ML19095A696

LER 1975-029-00 for Surry Power Station, Unit 1, While in Cold Shutdown for Maintenance It Was Desired to Shut Valves MOV-1289A & B (Normal Charging Line Stop Valves) from Control Room

ML19095A696
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	12/31/1975
From:	Stallings C Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
To:	Moseley N NRC/IE, NRC/RGN-II
References
Serial No. 839 LER 1975-029-00
Download: ML19095A696 (3)

Text

kEGULAT6~ DOCKET FILE COP1 Vepco VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

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Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement ~**

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 11 - Suite 818

• Docket Nos. 50-280 230 Peachtree Street, Northwest License Nos. DPR-32 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 ..

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B. 1, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits forty (40) copies of Abnormal Occurrence Report No. AO-Sl-75-29.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours, C. M. Stallings Vice President-Power Supply and Production Operations Enclosures 40 copies of AO-Sl-75-29 cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid

L'!CENSEE EVENT REPORT . A . .. .

COf'J TRO L BLOCK: l_ L. __.._ _.I_.L_...1'-..1.'---l' .,

(?LEASE il-'RiiNT A!.L l=lEtlUJREC li"FORMATlONJ 1 S UCEi'l,%E LICENSE EVENT

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.. NAME LICENSE NUMBER TYPE TYPE

• 7

• a g V l ,i; j S I P I S I 1 I

• 14 I ol ol-1 oI oI oI oI 01-1 o I o25I 15 l4llllll!OI 26 30 1°31 1132I REPORT REPORT .

• CATEGORY TYPE. SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER . EV~NT DATE REPORT DATE

[d)1!coN'T lM II l L!J L!J 1° 5 1 1°1~1°1 1 1. 68 2 8

°1 11 f2 li ll l7j 5j I I I 7 8 57 58 59

• 60 61 69 74 7Ej 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION

.

• lfilfil i~hile in cold shutdown for maintenance it was desired to shut valves MOV-1289A and I 7 s s~-----:-:-----------------------------------"--_J 80 lolsj I B (Normal Charging Line Stop ValvesL from the control room. Valve MOV-1289A did not 1 7 8 9

.@El I fully close, although MOV-12898 did. Cause was Binding in a limitorque s~iitch 7

• 1 8 .

fan]8 8I pinion gear caused the motor to overload and open the thermal overloads. The l imH 80 7 8 9 80j

@:lli i switch assembly was replaced and the valve performed satisfactorily. (continued) 7 8 9 PRIME 80j SYSTEM CAUSE COMPONENr COMPONENT

• coo~ .CODE COMPONENT CODE SUPPUER MANUFACTURER VIOLATION

@0 I PjC ! LU IVIA!LJVjOjPJ ~ 1v I oI s1 o1 LD 7 8 9 10 11 12 17 43 44 47 48 CAUSE- DESCRIPTION

[? fs] l The pinion gear on the 1 i mi t switch bound up and caused therma 1 overload to open, LS~ Lthereby protecting , event80I 9

};,tj the motor. Gear failure was due to mechanical wear. In tne 7 8 9 . .

~~!of a safety injection valves MOV-1289A and 12898 receive signals to shut. (continued)  !

8.

80 FAC!LITY METHOD OF STATUS  % POWER OTHER STATUS OISCO'JERY DISCOVERY DESCHiPTiON EE lG j 10 jO 10 I NA ~ . 46

. NA 7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 BO FORM OF AC:!ViTY . CONTENT rn w AELEASE8 OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LDCATIO~J\F RELEASE L?~. I NA 7 8 8 10 11 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION Em Io lo I 0111 7 8 9 w12 13 NA BO.

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMSER DESCRIPTION E§ lo lo I 01 NA 7 8 9 11 12 BO Cc'FSITE CONSEQUENCES

[ITol 7 .. 8 9 NA 80 LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

. TYPE. . DESCRIPTION bJ~J gIZI 7* .8 '10 NA 80

• P,J.BLICITY

[iliJ I NA 7 8 9 80 ADDITIONAL FACTORS

• IT@] I Due to the backup protection provided for a safety injection, the hea 1th and safety I

• • . 7. 8 9 SQ

. [1jsj. I of the general public were not affected by this occurrence.

7 8. 9 80 NAME:. _ _ _T_._L_._B_a_u_co_m _ _ _ _~ - - - - - - - - PHONE: 804-357-31 ~+/-.-

OPO 8.81*667

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EVENT DE,SCRlPTI ON (CONTINUED)

Malfunction of this valve is contrary to Technical Specification 3.3.A.7.

I.

I CAUSE DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED)

In this case valve MOV-1289A would not have fully shut; however, 12898 would have shut, providing backup protection. The safety injection system would have functfoned as designed. Similar limitorques are used on may valves throughout both units; however, since this is the first failure.

of this type, it was felt to. be random in nature and will not require any long t~rm corrective action.