ML20006E440

LER 90-007-00:on 900117,main Steam Line Isolation Signal Actuated During Surveillance for Pressure Transmitter, Causing Isolation Signal & ESF Actuations.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Panel Labeling corrected.W/900215 Ltr

ML20006E440
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	02/15/1990
From:	Miller L, Pollack M Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-007, LER-90-7, NUDOCS 9002230162
Download: ML20006E440 (6)

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• February 15, 1990

..U..S.: Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4

Document Control Desk -

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Dear- L Sir :

a SALEN GENERATING STATION

-LICENSE NO. DPR-75

' DOCKET NO. 50-311' '

UNIT.NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT. REPORT 90-007-00

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<r This Licensee EventlReport is-being submitted-pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR . .

50.73 (a) (2) (iv) . .This report is required ~within thirty (30) days Toftdiscovery.

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..i t Sincerely yours, 8 s

L. K. Miller General Manager -

Salen Operations s .

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1 9002230162 900215 I/

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LK:ENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

PAstLITY Isans tu . , . coCa T InAmen (3) -m Stlem Generating Station - Unit 2 0 l 5 l 0 l 0 l 0 l 311 l1 1l0Fl0f5 TrTLs te ESF-Actuation - Main Steamline Isol. Due To An Inadequate Procedure eveerv oats e ten muusen is aeront oAve m oTwen raciurias servo 6veo si 8 Acikitv hawse DOCKET pevueents) teostTM oAY YEAn YtAn 'DM $$ woNtw oAY vtAn Salem Unit 1 0l6l0l0l0 1217 l 2 -

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UN 'dA I l l l l l l l l l l l l l sumpteueNTAL nepont expecteo um woNTw oAv vpn sueuissioN YE$ let vee. cornemen fx9fCrf0 SVenetSStoN DMil ko l l l AsetnACT su ,, ,m -e i. . .e ,, a, ,,,. ,, ,,,o , o si On 1/17/90, with the plant in Hot Shutdown, a Main Steamline Isolation signal.was actuated during the performance of the functional surveillance for pressure transmitter 2PT506. Procedure 2IC-2.6,025 "2PT-506 First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure - Channel II" was being used. The logic causing actuation of the isolation signal was low steamline pressure coincident with high steamline flow. Main Steamline Isolation is an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF). The root cause of this event has been attributed to an inadequate procedure.

Contributing to this event, was confusing labeling of a control room status panel indicator and lack of' specific detail in the Maintenance-I&C training program for this indicator. The Salem Units 1 and 2 procedures associated with the PT-505 and PT-506 first stage turbine impulse pressure channel surveillances have been revised to identify the potential for Main Steamline Isolation under certain plant conditions. The labeling of the RP-4 panel will be corrected as part of the Control Room human factors upgrade project. This event was discussed, in detail, with applicable Operations Department personnel.

Several licensed operators were questioned as to whether the Main Steam Isolation function would be blocked under the current plant conditions. All, but the NCO involved in the event, answered that the Main Steam Isolation signal would not be blocked. The Maintenance-I&C training program has been revised to clearly identify the operability of Main Steamline Isolation. This event will be reviewed for inclusion in the next licensed operator requalification training program. This event will be reviewed with applicable Maintenance personnel.

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[ ' Salem'Generatingestation'.. DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE e ' Unit 2 ., 5000311 90-007-00 2 of 5 m '

. PLANT AND SYSTEN IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse -1 Pressurized: Water Reactor-Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in.

the text as-(xxl IDENTIFICATION'OF'OCCURRENCEi Engineered Safety Feature Actuation - Main Steamline Isolation j actuated due to an inadequate procedure

. Event Date: :1/17/90 .

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Report Date: -2/15/90

'This report was initiated by Incident Report No.90-049.

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CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE: '

Node 4 -Hot Shutdown; Reactor'being shutdown in accordance with' Technical Specification 3.0.3 (reference LER 311/90-005-00)

(DESCRIPTION'OF OCCURRENCE: (j q . On: January _17, 1990 at 2200 hours0.0255 days <br />0.611 hours <br />0.00364 weeks <br />8.371e-4 months <br />, with'the plant;in Mode 4 (Hot' R Shutdown) , 'a1 Main Steamline Isolation signal was actuated during" the performanceLot the functional surveillance for pressure transmitter-  ;,

J2PT506. Procedure 2IC-2.6,025 "2PT-506 First Stage Turbine 1 Impulse:

Pressure'-LChannel1 II (ChanneliFunctional Test Procedure)" was being-used. 'The: logic causing actuation'of the_ isolation signal was low

- steamline pressure coincident with--high.steamline flow.

.. Main:SteamlineLIsolation is an EngineeredtSafety Feature-(ESF). .

Therefore,.on' January 17, 1990 at 2334 hours0.027 days <br />0.648 hours <br />0.00386 weeks <br />8.88087e-4 months <br />, the actuation of the Main Steamline Isolation signal event was reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in accordance with Code of Federal Regulations 1;

c10CFR 50.72 (B) (2) (ii) .

L APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: ,

1 The= root cause of this event has been attributed to an inadequate- U procedure. -contributing to this event, was confusing labeling of a  ;

contro1 ~ room: status panel indicator and lack of specific detail' in a '

the Maintenance-I&C training program for this indicator.

, lAs-indicated'above, Procedure 2IC-2.6,025 was being-performed.

eOperations shift personnel had authorized performance of the procedure, prior to initiating the procedure, as per current administrative controls. This procedure requires functional testing L of pressureLtransmitter PT-506 as required by Technical l- Specifications. In the " Limitations and Actions" section of the h procedure, there is a specific requirement for the technician,

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salen Generating Station . . DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 2 . . 5000311 90-007-00 3 of 5 .!

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'dl '

l performing the procedure, to contact the job supervisor "immediately" if." required indications cannot be obtained". The job supervisor then~ determines if " exceptions to the required indications, due to plant conditions at the time of the procedure, may be made". These exceptions "must be-indicated and explained in the' REMARKS section"- i of the procedure.

1 As required, the technician contacted the job supervisor and.the board Nuclear Control Operator (NCO) when the Reactor Protection _

Status Panel lights for " Safety Injection, Low Steamline-Pressure",

for all four loops, were found "on" instead of "off".

The board NCO, when questioned, recalled a previous event (LER:

272/89-012-00)- which involved the functional testing of the PT-506 channel.- However, that event involved a Turbine Trip / Reactor Trip from Mode 2 caused by the technician not complying with the functional procedure. Since this was not the case here and recent-plant modifications involving installation of a P-9 permissive prevents that specific event from occurring again, the NCO did not identify any concern with continuing the procedure. After the event, the-NCO was questioned and it was found that the NCO had thought Main Steam Isolation was blocked in addition to the safety injection function as apparently indicated by the RP-4 Status Panel indicator for "rteamline Isolation SI Blocked Trains A & B" being lit.

The supervisor, when questioned, determined that due to the current plant conditions (i.e., Mode 4), the status lights were correct'.

Additionally, with the RP-4 Status Panel indicator for "Steamline Isolation SI Blocked Trains A & B" lit, the procedure could be continued. This determination was documented in:the. procedure.

Subsequently, the functional testing was continued. When the bistable for high steamline flow was placed in test, thereby.

actuating the "High Steamline Flow" alarm, the logic was completed for actuating Main Steamline Isolation, i ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Main Steamline Isolation protection is applicable only in Mode 1 l (Power Operation),' Mode 2 (Critical Operation), and Mode 3 (Hot

_ Standby). It is designed to mitigate the consequences of various design base accidents including main steamline rupture and Steam l s Generator primary to secondary tube rupture. l In Mode 4, the reactor is suberitical with T .. greater than 200*F but less than 350*F. Decay heat is removed either by.the Residual Heat Removal system or via steaming from the S/Gs. Makeup water to the S/Gs can be supplied by either a Condensate Pump or by an-Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. In Mode 4, the Auxiliary Feedwater System is not required to be operable.

During this event, reactor excess heat removal (Tave = 335'F) was

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a j 3- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT'(LER) TEXT CONTINUATION'

- Salen Generating Station .

DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE

. Unit 2 . 5000311 90-007-00 4 of 5 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) accomplished using the Steam Generators with makeup supplied by a Condensate Pump. The 21MS18 valve (No. 21 S/G Steamline Main Steam Bypass Stop Valve) was open to provide a flowpath, for the steam,-

directly--to the Condensers. When the Main Steamline Isolation signal was actuated, the 21MS18_ valve closed as designed. All other main i steamline isolation valves were already closed. The steam was then-diverted to the outside atmosphere via the MS10 valves (Main Steam Power Relief Valves).

Since this event was not the result of an actual plant need for Main Steamline isolation, this event did not affect the health or safety of-the public. However, since Main Steamline Isolation is an ESF system and the procedure being used did not address the possibilities of actuating it, this event is reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in_accordance with Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv) . ,

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The Salem Units 1 and 2 procedures associated with the PT-505 and PT-506 first stage turbine impulse pressure channel'surveillances have been revised to identify the potential for Main Steamline Isolation-under certain plant conditions. Notification of Operations shift

' personnel is addressed.

The labeling of the RP-4 panel, which incorrectly indicates that Main Steamline Isolation is blocked in addition to the safety injection i actuating signal, will be corrected as part'of the Control Room human factors upgrade project.

This event has been reviewed with the Maintenance personnel involved in the event. .

l This. event was discussed, in detail, with applicable Operations Department personnel. Several licensed operators were questioned (immediately following the event) as to whether the Main Steam Isolation function would be blocked under the current plant conditions. ,All, but the NCO involved in the event, answered that the Main Steam Isolation signal would not be blocked.

7 The Maintenance-I&C training lesson plans were reviewed. Although the Solid State Protection System block functions are taught for a given

-plant condition, the confusing RP-4 panel labeling was not emphasized in the lesson plans. Subsequently, the Maintenance-I&C training program has been revised to clearly identify the operability of Main Steamline Isolation in all Modes.

The PSE&G Nuclear Training Center will review this event for inclusion in the next licensed operator requalification training program.

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0: Salem Generating: Station.. . . DOCKET NUMBER LER' NUMBER PAGE1

Unit 2 4 . 5000311 90-007-0.0 5~of 5

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LCORRECTIVE ACTIONS.:' (cont'dl ,

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-This~ event will be reviewed-with applicable: Maintenance Department-personnel.- ,

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