ML20024A209
| ML20024A209 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/27/1982 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024A198 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-82-334 NUDOCS 8306160115 | |
| Download: ML20024A209 (16) | |
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For:
The Commission From:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Subject:
LETTER FROM DR. THOMAS E. SHEA ON IMPROVING IAEA SAFEGUARDS
Purpose:
To propose a letter from the Chairman thanking Dr. Shea for his suggestions on how to improve IAEA safeguards, and to inform the Commission o.f the staff's forwarding Dr. Shea's letter to State Department with the request that the ISG consider his suggestions.
Discussion:
On December 2 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards and how safeguards might be improved. Testimony was heard from Under Secretary of State Kennedy, Commissioner Gilinsky for
.the NRC, and three private citizens: former IAEA Safeguards Department employees E. Roy Morgan and Thomas E. Shea, and-Paul Leventhal of the Nuclear Club, Inc.
Following that hearing Dr. Shea wrote a letter to Senator Percy making a number of suggestions as to how, in his opinion, the U.S. might work to improve I AEA safeguards.
Dr. Shea sent a copy of that letter to Chairman Palladino under separate cover (Enclosure 1).
A number of Dr. Shea's suggestions are relatively specific proposals on the appli-cation of safeguards (see item number 4--some of the proposals under this item are essentially the same as elements of s
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the interagency Action Plan to Strengthen IAEA Safeguards,
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but other proposals under this item are essentially new).
However, other of Dr. Shea's proposals would involve s
fundamental changes in the relationship of the IAEA to it's x
Contact:
2.C. Kessler (49-28155) 8306160115 830401 PDR FOIA GREENBES2-334 PDR
e The Commission 2
Discussion:
member states.
For example, item number 1 would require (continued) a renegotiation of the IAEA Statute by which all member states would cede to the IAEA the power to review all nuclear development projects and' all international transfers; and to disapprove those that the IAEA did not consider consistent with " accepted patterns of peaceful nuclear development." This would be a substantial increase in the
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degree _of sovereignty ceded to the IAEA, which is already unique among international organizations in the degree of member state sovereignty ceded to it.
Item number 3-would likewise involve a fundamental change, in that traditionally
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the standards for how safeg0ards will be applied have been the responsibility of the IAEA's Board of Governors; this suggestion would have the U.S., as the supplier state, establishing for the IAEA these standards for the facilities and materials supplied by the U.S.
A proper review of such proposals clearly requires consideration of the international political impacts of initiatives to implement them, and an evaluation of the chances of success and costs of failure as well as the benefits of success. Thus considerhtion
-of these sugges,tions would necessarily involve Executive Branch agencies as well as NRC.
Because of the need for joint consideration of Dr. Shea's proposals by NRC and several Executive Branch agencies, we have forwar.ded his letter to State with the recommendation that it be considered by the Interagency Steering Group on IAEA safeguards (ISG)
(Enclosure 2).
Recommendation:
.That the Comission approve the attached letter to Thomas.
Shea thanking him for his interest and informing him of our action on his suggestions (Enclosure 3).
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William'J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
1.
Ltr Palladino fm T. Shea dtd 12/15/81 2.
Copy of ltr Boright fm James Devine dtd 2/22/82 3.
Proposed reply to T. Shea
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The Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman U..S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 1
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Dear Sir:
On December 2nd, the Senath Comittee on Foreign Relations conducted Hearings to ascertain the effectiveness of the piogram 'of non-pro-liferation safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Comissioner Gilinsky represented the NRC, expressing the Comission's reservations and consideration'of actions that might be undertaken.
As a former IAEA staff member,iession than some of the 'other witne'sses.
I was invited to testify and presented a somewhat"more optimistic imp Following the Hearings, I felt an obligation to offer additional con-structive suggestions regarding actions which might be taken to improve..".
IAEA safeguards.
I enclose a copy of my letter. to Senator. Percy as.
a courtesy, knowing of the Comission's deep interest in this matter.,
Item #3 describ.es a scheme which may be useful in your consideration of steps associated with export licensing.
In addition tio the in-creased assurance which would be realized if the IAEA were to give the comitment described, the Comission might gain further assurance if the IAEA could be required to report the outcome of its efforts in terms of the' factors cited.
Ultimately, this type of approach, if adopted by the international community, could bring into effect substantive', across-the-board improvements in IAEA safeguards effect-iveness.
I believe the scheme could be implemented within the current IAEA limitations on disclosure, and thus may be feasible.
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Page 2 December 15, 1981 My interest is in continuing to contribute to improved IAEA safeguards.
I am also a fortner NRC staff member, trid take pride in my affiliations with the IAEA and the NRC.
I hope that some of the enclosed suggestions are useful.
Yours sincerely,
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s Thomas E. Shea, Ph.D.
Vice President rir Enclosure 1
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l The ilonorable Charles H. Percy, Senator from Illinois l
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The Comittee on For~eign Relations
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The United States Senate Washington, DC 20510
Dear Senator:
I want to thank you for the opportunity to tes'tify at the.Comittee Hearings on Dactmber 2,1981, delving into the effectiveness of the non-proliferation safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Many important considerations were brought out, which will be of unquestionable
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value in efforts to strengthen the existing non-proliferation regime in general, and the IAEA in particular.
It is clear that the current level of IAEA safeguards effectiveness is inadequate to provide the non-proliferation assurances we seek.
This appre-ciation is, in itself, an essential prerequisite to improvement. But recognition within the United States is not enough: that appreciation must be widely shared within the internat!ional comunity before ' ubstantial s
improvements can.be brought into effect.
Having established that a problem exists, what might be done to bring about improvements? Some suggestions have already been expressed; of those, some' will succeed, some-will-meet-with considerable resistance within the IAEA and within the international comunity.
In the interests of improving the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards, in the following paragraphs I submit a number of additional-possibilities, intended to augment the list of those
- already identified.
On the basis of my IAEA service, I believe each would contribute improvements, and each could be accomodated within the existing framework of international agreements.
1)
Questions have arisen regarding whether or not the Osiraq (Tamuz) reactors were intended to serve a legitimate peaceful purpose. One '
possibility to allay future concerns of this nature might be to expand the authorities granted to the IAEA, to make a determination regardirig each project initiated within a state, or each international transfer, i
that the declared uses are consistent with accepted patterns of peaceful nuclear development, appropriate to the state at the time the project is proposed.
It would. be necessary to reach international agreement on 568 Weddell Driv'e Sunnyvale, California 94086 - (408) 734 0311
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If we want the IAE'A to improve, to perfom a vital mission for us, and
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2) we want to use their activities in something as direct as U.S. export licensing, in fairness we must tell the IAEA precisely what we' expect, make certain they are given the wherewithal to do what we want, and then, 1.
then we must hold them accountable for meeting our needs.
The IAEA is in the process of adopting an evaluation scheme for judging the effectiveness of its safeguards. Using that scheme, minimum performance
. targets could be identified for each type of nuclear material subject
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The.IAEA could then plan its programs and measure to IAEA safeguards.
Serious its progress in terms of meeting those performance targets.c relation to that framework.
Within the United States,'we have experts able to define the inspection 3) activities which should be adequate for the IAEA to implement effective One means to provide assurance that U.S. interests would-
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safeguards.
be served in'any export would be to provide the IAEA with a detailed A
description of the minimum safeguards considered necessary, granting approval for the export only when the IAEA had acknowledged its agree-ment to implement its safeguards in accordance with that description Such a description would (or some mutually agreeable alternative).
include the basic approach to be followed, the equipme'nt to be used,'
the schedule of inspections to be performed, the inspection activities to be undertaken on each inspection, descriptions of the anomalies -
which should be detected in the event a diversion occurs, and a list
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of follow-up actions which should be undertaken in the event anomalies are detected to establ.ish whether or not a diversion is suspected.
Working with other members of the international comunity, we should Consider.the 4) help the Agency to be capable of being more effective.
following:
THERE JUST AREN'T ENDUGH INSPECTORS.
List'en to what the IAEA is For telling us in its. annual Safeguards Implementation Reports.
example, they say that they need at least twice the number of inspectors now that they had in 1980 to be able to provide the Note that the basis they use for minimum coverage necessary.
reference is not agreed as the minimum necessary; rather, reference is with respect to the numbers negotiated in facility atta some old, some new.
higher.
The Agency should A LOT OF FACILITY ATTACHMENTS ARE OUT OF DATE.
review,all of its' facility attachments to en,sure that the provisions
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s INET CORPORATION allow the Agency the opportunity to satisy their own criteria. This activity would not require a very great effort and would at least
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assure that safeguards are being applied on an equivalen.t basis.
IMPROVE PERSONNEL SELECTION. The Agency is currently not able to interview candidates before selection, and can't get rid of its duds before the contracts expire.
Improvements could be brought into
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effect by more' active recruiting (e.g., direct mailing to all nuclear establishments, plus expanded advertis:ng in appropriate journals), pre-employment screening,....
Within the U.S., we might take more of a lead to prepare candidates for IAEA snployment, especially those from developing countries, having them take intensive training at Los Alamos and Sandia laboratories, for example.
IMPROVE INSPECTOR SUPPORT.
There isn't enough help within the Agency, and many times it does not appear to be well. directed. This is especially true in the support given by the information treatment division. The emphasis must shift to supporting the inspectorate with applications programs and an adequate number of data processing specialists to help make important information available, to make the information system slave to the inspectorate, rather than vice-ve Aa.
INSPECTORS SHOULDN'T GO OUT ALONE.
EVER!
Even inspections at simple facilities should b'e underta. ken by a team, minimum sizc: 2!
Inspectors face a crowd of people from the facility and from th'e natio.nal authority.
They are subjected to scrutiny, questions, the hardships of extensi've '
travel often under trying conditions.
I believe that the current policy is an unwise economy which can only lead to poor morale and ineffective.
ness.
BUILD INSP5CTIO'N TEAMS TO COVER THE REQUIRED TASKS.
Somb progress has been made in this direction, but more should be done. The lead inspector must be technically competent and well trained in matters related to diversion, ve'ification, and the rights and authorities of the Agency r
and of the state. The inspection team should be made up of junior inspectors and non-professional inspection assistants trained in making measurements, applying seals, auditing accounts, etc., per-forming these needed tasks under supervision while relieving the lead inspector to marshal the information necessary to derive the conclusions required, ar.d to investigate anomalies, preferably as they are identified.
IMPROVE INSPECTION QUALITY ASSURANCE.
Further efforts are needed,by the IAEA to improve the manner in which inspections are-planned and conducted.
One means to improve planning would be to help the Agency formalize it's inspection planning, briefing and de-briefing, perhaps using the procedures adopted in the Agency's Euratom Section as' a O
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. approach and critique the inspections.
Such a group should be coordinated throtgh the Safeguards Evaluation Section.
ESTABLISH AN ANOMALY REVIEW GROUP. At present, anoma. lies are_ defined somewhat differently in the six regional sections, and the follow-up actions undertaken are not standardized and not controlled.
An effort should be made to reach a common definition on just what constitutes an anomaly, and what actions should be taken to determine whether or not a diversion may be indicated. The anomaly review group should be given sufficient authority to recomend special inspections where appropriate, and to suggest (order?) facility operators to take the actions necessary to bring about the prompt, unambiguous resolution of, outstanding. anomalies, once identified.
- GET THE AGENCY TO REPORT MORE.
For example, the Agency could report the details of the anomalies it detects (currently on the order of 200 per year), especially th*ose that remain unresolved.
They needn't be keyed to specific facilities or states, and thus.this information could be provided under existing disclosure' arrangements.
Perhaps the Secretariat should make a report at sach and'every Board meeting, describing the unresolved anomalies and the means used to resolve those which had been attributed to innocent causes.
IMPROVE REPORTING TIMELINESS. The current reporting scheme requires delays (e.g., transactions are reported by month, a month after.they occur -- at best), and is hopelessly cumbersome.
Commission a study to recomend adoption of reporting based upon teleconmunications links, expanding on the " recover" project work.
PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO STATES ON THE BASICS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL.
Agency inspectors are presented with a mind-boggling mish-mash, which they must struggle to understand.
Generally this isn't the result of any mischievousness, rather, no guidance is available and' entropy triumphs. The IAEA issues a extensive series of safety guides suggesting how states should regulate siting, construction, operation,..., features pertaining to nuclear facilities-- some' efforts are certainly needed in records keeping, inventory taking, error estimation,... to improve the basis on which safeguards are built.
5)
For effective IAEA safeguards, the United States must continue to support the IAEA directly and continue the Program of Technical Assistance to the IAEA. Without the fomer, there is no IAEA; without the latter,- there is no hope for improvement.
6)
More concern must be given to the human factors aspects of IAEA safeguards',
especially to attitude formation, vigilance and motivation.
Some of the
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. items noted above might help in this, regard, and one other possibility comes to mind' Just as a football team is more likely to win when the crowds are cheering, we should expect the IAEA staff to be responsive to the support and encouragement of its member states.
Further effectiveness could be gained through simple steps intended to reinforce'the sense of importance, the concern and support felt within the comunity. for examp.le, why not gather the entire safeguards staff together in a big room with the Agency's Board of Governors, and have them express in person their support.
Of 'all the recommendations above, I suspect this one would be most cost-effe~ctive.
Challenge the staff to improve, and provide the climate where improvements are eagerly sought and rewarded.
That will help.
The United States is at the forefront of virtually all improvements in the effectivenes's of IAEA safeguards. We can do more, especially in the sense of demonstrating how things should be.
The application of IAEA safeguards
. in the U.S., especially at the E'xxon fuel manufacturing plant in Richland,
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Was.hington, is an example of the best kind of leadership we can provide.
Under the current terms of the U.S./IAEA safeguards agreement, the IAEA will shift its safeguards to another facility in another year, and the'IAEA will no longer be able to derive the full and very positive benefits of this effort.
Some arrangement should be. created to continue this arrangement as a base for advanced training and demonstration.
Also, we'could extend our activities ~in demonstrating how things shoul' be',
d' The. Allied General Nuclear Services Company, operators of the Barnwell Nuclear Fuels Processing Plant have proposed an extended test of the implementation of-international safeguards at their reprocessing facility.
The tests would not (in the first year) include actual use of spent fuel and no plutonium would be processed, but even with these limitations, that facility represents the state-of-the-art in reprocessing safeguards technology, and the proposed experiments would contribute to further improvements.
Serious consideration should be given to funding that experiment, with the acti've participation of the IAEA and open to all interested nations of the world.
If the human species is to survive, international accomodations must one day evolve which will allow life free of international conflict.
Existing nuclear arsenals may ther, be allowed to deteriorate into disuse, without replacement.
We must hold the world together until that time, for as many decades or centuries l-as it takes.
l The Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the safeguards 1
applied by the ' International Atomic Energy Agency are vital to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.
Every effort must be made to gain acceptance of the NPT by all nations, and.to strengthen the bonds that unite the t:PT comuni ty. There are very few holdouts -- each should be examined to identify
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IN'ET CORPORATION the steps needed to gain ihat country's acceptance. We should be prepared to offer incentives, pressures, security alliances; we should, if need be, be prepare.d to acknowledge the n6 clear weapons capability of nations which are not currently enshrinecf in the NPT as " weapons states."
As new goals and priorities are established for the IAEA, th'e following points should be recalled:
No case has ever been shown where IAEA safeguards have failed -- where a nation has developed nuclear weapons under the ruse of false partici-pation in IAEA safeguards, or by escaping detection; View this unique undertaking in concert with the intrinsic value of international verification, with ' diplomatic initiatives to reduce incentives for proliferation, and i
B. earing in mind that perfection can never be achieved, define these new goals to give measurable improvements.
With every wish for success in 'this effort, and all due respect,
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Thomas E. Shea, PhD Vice-president 4
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JEDevine JCKessler KDCohen IPEI R/F IP R/F JAN 2 21982
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Mr. John Boright, Director Office of Nuclear Technology and Safeguards U. S. Department of State Washington, D.C.
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Dear Mr. Boright:
.Following his' testimony at the Senate Foreign Relations Comittee's December 2 hearings on IAEA safeguards, Dr. Thomas Shea wrote a letter to Senator Percy proposing a number of measures to strengthen IAEA safeguards, a copy of which he provided to NRC (attached).
His proposals range from relatively technical changes in the-Department of Safeguard's procedures to a redefinition of the relati6nship of the IAEA to member states.
We find a number of Dr. Shea's proposals interesting, and worthyof review and possible action by the ISG.
Sincerely, Ol'dC nal signed by i
Jn=esB. Devina James B. Devine, Assistant Director Export / Import and International Safeguards Office of International Programs - '
Attachment:
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Dr. Thomas E. Shea INET Corporation 568 Weddell Drive Sunnyvale, Claifornia 94086
Dear Dr. Shea:
l Th'ank you for your letter of December 15 providing your coments and.-
suggestions regarding the strengthening of IAEA safeguards..NRC has
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submitted your recomendations to the Interagency Steering Group on IAEA Safeguards for. consideration and possible action.
I appreciate your interest in continuing to contribute to improved IAEA safeguards, a matter of serious concern to the Commission, and your efforts to stimulate the changes you believe important to achieving more effective -
international safeguards.
Sincerely, Nunzio J. Palladino-Chainnan I
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DISTRIBUTION:
IP Rdg File IPEI Rdg File JRShe b MRPeterson KDCohen DMyers JDLee FEB 2 31982 i
EDO 11360 4
Dr. Thomas E. Shea INET Corporation O
568 Weddell Drive Sunnyvale, California 94086
Dear Dr. Shea:
Thank you for your December,15 letter to Chairman Palladino providing your comments and suggestions regarding the strengthening of IAEA safeguards.
NRC has submitted your reconmendations to the Interagency Steering Group on IAEA Safeguards for consideration and possible action.
We appreciate your interest in continuing to contribute to improved IAEA safeguards, a matter of serious concern to the Comission, and your efforts to stimulate the changes you~believe important to achieving rare effective international safeguards.
Sincerely, James R. Shea, Director Office of International Programs bec: NMSS/Burnett~
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