ML20027B263

Sixth Set of Interrogatories,Per ASLB 810728 Memorandum & Order.Certificate of Svc Encl.Related Correspondence

ML20027B263
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	09/13/1982
From:	Hiatt S OHIO CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENERGY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD)
References
NUDOCS 8209160592
Download: ML20027B263 (10)

Text

__ __- _ _ - . _

. t unnD WRMNN S0pttmber 13, 1982 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .

00CMETE0' USNRC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensine Board 2 95 15 d'053 In the Matter of )

) 0FFICE OF SECRETAR' CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING ) l Docket.Nos.50fi@Y?dda,Eiulc S COMPANY, Et A1. ) 50-441 ~"

) (Operating License) ,

l (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) )

)

OHIO CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENERGY SIXTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO NRC STAFF Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy ("0CRE") hereby pro-pounds its sixth set of interrogatories to the NRC Staff, pur-suant to the Licensing Board's Memorandum and Order of July 28, 1981 ( LBP-81-24, 14 NRC 175).

Issue #8 Statement of

Purpose:

The following interrogatories are designed to ascertain the Staff's assessment of the hydrogen control features to be implemented at Perry and the ability of the Perry containment to withstand a hydrogen explosion. ,

6-1. What does the Staff consider to be the equivalent of a TMI-2 accident at Perry? Provide the probability of its o currence and hEhorough description of its consequences, including fuel failure modes, effect on containment in-tegrity, and off-site doses.to the public at 2, 5,10, and 50 miles from PNFP.

6-2. What does the Staff consider to be the worst-case accident Provide the probability in terms of H 2 generation at Perry?

' ta occurrence and a thorough description of its con-8209160592 820913 DR ADOCK 05000440 PDR

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-2 sequences, including fuel failure modes, effect on contain-ment integrity,- and off-site doses to the public at 2, 5, 10, and 50 miles from PNPP.

6-3. Has the Staff (or anyone on its behalf or to its knowledge) performed MARCH code calculations specific to Perry for any accident sequences? If so, produce these analyses.

If Perry-specific calculations have not been performed, produce'all MARCH code analyses performed for Grand Gulf (most useful are graphical presentations of the calculated e.g., pp. C-13 to C-44 of NUREG/CR-parameters versus time, 1659, Volume 4).

6-4. Describe in detail the capabilities and limitations of the MARCH code. Discuss any approximations and assumptions and their bases. Specifically, can the MARCH code account for the effects of steam concentration on hydrogen flam-mability, effects of containment structures or equipment on flame fronts, effectiveness of the hydrogen control system, and effects of deliberate hydrogen ignition on the con-tainment and equipment therein?

6-5. Commissioner Gilinsky has stated that the Mark III.is.a weak. containment that should be required to be stronger.

How could the Perry (47 FR 2300, January 15, 1982).

containment be strengthened? Include a cost estimate of all measures that could strengthen the Perry containment.

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6-6. SECY-80-107A contains view-graphs presented by General Electric to the NRC which state that containment incrting, hydrogen ignition, recombiners, and purging are all im-Does practical for significant rates of H2 production.

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the Staff agree? If not, why not?

6-7. The Commission has stated that hydrogen control methods that do not involve burning provide protection for a wider spectrum of accidents than do those that involve burning

/

- (46 FR 62282, December 23, 1981).

What are the bases for v this statement?

y 6-8. , NUREG/CR-1561 at p. 49 states that spontaneous . hydrogen deflagrations or detonations have occurred in the off-gas systems (handling quantities of H2 due to radiolysis) of of several BWRs (Cooper, Browns Ferry 3, Millstone 1).

(a) What were the magnitudes and consequences of these explosions? .

(b) Did these incidents occur because of the failure or inadequacy of the recombiners?

(c) Did'the recombiners provide the ignition source?

(d) Are these recombiners similar to those to be used at Perry?

l , ,

h- 6-9. What is the status of the proposed rule to 10 CFR Part 50, ,

- " Interim Requirements Related to Hygrogen Control," 47 FR 62281, December 23, 19817 l

l 6-10. What types of hydrogen control systems are available f

for preventing H2 buildup and/or explosion in Mark III containments? Briefly discuss each system, listing the advantages and disadvantages of each. Which system is Ii l

f favored by the Staff? Why?

l 6-11. It is stated in the discussion of the proposed rule l, (46 FR 62282) that there are ongoing programs of research pertaining to hydrogen generation, release, burning, and

control. Please list all such research programs. ,

3.' Briefly describe the status 'of each,'along with any j '; ~'

interim findings and the expected date of completion

- and publication of results.

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k-J,N,3,';b'6-12. SECY-80-107 at p. 30 states that the Staff believes that

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z ,. . the Mark III containment has a failure pressure of at f.4L -

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?.$,6.33d?iN..'.- , least twice the' design pressure. ~

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% 6Ci Cy,i'U..'jp , , ) -(a);, Is this estimate based on static or dynamic pressures?

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.(b)' Provide all factual bases and experimental evidence

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supporting this belief.

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6-13. Has the Staff performed any analyses on the ultimate strength of the Perry containment? If so, produce them.

Discuss all assumptions, judgements, and approximations made in the anElyses and the bases for them.

At what range of concentrations (volume-%) of H2 are

. '. . ',.',. 6-14.

'.- .' i ' , y recombiners of the type to be used at PNPP effective in reducing the H2 concentration below flammable limits?

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6-15. If the recombiners were ineffective in reducing H2 ""

[3 centrations, would the recombiners become an ignition hazard? At what H2 concentration?

6-16. At what range of H2 concentrations (volume-%) are glow plug igniters effective in reducing H2 concentrations below flammable limits?

t 6-17. Does the Staff believe that the igniters could pose a Suard to the integrity of the containment and the equipment therein by causing severe detonations?

s 6-18. .Does the Staff'believe that the normal, expected operation of the igniters (controlled ignition) could pose a threat

. o to the integrity of the containment or the equipment

.- therein by causing high temperatures and cyclic pressure

. pulses?

,. 6-19. In the Staff's opinion, has the Perry hydrogen control

, ) ,

system met the' requirements of GDC 41, 42, and 43'of I ; .?, t

" List all criteria not met.

. -10 CFR Part 507

!h.' - .. ' ,6 Has tfie Staff analyzed the Perry containment for sources

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of ignition? If so, produce the results of the analysis.

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.6-21. Has the Staff analyzed the Perry hydrogen control system against all applicable regulations, regulatory guides, branch technical positions, and other standards? If so, produce the results of this analysis, especially describing any instances in which criteria and guidelines: have.not been met. If this analysis has not been performed, when does the Staff intend to do so?

.!. 6-22. FEAR Section 6.2.5.2.1 states that delaying the start of tie analyzers until 15-60 minutes following the LOCA will avoid exposing the analyzer to severe sample con- ,

ditions. In the Staff's opinion, can severe conditions persist beyond 15-60 minutes after the LOCA? After transient sequences?

6-23.~ In the Staff's opinion, for containment H2 concentrations above 4 vol-%, would the mixers accelerate combustion by providing a uniformly combustible atmosphere in the containment? Why or why not?

6-24. In the Staff's opinion, could the ignition of hydrogen by the glow plugs produce missiles that could damage the

' containment or equipment therein? .

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6-25.. Provide.off-site radiation doses (whole body and thyroid)

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,' . j. ,- .to the public at 2, 5, 10, and 50 miles from PNPP re-

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,' , ,sulting from containment purge.following each of t he

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.' following [ .- c.. ~accidents:

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'4 what the Staff considers to be the equivalent of a'

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.TMI-2 accident at Perry; Mi}dhi:ISU:f. '

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i1?[x&y.;$f j f:<c/" .what.the Staff considers to be the worst-case accident pq ;, ., .. .' 5.i;.; ( b )

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j in' terms of H2 generation for Perry;

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(c) the following accident sequences as defined in

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NUREG/CH-1659, Volume 4 (RSS MethodoloEy applied tr

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' ' . , ,. Grand Gulf):

(1) AI 9

( 2) AE ,

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(3). AC c.t i

fy,E ',' (4) SI

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(6) SE

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l (7) T yPQI

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(8) T PQEy

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(9) T23 PQI l

(10)'T 23 PQE

.i (11) T 4W 1 (12) T QUV1 .

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(15) T230 ~

,  ! (16) T23QW (17) T23QUW

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(18) T23QUV 6-26. In the Staff's opinion, would overpressure from H2 pro-

'/ duction alone (no explosion) be sufficient to rupture

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From what % metal-water reaction?

' 'the containment?

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J. V. 6-27.' 's '. Dcscribe the pressure and temperature transients which

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would be experie'nced by the containment from the com-

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., .g .

,'["pl'etecombustionofthefollowingconcentrationsof-

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. .J,.'0'yc.' hydrogen (vol-%,assumeabundantoxygen):-

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[ Q $ Y$.' ,; .*

cr " ";, ;' - ( a ) 4%

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m (b) 6%

(c) 9%

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m. . (d) 12%

(e) 18%

. (f) 24%

ll- ' (g) 33%

6-28. Are the results given above based on any experimental f, data or studies specific to either the Perry or the generic Mark III containment? Produce all such studies.

6-29. List any assumptions made in the preparation of such l* studies, e.g. , regarding the quenching effects of steam /

humidity or the effect of containment structures and equipment on flame fronts.

6-30. If the Staff has performed any analyses of the Perry

< containment, did this analysis consider containment If not, penetrations as pocM kle points of rupture?

why not?

6-31. In the Staff's opinion, could blowdown through the

. suppression pool or direct drywell-to-containment

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., .,' . 't, leakage exceed the capacity.of the nixers?. -

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6-32. .In.the Staff's opinion, could direct-drywell-to-contain '

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b,,9d/ S h:k, : c. Jment' leakage dissipate hydrogen kutside the. area from ym ; . , , . . .e ~

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' , ,, . .which the recombiners take . suctiioa. or . ou'tsid bbl;.a 5.k[rd.:4.

-where'.the igniters are located? -

l fisq - 6-33 (Ihliti1[ Staff's opinion, would. the drywell-to-contain-u .s ,  :, -

( N ;, i.i.3,.'M. . , , / ment differential. pressure ever be great enough (e.g.,

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kflk5NN.hI@.M. ., ... . af ter' upper . pool dump) that the mixer compressor. head is yzy,.S.p

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"?9 .,%,s sinsu;ficient to. clear the upper suppression. pool vonts?

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6'-34.

c- In t,he Staff's opinion, could the recombiners produce i

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" hot spots" which could adversely affect the containment ,

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, or equipment therein?

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,,= 6-35. Does the Staff consider the manual actuation of all J

components of the Perry'H2'. control system acceptable?

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If so, how can this be justified, sin,c6'large amounts of '

2[G H2 can be produced within minutes of core overheating -

[.;.so (NUREG/CR-1651, pp. 36-37; SEC'f-80-107, p."6)?

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6-36. NUREG/CR-1561 at pp. 36-37 states that once-the core ,

temperature exceeds 140005, only minutes remain before significant quantities of H2 are produced.

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14000K l .

[, corresponds to 2061 F. 10 CFR 50.46(b)(1) limits the cladding temperature to 2200 F. Does this mean that, even if the ECCS Evaluation Model meets this criterion, substantial hydrogen could still be generated? Are 10 I

CFR 50.46 (b)(2) and (b)(3) consistent with the amounts of hydrogen expected to be generated when the cladding t'emperature reaches 22000F?

I 6-37. List all documents relied upon in answering the above

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interrogatories, and list all persons respons ible for r.

. the answers, along with their professional qualifications.

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Bespectfully submitted,

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8275 Munson Rd.

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.1 Mentor, OH 44060 (216).255-3158 f.;.1,.s .. ,'. .'T9F, ,.

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4 DOCKETED USNRC CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that copies of che foregoing OHIO 2 Cl@Ii1N2104 FOR RESPONSIBLE ENERGY SIXTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO NRC STAFF were served by deposit in the U.S. Mail, first class, pggygg& SECRtTA#-

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prepaid, this 13th day of Spetember 1982 to those on th003Erm44%ERVIEE BRANCH list below.

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Susan L. Hiatt

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SERVICE LIST ,

Peter B. Bloch, Chairman Daniel D. Wilt, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board P.O. Bo'x 08159 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Cleveland, OH 44108 Washington, D.C. 20,555 Dr. Jerry R. Kline Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Washington, D. C. 20555 Frederick J. Shon Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Comm'n ,

Washington, D. C. 20555 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U . S . Nu clear Regula tory Comm ' n Washington, D. C. 20555

, Stephen H. Lewis, Esq.

Office of the Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Washington, D. C. 20555

Jay Silberg, Esq.

1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555