ML20012C529

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1989 Annual Operating Rept for VC Summer Nuclear Station. W/900228 Ltr
ML20012C529
Person / Time
Site: Summer South Carolina Electric & Gas Company icon.png
Issue date: 12/31/1989
From: Bradham O
SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
To: Ebneter S
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
NUDOCS 9003220161
Download: ML20012C529 (17)


Text

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j[Jhda ,- South C r: lina Electric & Ces C mpany i Nh.heMm-

. P.O. Box 88 ' Vice Prtsident '

knunsvists, SC 2E065 : Nuckter Op3rttsons (803) 3454 040-SCE&G  ;

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February 28, 1990 g'.N gg %$

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Mr. S. D. Ebneter Regional Administrator- '

'U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II. Suite =2900 101 Marietta Street, N. W.

~ Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Subject:

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station 1

Docket No. 50/395 Operating License No. NPF-12 Annual Operating Report

Dear Mr. Ebneter:

i 1

Attached is the 1989 Annual Operating Report for the South Carolina Electric

& GasLCompany Virgil.C.' Summer Nuclear Station Unit'No. l. This report is .

being submitted in accordance with Technical' Specifications 6.9.1.4, 6.9.1.5,  !

and Regulatory Guide 1.16. >

If there' are any questions, please call at your convenience.

Very truly yours, t

0.-S. Bradham ARR/OSB: led -

Attachment c: :D. A. Nauman/0. W. Dixon, Jr./T. C. Nichols, Jr.

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" E.-C. Roberts

'R. V. Tanner K. E. Hodland General Managers J. C. Snelson J..J. Hayes, Jr. R. L. Prevatte L. A. Blue- J. B. Knotts, Jr.

W. R. Baehr NPCF i C. A. Price NSRC R. B.'C1ary RTS (ANN 2800)

J. R. Proper File (818.02-10) 9003220161 891231 p%

PDR :ADOCK 05000395 d R PDC l

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1989 i ANNUAL OPERATING REPORT 1 l I

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PREFACE 4

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The'1989 Annual Operating Report'for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station.is  !

hereby submitted in accordance with Technical Specifications 6.9.1.4  ;

6.9.1.5, :and.; Regulatory Guide 1.16 under Docket Number 50/395 ' and Facility -

, ;0perating License NPF-12. l t- ,

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    • < TABLE OF CONTENTS l..+ . ,

l SECTION TITLE PAGE t

1.0 Introduction 1 ,

2.0 Highlights 1 3.0- Scheduled or Forced Power Reduction Summaries 1

, 4~. 0 Exposures 7 e

~ 5 . 0 -- Failed Fuel 7 p

' ATTACHMENTS

- 'I. 1989 Man-Rem Report

'II . Specific Activity Graphs i

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) utilizes a pressurized water reactor rated at 2775 MWt. The unit produces a maximum dependable capacity of 885 MWe net of electrical power. The plant is located approximately 26 tiles northwest of Columbia, South Carolina.

2.0 HIGHLIGHTS for the reporting period of January 1 through December 31, 1989 the plant operated at a capacity factor of 69.8% (using maximum dependable capacity) and a unit availability of 80.8%. The reactor was critical

, for a total of 7,276.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, the generator remained on-line for a total of 7076.8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, and the total gross electrical energy generated for 1989 was 5,714,880 MHh.

3.0 SCHEDULED OR FORCED POWER REDUCTION SUMMARIES During the 1989 report period, the plant experienced two scheduled and fifteen forced power reductions of greater than 20% of design power which exceeded four hours in duration. Included in these power reductions are five (three automatic and two manual) outages initiated by reactor trips.

1. At the beginning of January 1989, the plant was at approximately 50% power and was continuing with power ascension from the fourth refueling outage. On January 4, 1989, at 1035 hours0.012 days <br />0.288 hours <br />0.00171 weeks <br />3.938175e-4 months <br />, power was decreased from 75% to 40% because the secondary water chemistry was out of specification. Cation conductivity exceeded 7.0 umho/cm in all three steam generators. This condition was caused by resin intrusion from the condensate polishing system via a broken check valve in the hold pump discharge line. The check valve was repaired and the plant remained at reduced power during secondary side cleanup using the condensate polishing system and 1 maximum blowdown. All secondary water chemistry action levels were cleared at 2100 hours0.0243 days <br />0.583 hours <br />0.00347 weeks <br />7.9905e-4 months <br /> on January 5. The forced power reduction was 34.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> in duration. Power ascension was

. resumed and 100% power for Cycle 5 was achieved on January 11, 1989.

2. At 1610 hours0.0186 days <br />0.447 hours <br />0.00266 weeks <br />6.12605e-4 months <br /> on January 29, 1989, a problem was experienced with the "A" Reactor Coolant Pump lower oil reservoir level. Reactor power was reduced to approximately 40% to allow entry into the Reactor Building. It was determined that the oil level was slightly high and approximately 1.5 gallons of oil was drained from the 25 gallon reservoir. The change in level was attributed to increasing ambient temperature and possible overfill of the reservoir during the fourth refueling outage. As part of the corrective Etion for this occurrence, a procedure for adding / draining oil was issued and the high/ low alarm settings were modifiet At 2130 hours0.0247 days <br />0.592 hours <br />0.00352 weeks <br />8.10465e-4 months <br />, power was increased. The forced reduction in power lasted 5.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.

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r 1 3. On February 14, 1989, at 2312 hours0.0268 days <br />0.642 hours <br />0.00382 weeks <br />8.79716e-4 months <br />, a manual plant shutdown was initiated to clean up secondary water chemistry after an inadvertent resin release. On February 15 at 0200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br />, the j plant was taken off-line. The cause of the resin intrusion was a

, system misalignment (Valve XVD-6186 was inadvertently left open after maintenance) in the Nuclear Blowaown Demineralizer System which allowed the main condenser vacuum to be aligned to the Blowdown Demineralizer. 1his allowed the resin to bypass filters and be injected into the condenser.

l A decision was'made to attempt system cleanup in hot standby r' using the Steam Generator Blowdown System. When it appeared that chemistry was returning to normal limits on February 19, the reactor was taken critical at 1145 and the generator was placed on-line at 1605 hours0.0186 days <br />0.446 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.107025e-4 months <br />. The duration of the forced shutdown was 110.1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The plant operated at reduced power levels (le.ss than 50%) to continue secondary chemistry cleanup until March 10.

(See item 4 for corrective actions and reports made for this event.)

4. On March 10, 1989, at 1005 hours0.0116 days <br />0.279 hours <br />0.00166 weeks <br />3.824025e-4 months <br />, a controlled manual shutdown was initiated. The generator was taken off line at 1125 hours0.013 days <br />0.313 hours <br />0.00186 weeks <br />4.280625e-4 months <br /> to allow for secondary water chemistry cleanup which could not be accomplished at power.

Corrective actions included a modification to place strainers in the inlet headers to the demineralizers. Also, procedural changes were made to the locked valve tracking program and the tagout program. In addition, a task force was formed to identify similar configurations susceptible to resin intrusion. Equipment cleanup included replacing filters, steam generator sludge lancing and secondary system flushing.

Information on this event was provided in SCE&G S April 5, 1989, response to NRC Inspection Report 89-03 and in a March 22 meeting with the NRC (reference the March 28, 1989, letter to the Document Control Desk). On March 29 at 2255 hours0.0261 days <br />0.626 hours <br />0.00373 weeks <br />8.580275e-4 months <br />, the reactor was taken critical. The generator was placed on-line at 1732 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.59026e-4 months <br /> on March 30, 1989. The duration of the forced shutdown was 486.1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

5. On March 30, 1989, at 1819 hours0.0211 days <br />0.505 hours <br />0.00301 weeks <br />6.921295e-4 months <br />, the turbine tripped on indicated high moisture separator / reheater (MSR) level. Initial investigation indicated that the trip was generated by an MSR high level signal but no MSR high level alarms had annunciated.

As a result of confilcting indications and plant data, the trip was attributed to erroneously generated signals. The suspect MSR level switches were recalibrated and the unit was placed on-line

at 1047 hours0.0121 days <br />0.291 hours <br />0.00173 weeks <br />3.983835e-4 months <br /> on March 31, 1989. The duration of the forced shutdown was 16.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. This event is covered in LER 89-06 which reported a similar occurrence (April 1, 1989).

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6. With the plant operating at 30% power for continued chemistry '

cleanup, another turbine trip on high MSR level occurred at 0445 hours0.00515 days <br />0.124 hours <br />7.357804e-4 weeks <br />1.693225e-4 months <br /> on April 1. At 0519 hours0.00601 days <br />0.144 hours <br />8.581349e-4 weeks <br />1.974795e-4 months <br />, a reactor trip occurred due to 10-10 steam generator level.

The cause of this event was various secondary equipment  !

malfunctions. Detailed investigation revealed that the turbine trip was caused by actual high MSR level resulting from a i malfunction of the MSR drain tank level controller and switch.  !

, The resultant 10-10 steam generator level reactor trip was caused by a Feedwater Isolation Valve (FWIV) signal. The FWIV signal resulted from an indicated but not actual low feedwater flow signal generated by a faulty flow transmitter coincident with low feedwater temperature. Corrective action included .

repair / replacement /recalibration of improperly functioning MSR

< components and the feedwater flow transmitter. In addition, ,

verification of adequate preventive maintenance for these components was made. Also, a plant procedure was revised to '

require initiation of detailed investigations of secondary plant trips. The reactor was taken critical at 0415 hours0.0048 days <br />0.115 hours <br />6.861772e-4 weeks <br />1.579075e-4 months <br /> on April 4, 1989, and the plant was placed on-line at 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br />. The i duration of the forced outage was 82.7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> and the event was reported in LER 89-06. Plant power was slowly increased to 100%

(achievedApril11at1940 hours)toallowforcontinued '

chemistry cleanup.

7. At 0252 hours0.00292 days <br />0.07 hours <br />4.166667e-4 weeks <br />9.5886e-5 months <br /> on May 28, 1989, a manual reactor trip was initiated following the failure of Pressurizer Safety Valve XVS-8010-C. The valve became unseated causing a rapid depressurization of the Reactor Coolant System. The manual trip wat initiated at approximately 2000 psig and the safety valve reseated prior to reaching the Safety Injection setpoint of 1850 psig. The Reactor Coolant System pressure was stabilized at -

approximately 2000 psig.

The reason for the misoperation of XVS-8010-C was that the ,

expected margin (10%) between nomal operating pressure and the pressurizer safety valve relief setpoint pressure was reduced to zero. It was determined that the most prevalent factor in this margin reduction was a loop seal discharge. This discharge resulted in a reduced valve setpoint because of the steam medium imposed on the valve. SCE&G is currently planning to eliminate the loop seal capability for the pressurizer safety valves.

Short term corrective action for this event involved replacing the "B" and "C" safety valves. The "B" valve was replaced as a precaution due to previous minor leakage past the seat. The setpoints on all 3 valves were verified prior to restart. Also, temperature detectors were temporarily installed on the Pressurizer Safety Valves to facilitate valve body temperature monitoring. A special instruction for Operations personnel was issued to provide instruction on temperature monitoring requirements and when a plant shutdown should be initiated. In addition, a current / pressure convertor was adjusted for a t Page 3 of 8 l

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condenser steam dump valve which failed to operate during the ,

transient.  ;

On June 11,1989, at 0049 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br />, criticality was established and l the plant was placed on-line at 0957 hours0.0111 days <br />0.266 hours <br />0.00158 weeks <br />3.641385e-4 months <br />. The duration of the  :

forced shutdown was 343.1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and was reported in LER 89-011 (and Revision 1).  !

8. On July 11, 1989, at 1435 hours0.0166 days <br />0.399 hours <br />0.00237 weeks <br />5.460175e-4 months <br />, a turbine trip / reactor trip  !

occurred while operating at 100% power. Technicians working l inside the " Generator Stator Cooling Water" cabinet inadvertently '

shorted the power leads on the temperature converter causing the AC power fuse to blow. This gave a false indication of loss of generator stator cooling water which caused a turbine trip and  ;

resultant reactor trip. A turbine runback relay in the circuitry >

which would have limited turbine runback failed to operate. In addition, three other generating stations tripped while attempting to compensate for the loss of reactive generation (VARs) on the grid dLe to the VCSNS trip.

With the exception of the failed turbine runback relay, the plant responded as expected. As a result of the loss of four generating stations and subsequent degraded voltage condition, both Emergency Diesel Generators started and supplied their respective Engineering Safety Feature busses. To minimize the probability of recurrence, interim controls were established

-including limiting VCSNS reactive output. Also, generator backup relay settings on other plants were increased to prevent inadvertent / unnecessary loss of the plants. A modification to ,

install voltage regulators on the 115/7.2 KV Emergency Auxiliary Transformer is in progress.

The defective turbine runback relay was replaced and on July 12, 1989, at 0555 hours0.00642 days <br />0.154 hours <br />9.176587e-4 weeks <br />2.111775e-4 months <br />, the reactor was taken critical. On July 13, ,

1989, at 0537 hours0.00622 days <br />0.149 hours <br />8.878968e-4 weeks <br />2.043285e-4 months <br />, the generator was placed on-line. The forced shutdown lasted 39 hours4.513889e-4 days <br />0.0108 hours <br />6.448413e-5 weeks <br />1.48395e-5 months <br /> and was reported in LER 89-12. A i presentation to the NRC was made on this topic on August 1,1989,

9. At 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> on August 25, 1989, the "A" Pressurizer Safety -

Valve (XVS-8010-A) body inlet temperature increased to greater than 450'F and a plant shutdown was initiated. During the load reduction, the pressurizer safety valve opened at a system pressure of approximately 2260 psig. The Reactor Coolant System rapidly depressurized and the reactor was manually tripped at

  • 1004 hours0.0116 days <br />0.279 hours <br />0.00166 weeks <br />3.82022e-4 months <br />. The valve reseated prior to reaching the Safety Injection setpoint of 1850 psig.

The cause of this event was similar to the May 28 "C" Pressurizer Safety Valve failure. The "A" valve had been leaking and as the loop seal temperature increased, the it:akage rapidly increased leading to a loss cf the loop seal. This caused a dramatic reduction in the valve setpoint. The affected valve was replaced. A modification is planned to change out all three of the pressurizer safety valves' internals for steam application Page 4 of 8 .

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and to remove the loop seal capability. On September 1, 1989, at l 0635 hours0.00735 days <br />0.176 hours <br />0.00105 weeks <br />2.416175e-4 months <br />. the reactor was taken critical and the plant was on-  ;

line at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br />. The duration of this forced shutdown was ,

173.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and was reported in LER 89-015 (and Revisions 1 and  !

2).  !

10. On September 7, 1989, with the plant at 100% power, a power i reduction was commenced at 1740 hours0.0201 days <br />0.483 hours <br />0.00288 weeks <br />6.6207e-4 months <br /> to repair condenser tube  !

leaks. During the repair activity, a faulty test circuit on the  ;

"A" Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) was discovered. At 0410

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hours on September 8, a controlled shutdown was commenced as required by Technical Specification 3.7.1.5 (MSIV "A" was '

declared inoperable at 0001 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> on September S). It was determined that movement in a four inch feedwater forward flush ,

line crushed a conduit which caused a short circuit in the "A"  ;

MSIV test circuit wiring. The movement of the forward flush line  ;

was caused by a pressure spike / wave generated in the line when  !

water flashed to steam and then (water) reentered the line.  !

Corrective action consisted of repairing the conduit and test circuit wiring. The forward flush line was inspected and i restored to design condition. Also, the method of operating the non-safety flush line is being modified to minimize the probability of future transients. On September 15, 1989, at 1457 hours0.0169 days <br />0.405 hours <br />0.00241 weeks <br />5.543885e-4 months <br />, the reactor was taken critical. After holding at lower power to clean up secondary chemistry, the plant was placed on-line at 2149 hours0.0249 days <br />0.597 hours <br />0.00355 weeks <br />8.176945e-4 months <br /> on September 17. The duration of the forced  !

outage was 239.9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. This event was reported in LER 89'16.

11. On September 19, 1989, at 0249 hours0.00288 days <br />0.0692 hours <br />4.117063e-4 weeks <br />9.47445e-5 months <br />, the turbine tripped from approximately 36% power due to a loss of condenser vacuum. '

Operations personnel were in the process of transferring circulating water to the condenser from the outer to inner loop as part of tube integrity testing. A missing light bulb associated with the circulating water isolation valve indicator resulted in a false indication / personnel misinterpretation of the associated valve position and led to the loss of circulating water to the condenser.

As part of the corrective action for this event, all buildings were walked down to ensure indicating lights and lens covers were installed where appropriate. Also, the procedure in use during the system evolution was revised to require verification of system status using pump running amps. The generator was placed back on-line at 0705 hours0.00816 days <br />0.196 hours <br />0.00117 weeks <br />2.682525e-4 months <br /> on September 19, 1989. The forced shutdown lasted 4.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. L

12. On September 22, 1989, at 0320 hours0.0037 days <br />0.0889 hours <br />5.291005e-4 weeks <br />1.2176e-4 months <br />, reactor power was reduced to 70% due to a loss of system loads resulting from hurricane damage to the SCE&G grid. At 2120 hours0.0245 days <br />0.589 hours <br />0.00351 weeks <br />8.0666e-4 months <br /> on the same day, the plant returned to full power. The duration of the load reduction was 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />.

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13. On October 13, 1989, at 2200 hours0.0255 days <br />0.611 hours <br />0.00364 weeks <br />8.371e-4 months <br />, a power reduction began to allow for locating and repairing condenser leaks. Power was reduced to 30% by October 14 at 0100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />. Following condenser repairs, condensate system oxygen levels required power to be maintained at 30%. This forced power reduction lasted 160.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> until October 20 at 1422 hours0.0165 days <br />0.395 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.41071e-4 months <br />.
14. On October 20, 1989, at 1422 hours0.0165 days <br />0.395 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.41071e-4 months <br />, the main generator was taken off-line to repair the Alterex slip ring and brushes. Reactor power was maintained at 30% using the steam dump valves. At 1705 hours0.0197 days <br />0.474 hours <br />0.00282 weeks <br />6.487525e-4 months <br />, the repairs were completed and the generator was placed back on-line. The duration of this scheduled outage was 2.7 .

hours. "

15. Continuing secondary chemistry problems on October 20 indicated ,

additional condenser leaks were present and the plant was shutdown to plug tubes and repair any other leaks. The generator was taken off-line at 1759 hours0.0204 days <br />0.489 hours <br />0.00291 weeks <br />6.692995e-4 months <br />. On October 26 at 1133 hours0.0131 days <br />0.315 hours <br />0.00187 weeks <br />4.311065e-4 months <br />, ,

criticality was established and the generator was placed on-line at 2156 hours0.025 days <br />0.599 hours <br />0.00356 weeks <br />8.20358e-4 months <br />. The duration of this forced shutdown was 147.9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. Long term actions to improve condenser reliability / upgrade the condenser are being evaluated.

16. On December 2, 1989, at 2202 hours0.0255 days <br />0.612 hours <br />0.00364 weeks <br />8.37861e-4 months <br />, Operations personnel started a load reduction to 90% power for monthly turbine control valve testing. Due to a turbine control system failure, the turbine commenced a rapid power decrease during the evolution. The turbine was manually tripped at 2216 hours0.0256 days <br />0.616 hours <br />0.00366 weeks <br />8.43188e-4 months <br />. At 2222 hours0.0257 days <br />0.617 hours <br />0.00367 weeks <br />8.45471e-4 months <br />, a reactor trip occurred on "C" steam generator 10-10 level.

The cause of this event was a relay contact failure in the ,

turbine Electro Hydraulic Control (EHC) load reference circuitry.

The circuit board with the defective component was replaced.

Also, a failure of the exciter field breaker to actuate promptly during the event was attributed to lack of lubrication.

Preventive Maintenance (PM) was performed on the breaker and PM frequency was increased.

The circuitry of the EHC card was analyzed and it was discovered that diodes were not installed to prevent high inductive voltages. On December 3 at 2108 hours0.0244 days <br />0.586 hours <br />0.00349 weeks <br />8.02094e-4 months <br /> . criticality was established and at 0121 hours0.0014 days <br />0.0336 hours <br />2.000661e-4 weeks <br />4.60405e-5 months <br /> on December 4, 1989, the generator was placed on-line. The duration of the forced shutdown was 27.1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and was reported in LER 89-020. A modification to install diodes in the circuitry was scheduled for December 29, 1989.

17. On December 29, 1989, et 1009 hours0.0117 days <br />0.28 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.839245e-4 months <br />, the generator was taken off-line to perform the aforementioned modification to the EHC circuitry. The generator was placed back on-line at 0459 hours0.00531 days <br />0.128 hours <br />7.589286e-4 weeks <br />1.746495e-4 months <br /> on December 30. The duration of the scheduled outage was 18.8 >

hours.

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. l 4.0 EXPOSURES Attachment I provides a table which lists the number of station, utility,andotherpersonnel(includingcontractpersonnel) receiving exposures greater than 100 Mrem / Year, and their associated man-rem o exposure according to work and job functions.

5.0 FAILED FUEL The specific activity of the primary coolant remained within the limits (1.0microcuriepergramDoseEquivalentI-131)ofTechnical Specification 3.4.8, " Specific Activity," except on four occasions  :

where the limit was slightly exceeded following a reactor power reduction or trip. In all four cases, the reactor was operating at approximately 100% power with a constant letdown flow of 100 gpm for the 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> prior to the event. Attachment 11 provides a graph for each event showing reactor power and activity levels for I-131, 1-133 and I-134 as a function of time.

On May 28, 1989, at 0530 hours0.00613 days <br />0.147 hours <br />8.763227e-4 weeks <br />2.01665e-4 months <br />, Dose Equivalent I-131 exceeded Technical Specification limits following a manual reactor trip. The '

results of isotopic analyses for samples taken prior, during, and after the occurrence were:

May 26 at 0120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> - 1.40E-2 uC1/gm May 28 at 0530 hours0.00613 days <br />0.147 hours <br />8.763227e-4 weeks <br />2.01665e-4 months <br /> - 1.14 uCi/gm May 28 at 0925 hours0.0107 days <br />0.257 hours <br />0.00153 weeks <br />3.519625e-4 months <br /> - 8.38E-1 uC1/gm Based on sampling results, the duration of the occurrence was 3.9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />.

On July 11, 1989, at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br />, Dose Equivalent I-131 exceeded Technical Specification limits following an automatic reactor trip.

The results of isotopic analyses for samples taken prior, during, and after the occurrence were:

July 11 at 0050 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> - 2.22E-2 uci/gm L July l'1 at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> - 1.07 UCi/gm July i2 at 1830 hours0.0212 days <br />0.508 hours <br />0.00303 weeks <br />6.96315e-4 months <br /> - 8.39E-1 uCi/gm Based on sampling results, the duration of the occurrence was 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.

1 On December 3, 1989, at 0145 hours0.00168 days <br />0.0403 hours <br />2.397487e-4 weeks <br />5.51725e-5 months <br />, Dose Equivalent I-131 exceeded Technical Specification limits following an automatic reactor trip.

The results of isotopic analyses for samples taken prior, during, and i

after the occurrence were:

December 2 at 0300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> - 3.06E-2 uC1/gm December 3 at 0145 hours0.00168 days <br />0.0403 hours <br />2.397487e-4 weeks <br />5.51725e-5 months <br /> - 1.04 uCi/gm December 3 at 1340 hours0.0155 days <br />0.372 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.0987e-4 months <br /> - 2.60E-1 uCi/gm Based on sampling results, the duration of the occurrence was 11.9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. (Note that LER 89-19 reports the failure to obtain the second December 3 sample in the required time frame.)

Page 7 of 8

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.On December 29, 1989, at 1118 hours0.0129 days <br />0.311 hours <br />0.00185 weeks <br />4.25399e-4 months <br />. Dose Equivalent I-131 exceeded Technical Specification limits following a power. reduction. The results of isotopic analyses for samples taken prior, during and after the occurrence were:

December 26 at 0045 hours5.208333e-4 days <br />0.0125 hours <br />7.440476e-5 weeks <br />1.71225e-5 months <br /> - 3.37E-2 uC1/gm December 29 at 1118 hours0.0129 days <br />0.311 hours <br />0.00185 weeks <br />4.25399e-4 months <br /> - 1.06 uCi/gm December 29 at 1240 hours0.0144 days <br />0.344 hours <br />0.00205 weeks <br />4.7182e-4 months <br /> - 1.14 uCi/gm

-December 29 at 1540 hours0.0178 days <br />0.428 hours <br />0.00255 weeks <br />5.8597e-4 months <br /> - 8.50E-1 uC1/gm Based on. sampling results, the duration of the occurrence was 4.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

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Attachment I to Mr. S. D. Ebnet:r Lett:r Februety 28,,1990 l Page1cf1 )

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY V. C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION 1989 MAN-REM REPORT FOR PERSONNEL EXPOSURE GRE ATER THAN 100 MREM NUMBER OF WORK AND JOB FUNCTION PERSONNEL > 100 M REM TOTAL MAN REM i STATION UTILITY CONTRACT STATION UTILITY CONTRACT i Reactor Operations & Surveillance I Maintenance Personnel 0 0 2 0.744 0.000 0.470 l Operating Personnel 14 0 4 3.691 0.095 1.785 l Health Physics Personnel 7 0 11 1.894 0.000 3.072 Supervisory Personnel 0 0 0 0.295 0.005 0.083 Engineering Personnel 0 0 0 0.305 0.000 0.190 ft_qutine Maintenance Maintenance Personnel 6 0 4 3.175 0.000 1.688 Operating Personnel 0 0 4 0.442 0.015 1.626 ,

Health Physics Personnel 0 0 1 0.385 0.000 0.490 Supervisory Personnel 0 0 0 0.157 0.000 0.030 Engineering Personnel 0 0 1 0.256 0.000 0.110 Inservice Inspection Maintenance Personnel 0 0 3 0.000 0.000 1.205 Operating Personnel 3 0 0 0.910 0.000 0.125 Health Physics Personnel 0 0 0 0.125 0.000 0.135 ,

Supervisory Personnel 0 0 0 0.005 0.000 0.000 ,

Engineering Personnel - 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.120 -

Special Maintenance Maintenance Personnel 30 0 47 9.741 0.000 13.983 Operating Personnel 8 0 6 2.344 0.020 1.690 Health Physics Personnel 7 0 9 2.225 0.000 3.037 Supervisory Personnel 2 0 0 1.023 0.000 0.000 Engineering Personnel 1 0 0 0.310 0.000 0.060  ;

Waste Processino Maintenance Personnel 0 0 0 0.044 0.000 0.000 Operating Personnel 0 0 5 0.015 0.000 1.083 Health Physics Personnel 1 0 2 0.215 0.000 0.460 Supervisory Personnel 0 0 0 0.005 0.000 0.000 ,

Engineering Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000  ;

Refuelino Maintenance Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000

' Operating Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 '

Health Physics Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 Supervisory Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 Engineering Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 TQTAl$

Maintenance Personnel 36 0 56 13.704 0.000 17.346 Operating Personnel 25 0 19 7.402 0.130 6.309 Health Physics Personnel 15 0 23 4.844 0.000 7.194 Supervisory Personnel 2 0 0 1.485 0.005 0.113 Engineering Personnel 1 0 1 0.871 0 000 0.480 ~

GRANDTOTAL 79 0 99 28 306 0.135 31.442 The above Whole Body dose assignments are based on Pocket Dosimeter estimates. ,

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