ML20039E148
| ML20039E148 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000561 |
| Issue date: | 10/01/1976 |
| From: | Cox T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML111090060 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-80-515, FOIA-80-555 NUDOCS 8201060582 | |
| Download: ML20039E148 (13) | |
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uNirE3 STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20666 o
OCT 0 1 $76 j
Docket No. STN 50-561 i
VENDOR:
Babcock & Wilcox Company (B&W) l
SUMMARY
OF MEETING TO DISCUSS BSAR-205 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS QUESTIONS AND POSITIONS On September 27, 1976, representatives of B&W and the NRC staff met to discuss Round 2 questions and positions developed by the staff.
Topics discussed are shown in Enclosure 1 of this sumary. The staff had asked for this meeting to develop an understanding of the data needed in BSAR-205 to effect an adequate interface between the standard nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) preliminary design and a future application which would reference the BSAR-205 standard. is a meeting attendance list.
Requests 022.6, 7, 8 and 14 deal generally with postulated mass and energy releases to the containment building spaces as a result of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). NRC staff members responsible for containment systems review must' ensure that an adequate description of possible mass / energy releases to containment is provia d in BSAR-205 to pennit the balance-of-plant (B0P) designer to independently design a containment building and systems. A number of containment systems design options are available to a B0P designer and the calculated long term mass / energy releases from the NSSS are a function of a particular set of containment design' options. The staff and B&W agreed that some spectrum cf hypothetical LOCA and secondary system break types and sizes should b'e" described in the BSAR-205, for a specific set or sets of conthinment systems desjgn assumptions, The total _ break spectrum will include main steam liiie and feedwater line breaks. The containment systems design assumptions must be explicitly and completely described as interface requirements on the future user of the mass /
energy release data presented. An applicant referencing the BSAR-205, i
l then, will be required to: (1) justify that their containment building
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and systems are conservatively modeled utilizing the BSAR-205 spectrum of mass / energy releases, or (2) provide additional or revised mass / energy release data as appropriate to evaluate the specific containment design proposed.
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. OCT 011976 i
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i The specific set of break types and sizes to be included in BSAR-205 was not finally detemined at the meeting, but was left to B&W to specify. All discussion and data concerning the design bases for containment systems design will appear in, or be referenced in, l
l BSAR-205 Section 6.2.
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Request number 022.9 concerned the maximum temperature to which safety-related mechanical and electrical equipment must be qualified in order to assure reliable operation during and after a design basis main steam line break.
B&W stated that their planned equipment qualification tests will verify equipment perfomance at 300'F for sufficient time periods such that i
the equipment would remain operable in anticipated containment designs and for planned equipment installation configurations. Staff pointed out that they have not seen any analytical or test data validating such anticipated perfomance. The staff and B&W did agree that, whatever temperature versus time history that the B&W designed equipment is qualified to, the specifics of such qualification must be clearly defined in BSAR-205 as interface requirements for an applicant referencing this document. The burden will then fall on each applicant to demonstrate that the equipment will not be subjected to an accident environment more severe than that of the equipment qualification test.
I Request number 022.10 was clarified by further discussion of the functional requirements of certain valves within the BSAR-205 scope of design.
These valves, typically within the ECC system, make-up system or residual heat removal system, are used to meet containment isolation requirements.
B&W pointed out that, for these valves, design specifications related to the containment isolatson function of the valves are the responsibility of the user of BSAR-205.
B&W intends to specify only the functional requirements necessary to the safety-related operation of B&W designed systems.
B&W did a5ree that a full description of the division of responsibility for the specification of these valves would be included j
in Section 6.2.4, either (1) by addressing each infomation requirement stated in staff request number 022.3, or (2) by addressing none of i
l the requirements and explicitly stating that all containment isolation t
function infomation required by the NRC licensing process will be supplied by the BOP designer.
Request number 022.11 concerning diversity in parameters sensed for centainment isolation was discussed. The staff pointed out that Standard Review Plan Section 6.2.4, Item II.6 indicated the required diversity.
B&W agreer'. to review their ESFAS signals and propose a resolution of this issue.
OCT 011976 j
Regarding request number 022.12, the staff explained the meaning of bypass leakage in a dual containment plant with respect to the leakage that could occur through BSAR-205 piping systems. For those systems which penetrate both containments of a dual containment system, the leakage through the system isolation devices could bypass the secondary containment.
B&W agreed to provide leak rate specifications for which they are responsible.
Request number 022.13 on combustible gas control was discussed.
B&W stated that they would modify previous infonnation submitted on this subject to delete any specification or description of metal corrosion rates. They will specify an amount of aluminum that is expected to be present in the containment from the B&W scope of supply.
A description of component thicknesses, weights and surface areas will be provided where known, and a contingency factor in the fonn of additional metal totally reacted will be identified. This infonnation then will become the design interface to which the B0P supplier will then add as appropriate for materials which the B0P design includes that could produce hydrogen. The B0P supplier will then justify a specific hydrogen production and accumulation rate.
i Thomas H. Cox, Project Manager Light Water Reactors Branch No. 3 Division of Project Management
Enclosures:
1.
Request for Additional Information, BSAR-205, Containment Systems Branch 2.
Meeting Attendance List cc:
Babcock & Wilcox Co.npany l
ATTN: Mr. Kenneth E. Suhrke
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Manager, Licensing i
Nuclear Power Generation P. O. Box 1260 Lynchburg, Virginia 24505 l
. OCT 011976 i
cc: Washington Public Power Supply System ATTil: Mr. J. J. Stein Managing Director P. O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 i
Mr. Robert Borsum Bethesda Representative Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Power Generation Division t
Suite 5515, 7735 Old Georgetown Road l
Bethesda, Maryland 20014 B. G. Shultz Project Engineer Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.
i P. O. Box 2325
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Boston, Massachusetts 02107 i
Mr. A. H. Monteith j
Ohio Edison Company 47 North Main Street Akron, Ohio 44308 Mr. W. E. Kessler i
Coninonwealth Associates, Inc.
209 East Washington Jackson, Michigan 49201 Robert J. Kafin, Esq.
115 Maple Street Glen Falls, New York 12801 i
EllCLOSURE 1_
i REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION B-SAR-205 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BRANCH l
022.6 The response to Question 222.1 is incomplete.
Provide the mass and energv release data requested for the containment subcompartment analysis.
l 022.7 The response to Question 042.4 is incomplete. Justify that the double-ended rupture of a main steam line will result in the design basis main steam line break accident, or provide the mass and 3
energy release data for a spectrum of main steam line breaks.
022.8 Provide the mass and energy release data for a postulated main j
feedwater line break.
l' 022.9 The maximum environmental temperature that safety-related mechanical (RSP) and electrical equipment will be designed and qualified to is given in Table 3.11-2 as 300'F. Main steam line breali accident analyses have indicated that the containment atmosphere temperature may exceed 420 F.
Therefore, it is our position that Table 3.11-2 must be revised to reflect a conservative upper bound on the maximum temperature expected inside the containment following a postulated main steam line break accident, or that a commitment be made to i
qualify the safety related equipment for the containment environmental conditions calculated by the B0P designer.
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022.10 The response to Question 022.3, which reauested additional infomation (RSP) about the containment isolation system within the B-SAR-205 scope of design, is unacceptable.
It is our position that the requested information should be included in B-SAR-205, and the interface requirements for the B0P designer should be identified.
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022.11 The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) provides (RSP) l the signals for ESF actuation, including containment isolation.
For the containment isolation and cooling (CIC) signal, the ESFAS j
i only monitors containment pressure.
It is our position that 3
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there should be diversity in the parameters sensed for the initiation of containment isolation. Therefore, propose other ESFAS signals that satisfy this position; e.g., safety injection 4
signal.
022.12 Specify the maximum leakage rate and type of fluid for all containment isolation devices withiri the design scope of B-SAR-205.
This information is needed by a B0P designer to determine the
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potential bypass leakage for a dual containment plant.
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022.13 With regard to the combustible gas production and accumulation analysis, provide the following information:
1.
Specify the amount of hydrogen assumed to be in the primary coolant;
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,4 Provide a table of the aluminum and zinc components in the 2.
B-SAR-205 scope of supply, in'clud{ng a description of the components, and their weight, thickness, and exposed surface area.
Figure 6.2-2 shows the total hydrogen generated by the corrosion 3.
Provide an accompanying analysis, and justify of aluminum.
the metal corrosion rates for the assumptions that were used.
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Specify the temperature and pressure used to calculate standard l
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cubic feet.
Section 6.2.1 lists the criteria to assure that the structural h
i 022.14 integrity of the containment will be maintained.
Item 3 in this i
i section implies that the only accident that must be considered is i
j the LOCA.
It is our position that containment and interior structures be designed to withstand the effects of a postulated main steam line and feedwater line accident.
Include these accidents
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in your criteria.
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ENCLOSURE 2 g
3-ATTEllDANCE LIST
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HEETING W B&W &'NRC STAFF - 9/27/76 l
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i NRC
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D.-Tibbitts T. Greene l
J. Shapaker W. L. Jensen T. Cox F. Eltawila r
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J. Hamilton J. Happell J. Cuvelier R. Schomaker 1
G. Brazill l
L. Smalec'
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