ML20028F400

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Forwards LER 82-170/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted
ML20028F400
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 01/13/1983
From: Ray H
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To: Engelken R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
Shared Package
ML20028F401 List:
References
NUDOCS 8302010327
Download: ML20028F400 (2)


Text

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$ffE0 Southem Califomia Edison Company Qty, AT S AN ONOFRE NUCLE AR GENER ATINw S T A TION ),

P.O. BOX 129 s A N C LEMEN T E. C A LIFOR NI A 92672 -

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January 13, 1983 " " " " - " "

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm Ssion Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken, Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:

Subject:

Docket No. 50-361 30-Day Report Licensee Event Report No.82-170 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 Pursuant to Section 6.9.1.13.b of Appendix A Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License NPF-10 for San Onofre Unit 2, this submittal provides the required 30-day written report and copy of Licensee Event Report (LER) for three occurrences involving Lim-iting Condition- for Operation (LC0) 3.4.8.1 associated with Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure / temperature limits.

On December 14, 1982, the plant was in Mode 5 with the Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) in operation. A review of the strip chart recordings of the RCS cold leg temperature indicated that the RCS heatup/cooldown rate limits of LC0 3.4.8.1 had been exceeded on three occasions that day. As required by the Action Statement associated with this LCO, on all three occasions, the RCS heatup/cooldown rate limits were restored within the allowable 30 minutes.

The excessive heatups/cooldowns were due to inability to properly control SCS flow. As corrective action to prevent recurrence, responsible l Operations personnel have reviewed the circumstances of this event and

! have been directed to more closely monitor SCS flow and RCS heatup/cooldown l

operations. This will be included in their monthly retraining session.

Additionally, design modifications to the SCS to allow better control of flow are planned to be completed during the first refueling outage.

l l

i 8302010327 830113 PDR ADOCK 05000361 C PDR Q b?S 8.5-19._ -__.

R. H. Engelken January 13, 1983 An engineering evaluation performed as required by the Action Statement of LC0 3.4.8.1 indicated that the structural-integrity and the fracture toughness margin of the RCS were not compromised as a result of these events.

There was no impact on the health and safety of plant personnel or the public associated with these events.

If there are any questions regarding the above, please contact me.

Sincerely, M

s

Enclosure:

LER 82-170 cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 2 & 3)

R. L. Pate (USNRC Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 2 & 3)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Management Information and Program Control Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INP0)