ML19341A524
| ML19341A524 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/29/1979 |
| From: | William Ward NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19341A503 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-80-516, REF-QA-99900400 NUDOCS 8101260218 | |
| Download: ML19341A524 (2) | |
Text
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D-RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH ROBERT C. JONES AS RECORDED BY INVESTIGATOR WIL J. WARD, US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ON MAY 29, 1979 Jones, employed as a Senior Engineer with the Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) Nuclear Power. Generation Group, Lynchburg, Virginia was interviewed at the B&W facility in Lynchburg under favorable conditions (private office) commencing at 1415 hours0.0164 days <br />0.393 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.384075e-4 months <br />, on May 29, 1979 by the reporting investigator.
Jones provided the following information in substance:
He was familiar with report prepared by Mr. Carlyle'Michelson, an engineer with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and consultant to the NRC Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards which raised some questions regarding the vulnerability of the B&W Pressurized Water Reactors to small break loss of coolant accidents.
He received
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a copy of the Report sometime in early May,1978 and was asked to review it and to reply to TVA regarding its concerns.
He was quite busy at the time on a small break analysis project that prevented
,him from paying imediate attention to the Report.
These small breaks that he was analyzing were of a larger size than those, postulated by Michelson.
Shortly afterwards, sometime in the period of May-June 1978, he took the Report home with him and gave it a cursory review. Based on this preliminary evaluation, he decided that although some of the concerns appeared to be valid, he did not see that they had significant safety. implications.
He particularly disagreed with what he described as Michelson's claim that small breaks would discharge more water than would larger breaks.
He also disputed that an energy balance methodology was the valid way to approach the analysis.. He did agree with the following ~ points:
1.
That small breaks would require the use of the steam
~
generator in order to maintain adequate cooling.
2.
That a loss of naturaf circulation would cause repres-surization.
3.
That pressurizer level indications alone did not provide 1
an accurate depiction of water level (water over the core).
On the other hand, he felt that these were obvious conclusions and that B&W essentially already knew the foregoing.
For this reason, he assigned the response to the Report a very low priority and so infonned his super-visor, Bert Dunn, Manager of the ECCS Analysis Group.
He indicated that he had full authority as a senior engineert:to make a decision of this nature.,
He remained very busy over the next few months, often working 14 hour1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> days.
He estimated that a proper response would require one full week of effort and that he did not have the week to devote to it.
He emphasized that mcst of the work would be in the area of proving the
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ATTACHMENT 9 81 onco gp
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1 validity of his position with more sophisticated modeling and computation than Michelson had.used.in.his.. report, and that at no point did he think He was that such analysis would. prove him. wrong and.Michelson right.
chided by Robert Lightle of the B&W Project Management on sevccal occasions to reply to TVA; but he kept;getting interrupted and just could not come -
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up with the needed one week.
During ~this period he did not discuss the Report with any higher management officials and had no discussions con-cerning it with anyone from the NRC.
Telephon'e conferences and receipt of a one page sumary from Michelson
' 'in addition to completion of. his small break. analysis served to allow him to complete his work on the: Report and to dispatch 4 reply to TVA in January 1979.
He added that as he had expected, his. calculations vindicated his position.. Upon receipt.of another. letter from TVA in
. early February,1979, he agreed.to do additional analysis, but informed He his supervisor that he would assign the response a low priority.
i promised that he would finish it within.two months.. The Three Mile Island accident and the work that it engendered has prevented him.from drafting a formal reply to TVA. On the other hand,'he claimed that Appendix K to a two volume study entitled " Evaluation.of Transient Behavior and Small Reactor Coolant Assembly Breaks in the 177 Fuel Assembly Plant" prepared by B&W and furnished.to. the NRC on May 7, 1979 is the formal response to the Michelson Report.
Jones did not at any time in his handling feel that the issues, raised
~ by Michelson fell within the scope of.10 CFR 21.
Thus he did not discuss it with higher management nor generate any internal correspondence regarding it.
He added that he was quite familiar with Part 21 and that he, himself had recently filed a Part 21 report.
The interview was. concluded a' 1458 hours0.0169 days <br />0.405 hours <br />0.00241 weeks <br />5.54769e-4 months <br /> with Jones averring that he,did not t
view the Michelson} Report as having had any-substa tial safety ignificance.
William J. Ward Senior Investigator Office of Inspection y
and Enforcement T...__-..-.
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