ML19290E467
| ML19290E467 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1980 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19290E468 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8003110333 | |
| Download: ML19290E467 (75) | |
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U NIT E D STATES N UCLE AR R EG UL ATORY COMMISSION in the matter of:
BRIEFING ON CRYSTAL RIVER i
i PIaee:
washington, D. c.
DGtO February 27, 1080 Pogos:
1-74 INTERNAT!CNAL VERaATiM REPcRicas. INc.
M SvW CAPITCL STREET. S. W. SUITE 107 WASHINGTON. D. C. 20002 M 484-3550 9
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U'IITED STATES i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
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In the Matter of:
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3 BRIEFING ON CRYSTAL RIVER
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Room 1130, Eleventh Floor 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Wednesday, February 27, 1980 f
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The Co= mission met, pursuant to notice, for
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presentation of the above-entitled matter, at 11:03 a.m.,
tJ BEFORE:
l 14 JOHN A. AREARNE, CHAIRMAN 17 VICTOR GILINSKY, COMMISSIONER is l
RICHARD T. KENNEDY, COMMISSIONER 19 PETER A. BRADFORD, COMMISSIONER
- o JOSEPH M. HENDRIE, COMMISSIONER f
LEONARD BICKWIT, GENERAL COUNSEL
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I'd like the background noise to I
l quiet down if we could.
We're here this morning to hear a
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status report from several members of the NRC, regarding an i,
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3 event which occurred yesterday at Crystal River.
I'm sure t
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6 l that we all are quite anxious to get the information that you i
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people have for us.
I would also expect we may have a number I
I of questions.
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l But, before we get to it, the Sunshine Act requires a following vote.
We have a briefing on the status of 4
Crystal River and I have to have a vote to hold on less than one weeks notice.
t:
(A chorus of " ayes").
I CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
With that done, we turn it over to 1s I
Vic Stello.
I'm sure that we will have a number of questions i3 and probably perhaps questions afterwards.
But, Vic?
4 14 8
l MR. STELLO:
Okay, let me begin, Mr. Chairman, then 17 wherever you would like if you would interrupt for clarifying 18 information, just feel free to do so.
19 What we pulled together I want to start by saying is
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I obviously preliminary.
We have not had copies of the data and l
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the charts to review and to look at.
So, some particular specifics of what happened have to be viewed with the under-l t
standing that the information we do have is preliminary and the 4
people are still reviewing the technical data to make sure that a clear understanding of exactly what happened is pulled l
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I together as soon as possible.
i CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
What is the status of the plant right at the moment?
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MR. STELLO:
Okay, I have a slide on that.
If you l
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3 wish we can --
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6 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Why don't you just give me a quick f
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statement and then you can go through your briefing.
MR. STELLO:
At the moment the plant is running at 3
i about 1800 pounds and about 400 degrees in the primary system with two of the reactor coolant pumps in operation circulating the coolant.
It's an essentially normal condition that you I
would have new after a shutdown and is being held in that 12 position until repairs are made in one of the pu=ps before they
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put it on a residual heat removal system.
14 CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
But, in you judgement this now is a 15 relatively normal condition?
14 MR. STELLO:
Yes, yes it is.
17 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Fine.
All right. go ahead.
18 MR. STELLO.
Okay.
Well, let me begin with the first 19 slide if I might.
Some of the highlights very quickly.
The unit where the event occurred was Crystal River Unit 3.
21 CHAIRMAN AFJARNE:
Now three doesn' to three nuclear units, is that correct?
MR. STELLO:
No, there are two coal fire units at l
t that site.
I guess they would be one of the two.
It's located
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in the Gulf of Mexico, about 70 miles north of Tampa.
It's a j~
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FWR.
It was designed by B&W.
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I assume it's located on the Gulf of Mexico.
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A COMMISSIONER RENDRIE:
Or alongside.
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3 MR. SIELLO:
Right.
As you can see, we did put the l
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slides together rather quickly.
It's rated at 2452 l
megawatts ther= ally,155 megawatts electric.
The event occurred 3
yesterday at 1425 hours0.0165 days <br />0.396 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.422125e-4 months <br />.
The unit prior to the event was 9
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operating at a 100 percent power.
The event was caused by a l
I loss of non-nuclear instrumentation power to one of the buses.
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Are you going to go into further detail?
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I MR. STELLO:
I will.
It lead to some erroneous i
14 signals in the ICS, --
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l CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Which is the --
14 MR. STELLO:
Integrated control system that's used 17 in the BW plants.
The event caused primary coolant to be la released in the reactor building and the plant as I've already 19 indicated is now in a stable cooling mode.
20 Let me turn to the next slide to go over very 11 quickly the notification and what happened.
The event occurred I
at 1423.
Our Atlanta office was notified at 1440.
The hotline l
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in our center in Bethesda was used and we were notified at l
.*2 1445.
I was informed just about i= mediately after the
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i notification and went to the incident center and we activated our emergency operation center.
The = embers of the management t
- ean came to the center which included Commissioner Ahearne j
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and Co=missioner Hendrie.
The full complement of people since j
i it was a normal working day was very quickly reached and people 6
l were right in the center essentially i= mediately thereafter.
7 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Vic, what were you notified of at 1440 or 1445?
3 MR. STELLO:
The information that I had that caused
.7 me to conclude that the center should in this instance be g
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activated was an indication of high radiation in the reactor l
building and high pressure.
CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
The latter turned out to be 1:2 erroneous, didn't.it?
14 MR. STELLO:
The original indication I had was that 15 there was an 18 PSIG reading in the containment and a reading l
of 50 hour5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> per hour in the dome monitor.
It later turned out, that the reading was not 18 PSIG, but 18 PSIA which meant la l
about a three pound over pressure.
19 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
There might be one or two people 20 around who don't quite understand that difference.
Would you 21 take a minute and explain the difference between gauge and i
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absolute?
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MR. STELLO:
Okay.
Well, the normal atmospheric l
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The over pressure is added to i
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that which in this case was three pounds which,would give a 7.w*wA"4.I.%T.*?
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total absolute pressure of about 18 pounds.
For some reason, 1
that was transmitted to us as 18 PSIG which then would have 1
meant that you had about 33 poounds.
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CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
The point is that when you talk i
about G it means gauge and it measures the pressure above the 3
normal pressure.
So, when someone says 19 PSIG or 18 PSI i
l 7
gauge that means if it's 18 pounds per square inch above that t
i normal 15 pounds per square inch.
That's what was the great 3
concern.
It turned out that it was 18 PS total, so you have to 9
l subtract off the normal to get it was really about an I
increase of 3 PSI.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
So, do va knok where the G
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slipped in?
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
de'll get to that.
14 MR. STELLO:
I've not been able to find out where it I
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came from.
I recall asking several times after that and had j
14 people go back and check and finally requested one more time 17 because the remaining parameters that we had from the plant 18 i
suggested that just didn't go tcgether, that the indication of i
19 the 18 pound gauge couldn't fit with the rest of the informa-
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i tion we had.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
But, it will be one of the items
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that we're going to have to try to track back I understand information --
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i MR. STELLO:
The 50 hour5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> per hour reading in the dome, U
however, does appear.to have been correct infor=ation.
I'll be es scWTW CAM?ta. ITWEE*. & s. SJfTE sf
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going through that in some more detail a little -bit later.
As you can see from the slide the remaining organica-tions that needed to be notified such as DOE, FEMA, EPA, and l
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others --
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3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Can I j us take you back?
3 Whom did the licensee notify in this state?
i 7
MR. STELLO:
The individual I don't recall the name.
I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But, did that fulfill the 3
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licensees 9
responsibilities so far as his emergency plan is concerned?
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MR. STELLO:
There is a point on that that I want to
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get into a little bit later.
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COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I think the answer is clearly I
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He has an existing and approved emergency plan in place.
. CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
As you'll find out, COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
He carried it out.
There is i
14 also under discussion, pretty heavy discussion, with Crystal 17 River management the upgraded emergency plan which then begins 18 to meet the new criteria that NRC and FEMA have enunciated.
i 19 That plan is not one which the licensee has prepared averting l
20 I
appropriate for his site and had approved by us.
So, the I
- 1 licensees position is he has an existing approved plan and he's I
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working on a new improved one.
But, until he gets it approved, i
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he has to use the existing one.
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4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But, did he carry out the
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existing criteria?
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MR. DENTON:
He carried out the existing one.
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MR. STELLO:
Yes.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
As you'll find out, part of the confusion was between those two plants.
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MR. STELLO:
Well, at 1530 a site emergency was declared and --
6 l
7 CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
What was the site alert tnat was declared?
We call it a site emergency.
MR. STELLO:
Okay, it was Class B which --
9 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
What does that mean, because I'd like to know.
11 i
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I'd like to know that, too.
12 MR. STELLO:
That the conditions were expected to be 13 i
such that it could affect things on-site te *he buildings.
It 14 was not expected to affect things off site.
When you expect 13 things to affect the off site, then you go to a general j
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e=ergency.
17 MR. DENTON:
Let me add one more.
It's a condition 18 wherein one more failure would lead to public exposure.
Another 19 way of thinking about the way Class B was thought out in their 20 previous procedure.
We sense we're trying to redefine these 21 l
action levels.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Is this a label used just by i
I2 this licensee or is this a more general label?
I
- L MR. DENTON:
I was --
"I COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Excuse me.
You're speaking l'
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t of the Class B?
l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Class B.
i COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Yeah.
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MR. DENTON:
I think it was not unique.
It was in 1
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use prior to our new efforts in emergency planning.
It may 6
have been used in other licensees.
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It'd be helpful if they would be uniform.
j 3
MR. DENTON:
There is.
CHAIIWAN AHEARNE:
It is~getting to be uniform.
That's, what our new procedures going in place will do.
This came into i
- that intervening period, though, between with the old procedures still there and the new procedures not yet in place.
- But, 13 i
under the new procedures everybody does have the same -- they e
14 not only have the same terminology, but they have a censifica-l 15 tion of what that terminology means.
'4 1
MR. STELLO:
But, not for laboring the point there.
I 17 I
There generally are three types of emergencies.
One a local 18 where things might be confined to a part of the building.
So 19 you have the equivalent of a local emergency, then something i
10 where you expect that there could be something going on on the Il site equivalent of a site emergency.
In this instance a Class B and then the general emergency where things could affect i
the off site.
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1550 the White House situation room was notified.
At 1
Commissioner Hendire called the Lt. Governor at 1614.
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=issed that the -- the ready Co==issioners were notified, I'm sorry, at 1505 through 1515.
At 1630 the local agencies were 1
notified.
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COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Who notified them, the licensee?
I 3
MR. STELLO:
As I understand that call was made 4
by someone from the NRC.
i CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
This is another issue we're going 7
to turn it down.
g MR. STELLO:
Which is another issue.
9 j
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
They were notified by the l
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state?
11 MR. STELLO:
They were not notified by the state, nor h would the state plan call for them to be notified in the 1:3 i
i existing plan.
It's part of the confusion.
We might as well 14 i
get to that point now, that the new plan calls for. notification 13 of the local agencies --
i 14 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
By the licensee.
17 MR. STELLO:
-- by the licensee.
That plan was not la I
in affect.
That's the one that's under review and is apparently 19 being upgraded.
20 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Okay, now.
Does that plan Il also apply then to St. Lucie and Turkey Point?
Would those
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same problems exist at both these sites?
l FEL. DENTON:
I think something like this applies t
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universally, because every licensee is in the process of switch-i ing to our new approach.
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I COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Right.
But we know that the i
Florida State plan apparently doesn't contain anything that l
requires the State to notify the localities.
Do you think i
A there's any difference l
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Wait.
Is it the State isn't e
3 required to notify the localities or isn't required at this level of alert?
g MR. DENTON:
It's at this level that this alert -- if i
you go up one notch I'm pretty sure the plan would restart.
I don't 10 see much reason for differentiating the status of emergency planning at Crystal River from that of Turkey Point or St. Lucie.
They're all right in this transition.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Did this notification of the i
local agencies cor e from the Emergency Management Team?
MR. DENTO?-
No.
M i
,I MR. STELLO:
It was an individual who was a reviewer 14 of this particular plant for Crystal River as I understand 17 it that made the call.
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Who was on-s'ite?
19 MR. STELLO:
He was in Bethesda at the time.
20 l
From 1630 on I haven't bothered to fill in the detail 21 in terms of the notification.
There were a number of calls calling back to the people that I've mentioned already.
i; COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Could I just ask you about i
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that?
Was this on someone's instructions, on his own?
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MR. DENTONr It's not clear yet.
But, he was the e m v-m.:s
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reviewer who had been reviewing the new emergency plans and l
apparently =ade the call on his own.
CRAIRMAN AHEARNE:
He'd been the team leader of the i
4 group that went down to Crystal River and reviewed with the 3
,' licensee the new plan.
MR. STELLO:
He was not at the direction of the EMT.
j 6
7 1 don't know if anyone directed him or he really did it on his l
I haven't asked the question.
I really don't know.
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CHAIR EN AHEARNE:
But, that's another of the items that we'll have to find.
10 l
MR. STELLO:
We deactivated our emergency center in the sense that the EMT felt comfortable that things were in a stable mode and that we could leave at that point CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
Also the Director of Region 2 at that point was on-site.
f 13 I
I MR. STELLO:
The Director of Region 2 and there were 14 about 20 NRC people on-site at the time.
They took over the
-l 17 monitoring of the plan, but we did keep a --
la COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Excuse me, Vic.
My understand-19 i
ing was that we -- at the time the incident occurred or 20 initiated we had a resident inspector and a team of analysis l
Il people --
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22 l
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Performance appraisal.
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COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
-- performance appraisal people,'
l totaling what five or six --
MR. STELLO:
Six were on-site at the time.
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i COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Five plus the --
MR. STELLO:
Well, the full time resident isn't there l
is equivalent resident from the regional office would happen I
A to be there at that time.
j 3
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Right, okay.
MR. STELLO:
So, we already had six of the NRC people j
3 on-site at that time.
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COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
So, the Regional Director plus 3
another 13 or 14 people went?
MR. DENTON:
That's correct.
10 i
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
All from the region?
MR. STELLO:
Well, at that time the Regional Director 12 was here in Bethesda and left from here and some of the people 1:3 l
left from the region, la CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
The acting Regional Director went I
T3 directly from the region, is that correct?
14 MR. STELLO:
Yes, and he arrived at the site, as I 17 recall, about 6:40 and then the Regional Director sometime la later.
19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I was trying to get to the 20 point, was that component of another 13 or 14 people all from 21 the regional office or were they representive also of head-i
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quarters.:ty?ple ?
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MR. STELLO:
All from the regional office.
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COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Thank you.
i MR. ETELLO:
We kept a calvery of people who have i
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been at the center through the night following what has 'oeen 2
going on and trying to as best as possible construct which --
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you may turn to the next slide the sequence of events in some A
detail of what happened.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Now, this sequence is one that I
i 3
has been generated you mean by all people, by our people at l
7 the site, and also the licensee?
MR. STELLO:
It's prinicipally a sequence of events 3
l that was generated by the people in Bethesda in consultation with the people at the site who have access to some of the g
information that was there.
We have had several conversations g
t with the licensee as well as the people from B&W.
I'll be making comments which will include information from all of our sources.
1s The event as I've alread indicated started about t.!
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l 2:30 yesterday efternoon.
It was caused by a failure in id non-nuclear instrumentation bus which supplies information to 17 the integrated control system which is used to --
la CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Could you say a little bit more 19 about -- do we know what actually fail?
20 MR. STELLO:
The number of parameters that are a part l 21 of this particular bus that failed include things like pressurizer level indication.
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CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
Well, ias it a failure of the 24 l
instrumentation or was it a failure of the power supply to i
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the bus which powers the instruments?
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i MR. STELLO:
The power supply to the bus which powers t
the instruments.
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MR. DENTON:
Technicians were working in this cabine j
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at the time of the failure.
Apparently, I've heard that what a
r failed was a typical power supply card that is in the power e
3 supply system that feeds on a number of instrumentation 7
channels and there was the sequential failures after that I
3 failure of the power supply.
I COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
It was not an off site power 9
failure?
10 t
i I
MR. DENTON:
No, there was an instrument power supply package internal to the plant.
i i.
j COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Is this similar to what l
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happened in the Rancho Seco?
14 MR. DENTON:
Yes.
I U
MR. STELLO:
Yes.
!d MR. DENTON:
It's happened perhaps ten times total 17 that one system or another looses power that feeds the 18 i
display and control systems in plants.
It happened at 19 Brunswick, Rancho Seco, Oconee, and we have a bulletin that i
we issued last year that requires all utilities to address the 21 i
effects of the loss of this type of power system.
I I
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
And make what kind of changes?
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Mk. DENTON:
Well make changes to diversify the I
- s control and display system so that loss of one power i
doesn't result in loss of more instrumentation than would be
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I necessary to achieve a core shutdown.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
When was that change suppose to be i
i made?
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1 MR. DENTON:
All the replies were due in -- and which j
i were due in --
4 l
6 l
Another two days.
i 7
MR. DENTON:
-- j ust about now.
I' l
l MR. STELLO:
About the end of the month.
The 3
l bulletin went out November 30th and the replies would be due 9
i at about the end of this month.
10 i
CHAIRMAO AREARNE:
Has Crystal River replied then?
I
- )
MR. STELLO:
Crystal River got the bulletin, I'm not i
aware of any reply from them.
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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Let's see, would the reply 1.L I
have to indicate that the change had been made or would the reply just have to indicate that they were addressing the f
I4 l
problem?
D' i
MR. DENTON:
Well, the reply has to identify -- the 18 i'
bulletin requires that they analyze the affect of failures of 19 the buses feeding the instrumentation and display systems and
- o identify a new system which would assure that they never lost I
1 more instrumentation than would be needed to bring the plant I
coal shutdown.
Then to propose those changes that would I
~,
necessary.
So, it requires that they do all the work except
- s making the changes and then they'd send in the proposed
~~
changes.
L""='~n.% " M.1 7 M 7-
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f i
I CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
So the end of February date doesn't ;
really tell you when those changes would end up being made?
MR. DENTON:
That's right.
It would depend on our l
A review of what comes in.
i t
3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Could you check for me and find l
6 l
out whether Crystal River did reply and if so what kind of systen I
7 they proposec and when it would be?
k 3
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Did we also impose any i
requirement either B&W licensees or B&W itself with regard to an analysis of the ICS?
g MR. DENTON:
Yes.
We require that they do a failure mode and effects analysis for the ICS.
i.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
B&W.
l 13 I
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
That was at the time we e
1.L i
l required the plants to shut down until this had been done.
IJ
,l t
MR. DENTON:
Yes.
l 14
- 7
-l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
That was one of the five items.
18 i
MR. DENTON:
That's right.
f 19 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Would that have included i
- 0 the effects of lawsuit 21 i
MR. DENTON:
Apparently there was no failure here of the ICS itself which what failed was the power supply that t
~,
t i
fed the ICS and resulted in the ICS assu=ing that =any of the I
t
- 4 plant parameters were at mid scale.
i
~
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
That was because the instrumentation i
~ ~ vm.m. =m. - x es S3tfle CapT31. TITCr*, L w. mJrrt ?S7
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i i
I channels were lost.
MR. DENTON:
Yes.
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Enich then lead the ICS to conclude l l
A the plant was in a different status than it was.
What kind of
,i j
instruments are these that were lost?
6 MR..STELLO:
Pressurizer pressure, pressurizer level, 7
temperature, some reactor cooling system pressure, some feed-3 water flow, pressurizer pressure to the PORV, main feedwater flow, stea= generator flow, --
f 9
i CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
A lot of critical instruments.
to l
MR. STELLO:
These are not part of the --
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Instruments not systems we I
l want to be sure.
i 13 MR. STELLO:
These are not the safety grade instruments i
that cause the plant to have to take action.
Those are 13 l
safety grade as distinguished from these which are "non-safety 14 grade or non-nuclear instrumentation".
17 Exactly what was lost'or whether it was indication, 18 whether it was a strip chart and what parts of them will need 19 to wait until we have the results.
I use these as examples 7
20 I
of things that are on this particular bus.
l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Now, what did the erroneous C
l signal cause the ICS to do?
MR. STELLO:
Well, the turbine -tripped.
- 4 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
The ICS tripped the turbine.
i
~
MR. STELLO:
The ICS caused the turbine to trip.
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i
--2.,
19 l
, AY
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i t
generally happens is most of the instruments will go to a reading which are mid range.
In this instance the primary 6
4 system flow indication went to it's cid range value which had i
i an input into the integrated control system and it eventually e
i i
3 tripped the turbine and as the turbine tripped a scram of the l
l 7
reactor which occurs as a result of the turbine tripped, The slide indicates that it also caused the PORV l
t 1
to open.
This is an issue we've been trying to get clear as 9
l to whether it did or didn't.
The difficulty is that the indication because of the way things fail would have indicated'
,1 t
that the PORV opened and indeed that's the information we had that it indicated opening.
But, people are not sure 13 i
that the PORV, in fact, was opened as a result of the particular la failure in the bus.
So it said it caused it to open.
I'm not is i
certain now based on the information that I've had that that's j
14 l
in fact a correct statement.
17 j
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Will there be positive 18 indication data available to ascertain whether in fact it 19 was or was not?
MR. STELLO:
Well, the information that we have 21 on the temperatures in the pipes from the valves, when we get
~
that information available I think we'll be able to more i
I precisely determine that.
Preliminary --
i 9
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Preliminary inference but not a positive indication on the valve itself.
~
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1 MR. DEUT 0N:
Yes, that's right.
Likewise, the volume in the drain tank that the pressurizer and safety valves l
i i
i vent to.
So, there have to be some analytical back calculation i
i i
4 to fill in some of the gaps.
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
But, there isn't a strip chart f
I f
I 3
recording which would tell you of their signals given to the l
i i
PORT' i
MR. STELLO:
Well, what we do have is there I
1 I
~
was an indication that the signal was there to open.
But, we l
believe the dent was caused by --
l 10 I
1
-i CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Pa:t of the erroneous.
11 MR. STELLO:
Yeah. -- of the bus rather than an actual signal to open.
The belief is that it, in fact, did not !
13 i
l open as a result of this failure.
l 14 i
I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me ask you.
We exempted I
15 t
I them from the requirement i
MR. STELLO:
Yeah, we're going to cover that.
I have 17 a slide on that.
!a COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I hope you'll comment on 19 whether that had any affect on --
i MR. STELLO:
We intend.to.
- 1 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
With regard to the instrumen-j
~,
tation, are you saying there was a time when they actually l
I2 couldn't tell what the system pressure was for example?
I 4
MR. STELLO:
No, I was very careful of trying to l
avoid saying that.
i 2
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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Okay, what were you saying?
l 2
MR. STELLO:
Some primary system pressure indication s
l was lost.
That does not mean all, seme.
Now, whether it meant J
4.
that there were some strip charts or the part of it that was on l
i the computer and exactly what parts of it, we won't know until i
i t
6 we get the detailed information back.
I do knew that they had 7
measurements of reactor coolant system pressure while we were i
l 3
at the incident center.
So they were clearly reading it.
MR. DENTON:
A large fraction of the recording indi-9 cating signals were lost for about 20 minutes until this power
- g was restored to this bus.
- )
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
You said you weren't sure j
I:
I 1:
whether PORV actually open.
Would not one of the valves have i
t had to open?
l la i
e s
MR. STELLO:
I'm going to come to that, yeah.
They i
12
\\,
I clearly did.
That's how the water, in fact, got into the j
reactor building through the valves.
i r*
MR DENTON:
What's not clear is whether the FORV 18 l
itself opened.
19 l
CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
Yeah.
See the issue he's 20 raising here, that's if I understand it correctly, is in this 21 order is whether the ICS opened the PORV --
i i
i MR. STELLO:
That's correct.
l' CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
-- not whether a valve opened 4
1 once you start dumping all the water out.
-=
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MR. STELLO:
There was an indication that it was O
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i 9
l i
i open, because of this failure.
But because of the way it does fail, it could be an erroneous indication that it was open and l
f it in fact was not open.
But, later in the transient there f
were eafety valves and relief valves that were probably open.
l t
I'll cover that --
f e
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me ask you just one more l
3 7
question here.
In the analysis of the ICS that was required of 3
l the licensee at the Three Mile Island, did this not include I
possibility of getting erroneous signals?
Y MR. DENTON:
Normally this type of plant should be able to take a turbine trip without opening the pressuriser relief valve.
I remember we made the plant make certain changes in the set point so that you would not open pressurizer relief valve.
Now, I'm not sure whether we have la i
i addressed the failure of a power system feeding the ICS which I3 l
would make all signals go to mid scale, so this case was j
id i
abnormal because of the particular power system failure the 17 ICS could have directed several action.
18 Now you know we do have block valves on the -- I l
19 i
think the key part of this transient is not the initiating i
i 20 failure but a little bit later down the line tcwards the
- 1 fact that turbine tripped as a result of ICS failure by itself i
~
you should be able to ride through that without opening any of the safety and relief valves.
l COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Is there any clear sign as i
yet as to whether the instrument failure did or didn't cause twTtpunaMcreas. '40ma4 Ties 4-i
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I overfeeding of the steam generators?
I MR. STELLO:
I think that the -- I'm giving you now i
t my j udgement.
I don't have enough intormation to say this i
4 with the kind of certainty I'd like to, but l
e COMMISSIONER RENDRIE:
Well, last night the power was I.
3 saying they felt steam generaters had been overfed after the l
i 7
trip in part because of the nature of the instrument failure.
l MR. STELLO:
Well, what could easily have happened l
3 l
i is after --
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
But, we don' t have anything further on that I
11 i
MR. STELLO:
Not definitive.
t:
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
All right, let's go on.
l MR. STELLO:
All right.
1.t At about three minutes in the event the containment i.!
i was isolated manually.
l 14 i
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Was this one of the plants wherein l
?',
until they get containment closing systems they have to have 18 someone there?
19 MR. STELLO:
Yes.
20 MR. DENTON:
Yes.
21 MR. STELLO:
We '1.1 be covering that a little bit
~
later as well.
~
t j
CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
So that's why manual.
MR. DENTON:
Yes.
i COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What signals wou ld t,erm..ro
<omam. es,. -
c.
ase SlW144 W ITWG".1 e. WWFfE *t7 I
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a AY :
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24 l
macz sc.
l I
1 auto =atica?ly isolate the containment air?
I MR. DENTON:
High pressures.
l l
MR. STELLO.
In about three half minutes the plant l
i began to cool down and the pressure began to decrease and very t
3 shortly thereafter you had an automatic initiation of the high pressure cool and injection system.
6 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
This gets back I guess to Joe's 7
question why did it drop to 1500?
g MR. STELLO:
The belief is that there was overcooling in the steam generators where the feedwater flow stayed up to i
i at high values and the reactor had tripped so that you had too i
4 much heat being removed in the steam generator which caused a t:
j cooldown of the primary system and contraction of coolant l
C i
inventory which would then cause the decrease in primary
!.4 i
i system pressure.
I5 l
i CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
What you don't know yet _s why l
i id the feedwater stayed on.
17 MR. STELLO:
Well, the feeedwater probably stayed 18 on because the integrated control system through the 19 erroneous information we're still looking at a signal that
- o l
says keep the feedwater up at high values.
It apparently cid 1
l that.
Now, that again is something I've qualified by saying l
~.
we need --
l
~
i CHAIR 1.AN A'7ARNE:
Let's go back.
Harold, in that f
.i bulletin that anes.. to which will be in the end of February, i
2 would the proposed or the requirements that you're putting on, IM N NM h.a'4 Er".sh j
me 33tTse C p*Tol. IT9rGT. & e. sufM '97
AY :
av 25 I
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would that lead to a fix of that kind of problem?
MR. DENTON:
It wouldn't. lead to a fix of the l
l possibility of the ICS causing a scram, but it would --
l A
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Well, but how about the ICS?
f i
y MR. DENTON:
The overcooling would allow the operator j
i 6
t know more precisely the steam generator levels and flows f
i 7
in temperatures and therefore take manual control.
i This ICS is a system that bounces as the flow rates 3
i 3
of the secondary side with a primary si6e.
You recall the 7
i I
B&W plant is probably the most sensitive of the designs to i
11 maintaining that balance and having changes in level and l
pressure in the pressurizer.
I:
l l
MR. STELLO:
Okay.
At four minutes --
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Wait, could I ask you what la i
i instructions do the operators have about keeping the high I3 l
i l
pressure injection going?
j
!4 j
MR. STELLO:
To keep the high pressure injection 17 system going until it's known that the plant conditions are 18 i
stable until you know you have adequate subcooling and the 19 depressure and level are being held correctly.
20 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Is there any fixed period of 21 i
time, however, thau they're supposed to keep them on?
~3 MR. STELLO:
1 can't recall.
Let me see if someone j
l 4
~,
~
happens t'o know.
a MR. DENTON:
We think that there is.
We're not f
eq able to get an answer.
l I,
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1 CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
Darry1?
~
2 MR. EISENHUT:
You recall back in last April the require =ent we came out with said there had to be 20 minutes i
4 or until you had certain amount of subcooling in the plant.
l i
i 3
- That was revised after we went through the reviews last year 3
in response to much of the analysis.
Now it adds also that f
7 you have to insure that you've got enough subcooling.
We t k out the specific 20 minute requirement which i
1 i
was there in a bulletin from last April.
9 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
So, it now says --
10 1
I MR. EISENHUT:
The actual words in the procedure I don't have.
But, it says in affect it took out the 20 minutes 1
l l
and said there is no predetermined time.
What you have to do l
I is you have to insure that you've kept it on adequataly enough 14 i
i to insure that your down is having enough subcooling.
I.! -
j CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
That's an operator judgement?
MR. EISENHUT:
To a certain extent, yes, based upon 17 the information that we have.
18 l
j C0KMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Is that true anytime the i
19 HPI initiates?
20 i
MR. EISENHUT:
It's when it's automatically I
actuated by some signal.
In this case,-it's 1500 PSI.
I pressure.
CHAIRMAN AEEARNE:
Wonder if you could dig out for us--l MR. EISENHUT:
Certainly, would be happy to.
D MR. STELLO:
The operator manually tripped the i
t e n x vene : -,
tac i
se 33.tne ChPTt2. TfttCET. & s,.
SJrrt '87 l
- M L L MR --
= AY av 97 eacz we.
i l
I reactor coolant pu=ps four minutes --
i COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Does he have explicit instruc-tions on that?
l l
4 MR. STELLO:
Yes.
That's part of the procedure to 1
l trip the reacter coolant pumps which he did.
3 I
6 From eight minutes on and I guess the judgement i
l i
7 l
would be from about eight minutes for perhaps the next hundred l
j minutes, possibly as long as a hundred minutes.
There was 3
intermittent opening of either safety or release valve getting a little bit later to tell you when the block valve was closed
- g i
on the relief valve.
But, the indications are that over this l
t,.
period of time there was some relieving through safety or j
i relief valves.
I:i At 14 minutes after you're supplying the water i
l and steam from the pressurizer relief and safety valves into 13 l
the crunch (phonetically spelled) tank.
You obviously will fill '
to up the crunch tank and a rupture disc is designed to open 17 when the happens.
It in affect did open and relieve the tank.
18 l
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
What are the FORV and safety 19 set points?
20 MR. DENTON:
Well, they're about like 2235 and 2300.
21 i
MR. STELLO:
Safeties I think are in excess of 2400 i
i to about 2450's and the relief valves would be around somewhere i,
~..,
i, under that.
i
- 4 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
A hundred and fifty pounds
~
under that 23, 2350.
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I MR. STELLO:
At 21 minutes then the problem would be non-nuclear instrumentation system was fixed and the bus was i
restored.
l 4
CHAIRMAN AEEARNE:
FEMA bus was restored into the
.i I
3 restorer.
i MR. STELLO:
The instruments were again functioning.
j 3
7 MR. DENTON:
But, I think it's important to understand that up to this point since the operator didn't know from his 3
1 i
instrumentation failures the exact status of all the parameters l
9 i
he kept the HPCI's on which was exactly the thing to do.
He just happened to be pumping the water through the primary.
systen out the safety and relief valves and into the drain tank which overflowed.
So, during the first 21 minutes I
!?
i think he was doing exactly what he should do from a safety 14 i
i standpoint is keep that water moving, keep the pressure.
I I.!
l think in that sense all the training and drill that he had
~
14 gone in in the last year, resulted in exactly the correct 17 actions.
t 18 l
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Inconvenient for the licensee,but 19 quite advantageous for the public health and safety.
20 MR. DENTON:
That's right.
21 MR. STELLO:
I guess that point needs to be empha-sized as recognizing that you're going to keep the high l
l
~~
pressure injection system on that you are going to cause that I
a i
water to be processed through the primary system and eventually going to the reactor building with the intent being that to i
iam3essaMCanaa. VCDGAMh3 I I pac w.m am. m n w. s.. mm e
I a AY 39 l
av
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I clearly keep the core where it's adequately being cooled and I
that is in affect that you have to expect that it will happen l
i
~
as a result of that requirement.
j i
1 At 22t minutes the containment pressure reached i
3 4 PSIG.
6 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
That's what will apply to the 18?
1 i
7 MR. STELLO:
The 18 we have earlier than this --
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Which was three PSI.
3 t
MR. STELLO:
--which was three.
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
What lead to the increase in 10 i
pressure?
- )
MR. STELLO:
Well, you were continuing to discharge the hot water in steam into the reactor building through the --
l CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yeah, but it's a steam disc irge I.L
~,
just a water running to it, wouldn't it?
l
!.5 MR. STELLO:
Well, it'll flash into steam as it i
14 l
goes into the crunch (phonetically spelled) tank it'll be 17 500 to 600 degree water for steam and not cause an increase 18 in the pressure in the reactor building.
i 19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
For how long was water l
20 I
pouring out of the primary system?
l 1
MR. STELLO:
I already indicated that my judgement f
=
at the moment based on what I have is that now looking at the l
charts rather than trying to study them very carefully and
- L look at them a judgement on the crder of a hundred minutes intermittent operation.
i em v-m. =-
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i MR. DENTON:
Probably more then the first 24 ninutes.
}
I MR. STELLO:
Yeah.
For the first 24 minutes they had i
I the pumps where they were not throttled so at that point you f
I 4
were discharging quite a bit.
i 3
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
At what rate was it being 6
discharged would we guess?
MR. STELLO:
In the range of --
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Three or four hundred GPM.
g MR. STELLO:
They have two pumps in operation, 400 to 9
700 would be a range.
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Three or four hundred I would l
11 think.
Don't you think?
MR. STELLO:
When the pressure is down at 1500 they probably were getting up to the high end of the range of the 14 I
pumps.
13 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Yeah, nothing was open at that l
I4 point.
U MR. STELLO:
With the two pumps on pumping against 14 2400 pounds, I guess 400 might be a reasonable number.
- But, 19 we'll need again the actual charts to get a 20 MR. DENTON:
They three pumps, one of which is a 1
standby tour started automatically.
The two did start auto-matically and performed as designed automatically until they j
begin to be manually operated.
j I#
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
But, of course, once you've
-e triggered the HPCI, our rules say, you know, don't be too i
lprTUEFeADCfada. YDB'EATT98 Nur e r - 4 i
l ase SCR/ne CAPTCn. STu,n?, & e. slJf?1 N I
4
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31
,e
,,gg y e, I
hasty about turning if off, make sure -- let's not worry about l -
water on the floor, let's worry about keeping the core cool.
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Right.
~
i A
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
So, you go ahead and run the i
I 3
systems solid.
Once you've lost the steam bubble then you have l
5 I
4 to keep even after you're quite confident where you are and i
that you are subcooled, you in order to maintain that subcooling 7
l l
3 l
you have to keep the pressure.
A way to keep the pressure i
f 9
up without steam bubble is to keep driving with throttle flow, l
keep driving these high pressure pumps against the lifting g
of the safety and relief valves so that you do for an extended period probably over to a throttle bubble why probably inter-mittently getting some water bypass through the valves as you is i
push -- let the pumps push up against those valve settings 14 l
in order to maintain system pressure.
IJ I
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What accounts for the l
Is t
I radioactivity reading in a doce?
17 i
MR. STELLO:
I'm going to cover that.
If I can I'd la i
rather do that.
I've got --
19 MR DENTON:
We're almost through with activity.
20 MR. STELLO:
I should know that 22% minutes they 21 also got an additional signal for high pressure coolant
~
injection again.
That's a redundant signal that would cause l
i
~
actuation in a high pressure injection system.
I doesn't say
- s on the slide, but that is the case.
i CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
When you say they got a redundant j
I m% v m.
-. _ i c
AY 32 f
av
..cz s e, l
i signal --
i MR. STELLO:
Well, they already had a signal on low pressure which caused the system to c ome on automatically.
l A
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
What was this from?
I i
[
MR. STELLO:
The system is designed to get high I
pressure injection either by low pressure in a primary system
{
c l
or four pounds in the containment.
It did get another signal i
7 as I now understand it.
5 5
At 24 minutes the system started to become at that Y
point where the pressure --
CHAIRMAN AHEAR!E:
One last question that you have 11 there the automatic containment isolation signal.
Containment I
was isolated though throughout that period wasn't it?
13 MR. DENTON:
It was manually isolated much earlier.
14 CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
Righ; back at -- yeah.
l IJ I
MR. STELLO:
The pressurizer at this point was gettingj I4 full.
17 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Well, it was full if you had bee 18 squirting water for 18 minutes or more.
MR. STELLO:
Yes.
I g
i COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:.These are just the conditions j
- 1 at the time the HPI was finally throttled right?
~.
~
MR. STELLO:
This is now three minutes after they j
m'-
had the instruments restored'and had confirmed where they were.
t' 2d I'm making the point here because this is the point at which i
the throttle and they had confirmed that they had adequate
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1 subcooling.
They had confirmed that the pressuricer was full i
{
and they were throttling back on the flow to hold the pressure down to where they don't continue to discharge through the j
i safety valves which is now the action you're trying to accom-I A
plish all the pressure at a high value to avoid getting any e
6 bubbles in the system, but yet you don't want it high enough j
7 where the safeties are discharging fluid.
So, they begin 3
to throttle correctly the high pressure injection flow.
But, as i
1 I said earlier, there was intermittent operation of the safety 9
valves thereafter, g
t CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Vic, in one of the PN's it mentioned!
11 I
i that one of the steam generator levels was not indicated.
Was l
that part of this failure of the instrumentation or was it an l indication that one of the steam generators had lost all the water?
13 l
MR. STELLO:
I haven't been able to get a clear 14
/,
answer.
It appears that what we have now is it probably was 17 l
spurious because the feedwater system was on and the first feedwater prp as I recall didn't get a trip signal until I
19 somewhere after a half hour after the event.
But, that'll i
20 have to be confirmed when we have the charts.
I 21 The plant was essentially held in this condition 22 controlling the pressure by throttling the high pressure i
~,
- ~
injection flow and making arrangements then to begin to go to
- 4
~
the normal condition in the plant which would be to put a
~#
bubble back in the pressurizer and control the pressure through
~
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that mechanism.
Then you can go to a normal makeup system.
That I
began at about four or five hours after the event.
i i
The steam generators were at that point about 95 j
t percent of their normal level and then in six hours and 45 i
minutes the reactor coolant pumps were started.
Essentially e
6 that's the status of the plant now as I indicated earlier 7
with two pumps running at about 1800 pounds and 400 degrees l
1 i
farenheit.
3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I think you mentioned -- you say
?
theyhe doing this until they get a placement pump?
10 j
MR. STELLO:
Yes.
Yesterday evening about 7:30 in checking out one of the pumps in a close cooling water system, the pump developed some problems in the and i:3 l
l started to vibrate and they found they had varied problems 14 l
on a coupling that was damaged.
It's a redundant system.
There '
l are two of then and they decided to hold from going onto that 14 system until they had repaired the damaged pump.
17 They have the pump -- the motor to the pump hao oeen 18 removed.
It appears that they may now have a shaft of the motor 19 that's damaged.
They may replace the whole motor.
The j
- o estimates are that they'd hope to be able to do this today, but I
l 21 i
they're proj ecting it might be today or as long as 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
i
-e I
~
'w'e need to make an assessment of the availability of the motor, how long it will take them to put it en.
l
- L COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Is the plant permitted to
'I operate with only one of RHR trainings in service or
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l i
l I
I functioning or ready to function?
i MR. DENTON:
There are some --
i COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
For a limited time.
l I
for a brief period of time.
4 MR. DENTON:
I i
Apparently this failure occurred you know coincident e
3 MR. STELLO:
Seven thirty last evening.
It's l
a normally operating system.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
It was discovered at 7:30 3
or discovered earlier?
I MR. STELLO:
Seven thirty last evening.
10 l
MR. DENTON:
It was declared inoperable by the plant about 7:30.
Now, I don't really know if it had been vibrating
,,u for sometime.
I 13 l
l CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Is it a normally running system?
14 MR. STELLO:
Yes.
These systems normally -- they If l
i supply cooling water to other systems.
Now, I don't know l
t4 1
whether they decided to check the pump and found they had a 17 problem before they went on or exactly how long they had a is l
l problem.
I really don't know.
But, at 7:30--
19 MR. DENTON:
The heat is being moved now through I
- o normal channels with the reactor. coolant pumps running the j
.)
steam generator and the normal condenser.
I I
~
MR. STELLO:
There's no reason that there is a RER system.
They could go on it now.
Their assessment is l
U it would be better to stay here until they've repaired the i
additional pump and then go on it at that time.
Thus far we've
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l I
I not found any reason to disagree with that particular mode.
i CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
So, that mode as far as you can l
0 tell is reasonable, is that correct?
l A
MR. STELLO:
Well, that is a normal mode for a plant f
l I
to go into as it's going to pull a shutdown.
They get hold l
4 l
of this condition for an indefinite period of time.
i 7
MR, DENTON:
You just can't quite pull down because i
3 of some pressure of cavitation problems with the reactor i
coolant pumps at the very low pressures.
10 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Harold, you made reference I
to an element of coincidence in this pump being out of or'er g
at this time --
i.
MR. DENTON:
I just don't know the details on when i
the vibration occurred.
All I really know it was declared 14 i
inoperable at 7:30. We'll have to look into the prior history 13 I
of it.
to MR. STELLO:
There are, however, limits as to how 17 long you can operate a plant with equipment out of service.
13 That would cause me to believe that it wasn't something that 19 had been going on for any extended period of time.
20 l
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Would that limit be in terms 21 of hours, days?
~~
4 MR. STELLO:
It depends on the piece of equipment.
j It's typically by ne order of seven days.
l
- 4 MR. DENTON:
Or three days depending on how vital.
i
~
MR. STELLO:
If I could move now to the next slide on i
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i the safety significance.
I think we've covered on the issue f
i of the failure of the non-safety equipment and it's significance.;
i Clearly this is an area that we have been looking at and l
1 A
obviously will be continuing to look at.
i i
3 As we've indicated earlier, the bulletin response I
i 3
on this particular class of equipment are due in the next l
7 rew days.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me understand.
Will j
3 i
f theseresponsesafterthey'vebeenapprovedbyusdealwiththis!
9 sort of problem?
g MR. STELLO:
Yes.
That's clearly the intent.
The g
first part of the bulletin simply brings to the licensees l
l l
attention the problem and says think about it and make sure i
13 that you understand it.
Make sure that you know you can't have 1.L s
these kinds of problems and look at your procedures so that you IJ can cope with it.
Then go in and review your plant and look j
at what kind,of design changes might be needed as a result of 17 that review and then propose the design changes as a result of 13 j
that.
Now, they'll need to do that because of the affecting 19 safety systems.
They can't make those design changes without 20 our specific approval.
21 MR. DENTON:
But even impleuenting the bulletin, I
though, eouldn't guarantee that you wouldn't have some loss i
a of water through relief and safety valves.
In other words, i
- e if the instrumentation had been working during the whole course of the accident he would have known the pressure level i,.,u
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and certain subcooling and key parameters sooner.
But, he 1
might still have kept the HPCI running long enough to pu=p water through.
So, we've gone from being sure he didn' t turn l
l the pumps off prematurely to keeping them running until 4
i you're absolutely sure everything is normal.
So even if you l
3 have instrumentation working during the same period of time I
l 7
I would have expected HPCI to have run long enough to have resulted in some water over to the dra#n tank and maybe rupturing with the spring tank level.
You can't have it both 9
ways.
You're going to have strong instructions to keep the 10 l
I pumps running I tend to err on keeping them running and letting-'
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
That'd mak'e sure that floor is covered.
l MR. DENTON:
Yes.
is i
MR. STELLO:
That's clearly the safer thing to do.
I.!
l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me understand again what 14 the problem is with this bulletins design team itself.
17 MR. DENTON:
The bulletin is intended to assure that 18 l
the instrumentation display in the control room has enough 19 diversity of power sources so that the loss of any 20 doesn't really adversely affect the operators knowledge of the 21 status of the plant.
MR. STELLO:
Okay, I think we've covered adequately that the safety systems have in fact functioned the way they l
i U
were intended to.
i COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What about the ICS?
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Is that secething that was functioning you're satisfied with 8
2 i here?
i MR. DENTON:
That's still being looked at -- the A
ICS itself is still being looked at.
Although the failure here l
3 was not that system but the power supply to it.
MR. STELLO:
You will recall that one of the things sith 3
i 7
the ICS originally was when they had an event like this you
_ ould start to get a run back decrease of pomar.
We caused them w
3 to change that system so that whenever you had a problem and 9
you tripped a turbine you immediately tripped a reactor.
That j
i functioned just as it was supposed to.
11 MR. DENTON:
We also the ICS from the auxiliary feedwater flow so they could not prevent the feedwater 1::
i flow from coming on when helpful.
14 i
COMMISSI'".ER GILINSKY:
Well, you don't see anything 13 further that needs to be done?
16 MR. DENTON:
No, I think we're still looking at the 17 ICS as part of the longer-term look at B&W design.
!8 MR. STELLO:
I think it's very difficult for us to 19 ever conclude that nothing else needs to be done on anything.
- 0 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Does the ICS power supply Il safety grade?
l l
MR. DENTON:
No, it would be a spot for a non-safety
~
grading bus.
l N
MR. STELLO:
Well, let me emphasize I think the third bullet in terms of safety significance. One of the i
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concerns that we had -- the thing that we were concerned with j
originally was was there any potential for the core to get uncovered?
Was there any fuel failure?
That's clearly what 4
we're trying to focus ani to see if there was any potential j
s 1
for a problem.
i e
The thing that we wanted information on first is an 6
understanding do you have any fuel failures?
Did you have l
7 any radioactive levels anywhere in the plant above which you 3
l would normalb' expect?
That's the thing we looked hardest at 9
and first.
All the indications that we had is that in fact turned out to be no indication of fuel failures.
The monitors 11 on the let down line were essential normal levels for a plant i
in a shutdown conditio.
They took primary cooling samples 1:3 i
and the primary cooling samples indicated that the activity 14 in the primary coolant was normal.
1.E I
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me ask you about that.
14 We required something about approved post accident s amp li ng --
17 MR. DENTON:
I've got a slide that identifies and 18 I think that many of our lessons learned did contribute to the 19 understanding of this accident, the subcooling meter, the 0
^
shift technical advisor, post accident sampling, all of which
- 1 I think were directly useful.
i l
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Are you going to say somethingi about this?
~
t MR. DENTON:
Yes.
l i
2 COMMISSIONER GILINSK.
Fine.
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I i
I MR. STELLO:
All of the information we have caused us to conclude early in the evening that there was no concern over fuel failure, no concern over the core being covered and the activity that we saw both in the reactor building activ-lI A
that i
ity and we saw in the primary system were all associated with j
e l
essentially a normal condition for shutdown of the plant.
j 3
If I can go to the next slide which the last bullet 7
introduces --
3 I
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But 50 hour5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> per hour is l
i something you would get just from the --
MR. STELLO:
Yeah, we've looked at that now several l
ways to convince ourself that's true.
The obvious concern being is there any problem off site we had as we indicated i
i 13
- earlier, about six of our inspectors on-site.
We asked one la of them which was a health phycists, to look at the environmental l
monitoring and go out and survey around the plant and in the 14 environs to see if therds anything being measured off site.
17 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
You as I recall. Tha-individual 18 went out as did the licensee team went down and found nothing 19 about background.
- o MR. STELLO:
Right, which confirmed and that's Il exactly what we expected to be the case.
But, we anted to be l
i l
sure that was in fact done.
It was done.
i COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
That off site monitoring was i
continuous after it was once instituted?
l N
2 MR. STELLO:
There are continuous monitors off site, I,rftymananomea. Vgesanes Q _,, w,, lanc aus Katf%e Cap"CI. STutI*. L e. mJrTI '67
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but we're interested in a survey down wind to see if there was l
anything coming out of that plant.
The answer was no which is 1
l what we expected to be the case.
I'= very reluctant to ever say no release since the sensitivity could be such that we f
4 3
would be in a microcurry (phonetically spelling) or military l
f 6
curry (phonetically spelled) ranger, whatever, in terms of 7
what have been getting in the environment just during normal operation.
g i
MR. DENTON:
No increase on the stack monitors, j
9 g
l for example, MR. STELLO:
Now, let me quickly su=marize, because g
I think this is the important issue in terms of health and i
,,s.
I safety to public.
I've alresiy indicated that the primary l
l coolant sample was normal.
14 i
Radioactivity in the plant -- you remember we started 13 l
by having a 50 hour5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> per hour reading in a containment dome i
14 monitor.
One of the things we want to understand, could you l
17 i
l
-r: 50 hour5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> per hour from the amount of activity which was i
13 expected and was measured to be in the coolant for normal 19 l
operation?
The answer turns out that yes that's within the I
20 range of what you would get if you off gas the primary coolant i
i 21 and those gases got into the reactor building --
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
What you're saying is that the primary coolant normally has radioactive levels in it, it
~L got du= ped into the containment building and the got 2
dumped into the containment building then gave off enough t,av am 4a mame w w.
me s3tfte M IN. L e, s#t.
e_-
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- umme.__, _ _ _. _ _.
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I radiation from it's normal activity to give that kind of a l
dome reading, is that right?
t MR. STELLO:
The slide should be corrected to make i
4 sure it says the sa=ple showed no increased activity of the i
level expected.
It says increased.
i f
6 MR. DENTON:
Just to clarify that, there is a normal 7
increase in item levels in the coolant following every scram l
l 3
due to a played out phenomenon and they have increased here j
by a factor of three which was always seen af ter any type i
of scram.
But, there was no look for other nuclides (phonetical-g ly spelled).
There was no increase in the activity that would indicate any fuel damage.
MR. STELLO:
I don't have my recollection, maybe U
i Harold you can help me.
Very soon after we started to track 14 I
the dome monitor it started to decrease and I can't recall U
i when it was a fairly short time after the event when it was i
14 I
down in the order of 25 R and then eventually continued to M'
l decrease to where it shows on the slide zero.
It's a very high l l
range instrument and it's very difficult to read in the 19 i
range, so you need to look at some of the other measure-i 20 ments that were there Like in the reactor building access there was a monitor which started out at 250 MR per hour and went down into the range of 25 MR -- the slide says 30 MR and before I left I checkd and as I recall it was reading about
- 4 25 MR per hour which are consistent with again normal levels in the reactor building.
em. vo
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ase 52Wm C.u'rTOL. BTWCI. t e. sJfTt !U e-m 1L xmann
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The containment air is again consistent with the gases l
j that you would evolve and they have taken a sample and it's i
I about two times ten to the minus two per CC.
f I
4 Principally the isotope is Xenon which is what you would also i
3 expect.
I t
6 The air outside of the containment and the radiation j
l 7
levels outside of the containment building and in adjacent i
g buildings are all normal.
We have not seen anything above l
~
normal throughout the --
9 l
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
By normal you mean measured 10 i
I against background?
MR. STELLO:
Normal levels in those places prior to l
the event.
There was no increase in the stack monitor.
There 1::
was no measurable. increase in the off site level and there 14 i
was no liquid releases from the accident.
So far we have had 13 no plant personnel overexposures been reported.
i
!4 l
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Now, roughly how many gallons 17 of water were du= ped into the containment?
13 MR. STELLO:
The estimate that we had before we left 19 this morning, it's about 43,000 gallons.
20 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
What you're saying then is that the 1
radiation levels that were measured within the containment I
are consistent with that mmount of primary cooling?
i
~,
~~
i MR. DENTON:
Yes.
l MR. STELLO:
Yes, off gasing for that amount of I
~
primary cooling.
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MR. DENTON:
You'd asked how often this large amount l
of water had been st in operating reactors, we've not done a complete search, but it's probably on the order of ence l
i A
every or once every two years cens, thousands of gallons of i water are spilled in the containment due to a pu=p seal fay I
e i
3 (phoneticaly spelled) or a valve sticking open and producing l
7 a situation comprable to this one.
3 i
l CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
So, it's not --
8 I
MR. DENTON:
It's not an unco = mon situation.
9 i
j MR. STELLO:
Okay, the current --
10 j
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
18 PSI gauge would have been after i
that?
12 MR. DENTON:
Yes.
l3 l
MR. STELLO:
The current status of the plant.
The I
L4 I
plantis in essentially a normal condition following a shutdown.
l L3 i
The water is supplied from the feedwater system to the steam j
L6 generators and the steam from the steam generator going over 17 in the hot well and being condensed.
18 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
It's steam bypass valves 19 not dumps.
20 MR. STELLO:
That's correct.
The primary system 21 pressure on the slide it says 1950 as I recall when I left I
~.
~
it was around 1850 and dry're controlling it in that region in -- my understanding is they intend to stay in that range l,
18, 1900 PSI and about 400 degrees until they've repaired the i
i
~
pump.
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I i
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
If I've understood what you've l
2 said up to now correctly, it leads me to ask whether without I
the erroneous 18 PSIG reacing at the beginning, you would have l
I 4
activated the response center.
That is if you had losses of j
water of this volume once or twice a year before, those e
t i
3 presumably would be a key accompany to most cases by a jump in j
i i
7 l the dome monitor and yet we certainly haven't activated the i
response center to agree to one of those up to now.
3 MR. STELLO:
Well, the reason I activated the response 9
centers because I believe that the pressure was 18 PSIG.
i 10 i
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Okay, that is the point.
i MR. STELLO:
If it had not been 18 PSIG I probably i4 may have taken some more time and may have decided not to.
I:i I
t The thing that caused me to reach the conclusion I reached 14 i
on activation was 19 PSIG.
!=
l l
l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Which I would agree was a j
T4 i
perfectly reasonable conclusion.
But, let me come back to that l 17 then.
Was that just something that was phoned in once or did 18 i
l you specifically ask whether it was PSIG, PSIA --
19 MR. STELLO:
I recall asking to have the number 20 i
verified three or four times.
{
21 l
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
You got the same number back?
i i
j
~
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
In fact, through the first hour
- M and a half.
It wasn't until about an hour and a half that --
's is that correct?
i MR. STELLO:
Yeah.
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l l
l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What about the loss of l
i i
instrunentation?
Would that not have --
MR. STELLO:
Well, that's why I asked the question
{
I did.
I would have taken more time and may still have j
4 decided to do it, but I don't know.
l
{
r i
MR. DENTON:
But, that was a complicating factor, l
4-s because we didn't know if that was the loss of instrumentation I
i 7
t that caused the problem or whether it was the result of 8
i l
moisture inside the containment.
So, the first few minutes 1
there it was a little confusion as of the sequence of events that had occurred.
11 i
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I think Vic was correct.
It shows i
1 l
a sign of caution.
w j
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Well, I think clearly as la i
long as one had good reason to believe that there was an 18 1.5 l
PSIG reading it was the right thing to do.
But, it does I
id lead to some further inquiries about why that number kept 17 coming back.
i 18 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Well, that's what I said earlier.
19 MR. STELLO:
I assure you we tend to find out.
20 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Does that containment normally l
.)
operate a little negative?
I would like to know.
1 l
MR. STELLO:
I would think not, but I don't really know.
I would have to check.
~
Id FEL. DENTON :
It's a gilbert design.
U COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I wondered if the containment i.m
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me 2:stfbe M 779527. & e. marrt 157 I
o- ^
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49 av
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t MR. STELLO:
They normally don't cool down much faster than on the order of 20 or 30 degrees per hour.
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Probably 50 max.
A MR. STELLO:
That I think is the licensed limit and they usually stay well under it.
So, you're talking around the 6
rder of a half a day to a day without the unusual.
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
H:n long does it take to clean p the containments?
8 I
MR. STELLO:
Well, there is 43,000 gallons of water 9
in there and that will be a function of the process system as to how fast they can process it through the rad waste 11 system.
I don't know what that rate would be, but I would 2:
think it would be on the order of several days, week, to 13 i
process that amount of water.
1.s CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
But, based upon the measurements t
they've made it's not a normal --
l 14 l
MR. DENTON:
The problem with processing wouldn't be 17 radioactivity.
It would be whatever chemical debree it picked la up from being on concrete floors or what it got exposed to.
19 So, that will probably be the limiting factor as opposed to
'c the radioactive clean up.
Usually it's more difficult to clean up water that's contaminated as this has been, being on the l
floor.
i i
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What is the status of the
.d plant as far as returning to operation?
Are there any restrictions on it?
I
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7 AY e n.7 50 l
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l i
ll I
MR. DENTON:
Not at the moment.
We've discussed with l
2 the= their plans.
They plan to be down on the order of a week.
l l
I thought we'd reconsider that as we get additional information r
I i
from our people on the site and the actions look a little more t
i 3
clear.
l 1
I do want to coet with them to be sure we understand 6
i 7
the sequence and the implications for other plants.
We talked l
about meeting perhaps on Friday, but that now looks a little g
bit premature.
I'd rather keep them there working on the 9
i g
j plant and perhaps next week we can meet with the people and the licensee and decide --
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Wasn't they going to shut down anyway in mid March?
Doesn't their exemption run out then?
MR. DENTON:
Mid Maren, yes.
14 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Does it may make sense for them to fix those two items while they're down anyway?
MR. DENTON:
I think that's part of their planning.
17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
So you're going to talk a 18 I
l little bit more about the --
19 i
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Oh,.yes.
It's not there yet.
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:. Seems like you've heard this 21 before, John.
~.
~
CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
No, I've been reading ahead.
l l
'~
MR. STELLO:
The last slide is -- I guess I've l
l u
covered about all the future actions.
They're repairing the
~
pu=p.
They're going to continue to stay about where they are I
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r i
i until that's completed.
At that point they'll reduce the l
l primary system pressure and tempera;ure in normal fashion and l
\\
go on to decay heat removal system and go to the cold shutdown.
i l
4 They will stay at cold shutdown until I'm sure sometime after Harold has had the meeting he just discussed and at that point e
4 they'll hopefully be able to tell us with a great deal more f
7 precision then I've been able to do here this morning exactly l
i what happened and what instruments were lost and the sequence 3
of events.
9 With that Harold I guess we're ready to go the last slide on the short-term lessons learned.
11 1
MR. DENTON:
On the last slide, I've attempted to j
characterize the impact on the plant during this accident of I3 the lessons learned that we ordered to be completed.
Remember 14 there were 20 items on our short-term lessons learned list.
13 We granted exemptions on two items for this plant.
14 One was the diversity of containment isolation and that's where 17 we had a manual requirement that someone be in the control room 18 l
which his whole job was to make sure containment was isolated.
19 He did that.
So, I think in this case there was no difference 20 between the course of the accident and having these instruments 21 or not having it.
j
~
The second one -- the instrumentation for positive l
l indication of vm'.ve position the instrument was due to arrive
=s t
about the first of March.
So this equipment was not available i
i on site.
I think it really did not affect the course of this
~
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accident.
If it had been available the operators would have i
still left the tipsy (phonetically spelled) pumps on until the instrumentation came on that showed them that they were within 4
the stable range could safely turn them off.
l So, I think even if they had positive indications i
on the relief valve --
,i 3
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Are you saying that if they 7
l had it this instrumentation would have been knocked?
MR. DENTON:
No, they would have still left tipsy i
9 (phonetically spelled) on until they were convinced that they had adequate subcooling and pressurizer levels.
l CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
In the absence of the other 12 instrumentations.
13 MR. DENTON:
So, they knew that with HPCI runt.ing 1s and through the high temperatures and the tail pipes and the 13 l
rising level in their drain tank -- so they knew they were I4 blowing down through these and even if they had.
17 instrumentation showing the position they would have continued la to let it go.
'9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, there's another way i
of looking at this.
I would think that -- as it turned out the operator action or the results in the plant may not have i
been different.
But, if we had known that this plant was going l contest it in this way, I don't know that we would have granted an exemption.
I' U
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
But, since it didn't make sett, epa 4% VUtsafias hr.,, - l e.
me s:2sTM C.AFTth IT*CET. & e. marTT *st
~~
=* m ** = --
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i i
I any difference, it turns out that granting the exemption was a reasonable thing to do.
We verified the reasonableness I
of the exemption process in this case.
i 4
MR. DENTON :
What would have been more important 3
is if we had straigtened out the bulletin that we referred to 3
- earlier for control room displace so they would have earlier j
7
- indications that the primary coolant system was stable and i
could have turned off the EPSI's perhaps sooner than they did 3
I and spill less water.
So, I think that is the -- which was not in our short-term lesson.
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
But, as I tried to make a point
,1 earlier the water spillages as far as I can tell is an 4
inconvenience to the licensee.
MR. DENTON:
That's correct.
14 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
So it's not a health and public i
L!
I safety.
i 14 t'
MR. DENTON:
They went exactly the correct way.
17 CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
They did provide the protection 18 which has to be our main concern.
19 i
MR. DENTON:
That's right.
l 20 i
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: 'There was a point at the 21 t
beginning of this sequence when there was uncertainty about l
what the PORV was doing.
I I
- ~
MR. DENTON:
But, nonetheless, HPSI was on all that 4
1 time and so whether it was a PORV or the safety or some combina-f tion thereof --
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av l
i COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
The action would have been l
the same as the licensee would get a clearer picture of what
{
was actually going on.
I i
A MR. DENTON:
You would have let both HPSI pumps i
I run until you satisfied yourselves about the primary system.
6 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Furthermore, it seems to me f
f 7
they closed the block valve.
l MR. DENTON:
Yes, they did.
I 9
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
You know you plan to shut on it.!
l i
CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
According to thir is later.
g 1
I f
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
My limited training in g
1 incident accidents of this type keeps leading me to listen to i
one phrase which I haven't heard.
I gather none of these l
I",
1 l
valves were, as far as you know, stuck open.
They were being 14 i
l forced open and then closing and then being forced open again.
1.5 MR. DENTON:
Well, I think we don't know for sure i
14 i
whether there was one that stuck or not.
It seems reusonable 17 l
from what we've seen that they were being forced open and j
18 i
i j
then receded.
But, one of them could have stuck open, but l
19 from looking at -- we have tempera *.ure traces on these tail 20 i
pipes from each one that they have determined that they were j
21 i
i all back closed after a given time.
- 7. think they can back
=
l calculate after they look at the traces more accurately, the i
exact performance.
4 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Now, by these valves you're talking about both the PRV and the safety valves?
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MR. DENTON:
And the safety valves, yes, sir.
COMMISSIONER EENDRIE:
Well, in the time interest i
I think it's the safety valves, because I think the block
~
l was closed.
The block valve was closed by the PORV by
-e 4.
l times of interest.
I think it is a good question, Peter, 3
I and one I was going to raise, because it wasn't clear last l
night whether for some period of time perhaps an hour or a little 7
more, one of the safeties may have either hung open or partially open or indeed whether the wa:er discharge was entirely because you were driving it open with the high to I
pressure injection pumps.
11 i
COMMISSIOENR BRADFORD:
Now, as you try to --
II COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
In any event it was clear l
that after a while if there had been one stuck open it had la I
cleared and was closed in whatever residual leakage there l
15 l
i was was very small.
id COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
As you try to assess your i
17 I
l ability to get a steam bubble back and bring the system back i
la under control, does it make a difference ?
I assume it would 19 for you to know whether the valve is stuck open or simply --
o I
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:.If you've got a partially 21 opened valve you're not going to have much luck with a steam 22 l
bubble up there.
l
~2 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
So that at least at that I
i.
24 point it would have been helpful to have an indicator or not?
U It still wouldn't thought you were stuck, but it would have l
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cold you --
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MR. DENTON.
No, it would have told you if it were l
open.
l i
A COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Right.
So that you could l
l have told whether it was stopped when it should have been --
e I
6 COMMISSIONER.'ENDRIE :
But, by the time one go-1 I
i ready to draw the bubble JPI, the high pressure injections 3
been terminated while it was on a normal makeup and let down f1wo where the flows were < t ::ty well balanced so that there
.v g
j couldn't have been a very big leak and still hold system i
pressure and level reasonably with balanced input, flow in I
and flow out of the system.
I think by the time they tried to draw the bubble it was pretty clear that the valves were 13 I
safe.
14 i
i l
MR. DENTON:
So, that's why I tried to characterize 13 i
it as little impact.
Certainly in one area the operator j
completely compensated for the diversity of containments l
17 they go in.
Here I don't think the operator would have done l
18 anything different in the first 24 minutes but let the HPCI l
19 t
ride.
s 20 COMMISSIONER 3RADFORD:
From the point of view of l
21 I
an operator performance, can you say off the top of your head I
~
whether et the 20th or 24th minute this was from the operator's point of view more complicated, less complicated or about
~
the same as the 24th minute at TMI?
MR. DENTON:
I guess for what I've heard from the estgesea h Vuotanas
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I site is the focus in tra4ni g on operators on subcooling and small break LOCAs really paid off in this case.
What compli-cated their life was a loss of instrumentation display during
[
4 that first 24 minutes.
I don't know how to compare it a duty i
3 cycle.
l i
6 COMMISSIONER EEITDRIE:
I think sensing what you're l
i 7
after, Peter, I think it was as complicated.
They lost a 3
major chunk of the process instrumentation.
It had a turbine trip, the reactor scram had come apparently steam generators were overfed causing this substantial expansion.
The pressure g
dropped, the HPCI's had come on.
They were having the whole g
drill, but the operator training as Harold says the operator I
i training the provisions that have been made since Three Mile i
f left them in a position where they proceeded --
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
That's what I was afer.
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
to do precisely what they l
14 l
ought to do to make sure the core was covered and there i
17 weren't going to be any difficulties with the fuel or releases l'
or anything else.
19 MR. DENTON:
I've listed some more --
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I'm very pleased with that.
21 CHAIRMAN \\HEARNE:
Why don't you cover the other i
22 items.
f 22 MR. DENTON:
Eight of the actions clearly improve 4
the response of the operators and contributed to understanding i
~
the accident.
I've listed those.
For example, the
-% w.=m. e- _ x ans. w.m. m.m. s.. ~m m Tm 1 L JuuRE
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av i
i technical advisor, the post accident CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Why don't you go through each of i
l them if you could.
i A
MR. DENTON:
Subcooling meter is one that we require j
i 3
to show that pressure is high enough to maintain subcooling 3
and that was installed.
So, that was working and we got numbers l i
7 like a 110 degrees subcooling or a 125.
So, no guess work.
l l
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
So, you were able to keep track 3
9 j
throughout to insure that subcooling was in fact always Present?
to I
MR. DENTON:
That's correct.
The shift technical advisor and certainly played a role.
I 13 I
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Well, seeing how you say that i
14 i
I l
it improved conditions, do you know?
Il l
MR. DENTON:
No, I'm just that inferring that it's --
id I don't know what role he plays.
17 CHAIPXAN AHEARNE:
I guess fron some experience 18 it's not clear that having a technical advice is necessarily 19 a advantage or disadvantage.
In theory it's an advantage, but 20 potentially played a positive role improving conditions.
Il i
MR. DENTON:
I think the on-site support center I
from I gather from talking to the people was used by the plant 2
people.
I l
- 4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDi'-
It was used and --
i CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Joe, you don't want to cocment
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nac s c.
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do you?
MR. DENTON:
The post accidents sampling procedures
[
I the fact that they had --
i 4
l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Let me go back to that l
i 3
technical -- was it actually in operation?
i l
MR. DENTON:
Let me say in all of these I'm talking l
3 l
7 on very skimpy evidence.
The efforts during the night didn't f cus on how these things had worked.
I just wanted to a
j I
categorize it.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I'm not talking qualitatively 10 l
I'm just asking was it in fact in operation?
COMMISSIONER RENDRIE:
I'll take my comment after all.
j It operated well enough so that at one point we asked for some information which was available on a computer print out, but i
la l
l we couldn't get it through our control room telephone links t'
i because the print out had been removed to the on-site technical 14 I
support center for analysis by the Emergency Management Team 17 there.
l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
That's what it's supposed to 19 do.
- o CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
It not only was there, but 21 fortunate.
I So, when you say eight actions improve the conditions {
they're potentially where improve can be -- some of them l
~~
I certainly did, certainly the subcooling meter you know was l
2 being used.
You got the readings from it.
The operator forvunnah VEMed te b.--
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i I
training you have some confidence approval.
l 2
MR. DENTON:
Yes.
The post accident sampling, apparently the system that had been installed to handle how
~
i 4
the contaminated containment air samples didn't function, so j
they took a contain.,ent air sample the conventional way.
- But, i
e I
it did assist in getting the sample the primary coolant.
l 7
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What was it that didn't function?
3 I
MR. DENTON:
Containment air sample.
A new system g
had been installed for handling how the contaminated samples.
I So, the containment air sample system apparently didn't function l 11 I
and they reverted back to a different way of taking --
CRAIRMAN AHEARNE:
But fortunately it wasn't a j
13 l
highly contaminated --
14 MR. DENTON:
Some other minor improvements that 13 l
-- like control room access, shift turnover procedures --
to I'm just inferring the fact that these were in place must 17 have assisted.
18 i
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I guess you and I are saying that 19 things improve conditions.
I'd hold off on them doing any i
inference.
Il MR. DENTON:
But, I think as Vic said, all of this l
C is more preliminary than the data we've got.
I didn't divert l
'~
anyone's attention at the site to go look into these areas.
If sl i
s og more inference from telephone discussions.
j l
~
The two actions that we need to look at a little
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I further, we had required that certain things be on vital buses, l
such as pressuri::er level indicators.
It's not yet clear i
whether the level indicator was available to the operator 4
at all times.
Maybe it wasn't on the computer print out.
So,
)
3 that needs more looking into to see --
3 CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
Well, I thought specifically 1
7 Vic mentioned that it was the pressurizer level that was one l
of the instruments that were lost.
g I
l MR. DENTON:
But, I've also heard from people at the l
9 site that they think that the operators had the pressurizer g
that were available at all during the entire event.
II l
l MR. STELLO:
Try to make very clear --
I COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Both can be true because you i
13 j
can get for instance, pressurizer level information from 14 l
several channels.
Once channel here on the board, the 15 operator looks at, another channel feeds the control system 14 l.
and so on.
So, you can have it and lose it in affect.
17 j
MR. DENTON:
We need to look into whether or not 13 our requirement of these be on a valuable bus really did 19 result in improved display of information during this type of failure in the control room.
I 21 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I would think it must have.
O l
MR. DENTON:
The number of actions that we have
~~
taken --
4 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
What about the ox feed flow --
MR. DENTON:
Same sort of thing.
It had to be on
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wasbeoeeCTtse.1 1 asmas
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av 6
8&GZ N C.
I l
I i
I the vital bus, but I haven't been able to establish whether or not it was actually displayed at all times during this i
22 minutes or not.
4 Some of the actions that we require would only apply I
5 to high fuel damages, such as containment leak testing and I
hydrogen control, and a number of actions we had such as 4
I 7
a high point venting didn't come into play at all.
So, I've I
i 3
just tried to give you a characterization of the impact of 9
the lessons order.
10 6
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I thought if there's some =ention j
about one of the items we had weighed had been the bubble i
j; measurement.
04 l
MR. DENTON:
Now, that's a long-term item, a list of the only two that we've weighed.
I i
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
If you're finished with this list, I wonder if you could say something about the flow of
(
information between the reactor and the NRC, about the quantity i
17 I
and quality and information we got?
18 i
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Maybe somebody has, some questions 19 on -- Dick?
i t'
20 i
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
No, I don't have anything.
21 i
CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
Peter?
,i COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
None that don't follow perfectly logically after that.
i i
- 4 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Okay.
2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Who was talking to whom?
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(
I MR. STELLO:
Okay, well you will recall we had six inspectors at the site.
So, we had a number of people who i
were available to get whatever infor=ation that we needed to l
t A
do whatever we asked.
j 3
Principally, our inspectors who were there were f
3 getting the information that was requested and the information f
I 7
flow was orders of magnitude improved from the Three Mile Island probe information that we had.
g I
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Even better than some of our 9
tests?
g i
MR. STELLO:
Much better than the tests.
I think we g
really i
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I think the organization out i
l there had shaken down there pretty well.
Let's see two drills ago, John, you remember we had what seemed like a certain 13 l
amount of difficulty in straigtening out who was in the 14 j
I front room and who was in the back room and --
17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Are you referring to the la NRC Organization?
19 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yeah.
20 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Yeah.
Il COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What were there's one line, 2
l two lines or --
m i
~~
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Two lines.
24 I
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Two lines to the licensee.
MR. STELLO:
We have two lines that are installed
- ,,v m % vo n : _,
i c i
aus 33the M ITWEZ*. L e. EJfM '87
9 AY ' c ev 64 l
z cz se.
i i
i now directly from the operations center to the plant. One of them was being used to get the environmental infor=ation and assess radioactive releases, whatever.
The other line was I
4 being used to get operational information and then we had l
obviously other lines where we could make calls into the e
j l
3 plant.
What we did, we spoke to the plant manager and got 7
his assessment COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Who manned the other end of l
3 the lines?
MR. STELLO:
Principally, our inspectors were on the I
other end of the line essentially throughout the night and 11 l
throughout the afternoon.
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Of course, once O'Riley got a
there we did get a review from it.
is i
MR. DENTON:
We talked in the course of the night 13 l
to the plant manager I guess about an hour after we had 14 assembled the ETM and got his overview.
We talked to the l
17 l
l corporate headquarters.
We talked to people in B&W Linchburg.
la i
The pattern sort of repeated occasionally after that.
19 l
MR. STELLO:
I say overall the flow of information
- o and assuring that the proper people were talked to and informed 21 of what went on was good.
There is nothing that I saw that i
l suggested problems.
Of course, when it comes to data such I2 u
as the numbers we've talked about we still don't have any l
- s equivalent of a data link.
You're relying on people going 1
and obtaining information and bringing it back to you.
Your e
!srftposath vers 4 Mas "
'sec ase W3JTW CAFTT:n. ff9'G"". E e. WF?T '87
= AY av 65 eacz %c.
I f
f I
ability to coordinate that with and the accuracy and verification; of the detailed technical information although significantly L
improved still is one thing from any equivalent of a real I
time data gathering system.
I J
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Would a data link have 6
given you the right answer on the containment pressure?
l 7
MR. STELLO:
Yes.
g i
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
If that had been one of the i
items --
9 10 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Well, that's our --
I MR. STELLO:
As I recall, it is.
l g
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I assume it is.
How quickly would you have had that?
Instaneously?
I MR. STELLO:
Instantaneously, i
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
That's a vote for.
14
~
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Excuse me.
l l
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Now who is in charge --
i 17 l
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
It's a vote for that 18 parameter with about 104 to go.
I l
19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Who is in charge for the
- o NRC on the site now?
l MR. STELLO:
Now?
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Yes.
22 MR. STELLO:
Jim O'Riley.
- 4 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
It was transferred to him once e
~
he got there, larftPunencense. VD'eAPes SprtPts lanc l
me En4 Tie cap?ci, snest?. L e, surft tst AEN
66 f
- EC ner we.
I i
l 1
COMMICSIONER GILINSKY:
When did he get there?
t When was the control transferred to him?
i COMMISSIONER RENDRIE:
I transferred control to t
i A
0'Riley in a formal way at 10:19 p.m.
last night after he i
arrived at the site then briefed by NRC staff, talked to the l
e 3
plant people, and I talked with him.
We discussed the status l
l 7
of the plant.
He was confident he had it well in hand.
~
f I discussed with him several points that we wanted j
3 i
him to make sure the operators kept in mind overnight and l
I coordination of various things and then formally handen over l
'O
\\
\\
NRC control of the incident to O'Riley in 19 --
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Also, Vic passe.d over control as I recall to --
,,u l
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
When we got to the center la i
John said you're designated.
13 l
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
So, you decame the chairman i
14 I
of the EMT or director whatever the correct designation is.
17 i
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
One other point I'd like to 18 make on O'Riley, in addition, Vic, as I recall you as 19 Director of I&E because you have the authority to delegate 20 Commission authority.
You delegated that to O'Riley?
i Il l
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
At that particular time.
I:
I CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
So, that if any action had to l
be t.1 ken, O'Riley did have that authority?
I MR. STELLO:
That's correct.
~
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
You have the authority to
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delegate to a regional director the power to issue orders?
f MR. STELLO:
That was my understanding.
i I did do it last night.
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Who was in charge for the l
3 NRC before O'Riley got there at the site?
l
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MR. STELLO:
The EMT.
3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
No, his question is at the site 7
I who is speaking for the NRC.
3 i
MR. STELLO:
At 6:30 when Murphy arrived he was acting for the regional director until he got there.
Prior to I
that time there was no formal designation of any individual.
I 11 i
l The operations were essentially patrolled from EMT.
12 CRAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Which is one of the items that l
- s I'm going to ask you to try to clarify because I think we've la got to have some clear procedure that NRC people know when--
IJ l'
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
We need a designated site 14 chief right along the line as well as a clear understanding 17 l
whether the site has :he NRC lead or the EMT up here has the 18 i
NRC lead.
19 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Well, that latter is a question
.n that is being addressed we call out of one of the previous 3
role on emergency sessions.
But, the former question is one
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that I don't think we had really thought about because we had l
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not really thought of the situation where we would have a l
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large cluster of NRC people at the site immediately.
i MR. STELLO:
Normally, if the resident inspector at i,u nc v
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senior resident is the individual who would be charge CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Which I think ought to be.
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MR. STELLO:
and that who is normally in charge.
l 4
In this instance there was not a senior resident there and j
l 3
there was a large contingent of NRC people at the site.
It was 6
a little bit unusual and I think --
7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
What was the position of the resident in using a small letter?
3 h...
STELLO:
He's from the region and he's the equivalent of the inspector for that particular plant.
10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
But, he's not in residents?
MR. STELLO:
He's not in resident.
Now, if he had 1,4 been, then we would have been okay.
M i
l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
It's a plan which we do not 14 i
yet have a resident inspector.
13 i
MR. STELLO:
Excuse me.
f4 I
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
We do not have a resident 17 inspector yet designated at this plant.
18 CHAIRMAN AREARUE:
But when designated he's not 19 l
l there.
20 MR. STEi
- Designated but he's not physically 21 there.
We have selected the individual and we know who he is.
I2 i
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
When is he going to get
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there-2' MR. STELLO:
I don't know, I'd have to look the i
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date up.
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I CCMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
In the meantime the fulltime i
coverage is being provided but it'll be by a series of people --
i MR. STELLO.
From the region.
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Now, Joe, in your capacity I
as Director of the EMT, you had the agencies resources at your l
e 6
disposal, but could not issue orders which would have to go l
1 7
through the --
l 1
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Or the EDO itself.
3 I
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
senior officials.
9 I
MR. S't ELLO :
Well, it was either the --
COMMISSIONER RENDRIE:
We had all kinds of designated officials to whom the authority has been delegated.
Bill Dircks, and Harold and Vic -- so, we wouldn't have trouble l
l with orders.
I4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
My last question is what is 13 our role in concurring in or approving actions that the licensee, id will take fran this point on. Is it basically -- is the licensee i
required to check with O'Riley before he takes actions or are 18 i
they simply in close touch and there's formal arrangement?
19 MR. STELLO:
Everything that the licensee is doing 20 in the plans are being coordinated with O'Riley.
I would
- 1 hesitate to use concur or suggest that the licensee is prohibited from doing something that they'll specifically l
approve.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
As far as I got it correctly, i
as far as you can see, this is a situation where you do not
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have any great concern with?
2 MR. STELLO:
That's right.
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
That's not in that kind of a i
4 tense situation.
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3 MR. DENTON:
The accident's been terminated so I 3
would see O'Riley's role as gathering up the loose ends of I
l 7
the questions that occurred and making sure they continue within !
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their text specs as they cool down the plant from here on.
3 MR. STELLO:
I should make one mention though, with 9
respect to delegating authority to the regional directors.
I i
10 I
The General Counsel has assured me that he's working very hard on formalizing this and I hope that we would have this issue squared away in the very near future, la COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me ask one last question 14 here, what is being done to gather up the data on this incider ?
l I
13 I assume Mr. Michelson would be interested in it.
r 14 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes, in fact, he's right there 17 listening addedly.
la i
i MR. STELLO:
Well we all are and that's hopefully 19 what we expect that O'Riley will be pulling together today.
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We clearly will have a full account of what happened :.n i
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detail in terms of records and detailed sequence of events.
f I
MR. DENTON:
NPO was also notified, so they're j
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i intending to do a investigation and issue a report within about i
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a month.
CHAIRMAN KENNEDY:
Do you know what involvement NPO l
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i had if any in this process?
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2 MR. DENTON:
No, I don't.
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f COMMISSIONER KENNEDY-You don't know whether the
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licensee contacted --
i l
i 3
MR. DENTON:
I do know that EPRI was involved, but I
i i
3 I don't know about NPO specifically.
MR. STELLO:
I don't know if we mentioned that B&W 7
also set up a center and had people staffed throughout the 3
l i
event available as an advisory role of the licensee.
We did 9
discuss with them their views, and thoughts and ideas as well.
g I
CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
Now, at some stage I guess I would (
g like you, Vic and I&E to review with the NRC people who at 1,4 Crystal River, since we did have this large complement --
l 0
two questions.
One, on their view of the information trans-t.L s
i i
ferred, particularly in those early stages, I would agree with U
you that it was much better than previous instances.
I didn't 14 think it was completely satisfactory and obviously they have 17 one serious question in the early stages.
I also am interested la in you getting something which would clarify who speaks on t
19 behalf of the NRC when there are several NRC people at a site.
20 I would also like for you to review and perhaps give us a short
- 1 paper on the procedure for notification of states.
I don't think in this particular Crystal River case i
~~
it's that much of an issue, but we do have another letter from l
.s Governor Thorneburg expressing his concern.
I just would
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like to be clear in my mind on our notification procedure.
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' COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I guess I'd put it a little l
more strongly than that.
The one disturbing after affect j
i other than the 18 PSIG is to me the proposition not so much state notification but the local officials at least as to the t
equivalent to Class B occurrences around the country.
It l
might conceivably not be notified at all.
l o
l CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
But, they will be once we get our--
7 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Well, yeah, but when will that 3
i l be and what happens in the interim?
In this case perhaps
,y i
commendably the NRC seems to have taken matters into its 10 own hands.
11 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I would put aside the judgement
!2 of commendably.
i 13 I
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Well, it seems to me o be 14 important that local officials have been notified.
I think j
IJ l
the efficiency in the procedures that they weren't and I'm 14 at least prepared to consider the proposition that it was 17 incredible that someone filled that gap.
18 j
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I'm not -- it's not clear to 19 me, Peter, from the events of the evening that there was not notification.
The particular action that one of our people 1
that would have taken place under the new plan not yet approved 2
l at Crystal River.
One of our people chose to recommend that 12 the county sheriff put into action as to erect some road i
i
.d barriers and so on.
l 2
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Well, leaving aside whether l
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t there should have been road barriers and just think the man should have notified.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
But, that was a specific action.
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that I was speaking.
was commendable.
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3 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
But, you see I'm not sure i
the local officials, the sluriff's of fice for instance, may not l
3 i
have been notified that there was an alert condition at the l
7 l
plant which would be a reason for configuration.
I think --
3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
That is something we should find t
out.
I
!0 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
that 's something that we can 11 get straightened out.
12 j
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Leave the road blocks aside but, the question.of notficatimi is what seemed important to me.
I CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Harold, I guess I am interested.
I.!
Last of all I hadcade a request for a examination of 14 j
i sensitivity at the B&W plants and I guess I'd like to have 17 the next week or so the status report of that review which ta you have underway.
19 MR. DENTON:
Yes.
I might mention that ironically we ht decided to approach that p.roblem through a risk
'1 i
and we picked Crystal River as the plant to examine.
[
assessment i
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes.
l i'
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
You've got some great data.
l CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I would also like OPE to take a
~J look at sort of as a non-NRR I&E observe at what was the impact mm mm. w_ u.a.
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of the changes we have placed upon the system.
l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Are there any from an l
I enforcement point of view any areas that we'll be pursuing?
1 i
A MR. STELLO:
I think it's too early to make a j
3 judgemen-.
i I
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Certainly not either forclosed l
3 or predetermined.
That's one of the things that --
i 7
MR. STELLO:
I guess I should also add nothing 3
leaks to mind tihen you ask the question, but I really want to i
reserve judgement on that but, I don't 1<now.
10 i
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Dick?
Joe?
Peter?
Len?
Ed?
11 Thank you very much Vic and Harold.
I appreciate it.
12 COMMISSIONER RENNEDY:
Thank you.
4 l
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
You'11 of course let us know 14 i
if anything out of the ordinary does happen?
13 l
MR. STELLO:
Oh, absolutely.
i
!d i
I CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I would be interested in knowing 17 when they get that pump replaced.
18 (Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12:43 p.m.)
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EVENT HIGHLIGHTS e
CRYSTAL RIVER, UNIT 3 e
LOCATED IN GULF 0F MEXICO 70 NORTH OF TAMPA e
-- 2452 MWt 855 MWe o
EVENT OCCURRED AT 1425 HRS ON FEBRUARY 26, 1980
-- UNIT AT 100% POWER
-- TEMPORARY LOSS Of1 NON-NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION POWER
-- LED TO ERR 0NE0US SIGNALS TO ICS e
PRIMARY COOLANT RELEASED TO REACTOR BUILDING e
PLANT NOW IN STABLE COOLING MODE
PRINCIPAL NOTIFICATION CHRONOLOGY TIME NOTIFICATION 1423 INITIATING EVENT 1440 R0-II (ATLANTA) NOTIFIED 1445 IRC (BETHESDA) NOTIFIED 1500 LICENSEE NOTIFIED STATE 1504 EMT FORMED AND IRC ACTIVATED 1505-1515 NOTIFICATION OF COMMISSIONERS 1518-1522 DOE, FEfiA, EPA AND HEW NOTIFIED 1530 SITE EMERGENCY (CLASS B) DECLARED 1548 SITE EVACUATED OF NON ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL 1550 Wi:ITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM NOTIFIED 1614 COMM. HENDRIE CALLS LT. GOVERNOR 0F FLORIDA 1630 LOCAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED (e.g.,
SHERIFF, CIVIL DEFENSE) 2020 EMT (BETHESDA) CLOSES DOWN, DIRECTOR OF R0-II ON-SITE ASSUMES CONTROL OF NRC RESPONSE 9
SEQUENCE OF EVEtlTS PRELIMINARY TIME EVENT T=0 (14:23:21)
. NNI ELECTRICAL FAILURE
. 2 0F 4 fitll CHANNELS LOST
, ERR 0flE0VS SIGilAL TO ICS
. NNI/ICS CAUSES:
PORV OPEllING TURBINE TRIP REACTOR TRIP T=3 MIN
. C0tlTAltlMENT ISOLATED MANUALLY T= 0 3B MIN
. PLAT!T C00LDOWil/ PRESSURE DECREASE T=3h min
. HPI INITIATES AT 1500 PSI T=4 MItl
. OPERATOR TRIPS RCPs T=8 i1IN
. PORV OPEtt (MAY HAVE CLOSED AtlD RE0PENED)
. SAFETY VALVE OPENS
T= 14h MINUTES RUPTURE DISC BURSTS T=21 MIfiUTES
. NNI RESTORED T=22% MIfiUTES
, CONTAI!! MENT PRESSURE 4 PSIG
. AUTOMATIC CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL T=24 MINUTES
, PRESSURE 2400-2500 PSI
. PRESSURIZER LEVEL HIGH
. PORV BLOCK VALVE S!1UT
, HPI THROTTLED T=4-5 HOURS
. BEGIN RESTORIt!G PZR STEAM SPACE
. S/G LEVELS 95%
T=6 HOURS 45 MINUTES
. STARTED 2 RCP's THEREAFTER, COOLING THROUGH 2 STEAM GENERATORS USIfiG 2 REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS, DUMPING HEAT TO CONDENSER
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE PLANT e
FAILURE OF NON SAFETY EQUIPMENT e
SAFETY SYSTEMS FUNCTIONED e
NO CORE UNC0VERED OR FUEL FAILURE RADIOLOGICAL o
NO SIGNIFICANT RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY FROM PLANT
PRIMARY COOLANT SAMPLE S110WED INCREASED ACTIVITY OF LEVEL EXPECTED AFTER REACTOR SCRAM RADI0 ACTIVITY IN Tile PLANT CONTAINMENT DOME MONITOR 50 a/iin 25 a/iin
)
0 REACTOR BUILDING ACCESS 250 Ma/iin
> 30 MR/tlR CONTAINMENT AIR 2.2 x 10-2 uCI/cc (80% XE - 133)
AIR OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT NORMAL LEVELS RADIATION LEVELS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT NORMAL LEVELS RADI0 ACTIVITY RELEASED FROM PLANT N0 INCREASE ON STACK MONITORS NO MEASURABLE INCREASE IN OFFSITE LE.VELS NO LIQUID RELEASES FROM ACCIDENT PLANT PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NONE D
k
CURREi1T STATUS 8:00 A.M.
2/27/80 NORMAL CLOSED CYCLE COOLING THROUGH FOLLOWING PATH:
o FEEDWATER B0OSTER PUMPS CONDENSATE FROM C0flDENSATE STORAGE TANK TO STEAM GENERATORS e
STEAM GENERATORS STEAMING TO MAIN CiNilSER THROUGH STEAM DUMP VALVES e
STEAM CONDENSED IN MAIN CONDENSER BY HEAT TRANSFER TO NORMAL CIRCULATING WATER o
CONDENSATE TO HOT WELL (GRAVITY) e PUMPED AUTOMATICALLY FROM HOT WELL TO CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK PRIf tARY SYSTEM PRESSURE / TEMP,1951 PSIG/404F NO PRIMARY SYSTEM LEAKAGE, NORMAL LETDOWN / MAKEUP NORMAL HOT-STANDBY PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE / FLOW WITH 2 RCPs ON NORMAL SUPPLY TO MAKEUP WATER AVAILABLE (BWST)
FUTURE ACTIONS e
REPAIR SECOND DHR TRAIN e
CONTINUE WITH PLANT C00LDOWN TO DHR PERMISSIVE PRESSURE (DECREASE SECONDARY PRESSURE IN SGs, DUMP MORE HEAT, COOL AND DEPRESSURIZE PRIMARY) e PLACE DHR SYSTEMS ON-LINE WHEN PROPER PRESSURE OBTAINED e
CONTINUE C00LDOWN TO COLD SHUTDOWN e
INVESTIGATE CONTINUED OPERATION - MUST FIX NNI POWER SUPPLY, INVESTIGATE CAUSES OF FAILURE AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS
=
TMI-2 SHORT TERM LESSONS LEARNED e
20 ACTIONS REQUIRED BY LICENSEE TO BE COMPLETED 2/15/80 e
2 EXEMPTIONS PERMITTED. LITTLE ADVERSE IMPACT DIVERSITY OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION POSITION INDICATION FOR PORV AND SAFETY VALVES e
8 ACTIONS IMPROVED CONDITIONS DURING EVENT SUBC00 LING METER SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR ONSITE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING FOUR IMPROVEMENTS IN REACTOR OPERATIONS e
2 ACTIONS RTlVIRE FURTHER ASSESSMENT EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY TO PZR HEATING, LEVEL INDICATORS AND PORV AND BLOCK VALVE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FLOW INDICATION e
5 ACTIONS WOULD HAVE IMPROVED CONDITIONS HAD FUEL DAMAGE OCCURRED e
4 ACTIONS HAD NO IMPACT ON EVENT