ML20012C436

Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Primary Containment Integrity Shutdown Tech Specs Limiting Condition for Operation 3.6.1.1.2

ML20012C436
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	03/16/1990
From:	CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20012C435	List: ML20012C434 ML20012C436
References
PY-CEI-NRR-1140, NUDOCS 9003210286
Download: ML20012C436 (4)

Text

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,. Attachment 2 I

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PY-CEI/NRR-il40 L Page i of 4 1

3/4. 6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGR!TY - SHlffDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

3.6.1.1.2 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

• shall be maintained.8 APPLICABILITY:

, When irradiated fuel is being handled in the primary containment, and during li i

CORE ALTERATIONS, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor l L vessel. Under these conditions, the requirements of PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ,

INTEGRITY do not apply to normal operation of the inclined fuel transfer  !

system. i l ACTION:

L l Without. PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, suspend handling of irradiated fuel in l= the primary containment, CORE ALTERATIONS, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l 4. 6.1.1. 2 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

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a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all primary containment penetrations not capable of being closed by OPERABLE primary contain-ment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deacti- -

) vated automatic valves secured in position, .except as provided in l

Table 3.6.41 of Specification 3.6.4.#

b. By verifying each primary containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.

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<NS gga- *The primary contaissent leakage rates in accordance with Specification 3.6.1.2 go are not applicable.

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, Excep6 R.:* wJ 3/4" vent and drain line patW may be opened fi?.he co o surpose of perfom., i

$8 primary containment to g g Q { leak rate rential pressure testing arovided is ::.ain-

-e :ained within the limit is in effect for i i ,-

t N :he first refueling outage only.

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PERRY - UNIT 1 3/46-2 Amendment No. 19

Attachment 2

'.i" ' ' PY-CEI/NRR-l140 L Page 2 of 4 3.4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS i(n.

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. LUi BASES 3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT 3/4.6.1.1 " PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY L PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the accident analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR Part 100 during g accident conditions, g During shutdown when irradiated fuel is being handled in the primary / ,

con ent, and-dut ^%E ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for I draining eacte  % # footnote pennits the opening of two vent and drain line valve leak rate surve 7 m of *-4te performing containment isolation doses have been calculated for the postulated-fuel handlin rv contaia=*at $55u=ia9 a 100 cfm flowrate through the open e*[

two vent / drain pathways could be open w 4 ws.. Although more than in the bounds of the

o avoid the need for 1

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analysis, the number of open pathways was 11m l constant monitoring of the containment pressure th .dministrative controls.

By adding the requirement to periodically check primary irunent to secondary containment differential pressure while the 3/4" vent / drain pa s are open, l

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l there is assurance that sufficient primary containment to outside a ere ,

l differential pressure does not exist to create a 100 cfm flow through the l vent / drain pathways. s 3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total contain-ment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the accident analyses (

at the peak accident pressure of 11.31 psig, Pa. As an added conservatism, the j measured overall integrated leakage rate is further limited to less than or i equal to 0.75 La during perfonnance of the periodic tests to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

i l Overall integrated leakage rate means the leakage rate which obtains from l a sunenation of leakage through all potential leakage paths. Where a leakage l- path contains more than one valve, fitting, or component in series, the leakage j for that path will be that leakage of the worst leaking valve, fitting, or

! component and not the sununation of the leakage of all valves, fittings, or l' components in that leakage path.

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- Operating experience with the main steam line isolation valves has indicated that degradation has occasionally occurred in the

' of the valves; therefore the special requirement for testing, theseleak tightness valves.

I PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-1 Amendment No.19 ll 1

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Attachment 2 PY-CEI/NRR-1140 L

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. CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS "Uh BASES 3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT INTERNAL PRESSURE l The limitations on primary centainment to secondary containment differential pressure ensure that the primary containment peak pressure of 11.31 psig does not exceed the design pressure of 15.0 psig during LOCA conditions or that the external pressure differential-does not exceed the design maximum external pressure differential of +0.8 psid. The limit of

-0.1 to +1.0 psid for initial positive primary containment to secondt.ry containment pressure will limit the primary containment pressure to 11.31 M psid which is 'less than the design pressure and is consistent with the hpWdMA safety analysis. 02-4 g c're' 4 g :^-di tc i r this d4"e e-t e' - et e e i >

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i 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT AVERAGE AIR TEMPERATURE i=

1 The limitation on containment average air temperature ensures that i the containment peak air temperature does not exceed ~the design temperature of 185'F during LOCA conditions and is consistent with the safety analysis, e' 3/4.6.1.8 DRYWELL AND CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM

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The use of the drywell and containment purge lines is restricted to the 42-inch outboard and 18-inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valves. These valves will close during a LOCA or steam line break accident and therefore the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in'the event of. an accident during purging operations. The term sealed closed as i

used in this context means that the valve is' secured in its closed position t by deactivating the valve motor operator, and does not pertain to injecting seal water between the isolation valves by a seal water system.

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PERRY - Unit i B 3/4 6-2a Anendment No.19 , l (Next page is B 3/4 6-3)

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• Attech::nt 2 PY-CEI/NRR-1140 L Page 4 of 4 ,

Insert 1

1. Except that six (6) 3/4" vent and drain line pathways may be opened for the purpose of performing containment isolation valve leak rate testing provided the plant has been suberitical for at least seven (7) days.

Insert 2

-During shutdown when irradiated fuel is being handled in the primary containment, and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for.

draining the reactor vessel, the # footnote permits the opening of six vent and-drain pathways for the purpose of performing containment isolation valve leak rate surveillance testing provided the reactor has been suberitical for at least seven days. Offsite doses vere calculated assuming the postulated fuel handling accident inside primary containment after a seven day decay time, and assuming all the airborne activity existing inside containment after the accident is immediately discharged directly to the environment (i.e. no containment). Although this analysis vould indicate that no restriction on the number of vent and drain pathways was required, the number of open pathways was restricted to six for van:;ervatism. i NJC/ CODED /3209