ML19325C117

LER 87-009-00:on 870227,failure of Two Control Air Solenoid Valves Rendered Div I & II Diesel Generators Inoperable. Cause Unknown.Solenoid Valves Replaced & Plant Administrative Procedure PAP-1705 revised.W/870327 Ltr

ML19325C117
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	03/27/1987
From:	Dunn G, Edelman M CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-87-009, LER-87-9, PY-CEI-NRR-0620, PY-CEI-NRR-620, NUDOCS 8704010005
Download: ML19325C117 (5)

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On February 27, 1987 at 1905, a failure of two control air solenoid valves r'endered Division I and 11 Diesel Generators (DG) inoperable. In addition at 0100 on February 28, 1987 while returning Division 1 Diesel Generator to standby status an unexpected autostart of the Diesel Generator Building ventilation System occurred. The two control air solenoids were discovered failed during the performance of Diesel Generator tasting. The valves were replaced and the D!esel Generators retested satisfactority by 0142 on February 28.

No cunctusive cause of f ailure f or the solenoid valves could be identified.

Both leaking solenoid valves had previously been identified for replacement due to leakage, with work requests initiated but not yet implemented. The reuse of the imeediate SG failures was the accelerated degraded condition of 1

the leaking solenoid valves. At discovery, the conditions were evaluated not to require immediate action, thus expeditious replacement did not occur.

To prevent recurrence, the administrative procedure for DG reports and recc,rds will be revised to require a review of DG work orders to ensure the 1

appropriate priority is assigned. Additionally, an evaluation will he performed to better define the service life for the air control solencid valves.

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On Tebruary 27,1987 at 1905, a f alture of two control air solenoid valves i rendered Division I and II Diesel Generators (DG) inoperable. In addition, at j 0100 on Tebruary 28, 1987 while returning Division I Diesel Generator to '

standby status after maintenancej an unexpected autostart of the Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System (DGBVS)(VJ) supply f an (TAN) for the Division I Diesel Generator occurred. At the time of these events, the plant was in Operational Condition 1 (power Operation) with reactor thermal power approximately 29% of rated. Reactor coolant temperature was approximately $10 degrees and reactor vessel (RPV) pressure was approximately 935 psig.

i On Tebruary 27, 1987 a special Test Instruction ($XI-0007) " Diesel Generator i Start on a Single Admission Valve-Division I" was being performed to l demonstrate the diesel generator ability to start on a single starting air l admission valve. During performance of the test the Senerator field did not l flash. The failure to flash was believed to be due to the special l configuration required by the SXI, and the Diesel Generator was still considered operable. Subsequently, the Division I Diesel Generator was stopped and restarted in accordance with the System Operating Instruction (S01)-R43 " Division I and 11 Diesel Generator System" to verify operability. 1 At 1708 the Division I Diesel Generator did not perform as expected by the SOI I

and was declared inoperable because the field did not flash until approximately 2 minutes af ter starting. Troubleshooting of the failure was initiated immediately. l i

l Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 action statement b. requires demonstration of operability of the remaining OPERABLE diesel generators by performing  !

Surveillence Requirements 4.81.1.2 a.4 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 separately for each i diesel generator within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. At 1738 Surveillance Instruction (SVI)-  !

R43-71318 " Diesel Generator Start and Load Division II" was initiated. The l Division II Diesel Generator also failed the SVI due to an overspeed trip and ,

subsequent failure of its field to flash. The Division II Diesel Generator l l

was declared inoperable at 1905.

Troubleshooting of the Division 1/11 DG identified the problem as excessive air leakage past the 3 way energized air solenoid valves (Delaval Part fT-586-061 Humphrey Products Model No. TOG 2El-3-10-35). The valves were replaced and survelliance testing initiated. At 2234 on February 27 and 0142 i on February 28 the Surveillances were completed on Division I and II Diesel respectively. Division I was declared operable at 0135 and Division II at .

0345 on Tebruary 28, 1987. The cause of the overspeed trip on Division II was/  !

due to an inproper adjustment of the mechanical governor / This incorrect /

adjustment was not considered as a factor in Operability and was subsequently  !

readjusted on March 14, 1987. Additionally at 0100 while securing the Division I Diesel Generator following its surveillance run, a DGBVS (Division .

1) supply fan autostarted unexpectedly.

The cause of the DGBVS is believed to be a result of electrical noise within the tachometer circuitry. Substantial troubleshooting and investigation has been performed on previous similar events (see Licensee Event Reports86-019, l 86-031, 86-042 and 86-082).

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0 l0 mnva== emesma .mamemet==manwim No conclusive cause of f ailure for the solenoid valves could be identi led.

The volve manufacturer was contacted and responded that failures seldo.n occurred and that the most common f ailure developed when the poppets, made from BUNA-N, were subjected to an incompatible lubricant or excessive heat.

These valves are subjected to temperatures near the upper end of the qualified operating range and are continuously energised. These factors are believed to eventually cause degradation of the material within the valve resulting in air leakage and eventual f ailure. Both leaking solenoid valves had previously been identified for replaceteent due to leakage, with work requesta initiated but not yet implemented. In addition, several Surveillance Tests had been run successfully subsequent to identifying the leaking valves. The cause of the immediate diesel failures was the accelerated degraded condition of the leaking solenoid valves. At discovery, the conditions were evaluated not to l require immediate action, thus expeditious replacement did not occur.

l Subsequently it was determined that the control air pressure regulators whic supply air to these solenoid valves were malfunctioning and may have I contributed to the diesel failure (Delaval Part (F-579-061; Bellofram Model No. 241-960-069 Type 50). \61~71 l The Standby Diesel Generator System provides an independent source of AC power to the Division 1, 2, 3 Class 1E buses in the event of loss of the redundant offsite power supply. During the time period Class 1E Power was available from at least two physically independent circuits from the transmission network to the onsite electric distribution system. AdditionaH y, the High Pressure Core Spray diesel generator and system were verified operable during this timeframe. However, the event is considered safety significant because the loss of Division I and II backup power supplies results in conditions outside of the design basis under certain accident scenarios. No previous similar events were identified.

The following corrective actions have been or will be completed to prevent recurrence:

1. Those diesel generators air control solenoid valves which have been in service and continuously energized for over 6 months will be replaced.

2. Plant Administrative Procedure (PAP)-1705 " Diesel Generator Reports and Records" will be revised to require a periodic review of diesel generator work order priorities with the Work Review Committee to ensure the appropriate work priority is assigned.

3. An engineering evaluation will be performed to establish a better defined service life for the air control solenoid valves.

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4. A design review will be conducted to minimise the application of

ontinuously energised solenoid valves in the diesel generator control air panel and to evaluate replacement of solenoid valves containing BUNA-N material with Viton asterial.

5. An engineering design change will be implemented to upgrade the control techometer.

6. The f ailed control air solenoid valves will be returned to the vendor for performance of failure analysis.

Energy Industry Identification Systems Codes are identified in the text as [XX).

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I j T H E C L E# E L A N D E L E C T R I C I L L U M I N A T I N G C 0 l(, P A N 'i o ., o .o. . at. .oo , . .. ,, ., s . . ,u ,

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""* 2 ** March 27, 1987 I p PY-CE!/NRt4620 L j

in U.S. Nuclear Reguistory Come(solon

, Document Control Desk i Weshington, D.C. 20555

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Perry Nuclear Power Plant l Docket No. 50-440 l

Ltte'87-009-00 and 87-010-00 j i

Dear Stra Enclosed are Licensee Event Reporte 87409-00 and 8741040  !

for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, j

s: l Very truly yours, . t (7

.Murray R. Edele n# .- l

' senior Vice ' President ]

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Enclosure:

Leas 87-009-00 and 87-010-00 f ~

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.; cc 'raul Leech ,

K. Connaughton f

' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coenlosion i j 799 Roosevelt Road  !

f Clen Ellyn, IL. 60137 l l

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