text
.
g e
Southem Califomia Edison Company P O Box 128 S AN CLEM E NTE. C ALIFORNI A 92674 ol28
"..
rebruary 7, 1995
,"I,'[," ",',
n........,.
U.
S. Nu lear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington.
D.C.
20555
Subject:
Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362 30 Day Report Licensee Event Report No.95-001 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(d), this submittal provides the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving a physical altercation within the Protected Area of Units 2 and 3.
Since this occurrence is applicable to Units 2 and 3, a single report for Unit 2 is being submitted in accordance with NUREG-1022.
Neither the health nor the safety of plant personnel or the public was affected by this occurrence.
If you require any additional information, please so advise.
Sincerely, t
i Y >'
J J
Enclosure:
LER No.95-001 cc:
L.
J.
Callan, Regional Administrator, NRC, Region IV A.
B.
Beach, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region IV K.
E.
- Perkins, Jr.,
Director, Walnut Creek Field Of fice, NRC, Region IV J. Sloan (USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)
M.
B. Fields, NRC Project Manager, San Onofre Units 2 & 3 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)
- t yf j.
/
i 9502150374 950207 PDR ADOCK 05000361 S
PDR
O l
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
IFactlity Name (1)
IDocket Number (2) l _ fAge, (3)_
l i
I i
i I
I I
15AN DN0f 7L NVCL(M.GLNLMTING_51ATIOL UNIL2 LDLSLD1 OLDL3L6L1LLLofLDLLI ITttle (4) l I
I I
I I PHY51CALALT ER.CATIOV WITNIN _TMLPR OT ECT LD AR LA _
l l_ EvuvT.DATL (5) d _. _ LIR_NUMEfa.16)
L.atPottoATE_c73. ' ___0THEa EAc1t1Tittruv0tvfD t:3..
I I
I l
I I!
""I I
I I
II)
I Month I
i 1 Day 1 Year Vear 1
11//Lhumber__lll/LNumberd onth i Day l _ ear _I I
I M
Y l
l 1
1 I
I I
I I
I I
I I 50NG5.VNIL3
_L O L)LDLOLDLJ L6L2l l
1 i
l I
l---I l---I I
i l
i I
l LD L 2.L11 6L 9LSL9L11_ LO 1_0J. LLJ 010_L_ l_LLLL_L _
_LD1JL O L.D L D I I LI I
I ITHIS REPORT 15 $UBMITTED PUR5UANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR j
OM*f[
l l(Check one orJnore 9LibtJollowinsLL11)
._ _ I l
1._
L ___l _ 120.402(b) l _ l20.405(c) l _ l50.73(a)(2)(1v) l__l73.71(b) i l P0wt R I
l _ l20.405(a)(1)(1) l _ l50.36(c)(1)
L 150.73(a)(2)(v) l__l73.71(c)
I i LEVEL l
L_ 120. 405 (a) (1) (11) l _ l 50. 36 (c ) (2)
L__l50.73(a)(2)(vii)
L)Ll0ther (Specify in I
L Ilo) ___L019._L L I __ l 20. 405(a)(1)(t i t) L_l 50.13 (a)(2)(1)
L_ l 50. 73 (a)(2)(vii t)( A)
Abstract below and I l/////////////////////////l _ l20.405(a)(1)(iv) L _l50.73(a)(2)(ii) L_l 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)(B) in text)
I/////////////////////////l _l20.405(a)(1)(v) I _ l50.73(a)(2)(1ti)I __l50.73(a)(2)(m) 10 CFR 73.71(d) l I !'!!!////////////////////l l
I////////// m ///////// W L l
i I
LICEN5EE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) l _ _ ___.__ _ ___ _ _
i_
TEL LPHONLNUMBR I
I"'**
I I ARLA CODE I l
L_ RcW,.. KriegerdtatiofLManager_ _ _
LLLLL4_L3L6L6L L6L2L5L51 l_
COMPLETE ONE LNE FOR E ACH COMPONLNT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
' C AUSE l..SYST E M } _ COMPONENT l _MANW At-
[ REPORTABLE lW/MlCAUSE}I SYSTEM}I I
I
'RE PORTABL E]MMI COMPONENT MANUFAC-i L_.. _ _ _. _
TVNLR TQ NPRD5 LTVRR I 10 M D5 l __.} _.1._LLLLL L L EL_ ____J /m///l l_t _ LL ttLL LLI.
Imml i
L_ _.1_i _ L L L L L ut L1 __
immd L_L_Lt LLLLuL}
Imml lMnthjDayl Year l SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
Expected 1._
~- ~ ~
15ubmission I l
l l
1.. l Yes (Il res a ompletc.LAPLCTLDJ VBMI5510N DATL t _ _lJ LNO
_ _ _l Dan (H { { g { g { L l l ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e.,
approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16) l At approximately 23:45 on Jantmy 16, 1995, with both Units at about 97% power, two Firewatch contractors U.on-utility, non-licensed) were involved in a physical altercation (exchange of blows) inside a multipurpose lunch room in the Protected Area.
The altercation was not related in any way to plant operations I
or plant safety; rather, it apparently related to Firewatch union accounting / financial matters.
A security officer entered the multipurpose lunch room at the conclusion of the altercation and determined supervisory involvement was required.
The Firewatch supervisor arrived independently and immediately escorted individual #1 out of the Pu,tected Area.
Individual #1 was transported to Good Samaritan Hospital and diagnosed with a fractured rib.
Edison management directed Security to remove individual #2 from the Protected Area at 01:00 on January 17, 1995.
A security officer and operations personnel walked down plant areas occupied by the two individuals, from the time of the incident until they were escorted out of the Protected Area, verifying no unauthorized actions had occurred.
Security suspended unescorted Protected Area access for both individuals at approximately 01:25 on January 17, 1995.
Edison plans to permanently deny plant access for these two individuals.
In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.71(b), Edison reported this occurrence by telephone (NRC Log Event Number 28247) at 03:00 on January 17, 1995.
Edison is providing this 30-day follow-up report in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71 (d).
No required Firewatch postings were missed and there was no safety significance to this occurrence.
There have been no LERs submitted for similar occurrences in the past three years.
|
|---|
|
|
| | | Reporting criterion |
|---|
| 05000361/LER-1995-001, :on 950116,two Firewatch Contractors Were Involved in Physical Altercation.Caused by Firewatch Union Accounting/Financial Matter.No Firewatch Postings Were Missed |
- on 950116,two Firewatch Contractors Were Involved in Physical Altercation.Caused by Firewatch Union Accounting/Financial Matter.No Firewatch Postings Were Missed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000362/LER-1995-001-01, :on 950722,discovered That RCS Pressure Boundary Weepage Occurred During Cycle 7 Operation Due to PWSCC of Alloy 600 Type Matls.Accessible Exterior of Two RCS Hot Leg Nozzles Will Be Replaced W/Alloy 690 Nozzles |
- on 950722,discovered That RCS Pressure Boundary Weepage Occurred During Cycle 7 Operation Due to PWSCC of Alloy 600 Type Matls.Accessible Exterior of Two RCS Hot Leg Nozzles Will Be Replaced W/Alloy 690 Nozzles
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000362/LER-1995-001, Forwards LER 95-001 for Discovery of Minor RCS Pressure Boundary Weepage Which Occurred During Cycle 7 Operation. Neither Public Health Nor Safety of Plant Personnel or Public Affected by Occurrence | Forwards LER 95-001 for Discovery of Minor RCS Pressure Boundary Weepage Which Occurred During Cycle 7 Operation. Neither Public Health Nor Safety of Plant Personnel or Public Affected by Occurrence | | | 05000362/LER-1995-002-01, :on 950826,noticed Open Vent Valve on AFW Line for SG E089 While SG E089 Adv Open to Drain SG During Refueling.Caused by Incomplete Communication.Adv Closed & Core Alterations Halted |
- on 950826,noticed Open Vent Valve on AFW Line for SG E089 While SG E089 Adv Open to Drain SG During Refueling.Caused by Incomplete Communication.Adv Closed & Core Alterations Halted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000361/LER-1995-002, :on 950211,soft Seated Mfivs,Intended for Maintenance & Insp,Found Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Individuals Responsible Received Counsel & Procedures Revised |
- on 950211,soft Seated Mfivs,Intended for Maintenance & Insp,Found Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Individuals Responsible Received Counsel & Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000362/LER-1995-003-01, :on 950827,electrical Test Technicians Failed to Install Jumpers for EDG Output Breaker During Tests on Protective Relay on Supply Breaker to Train B Class 1E Bus. Technicians Involved Appropriately Disciplined |
- on 950827,electrical Test Technicians Failed to Install Jumpers for EDG Output Breaker During Tests on Protective Relay on Supply Breaker to Train B Class 1E Bus. Technicians Involved Appropriately Disciplined
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000361/LER-1995-003, :on 950225,discovered Cracking in Rotor Discs. Caused by Stress Corrosion Cracking.Cracks Removed by Excavation |
- on 950225,discovered Cracking in Rotor Discs. Caused by Stress Corrosion Cracking.Cracks Removed by Excavation
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000361/LER-1995-004, :on 941114,valve Release Weight Stuck & Did Not Drop Upon Electronic Actuation & Valve Did Not Open as Required.Replaced Incorrectly Mfg Weight Switch on 950126 & Ensured Correct Positioning |
- on 941114,valve Release Weight Stuck & Did Not Drop Upon Electronic Actuation & Valve Did Not Open as Required.Replaced Incorrectly Mfg Weight Switch on 950126 & Ensured Correct Positioning
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000361/LER-1995-005, :on 950406,loss of Pressurizer Level Occurred Due to Valve Alignment Error.Terminated Event at 0207 When Licensee Reclosed mini-flow Isolation Valves |
- on 950406,loss of Pressurizer Level Occurred Due to Valve Alignment Error.Terminated Event at 0207 When Licensee Reclosed mini-flow Isolation Valves
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000361/LER-1995-006, :on 950406,RCS Dissolved Oxygen Found Out of Specification.Caused by Failure to Follow Procedure.Returned Oxygen Level to Below TS Steady State Limit by Addition of Hydrazine |
- on 950406,RCS Dissolved Oxygen Found Out of Specification.Caused by Failure to Follow Procedure.Returned Oxygen Level to Below TS Steady State Limit by Addition of Hydrazine
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000361/LER-1995-007, :on 950331,incorrect Rod Shadowing Factors in Core Protection Calculators Occurred.Caused by Incorrect Values Provided by ABB Ce.Revised Reload Power Ascension Procedure to Include Addl Data Verification Steps |
- on 950331,incorrect Rod Shadowing Factors in Core Protection Calculators Occurred.Caused by Incorrect Values Provided by ABB Ce.Revised Reload Power Ascension Procedure to Include Addl Data Verification Steps
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000361/LER-1995-008, :on 950412,TS 3.0.3 Entry Occurred Due to Inoperable Containment Emergency Cooling Fans.Removed Fan Immediately Upon Discovery |
- on 950412,TS 3.0.3 Entry Occurred Due to Inoperable Containment Emergency Cooling Fans.Removed Fan Immediately Upon Discovery
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000361/LER-1995-009, :on 950511,EDG Initial Step Load Should Have Been 20% Higher than 1,720 Kw.Caused by Bechtel Who Did Not Recognize That Lovs May Cause Larger EDG Initial Step Load than Lovs W/Sias.Revised Appropriate Load Circuitry |
- on 950511,EDG Initial Step Load Should Have Been 20% Higher than 1,720 Kw.Caused by Bechtel Who Did Not Recognize That Lovs May Cause Larger EDG Initial Step Load than Lovs W/Sias.Revised Appropriate Load Circuitry
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000361/LER-1995-010, :on 950530,pressurizer Safety Valve Setpoints Found to Be Out of Tolerance Due to Setpoint Drift.Util Assessing Expansion of Current TS Tolerances to Reduce Future TS Violations Caused by Setpoint Drift |
- on 950530,pressurizer Safety Valve Setpoints Found to Be Out of Tolerance Due to Setpoint Drift.Util Assessing Expansion of Current TS Tolerances to Reduce Future TS Violations Caused by Setpoint Drift
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000361/LER-1995-011, :on 950605,fire Dampers Failed Due to Long Term Matl Degradation.Completed Repair & Replacement of All 54 Impaired Dampers & Svc Any Fire Damper Not Tested |
- on 950605,fire Dampers Failed Due to Long Term Matl Degradation.Completed Repair & Replacement of All 54 Impaired Dampers & Svc Any Fire Damper Not Tested
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000361/LER-1995-012, :on 950707,Unit 2 Containment Air Lock Door Seal Test Did Not Meet Literal TS Requirements Due to Typo in Ts.Revised Containment Air Lock Seal Test Procedure to Ensure Compliance W/Literal Wording of TS for Both Units |
- on 950707,Unit 2 Containment Air Lock Door Seal Test Did Not Meet Literal TS Requirements Due to Typo in Ts.Revised Containment Air Lock Seal Test Procedure to Ensure Compliance W/Literal Wording of TS for Both Units
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) | | 05000361/LER-1995-013, :on 950718,recognized That Sf Handling Machine (Sfhm) Operated Over SFP on 950207 W/O Train a Post Accident Cleanup Unit (Pacu) in Operation Contrary to Ts.Required Monthly 10-h Operation for Pacu E-371 Performed |
- on 950718,recognized That Sf Handling Machine (Sfhm) Operated Over SFP on 950207 W/O Train a Post Accident Cleanup Unit (Pacu) in Operation Contrary to Ts.Required Monthly 10-h Operation for Pacu E-371 Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000361/LER-1995-014, :on 950813,TS Surveillance Was Missed Due to Lack of Alarm.Returned Control of Breaker to Automatic on 950813 |
- on 950813,TS Surveillance Was Missed Due to Lack of Alarm.Returned Control of Breaker to Automatic on 950813
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000361/LER-1995-015, :on 950822,determined RCS Lds Inoperable for About 31 H Due to Containment Atmosphere Particulate RMs Filter Paper Supply Roll Being Inadvertently Installed Upside Down.Paper for Monitors Corrected |
- on 950822,determined RCS Lds Inoperable for About 31 H Due to Containment Atmosphere Particulate RMs Filter Paper Supply Roll Being Inadvertently Installed Upside Down.Paper for Monitors Corrected
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000361/LER-1995-016, :on 951127,omission in High Energy Line Break Analysis Occurred.Caused by Original UFSAR Section 3.6A Hypothesized High Energy Line Break Analysis Completed by Plant.Interim Compensatory Review Initiated |
- on 951127,omission in High Energy Line Break Analysis Occurred.Caused by Original UFSAR Section 3.6A Hypothesized High Energy Line Break Analysis Completed by Plant.Interim Compensatory Review Initiated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000361/LER-1995-017, :on 951207,toxic Gas Isolation Sys Monitor Setpoint & Propane Trip Setpoint Was Less than 193 Ppm. Because Personnel Did Not Establish Appropriate Butane Setpoint to Envelope Propane TS Limit |
- on 951207,toxic Gas Isolation Sys Monitor Setpoint & Propane Trip Setpoint Was Less than 193 Ppm. Because Personnel Did Not Establish Appropriate Butane Setpoint to Envelope Propane TS Limit
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) |
|