ML20024A256

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Forwards Summary of Significant NRC & Executive Branch Efforts to Improve IAEA Safeguards & Estimate of Expended Resources.Safeguards Info Deleted.W/O Encl Rept on Us Assistance to IAEA & Outline of Areas Needing Improvements
ML20024A256
Person / Time
Issue date: 05/26/1982
From: Dircks W
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:
Shared Package
ML20024A198 List:
References
FOIA-82-334, TASK-PII, TASK-SE SECY-82-210, NUDOCS 8306160208
Download: ML20024A256 (17)


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- _.. - -POLICY ISSUE (ln[Ormation)

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The Commission Frcm; William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations.

(U)

Subject:

EFFORTS TO IMPROVE IAEA SAFEGUARDS (U)

Purcose:

To provide a summary of significant NRC and Executive Branch efforts to improve IAEA safeguards, an estimate of resources expended to date, and an outline of improvements needed and further work underway to strengthen IAEA safeguards.

(U)

Discussion:

Over the past several months much attention has been re-focused, within all branches of the USG, on the need for strengthening IAEA sa feguards.

The concerns expressed by the Conmission in its several recent letters to the Congress echo the concerns which the Commission expressed as early as 1977.

Strengthening IAEA safeguards has long been a fundamental element of U.S. nonproliferation policy.

SECY-82-46 (

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF INTERAGENCY GROUPS ESTABLISHED TO UPGRADE IAEA SAFEGUARDS) described for the Commission the interagency groups involved in U.S. efforts to upgrade IAEA safeguards and provided a brief re' port on the status of their activities.

(U)

The Commission has renewed its commitment to improving IAEA sa feguards in recent Congressional letters and testimony.

In a March 18, 1982 letter to various Congressional Committees and Subcommittees the Commission noted that it

"... will continue to strongly support renewed U.S. efforts to improve interna tional safeguards, particularly with respect to new initiatives to address those problems identified in information available to the Ccmmission." 'In CONTACT:

David A. Myers, IP (49-24725)

Ken Sanders, NMSS (12-74181) 8306160208 830401 PDR FOIA Cbssdcd Sy GREENBE82-334 PDR Mncinni Authwity)

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addition the Conmission's 1982 Policy and Pl::nning Guidance (Continued) states that "NRC supports the President's ccc.mit.nent to work with other na tions to help the I AEA improve the inter-na tional sa feguards regime and directs that "s ta ff, in consultation with appropriate Executive Branch agencies, will work to develop NRC recommendations for strengthening 1 AEA sa fegua rds. "

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NRC Activities:

NRC efforts have been undertaken primarily within the existing interagency co'emittee structure (i.e., the Interagency Steering Group (ISG), the Action Plan Working Group (AFWG), the Technical Support Coordinating Ccmmittee(TSCC),and the US/

IAEA Safeguards Agreement Working Group (SAWG) and Negotiating Team).

In general, NRC contributions have been in the technical areas of IAEA safeguards objectives, facility designs, evaluation of inspection results, assistance to sta tes in developing their sta te systems of accounting,and inspector training.

(U)

Efforts for which NRC has taken the lead or contributed substantially are outlined in Enclosure 1 with a brief description of-each.

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fDNRDENTiAL-

UNC ASS E D The Commission (U)

Current Imorovements in the Implementation of IAEA Sa feguards:

U.S. efforts, in conjunction with the activities of the U.S.

Action Plan Working Group (See SECY-82-46.) and the U.S.

Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (See.),have resulted in important contributions to l

the IAEA's ability to implement its safeguards in a more effective and efficient manner.

In general, some of the more significant improvements include:

1.

Better analysis of inspection results, including upgrading the IAEA's Safeguards Evaluation Section; 2.

Identification of specific diversion scenarios and i

use of quantified inspection goals (expressed in terms of times and quantities)in developing safeguards approaches for " facilities; 3.

The introduction and development of a computerized

. safeguards information system to facilitate reporting and handling of data; 4.

More effective and efficient use of available inspectors, includir.g the establishment of a regional office in ' Canada and the use of resident inspectors at a few facilities; 5.

Further development of the IAEA Safeguards. Training Unit; 6.

Increases in the actual number of inspectors; 7.

Guidelines for developing and operating state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC),

upon which the implementation of IAEA safeguards depends; and 8.

The development and use of additional types of equipment to facilitate the implementation of effective safeguards.

(U)

Of the various committees and programs wht ch have been estab-lished, only P0TAS (under the caordination of the TSCC) is funded as a specific budget item.

The funds are budgeted by the Agency for International Development, and the overall program direction is administered by the TSCC, with technical implementation by the International Safeguards ' Project Office (ISP0) at Brookhaven National Laboratory.

For FY 1977 through FY 1981 a total of $23 million was budgeted in support of POTAS; $4.1 million has been budgeted for FY 1982 A large percentage of the FY 1982 funding is designated for use in ongoing tasks.

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All oti.cr e.,enditures in support of i AEA so f 29u.2 rds u...e fecm within existing agency and of fice budgets.

E>cicsure 4 prcvides estimates of U.S. resources expenOd in support of IAEA safeguards.

[U)

In an effort to focus the available agency resources, the APWG is presently selecting the activities to receive priority attention for the remainder of 1982.

Although priority activities were selected in 1981, even with this more modest program, a number of priority activities have fallen behind schedule due to the lack of sufficient Executive Branch resources to implement the activities.

[U)

In response to the Commission's Program and Planning Guidance concerning recommendations for strengthening IAEA safeguards, f4 MSS is conducting a comprehensive technical review on which to develop detailed recommendations for strengthening IAEA s a fegua rds.

The following four tasks will be undertaken in this review:

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The Commission (U)

(1)

Determination of the desired characteristics and capabili-ties of functional elements of the IAEA safeguards regime; (2)

Characterization of the present IAEA safeguards system and its operational aspects and related issues; (3)

Identification of current initiatives for strengthening safeguards being undertaken in the U.S. (and other countries) in the context, for example, of specific elements of the Action Plan and the Program-for Technical Assistance to IAEA safeguards; and (4)

Detennination of alternatives to strengthen IAEA safeguards to close any remaining gaps between the current IAEA safeguards system and the safeguards system with the desired level of effectiveness and capability.

'(U)

On May 1,1982, NMSS initiated a research request for support in tasks 2, 3, and 4 above.

The planned completion date for this research project is September 30, 1982.

Upon completion of the research project, detailed recormiendations for strengthening IAEA safeguards will be prepared in consultation with the Executive Branch.

In accordance with the E00's draft Program Guidance, the completion-of these recommendations is-planned for January 1983.

(U)

==

Conclusion:==

As noted above, many of the areas of IAEA safeguards in need of improvement have been well identified and are currently addressed in either the Action Plan or POTAS, although limited Executive Branch resources have resulted in little or no progress in several specific areas.

Looking to the future, the longer term staff technical review now underway will attempt to assess thoroughly current initiatives for strength-ening IAEA safeguards with a view to developing further recommendations for strengthening them.

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WilliaB1 J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations 4

Enclosures:

See next page.

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KASS - D The Commission

Enclosures:

1.

Significant flRC Contributions, (C) 2.

Significant Executive Branch Efforts, (C) 3.

Report on the U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to Sa feguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (POTAS), (U) 4.

Strengthening IAEA Safeguards:

Resource Estimates, (U)

,5.

Outline of Areas in Need of Further Improvement, (C)

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IAEA Goals and Objectives The APWG agreed that the IAEA should continue to define its safeguards objectives, goals and criteria.

--A report titled " Implications.o.f IAEA Technical Objectives" has been completed by a contractor for NMSS.

The report assesses the implications of safeguards objectives which the U.S. recomended to the IAEA in 1977 regarding detection times and goal quantities of material and presents an cstimate of manp0wer necessary to meet the objectives.

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Facility Design to Facilitate Safeguards The APWG has agreed to develop information and guidelines for the design of facilities relevant to material measurement and containment and surveillance to facilitate effective and efficient safeguards for all types of facilities.

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--Reports prepared under contract to NMSS have identified and assessed various design features for LWRs, reprocessing facilities,and mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facilities.

The results of this work were presented-as the U.S.

contribution to a December 1981 IAEA Consultants' Meeting on " Design Features for Assisting IAEA Safeguards." Draft guidelines for LWRs, prepared at that meeting, have been revised for final discussion at an upcoming Consultants' meeting in September.

Preparation of guidelines for reprocessing plants will also be undertaken at this September Consultants' Meeting.

(y) 4.

Training of Inspectors 4

The APWG has agreed to examine the training needs of IAEA inspectors and the current level of training offered by the IAEA.

In addition, Title II of the NNPA requires DOE, in consultation with NRC, to establish and operate a safeguards and physical security training program.

--NMSS participates regularly in presenting IAEA-sponsored training courses on state systems for accounting and control of nuclear material.

CONRDENTIAC-

GONRDiiNTIAl-3 (U) 5.

Utilization and Retention of Personnel The APWG agreed % examine whether current IAEA employment practices for inspectors promote the effective use and retention of trained and experienced inspectors.

--The NRC assisted in the identification of qualified European-based consultant groups to examine the management and personnel practices of the Department of Safeguards.

A final report has been completed which examines those factors which tended to inhibit the recruitment, develop-ment, motivation,and retention of Departme'nt of Safeguards staff.

The U.S. is providing additional assistance to the IAE'A in implementing the recommendations of the study through the POTAS program.

(U) 6.

State Responsibilities in Establishing a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC)

APWG agreed to attempt to achieve better compliance by States with the responsibilities to establish and operate adequate SSACs.

--In connection with its annual review of the IAEA's SIR, the U.S. has encouraged the IAEA to be more forthcoming about the adequacy of SSACs and the identification of any inspection problems which have been experienced as a result of SSAC deficiencies.

NMSS has provided direct assistance to South Korea and Taiwan, has participated in IAEA SSAC training courses held in the USA and USSR, and has helped prepare the IAEA guidelines for SSACs.

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POTAS/TSCC Particication

--As a me.rber of the Technical Support Coordinating Corrsnittee, i;t1SS reviews, approves, and monitors technical assistance projects supported by the U.S. POTAS program to meet certain needs of the IAEA.

These include development and field testing of nieasurement instrumentation, surveillance devices, safeguards procedures, training courses, and the transfer of safeguards technology by providing " cost-free experts" to the IAEA.

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Consultina to IAEA

--NMSS has provided experts to the Safeguards Evaluation Section to consult on particular problems or areas of safeguards. Such consulting has pro-vided assistance on safeguards evaluation methodology, quality assurance programs, and a records audit manual.

(U) 10.

Review and Vodate Action Plan

--IP utilized contractor and in-house staff time in late 1980 to reorgariize and update the content of the Action Plan.

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Significant Indeoendent Executive Branch Efforts _to IrTrove_ IAEA Safeguards (U) 1.

International Working Group on Reorocessing Plant Safeguards (IWGRPSJ Established by the Director General of the IAEA in Tiovember 1978, the-IWGRPS was a subgroup of the IAEA's Advisory Group on Reprocessing Plant Safeguards.

The IWGRPS examined materials accountancy measurement procedures and technologies, flow monitoring and in-process inventory measurement techniques, containment and surveillance procedures and technologies, facility designs to facilitate safeguards and advanced systems for safeguarding reprocessing facilities.

The IWGRPS issued an overview report to the Director General of the IAEA in September 1981 and is no longer active.

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The Hexacartite Safeguards Project (HSP)

The HSP is sponsored jointly by Australia, Japan, FRG, tietherlands, U.K.

and U.S.

The safeguards inspectorates of the IAEA and EURATOM are full participants in the project.

The goal of the HSP is to develop an adequate technical base of technical experience and information which can be used by the IAEA, EURATOM, and the state involved in their evaluation of the various safeguards approaches, and the possible develop-ment of arrangements for the direct implementation of an effective and efficient safeguards system at enrichment plants of the gas-centrifuge type.

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TASTEX The Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise (TASTEX) was a joint program of Japan, the U.S., France, and the IAEA on developing, testing, and evaluating advanced safeguards technology for reprocessing plants, with emphasis on the applicability of the technology in the PNC Reprocessing Facility at Tokai Mura.

In 1977, this program grew out of negotiations on execution of the Japan /U.S. Agree:r.ent for Cooperation and was completed in early 1981.

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oo STRFNGT12EilING I AEA SAFEGUARDS:

RFSOURCE ESTIMATES Fxecutive Branch POTAS FY 1977 - 81

$23M (total)

FY 1982

$ 4.lM ACDA Pro fes s ional s FY 1979 - 82 5 - 6 sy per year Contractual FY 1979 - 81

$ 1.5M per year FY 1982

$ 0.25M (addi tional funding requested for FY 1982)

DO E, Professionals FY 1979 - 82 5 - 6 sy per year (considerable uncertainty)

Contrac tual FY 1979 - 82

$5 - 6M per year State Professional FY 1979 - 81 approximately I sy per year FY 1982 2 sy Contractual none identified NRC EISS.

Direct Support Sta ffing FY 1980 1.6 sy FY 1981 1.2 sy FY 1982 2.6 sy Contractual Technical Objective Study FY 1979 - 81

$240K (total)

Design Feature Studies FY 1979 - 81

$255K FY 1982

$ 75K Strengthen IAEA Safeguards FY 1982

$ 87K l

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4 l Indirect _ Support, (Implement US/I AEA Safeguards Agreement)

S ta f fing FY 1980 - 82 3 sy per jear Centractual ticensce Instructions FY 1979 - 81

$500K Cevelopaent Informa tion System FY 1979 - 80

$500K

  • nual Operation Cost of

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$1SOK/yr.

Other_

A research request has been initiated to develop a technical basis for rccc:nuendations to strengthen I AEA sa feguards.

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Direct Support Pro fes s ional s FY 1980

.Ssy FY 1981

.5sy FY 1982

.5sy Contractual Consul tant FY 1980

$7K FY 1981

$4K FY 1982.