ML20039E192
| ML20039E192 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000561 |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1977 |
| From: | Taylor J BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | Boyd R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML111090060 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-80-515, FOIA-80-555 NUDOCS 8201060631 | |
| Download: ML20039E192 (9) | |
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ICC3x1 STN 58-561
&aCD88t 4 1977 L
i Office of Nucteer Reaeter R:rgslation Altentfoot Mir Engee S. Boyd, Director Btwissen el Freiset PDraegeneak W S E.telaar Regelstory Cleanimates t":rsMe ten, A C.
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Sub3eert D-523-205 - tucatac:ffag Isoets hierencer 1 Baycet to the Afrissey Cemittee on F.cceter Sttfeguardis By the office of Ibclese Racetor Engsslattion, F. S. Sueleer l
j Reginf atory Cbmission, in the matter ed Babcock. & W12 cost.
Cisayany Reference Safety Analysis Report, E-SAE-It$,
Ikretat No STE 50-563. July 8,1977 L
.1 L stryJoe to R S. Weyd, "D-5AD-205 - Ccstandfag femmes,".RaIy 15, 1577 3
.1. W Taylor to L 5. EDyd "D-SAD-205 - Instatswfing l
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".maiy al,1c77.
i Beer Mr. Enydt i
l Mk have been farermed ngr the Staff thee additsemal fafewantion is necessary l
to permit so avaInstice of eartuiw outstaartng seesses as Isoted fa seetfea 1.6 of Reference 1 Ttds letter is specifies 11y intended to provide the j
ired additional faformation conceratas outsesading isomes, 2, 4 7, S, s
13 am listed $m Sectsen 1 & af Reference 1 In tMa regard, the isr-seemetions in the strachment to thieL )$${$7 Sdggk$$$$h$ kRfSeES($$$ $E7e$d$I laevided to the Staff im Deferences 2 mat 3, as applicable.
1 h hope Ensa. the adcith==1 eer clarified perttsens ein..M.-
thest est-staa ing amones before the ACES Fw11 Committee Raretfhg,.
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The Reheck & Etteam Cecipersy escatto tar fernally ittehuHag sofffled materia as feccribed in tre attachment to this 3etter fu a futenre esembarat to the B-SLc205, whicts is scheduled for =^*ntttal ydoer to August 31, 1977 Wry tzsty youtra,
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James B. Taylor F
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Finge 3 of 7 Ct:statantinft facue Mb 2r Ebarirennental eaal_ification Program 4
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Chr hva deteruined that. Dubcock & E11eene has not proposed sta ecceptakte egetatifica i
M troperature for safety--related equipment which must function inside contaisu htter a design becia reactor coolant or steen system rupture T!da matter is did et:naed fszther in section 6.2d of th.fs report h wi11 regtrire that Fabcock &
DE1com comit to a conservatiW qualifiestica: test temperature er ~~-=4t to gamIl he:fpasse to the temperature det IM by a referencing appliesat D Ptcities b teiterate the pacition p: resented in reference 2. 342 han su5critted the regadhn 4 tac:sitment to a ett:=Iffication temperature im Amendheat 16 to B-EJub-295. In a telephone conversation on August I, ths Stati roguested that Bsw (1) sefine th kh:is fee establishing this tempermettre and (2) diccoce its conservatism. Da tecgoasa to this latest regree, tas forIIacing wfH be added to D-SAR sectica M
' Ainendirent IF to B-SAD-205.
" Firm 311-2 wee defined to envelope the steser 1.tne treak endronments
.e ened in the Psmt's for aII previous R&R 205 famI assembly resetors.
r Sherefore, this. temperature profile is expected to be conservative with respect to a surforit.y of the bs2sace of plant designs. utilised by appli-ennem referencing IP-SAS-20%."
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_tk:tatc=dite Isene _Wm. 4m Beroer Dffatfore L" vent Atff Pbcitica AcastsencI furormation is rsquired from 2:abeoelt & W12een ter sheer time the stenene* of the makeup tanF.. bypass 25mm does not result in a more severe dilut tweet. than that now analyzed.
11kis matter is dicemamed further its Feetion Ik of this report
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- 9. w a cy 1ba first sear.ence of the tlii[4:Ya*Eikaph en page 1.L1A-3 of B-8E5-205 M asse 16 will be revisei to read ar.foUownt'~
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"thrring refueling or maWh$nc'e [perations, when the resetor elesure heed has Deen removed, thenkcoppyntes is not in service and all secreas. of dilute water toithe system ineInding the Ifues which bypass '
the makeur taat, are isolated by closed vaivas,. thus makfa prabability of a moderator dilation event extremely Iow." g the the atave change vill be facerporated fa. Amendment 17 to 3--EAID-205 sche & rind fi dntttal ts MitC e:1 er about $/31/77, y
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Cutatanding Issue _Mo. 7r Provisions for Shutdown Gtali Tonition Ek wf11 require Babcock & il1 Icon to provide additional futerface specifiestietu
& referencing apyIicant to assuie that such. applicant. can provide the balancew plant capability (1) to achieve and malatain cold shutdown conditions using the fecer heat rec > oval cysten, assuming the use of only safety grade equipment and AC.v,Ie active failure, and (2) to reach and maintain het shutdown conditions fi scrual operating conditiens, esing only safety grade equipment and assuning the 3cca of offatta power. This iccue is diccussed further fw Seetles 5.4.3 of Ek tcport.
131r Pocition f+.2 fo2Ioving. will be added te our recponse to apaestion 212.223r
"/.31 systema and eguipment required to echieve and maintaia e safe hat shutdowst conditica are safety grade and can perform their functions i
with less of offsite power.- A description and Ifacing of these systems and aceponenta are contained fa section 7.4 "
The above thange will be thcInded in E-5AR-205 Amendment 17 whfeh is atheduled 21sb:.ittal to ERC on or about 8/31/77.
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DOCKET SIN 50-56 I
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Outstanding Issum No. St DHES Isolation l
I Staff Fusition Ya require additional information frear Babcock. & Wilcox to demonstrate that di l
eay heat. removal system. isolation from the reactor coolsat system een be acca glished in the event of a posttrIated pipe failure tw the decay heat renoval I
system outside containment, during shutdowrt cooling, asse:ning a single active l
componene failure,in accordcace with Standard Ecview Flem 3.6 1.
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l BCE Fosition 20R intende to modify the design. of the decay heat, suctica lines te actisfy tl requirements of~ the Staff position.
Two speciffe designs are near ic:dar cons 9 crction2-Alternata 1.
Rttferring to B-SAR Figure 9 3-5 the fo11 cuing power supply arrangements will
&2 regnired of the E0P designer for the drop line (Dt1 section isolation) valv
.I Nornal nuclear l
i Valve safety bis _
41 ternate hua DCT-VI2A.
A.
EG-VIIA R
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5n-7125 3
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BH-V113 A.
3 The associated instrumentation will be revised consistent with the-normal powd bu reassignments above. The following interface requirement will be added D-CAR. Chapter Se i
84.1.2 Arrangeneat of Power Supplies for j
DE Suction Isolation Valves Special provisions, which enoEIe DR section is8tation valve DE-Y125 te be tras ferred, by means of linitad and well programmed operator actions outside the eentrol room, fraar its normal power supply (noclear safety bus B) to an altee]
acts Class IE power, supply is the event of a failure of electrical power trai 8, shall be included in the plant desiga This temporary power supply ear. be 1
But is not restricted te,. neelear safety Bus A.
Special provisions, which. e$
ble BM auction isolation valve DR-VIIA to be transferred by means of Ilmitedl and well programsed operator actions outside the control room. free its normaf Penet supply (anelear safety bus A) to an alternate Class 1E power sepply,. in the event of a failure of electries) power train A,. shall be included in the Plcut, design. This temporary power supply can be, but is not reatt.ieted te, auctepr safety bus B Any such temporary power sopply arrangements which are, y
provided in the plaat design shall not violate physical and electriem1 separaa bility requirementa during normal operation. AIX operatoi actions outside the
B00tET STN 50-50J
- ,n hp 5 d 7 control room, required in using tenporary power supply arrangements, must take As an alternste to such temp <
piece in readily accessible areas of the plant.
czary power supply arrangements, the appIfcant may elect. to providt Class 1E cIcetrical power supplies to the DH suction isolation valves in nueh a manner that the single failure criteries is satisfied both for placing the DE system is operation and foe isolation of the Is cynten from the RCS.
b eininise '.ha sine of the special pouer arrangenents required s5cve, the size of t)e notor cperatora for these valves wl:1 be reduced to that required1 to spea the valves ageinet a 675-poi differential pressure (they are curre The tuvised. values siand to open against. a 2500-psi differential pressure) will be imeloded in Table 8.3-1 of D-SAR-205.
Alternate 2 Ruferring to B-SAR Figure 9 S 5 en EHO valve, operable from the control roce The you will be adhd isnedtately outside the contatunent in each drop line aupply will be the oppocite of that for all other components in the train. i,
- R* has power will be required for the valve is the "At* traia and vica-varaaj h valves will be open during normal operation.
With the addition of these valves, a simpler method for avoiding long-term Therefore the fo110wini post-IRCA. Doron precipitation probleus is possible additionsI changes not directly related to this open item. are soutemplated this r.Itcrnate is selectedt l
21vas Dit-V16A and B, DLttv354 and B, and their associated lines 1.
instrumatation would be deleted (reIief valves WR1f8A and R wou$
be retained, or bypass lines with check vaivas will be added arou valves hY12A and 3 to provide isolated-lias overpressure protech Dypass 11see including a flew-eIement,. flow indientet,. and teolat 2.
- 150, will be provided around each of the valves added outside c) tatement te provide circulation to prevent long-term post-LOCA bel This design is described in greater dhtait le the precipitatibn_
Ehehington Public Pever Supply System PSAR. Docket Eb. SG-4d0s Cae of the two alternates above will be selected and described su B5I 31, 1977 i
meet 27, schedtried for submission to tBe NRC on or a&eut August e6
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f toCKET 511t 50-2 x
Fage 6 of 7 h
Outstanding Issus No._ 13t Turbf_n,e Trip Analyste i
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8taff position 1
Babcock & W11 con must perform an analysis of the turbine trip without staan bypass flow, to demonstrate that applicable secondary systen pressure limitQ are not exceeded. This matter is discussed further in section.15.4.2 of this report B&W Position The last paragraph eer E-SAR-205 page 15.1.7-3 will be saleted and the follq iar paragraph added at the end of section 15.1.7.2.4
- An incidence of turbine trip freen 1021 power (3376. MWt) without auto-matic runback of the reactor or turbine bypass system action produces the highest secondary system peak pressure among the events that re-
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i salt is a. docrease in secondary heat removal capability.
The results el the analysis of this esse are presented in Figure 15.1.7-3 (at-tached). The peak secondary pressure occurring at the fcedwater in-let nonzie of the steam generators is 1350 psia (1335 pois), which is nelow the design limit of 1375 psia (1101 of 1250 pais).*
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Tier, ass TUR8INE TRIP AT 3876 MW POWER WITHOUT POWER l
RUMBACK OR TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM OPERATION
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