ML19341A521
| ML19341A521 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/21/1979 |
| From: | William Ward NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19341A503 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-80-516 NUDOCS 8101260188 | |
| Download: ML19341A521 (4) | |
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O RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH CARLYLE (NMN) MICHELSON AS RECORDED BY INVESTIGATOR WILLIAM J WARD, US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ON MAY 21, 1979 9
Michelson, employed as an engineer with the Tennessee Valley Authority'(TVA) was interviewed by the unuersigned in the office of the Chainnan, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) 1717 H Street, NW, Washingtont D:C.,
comencing at 1620 hour0.0188 days <br />0.45 hours <br />0.00268 weeks <br />6.1641e-4 months <br />st Ma'y 21, 1979.
4 Michelson was advised that the purpose of the interview was to gather back-ground data concerning a January, 1978 draft report prepared by him regarding the vulnerability of certain reactors manufactured by the Babcock and Wilcox Company (B&W) to small pipe break loss of coolant accidents (LOCA) and the attendant consequences of such LOCAs upon the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). Michelson indicated that he understood thepurpose of the interview and gave his permission for the tape recording of the interview.
No other persons were present during the interview.
Michelson, referring to several pages of notes that he had " recorded in a stenographer's notebook, then provided the following infonnation in substance:
He first became interested in the general topic of small pipe break LOCAs in about 1974 while still employed at TVA but prior to his association with the ACRS in any capacity.
He stated that it seemed a logical trail to explore in that, historically speaking, most pipe breaks (or cracks) have involved small pipes for a variety of reasons, i
- one of which is their susceptibility to vibration.
It seemed logical then to examine the impact of such breaks in view of their relative frequency in comparison to larger pipe breaks.
He found that in
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examining applicable standards that the lower limit for sizes of pipe breaks was the largest break that he had under consideration.
In May,1975, an engineer who worked for him, Ronald Sabin raised 2
this question '(the one covered in his January,1978 Report) in relation to reactors manufactured by Combustion Engineering (C-E) and produced a report concerning this problem.
A copy of this l
report was provided Darrell Eisenhut, Deputy Director, Division of Operating Reactors, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, USNRC i
4 in April,1979 along with other documents described, infra.
Michelson subsequently wrote a report of his own regarding Combustion Engineering in May,1977.
A copy of this handwritten report was provided Eisenhut at the same time as Sabin's report.in April 1979.
At about this time, Michelson began to suspect that B&W reactors may be more susceptible to these problems than C-E.
Hedrafted7reportdocumentingthemin September, 1977.
He discussed these concerns with Mr. Jesse Ebersole, a member of the ACRS, who was his fonner supervisor at TVA. He also provided Ebersole a copy of his handwritten draft sometime during the
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Fall of 1977.
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ATTACHMENT 2
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Ebersole suggested that he " harden up" the report in that it appeared to be too speculative. He subsequently redrafted it and the typed draft was entered in the TVA Word One computer file in January, 1978.
He had the assistance of another TVA engineer, Bruce Siefken (615/632-3354) during this redraft.
He also discussed its develop-ment with several other. coworkers.
Michelson stated that he did not know what distribution Mr. Ebersole made of his report, but that9t*
was apparently relied upon during the hearings regarding the Pebble Springs Nuclear power Plant.
lie recalled that of the 23 questions asked of Portland Gas and Electric by the ACRS in the Fall of 1977, at least one of them, Question 6, was based on his draft report.
Michelson stated that with the exception of Ebersole, he had no con-4 tact with the NRC, either fomal or infomal regarding his concerns during this period.
During the period between January 1978 and April 27, 1978 he had several discussions within TVA about the merits of the report and ths best course of action regarding it.
The highest level of supervision with
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whom he discussed it was Mr. E. G. Beasley, Head, Nuclear Engineering Group (615/632-2434), his immediate supervisor.
He did not know whether it was discussed at higher levels of management, but assumes that it must have reached the Branch level inasmuch as the letter he drafted to B&W addressing these concerns was signed by his Branch Chief.
D. R. Patterson, Chief of the Mechanical Engineering Branch, TVA, on April 27,1978. He did not know if Patterson discussed it with any higher official within TVA.
During the period between April,1978 and January,1979, several attempts l
were made to goad B&W into providing a reply to the TVA letter of April 27, 1978.
He indicated that he asked the TVA contracts people to " bug" B&W on at least a. half dozen occasions during this interval.
Although no formal records were made of these contacts, Mr. Lep Chin and George Dillworth of TVA contracts recall having contacted B&W during this period.
Michelson believes that telephone logs for this period may substantiate these contacts.
In December,1978, Michelson gained the impression that either B&W did not understand the issues or they had failed to read the letter.- Consequently, he prepared a one page summary statement that was s
transmitted to B&W via telefax on December 10, 1978.
Copies of the transmitted document' and his-handwritten draft are available for inspection in TVA files.
B&W asked for more time in response to that message, and on January 23, 1979, they provided a written reply that in part seemed to substantiate some of his concerns but disagreed with the consequences.
As a result, he authored a letter back to P&W that was signed by Mr. Patterson, supra on February 8,1979 that asked B&W to reconfim their position and to provide a written response by March 15, 1979.
B&W has yet to respond to that second letter.
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i Michelson was sumoned.to Bethesda to assist with the Three Mile Island l
incident.
He arrived on April 1,1979, and at some point subsequent to that provided copies of his report and related material to Darrell Eisenhut.
That was the first contact that he had with the NRC regarding..
this material or this issue other than with Ebersole, supra.
l Michelson explained tha't his original. interest in this proble'm g' red out of a personal uneasiness about small pipe break phenomena and that the concern bore no direct relationship with his status as a consultant with i
ACRS.
He stated that the concern predated that relationship which began some time in 1976 when he consulted on security matters to ACRS.
He emphasized that these concerns were independent of his consultant status with ACRS.
The issue was something that " gnawed away" at him over a long period of time.
He was a little intimifdated by the fact that this topical area was one that had been reviewed time and again to the satisfaction of the entire industry. This fact led him to move quite cautiously. As time went on, he became more confident, but could not be positive.
Thus his primary concern was and still is to focus attention
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upon the issue so that it can be adequately resolved.
He added tiiat he still is not sure that his assumptions are correct, and that it is quite possible that more sophisticated computations and analysis may prove him wrong. The major point is that such an analysis should be taken and as of this point, he has not seen that it has been.
He stated that the slow progress regarding the ventilation of his ideas was mostly attributable to the fact that he wanted to proceed cautiously in the face of what he perceived to be a generic safety issue. His sense of imediate concern was alleviated by the fact that the Bellefonte Plant.
TVA's only plant using a B&W reactor, was not scheduled for operation for another two years which he felt gave him adequate time to pursue this matter in the fashion tha't he did.
He indicated that he was aware that this issue may have 10 CFR 21 implications and for that reason discussed this aspect with Mr. E. J. Ualker of the TVA licensing unit.
It was TVA's impression that Part 21 applie'l primarily, if not exclusively, to vendors rather than utilities.
In any event, they felt that B&W would have to evaluate Michelson's information before it would be appropriate to undertake any actions under Part 21. He added that he did not see where preliminary ideas such as his are appropriately referred to NRC until some further analysis of their validity could be done.
!!e added that TVA considered that the analog regulation to 10 CFR 21 which applied to this situation was 10 CFR 50.55(e).
He said that the evaluation criteria stemming from this _ regulation when applied to this situation indicated
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that his concerns need not be reported to HRC.
Michelson advanced the opinion that in contrast, it appeared that B&W did have some responsibilities in accordance with Part 21 and stated that he felt that the period of time that B&W had and has taken to respond to his concerns is excessive.
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The interview was concluded at 1743 hours0.0202 days <br />0.484 hours <br />0.00288 weeks <br />6.632115e-4 months <br />, May 21, 1979, viith Michelson offering to provide any additional assistance or infonnation as may be needed by the NRC in this matter.
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.illiam c. Ward Investigator Office of Inspection and Enforcement o
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'lostead, actonflag.te NRC effletals !atcr, "th!
prob!cn/ was.restened witMa the a 3...;
the}~RCs reactor systems t. ranc some cases the level 'of the cocung water in the sw dloactive core of at reactor might seem bisher en some instruments than it actumDy wat That was daels what happened March 's at Three MRe Is. -
Isad,utere.eperators reMng on a yarticular pres.
surtaer gauge.~aD..o.w.ed th..e core t.o b.e.c.om. e
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. ne memo was directed' to.abLt 13 'othe
, s.~., t: s***v bers of Norst's unft for their guldsac(inreviewir.g app!! cations for construction permits and new reas.'
ter !!renses. It adet ed them to check app,11caUons for man around the ppblem..'.O..J.'%.~..[ -
.frhtsis the first Preseen of thW,said John (
IIerbeta,vice president of h1etropoDianT41 so which owna nree Mile taland. when presented the soemo 'at yesterday's bearing of the House energy and environment; subcommittee.'To n:y knested 6
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. Bep. James Wesver (DoreJ, sho committee's task force investJgat:ng Three Mt!e Is 1and, said he uss "very disturbed...abocied' t the snemo had been writica 30 days before nree Jtile IJand II recefivd its qperating Ecenses an
'yet bad, mot,gone to the utility., * *.J7,'J ',*
' Roger Mattaon,. director 3ef.the NRC) sptem safety didston, said la an latervie It was a farent poastbtlity la the adads of,the pes l ved'
.that looled at.11.5.the.problema.wss,ter eM'f
, sithin the agency and dhmissed*
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veme -was (searer than foresight".e pr.N.e. se s wit!!eg gjhgeth NovatJ Min ff% ember,~ dan 7n,Mth, t*,:.DcL's.
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other problems and, according' to Maltaan, it draft also c!reviated asnong me technical addsory board and the Ore. Geocra! 23ectric Co; but was not then anyt
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'partieatat urgency,Mattson no e.-The pre ume the autject of an enchangeef lettersbetween.
).nchelson and the 2fabruck & WUcos nice 11De Island, but mething het beca reselss(
shes the accident occurred Starsh:5.+ad;'; Jg meurs at the bearing that *1L jus that no dir% re!Aable aneasurenient exists of wat level la.the reactor. core. Instanlag such instrov -
ments on aD wiistlag reacton weddecst *s'en '.
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'uma= responded that in the en::ye=y's etew operie t
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tion of the, core.. water and.ta recogniae proble '
e only par atten i with the pressurtser af they wt!!,hd faDr.re '
to St. 71e moted that the only sne n
nree MDe Island involved a s 3
,8 out va3.t that afloded.wster to flow tr.!m 4
.p # y the bot av metor enredi;."*.i.'.W.**)
nree MCe Island stacon annarer Cary 2*.M:D sbo, as la charge of efforts to ser. trol the s!!nsti.
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.htarth "8, told Lbe beartr4g be had a great attend to ist ' day. *ne phone. the'prearart. thE.
f act ti.at the plant was to a state that I ha8 oct '
been schooled f a. ecmbfned to r.de ened:tis
. ;Q'gO g Igl -l ngj u
e met 1"telrrette,*.t.e erto la L!s uttten ter.im.y.
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