05000361/LER-1982-001, Forwards LER 82-001/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted

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Forwards LER 82-001/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted
ML20049J920
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 03/18/1982
From: Ray H
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To: Engelken R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
Shared Package
ML20049J921 List:
References
NUDOCS 8203290217
Download: ML20049J920 (2)


LER-1982-001, Forwards LER 82-001/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted
Event date:
Report date:
3611982001R00 - NRC Website

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WE S AN ONOFRE NUCLE AR GENER A TING STA TION P.O. eO x 12s s AN C LEMENTE. C ALIFORNI A 92672 H. S. R AY TeterwoNa

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March 18, 1982 mimr=

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9 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission FiECE!VED 9

Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region V D

MAR 2 61982Uo 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210

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Ngwan Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 c

Docket No. 50-361 R

j Licensee Event Report No.82-001 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 (SONGS 2)

Attention:

Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director

Dear Mr. Engelken:

This letter describes a reportable occurrence involving the SONGS 2 Fire Protection System and the Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System, and is intended to satisfy the reporting requirements of the Appendix A Technical Specification action statement 3.7.8.2.a. and section 6.9.2 for inoperability of Fire Protection System Equipment and Section 6.9.1.13.b for operation with one Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System inoperable. Although the event occurred prior to receipt of the SONGS 2 operating license, it is considered reportable since complete resolution of the problems had not been achieved by February 17, 1982, when the SONGS 2 operating license was received.

L On February 14, 1982, an attempt was made to place the Fire Protection I

System associated with the Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System into service. At 0610, an operator opened the isolation valve and declared the system operable.

It was not realized however, that water was flowing through a tripped open deluge valve supplying water to open spray heads located over the charcoal filter beds.

The resulting fire main pressure decrease caused the fire pump actuation alarm to sound in the Control Room. At 0630, operators determined that the deluge valve was open and reclosed the isolation valve.

Flooding of the charcoal filter beds resulted in their being declared inoperable and the redundant system was placed in the recirculation made in accordance with the action requirements of Technical Specification Section 4

3.7.5.

The charcoal filter medium was replaced and the Emergency Air Cleanup System was declared operable on February 26, 1982.

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  • Closure of the isolation valve at 0630 on February 14, 1982, rendered the automatic features of the Fire Protection System associated with the Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System inoperable.

Consequently a continuous fire watch with backup i 're suppression equipment was established on February 17, 1982, pursuant to the action requirements of Section 3.7.8.2.a.

Our investigation determined the Fire Protection System for the charcoal filter bank is not required to be an automatic system, and following discussion with representatives of the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (Mr. Raj Anand), the charcoal absorber fire protection system on both Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup Systems was temporarily modified for manual actuation in accordance with Special Operating Procedure S023-SP0-5.0.

A continuous fire watch will be retained on both units until the permanent modification (including associated design review) is completed and operating instructions are modified to instruct operating personnel how and when the system is to be manually actuated.

The permanent modification is presently scheduled to be completed August 1, 1982; we are, however, attempting to expedite that schedule.

Revised operating instructions will be issued consistent with completion of permanent modifications.

There was no degradation of plant safety as a result of this reportable occurrence, since the redundant Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System was placed in the recirculation mode when the primary system was declared inoperable and a continuous fire watch has been and will be maintained until such time as the permanent modifications and revised operating instuctions are in place.

If you should require additional information concerning this occurrence, pfease contact me.

Sincerely, p bv tL

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report LER 82-001 cc:

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Management Information & Program Control Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

A. E. Chaffee - USNRC Resident Inspector