ML19341A527
| ML19341A527 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/02/1980 |
| From: | Jamarl Cummings NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR (OIA) |
| To: | Ahearne J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19341A503 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-80-516, REF-QA-99900400 NUDOCS 8101260237 | |
| Download: ML19341A527 (2) | |
Text
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APR 2 1980 I D' ORA!!DUlf FOR: John F. Ahearne, Chaiman g
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James J. Cummings, Director 60 ed Office of Inspector and Auditor
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SUBJECT:
BABC0CK Afl0 WILC0X (BMI) I!!VESTIGATI0lls -
REVIEU FOR CRIllIfiALITY During the period Itay 1979 through flovember 1979, the Office of Inspection and Enforccment conducted three separate investigations into various aspects of t.hether B&U had adequately analyzed potential safety problens brought to their attention and vhether the natters should have been reported to the llRC pursuant to part 21,10 CFR.
The first investigation, case number 79-110-001, was conducted during the period Itay 14-31, 1979, and addressed the narrow issue of whether the "ltichelson Report", t:hich addressed the implications of small pipe break LOCAs, was properly handled by B&W. !!ichelson mphasized that the thrust of his concern was not that he was certain that the small pipe break LOCA's that he postulated presented a significant safety hazard, but rather he felt that they had not
- en sufficiently analyzed. The investigation substantiated that although B&W received l'ichelson's report, they did not perceive it to be a matts
' safety hazard significance, but rather a " valid technical comment.
1 sum, the report's significance was not recognized until after its Snical comments" were confimed by the accident at Three !!ile Islanc gTl1I).
The second investigation, case number 79-!!0-002, was conducted during the period July 19-August 17, 1979, and was concerned with how BAU handled an internal nenorandun uritten by a FAU cngineer in flovember 1977.
In the r.cnorandun, the engineer expressed concern that ESU custoners lacked cuidance regarding the necessity for not teminating IIPSI during i LOCAs and recommended that such advice be provided.
One recipient of the peno characterized the natter as a serious concern and suggested that improper operation interruption of IIPSI could result in core uncovery and possible fuel damage.
Again, this is s. hat bapnened at 1111.
flevertheless, prior to TI?I, the BSU Licensing l'anager felt that the natter raised was not a sinnificant safety item recuiring him to inplement ESU Part 21 procedures. Additionally, another engineer authored a nc.'o essentially expressing the, vW that following the sugoested changes could cause ham. Higher officials of BAU denied 1.nowledge of the remo prior to Ti!I. They also characterized the issue as being a technical difference 6f cpinion or dispute.
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The third investigation, case nunbar 79-110-003, was conducted during the
' period October 25-flovember 26, 1979, and also nas targeted on whether l
BLU had conducted proper analysis under Part 21 of tuo matters raised.
In !!ovember 1977, Toledo Edison Conpany (TECO) requested that they be pennitted to lower the steam generator (SG) set point from 10 feet to 3 feet.
In addressing the question P.&W engineers detemined that the original calculations had been at the 32 foot level, but felt that the 10 foot level nas bounded by that analysis.
Other E&W employees subsequently noted that small break LOCAs with reactor coolant punps powered were also unanalyzed. Uhen these rutters were raised, B&U personnel viewed them as not being a safety hazard and, therefore, did not requirr a Part 21 analysis. B&W detemined not to advise TECO, and fiRC that tiuse catters had not been analyzed. They were concerned that the notice to flRC of the issues night generate an " overreaction" on the part of the flRC. Ilevised B&W Part 21 procedures now include " safety implications _"
(cnphasis added) which presumably vould require these natters to be c h ~ g -/ gj
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reported to the !!RC in the future.
Our revicu of these investigations reveals no evidence of willful cor.Qct or anission by B&W such as to constitute criminality, especially under the regulatory requirements existent at the time.
For example, Part 21 nerely required the " evaluation" by the licensee of the existence of a s
particular deviation which could create a substantial safety hazard and notification to liRC of such a defect if it were found to exist.
Tharninre, crininality could be dependent on shouing that the licensee, in its evaluation, had detemined that one or nore of the above stated natters did constitute a safety hazard and then uillfully detemined not to report the natter to the flRC. The discretionary judgment of the licensee is controlling so long as there is any reasonable basis for that judgnent and criminality, should it exist, uill still require a showing that the licensee willful.ly did not report a known defect.
It is emphasized that this conclusion is based on the parametersTi the three referenced IE investigations, which are still in a "pending status" and, therefore, the substantiation of crininality at a future time based on "new facts" is not foreclosed. Cased on the chove, I have detemined that the natters raised, thus far,' do not t.crrant referral to the Department of Justice for their prosecutive consideration.
s cc: Connissioners (4)
M. J. Dircks, A/EDO L. Dictuit, GC V. Stello, IE H. Shapar, ELD Distribution:
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