ML20003G154
| ML20003G154 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1981 |
| From: | Withers B PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Clark R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TAC-46275, NUDOCS 8104280388 | |
| Download: ML20003G154 (18) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:.= _ = 6 h //$7 M. s g g . ~; m ~ Pett!and General E!ectric CenTcny Oenp7 // l -. = .~ '- %,,4:n.;f /g -{. ] -C ~ D. ./ ?. i%, ' _,./ l April 23, 1981 u-Trojan Nuclear Plant Docket 50-344 License NPF-1 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN: Mr. Robert A. Clark, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 I
Dear Sir:
Attached is a copy of the revised section of the Trojan Radiological Emergency Plan Evacuation Analysis Report which addresses the potential effects of a future eruption of Mt. St. Helens as requested by your letter of November 24, 1981. The analysis included two postulated flooding and audflow scenarios and one postulated ashfall scenario which were conservatively based on a potential future eruption equivalent to the May 18, 1980 Mt. St. Helens l l eruption. However, the assumed river flows and wind direction at the time of the postulated eruption were used to maximize the impact of the eruption on evacuation routes. The flood scenarios postulated the loss of some or all of the northbound evacuation routes out of the plume exposure EPZ. The ash scenario postulated extreme reduced visibility due to resuspended ash under dry road conditions, or reduced road speeds due to the reduction in vehicle traction from ash deposition coincident with precipitation. The conclusions of the analysis were as follows: 1. The two flooding scenarios resulted in no significant I increases in evacuation time estimates over those cal-culated for normal and adverse weather conditions when I-5 South, which was not previously used for northbound traffic, is used as an alternate evacuation route. /' h 2. The ashfall scenario resulted in evacuation times that were similar to those previously calculated for adverse weather conditions. S Under the postulated flooding and mudflow scenarios the routes that Plant ff 1 workers use to drive to the Plant site would not be affected. Ashfall conditions could decrease road speeds and therefore increase driving 810.428033% i i l
I ' C""^] OCPCF! emf C CC.'."y j Mr. Robert A. Clark April 23, 1981 Page two t l times to the Plant. In any case, the on-shift Plant staff would be j capable of handling emergencies in the short term even if sugmentation times for off-duty personnel were increased. Therefore, changes in notification or augmentation procedures for Plant personnel to account for the effect of volcanic eruptions are not required. The analysis of the impact of volcanic activity on evacuation plans has been reviewed by Columbia County and Cowlitz County emergency planning officials and their comments have been incorporated. l The Evacuation Analysis Report has also been revised to include addi-tional discussion of the evacuation of the transient population within the plume exposure EPZ. The small transient population due primarily to tourists or similar visitors has no effect on evacuation plans. The analysis results indicated that there are no immediate changes required to the current Appendix 1-E. Therefore, this information will be incor-porated into Amendment 1 to the Trojan Radiological Emergency Plan, to be I ( issued in June 1981. Sincerely, i o Eart D. Withers Vice President Nuclear i l Attachment l ct Mr. Lynn Frank, Director w/ attach State of Oregon Department of Energy i Hugh Fowler, Director w/ attach State of Washington Department of Emergency Services Mr. Ben Bena w/ attach Cowlitz County Emergency Services Coordinator Mr. John DeFrance w/ attach Columbia County Director of Emergency Services
=_ Attachnert to Trojan Nuclear Plant B. D. Withers letter Docket 50-344 to Robert A. Clark Licease NPF-1 April 23, 1981 Sheet 1 of 9 EXCERPT FROM EVACUATION ANALYSIS REPORT REGARDING THE EFFECTS OF VOLCANIC ERUPTION I E.4.4 EFFECT OF VOLCANIC ERUPTION ON EVACUATION TIMES The evacuation time estimates determined for normal and adverse weather conditions in Section E.4.1 were also reevaluated considering adverse conditions resulting from volcanic activity, such as ash deposition, mudflows, and floods. hro flood scenarios and one ash deposition sce-nario were developed representing different sets of conditions relative to their effect on general public evacuation times from the Trojan plume exposure EPZ. The flood scenarios were developed by conservatively assuming a future volcanic eruption and subsequent flooding similar to the events following the May 18, 1980 Mt. St. Helens eruption (24), The Cowlitz River and Toutle River flood potential was modeled by com-bining the estimated discharge of the May 18, 1980 audflows with a 99 percentile mean daily discharge rate of the river drainage (24), [ The Kalama River flood potential was modeled by aseming a southwest-directed eruption combined with a 99 percentile mean daily discharge rate of the streas(24), The Lewis River flood potential was modeled by determining the effects of a 100,000 acre-ft audflow into the Swift Reservoir. The owner-operator of the dans on the Lewis River has indicated that a storage capacity of 100,000 acre-ft will be maintained in order to contain potential audflows. The owner-operator is of the opinion that they can also regulate the Lewis River flows under all foreseeable condi-tions. Therefore, it appears that none of the evacuation routes would be affected by events in the Lewis River drainage (24),
1 Sheet 2 of 9 Flood Scenario A results in the closure c! the I-5 Bridge over the Toutle River and the Pacific Avenue Bridge over the Toutle River, which principally affects evacuation Sector N, and possible damage to portions of the Kalsma River Road, which passes through Sectors C, H, and P (see i Figure 1:E-1). Flood Scenario B results in the closure of State Route 411 at the con-fluence of the Toutle and Cowlits Rivers in addition to the Flood Sce-nario A closures. The ash deposition scenario was developed assuming a May 18, 1980 equivalent volcanic eruption of Mt. St. Helens with prevailing winds directing the tephra plume directly toward the Trojan site. The poten-tial ash scenario conditions resulted in the deposition of 20 to 50 mm (0.8 to 2.0 in.) of volcanic ash on portions of all evacuation routes (24), As discussed in Section E.4.1.1, a microscopic traffic analysis was originally performed of Sector N due to the relatively high population and the extensive existing road network. The six evacuation routes l available for use by traffic leaving Sector N are identified in Section E.4.1.1. The individual route vehicle capacity (in vehicles per 10-min time increments) within the EPZ and Sector N evacuating vehicle demand assigned to each route are summarized in Table 1:E-32. The capacities shown in the table represent normal weather conditions. As discussed in Section E.1.1, the capacities of the evacuation roadways under adverse weather conditions were assumed to be 40 percent below that expected under normal weather conditions. E.4.4.1 Flood Scenario A l Under assumed Flood Scenario A, none of the six identified evacuation j routes would be impacted within the EPZ since the route closures are beyond the EPZ limits. Therefore, this scenario would result in no increase in the previously calculated evacuation times for the plume exposure EPZ for normal and adverse weather conditions (see Table 1:E-13). _.... _ _ _ _. _ _ _. _. _. _.,. _ _ _.. _, ~ _ _.... _ _. _.. _
i i Sheet 3 of 9 However, there would be an impact on northbound travel times beyond the EPZ limite due to the assumed road closures at the Toutle River. Flood l Scenario A requires the use of the bridge across the Cowlits River at i Castle Rock to permit evacuation traffic northbound on I-5 and Pacific Avenue to access State Route 411. This results in State Route 411 north of Castle Rock representing a route (capacity) restriction affecting the total time necessary to clear the area of route closures at the Tc itle River. l The basic time-estimate methodology described in Section E.3 was followed I in this special analysis. I For informational purposes, the general public evacuation time estimates l for Flood Scenario A are summarized in Table 1 E-33. The evacuation times to clear the EPZ limits are indicated for the individual routes for both normal and adverse weather conditions. The table indicates that traffic evacuating to the north on State Route 411 will require the l longest times: 130 min under normal weather conditions and 220 min under adverse weather conditions. These times are identical with the times calculated for nonflood conditions. 1 As discussed previously State Route 411 north of Castle Rock will represent the major route restriction relative to travel time required i for northbound evacuating traffic to clear the area constrained by l the closure of I-5 and Pacific Avenue Bridges over the Toutle River. While the 14,598 vehicles evacuating Sector N on I-5, Pacific Avenue North, Pacific Way, and State Route 411 will be clear of the EPZ, the assumed route closures mean that all of these vehicles must use State Route 411 to bypass the area of closures. Thus, 'he capacity of State Route 411 will determine the time required for the evacuating vehicles j to clear the area affected by flooding. Table 1:E-33 indicates that this additional travel time (outside the EPZ limits) will be approximately 650 min under normal weather conditions and 1080 min under adverse weather conditions. i l
Sheet 4 of 9 The above travel times could be reduced to 150 min under normal weather conditions and 250 min under adverse weather conditions by allowing evacuation of Sector N via I-5 southbound past the Trojan Nuclear Plant i if emergency conditions permit (ie, precautionary evacuation). An analysis was performed to determine if the routes provided adequate storage space for the 14,598 vehicles during the time interval they were out of the EPZ until they could bypass the route closures. This analysis included the traffic demand versus the evacuation route lengths between the EPZ limits and the State Aoute 411 route restriction. Storage capacity was evaluated on the basis of 25 f t of roadway average per i vehicle and calculated using only the outbound lanes on all evacuation routes except I-5, on which the three southbound lanes between the EPZ and the Castle Rock interchange were also used. This analysis indi-cated that adequate roadway storage capacity existed outside the EPZ l to accommodate the evacuating vehicles until they were able to clear the State Route 411 route restriction. The Washington State Department of Transportation is reportedly con-sidering implementation of an emergency plan that would provide for removal of a section of I-5 mainline roadway to relieve the poten-tial flooding pressures and failure of the I-5 Bridge across the Toutle River ( } Such relief could be provided through the use of either heavy equipment or preset explosive charges. The plans also entail the use of an emergency bypass backfill of the removed section of the roadway once the flooding subsides and pressure on the bridge structure has been l removed. This would permit I-5 to be open for limited service within several days following the flooding, rather than the several years that might be required if the bridse structure were destroyed by flood conditions. ) The above-discussed emergency planning efforts of the Washington State Department of Transportatina would have no effect on the time required for Sector !! evacuation of the EPZ ander Flood Scenario A.
- However, dependent on the time relationship between the flooding and a potential i
Sheet 5 of 9 Trojan EPZ evacuation need, this plan could significantly reduce the travel time required for the evacuating traffic (once clear of the EPZ) to bypass the Toutle River area. With I-5 back in service on a limited basis, some traffic could probably use this route rather than the restricted section of State Route 411 north of Castle Rock. E.4.4.2 Flood Scenario B Under the assumed Flood Scenario B route closures, the six identified evacuation routes would be impacted within the EPZ because of the closure of northbound routes and resulting increased traffic on the remaining routes. All traffic assigned to evacuate nor;hbound out of Sector N on Pacific Avenue North, Pacific Way, and State Route 411 would be required to evacuate the EPZ via State Route 4 to the west. In this instance, the available roadway capacity of State Route 4 would determine the time required for this traffic to evacuate the EPZ. In addition, the assumed Flood Scenario B route closures would necessitate the I-5 traffic, other-vise assigned to evacuate the EPZ to the north, to evacuate the EPZ to the south and west via the Lewis and Clark Bridge crossing the Columbia River between Longview, Washington, and Rainier, Oregon, providing access to U. S. Highway 30. For this evacuation traffic demand, the available capa-city of the bridge connection with U. S. Highway 30 would determine the time required to evacuate the EPZ. The general public evacuation time estimates for Flood Scenario B are summarized in Table 1:E-33. The evacuation tLaes to clear the EPZ limits are indicated for both normal and adverse weather conditions. The table indicates that the 9732 vehicles evacuating to the west on State Route 4 would require 410 min under normal-weather conditions and 680 min under adverse weather conditions. Table 1:E-33 indicates that the 9732 vehicles required to evacuate the EPZ to the south and west via the Lewis and Clark Bridge and U. S. Highway 30 would require the longest evacuation times to clear the EPZ limits: 470 min under normal weather conditions and 790 min under adverse weather conditions.
) i i Sheet 6 of 9 The above evacuation times could be reduced to 190 min under normal j weather conditions and 320 min under adverse weather conditions b/ allowing evacuation of Sector N via I-5 southbound past the Trojan Nuclear Plant if emergency conditions permit (ie, precautionary evacuation). Dependent on the time relationship between the Toutle River flooding and a potential Trojan EPZ evacuation need, the Washington State Department ) of Transportation's proposed emergency plan could significantly reduce the total time required for Sector N traffic to clear the EPZ limits under Flood Scenario B. If, at the time an evacuation of the Trojan EPZ l was necessitated, I-5 were available for limited bypass service, this I would provide an additional route for Sector N evacuation. This would I raduce the EPZ evacuation demands on State Route 4 and the Lewis and Clark Bridge, and accordingly would reduce the evacuation time constraints l imposed by the capacities of these two facilities. While there are too many potential combinations of conditions and timing to quantitatively assess the actual effects of this emergency planning effort, it would likely reduce substantially the EPZ evacuation tia estimates shown in f Table 1:E-32 for Flood Scenario B. E.4.4.3 Kalama River Road i Flood Scenarios A and B also resulted in possible damage to portions of the Kalama River Road. It is impossible to determine at this time the precise nature of the damage that might occur. If the road were made impassable at a single point (for example, due to the loss of a bridge or l a mud slide), then persons living on Kalana River Road could still evacu-ate the EPZ area by traveling away from the road blockage: all persons on the west side of the road blockage could evacuate by traveling west-bound on Kalama River Road to I-5 and then out of the EPZ area; all persons on the east side of the road blockage could evacuate by traveling eastbound on Kalama River Road, and then southward to Little Kalama River Road, which leads out of the EPZ. These potential evacuation routes are illustrated in Figure 1:E-5. Evacuation times would not be significantly
5*neet 7 of 9 affected by such an occurrence. If the road were made impassable at more than one location, then it would be necessary to evacuate some or all of the residents out of this area via some other mode (for example, by I helicopter). In the worst case, no use could be made of Kalama River Road, and therefore, all persons living on the road would need to be assisted in their evacuation. It is estimated that such a worst-case condition would require the transfer of approximately 600 persons. E.4.4.4 Ash Scenario The ash scenario assumes that a volcanic eruption at Mt. St. Helens equivalent to the May 18, 1980 eruption would occur with prevailing winds directing the ashfall towards the Trojan Nuclear Plant. This potential assumes that the available evacuation routes in Sector N would be covered with between 20 and 50 mm (0.8 to 2.0 in.) of volcanic ash. This analysis involves a refined estimate of the effects of ashfall on Sector N evacuation time estimates. No valid empirical documenta-tion exists to substantiate the ashfall impacts. However, reports from official agencies involved with the control of traffic during the major ashfall conditions prevailing in areas east of Mt. St. Helens during previous eruptions indicated that visibility was the major driver-encountered problen(26,27) Vehicle malfunctions due to air filter clogging apparently were not a major consideration until af ter approximately 100 miles of travel (26,27,28) Similarly, loss of vehicle traction due to ash on the road surface apparently did not represent a significant problem at low travel speeds under dry roadway conditions ( 0) Therefore, in this case the amount of ash deposition on the evacuation routes is not considered to be limiting for amounts of ash considered here since vehicular movement resuspends the ash, regard-less of the amount deposited, resulting in reduced visibility. Thus, for this analysis, visiblity was considered to be the principal factor affecting evacuation time estimates due to ashfall. Subjective postashfall assessments by official transportation agencies indicate t _ _ ~, -...
-i 4 I 4 Sheet 8 of 9 that 10-sph travel speeds represented the threshold above which ash distributed by movitig vehicles rose to the windshield level and affected driver visibility (26,27,28) Most agencies imposed speed limits under non-emergency evacuation conditions of between 15 and 20 mph I 0' '20) The 10-aph speed to minimise visibility constrainte threshold has been used in this evaulation. It has further been assmed for the purposes of this analysis that a vehicle spacing interval of approximately 50 f t at 10 mph is reasonable under emergency conditions in I order for successive evacuating vehicles to maintain visual contact with f the rear lights of the vehicle ahead under these reduced visibility conditions. l Ash deposition combined with precipitation results in increased visibil- ) ity compared to dry road conditions since the ash is not resuspended by vehicular movement. However, vehicle traction is reduced due to wet ash on the road surface. i Wet and dry ash conditions present different driving conditions but are considered to have the same impact on evacuation times due to the assumed reduced travel speed of 10 mph (29), These combined ass e ptions of a 10-aph travel speed at a 50-fe vehicle spacing are representative of a 40 percent reduction in vehicular road capacities under ashfall ranging between 20 and 50 mm in thickness. Thus, the 40 percent reduction in capacities for adverse weather condi-tions discussed in Section E.1.2 still appears to be valid for circum-stances when ash falls in the direction of the Trojan Nuclear Plant. These assumptions and evaluation indicate that the Sector N adverse weather conditions evacuation time estimates in Table 1:E-14 still appear to be reasonable estimates of maximum evacuation times. Further-more, this conclusion applies equally to all of the sectors within the EPZ and not just Sector N. The nonquantifiable elements of these esti-mates are directly related to the relationship between the time the ashfall occurs and the time evacuation of the EPZ might be necessitated. ..~
6 Sheet 9 of 9 The greater the time interval between these potential events, the less impact ashfall would have on EPZ evacuation times. Thus, the effects on evacuation times'due to ashfall could be less than the adverse weather conditions times indicated in Table 1:E-14. E.4.4.5 Effect on Special Populations The Flood and Ash Scenarios discussed in Sections E.4.4.1 thromh E.4.4.4 affect evacuation times for the plume exposure EPZ by incr easing the travel times along the evacuation routes. Therefore, evacuation times for special populations within Sector N under the Flood and Ash Sce-narios will be identical with the evacuation times for the general population given in Se.:tions E.4.4.1 through E.4.4.4. l
2 Sheet 1 of 5 REFERENCES (1) Climatological Handbook, Columbia Basin States, Precipitation, Volume 2, September 1969. (2) Climatological Handbook, Columbia Basin States, Hourly Data, Volume 3, Part A, June 1968. (3) Trojan Nuclear Plant Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendments 1 to 33, Portland General Electric Company, February 1979. (4) D. Mullineaux, U. S. Geological Survey, personal communication, August 7,1980. (5) E. Blodgett, District 4 Traffic Operations Engineer, Washington Department of Transportation, personal communication, May 9, 1980. (6) K. Halverson, Cowlitz County Department of Emergency Services, personal communication, April 9, 1980. l (7) U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Evacuation Risks--An Evaluation, EPA-520/6-74-002, June 1974. (8) Kennedy, Kell, Homburger, Fundamentals of Traffic Engineering, 8th Edition, University of California, Berkeley,1973. l l l (9) Institute of Transportation Engineers, Transportation and Traffic Engineering Handbook, Prentice-Hall (1976). (10) Highway Research Board, Highway Capacity Manual, Special Report 87, 1965. (11) Conputer printout of Washington State routes and associated volume / capacity ratios, dated October 11, 1977. l -
Sheet 2 of 5 REFERENCES (12) April 24, 1980 meeting with Cowlitz County Department of Emergency Services and Sheriff's Office and Washington State Patrol and Department of Transportation representatives. (13) R. Failmezger, Regional Traffic Engineer, Oregon Department of Transportation, personal communication, May 1, 1980. (14) Oregon Department of Transportation, Traffic Volume Tables for 1977, July 1978. (15) Washington State Transportation Commission, Department of Trans-portation, Annual Traffic Report: 1977. (16) April 23, 1980 meeting with Columbia County Office of Emergency Services and Sheriff's Office representatives. (17) B. Brady, Longview School District Transportation Supervisor, personal communication, April 24, 1980. (18) April 30, 1980 meeting with Columbia County Office of Emergency Services and Sheriff's Office representatives. (19) April 29, 1980 meeting with representatives of: Cowlitz County Department of Emergency Services and Sheriff's Office; Washington State Patrol; and the Police Departments of Castle Rock, Kalama, Kelso, Longview and Woodland. i I (20) May 15, 1980 meeting with Cowlitz County Sheriff's Office and Kalama Police Department representatives. (21) June 5, 1980 meeting with Cowlitz County Sheriff's Office and Kelso and Longvicw Police Departments representatives. l l
Shoot 3 cf 5 REFERENCES (22) June 9,1980 meeting with Columbia County Office of Emergency Services and Sheriff's Office representatives. (23' July 11, 1980 meeting with Longview Police Department representatives. (24) Foundation Sciences, Inc., Effects of Potential Flooding on Evacuation Routes, January 1981. (25) J. Barsness, Washington State Department of Transportation, per-sonal communication, March 19, 1981. (26) J. LaRue, Yakima Chief of Police, personal communication, August 5, 1980. (27) Under Sheriff Barnes, Lewis County Sheriff Department, personal communication, August 5, 1980. (28) 'J. Silvers, Yakima County Sheriff's Office, personal communication, August 7, 1980. (29) Ben Bena, Cowlitz County Emergency Services Coordinator, personal communication, April 14, 1981. (30) J. Blake, Kelso School District Transportation Supervisor, personal communication, May 14, 1980. (31) Kay Halverson, personal communication, October 1,1980. t (32) G. Throop, Woodland Transportation Cooperative, personal com-I munication, April 18, 1980. j i (33) N. Anderson, Columbia H; rights Christian Academy, personal com-munication, May 5, 1980. l l L
Sh:ct 4 cf 5 REFERENCES (34) B. Bickle, Cross Roads School, personal communication, April 29, 1980. (35) J. Chenowith, Longview Christian School, personal communication, April 29, 1980. (36) E. Kenny, St. Rose Catholic School, personal communication, May 2, 1980. (37) Mrs. Lee, Zion Christian Center, personal communication, April 29, 1980. (38) June 30, 1980 meeting with Cowlitz County, Washington State, Monticello Medical Center and St. Johns Hospital representatives. (39) K. Halverson, Cowlitz County Department of Emergency Services, personal communications, various dates. (40) K. Halverson, Cowlitz County Department of Emergency Services, personal communication, May 16, 1980. (41) J. Schoening and M. Mason, Weyerhauser Company, personal com-munication, April 17, 1980. (42) J. Larson, Reynolds Metal Company, personal communication, April 17, 1980. (43) G. Rondeau, Longview Fibre Company, personal communication, April 21, 1980. (44) H. Watson, International Paper Company, personal communication, April 21, 1980.
She:t 5 of 5 REFERENCES l l (45) W. Durgeloh, Pacific Northwest Bell, personal communication, April 22, 19E3. l l (46) V. Eaton and R.- Nelson, Cowlitz County Public Utility District No. 1, personal communication, April 17, 1980. ( 47,' N. Graham, Cowlitz County Public Works and Roads, personal communication, April 17, 1980. (48) B. Cole, Kalama Chemical Company, personal communication, April 22, 1980. (49) R. Coffey, Kalama Telephone Company, personal communication, May 5, 1980. (50) V. Warden, Port of Longview, personal communication, April 22, l 1980. l l (51) J. Fratt, Port of Kalama, personal communication, April 24, 1980. (52) M. Collins, Oregon State Department of Fish and Wildlife, personal communication, June 2, 1930. (53) Personal communications with hotels and motels within plume expo-sure EPZ, February 9, 1981. .,y, a-w n-n aw- ,--,a,, .-w-,
TABLE 1:E-32 ROAD NETWORK CAPACITY AND EVACUATING GENERAL PUBLIC VEHICLE DEMAND PLllME EXPOSURE EPZ SECTOR N Normal Weather Total Assigned Condition Sector N Evacuation 10-Min Evacuating Route Capacity (Veh)[a] Vehicle Demand I-5 667 7,786 State Route 411 225 2,920 State Route 4 240 2,920 Pacific Avenue North 210 1,946 Pacific Way 225 1,946 Lewis and Clark 210 1,946 Bridge to U. S. Highway 30 TOTAL 1,777 19,464 I [a] Roadway capacity estimates asstume normal weather conditions. l Adverse weather conditions are asstaaed to result in a 40 percent reduction in the above capacity values. i l l l I l l l
TABLE 1:E-33 SECTOR N GENERAL PUBLIC EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES FOR ALTERNATIVE FLOOD SCENARIOS Travel Time Evacuation Time Estimates From Estimates to EPZ Limits to EPZ Limits Clear Area Route Normal Adverse Normal Adverse Weather Weather Weather Weather Flood Evacuation Cond. Cori. Cond. Cond. Scenario Route (Min) (M n) (Min) (Min) A I-5 (North) 120[b] 190[b] NA[a] NA[a] Pacific Avenue 90[b] 150[b] NA[a] NA[a] P North Pacific Way 90 140 NA[a] NA[a] State Route 411 130 220 650[b] 1,080[b] State Route 4 120 200 NA[a] NA[a] Lewis and Clark 90 150 NA[a] NA[a] Bridge to U. S. Highway 30 1-5 (South) (150)[el (250)[cl NA NA B Pacific Avenue NA NA i l North Pacific Way NA NA State Route.411 NA NA State Route 4 410[c] 680[c] NA NA (130) (220) I-5 (North) NA NA l Lewis and Clark 470lCl 790[c] NA NA Bridge to U. S. (190) (320) Highway 30 \\ U. S. Highway 30 I-5 (South) (190)[c] (320)[c] NA NA [a] Route restriction outside of EPZ for Flood Scenario A represents State Route 411 north of Castle Rock being used as a bypass of the Toutle River route closures. [b] Not applicable when I-5 South is used for an evacuation route. [c] Times in parentheses are applicable when I-5 South is used for l evacuation of Sector N. f NA - Not Applicable. l .-.-.}}