ML19341A517
| ML19341A517 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/24/1979 |
| From: | Kelley C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR (OIA) |
| To: | Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19341A503 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-80-516 NUDOCS 8101260141 | |
| Download: ML19341A517 (6) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O4 r.c E WASHINGT ON, D. C. 20555 l
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July 24, 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Hendrie Commissioner Gilinsky Commis'sioner Kennedy Commissioner Bradford Commissioner Ahearne
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THRU:
James J. Cumings, Director f'
Office of Inspector and Auditor.#I '
(/1977/W I
I. j) n FROM:
Corenthis Kelley, Inspector /A'udi or Office of Inspector and Auditor k
SUBJECT:
HEARINGS HELD BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
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ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND This is the third of a series of reports summarizing my coverage of the hearings held by the President's Commission on the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI).
The Commission heard testimony from Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) officials on July 18 - 20 at the Hall of Nations, Edmund Walsh Building, Georgetown University, during its fourth session of hearings on the accident at TMI.
The hearing agenda, a summary of the reporting relationships of the witnesses along with the organization charts for B&W and the names of the Comission's new staff attorneys are shown in' Attachments 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
This session of hearings was characterized.by an in-depth focus on fewer issues rather than the " skimming of the surface" of numerous issues evident in previous ressions.
Although there were times when obvious questions, to me, were not asked, the Commission seemingly had more purpose behind the questions that were posed.
Of primary interest to the Comission, was a series of memoranda concerning safety issues raised by two B&W employees as a result of the Davis Besse (Toledo, Ohio) incident of September 24, 1977.
Joseph J. Kelly, a B&W employee who was sent to investigate the Davis Besse incident expressed concern in a November 1, 1977 memorandum (see Attachment 4) over whether B&W had given its customers enough guidance on the operation of the high pressure injection system (HPIS).
In this memorandum, Kelly made
Contact:
Corenthis Kelley, CIA 49-27051 810126nlh a
The Comissioners.
two recommendations concerning HPI and solicited the thoughts of other B&W officials on the matter. The memorandum was sent to seven B&W employees.
Kelly stated that he received a response to his memorandum from Jesse F. Walters (see Attachment 5) but felt Walters must have been someshat confused and
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that Walters' response did not answer his concerns.
Kelly stated that after his concerns were not answered he escalated them to Bert M. Dunn, Manager, Emergency Core Cooling System, B&W. Dunn wrote two memoranda concerning the same issues that Kelly had raised (see Attachments 6and7). The memoranda dated February 9 and 16, 1978 to James Taylor, Manager, Licensing Section, B&W, gave two conditions under which HPI could be terminated.
Kelly testified he thought the matter was resolved by Dunn's February 16, 1978 memorandum.
In responding to a question posed by Chairman Kemeny, Kelly stated that had the operators at TMI 2 followed the guidelines in his November 1, 1977 memorandum, it would have made a substantial difference in the severity of the transient.
Dunn testified he was under the impression that the new procedures had gone to B&W customers until he received a copy of an August 3,1978 enemorandum
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from D. F. Hallman, Manager, Plant ' Performance Service Section, B&W, to Bruce A. Karrasch, Manager, Plant Integration Unit, B&W (see Attachment 8).
In this memorandum, Hallman stated the Nuclear Service Department believes that keeping the HPIS on can cause the reactor cooling system (RCS) to go solid. He added that Nuclear Service had not notified B&W's operating plants to change their HPI policy because of two questions:
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If the pressurizer goes solid with one or more HPI pumps con-tinuing to operate, would there be a pressure spike before the reliefs open which could cause damage to the RCS?
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What damage would the water surge through the relief valve discha.rge piping and quench tank cause?"
Dunn stated he was upset because he did not think the consequen'ces of going solid were as important as the possibility of uncovering the core if the present HPI policy is continued.
Dunn testified that after TMI 2, on April 4,1979, the 'new HPI policy was sent to B&W customers (see Attachment 9).
Dunn believed the new instructions relied heavily on his input. The new instructions were revised by an April 17,.979 memorandum (see Attachment 10).
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Dunn testified that he believed there was communicai. ion between NRC and B&W l
prior to the issuance of the new policy and that NRC was concerned about l
steam water overfill causing increase in t ressure.
The Comission presented for the record Exhibit 8 summarizing a meeting called by NRC Region III ingectors to discuss the loss of pressurizer ' level indication at Davis Besse (see Attachment 11).
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The Commission pursued questions concerning the Michelson Report to which
' Dunn responded he became aware of the Michelson Report in April 1978 adding that B&W got a request from a customer to evaluate the issues raised by Michelson. Dunn stated that Bob Jones, B&W, was assigned to evaluate the report and that Jones' conclusion was that there was no new infomation in the report, that the phenm had already been covered directly or " bounded" by B&W. Dunn stated th'at he prepared Michelson Story Comments with which B&W could respond to criticisms about not reacting to the Michelson Report (s,ee Attachment 12 for comments).
Dunn was asked wh' ether anyone in NRC was concerned about B&W's instructions
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or training on the HPI system after the Davis Besse incident.
Dunn replied he believes there was a memorandum that had a strong relation to temination
.of the HPI written by someone in NRC but he felt the emphasis in the NRC memorandum was misplaced. He added the memorandum dwelled on the point of loop seal which, in Dunn's opinion, was of less importance.
When asked
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whether the memorandum was, at that time, sent to B&W, Dunn responded negatively to his knowledge, but that he now has a copy of the memorandum.
The memorandum was not available or entered into the records.
Both Kelly and Dunn were asked why they did not present their concerns in B&W's formalized system for Preliminary Safety Concerns (PSC).
Kelly stated be was certain that his concerns needed addressing but was not sure the issues were appropriate topics for the PSC system.
Kelly added he thought Dunn was better qualified to make that determination.
Dunn stated
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he addressed his memoranda to Taylor because he felt Taylor to be very intelligent and concerned with safety, adding that Taylor is Manager of the section which handles the PSC system.
Dunn further stated he preferred to handle the matter in an infomal manner.
He stated if it is determined that a PSC results in a reportable event, the Vice President of B&W has 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to present.the infomation to NRC. Both Kelly ano Dunn clarified that there are no restrictions on the types of concerns that can be entered 2
into the PSC system.
Dunn was also asked why he did not surface his concerns at an April 14, 1978 meeting with NRC officials.
It was pointed out that a Metropolitan Edison (Met Ed) official was at the meeting and Dunn wa's asked whether NRC's presence kept him from surfacing his concerns.
Dunn responded that the meeting was called for another purpose; he was not aware a Met Ed official was present and NRC's presence did not prevent him from surfacing his concerns.
Dunn testified that the principles behind his February 1978 memoranda could have prevented TMI and core damage.
Walters, the author of the memorandum shown in Attachment 5, stated he believed Kelly raised a valid point but he (Walters) was concerned with the reactor cooling system going solid. Walters added that instructions on when to and when not to go solid would be valuable but have not been provided to his knowledge.
Walters testified that Kelly's and Dunn's concerns
" slipped through the cracks."
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Taylor explained B&W's reporting requirements under 10 CFR Pa" rt 21 and how the PSC system works.
He stated he thought Dunn's February memoranda were misdirected but agreed that had Dunn presented his co.ncerns on a PSC fom, it would not have been misdirected.
y Taylor testified that not many PSC's involve operator reaction adding that they mostly deal with equipment and that most of the attention is given to equipment. Taylor stated he would liks to see that change to 50/50.
Taylor testified that there is a need to tighten the loop among designers, analysts, and trainers in the nuclear procedure loop.
It was pointed out to Taylor that customers like Met Ed depend heavily on B&W for operator training as evident by their use of the B&W simulator.
Taylor responded that he would pay more attention to a memorandum like Dunn's. Taylor added that he is not sure more operating procedures would have made a difference in the TMI incident because the TMI 2 operators had a lot of infomation available to them which they did not use.
Taylor testified he was not aware of any regulation requiring automatic 1_. ~
transmittal to NRC of infomation obtained by B&W as a result of investigating a transient. He added that some transients are significant enough to justify sending information to NRC.
Taylor stated that during an ACRS meeting in October 1977, the question of pressurizer level with regard to the Portland General Electric (PGE) plant was raised. Taylor was asked whether NRC forwarded a list of 26 questions raised by the ACRS to PGE.
Taylor responded that he could not recall.
Karrasch testified that he did not remember receiving Kelly's memorandum of November 1,1977, or several of the other exhibits put before him.
He stated that he did remember Exhibit 5 (Attachment 8) but his reaction was to forget it and. proceed with higher priority work.
He stated that in retrospect, Hallman's memorandum was taken too lightly.
Karrasch stated that B&W, prior to TMI, operated in a responsive mode with respect to NRC guidelines.
When asked whether there is anything NRC can do to tighten loops, Karrasch responded affirmatively and stated NRC should define new analyses upon nomal expected occurrences and that that kind of thinking is going on at NRC right now.
Karrasch added that he would-recommend quick action on the part of NRC.
Commissioner McPhearson pointed out to Karrasch that part of his (Karrasch's) responsibility is to keep the lines of comunication open, yet he did nothing when Kelly communicated his concerns to him.
Karrasch stated that he told Hallman to go ahead with Dunn's recomendations.
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, The Comissioners During Hallman's testimony, the Commission showed an interest in why he (Hallman) allowed Dunn's memorandum to lay for six months and did nothing about resolving the matter.
Hallman testified that it was. not clear to him what Karrasch meant when he stated, "everything is okay now" and that he tried numerous times to reach Karrasch to obtain clarification on his
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instructions but was unable.
Hallman admitted it was an error in judgment on his part not to do whatever necessary to resolve the matter in a more
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timely manner.
As Noman Elliott, Manager, Training Services, B&W, was testifying, the Commission asked in-depth questions on the training requirements for plant operators, the procedures for incorporating safety concerns into the training program, the qualifications of the instructors, and the procedures for fomulating and approving energency operating procedures.
The Commission was also interested in NRC's participation in training programs and role in approving the energency operating procedures.
Exhibit 10 (see Attachment 13)
Operator Requalification Training was entered into the record during Elliott's testimony.
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In responding to a question, Elliott stated that it would be helpful for each utility to have its own simulator.-
The questions asked of Donald Roy, Manager, Engineering, B&W, were more of a technical nature covering such things as core uncovery, extent of fuel melting, calculations surrounding the hydrogen bubble and the maximum temperature reached in the core during the TMI accident.
The tenor of the testimony of John H. MacMillan, Vice President, Nuclear Power Generation Division, B&W, was somewhat of a summary of the preceding testimonies. MacMillan was asked to cite previous instances in which the pressurizer relief valve had stuck open.
He cited four instances prior to the TMI accident where this had happened.
P The Commission asked many questions regarding the purpose and substance of a B&W press conference held in June 1979. MacMillan was asked to expound upon many of his statements during this press conference.
He stated the purpose of the press conference was to explain B&W's position with regard to THI and that B&W had received pressure from the media to speak out on the issue of TMI.
Also, during his testimony before the Udall Committee on TMI, MacMillan had apparently criticized NRC's approach to regulating.
MacMillan was asked how NRC could change its regulation philosophy to make it better.
MacMillan responded by saying that is a broad quesiton that he would rather have the benefit of the results of a lessons learned investigation before answering it.
MacMillan was asked by Commissioner Babbitt to submit his answer to the question in writing.
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Commissioner McPhearson delivered a lengthy speech to MacMillan durin9 which he reminded MacMillan that the business he is in does not afford him.
certain luxuries enjoyed by other businessmen.
McPhearson sumarized many events surrounding infonnation available to B&W with which they did nothin9.-
McPhearson added that when General Motors builds a car they do not have to concern themselves with whether the purchaser of the car can operate it safely, but operator safety at a nui: lear power plant should be of primary interest to B&W.
Attachments:
1.
Agenda 2.
Organization Charts 3.
Names of Comission's new staff attorneys 4.
Memo from Kelly, B&W, to Distribution, dated November 1, 1977 5.
Memo from Walters, B&W, to Kelly, B&W, dated November 18, 1977 6.
Memo from Dunn, B&W, to Taylor, B&W, dated February 9,1978 7.
Memo from Dunn, B&W, to Taylor, B&W, dated February 16, 1978 8.
Memo from Hallman, B&W, to Karrasch, B&W, dated August 3, 1978 9.
Memo from.Fairburn, B&W, to Distribution, dated April 4,1979 - -
- 11. Memo from Willse, B&W, to Distribution, dated March 9, 1979
- 12. Michelson Story Comments, dated March 14, 1979
- 13. Class / Control Room Schedule
- 14. Memo from Jorgenson, dated June 18,1979,subj:
Copies of Public Hearings Transcripts, President's Commission on the Accident at.
Three Mile' Island L. Gossick, ED0,' w/ attachments cc:
K. Cornell, EDO, w/ attachments L. Bickwit, GC, w/o attachments J. Fitzgerald, GC, w/ attachments A. Kennekd, PE,pw/o attachments
/o attachments S. Chilk, SECY, w C. Kammerer, CA, w/o attachments H. Denton, NRR, w/ attachments V. Stello,IE, w/ attachments S. Levine, RES, w/ attachments W. Dircks, NMSS, w/ attachments R. Minogue, SD, w/ attachments H. Shapar, ELD, w/o attachments N. Haller, MPA, w/o attachments J. Shea, IP, w/o attachments R. Ryan, SP, w/o attachments om o
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