ML19291C216

Proposed Tech Spec Changes to Permit Core to Be Unloaded & Reloaded W/O Use of Large Number of Control Blade Guides

ML19291C216
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	01/14/1980
From:	NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML19291C214	List: ML19291C212 ML19291C216
References
NUDOCS 8001230145
Download: ML19291C216 (14)

Text

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COOPER NbutEAR STATION TABLE 3.2.C CONTROL ROD WIT 1[DRAWAL BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION -

Function Minimun Number Of Trip Level Setting Operable Instrument Channels / Trip System (5)

APRM Upscale (Flow Bias) < (0.66W t 42%)'FRP ' (2)

APRM Upscale (Startup) 2(1)

< 12%

, ,MFLPD, 2(1)

APRM Downscale (9) 1 2.5% 2(1)

APRM Inoperative (10b) 2(1)

RBM Upscale (Flow Bias)  ;[ (0.66W + 39%) (2) 1 RBM Downscale (9) > 2.5% 1 RBM Inoperative (10c) 1 IRM Upscale (8) < 108/125 of Full Scale 3(1)

IRM Downscale (3)(8) 1 2.5% 3(1)

IRM Detector Not Full In (8) 3(1)

IRM Inoperative (8) (10a) 3(1)

SRM Upscale (8) j[1 x 105 Counts /Second 1(1)(6)

SRM Detector Not Full In (4)(8) (> 100 cps) 1(1) (6) fb SRM Inoperative (8) (10a) to 1(1)(6)

- CD Flow Bias Comparator j:,10% Difference In Recire. Flowa O 1

4. .

Flow Bias Upscale /Irop. -*

j:,110% Recire. Flow 1 sa .

SRM Downscale (8)(/) [f[ > 3 Counts /Second (12) 1(1) (6)

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k/M W

RSCS Rod Group C Bypass -*

> 20% Coro Thermal Power (11) k

11. There are two pressure transmittert, which provide the signal to allow Group C rod withdrawal. Failure of either unit will not allow the Group C withdrawal. These units are required to function only until 6500 MWD /T at which time the Group C interlock will be removed after AEC approval.

As described in the Bases for Specification 3.3.B.3, the RSCS operation is required below 20% core thermal power. Therefore, the pressure switches will be calibrated to 22% core thermal power to allow for the instrumentation and calculation accuracy.

12. During spiral unloading / reloading, the SRM count rate will be below 3 cps for some period of time. See Specification 3.10.B.

1791 352

- 62a -

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANG8 REQUIREMENT 3.3 (Cont'd) 4.3 (Cont'd)

B. Control Rods B. Control Rods

1. Each control rod shall be coupled to 1. The coupling integrity shall be its drive or completely inserted and verified for each withdrawn control the control rod directional control rod as follows:

valves disarmed electrically. This requirement does not apply in the refuel a. When a rod is withdrawn the first condition when the reactor is vented. time after each refueling outage or Two or more control rod drives may be after maintenance, observe discern-removed as long ar. Specification 3.10. A.5 ible response of the nuclear instru-or 3.10.A.6 is met. mentation and rod position indication.

However, for initial rods when response is not discernible, subsequent exer-cising of these rods after the reactor is above 30% power shall be performed to verify instrumentation response.

b. When the rod is fully withdrawn the first time after each refueling outage or after maintenance, observe that the drive does not go to the over-travel position.

1791 353

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.10 CORE ALTERATIONS 4.10 CORE ALTERATIONS Applicability Applicability Applies to the fuel handling and Applies to the periodic testing of core reactivity limitations. those interlocks and instrumentation used during refueling and core alterations.

Objective Objective To ensure that core reactivity is To verify the operability of within the capability of the control instrumentation and interlocks used rods and to prevent criticality in refueling and core alterations, during refueling.

Specification Specification A. Refueling Interlocks A. Refueling Interlocks

1. The reactor mode switch shall be 1. Prior to any fuel handling with the locked in the " Refuel" position head off the reactor vessel, the during core alterations and the refueling interlocks shall be refueling interlocks shall be functionally tested. They shall be operable except as specified in tested at weekly intervals thereaf ter 3.10.A.5 and 3.10.A.6 below. until no longer required. They shall also be tested following any repair work associated with the interlocks.

2. Fuel shall not be loaded into the 2. Prior to performing centrol rod or reactor core unless all control control rod drive maintenance on control rods are fully inserted or unless cells without removing fuel assemblies, tne spiral unload / reload technique it shall be demonstrated that the is used. core can be made subcritical by a margin of 0.38 percent Ak at any time during the maintenance with the strongest operable ntrol rod fully withdrawn and all other operable rods fully inserted. Alternatively if the remaining control rods are fully in-serted and have had their directional control valvoa electrically disarmed, it is sufficient to demonstrate that the core is suberitical with a margin of at least 0.38 percent Ak at any time during the maintenance. A control rod on which maintenance is being performed shall be considered inoperable.

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1791 354

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.10.A (Cont'd) 4.10.A (Cont'd)

3. The fuel grapple hoist load switch 3. Whenever the reactor is in the refuel shall be set at < 650 lbs. mode and rod block interlocks are being bypassed for core unloading, one licensed operator and one member of the reactor engineering staff will verify that all fuel has been removed before the corresponding control rod is withdrawn.

4. If the frame-mounted auxiliary hoist, 4. Following the withdrawal and bypassing the monorail-mounted auxiliary hoist, of a control rod, two licensed operators or the service platform hoist is to will verify that the interlock bypassed be used for handling fuel with the is on the correct control rod.

head off the reactor vessel, the load limit switch on the hoist to be used shall be set at < 400 lbs.

5. A maximum of two nonadjacent control 5. Prior to loading fuel in a control cell rods may be withdrawn from the core (using the spiral reload technique),

for the purpose of performing control the control room operator and a licensed rod and/or control rod drive maintenance, operator and a member of the reactor provided the following conditions are engineering staff on the refueling floor satisfied: shall verify that the control rod is inserted in the cell to be loaded.

a. The reactor mode switch shall be locked in the " refuel" position. The refueling interlock which prevents more than one control rod from being withdrawn may be bypassed for one of the control rods on which maintenance is being performed. All other refueling interlocks shall be operable.

b. A sufficient number of control rods shall be operable so that the core can be taade suberitical with the strongest operable control rod fully withdrawn and all other operable control rods fully inserted, or all directional control valves for remaining control rods shall be disarmed electrically and sufficient margin to criticality shall be demonstrated.

c. If maintenance is to be performed on two control rod drives, they must be .

separated by more than two control cells in any direction.

d. An appropriate number of SRM's are available as defined in specification 179 355 3.10.B.

-204-

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 3.10.A (Cont'd) 4.10 (Cont'd)

6. Any number of control rods may be withdrawn or removed from the reactor core providing the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The reactor mode switch is locked in the " refuel" position. The refueling interlock which prevents more than one control rod from being withdrawn may be bypasted on a withdrawn control rod after tFe fuel assemblies in the cell containing (controlled by) that control rod have been removed from the reactor core. All other refueling interlocks shall be operable.

B. Core Monitoring B. Core Monitoring During core alterations two SRM's Prior to making any alterations to shall be operable, one in the core the core, the SRM's shall be quadrant where fuel or control rods functionally tested and checked for are being moved and one in an ad- neutron response. Thereafter, while jacent quadrant. For an SRM to be required to be operable, the SRM's considered operable, the following will be checked daily for response conditions shall be satisfied: (or every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> until 3 cps is '

attained if the spiral reload

1. The SRM shall be inserted to the normal technique is being used).

operating level. (Use of special move-able, dunking type detectors during initial fuel loading and major core alterations in place of normal detectors is permissible as long as the detector is connected to the normal SRM circuit.)

2. Operable SRM's shall have a minimum of 3 eps excent as spec i fimi in 3 and 4 below.

3. Prior to spiral unloading, the SRM's shall have an initial count rate of 3 cps. During spiral unloading, the count rate on the SRM's may drop below 3 cps.

1791 356'.

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.10.B (Cont'd) 4.10 (Cont'd)

4. During spiral reload, SRM operability will be verified by using a portable external source every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> until the required amount of fuel is loaded to maintain 3 cps. As an alternative to the above, two fuel assemblics will be loaded in different cells containing control blades around each SRM to obtain the required 3 cps. Until these two assemblies have been loaded, the 3 cps requirement is not necessary.

C. Spent Fuel Pool Water Level C. Spent Fuel Pool Water Level Whenever irradiated fuel is stored When irradiated fuel is stored in the in the spent fuel pool, the pool spent fuel pool, the water level shall water level shall be maintained at be recorded daily.

or above 8 ' above the top of the fuel.

D. Time Limitation Irradiated fuel shall not be handled in or above the reactor prior to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after reactor shutdown.

1791 357

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I,IMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEII,IANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.10 (Cont'd) 4.10 (Cont'd)

E. Spent Fuel Cask Handling E. Spent Fuel Cask Handling

1. Fuel cask handling above the 931' l. Prior to fuel cask handling operations level of the Reactor Building will be the redundant crane including the rope, done in the RESTRICTED MODE only except hooks, slings, shackles and other as specified in 3.10.E.2.

operating mechanisms will be inspected.

The rope will be replaced if any of the following conditions exist:

a. Twelve (12) randomly distributed broken wires in one lay or four (4) broken wires in one strand of one rope lay.

b. Wear of one-third the original diameter of outside individual wire.

c. Kinking, crushing, or any other damage resulting in distortion of the rope.

d. Evidence of any type of heat damage,

e. Reductions from nominal diameter of more than 1/16 inch for a rope diameter from 7/8" to lk" inclusive.

2. Fuel cask handling in other than the 2. Prior to operations in the RESTRICTED RESTRICTED MODE will be permitted in MODE:

emergency or equipment failure situations only to the extent necessary a. the controlled area limit switches to get the cask to the closest acceptable will be tested; stable location.

b. the "two-block" limit switches will be tested;

c. the " inching hois*" controls will be tested.

3. Operation with a failed controlled area 3. The empty spent fuel cask will be limit switch is permissible for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> lifted free of all support by a providing an operator is on the refueling maximum of 1 foot and left hanging for floar to assure the crane is operated 5 minutes prior to any series of fuel within the restricted zone painted on cask handling operations.

the floor. ,

4. Spent fuel casks weighing in excess of 140,000 lbs. shall not be handled.

1791 358

-206-

3.10 BASES A. Refueling Interloc,ks The refueling interlocks are designed to back up procedural core reactivity controls during refueling operations. The interlocks prevent an inadvertent criticality during refueling operations (when the reactivity potential of the core is being altered) by restricting the movement of control rods and the operation of refueling equipment.

The interlocks include circuitry which senses the condition of the refueling equipment and the control rods. Depending on the sensed condition, interlocks are actuated which prevent the movement of the refueling equipment or withdrawal of control rods (rod block). Cir-cuitry is provided which senses the following conditions:

1. All rods inserted.

2. Refueling platform positioned near or over the core.

3. Refueling platforn hoists are fuel-loaded (fuel grapple, frame-mounted hoist, monorail-mounted hoist).

4. Fuel grapple not full up.

5. Service platform hoist fuel-loaded.

6. One rod withdrawn.

When the mode switch is in the " Refuel" position, interlocks prevent the refueling platform from being moved over the core if a control rod is withdrawn and fuel is on a hoist. Likewise, if the refueling platform is over the core with fuel on a hoist, control rod motion is blocked by the interlocks. When the mode switch is in the refuel position, only one control rod can be withdrawn. The refueling inter-locks, in combination with core nuclear design and refueling procedures, limit the probability of an inadvertent criticality. The nuclear characteristics of the core assure that the reactor is suberitical even when the highest worth control rod is fully withdrawn. The combination of refueling interlocks for control rods and the refueling platform provide redundant methods of preventing inadvertent criticality even after procedural violations. The interlocks on hoists provide yet another method of avoiding inadvertent criticality.

Fuel handling is normally conducted with the f uel grapple hoist. The total load on this hoist when the interlock is required consists of the weight of the fuel grapple and the fuel assembly. This total is approximately 980 lbs., in comparison to the load-trip setting of 650 lbs. Provisions have also been made to allow fuel handling with either of the three auxiliary hoists and still maintain the refueling inter-locks. The 400 lb. load-trip setting on these hoists is adequate to trip the interlock when one of the more than 600 lb. fuel bundles is being handled.

1791 359

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3.10 ItASES (ConL'd)

During certain periods, it is desirable to perform maintenance oi. two control rods and/or control rod drives at the same time. The maintenance is performed with the mode switch in the " refuel" positi.n to provide the refueling interlocks normally available during refueling operations.

In order to withdraw a second control rod after withdrawal of the first rod, it is necessary to bypass the refueling interlock on the first control rod which prevents more than one control rod from being with-drawn at the same time. The requirement that an adequate shutdown margin be demonstrated or that all remaining control rods have their directional control valves electrically disarmed ensures that inadvertent criticality cannot occur during this maintenance. The adequacy of the shutdown margin is verified by demonstrating that the core is shut down by a margin of 0.38 percent Ak with the strongest operable control rod fully withdrawn, or that at least 0.38 percent Ak shutdown margin is available if the remaining control rods have had their directional control valves disarmed. Disarming the directional control valves does not inhibit control rod scram capability.

Specification 3.10.A.6 allows unloading of a significant portion of the reactor core. This operation is performed with the mode switch in the

" refuel" position to provide the refueling interlocks normally available during refueling operations. In order to withdraw more than one control rod, it is necessary to bypass the refueling interlock on each withdrawn control tod which prevents more than one control rod from being withdrawn at a time. The requirement that the fuel assemblics in the cell controlled by the control rod be removed from the reactor core before the interlock can be bypassed ensures that withdrawal of another control rod does not result in inadvertent criticality. Prior to removal of the last two dingonal fuel assemblies, a double blade guide shall be inserted to properly support the control rod and fuel assemblies. After removal of the last two fuel assemblies and withdrawal of the control rod, the double blade guide may be removed.

Each control rod provides primary reactivity control for the fuel assenblies in the cell associated with that control rod. Thus, removal of an entire cell (fuel assemblies plus control rod) results in a lower reactivity potential of the core. The requirements for SRM operability during these core alterations assure sufficient core monitoring.

To minimize the possibility of leading fuel into a cell containing no control rod, when refueling interlock input signals are bypassed, it is required that the control room operator and a licensed operator and a member of the reactor engineering staf f on the refueling floor verify that the control rod is inserted in the cell to be loaded. Prior to insertion of the control rod, it shall be verified that a double blade guide was placed in the cell to be loaded to properly support the control rod and fuel assemblies.

1791 360

-208-

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3.10 BASES (Cont'd)

B. Core Monitoring The SRM's are provided to monitor the core during periods of station shutdown and to guide the operator during refueling operations and station startup. Requiring two operable SRM's in or adjacent to any core quadrant where fuel or control rods are oei. _ moved assures adequate monitoring of that quadrant during such alterations. The requirement of >3 counts per second provides assurance that neutron flux is being monitored and insures that startup is conducted only if the source range flux level is above the minimum assumed in the control rod drop accident.

A spiral unloading pattern is one by which the fuel in the outer.ost cells (four fuel bundles surrounding a control blade) is removed first.

Unloading continues by removing the remaining outermost fuel cell by cell. The center cell will be the last removed. Spiral reloading is the reverse of unloading. Spiral unloading and reloading will preclude the creation of flux traps (moderator filled cavities surrounded on all sides by fuel).

During spiral unl;ading, the SRM's shall have an initial count rate of

>3 cps with all rods fully inserted. The count rate will diminish during fuel removal. After all the fuel is removed from a cell, the control rod may be withdrawn in that cell. After the control rod is withdrawn, the refueling interlock will be bypassed on that control rod. Following the withdrawal and bypassing ci the control rod, two licensed operators will verify that the interlock bypassed is on the correct control rod. Once the control rod is withdrawn, it will be valved out of service. The refueling interlocks will prevent the withdrawal of another control rod unless the control rod just withdrawn from the unloaded cell is bypassed.

Under this special condition of complete spiral core unloading, it is evpected that the count rate of the SRM's will drop below 3 cps before all of the fuel is unloaded. Since there will be no reactivity additions, a lower number of counts will not present a hazard. When all of the fuel has been removed to the spent fuel storage pool, the SRM's will no longer be required. Requiring the SRM's to be operational prior to fuel removal assures that the SRM's are operable and can be relied on even when the count rate may go below 3 cps.

During spiral reload, SRM operability will be verified by using a portable external source every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> until the required amount of fuel is loaded to maintain 3 cps. As an alternative to the above, two fuel assemblies will be loaded in different cells containing control blades around each SRM to obtain the required 3 cps. Until these two assemblies have been loaded, the 3 cps requirement is not necassary. l C. Spent Fuel Pool Water Level To assure that there is adequate water to shield and cool the irradiated fuel assemblies stored in the pool, a minimum pool water level is established. The minimum water level of 8b' above the top of the fuel is established because it provides adequate shielding and is well above the level to assure adequate cooling. ,

-209-

3.10 BASES (Cont'd)

D. Time Limitation The radiological consequences of a fuel handling accident are based upon the accident occurring at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after reactor shutdown.

E. Spent Fuel Cask Handling The operation of the redundant crane in the Restricted Mode during fuel cask handling operations assures that the cask remains within the controlled area once it has been removed from its transport vehicle (i.e., once it is above the 931' elevation). Handling of the cask on the Refueling Floor in the Unrestricted Mode is allowed only in the case of equipment failures or emergency conditions when the cask is already suspended. The Unrestricted Mode of operation is allowed only to the extent necessary to get the cask to a suitable stationary position so the required repairs can be made. Operation with a failed controlled area microswitch will be allowed for a 48-hour period providing an Operator is on the floor in additior. to the crane operator to assure that the cask handling is limited to the controlled area as marked on the flocr. This will allow adequate time to make repairs but still will not restrict cask handling operations unduly.

4.10 BASES A. Refueling Interlocks Complete functional testing o' all refueling interlocks before any refualing outage will provide positive indication that the interlocks operate in the situations for which they were designed. By loading each hoist with a weight equal to the fuel assembly, positioning the refueling platform and withdrawing control rods, the interlocks can be subjected to valid operational tests. Where redundancy is provided in the logic circuitry, tests can be performed to assure tnat each redundant logic element can independently perform its functions.

B. Core Monitoring Requiring the SRM's to be functionally tested prior to any core alteration assures that the SRM's will be operable at the start of that alteration.

The daily response check (or 12-hour check for spiral reload) of the SRM's ensures their continued operability.

E. Spen _t Fuel Cask Handling The Surveillance Requirements specified assure that the redundant crane is adequately inspected in accordance with the accepted ANSI Standard (B.30.2.0) and manufacturer's recommendations to determine that the equipment is in satisfactory condition. The testing of the controlled area limit switches assures that the crane operation will be limited to the designated area in the Restricted Mode of operation. The test of the "two-block" limit switch assures the power to the hoisting motor will be interrupted before an actual "two-blocking" incident can occur.

The test of the inching hoist assures that this mode of load control is available when required. ,

1792 0132

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4.10 BASES (Cont'd)

Requiring the lifting and holding of the cask for 5 minutes during the initial lift of each series of cask handling operations puts a load test on the entire crane lifting mechanism as well as the braking system.

Performing this test when the cask is being lifted initially from the cask car assures that the system is operable prior to lifting the load to an excessive height.

1792 003

-209b-

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