std 279-1971. Describe any changes proposed for meeting these require:ents.
2.
Describe the design of the onsite escrgency power ' system, a-c and d-c.
Identify any non-conformance of this design with the single failure require =ents of IEEE Std 279-1971.
Describe any changes proposed for ceeting these requirements.
3.
Identify all the electrical equipoent rcquired for the ECCS and supporting subsyste.s to enabic performance of the ECCS safety function.
De-fine the qualification status (ability to withstand the design basis seismic and environmental conditions) of this equipment, and the basis for such qualification, to provide reasonable acsurance that the i
equip:ent will be capable of performing its safety function. Describe k
r
W'" I 2 E' A 2
2:y proposed design :sdifications, analyses, or test progra:s for meeting the environ: ental and seiscie qualification require =ents.
4.
Identify all electrical equipment, both safety and non-safety, that may become subserged as a result of a 1,0CA.
For all such equipment
'that is not qualified for service in such an environment, provide an
~
.s analysis to determine the following:
(1) the safety significance of N
the failure of the equipment (e.g., spurious operation, loss of function.
- loss of accident / post-accident monitoring, etc.) as a result of t
flooding, (2) the effects on Class IE electrical power cources serving
. ~,.
.s
~~ ~. "' t.his ' equipment" a's a result of' ~sucE failures, and (3) the proposed
~*
design changes resulting fron your analysis. Your response to item (2) should specifically address breaker and fuse coordination and the isolation capabilities of this aspect of your design.
5.
Identify any single electrically operated fluid system component, including manually-controlled electrically-operated valves, whose failure could result in loss of capability of the ECCS to perform its safety function.
Failure in both the " fail to fuaction" pense and in the " undesirable function" sense should be considered, and this should apply even though the component cay not be required to function in a given safety operational sequence.
6.
With regard to the equip =ent identified in item (5), provide a detailed description of any preposed design changes decced necessary by your
~
analysis for ceeticg the single failure criterion. Your response should specifically address but should not be limited to changes made to caet the single failure criterion by conforcance to Branch Technical
~
Position EICSB 18, "/,pplication of the Singic Failure Criterion to
c, f 2. 1 2.7
, 3 Manually-Controlled Electrically-Operated Valves", of Appendix 7A of the Regulatory Standard Review PIEn. This position establishes the acceptability of discon'necting power to the electrical components of a
, fluid system as one means of meeting the single failure criterion.,
6 7.' Identify any electrical interlocks between redundant portions of the ECCS and supporting subsyste=s. Define the consequence of failure'of 4
any interlock on the capability of the ECCS to perform its safety function.
Describe any proposed design modifications resulting from this review.
~
~
e/,
f_
8.
Provide the electrical and physical separation criteria for your design of redundant safety equip =ent and functions.. Include the features in your design that minimize the vulnerability of the ECCS and supporting subsystecs to common failure modes.
9.
Provide the following drawings for the ECCS and supporting subsystems:
a.
Piping and Instruc ent Di*agrar.s (P&ID).
b.
Electrical Control Schenatic Diagrams.
One Line Diagran of the Onsite AC Power DisIribution System.
c.
d.
One Line Diagrac of the DC Power Distribution System.
One Line Diagram of the Vital Instrument Power Distribution System.
e.
s es
- 1
.(
g
, - -