05000311/LER-1983-014, Forwards LER 83-014/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 83-014/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20023D483
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	05/11/1983
From:	Zupko J Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Allan J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20023D484	List: 05000311/LER-1983-014, Forwards LER 83-014/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8305200537
Download: ML20023D483 (3)

LER-1983-014, Forwards LER 83-014/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
3111983014R00 - NRC Website

text

.O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station May 11, 1983 Mr. J. Allan Acting Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Dear Mr. Allan LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 PIPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-014/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No.

2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 83-014/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, M

v/*

J.M.

Zupko, Jr.

General Manager -

Salem Operations RF:ks CC:

Distribution h

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'h The Energy People R 2189 (20MI Il 81

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Report Number:

83-014/03L Report Date:

05-11-83 Occurrence Date:

04-13-83' Facility:

Salem Generating Station Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Reactor Coolant System - Residual Heat Removal Loops -

Loss of Operating Loop.

This report was initiated by Incident Reports83-071 and 83-072.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 5 - Rx Power 0 % - Unit Load 0 MWe, DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On two separate occasions, at 1755 hours0.0203 days <br />0.488 hours <br />0.0029 weeks <br />6.677775e-4 months <br />, April 13 and 1520 hours0.0176 days <br />0.422 hours <br />0.00251 weeks <br />5.7836e-4 months <br />.

April 18, 1983, operating loads on the No. 2A 4KV and 460V Vital Buses were observed to trip.

The only indications received in the Control Room were alarms associated with the loss of the running equipment and flashing bezel stop pushbuttons.

Two different vital-bus power sources were involved; on both occasions the infeed breaker remained closed.

In both cases, due to the deenergization of No. 21 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump, No. 21 RHR Loop was no longer in operation.

Due to no RHR loop being in operation. Technical Specification Action Statement 3.4.1.4b was entered.

In each instance, the RHR loop was immediately returned to operation, and no reduction in Reactor Coolant System (RCS) boron concentration occurred with the RHR loop out of service.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation revealed that the occurrences were evidently due to spurious operation of the Safeguards Equipment Control (SEC) System.

Previous spurious actuations related to control circuitry nets

!see LER 82-132/03L) had been addressed by installation of noise suppression devices (per Design Change Request 2EC1387).

Due tv the different symptoms, the present problems are apparently unrelated.

A contract has been written for further investigation of the problems by an experienced consultant.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Operability of the RHR loops is required to provide heat removal capability for removing decay heat.

A single loop provides sufficient capability; single failure considerations require that two loops be operable.

A single RHR pump also provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during RCS boron concentration reductions.

LER8{-014/03L ANALYSIS OF OCCERRENCE: (cont'd)

As noted, in both instances. RHR flow was immediately restored. and no reduction in boron concentration occurred.

The events therefore involved no risk to the health or safety of the public.

The occurrences constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation and are reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9 1.9b.

Action Statement 3.4.1.4b requires:

With no RHR loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the RCS and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loop to operation.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

In both cases, after a survey of the control board showed no other abnormalities, the Control Room Operator restarted appropriate equipment.

In each instance. No. 21 RHR Pump was restarted to restore an RHR loop to operation, and Action Statement 3.4.1.4b was terminated at 1756 hours0.0203 days <br />0.488 hours <br />0.0029 weeks <br />6.68158e-4 months <br />, April 13. and at 1520 hours0.0176 days <br />0.422 hours <br />0.00251 weeks <br />5.7836e-4 months <br />. April 18, 1983.

respectively.

Finally, as noted, further investigation into the cause of the occurrence will be performed; appropriate corrective action will be recommended on the basis of the findings.

A Supplemental Report will be submitted upon final resolution of the problems.

FAILURE DATA:

Automation Industries. Inc.

Safeguards Equipment Control System ytltrh>b)

Prepared By R.

Frahm j

" General Manager -

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No.83-065 l

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