ML20024A258
| ML20024A258 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/03/1982 |
| From: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024A198 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-82-334, REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8306160211 | |
| Download: ML20024A258 (2) | |
Text
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'o UNITED STATES, M
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8 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
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August 3,1982 CFFICE OF THE SECR ETARY COMMISSION DETERMINATION REGARDING PUBLIC DISCLOSURE UNDER THE GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT OF:
Transcript of Briefing on Efforts to Improve IAEA Safguards Wednesday, June 2,1982 O
Pursuant to 10 CFR 9.108(c) and 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1), the Commission has determined that the attached portions of the subject transcript should be released to the public. The remaining portions of the transcript are being withheld from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) as noted below:
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Page/Line through Page/Line Exemption 4/19 5/b1 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 6/25 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 6/22 10/24 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1-)-
10/23 14/07 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 14/05 18/06 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 18/04 18/14 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 18/11 21/23 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 21/21 22/02 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 22/01 25/25 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 25/23 26/03 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 26/01 26/11 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 26/07 28/17 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 28/13 37/1 4 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1-)
37/14 41 /04 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) l 41 /03 41 /0 7 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) j 41 /06 41 /22 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 41 /21 41 / 2 4 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 41/23 42/08' 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 41/25 42/1 0 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 42/09 42/13 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 42/12 42/23 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 42/19 42/25 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 42/24 43/02 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 43/01 l
43/07 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) l 43/03 43/18 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 43/15 i
43/22 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 43/19 44/21
.10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 44/15 44/24 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 44/22 g 6 g 11 830401 OREENBE82-334 PDR
.- "g tag4 UNITED STAT 5S 8
NUCLEAR REGULATOR.YCOMMISSIDN y
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20585 f
CFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
-page 2-Page/Line Through Page/Line Exemption 45/03 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 44/25 45/06 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 45/04 45/25 10 CFR 9.104(a 45/07 59/12 59/14 10 CFR 9.104(a 60/14 10 CFR 9.104(a 59/23 60/15
'60/16 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 62/22 10 CFR 9.104(a) 1) 62/16 63/05 10 CFR 9.104(a) 1) 63/01 63/13 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 63/10 64/04 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 63/25 71 /02 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 70/21 80/12
- 10. CFR 9.104(a 1) 80/06 80/21 10 CFR 9.104(a 1) 80/17 82/09 82/10 10 CFR 9.104(a 1) 83/15 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 83/15 84/03-10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 84/03 87/12 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 87/09 88/02 10 CFR 9.104(a)(1) 87/19 SAMU J. CHILK l
cretary the Commission 1
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1 UNITEL STATES OF AMERICA l _
2 NUCLEAR RESULAIORY COMMISSION 3
4 BRIEFING ON EFFORTS TO IMPROVE IAEA SAFEGUARDS 1
5
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6 CLOSED MEETING - EXEMPTION NO. 1 7
8 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Room 1130 9
1717 H Streat, N.
W.
Washington, D. C.
10 Wednesday, June 2, 1982 11 The Commission convened in closed session at 12 2430 p.m.
13 BEFORE:
14 NUNZIO PALLADINO, Chairman of the Commission 15 VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner JOHN AREARNE, Commissioner 16 THOMAS ROBERTS, Commissioner JAMES ASSELSTINE, Commissioner 17 18 STAFF ASD PRESENTERS SEATED AT COHMISSION TABLE:
19 J. H0YLE H. NORDLING'ER 20 T. SHERR T. BURNETT 21 W. DIRCKS J. SHEA 22 AUDIENCE SPEAKERS:
23 J. ZIMMERMAN 24 K. SANDERS 25 1
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CHAIRMAN PAlLADIN04 Good afternoon, ladies 3
and gentlemen.
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The Commission has expressed concern on 5
seversi recent occasions about the adequacy of IAEA's 6
safeguards and repeated its desire to support renewed 7
U. S. effott to Laprove them.
8 The Commission scheduled this meeting for the 9
purpose of updating itself on efforts to strengthen to international safeguards.
Of particular interest are 11 such questions as what are the principal U. S.
12 activities to stcengthen safaguards, how have they been 13 furthered by NRC efforts in recent months, what more can 14 and should be done and how can NRC better focus its 15 efforts to that end.
16 I would be especially interested in the 17 staff's view of whether there are additional short-term 18 actions which tha Commision could take that would be of 19 vslue perhaps with respect to the setting of priority 20 tasks by the action plan working group.
21 Unless other Commissioners have opening 22 remarks, I suggest turning the =seting over to Bill 23 Dircks.
24 ER. DIRCK5s I will just make a couple of 25 points.
One, we have been working in response to the 1
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1 Commission's request.
That in'terest of-th e-Commission
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2 goes back many years, back to 1977, I'th' ink when the 3
IAEA Special Safeguards Impresentation Report indicated 4
a significant number of problems existed in the 5
application of IAEA saf.eguards.
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6 The staf f has participated in several 7
activities in this area, including the Interagency 8
Action Plan and so on.
9 Last year there were additional deficiencies 10 noted or the same deficiencies were noted again.
On 11 Earch 18th the Commission did write to the various 12 Congressional coanittees indicating that NRC would 13 continue to rtrongly support renewed U. S. efforts to 14 improve international safeguards.
In 1982, as you 15 noted, Hr. Chairman, the PPG came out and repeated 16 furthat s2pport f or the staf f and the Commission in this 17 area.
18 We forwarded to you recently 82-210, a staff 19 paper.
Ha would lika to discuss that paper with you 20 today.
As indicated in 82-210, NHSS did initiate a 21 research request in response to the Commission's 22 guidance document and that request is expected to be 23 completed sometime this fall.
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24 COH3ISSIONER AHEARNE:
I as sorry, I missed 25 that point.
The research request is supportive of ---
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1 3R. DIRCKS:
In the Commission's PPG, if you
. 2 look on page a and 5 of the 82-210 ---
3 C35MISSIONER AHEARNE:
Right.
I am just 4
trying to draw a distinction between the NRC staff doing 5
something and the contractor doing something.
6 MR. DIRCKS:
Oh, well, the contractor's effort 7
is part of the NRC staff.
8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It wasn't that the PPG 9
directed a contenct?
10 ER. DIRCKS:
No..You directed our effort and 11 part of that effort is a contractor.
The range of 12 things that will be looked at, I am not too sure what we 13 are goin7 to get out of it, but we vill take another 14 look.
15 We talked about this at the meeting this 16 morning in my office.
One thing I wanted to stress to 17 the Commission is that when you look at the problems of 18 implementation of IAEA safeguards there is a range of 19 problems 20 21 22 23
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2 When you look at what NRC can do and what the 3
staff can do, it is a ralitively narrow slice of that 4
pie and that is what we want to talk about today.
We 5
vill be talking about various things we can do, but many 6
of these things won't get at the major problems that 7
have been identified.
8 So we can 4e have a discussion here ---
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, we can make 10 recommanistions to the Executive Branch.
I mean we can 11 deal with the gut problems in the sense of making 12 recommendtions within our own government.
We can't 13 actually get our hands on the problems themselves.
14 HR. DIRCKS:
We can get that part of it done.
15 It is a major political issue which a technical staff 16 can't 17 COH3ISSIONER GIIINSKY:
Well, they may or may 18 not pick up on that, but a t least ---
19 HR. DIRCKS:
But I don't think we can identify 20 very much more that the Commission can do in that area.
21 I think that problem has been laid out to you,.
We vill 22 discuss some of the upgrading efforts that are being cise 23 done today, but I don't want to ( ;;th: expectations 24 that we are going to bring out too much that you already 25 don 't know about.
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1 On that upbeat nota I thought we might get
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CHAIRMAN PALLADINot Have we included in our 5
work the concept of making recommendations to other 6
branches of the Federal Government?
7 HR. DIRCKS:
Yes.
8 HR. SHERRs Yes.
9 HR. BURNETTs Oh, yes.
10 HR. SHEAs Yes.
11 COMEISSIONER AHEARNE:
That is at' the heart of 12 the development of the Action Plan des making strong 13 recommendations.
14 HR. BURNETIs The cecommenations haven't gone 15
~auch furtner than from us to them.
16 CONHISSIONER GILINSKYs Well, it carries a 17 cartain amount of weight if it has the backing of the 18 Commission.
19 HR. DIRCKSs That is right.
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
They can still ignore j
l 21 them or decide the time is not opportune.
22 HR. DIRCKSs i
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1 0035I55IONER AHEARNEs The information 2
transfer request.
3 ER. DIRCKSa And the opening up of aspects of 4
the reporting nature of the agency.
5 COHEISSIONER GILINSKYa A lot of this is e
intrinsic to the nature of the agency and it is not 7
going to ga t rhsnged without changing world politics.
8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
No, but it is useful to 9
just keep a little pressure on the ---
10 COH3I55IONER GILINSKY Right.
11 MR. BURNETTs And Mr. Blix has indicatad a 12 little bit more openness and interest into some of these 13 pursuits.
So that I think some of the suggestions are 14 getting through via informal channels o,r otherwise.
15 HR. DIRCKSa But there are two levels to get-16 that type of initiative moving.
I guess the point I am 17 stressing is that the staff can handle one end of it, 18 but the big transfer of nudges would have to come from 19 the Commission itself.
20 WhY ion't you go ahead.
l 21 ER. BURNETTs I am not going to say a whole 22 lo t at lasst it this stage.
I am going to introduce Mr.
1 23 Sherr from the Office of NESS, Division of Safeguards, 24 and Branch Chief of Haterial Transf er Licensing which r
25 has th e rasponsibility for import / export and the IAEA
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Treaty Strengthening Programs.
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Ted has a briefing package that we hope to 3
flip right through here and everybody will understand.
4 CHAIRE45 PALLADINos Is this a classified
's packet?
6 ER. BURNETT4 No.
?
COEMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Your notes might be.
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8 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN0s What is that?
9 COMBISSIONER AHEARNE4 The notes that you take 10 on it might become classified.
11 CHAIREAN PALLADINO:
I should have indicated 12 at the beginning of the meeting that this is a 13 classified meeting and the Sacretary's Office has 14 checked to make sure that only cleared people are 15 present.
18 HR. ROYLE4 Tes.
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But this packet is not 18 classifia$.
19 HR. BURNETT Hight.
20 (Slide presenta tion. )
21 ER. SHERR I as not sure if we are going to i
l 22 address all the questions th a t you rsised at the i
23 beginning of the meeting, but we vill try.
24 Again, along the lines of what Mr. Dircks j
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25 said, our focus-in teras of staff efforts to support l
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1 strengthening IAEA safeguards is built within the 2
- ontext of IAEA statutory responsibilities.
We ha ven ' t 3
looked beyond in terms of what could be expanded in 7-4 terms of the IAEA statutory responsibilities or what 5
substitutas there are for IAEA or anything like this.
6 The focus of the briefing is on what NRC staff 7
has been doing to support U. S. efforts to strengthen 8
IAEA safeguards.
9 CHAIREAN PALLADINos Ted, if you will speak to into the aike I think they can hear you better in the 11 bsek.
12 MR. SHERHs In terms of the briefing outline 13 just as a mattar of overview and background I am going 14 to cover fairly quickly areas 1 through 3 just to
'15 provide you perspective of what NRC has been doing and 16 then the real subject of the meeting is in area 4.
17 The first area is in terms of where IRC has 18 been sai what their position is on commitments in terss 19 of strengthening IAEA safeguards.
Basically, probably 20 even before 3RC was formed, NRC has been involved to 21 varying dagrees in efforts to strengthen IAEA safeguards.
22 NRC, in addition, has made commitments in 23 correspondance with tha Executive Besach, in 24 communications with Congress.I think dating back to 25 1977 ---
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1 HR. EURNETT:
The next slide, please.
2 NB. SHEBH:
--- as well as recently in the PPG 3
policy statements, PFG guidance and it has been 4
supplemented also by the EDO draft progran guidance.
5 Iha next slida.
i 6
COEZISSIONEE AHEARNE:
Ted, included in that I 7
gather we have been a major participant in the 8
development of the Action Plan since the Action Plan had 9
as one of its two principal cassons for coming into 10 existence being to strengthen IAEA safeguards.
11 ER. SHERRs That.is right.
As a matter of 12 fact, the last tise I was briefing the Commission on 13 this thing was in 1978, I think it was, in Novesber when 14 ve were looking at what should be the basis for approval 15 of exports.
One of the decisions there was in fact that 16 the Action Plan had been developed and there was a need 17 to, which was suggested earlier, a need to push for -
18 improvenants on IAEA safeguards, notwithstanding what we 19 do in the export category over the meantise.
20 This vievgraph basically characterizes the 21 general IAEA safeguards problems.
These are generally 22 recognized areas.
They are the types of things that we 23 identifial in our recent Congressional testimony 24 the 1
25 lafor21t13n flows, vnirh is something that NRC is i
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particularly interested as well as the backbone of the 2
safeguards organization; problems with the safeguards 3
in spec tion. program itself3 and its ability to meet its 4
goalss problems with the states in terms of implementing 5
systems that enable the agency to apply effective 6
safeguards and, finally, the standa rd problem of 7
resources, both equipment and manpower.
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYa Well, how do you 9
distinguish between B and D?
Is it how well ther 10 function given the resources?
11 5R. SHERE:
B generally relates to their 12 inspection progras and what goals their inspections are 13 directed to ---
14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKIs Does that include 15 problems with their goals?
16 HR. SHERB:
Yes.
What they call safeguards 17 approarhas ara inspartion proceduras f or particular 18 facility t y pe s ---
19 CORHISSIONEB GILINSKYa But their overall goal 20 is trying to detect at a certain tise?
21 HR. SHERRs Hight.
22 HR. BURNETT Yes, that would be in there 23 miso, their tiaaliness.
24 COREISSIONER GIIINSKYs Right.
25 COM3ISSIONER AHEARNE:
The new Director
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1 General, at least once in public print, and I don't 2
know, maybe more, and certainly I heard him when he was 3
here, addressed a role for safeguards, IAEA safeguards 4
or the role for IAEA safeguards, which really is sort of 5
different than the basir philbsophy I think a lot of our 6
approach has been.
Our approach, which I think is 7
fairly summarized by when we say problems areas, views 8
I AEA safeguards in auch the same way we would view 9
safeguards applied to our facilities and what their role 10 and purpose is.
11 But the Director General, as I say at least 12 once in print, has said the purposa of it is more for 13 use of the country on whose f acilities safeguards are 14 being applied to show to the rest of the world that ther 15 are living up to their kinds of commitments and that in 16 that sense it is much more a political approval process.
17 HR. SHERR4 I would agree with the Director 18 General.
I think 3RC has looked at it and NESS not in 19 the same vain that we would look at a domestic 20 safeguards program.
The domestic safeguards program is 21 focused to preventing theft.
We put a lot of reliance l
22 on the facility to aiministec the safeguards program and 23 auch less relying on independent, you know, 24 ca rtification that everything is okay and verification.
25 Whereas, along the lines of what you are suggesting, the l
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agency, their' responsibility is to make an independent
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2 conclusion that averything is okay.
So when they say 3
everything is okay the neighbor is satisfied.
4 C055ISSI'ONER AHEARNEa What he said, at least 5
in a conversation I had with him, and then when I saw it.
6 in print I thought ha was making the sane point, was 7
that one shouldn't expect that m.uch out of the 8
inspection program.
That, instead, the fact that a 9
country is villing to invite the IAEA inspectors in and to to have their facility put under IAEA inspection is the 11 significant Es:t because that shows the country's 12 villingness to say that I am going to ask this outside 13 agen cy to verify that I as living up to th e commitments, 14 but that we shouldn't apply that same kind of 15 expectation of level of technical standard that we might to apply if we vote isoking at sur own f acilities.
That is 17 what I meant by 18 COMEISSIONER GILINSKYa Well, he is just being 19 a little franker than his prede'cessor -- well, a lot 23 franker -
about the limitations of the agency, and I 21 think he sees it more clearly than his predecessot, too.
22 COEEISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, a t least he is 23 auch frankar about it.
I never had the discussions with 24 his predecessor that what, so I don't know.
All I can 25 say is ha saamad to be very frank, but he really was
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this is the way he lookJ at what those safeguards are dMete60 3
for.
It is slightly/than I think the way we have tended 4
to look at what those safeguards are for.
5 HR. BURNEII:
6 7
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI Nofwouldwetry to.
9 HR. BURNETI:
Nor would we try to.
I didn't 10 vant to follow that up, but that is what he said.
But 11 that is not the important point.
12 C05HISSIONER AHEARNE:
That is consistent with 13 the philosophy at least that I heard him saying, which 14 actually is a bit inconsistent with saying these arc 15 problam areas.
That is the fundamental point I was 16 making.
17 COMEISSIONER GILINSKYa Well, he is being 18 franker, and I think that is goed, but what he says is 19 at odis with what the IAEA has put down as its 20 objectives.
21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE4 Well, I was asking a 22 question.
23 COMMISSIONE3 GILINSKY So if you look at what 24 the agency has said it is going to do or does in writing 25 in its documents and in various places, in official IAEA
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documents, then one finds that itcNy_esn't sensure up in 2
these ways.
3 3
COMMISSIONER AHEARNEa But, Vic, I wasn't 4
really trying to say now do an analysis of how the 5
documents tes:k with what the DG has said.
I was saying 6
that Blix seems to be giving a role for safeguards that 7
is different.
I as not saying that we ought to 8
therefora say, vall, let's buy Blix's das:ription of the 9
role.
I was just pointing out that when we say these l
10 areIAEAsafaguardsproblanarass,vahaveadMfer/ent 11 philosophy of what IAEA safeguards are for than at least 12 I heard him say.
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYs Well, va are applying 14 a severer test to their performance _than he would seen 15 to be applying.
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16 COEMISSIONER AHZARNE:
Well, not only a 17 severer test.
The impression I got is he would be 18 saying that is the wrong testg.
Those are useful goals 19 to talk about and they are nice alas to put down, but 20 they don't fit with the tests he vill be applying.
21 CHAIRMAN PA11ADIN0s But even if you want to 22 meet his point, if it is going to be an effective tool 23 for shaving the other nations that a particular nation 24 hss complied with safeguards, you still need an 25 effective means to do it.
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COMMISSIONER-AHEARNE:
Well, I would let him a-2 defend his case.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But I think he did, 4
didn't he.
5 COE3ISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes, but I think he 6
would disagree with that.
7 CONMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, I think 8
basically that they now realize that if somebody grabs 9
material and runs off with it they are not going to be 10 able to tell you about it before someone could actually 11 use it.
I mean, we have said that ourselves in letters 12 to the Congress.
13 COEMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That is another debate.
14 (Laughter.)
15 CORNISSIONER GILINSKY4 You know, they don't, 16 or at least he doesn't pretend that they can do that.
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
He did say, though, that 18 when they got information that it should be made 19 available to the Board of Governors.
20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Oh, yes.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I am just saying to put 22 all,these things in context it doesn't necessarily 23 indicate that these are not problems, but from the 24 perspective he is working they might have a different 25 thrust.
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY I think he would -
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3 COHEISSIONER AHEARNE:
Sure, but it is the 4
level of importance that I t,hink he would differ with.
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
No, I think he would 6
like to see all these things fixed up.
7 HR. BURNETT4 A, C and D I think he would 8
readily address.,
9 COEMISSIONER GILINSKY4 Yes.
10 ER. BURNETT:
He knows of these short 11 reso'urces.
12 COMMISSIONER AHE ARNE:
Oh, sare.
13 3R. SHEA:
But he would not have a high level 14 of optimism.
15 CO!MISSIONER AHEARNE4 Sometimes some people 16 in the NRC have I think tended to say that unless this 17 can be done that we should not expect IAEA safeguards to 18 be satisfsctory, and I think from his point of view that 19 would be incorrect.
20 MR. SHERS:
For one thing, we never said that.
21 C05MISSIONER AHEARNE:
I didn't say you did.
22 ER. SHERR No, no ---
23
( La ugh t e r. )
24 3R. SHERS:
There are a couple of things that 25 see going on though.
One of the things is that SAGSI, I
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Implementation, is in fact looking at what are the 3
factors that should go in the IAEA's goals other than l
4 just the quantitative goals.
5 6
7 COMHISSIONER AHEARNE:
I as sorry ---
8 COEMISSIONER GIIINSKY:
Well, wait a minute.
9 To pursua-your point, John, though, his massage has not 10 been one that has been received well in a lot of 11 places.
12 13 14 The reason is tha t these 15 safeguards are absolutely an indispensable element in 16 lagitimizing nuclear trade.
There is just no question 17 about that, and it is very upsetting to a lot of peopla 18 to take this lall-back view of them ---
19 (Laughter.)
20 C0!!ISSIONER OILINSKY:
If everyone accepted 21 that view and if that is the view that was presented to 22 the Congress and that is the way the Executive Branch 23 talked about it, and that is the way other countries j
24 talked about it, and that is the way the IAEA talked 25 about it, then we would have a whole different situation l
s.
19
~
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1 an$ I think you have raised would be n. lot more 2
pertinent.
3 You know, maybe this isn't the thing to be I
4 evaluating the agency on in that case, but that isn't 5
the world we live in.
We have just got this-one lonely 6
Director 3anaral who is vandaring around and saying 4
7 vell, maybe these things aren't whateveryfhasbeen 8
saying they were.
9 (laughter.)
10 COEMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, actually what he 11 was saying, I thought, was that the people who really 12 have put the system in place and have tried to make it 13 work and nost of the sanior :ountry that he works with 14 have this view of it and that there have been 15 discussions of it'which seemt to treat it as a different 16 thing.
Ha'is just saying let's try to be frank and talk 17 about what it is rather than what some people have 18 described it to be.
19 COMEISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, we can go on on 20 this for a long time.
21 CHAIRMAN PAllADINO:
Do you want to proceed.
22 MB. SHERR4 So these are the problem areas.
23 The next vievgraph, please.
l 24 As a general matter, the U.
S.
has been l
25 attacking these problem areas through interagency mS~~3@ GRTING CCMPANY. INC.
1 20 _
._.m..
1 mechanisms involving State, ACDA, DOE and 3RC.
The s
2 Commission paper that was forwarded in' January of '82 3
kind of gave some background and profile of what was s
1 4
going on in tha interagancy groups, the main one being 5
the Interagency Steering G~roup which has oversight for 6
U.
S. international safeguards policy. The NRC 7
representatives in that group ara Jim Shas and Bob 8
Burnett.
9 The Action Plan Work Group, which you are 10 familiar with, is coordinating the various efforts in 11 the U. S. Government to strengthen IAEA safeguards and 12 representatives from IP and NESS are involved in that 13 group.
14 The Tachnical Support Coordinating Conaittee, 15 which basically ---
16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Hay I interrupt.
17 ER. SHERR:
Sure.
18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Since you are auch more 19 familiar with the working group than I an, you nar have 20 a:curately ins:ribai what it is, but if I quote from 21 that February paper you just mentioned, that sells thes 22 short on what it is supposed to be.
It describes it as 23 "The Action Plan Working Group was developed in an 24 attempt to bring into an integrated framework ongoing 25 U. S. activitias in support of IAEA safeguards," and 1
21
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1 that is.what you said, but/
"and to identify additional 2
steps to correct specific deficiencies in the'
~
3 implementation.of IAEA safeguards."
4 So at least as I raad it at the time and as I 5
have read it all along, it seemed to me that it was to a 6
place in which one would identify what corrective 7
actions ought to be taken and, then to coordinate the S
U. S. effort.
9 ER. SHERR (Inaudible.)
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, but it is 11 critical in sort of the focus if we are saying that what 12 ve ought to try to do is figure out how to identify 13 deficiencies.
14 HR. SHERRa In fact, later on here when I talk 15 about our activities that is precisely the way I have 16 identified it.
17 The one area that is much more informal is 18 just the routine every-day clearance of cables.
Some of 19 them are in the context of the Action Plan and some of 20 them within the POTAS program, the TSCC type thing, but cettsh 21 other ones lika -lasseems examples g
23 and this type of 24 thing ara, you know, we routinely get these things for 25 review and this is the mechanism to communicate to the
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To it is kin:d of an informal and sometimes ad 3
hoc type type thLng.
4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
How effectively is that 5
working?
6 HR. SHERR Well, sometimes I think if you 7
don't get the right answer one time you are not on 8
clearanca for tha cable the next time.
9 (Laughter.)
to ER. SHERBs So they tend likely to tow the 11 mark I think a little bit, but I think it works pretty 12 vell.
There are a lot of times, like I got a note 13 coming in here that if I don't call back and clear right 14 away, ther vill send it without me.
They don't usually 15 do that, and that is the cabla going back on the SIR o 16 the U. S. position.
17 ER. BURNETT4 We have been successful in 18 wodifying them when we had things to say.
19 ER. SHERR Yes, I think so.
l 20 ER. BURNETT And that is important to know.
21 COEMISSIONER AREARNE:
Yes.
The other thing 22 is do you get the sense that they really are asking for 23 your comments on all the important ones?
24 ER. BURNETTa Yes, very much so.
l 25 5R. SHERE:
Yas, but I don't know all the i
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2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, no, but usually e.
3 af ter the f act you would probably find out if there was 4
on e th a t ---
5 MR. SHERR I think as a general matter.
We 6
don 't get iskai f or :'.aara nce on cables relating to 7
hexapartite and we are not involved in that and things 8
like this.
9 NR. BURNETT:
It is a lot better than it used 10 to be, Commissioner Ahearne.
They call over personally 11 and ask how should this be worded and have we' covered it 12 all.
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYs Of :ourse, we have 14 colonized the place.
15 (Laughter.)
16 ER. BURNETT Those colonies are the ones that 17 called in.
18 (Laughter.)
19 HR. SHERR Nov ve have gotten to the point in 20 the briefing that relates to what NBC is doing.
The 21 overview ts just that what we do is generally in the 22 context of the overall U. S. Government activities and 23 su pport of those activities.
24 ThLs covars basically what our general 25 activity tress are, examples of specific efforts within
e 24 L...............
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y.
1 those activity areas and, finally, what types of 2
additional things we are thinking about doing in the 3
futura.
4 With regard to the activity areas, there are 5
three major areas.
6 The first one, and this is along the lines 7
of ---
8 COHNISSIONER GILINSKY:
Can I ask you what 9
category are the things in 82-210 going to fall into?
10 Are these proposed efforts?
11 ER. SHERRa Pardon?
I am sorry, I didn't hear 12 the question.
13 COEZISSIONER GILINSKYa Are you going to run 14 through the items in 82-210 somewhere along the var?
15 MR. BURNETTa They will show up in some of his 16 vievgraphs.
17 HR. SHERRa There are three basic areas.
18 The first area, which is the primary area, 19 where we support strengthening IAEA safeguards, is 20 participating in the U. S. Government's identification 21 of safeguards issues that need resolution, developing 22 positions and solutions for these issues and assisting 23 in implemanting these solutions where we can.
24 CHAIREAN PALLADIN0s Does this come out of our 25 seabership on the Action Plan Working Group?
25 L.
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- Yes, coordinating - -
the tachnical support 2
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO it arises?
Is that primarily where 4
5 ER. SHERR4 Yes.
bullets basically talk about thin fact, the next four 6
7 e context that exercise that activity which is p we 8
interagency groups, reviewing articipation in the ac tivi ties.
and coordinating 9
We also provide direct consult 10 IAEA and to member states.
ation to the training courses, particularlWe participata in IAEA 11 SSAC type things y
12 conduct specific projects in supp and 13 Now the last ort of USG efforts.
pointedly directed to two general areas are less 14 there is some relationshipstrengthening IAEA safeguard 15
,but 16 The next one is to facilitate i 17 of safeguards in the United State mplementation 18 some examples of that a little lats, and I will get into 19 er.
- Finally, tso much basirtily bacause van area where we haven' 20 e
information.
a don 't have specific enough 21 But many of the probless of th 22 in fact with the kind of implementation th e agency are 23 at is done 24 25
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This in f act was one of the items that we
)
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managed to squeeze in the Action Plan way.back in 1977 6
which was actually contrary to Er. Pickering's response 7
of April of '78 i
8 9
10 11 12 C055ISSIONER AHEARNE It is different than 13 the Pickering response.
14 CHAIREAN PALLADIN0s.
Than what?
15 COHEISSIONER A'EARNE:
Er. Pickering was H
16 addressing the issue, as I think we know, with respect 17 to the NNP A and its apdlication of effectiveness in 18 safeguards which is different than something that might 19 he in the Action Plan.
20 C05HISSIONER ROBERTSa Who was Er. Pickering?
21 COEEISSIONER AHEARNE:
He was the Assistant 22' Sacratary of State Functions -- (Inaudible).
23 ER. SHERRs The whole context here is that the 24 first genatal area is esally the basi in teras of what 25 ve are doing to strengthen IAEA safeguards and the other o
An N. M __ __
27
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two are activities that were involved and that also 2
tends to or could also support strengthening IAEA 3
safeguards.
4 In terms of examplas of sparifir activities 5
within these specific efforts, one activity is 6
participating in the interagency planning, reviewing and 7
coordinating activities.
8 CONMISSIONER GILINSKYa You have been through 9
that about four times.
10 MR. SHERRa In addition to the standing i
11 interagency groups, we get involved in things like TAS3K 12 and INFCE.
6 13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYa What is TAS%K7 14
- 33. SHERR:
That was the review of safeguards 15 and reprocessing by Toka-Mura and that exercise was 16 looking at safeguards technology.
17 COMEISSIONER GILINSKY: What casa out of that?
18 HR. SHERR I am not sure.
19 C055I55IONER GILINSKIs What did we contribute?
20 HR. SHERE:
We provided a technical review in 21 teras of instrumentation and how it affected ---
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Actual instruments?
23 NB. SHERR Yes.
24 COE5I55IONER GILINSKY:
We supplied 25 instruments to Taka-Mura?
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ER. SH.EE,Q ;.Yo, it was just review.
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COENISSIONER GILINSKYa Review of instruments?
3 ER. 5 HERR Review of the program in terms of 4
the types of instruments that they. vere going to be 5
esploying in the test to demonstrat e how ---
6 CONNISSIONER GILINSKY What were they going 7
to demonstrate?
8 BR. SHERRs I think they were trying to 9
demonstrate that they could provide a measured material 10 balaace within the goal of quantities.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY Is the thing completed 12 or is it still going on?
13 HR. SHERR TASTEI is completed.
14 15 16 17 18 COEMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I just want to pursue 19 this.
I don't mean to press you here unkindly, but so 20 auch of this is turning the crank bureaucratically.
21 Where are the itass whera ve have mais a difference or 22 something has actually happened?
So as you go through l
23 these things maybe you could highlight those.
24
{
ER. SHERR:
Okay.
l l
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN04 That would be helpful i
4
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1 "-because-I"had the same f eeling.
I went back to look 2.~.
2 again at what was said about TASTEX and there was very 3
little.
It doesn't give any indication of what s,
4 participation we had, if any.
5 3R. SHERR I think the first item here 6
happens to be more bureaucratic.
7 C355ISSIONER GILINSKY:
I got set off a little 8
by these interagency meetings.
I mean, it is a forced 9
interagency ites and there are interagency meetings all 10 over town on millions of subjects and it goes on and 11 on.
That is whera th ey ought to deregulate.
12 (Laughter.)
13 C055ISSIONER GILINSKY If you have any 14 friends you can tell that to.
15 (Laughter.)
to COREISSIONER AHEARNE:
Some of us have 17 suggested that we could, f or example, remove the NBC 18 from the export licensing process.
19 COEHISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, some of us don't 20 vant to :stry out our responsibilities, John.
21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Some of us try to 22 interpret responsibilities into the law.
23 HR. SHERR The second area here I think is 24 along moca of tha line which you are addrassing, the 25 direct consultation to the IAEA and to states.
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Extaples of these are we have over the last 2
three or four years directly provided consultation to 3
the IAEA Safeguards Evaluation Section, which is the 4
group that provides the SIR and evaluates inspe= tion 5
results and this type of thing.
Recently we have been 6
providing them consultation on developing a quality 7
assurance program for a containment surveillance which 8
deals with seals and filas in particular.
9 In the past we have been involved in helping 10 then develop procedures, for example ---
11 CONEISSIONER GILINSKYs Do we work with then 12 directly?
Do we go over there or do they 13 HR. SHERR4 Yes, exactly.
14 COMEISSIONER GILINSKYs Somebody goes over, 15 experts from our staff go and talk to them?
16 HR. SHERE:
Yes, sir.
17 MR. BURNETTt Yes.
18 ER. SHERR:
In the past we have worked with 19 them on developing 20 C05HISSIONER GILINSKYa This is presumably run 21 through the mission or through the State Department, and 22 how does that work?
l
\\
23 HR. SHERRa It is basically coordinated by 24 ACDA.
It is between ACDA, NRC and one contractor 25 asployee who is basi:alir providing this.
Rather than 1
~
e 31
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1 providing a cost-free expert, it is basically just 2
divied up in tarss of providing, and we have provided 3
this on sinost a foreign travel funds available basis 4
historically.
It started on a one-time-per-quarter 5
basis and fell bi:k to like once s year and now we are 6
back to twice a year basically.
7 In the past we have provided them consultation 8
and assisted that in developing procedures for 9
examination of records, which is now part of their 10 technical manual in teens of its use.
11 Then the same think in the sase context are 12 procedures for assessment of inspection reports.
We 13 have assisted them in that area.
14 COMNISSIONER AHEARNE:
Do we ever get any 15 assistance on funding that from anybody else?
16 NR. SHERRa Until this last year we had never 17 used any POTAS funds for travel of U. S. Government 18 employees.
We have relaxed that a little bit through 19 some sachinism oc something.
But basically it is in 20 response to a direct agency request that we are 21 providing that parti:uiar person.
The tendency is to 22 try to sinimize that because every time we use travel 23 funds out of POTAS that means there is not a specific 24 project that va :sn suppset, but the sven:7 may be 25 requesting otherwise.
m e n v v ers ~.T m ra w o m m
32
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1 CHAIREAN PALLADINO4
-Do we have access to 2
POTAS fushs?
3 ER. SHERRa You mean for travel?
4 CHAIRHA3 PALLADINO:
For travel and for
~
5 providing consultation servi ~res or advisory services.
6 3R. SHERR Yes, if it is a direct request, 7
although we like to minimize it because it saturates and 8
it wouldn't look too good if it ended up where extensive 9
U.
S. Government travel for employees was being funded 10 out of PorAS.
I think it is legitimate what is being 11 done, but I think it needs to be kept within control.
12 HR. BURNETTs But any time we spend out of 13 POTAS that just comes out of a technical program.
So it 14 is robbing Peter to par Paul.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
My question was more 16 whether ACDA or the State Department had offeced some of 17 their travel funds?
18 ER. SHERRs No.
The closest we got to it is 19 an advisory group meeting where NBC was a participant.
20 So the avancy paid for our travel and ACDA paid travel l
21 for one of their employees.
That is about the closest.
22 We also have done direct consultation with 23 states.
We have been working with Korea for the last 24 couple of years in developing their state regulations.
25 A member of our Facilities Liransing staff has been
33
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1 working with them.
2 ER. BURNETTs I think that is a good 3
example ---
-4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYs How is that 5
arrangement made?
6 ER. SHERRs I don't know.
I don't know how it 7
was initiated.
8 HR. BURNETT2 It is through a bilateral.
A 9
member of the Licensing staff of NHSS has made several to trips to Korea and they are setting up an HCEA progras 11 that airrors the United States, and it is a direct, I 12 think, exam ple of what you were looking for, something 13 hird.
14 ER. SHEA:
Most of our cooperation is in 15 safety, but that is an unusual one where they have asked 16 for assistance in ---
17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNEs Is that the only 18 country?
19 HR. SHEAs That is che only one I believs, 20 except for Japan.
l 21 ER. BURNETTs Japan has asked for general l
22 information.
23 COEMISSIONER AHEARNEs But as far as details 24 in helping to set up a specific ---
25
- 33. BURNETTs Ihat is the only one.
1 3e
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HR. SHERR We provided, and I am not sure if 2
it was in casponsa to a raquast by the agency to assist 3
them in training, direct consulta/ tion to Taiwan in 4
terms of reporting procedures.
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Has any country ever 6
asked for us to look at what they have developed and to 7
pcovida than roanants on how to strengthan it?
8 ER.' BURNETTs No, not that I an aware of.
9 HH. 5 HERR The last iten in this group here 10 is bilateral, exchanges with visitors.
We have on a 11 routine basis foreign visitors who cose in and the topic 12 of conversation is always for us to describe our 13 domestic safeguards program.
So, you know, in that d
cur prog? --what 14 sense, but nothing in terms of this is 15 do you think about it.
i 16 We also participate in the IAEA consultants 17 and advisory group seatings.
I guess it is important in 18 this contaxt to say that when we talk about 19 participating we mean if we are the U. S. participant we 20 prepare the U. S.
position paper on these things and i
21 work out any vocking papers that the advisory group 22 sight come up with for further implementation.
23 Examplas of groups that we have been involved 24 in are the Design Features Group that met last December l
25 in looking at lasign f eatures that -vould f acilitate I
l l.
~
35 6
.:.....{..-
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1 implementation of I AEA saf eguards.
Some of the problems 2
that the IAEA has are to apply safeguards at facilities 3
that are very difficult to apply safeguards to.
So it d
requires more inspection time or reduces the 5
effectiveness of what they can apply.
6 That meeting dealt with design f eatures for 7
IWEs.
Thare vill be another meeting that we are 8
preparing for in September on reprocessing.
9 We also participated in a November meeting, a 10 ransultants amating dailing with pro adures for 11 reporting of exports and imports.
The agency is having 12 serious problems with matching exports and imports,
!3 which is an integral part of their safeguards program.
14 We basically helped then devise the U.
S.
proposals, 15 basically what the agency adopted, and procedures for 16 accomplishing that.
As I will discuss later, we are in i
17 th e precass of developing implementation of that right 18 now.
1 19 In the past, back in the '79 '80 time frame we 20 were involved heavily and made significant contributions 21 in developing an SSAC guidelines.
The guidelines that 22 finally popped out were auch more general than what we 23 would have liked to'have seen, but the agency is still 1
24 looking now to provide more specific guidelines.
In 25 fset, the POTAS program is providing the cost-free
36 u...,,,...,.......m...,n,v.,-,...-,en..
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1 expert this coming year starting this sonth I guess to 2 ' Work on that subject.
l 3
Ihe third area is participation in training 4
courses.
As you are probably aware, the U. S. under DOE 5
sponsocship as vall as the NNP A r2quiresents provides an 6
SSAC training course out in Santa Fe.
I think it is 7
every other year now.
The NRC has provided two lectures 8
for every one of those courses in the last three years.
9 The USSR also provides ---
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYs In Santa Fe?
11 MR. SHERRs Yes.
That is near Los Alames.
12 (Laughter.)
13 RR. BUR 8ETTs Los Alasos has a contract for it.
14 005HISSIONER AHEARNE:
That is a nice place.to 15-be.
16 (Laughter.)
17 ER. BURNETT It is a highly regarded course.
18 HR. SHERRs The USSR is providing for-the tospendsomeoftheirrubhstoprovidea 19 ag en cy on 20 -
training rourse in Russia bs the SSAC.
We have provided
/
21 lectures for that on two occasions, an'd,most recently 22-last 23 COEHISSIONER ROBERfS s I will go observe that 24 one.
I 25 (Laughter.)
t s
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37
........n.
1 HR. SHERE:
The last item is that DOE provides 2
for Foreign Service i fuel cycle and nonproliferation 3
course just to acquaint people.
Our group basically 4
providas the larture on IAEA safeguards.
5 COEMISSIONER GILINSK!:
Where is that course?
6 HE. SHERR:
It is in Washington.
7 (laughter.)
8 COMMISSIONER GIIINSKY:
Who are the students?
9 HR. SHERE:
I don't know exactly.
Jim might 10 ba able to describe more specifically.
qs Me-5 11 ER. SHEA:
Various ci -1_ics with interest.
12 COEMISSIONER GIIINSKYa For foreigners?
13 HR. BURNETTs b
the U.
S.
14 ER. SHERR 15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
What kind of people is take the first two courses?
17 HR. 5HERRa These are representatives of 18 governments.
19 3R. BURNETTs They are the developing nations 20 and they are the hands-on people that are going to have i
21 the role of invaloping the SS AC 's when they get back to 22 their country.
1 1
23 MR. SHERR There is a mixed participation.
24 In fact, some ecurses have higher level people and some (Inaudible).
25 tend to get l
1 l
i 1
38 i
1 ER. BURNETIs They taka ba:R a lot ~of ;iooit,--[l_
2 data and'they cover also physical security.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Is tha NRC involved or 4
has the NRC been involved in the last six months in 5
training courses, or U. S. nonprolifecation courses?
8 NR. SHERR:
Yes.
As a matter of fact, there' 7
is one tomorrow.
I as not sure how often it is.
8 HR. ZIMMEREAN:
Every two months.
5HEh4 Jia Zisserman just recently 9
HR.
10 attended one.
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
How many people are 12 involved?
13 HR. ZIMMERMAN:
Oh, 25 to 30 U.
S. ---
14 CHAIR 3AN PALLADINC:
No, I meant NRC people.
15 ER. ZINNEREAN:
NBC people?
I was the only is one of the students this last time.
I gather we have 17 had one et two each year.
18 Ken Sanders here from NMSS is a lecturer at 19 these coucses.
20 CHAIRHAN PALLADINO:
What I as trying to get a 21 feel for is what is the angnitude of our contribution?
22 Is it one person es=entially full time throughout the 23 year?
Is it one person every two months for a week?
24 ER. BURNETT We have one period to lecture.
25 Is that a two-hour period?
_ As.DERSON REPoR7NG COMPANY,INC. _. _
39
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3 CHAIR 5AN PALLADINO:
A three-hour lecture 4
about how often?
SnuNcsC:
5 HR. N v Every two.aonths, six times a 6
year.
7 COMMISSIONEP AHEARNE:
That is for this last 8
course?
SAudOEK2
- 9 HR. - -
Yes.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINos Which course?
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
The nonpolifera tion 12 course.
j 13 HR. SHERR:
This is like within the 14 government 15 COEEISSIONER GILINSKY:
Eighteen man-hours.
16 (Laughter.)
17 CHAIR 5AN PALLADINO:
Now how about the other 18 training courses?
19 HR. BURNETT4 In the first one we send two 20 people out of our offices, one on physical security and 21 the other on ECEA and they each have about a two to 22 three hout time slot.
23 The course is what, about a week imag?
3 R. W- _ = i..
Two weeks.
24 25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
How often is it run?
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1 MR. 64 Every year they have a 2
two-week course.
On alternating years they have one 3
- ourse on bulk handling f acilities and in the 4
alternating year they have a course on research reactor 5
and power reactors.
In addition, they have a physical 6
security :ourse.
7 HR. BUENETT Then this past year they left 8
that facility and visited one of the licensed power 9
plants for an on-site review of physical security.
It 10 is very highly regarded by the international group.
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Then the commitment of 12 our peopla to support it is very small.
13 HR. BURNETT Very small and very well spent.
14 Of course, va aske contact with each of the country's 15 representatives and then during the visits that rubs off 16 real well.
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
It would be helpful as 18 you go through the other itens if you can give us a feel 19 for what the magnitude of our participation is.
20 EB. SHERRa The specific projects we are l
21 involved in, one is the review of the implications of 22 _ the IAEA technical objectives.
23 COEMISSIONER GILINSKYs What are these 24 technical objectives?
i 25 ER. SHERRs These are the inspection goals.
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What-are we doing 2
about thes?
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3 ER. SHERE:
4 5
Let me step back for a second.
Back in 1976 6
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7 thers were two types of 8
concerns from the NBC.
One type of concern was they are 9
not strong enough.
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY Which goals are you 11 talking about?
Could you idantify tham?
12 ER. SHERR The 8 KGs plutonium, the 25 KGs 13 high-enti:hed ursnius and 75 KGs low-enriched uranium 14 with timeliness.
15 COEMISSIONER GILINSKY Well, whatever it was, 16 the seven to ten days?
17 3R. SHERR:
Right, exactly.
18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Those were, as I 19 understand, developed by some contractor.
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20 ER. SRERE:
SAGSI.
SAGSI basically got it in 21 an ordained fors,from the agency.
22 23 CO3NISSIONER AREARNE:
24
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10 11 HR. SHERE:
There were some concerns related 12 to the a:hievability, the la:k of adaquate definition 13 as well as the general 14 intuition that th ey weren 't achievable from a technical 15 point of view.
16 The other area was dealing in terms of whether 17 or not that was the right laval or something more 18 intense was appropriate.
19 20 21 22 23 l
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8 HR. SHERRa Well, they are tied to it.
I know 9
there is some -- (Inaudible).
10 COEHISSIONER GILINSKYa By a multiplication 11 factor, yas.
12 COEMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But it is kind of the 13 reference point.
14 Ken, you are shaking your head.
15 HR. SANDERSs 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Ken, if you stard up I 24 can see you bettar and I can hear you better.
25 ER. SANDERSa I,am trying to look while I am
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3 CHAIRHAN PALLADIN04 Oh, okay.
Go ahead.
4 MB. SANDERS:
One of the things I threw in my 5
brief=ssa in coming hora todir was a copy of the 6
inspection goals used for 1980.
If I can find that I 7
would like to ---
8 BR. BURNETI:
Ken was an inspector over with 9
the IAEA for two years.
10 ER. SANDERS:
If I any viva an example.
The IAEA categorizes the facilities into four categories, 11 12 one being light watac raa: tors ani than :ompares the inspection activities to the inspection goals.
13 14 For light estar reactors in 1980, and ' this is 15 no differant for 1981, 16 s
17 18 19 20 21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
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1 CONEISSIONER GILINSKY.4 I wasn't actually 2'
thinking of the light water reactor case.
i 3
Your other point is important, too, because 4
even if they vera seating these goals, that doesn't 5
square with the objective of safeguards as laid down by 6
the IAEA, which is to deter diversion by the threat of l
7 early detection.
8 In other words, if your objective is to get 9
there roughly at the tima someone can make a bomb, or in 10 fact as they really ala two or three times that sort of 11 time, then how can you be doing your job to deter by the 12 threat of early detection?
You are not doing your job.
13 So it just doesn' t square with the IAEA's own 14 fandamentti obja:tivas.
15 CHAIREAN PALLADINO:
Does the IAEA objective 16 have timely warning in there?
17 COEEISSIONER GIIINSKY:
It is precisely that, 18 deter diversion by the threat of early detection.
Ther 19 had a two part.
There is a political objective, and 20 that is there other part.
21 ER. BURNETI:
They come now to say more like 22 vall you can't totally rely on the IAEA system.
It has 23 to be linked with other systems like ~ intelligence.
24 COEEISSIONER GILINSKYa Now they are saying I
25 that.
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that.
3 COMMISSIONER ROBERIS:
Who is they?
4 MR. BURNETTs IAEA now says that.
5 COMMISSIONER GIIINSKYa Well, they are saying,,
6 ve have to rely on intelligence.
7 ER. BURdETT:
Right.
They can't provide the 8
ultimate safeguards.
It is one tool in coordination 9
with tools that sre available to other countries.
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, as originally 11 laid imun 12 HR. BURNETI:
I know.
g 13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYa
--- it was expected to 14 dammhr deter diversion by the threat of early 15 detection.
Now it can do it in some areas, but it can 't 16 do it 17 COMMISSIONER AREARNE:
I don't know whether it 18 was really expected to.
The statement was there.
19 HR. BURNETTa The goal was there.
i 20 C05MISSIONER AHEARNE:
But as we just heard, 21 the goals were ---
22 COMMISSIONER GIIINSKY No, this is 23 differant.
This acre formal.
The stuf f that we are 24 talking about here is the product of committees and so 25 on which I think is what you are going to sa y 1
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1 C053I55IONES AHEARNE:
Well, no.
I was going 2
to really say that the NRC apparently didn 't think it 3
was technically feasible when they originally ---
4 COHNISSIONER GILINSKY:
But 2
- deter 5
diversion by the threat of early detection, that is down 6
in their basic documents and that is something that the 7
IAEA itself has written down and approved and it has 8
been in th' era for some time.
These specific numerical 9
goals are the products of various advisory committees 10 and have been adopted as a practice and they don't have 11 the same fo rmai status.
12 CHAIREAN PALLADINO But the objective was to 13 deter by the thraat of early identification.
14 COMEI55IONER AMEARNE:
Exartly.
15 CHAIRHAN PALLADINO4 It wasn't to guarantee 16 that they were going to identify for you early enough 17 the intended diversion.
18 C05HI55IONER GILINSKYs They go on to say 19 implicit in this is that you are going to detect early 20 enough and with high enough confidence.
I asan 21 otherwise the whole' thing doesn't make any sense.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
This is subtle wording 23 and you are aisquoting the wording.
24 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYs It isn't the
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25 possibility, you know, it isn ' t th a t there is a chance 1
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3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
B ut, you see, as we 4
have seen, there are some countries who have adamantly 5
rasistad having safeguaris applied, and at least there 8
are some people, nyself included, who have a suspicion 7
that the reason that they are doing that is because ther 8
think that that threat is sufficiantly believable that 9
they don't want those safeguards applied.
to COEHISSIONER GILINSKYa Yes, but so what?
So 11 they don't want to even take a slight chance.
12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNEa They think it is a lot 13 larger thsn a slight chance.
I think the system 14 basically does have a strong th re at to it.
15 COREISSIONER GILINSKY s Well, you know, we 18 have mach got to decide how affectiva the system is.
17 But when the system itself is saying that it doesn 't 18 even aim to catch the diversion on a time scale shorter 19 than you could turn this stuff into a bomb, you know, 20 what kind of a* system is that?
21 MR. BURNETI:
Wall, you also have to take into 22 account that they have said that, particularly for 23 plutonium, Consissioner G111nshy.
24 C0d!ISSIONER GILINSKIs I will tell you where 25 this comes from.
Originally averyona thought in terms l
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5 C05MISSIONER AHEARNE:
The insider diversion 6
sesnacio, the tiny littia amount demand.
7 COEHISSIONER GILINSKY:
They really didn't 8
think in terms of a country simply taking the stuff and 9
deciding it is going to make bombs.
10 One of the reasons for that is that years ago 11 va used to think that making bombs is this horrendous 12 thing, $2 billion in los Alamos ande you know, that sort 13 of thing.
So thst it was just impossible for anybody to 14 do this without us knowing about it, but in fact as more 15 and more information is available and if people do their 16 homework, and we all know that countries have done 17 computer runs and have done various kinds of tests and 18 so on, it is a whole different world and then it ices 19 matter.
20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNEs It is still difficult.
21 It is not easy to make a bomb.
It still taker a lot of 22 work and a lot of preparation to get there.
It is 23 certainly true that a lot of countrias are now able to j
.. 24 invest that kind of time and effort to doing it.
25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
And many have.
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1 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO[ Yi~o,}gzo[urpoinEthat 2
the objectives are so unachiavable that we shouldn't'try 3
to improva the I AEA safeguaris?
Are the objectives 4
vrong?
5 COEZISSIONER GILINSKY:
I as saying the 6
objectives for cartain kinds of materials, for nuclear 7
explosive materials are just not such that they will let 8
rou meet the fundamental goals of the agency.
I think 9
what one needs to say is that you are not safeguarding 10 that matarial.
You =an't safeguari tha t aaterial.
What 11 you can do is inspect it to the extent it is there when 12 one inspects it.
13 But I think it is 1 whola diffarant kettle of 14 fish in dealing with reactors where, you know, the goals 15 I think are schiavable in prin:19 I---
16 CHAIREAN PALLADINO:
I was trying to get how 17 your point fit into trying to understand what NRC's ---
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, I will tell you l
19 where this leads me.
20 CHAIENAN PALLADINO:
No, I as serious.
21 COMHISSIONER OILINSKYs The raa: tors and their 1
22 fuel and so on compr'ise, I don 't know, 95 percent of all 23 nuclear activitias or more, 98 percent.
There you can 24 have a system which really can perform this safeguarding
(
25 function.
I mean, it requires improvement and I think l
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5 I think in the othar aran when we are talking 6
about higaly enriched uranius and plutonium you can't do 7
th at.
Now to the extent it is there you want to inspect 8
it and so on, but I think we ought to talk about it in a 9
different way.
One of the contributions we can make is 10 to urge that these things be described differently.
11 COMZISSIONER AHEARNE:
I certainly have no 12 problam with thnir being described differently.
I 13 thought though if we do that we ought to be explicit as f
14 to what kind of 1 gotl we believe yd ought to be there 15 or what kind of a goal can be there.
16 For example, it is possible to say the goal 17 should be that if a rountry has devoted substantial 18 effort into developing the technology for a nuclear 19 vaapon and has done all of the fairly extensive homework 20 required to devalop a design, then the time required to 21 take a formula quantity and make it into a bomb is very, 22 very short.
It ran be a wee'< or a f av days.
l 23 In that case ve can then raise the question 24 should the goal be to guarantee that you can detect the 25 diversion of the formula quaatity within a day.
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Many 2
people, or at least some people have~1ppeared to 3
describe the goal as it ought to be that.
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYa Well, I would say it 5
wouldn't even help if you could do it in a day.
But in 6
practice you can't do it in i day, and it may be that 7
what they are doing is as much as can realistically be 8
done or whatever and you want them to just do the best 9
they can.
10 But I think we ought to be clear that this 11 does not provide the same alarm function or safeguarding 12 f unction that it does on say reactors and their fuel 13 where the times are such that you in fact can alarm the 14 system.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Fine.
I have no 16 probles with that.
Ihe problem where I have had a basic 17 disagreemant I think with you, Vic, is tha t there has 18 been an ispression, and I don't know whether from you or 19 from others, but the impression that the goal ought to 20 be that you could do that, and I just don't think you 21 can do that.
I don't think that you can expect the l
22 systen ta be able to do that, to provide that timely l
23 COMMISSIONER OILINSKY:
Even if it were 24 instantaneous it would hardly matter..
25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Hight.
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ought to be elest that reactors are safeguarded in a way 3
that these nuclear explosive ma terials are not.
Those 4
are inspected and, sure, we would lika to have as much 5
information on it as possible, and if the guys were o
there last week, then we know the stuff vss ther's last 7
week, but that is about it.
8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But, of course, the 9
opposite, or at least from my view, the opposite part of 10 ay argument is, and it has nothing to do really at that 11 stage that the ILEA really csils into mind the other 12 intellicence information, but there are some countries 13 on whon vs do hiva enough intelligenre information to 14 have a fsirly confident apprsisal of whether or not they 15 have done all th e rest of this hosework which would to enable them to do that rather transition.
There are 17 other countries in which we have no information, or 18 simost none.
So the world does separite it into 19 different 20 C05EISSIONER AHEARNEa The difficulty is that 21 the IAEA can't in any simple var incorporate that kind 22 of information.
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Absolutely not.
It (Simultaneous Conversations -- Inaudible).
24 can't.
25 00EMISSIONER GILINSKY:
And also while it is AL.DERSON REPCRTING COMPANY,INC,
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before it really is a few days to saka a bomb ---
3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That is right.
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYs you are making 5'
arrangements and you are agreeing to facilities being.,
6 out in countries that subsequently any do all that extra 7
background work.
You have no control over that.
That 8
is not forbiidan by any agressant.
9 So basically for the long haul you have to 10 assume that anyone that you provide this material to or 11 is allowed to have this material, or whatever, may in 12 the futu're be in a position where they can make a bomb 13 in.a few days.
14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE I as not really sure 15 what the futura long haul part of the argument has to do 16 with it because it would seem to me that no matter what 17 kind of agreement or arrangesent is set up there is 18 always that potential.
19 COEMISSIONER GIIINSKY:
let me just take this 20 one' step further and tell you exactly what I have in 21 mind and why I press on this point is because when we 22 talk about safa7antting activitias or plutonium or 23 highly enriched uranium or whatever, we bestow a kind of-24 legitimacy on that activity which it oughtn't to have, 25 or we giva it a kind of safe character which it doesn't ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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' CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What would you suggest to 3
improve it?.That is what I think we were trying to get 4
at.
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, since we are 6
taking a transcript, I disagree with that, that we do 7
automatically bestow upon that' cachet, 8
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, I mean that has 9
been the effect of it.
You know, just take the word to "safeguariing," it is you are making safe.
You know, 11 you are protecting it.
That material is not protected 12 by this IAEA safeguards in the same way that a reactor 13 is protected.
14 COEEISSIONER AHEARNE:
That is correct, but it 15 is proterted by the IAEA threat systam coupled with, at 16 least as f ar as the U. S. and I imagine some other 17 co'un trie s, their in telligence systems.
And I a= not 18 sure whether one of the reasons that some people believe 19 that it was meant to be more than that is because some 20 of the people have raised the argument that here is what 1
21 it ought to be able to do and it doesn't do it.
So a 22 listenar thinks, gee, it really ought to be able to do 23 that.
24 CHAIREAN PALLADINO:
let's see what we get out 1
25 of this discussion.
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2 COEMISSIONER GILINSKYa Frankly, I wouldn't 3
refer to the inspection system over plutonium and high 4
enriched uran,ius as saf eguarding.
Frankly, Blix vants 5
to get away from that title, too, from that-nomenclature.
~
6 CHAIR 3AN PALLADINO Are you recommending we 7
carry this back to State and recommend that they push it?
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYa Yes.
9
-- (Simultaneous Conversations -- Inaudible).
10 CHAIRNAN PALLADIN0s What is tha t, Vic?
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYa I said if you don't 12 like it I will propose something else.
13 (Laughter.)
14 CHAIR 3AN PALLADINO No.
I think it is a 15 point that is maybe worth writing up --
(Inaudible).
16 COHEISSIONER GILINSKY:
I think they basically 17 recognize this.
You know, it is the kind of thing where 18 I think averybody basically rarogniza it, but we have 19 talked about it a different way all these years and it 20 is avkvari to g a t away from that.
21 Our difficulty, it seems to me, is not dealing 22 with a disagreemant but dealing with our agreement.
23 COENISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, sone people 24 racognize it, but I have continued to be astonished when 25 va go to, for exampla, a Congressional hearing and hear ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC,
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4 C0!EI55IONER GILINSKY:
Well, I mean the 5
people who are close1T involved.
6 CHAIRE45 PALLADINO:
Well, that includes 7
Congress.
8 Now seriously, Vic, this say be a point worth 9
drafting a proposal on.
10 Well, why don't we try to go on.
11 (Laughter.)
12 (Simultaneous Conversations -- Inaudible).
13 ER. DIRCKS:
That is what I triad to say in 14 the beginning 15
( La ugh ter. )
' 16 HR. DIRCKS:
that we are giving you a few 17 little tiibits hare that you can make into a banquet.
18 (Laughter.)
19 ER. SEERRa In terms of resources, the 20 technical objectives study, the funding of that was 2u0K 21 and the sonitoring of that project probably was l
22 somewhere between one and two man-years over a ---
23 CHAIREAN PALLADINO:
Which project are you nov 24 on?
25 ER. SHERR This is the technical objectives
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HR. SHEBR:
The first bullet,, the implications
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4 of IAEA technical objectives.
5 The second area there is the design features 6
to facilite IAEA safeguards.
Basically, as I indicated before,thetfrust of this study is to look at ways of 7
8 reducing the amount of resources the IAEA has to spend 9
to safeguard a facility or, conversely, to increase the 10 effectiveness for a given resource.
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Are we involved in that?
12 ER. SHERR Yes.
13 14 We have conducted studies for LWRs, 15 reprocessing and 10I.
As I indicated earlier, we have 16' participated in the IAEA consultants meeting on 17 establishing an I AEA policy in design features.
That 18 was directed to LWRs.
The next one vill be in September 19 dealing with reprocessing.
The funding for that was 20 330K over a three-year time period, and again that is 21 probably somewhere between one and two man-years of 22 effort in terms of monitoring that work.
24 25 l
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10 11 12 13 14 15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
16 17 ER. SHERE:
Quite f rankly, I think for a long 18 time it vis just a matter of they just didn't have the 19 staff to get on top of it.
This is about the same time 20 that 21 COM3IESIONER GILINSKY:
Why?
Were they 22 objecting to it?
23 COMYISSIONER AREARNE:
Right.
t 24 MR. SHERRs They didn't obdact to it.
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I think at that point in the 4
process they felt that a formalized criteria was not the 5
politi: vir to go.
I =in't tall you ---
6 COEEISSIONE2 GILINSKY:
I must say that I 7
think that at,least a certain degree of formalization 8
vould be useful and I would support that.
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I would say we should 10 go back and -- (Simultaneous Conversations -- Inaudible).
11 MR. SHERR Ihst is what I as saying.
This is 12 one of the ones that I think it should.be -- (Inaudible).
13 COMMISSIONER AREARNE:
We ought to go back, 14 and since the Working Group has turned it down maybe we 15 aight try to raise it on a higher level because to certainly, based on other information, that is clearly 17 something that (Inaudible).
18 MR. SHEA:
I think their feeling at that point for.fohhic_a} : d 19 was that they vece reluctant to pursue it 20 reasons.
21 COMYISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, it is ultimately 22 up to them, but it seems to me useful for us if we agree 23 to recommand to them that ther ought to pursue it.
If 24 they decide in the end they don't want to, they won't.
25 ER. RURNEIT:
And they didn't.
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from that other information that has come in, but I 4
think it is right to pursue it further.
5 HR. SHERRa I don 't know how we are -
6 time-vise.
The last two areas here again ver'e two areas 7
where they are not quite as pointed in terms of the a
contributions to strengthening IAEA safeguards.
They 9
are basically by facilitating the implemen tation of 10 safeguards in the United States and helping the agency 11 to conserve their resources.
Doing so is one aspect of 12 it and also trying to be as :ooperative as we possibly 13 can to set a good example for how it can be done right 14 and hopefully we won't be coun terproductive in that 15 regard.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 But don't hold your breath.
24
( La ugh t e r. )
25 003MI55IONER GILINSKY:
You mentioned here, Ai.canscN REPoGiET)@@I%DfJ$23"9 s
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HR. BURNETI:
No.' This was the management 7
8 study.
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKT Do we have that rescrt?
10 HR. SHERE:
Cooper, Lyb N and Ross.
11 12 13 14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY Have you sent that up 15 to the various offices?
16 XR. ShlERH s The management report?
17 COEHISSIONER GILINSKT Yes.
18 MR. SHERR Yes.
That was quite a while ago.
19 It was about a year and a half ago.
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY I camesbar Cooper and 21 Lyb 22 MR. SHERR:
This is an important area because 23 this is dealing with the agency's personnel practices l
24 which, like anywhere else, or it any be acre sensitive I
25 than is averywhere else.
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Now subsequent to this the study has been 6
complated.
Ihe avanry has very carefully embraced the 7
recommendations.
We are now providing a cost 8
COENISSIONER AHEARNE:
Does that the --
I 9
(Inaudibla).
10 HR. SHERRs Well, you know, some of them are 11 very difficult to put in pla:e, but we are providing 12 through a POTAS program a cost-free expert to keep on o
top of implementing those rerosspations.
So they are 13 14 follow through ---
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNEa We are providing 16 someone to help 17 ER. BURNETTa The United Sta tes and not the 18 NBC.
19 HR. SHERH4 This is through the POTAS 20 program.
The POTAS program is funding an individual to l
l 21 he working at the IAEA.
i 22 C033I55IONER AHEARNEs I thought if we had 23 sonaone who was casily an expert at -- (Simultaneo us 24 Conversations -- Inaudible).
?
25 (laughter.)
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correcttED record there.
1 NR. SHERE:
When I say've'I as talking about
- 4 tne U. S.,
5 The next vievgraph, plasse.
6 COE3ISSICNER AHEARNE:
I was going to say 7
where was he whan -- (Insudible).
8 HR. SHERR In terms of what additional things 9
va ara going to be doing in the future is under 10 consideration.
11 As Mr. Dircks indicated in the beginning, we 12 are going to do a comprehensive review of what is going 13 on right now, identification of gaps and 14 racomandations.
I tnink in Es t what we are doing here 15 is going to tie into.also the review of priorities in 18 terms of the Action Plan Working Group.
17 COE5ISSIONER AHEARNE:
Now should that be 18 viewed as an update of the original development of the 19 Action Plan list?
20 ER. SHERR:
The var I would laea at this right 21 now is, you know, I don't know when va get all done we 22 might find out that all the things that we could 23 possibly be doing we are directng our ef f orts to and 24 there really aren't any other avenues that are left open 25 to pursue.
But this is kind of taking inventory of l
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where we ses at.
2 The difficult part from at least the staff's 3
point of view is identifying the baseline in terms of 4
what we are working against and in terms of where ve 5
vant to be.
And like the Action Plan is f airly 6
qualitative, and one of the guastions is whether we want 7
to be less qualitative or not in defining that baseline.
8 CHAIRHAN PALLADINO Is this a revision of a 9
former identification of ---
10 MR. BURNETTs It is a second look and see.
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
When did this new 12 initiative get started?
13 3R. SHERBs We started it when we got the EDO 14 paidance I think in April and we started working on this.
15 CHAIRMAH PALLADINO:
When you say ve, you mean 16 the NRC or ---
17 3R. BUENEII:
Yes, and NMSS in particular.
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSK!
Can you give me an 19 example of a gap?
20 ~
HR. SHERR4 The gap that exists right now.
21 COMMISSIONER GIIINSKY I mean this is so 22 general that I find it hard to 23 CHAIREAN PALLADING:
I wasn't sure this was 24 even NRC.
You vece talking about the Action Plan Review 25 Gcoup I guess.
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essentially the research contract?
3 ER. SHERE:
Yes.
4 HR. BURNETIs Yes.
5 ER. SHEA Yes.
8 C055I55I3NER AHEARNEs So that it is listed on 7
page 5 of tha paper.
8 HR. 5 HERR Yes, that is what we are talking 9
about.
10 Now the research contract I think, as Mr.
11 Dircks said in the beginning, is to support our 12 evaluation of this ---
13 CHAIREAN PALLADINO:
This one?
14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNEs Yes.
So it is 2, 3 and 15 4.
18 HR. SHERRa Yes.'
17 HR. BURNETT:
And we are on line to have that 18 back to you by January '83.
19 COMNISSIONER AHEAREE:
Will yourcontractor ha 20 able to get access to enough information, that is the l
21 sensitive information ---
22 C05HISSIONER GILINSKY:
Who is your contractor?
23 3R. SHERR Righ t now the we have sent 24 basically proposals to Brookhaven N ational Laboratories 25 and Pacific Northwest Laboratory.
Now I don 't knov l
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talking about?
5 ER. SHERR:
120K.
My general view is that 6
Brookhaven vould know better all the U. S. activities 7
that are going on because of its relationship to the 8
POTAS program.
On the other hand, PNL is in a better 9
position to judge the sense of how well things are being 10 achierad.
So I don 't '<now who is going to get the 11 contract, but I think in either case both of them are 1
12 a:tively involvei in supporting the IAEA safeguards, 13 things right now.
14 COEMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So it is about a 15 three-sonth stair?
16 ER. BURNETT Yes.
17
- 53. SHERR :
Ihe basic purpose is just to ---
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY I will tell yo's, both 19 of those contractors, and certainly Brookhaven, are 20 kaovledgeable.
I mean, they have been involved.
But 21 they have also baan caught up in that system.
And I 22 vonder whether it might not be helpful to get someone 23 aise?
l 24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What system?
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5 ER. SHERR But isn't that the dilemma?
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7 C055ISSIONER GILINSKY:
Yes, but there is just 8
m disinclination to really take a tough minded view of 9
the subject.
That is what I sense up at Brookhaven to anyway at least.
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You mean they won't 12 identify gaps?
13 COMMISSIONER OILINSKY:
At least I have sensed 14 that in the past, let ze put it that way.
That may be 15 an unfair consant on their prasent outlook.
16 ER. BURNETTs They si'ght look at it as a 17 failure of the P3TAS system which they administer, or at 18 least part of.
It is possible.
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Or, :envarsaly, ther 20 might view it as an opportunity to just regurgitate the 21 problems they have trial to raisa with the POTAS group, l
22 and neither one would really be very satisfactory.
23 COMNISSIONER GILINSKY It :ould be.
I just 24 don' t know.
25 MR. SHERRs They might also view it as l
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5 MR. 5 HERR What I am saying, you know, is I 6
think the Action Plan Working Group, in other words, we 7
haven't just stack with where va vara be:suse we ha ve 8
identified problems along the way that 9
have basically supplesented or replaced different things in the Action 10 Plan.
New actions have been identified.
Whether or 11 not, you know, this kind of taking a stop, look, see 12 comprehensive intentory of where thin 3s are at is goin 13 g
to yield any new insights, but it is basically just time 14 to stop sad take an inventory if there ara additional 15 things we could be doing.
16 COENISSIONER AHEARNE: You have got a fairly 17 interesting phrase down here in your conclusion about 18 things that could be done.
You say "Lisited Executive 19 Branch resources have resultad in little or not progress 20 in several specific areas."
21 ER. SHERR Well, I think that is righ t.
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But that leads to the 4
question of do you see a major problem being that we 5
don't know what ;sps there ace and what weaknesses there 6
are, or do you see the major problem being th a t we 7
haven't identifiad some thing that ought to~be done and 8
there haven't been enough people or enough resources to 9
put on those problems?
10 MR. SHERE:
Historically we started off with 11 that Action Plan with all the actions with everything we 12 vece going to do and va founi that va vera falling 13 behind.
14 CHAIRMAN PAL 1ADINO:
You found what?
15 HR. SHERE:
We found we were falling behind.
16 Then we vent through a priority Action Plan that said, 17 okay, we know we can't do everything so le t's identify 18 these priority activities that need to be done and we 19 found that we were falling behind.
20 COEMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Then it seems lik e this 21 recommendation is well, let's take another look to see 22 vnethat there are some more ' problems or different 23 priorities to attach.
But you are telling me that n
24 perhaps the major problem has been that we have unable 25 to put enough resour:es on ---
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ER. SHERRs.
I think we ha ve, for all practical 3
purposes, we have met all our commitments.
4 COHEISSIONER GILINSKYs Well, does this thing 5
ha ve serious priority if it is State or does they throv 6
up these programs avary now sad than avery time the 7
Congress ---
8 CHAIRHAN PALLADIN0s Let's go back a little 9
bit in time.
Ihere was an action group much before my 10 time, but let's say ---
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It started in
'77.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
'77.
Then somewhere 13 along the line, like a couple or three years ago, 14 everything dropped and there was really no Action Plan.
15 There was no Action Plan Working Group and nobody ever 16 set is my impression.
17 HR. SHERRs No, it was just coming 18
-- (Simultaneous Conversations -- Inaudible).
19 CHAIBMAN PALLADIN0s Well, let me go back.
I 20 have a little bit of basis for what I say; quite a. bit 21 of basis for what I say.
I found as a result of our 22 f amous November 27th letter, I learned tha t this group 23 wasn't working.
They hadn't had a meetin; in two years 24 is wha t I was told.
l 25 MR. BURNETTs Oh, the ISG ---
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4 COMMISSIONER AHE AR!iEs That is the Interagency 5
Steering Group.
6 ER. BURNETT Th e steering group, which is 7
above the working group had not met for years.
The 8
vorking group had plodded along.
9 CHAIRHAN PALLADINO:
If there is not an 10 interagency group that is going o ersight to this, then 11 maybe that is part of the problem.
Something was 12 happening 13 MR. BURNETI:
I think it would be that it was 14 da-emphasized.
Ihat would be a f air sta tement.
15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What was that?
16 CORZISSIONER AREARNE:
De-emphasized.
17 HR. BURNETT:
De-esphasized, and you veuld 18 have to sgree with that even though you vent to the 19 Eeetings.
(Indicating Mr. Sherr.)
i 20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Well, maybe the action 21 group was working there but there is nobody listed.
22 ER. SHEAa You are really pi.cking up on when l
23 they would say we can only do so much and we lack l
24 resources and nobody was responding taking actions and i
25 decisions.
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I vill take that correction.
But then the 3
interagency group was not meeting.
I know one of these 4
committees was not meeting.
5 ER. BUR 3ETTs The steering group.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
All right, the steering 7
group.
The impression I got was that nobody was 8
listening and now be:ausa of the impetus of this letter 9
there was interest in getting things started again and 10 get a group that would begin to listan.
11 Now since that I hope has happened, has there 12 been any improvement in the listening in the follow-an 13 group?
Ihat was really what I was trying to get at.
I 14 was trying to put this in perspective ---
15 ER. SHERS:
I have got aixed si;nals.
On one 16 side in ters of the Interagency Steering Group, all the 17 agencies that stayed inactive in particular I think are 18 trying to prepara proposals and justify the need for 19 acre resources in their area which we would welcome.
I 20 think back in '83 or '81 ve told them.
Around that same 21 time period where things were dragging, I think we in 22 fact wrota Stata a lattar and said va think you need to 23 devote more effort in this area.
Now that is a signal 24 on one side.
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6 CHAIREAN PALLADINO:
Do you have any clues as 7
to why that is happenin37 Is it a result of the working 8
group not wishing to meet more often?
9 ER. SHERRs No.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN04 Is it f rustration on the
' 11 part of the working group saying there is no point in 12 meeting?
13 ER. DISCKSs I think we are hearing the same 14 thing.
When we started off somebody mentioned a number 15 of meetings, but the meetings have been going on for 16 years and they are regurgi$ ng many of the same problems 17 yaar in ani yase out and everyone has identified the
.18 problems.
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
In other words, the 20 problems are knows It is the f act that the resources 21 don't get applied to the problems.
22
-- (Simultaneous Conversations -- Inaudible).
23
!R. DIRCKS:
And you wonder whether ---
24 HR. SHERas I wouldn't read too much into that 25 ei the r.
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they hava slowly baen. able to get a few million dollars 3
a year in this technical support program and that is 4
useful.
They are building equipment and getting 5
hardwtre.
They have been abla to I guess encourage the 6
IAEA to go in certain directions in a limited way to 7
opening up the IAEA, and that is mora a function 8
probably of getting 9
'COEMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You said a few million 10 dollars a year.
The POTAS report here lists $19 11 million.
Does that overlap the program ?
12 MR. SHEA That is right.
It is what, three 13 or four a year.
14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Five years I think that 15 was.
16 HR. SHEA But I think what they do is they 17 run up against politiral. problems within the IAEA or 18 within their perspective of how to handle this and I 19 think that is where things tend to bog down.
They also 20 lack the resources of people to push these issues in the 21 Executive Branch.
So not a whole lot gets done.
What 22 is accomplishai smens to be vary slow and over a long 23 period of time ---
24 MR. BURNETTa But, Jim, this resources area, 25 they cry this at every meeting.
But the truth of the I
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work that they didn't have time to do.
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what they are saying is that it doesn ' t have a high 7
enough priority f or me, the State Department, to do it.
8 Th at is how I read it.
9 HR. SHEA:
Compared with the other things,
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10 there are always the cables to.get out and the immediate 11 support to the kosts abroad or the Secretary of State s
12 has gone up to testify.
So they are caught up with 13 that.
The othat issue is ther viav it as a long-term ie.prody 14 operation ofAthe safeguards.
15 COEMISSIONER GILINSKYa Well, they don't want 16 to make waves either.
17
-- (Sinultaneous Conversations -- Inaudible).
18 3R. SHEA:
They just put it down as a lower 19 priority.
20 HR. SHERR:
There is another aspect to that.
21 I can't ramember exactly when this took place, but 22 within the last year, the chairmanship for the Technical 23 Support Coo rdina ting Committee transferred from DOE to 24 State.
Now the representatives on the Tachnical Support 25 Coordinating Committee overlap quite a bit with the l
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6 asked before and they are tating a pratty strong 7
annagement role in that chairsanship position.
8 C05MISSIONER GILINSKYa Who is this now?
9 NR. SHERBs State.
10 CONHISSIONER GILINSKYa And who is it?
11 NR. SHERR:
Al Sessoms.
He was one of the 12 gentlemen who briefed us.
But they are doing a good
~
13 dob.
Maybe internally they are putting more attention 14 on getting a firm handla and taking over this new 15 responsibility in terms of technical support is co ordinatin g, and that is also a constraint maybe that 17 is affecting their resources.
18 I don't know and I can tell you exactly why 19 these this;s, roc know.
Ihe asetings are scheduled and 20 then they get postponed because something came up.
21 CHAIR 3AN PALLADIN0a There is one thing that 22 you said that I would like to clear up that bothered me 23 a little bit.
You said this steering group is 24 preoccupied with other things and they give this lower 25 priority.
Is the steering group not steering?
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4 MR. SHERR:
I have never been told that' i
5 officially.
It is just that ---
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Where does this steering 7
group fit into the picture?
Isn't it supposed to be the 8
arm that brings it to the attention of State and all the
~
9 other boitas what they ought to ba doing?
10 ER. SHERR That tha t right.
11 ER. SHEA:
Sperifirally in this aras for 12 safeguards.
It isn 't a group that handles other things, 13 just safaguards ---
14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Are they not giving it 15 consideration to the suggested improvements for IAEA 16 safeguards?
17 MR. BURNETI:
That is a hard one to answer.
18 They sit around and we talk about it.
19 ER. DISCKS:
But you have been talking about 20 it for years.
They know the problems.
21 COMMISSIONER GILINSK!:
It is too avkvard to 22 deal with them.
23 HR. DIRCKS:
And it is very avkvard to deal 24 with them.
You are dealing with an international 25 organization.
The ligit of our nation, we have a role, l
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10 11 12 13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, that is one way 14 of putting it.
Another war of putting it is he said 15 that one should be taalistic in how far va can go.
16 ER. DIRCKS Yes.
17 COMMIS3IONER AHEARNE:
18 19 20 21 22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO And that was part of the l
23 thrust of tha ravitalizad steering group.
It was 24 supposed to identify _those areas where there is a payoff.
25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY Well, they must be ALDERSCN REPCRTING COMPANY. INC.
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4 COMMISSIONER GIIINSKY And Kennedy has got 5
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6 MR. BURNETTs The people that are occupying 7
those positions are soving cautiously.
8 HR. SHEAs And they are losing a key person.
9 John Boright has been a key person in the safeguards 10 efforts.
11 CHAIRMAN PAllADINO:
Where is he going?
12 HR. SHEA4 He is going to be the Science 13 Counselor in Paris.
He is in language training now.
14 CHAIRMAN PA11ADINCs Where is he going?
15 ER. SHEA:
Paris to be the Science Counselor.
16 So they are losing a key person and they will have to i
17 try and fill in.
State has a problem because they find 1
18 it difficult to bring in non-Foreign Service people into 1
i 19 the State Departaent and to fight that administrative i
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They may have to accept a Foreign Service i
21 officer who will have have to get up to sposi on all i
22 these issues and they have limited slots.
And they and A~DAhafvery similar problems with resources.
23 24 So resources is a key problem which tends to i
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6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINCa Well, I was trying to get i
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that you really think we ought to be taking and getting 9
se up to speed on it.
10 11 HR. BURNETT Let me give you a candidate for 12 that then.
'Je have been told for years and years, or we 13 havv been telling them, that we need more information.
14 So this body decided to ask NMSS to put together the 15 information that we know on a country.
He did that.
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN04 Information on what?
17 NR. BURNETT:
That we know about countries.
18 C05MISSIONER AHEARNE:
For each country.
19 ER. BURNETT Then it was decided and the 20 Commission agreed that we would send this over to the 21 State Depsetnent to have it icoked at to fill in the 22 gaps.
This is a candidate for what you are talking 23 about.
I Four now sit over there, one approaching
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25 CHAIR 5A3 PALLADINO:
That is a decent period.
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C0!!ISSIONER AREARNE:
But, Bob, there are two 8
other pieres that you have to put into that picture.
9 The first is that even if they told us what was lacking, 10 that imens't nacassacily address the issua hare of what 11 sort of actions should we take.to improve safeguards.
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
The second, as I think 14 va all carogniza, is there are certain types of 15 information which aren 't in those.
16 HR. BURNETTs Yes, and that is made clear.
17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I know.
So it isn't as 18 though here is averything that the NRC knows ---
19 ER. BURNETT No 20 00EMISSIONER AREARNE:
--- and now tell us 21 what else night be there.
It is here is everrthing that 22 the NBC knows sinus ---
i 23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKT But the point remains i
24 they just ignored the whole thing.
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What I was trying to get ALDERSCN REPORTING COMPANY,INC,
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8 C05EISSIONER AHEARNE:
I think that is ---
9 HR. BURNETT4 I think we all agree that that 10 one could move.
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes, or should.
12 ER. BURNETTs But that one is hung up 13 politically and the othat ona is hung up resource-vise.
14 COMEISSIONER AHEAREEs Yes, but I think that, 15 for example, that one.
I would suggast on the resources 16 if you can identify a few of the areas where you feel 17 are most :ritical for casour:as to be applied, that is 18 another ---
19 CHAIREAN PALLADINoa That is the kind of thing 20 I was thisking of.
21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes.
22 CHAIR 5AN PALLADIN0s Because Kennedy did make 23 I thought a significant' commitment to try to work to l
l 24 improve the IAEA safeguards and I would like to take his 25 up on that in some fashion and that might be a good way l
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I don't mean to suggest that I
3 they aren't.
I think that thay are in their own way.
4
-- (Sisultaneous Conversations -- Inaudible).
5 ER. BURNETTs Well, seriously they are.
They 6
are working through informal channels ---
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINOs I as not going to try to 8-tall his how to accomplish it, but if he can focus on 9
one or two.
let's give it a try.
'0 I will get together with you.
11 HR. SHEA4 One thing in the resource area, if 12 ve approarh it, and I guess we vill in part by saying 13 that we think there needs to be sore Executive Branch 14 resources in these areas) b[eymay well come back, as f
4 15 they have to us at the staff level and say, well, we.
16 would lika to sea acre NRC rasources put into these 17 areas.
One thing they mentioned is more travel to 18 Vienna to help upgrade the IAEA.
The other is to 19 station a person in Vienna using an NRC slot if possible.
20 So those are two specifics that they keep 21 bringing 2p.
22 COE5I53IONER AHEARNE:
And rotate that 23 among 24 (laughter.)
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3 CHAIRMAN PALLA0!:10:
And with the language you i
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5 (Laughter.)
6 COMMISSIONER ARIARNE:
To 3ust test out the 7
training program.
8 (Laughter.)
9 CHAIRHAN PALLADINO:
Ted, let's see, can we 10 finish up.
11 ER. SHERR:
Given the tangent we vent off on 12 last time, I don't know I want to mention this or not.
13
( La ugh te r. )
14 HR. SHERRs But we have got a numbar of 15 activities related to a follow-on to the Technical 16 Objective Study.
I won't take them in the order of what 17 I have listed here.
18 One of the things that we came up with was 19 basically given the resource technology and legal 20 restraints that are on the agency, you know, at best 21 those tarhniral objertives that exist today are 22 long-ters propositions, you know, like maybe a 20-year 23 time f rase if everything vent right.
24 The question is what kind of objectives should 25 ve be seeking in the near term and the intermediate term i
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2 There are a lot of different cuts to th'd thing.
You 3
can talk about sensitivity in countries, you can talk
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4 about the complexities of ways of stealing material and 5
you talk about you should be concerned for. certain 6
facility types and not for others.
Ensically the 7
follow-on here would take a look at some of those 8
alternative things.
9 10 11 12 13 Another thing that is related to this that is 14 going on_r;l.ght now is looking at again safe 7uards 15 approaches and inspection activities.for particular 16 f acility typas which is relatad to the objectives I 17 think in the sama sense that Ken described it a little 18 while ago.
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3 One of. the follow-on things is to take a look 4
at how the inspection approach was the basis for 5
estimating the Technical Objective Study and how that 6
differs from what the agancy does in practice as a basis 7
for explaining that and providing better perspective.
8 Along the same lines we are going to look at 9
what actually tha agency does in the United States in 10 terms of applying safeguards at U. S. facilities and 11 just look at it ini saa if the same methodologies in 12 terms of assessing the level of effectiveness of that 13 safeguards from a technical point of view as it is 14 applied in the United States, whether that is 15 representative of what they do in the world or not and 16 ve can't generally judge.
17 ER. BURNETT But it is an opportunity.
It is 18 a vindow on how ther operate.
19 HR. SHERR:
The other open area in terms of 20 the Tachnical Objective Study was that basically looked l
21 at what was needed by a facility type.
It didn't really 22 focus on by country in terms of how that would, and the 23 follow-on study is looking at the resource implications l
24 like on a country basis.
Its presentation is 25 hTootheti:al.
In fa:t, if faal cy:la is to be l
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ppogram.
We did put in the FY-84 submission some funds 5
to support that in that time frame.
In the concurrence
- AccesMTK, 6
chain is an NUSS assessment of the - program.
7 Basically there is a broad assessment going on right 8
now.
The GAO is reviewing it and a t the same time the 9
IAEA has a review men'ing for this project scheduled in t
10,the last part of this month.
But basically it is not a 11 panacea.
On the other hand, it could it f act result in 12 inspector savings in terms of need site inspectors ---
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
(Simultaneous 14 Conversations -- Inaudible).
15 HR. SHERRa and especially at unloading 16 reactors, critical assemblies and storage locations that 17 don't have a lot of turnover.
18 ER. BURNETIs What the Commission is probably 19 not aware of is that the staff has been supporting Retov'A AEcowVA.
20 seeemet for several years and there are working sp 21 tarminalsinAmerica[atlicensedfacilitiesthat we 22 aided in the installation of.
MIT is one of them.
7xAMSEAVft 23 HR. SHERE:
Now heroesuse-really isn ' t an 24 inernational safaguards projact, but because it is
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25 always mixed up and confused with the international l
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It is basically a. physical security matter in 3
terms'of providing communication at sea, continuous 4
- ssaunication which, if the appropriate political 5
arrangements are made, would provide a response if the 6
signal that says everything is okay quit coming.
7 ER. BURNETI:
It monitors the integrity of a 8
shipping cask while on the high seas on very real time 9
basis.
10 MR. SHERE:
We participated in an earlier 11 phase of this thing in looking at the acca conceptual 12 thing and ACDA recently requested that we participate in 13 the next phase which is a joint U.S./Japanesa test of 14 this thing and va have committed 450,000 to participate 15 in that test and review the results.
16 ER. BURNETT In '80 ve consitted $70,000 in 17 the ear 1T phssas of that, too -- (Inaudible).
18 ER. SHERHs Another matter, and again this is 19 zore in taras of our operational domestic agency 20 context, one of the important things that the agency "
21 focused on this year. vas the reporting of export / imports 22 and getting this unified so that they could make a match 23 between transfers between= countries.
Nov ve are in the 24 process of davalsping tha rula changas,and we vill be
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2 Finally, the agencr:throogn ths POTAS program 3
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facilities to i
4 test some of the new equipment and safeguards 5
approaches.
We have done this in the past to facilitate 6
if it is a reactor of getting NRE's okay and dealing 7
with the licensee so that everybody understands what is 8
happening.
9 That is kind of in terms of what we are to planning right now.
As was mentioned earlier, the 11 Action Plan Working Group, if we meet again, is 12 carrentir reviewing tha priority things, and when we get 13 done with that priority review it may turn out there are 14 some siiitional activities va are involved in, as well 15 as when we complete the comprehensive review in Janaury 16 it may be a basis for additional activities as well.
17 That is it.
18 CHAIEEAN PALLADINO:
All right, thank you.
19 Any facther questions?
20 (No response.)
)
21 CHAIEMAN PALLADIN0s Well, we thank you very t
22 auch.
23 We vill stand adjourned.
24 (Whereupon, at 4:20 p.a.,
the meeting I
25 adjourned.)
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This 11 Cc ca.W f7 tha.t the. ~ attachec prcceec.irg: befcre the COMMISSION MEETING is the =atta.*.cf:
Closed Meeting - Exemption No. 1 - Briefing on Efforts to Improve IAEA Safeguards Cata cf Frec,v. ii.g:
June 2, 1982 U c c!4 4 t IU "* h e r F.2ce cf Prected'i=g:
Washington, D. C.
Jere held as hervir appears, and chah this is the cri.;1:zi :: scsc:-
thersef fc:- the file of the C -t'sicc.
Mary C. Simons l
Cfficial.Eegercar (~ ;ec)
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Officizi Regeeter (51 acu: e) i 1
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