ML18101A157

Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd - Revised Response to RAI 434-8352 for Question 19-85 (Rev. 3)

ML18101A157
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Site:	05200046
Issue date:	04/11/2018
From:	Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co, Ltd
To:	Office of New Reactors
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MKD/NW-18-0055L
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19-85_Rev.3 - 1 / 3 KEPCO/KHNP REVISED RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION APR1400 Design Certification Korea Electric Power Corporation / Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., LTD Docket No.52-046 RAI No.: 434-8352 SRP Section: SRP 19 Application Section: 19.1 Date of RAI Issue: 03/08/2016 Question No. 19-85 10 CFR 52.47(a)(27) states that a DC application must contain an FSAR that includes a description of the design-specific PRA and its results. In addition, Standard Review Plan (SRP)

Chapter 19.0, draft Revision 3, Items 25 through 37 on Pages 19.0-18 and 19.0-19 provide the acceptance criteria for a PRA-based seismic margin analysis (SMA) submitted in support of a design certification (DC) application, in part, it states that The staff will determine that the applicant has performed a PRA-based SMA to determine the seismic capacity of the plant and for each sequence that may lead to core damage or large release. In addition, SRP Chapter 19,Section III Review Procedures / Design-Specific PRA (PRA-Based SMA), states It is important that the plant systems analysis focus on those sequences leading to core damage or containment failures, including applicable sequences leading to the following containment failures: (1) loss of containment integrity, (2) loss of containment isolation, and (3) loss of function for prevention of containment bypass. The applicant should address the following operating modes in the analysis: (1) at power (full power), (2) low power, and (3) shutdown.

In APR1400 DCD, Section 19.1.5.1.1 Description of the Seismic Risk Evaluation, the applicant describes the methodology (Tasks (a) through (g)) used to evaluate the seismic margin.

However, the staff review finds that, among these tasks, only Task (b) Development of seismic equipment list and Task (e) Fragility analysis are discussed in detail in Sections 19.1.5.1.1.1 and 19.1.5.1.1.2, respectively. Therefore, in order for the staff to reach a reasonable assurance finding, please address by providing and discussing in detail the analyses performed for Tasks (a), (c), (d), (f), and (g) in theAPR1400 DCD, including the following items:

a) Consequential initiating events that were actually quantified in the seismic model b) Recoveries of mitigating systems and seismic related failures that were credited in the PRA-based seismic margin analysis (SMA) c) The modeling of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that are not on the seismic equipment list (SEL) in SMA analysis, if any

19-85_Rev.3 - 2 / 3 KEPCO/KHNP d) The protection against flooding, spraying, steam impingement, pipe whip, jet forces, missiles, fire and the effect of failure of any non-seismic Category I equipment e) Evaluation of human error probabilities (HEPs) for the operator actions included in the analysis f) Operator actions that were identified as being important to mitigating seismic accident sequences g) Accident sequences (at cutset level) that were examined to assess the plant-level high confidence of low probability of failures (HCLPF) capacity h) Evaluation of containment performance as described in Section 5.1.1 of DC/COL-ISG-20 as referenced in the SRP so that the appropriate Level 2 SSCs are appropriately included in the SEL i) Significant functions, SSCs, and operator actions that are limiting in determining the plant-level HCLPF capacity.

Response - (Rev. 3)

The PRA-based seismic margin analysis (SMA) for at-power conditions was performed. Both at-power and LPSD SMA results reflect the latest PRA model updates. Details of the at-power PRA-based SMA are documented in DCD 19.1.5.1, Seismic Risk Evaluation and includes the plant systems analysis focus on those sequences leading to core damage or containment failures, including applicable sequences leading to loss of containment integrity, loss of containment isolation, and loss of function for prevention of containment bypass. provides the DCD markups summarizing how the APR1400 PRA-based SMA was applied to at power conditions. Results of the at-power PRA-based SMA include the seismic cutsets and the sequence HCLPF capacities, as well as assessment of random failures and operator actions. In order to provide the modeling information, the detail information for event trees and failure mode and effects analysis for the at-power conditions are provided in Attachments 2 and 3. In addition, Attachment 4 provides a cross-walk to how the at-power PRA-based SMA was developed to follow NRC Interim Staff Guidance on Implementation of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment-Based Seismic Margin Analysis for New Reactors DC/COL-ISG-020. Attachment 5 provides the information of the fault tree in APR1400 PRA-based SMA for at-power.

DCD Section 19.1.5.1.1 and 19.1.5.1.2 are to be revised to reflect the at-power PRA-based SMA results, as shown in Attachment 1, and address each of the RAI items (a) through (i), and cross-referenced with the respective DCD subsection to address the item, as shown below:

a) Treatment of consequential initiating events is described in Section 19.1.5.1.2.1 of the DCD Rev. 1 (Refer to Attachment 1).

b) Recoveries of mitigating systems and seismic related failures that were credited in the PRA-based seismic margin analysis (SMA) are described in Section 19.1.5.1.1.4.9 j of the DCD Rev. 1 (Refer to Attachment 1).

19-85_Rev.3 - 3 / 3 KEPCO/KHNP c) The modeling of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that are not on the seismic equipment list (SEL) in SMA analysis is discussed in 19.1.5.1.1.2 of the DCD Rev. 1 (Refer to Attachment 1).

d) The protection against flooding, spraying, steam impingement, pipe whip, jet forces, missiles, fire and the effect of failure of any non-seismic Category I equipment is discussed in Section 19.1.5.1.1.4.9 h of the DCD Rev. 1 (Refer to Attachment 1).

e) Human error probabilities (HEPs) for the operator actions included in the analysis is discussed in Section 19.1.5.1.1.4.9 p of the DCD Rev. 1 (Refer to Attachment 1).

f) Operator actions that were identified as being important to mitigating seismic accident sequences are described in Section 19.1.5.1.2.4 of the DCD Rev. 1 (Refer to Attachment 1).

g) Accident sequences (at cutset level) that were examined to assess the plant-level HCLPF capacity is described in Section 19.1.5.1.2.4 of the DCD Rev. 1 (Refer to Attachment 1).

h) The at-power SMA event trees include top events that evaluate containment performance, and cutsets are provided for all the seismic event trees. Containment failure, containment isolation failure and loss of function for prevention of containment bypass is described Section 19.1.5.1.2.4 of the DCD Rev. 1 (Refer to Attachment 1).

i) Significant functions, SSCs, and operator actions that are limiting in determining the plant-level HCLPF capacity is discussed in Section of the DCD Rev. 1 (Refer to Attachment 1).

Impact on DCD The previous DCD markup which relate to DCD Section 19.1.2.3 and 19.1.5.1 will be withdrawn.

These section will be superseded as discussed above, and provided in Attachment 1.

Impact on PRA There is no impact on the PRA.

Impact on Technical Specifications There is no impact on the Technical Specifications.

Impact on Technical/Topical/Environmental Reports There is no impact on any Technical, Topical, or Environmental Report.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS NUMBER TITLE PAGE 19.1.2.3  PRA Technical Adequacy ............................................................................. 4

19.1.5.1  Seismic Risk Evaluation................................................................................ 6

19.1.5.1.1 Description of the Seismic Risk Evaluation .................................................. 6

19.1.5.1.1.1 Selection of Review Level Earthquake ....................................................... 10

19.1.5.1.1.2 Development of Seismic Equipment List.................................................... 10

19.1.5.1.1.3  Identification of Seismic Initiating Event Categories ................................. 13

19.1.5.1.1.4  Development of System Models ................................................................. 14

19.1.5.1.1.4.1 Direct Core Damage (S-DMG) ................................................................... 14

19.1.5.1.1.4.2 Station Blackout (S-SBO) ........................................................................... 16

19.1.5.1.1.4.3 Loss of All Instrumentation and Control (S-IC) ......................................... 17

19.1.5.1.1.4.4 Main Steam Line Break (S-MSLB)............................................................. 18

19.1.5.1.1.4.5 Total Loss of Component Cooling Water (S-TLOCCW) ........................... 18

19.1.5.1.1.4.6 Anticipated Transient Without Scram (S-ATWS) ...................................... 20

19.1.5.1.1.4.7 Loss of Coolant Accidents .......................................................................... 20

19.1.5.1.1.4.8 Loss of Off-Site Power ................................................................................ 22

19.1.5.1.1.4.9 Seismic Event Additions to Internal Events Fault rees ............................... 22

19.1.5.1.1.5  Seismic Fragility Analysis........................................................................... 26

19.1.5.1.2  Determination of Seismic Margin in the Design ......................................... 27

19.1.5.1.2.1  Seismic Equipment List............................................................................... 27

19.1.5.1.2.2  Seismic Fragility Analysis Results .............................................................. 28

19.1.5.1.2.3  Plant Level HCLPF ..................................................................................... 29

19.1.5.1.2.4 3 Risk Insights ................................................................................................ 31

19.1.5.1.2.4.1 Core Damage Risk Insights ......................................................................... 31

19.1.5.1.2.4.2 Containment Failure Risk Insights .............................................................. 35

19.1.9 Combined License Information ................................................................... 37

19.1.10 References ................................................................................................... 40

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LIST OF TABLES NUMBER TITLE PAGE Table 19.1-4 ..................................................................................................................... 41 Table 19.1-41 Systems Considered for Seismic Equipment List ..................................... 42 Table 19.1-42 Seismic Equipment List .............................................................................. 44 Table 19.1-43 Seismic Fragility Analysis Results Summary ............................................. 63 Table 19.1-44A At-Power Seismic Event Direct Core Damage Initiator Cutsets ............... 68 Table 19.1-44B At-power Seismic Event Top 100 core damage cutsets of Non-Direct Core Damage Initiator ......................................................................................... 79 Table 19.1-44C At-power Direct Containment Failure cutsets .......................................... 117 Table 19.1-44D At-power Seismic event Top 100 containment failure cutsets of Non-Direct Containment Failure Initiator .................................................................... 124

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LIST OF FIGURES NUMBER TITLE PAGE Figure 19.1-48A At-Power Seismic Event Tree.............................................................. 148

Figure 19.1-48B At-Power Seismically Induced Small LOCA Event Tree .................... 149

Figure 19.1-48C At-Power Seismically Induced LOOP Event Tree .............................. 150

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19.1.2.3 PRA Technical Adequacy The content of the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and the steps taken to provide for its technical quality are consistent with the guidance in the ASME/ANS PRA Standard and NRC RG 1.200. This PRA Standard presents high level requirements (HLRs) for various PRA technical elements and, for each HLR, a set of more detailed supporting requirements (SRs). The supporting requirements are related to the three capability categories addressed in the standard.

These requirements were formulated for application to operating nuclear power plants, and in some cases cannot be explicitly satisfied for a PRA performed in the design phase.

Table 19.1-1 provides a summary of the degree to which the APR1400 PRA relates to the capability categories for the nine technical elements addressed in the ASME/ANS PRA Standard.

A COL applicant and/or holder that references the APR1400 design certification should conduct a peer review of the PRA relative to the ASME/ANS PRA Standard prior to use of the PRA to support risk-informed applications (COL 19.1(5)). The findings and observations from this review should be dispositioned after the review to provide reasonable assurance that captured issues are addressed. Changes that are made to the PRA model and associated documentation as a result of this resolution process are to be conducted in a manner consistent with Subsection 19.1.2.4.

The ASME/ANS PRA Standard does not fully address Low Power and Shutdown (LPSD) modes of operation (the standard is still in draft form). For analyses in which the ASME/ANS PRA Standard does not directly apply, the APR1400 PRA has used the latest industry guidance available to perform assessments commensurate with the uses of the PRA. This additional guidance includes the following:

a. Internal fire analysis: The internal fire PRA uses the guidance provided in NUREG/CR-6850 and its supplement for at-power fire analysis, and NUREG/CR-7114 for LPSD fire analysis. These reports document This report documents the latest methodology available for practical assessment of internal fires in nuclear power plants. Limitations in applying this methodology because some design details are not yet available are addressed in Subsection 19.1.5.2.

b. LPSD analysis: The ASME/ANS PRA Standard and the associated NRC guidance on PRA adequacy apply only to accidents initiated from power operation. The

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APR1400 PRA also addresses LPSD modes. The LPSD PRA methodology and level of detail are consistent with industry practice. The LPSD methodology and modeling are state of the art and are designed to meet the requirements of the draft ANS/ASME LPSD PRA Standard (Reference 9).

c. PRA-based seismic margins assessment: The APR1400 PRA uses a PRA-based SMA approach to evaluate potential vulnerabilities to seismic events. The methodology and level of detail used to develop the PRA-based SMA are consistent with industry practice at the DC stage. The methods as implemented for the United States is consistent with guidance in SECY-93-087 and follows the general approach delineated in the NRC staff interim guidance document DC/COL-ISG-020 (Reference 57). A self assessment has been conducted to ensure that the technical adequacy of APR1400 PRA-based SMA meets NRC recognized guidance and requirements. ISG-028 (Reference 79) and ASME/ANS Standard. Technical adequancy is confirmed for at-power PRA-based SMA following guidance in the ASME/ANS standard, including: 1) Seismic harzard Analysis: is performed in accordance with section 5.2-1 of ASME/ANS Standard; 2) Seismic Fragility Analysis: is performed in accordance with 5.2-2 of ASME/ANS Standard; and 3)

Seismic Plant Respnse Analysis: is performed in accordance with 5.2-3 of ASME/ANS Standard. Self Assessment for LPSD PRA-based SMA has been conducted to follow the guidelines in the draft ANS/ASME LPSD PRA Standard.

However, since the PRA-based SMA was conducted for the design certification, it does not reflect unavailable information due to site-specific, as-built and/or as-operated plant conditions.

d. Other external events: The APR1400 PRA for design certification uses a screening method to address other external events that could represent challenges to safe operation. The screening approach follows guidance provided in the ASME/ANS PRA Standard.

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19.1.5.1 Seismic Risk Evaluation The scope of a seismic risk evaluation is limited due to the design-specific aspects within the scope of the design certification (DC). The design-specific PRA developed for the DC stage does not evaluate site specific information (e.g., local hazards, switchyard and offsite grid configuration, and ultimate heat sink) and can not explicitly model all aspects of the design (e.g., balance of plant).

Without a site-specific probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA), as-built information, etc., the NRC guidance allows for a PRA-based seismic margin analysis to evaluate risk at the DC stage. Evaluation of the risk due to seismic events was performed using a PRA-based seismic margins approach for the ARR1400. This subsection describes the seismic risk evaluation including the results of the evaluation. The scope of this analysis is at-power operation. The seismic risk evaluation for low power and shutdown states is presented in Section 19.1.6.5.

19.1.5.1.1 Description of the Seismic Risk Evaluation The seismic margin methodology was applied to estimate the seismic margin and accident sequences for APR 1400. The seismic margin for the APR1400 is evaluated by using PRA-based SMA. This methodology satisfies the recommendation of SECY-93-087 (Reference 8), as modified and approved by EPRI 3002000709 (Reference 77), for a seismic risk evaluation. The PRA-based SMA identifies potential vulnerabilities and demonstrates seismic margins beyond the design basis safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).

The capacity of components required to bring the plant to safe and stable conditions is assessed. The plant structures, systems, and components (SSCs) identified as important to seismic risk are addressed.

a. Selection of review level earthquake The starting point to perform PRA-based SMA is to select a review level earthquake (RLE). PRA-based SMA demonstrates that sufficient margin in seismic design exists by showing the high confidence of low probability of failures (HCLPFs) of the plant and components is greater than or equal to the RLE. The RLE is 1.67 times of the certified seismic design response spectra (CSDRS) in Chapter 3, which are shown in Figure 3.7-1 and 3.7-2. The RLE

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for APR1400 is 0.5g which is 1.67 times of SSE and is consistent with the requirement of DC/COL-ISG-020.

b. Development of seismic equipment list The seismic equipment list (SEL) is developed from the internal events PRA model. The SEL provides a documented list of SSCs that could be used to response to an earthquake or mitigate potential plant damage initiated by a seismic event. Also, earthquake-specific SSCs such as passive components and structures related to a safety function, which are not addressed in the internal events PRA model, are included in the fragility analysis and system analysis.

c. Identification of seismic initiating event category Initiating events due to a seismic event are identified based on the internal events PRA. However, there are some major differences between seismic and internal events for the purpose of identifying the initiating event category, which are as follows: 1) seismic events may damage passive plant components and structures (e.g., steam generators, auxiliary building, etc.) that are not explicitly modeled in the internal events PRA; and 2) seismic events may simultaneously damage multiple SSCs in the plant.

d. Development of system models The PRA-based SMA system models are developed from the internal events PRA model to include the important accident sequences. This model also contains random failures and human errors from the internal events PRA.

System models are modified to accommodate a seismic event and seismic induced failures. The model is used to estimate seismic margins and to identify vulnerabilities in the design.

e. Fragility analysis Per ISG-020 (Reference 57), two methods can be used to calculate the structure, system and component HCLPF capacity to demonstrate a seismic margin over the design-specific CSDRS. They are the Conservative Deterministic Failure Margin (CDFM) approach and the Separation of Variables approach. For the APR1400 Design Certification application, the CDFM approach is used. As

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delineated in ISG-020, APR1400 design-specific documents and drawings are reviewed to identify potential failure modes of the individual SSCs and APR1400 design-specific seismic demands are used. As for capacity, code capacities are used and inelastic energy absorption capability, if any, is considered. The resulting HCLPF capacities are described in DCD Section 19.1.5.1.2.2.

At the design certification phase, specific design data for the balance of plant (BOP) components, such as material properties, analysis results, qualification test information, etc. are not available. Appendix E of EPRI-NP-1002988 (Reference 58) presents example calculations showing that the equipment designed for 0.25 g SSE can have 0.5 g or higher HCLPF considering the conservatism in the design process. The EPRI-NP-6041 (Reference 39) indicates that Seismic Category I concrete structure and BOP equipment can have 0.5 g HCLPF as long as the structure and the equipment are designed in accordance with the current code and standard and the anchorage is rugged.

The generic fragility data provided by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Utility Requirements Document (Reference 37) show the BOP components have HCLPF capacities higher than 0.5 g.

The seismic capacity for equipment qualified by testing should ensure that the equipment should remain functional operation within 1.67 times the required response spectra (RRS) as provided in the respective equipments procurement specification. The seismic demands to equipment defined in terms of RRS should use CSDRS-based seismic input and account for the structural amplifications caused by the supporting structures, including soil-structure interaction effects and supporting systems, and incorporate an additional seismic margin factor (1.67 times RRS).

f. Evaluation for the plant seismic capacity There are two acceptable approaches to evaluate the plant seismic margin as described in NUREG/CR-4482 (Reference 38).

1) Min-max method, in which HCLPF is assessed for accident sequences by taking the lower HCLPF value for components operating under OR logic and the highest HCLPF value for components operating under AND logic.

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2) Convolution method, in which probabilities of non-seismic and operator failures are included in the calculation as well as the component fragilities.

This is a fully quantitative approach in which the importance and contribution of seismic as well as non-seismic failures can be assessed quantitatively.

For the APR1400 PRA-based SMA, the min-max method is selected as the appropriate method at the design certification phase since detailed plant-specific data are unavailable at the design certification stage. This method is accomplished by calculating HCLPFs for each seismic core damage cutset.

Cutset HCLPFs are determined considering seismic-induced failures. Cutsets with random equipment failures and/or operator action failures are reviewed separately.

g. Demonstration of seismic margin in the design The objective is to demonstrate that there is sufficient seismic margin in the design. If the plant HCLPF earthquake is less than the RLE, modification of the design or refinements of the model are required. A PRA-based seismic margin analysis should provide a clear understanding of significant seismic vulnerabilities and other seismic insights to demonstrate the seismic robustness of a standard design. Accordingly, the level of detail of a PRA-based seismic margin analysis needs to be sufficient to gain risk insights, in conjunction with the assumptions made in the PRA-based seismic margin analysis, and to identify and support requirements important to the design and plant operation. To this end, Part 5, Requirements for Seismic Events at-Power PRA, of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers/American Nuclear Society (ASME/ANS) PRA standard, RA-Sa-2009 (Reference 2) is used to the extent practical and as endorsed by RG 1.200, An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities, Revision 2 (Reference 3), in guiding the PRA-based seismic margin analysis supporting a DC application.

h. Sensitivities and Uncertainties

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Uncertainties are taken into account explicitly in the fragility development and in evaluating non-seismic failures of equipment. Because the APR1400 PRA-based SMA is primarily qualitative, no sensitivity studies are conducted.

19.1.5.1.1.1 Selection of Review Level Earthquake Development of the PRA-based SMA uses a Review Level Earthquake (RLE) which has a reasonable probability of occurring, but does not mask or overwhelm systems needed to respond to the event. For the APR1400, the RLE is selected based on the design response spectra of the site-independent SSE which is developed from the certified seismic design response spectra (CSDRS). The peak ground acceleration (PGA) of the CSDRS has been established as 0.3g for the APR1400 design for both the horizontal and vertical directions.

To perform the PRA-based SMA, the RLE is selected as 1.67 times the SSE or 0.5g which is consistent with the requirement of ISG-020.

19.1.5.1.1.2 Development of Seismic Equipment List The SEL provides a documented list of the plant SSCs that could be used to respond to an earthquake or mitigate potential reactor plant damage initiated by a seismic event. This design certification SEL then is used to develop the PRA-based SMA systems logic model (i.e., event trees and fault trees).

While the objectives of the internal events PRA and PRA-based SMA are similar, there are differences between the SSCs included in each of the models. As a result, not all SSCs included in the internal events PRA model are included in the SEL. For example, many balance-of-plant components, such as the main feedwater system, condensate system, condensate storage and transfer system, AAC disel generator, steam generator blowdown system are not considered in the PRA-based SMA since they depend on offsite power, which is expected to be unavailable after a seismic event. In addition, some SSCs are not modeled explicitly in the internal events PRA but must be considered in the PRA-based SMA and, therefore, in the SEL. Examples include distribution systems such as piping, cable trays, ventilation ducts, and structural items such as masonry block walls that could fail and damage nearby safety equipment. The containment polar crane is designed as seismic category II in accordance with NRC RG 1.29. The dynamic behaviors according to the seismic event are restricted by the seismic restraints, which prevent the crane from jumping of falling during an earthquake. This crane is designed to maintain their integrity

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during and after SSE. Normal parking position of the polar crane is based on a location that does not interface with seismic category I equipment. Jib crane is also designed to be physically separated during at-power operation. Therefore, these cranes are assumed not to impact seismic category I equipment during at-power conditions.

The first step in developing the SEL was to determine the potential initiating events that could occur as a result of a seismic event. Initiating events considered could occur either directly as a result of the earthquake or due to random or consequential events that occur subsequent to the earthquake. A discussion of initiating events evaluated in the PRA-based SMA, including consequential initiating events, is provided in Section 19.1.5.1.1.3.

Identification of potential initiating events make use of the internal events PRA for guidance. The safety functions that would be required to respond to initiating events identified above were determined based on EPRI NP-6041 (Reference 39) and NUREG-1407 (Reference 40). These safety functions are:

a. Reactivity control

b. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure control

c. RCS inventory control

d. Decay heat removal

e. Containment integrity The front-line systems used to meet the five safety functions were identified from the internal events PRA, including the additional required support systems. Unlike the internal events PRA, only systems that do not require offsite power were selected.

Because the offsite power grid, switchyard insulators, and large transformers have relatively low seismic capacity, they cannot be relied on to provide power after a major earthquake. Only systems that can be supported by the onsite emergency ac power sources are considered.

The initial list of equipment for the SEL is then identified using the following data sources:

a. List of basic events from the internal events PRA

b. The internal events PRA systems notebooks

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c. Piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs)

d. Electrical diagrams (for offsite power and emergency power)

e. Plant arrangement drawings

f. Emergency Operating Guidelines (EOGs)

For the PRA-based SMA, the initial list of equipment was identified beginning with the internal events PRA and reviewing the system P&IDs and electrical diagrams to provide reasonable assurance that all necessary components are on the SEL. For example, components needed to provide reasonable assurance of system integrity or electrical isolation were examined. These components were identified and added to the SEL when appropriate. Small, passive, in-line filters that are supported only by the piping or ducting, and instrumentation, which are not required for mitigation of the seismic accident sequence are not included on the SEL (e.g., local instrumentation may be excluded, unless it is part of a plant procedure that would be implemented during a seismic event).

The following assumptions were used to develop the SEL: and the following components are considered to have seismically rugged capacity

a. The following components are considered to have seismically rugged capacity (i.e., having a HCLPF 2.5 times CSDRS)

a. 1) Piping and supports

b. 2) HVAC ducting, supports, and dampers

c. 3) Cable trays and supports, and electrical conduit

d. 4) Motor-operated valves

e. 5) Air-operated valves

f. 6) Solenoid-operated valves

g. 7) Pilot-operated safety relief valves

h. 8) Relief valves

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i. 9) Manual valves

j. 10) Check valves

k. 11) Instrumentation such as resistance temperature detectors, pressure transmitters, etc.

19.1.5.1.1.3 Identification of Seismic Initiating Event Categories Identification of feasible seismic initiating event categories for the PRA-based SMA is based on the initiating events defined for the internal events PRA. These events were reviewed to identify those that could be caused by a seismic event which would also impair equipment needed to mitigate the event. Then a determination was made as to whether the seismic-induced failures would require a unique response or would be evaluated by the seismic fault tree models.

All seismic events are assumed to cause a loss of offsite power (LOOP) and that transient event is explicitly considered. Other transient events considered in the internal events PRA could result from failure of plant components or systems. Failure of other support systems, e.g., loss of a 4kV AC bus, could occur during a seismic event. Due to the correlated simultaneous failures of multiple 4kV AC buses by earthquake, it is considered as seismic event specific Station Blackout (SBO). Therefore, for all the seismic specific initiators with total loss of a supporting system should be considered. The examples for this are loss of a 4kV AC bus and loss of one train safety-related DC bus. All the initiators by the total loss of a supporting system in the internal event are considered in the seismic event analysis.

The other initiating events that should be considered are supporting system failures due to a seismic event which are not considered in the internal event analysis. An example is loss of all I&C caused by the seismic-induced failure of ESF-CCS GC, LC and PPS cabinets.

In such an event, the plant operators would have no ability to control plant parameters.

Consequently, this event is evaluated explicitly. Similarly, the ATWS event requires unique plant response and the seismic event could induce the failures that prevent inserting the control rods.

Loss of coolant accident (LOCA) events are also considered to be induced by a seismic event. Large, medium, and small LOCAs are considered explicitly in the PRA-based SMA.

Excessive LOCAs are those breaks in the RCS that have a break flow larger than evaluated

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for large LOCA events considered in the internal events PRA. Excessive LOCA events could occur when multiple seismic failures occur simultaneously in the RCS. Such events as well as vessel rupture are considered as a direct core damage event and are considered bounded by auxiliary building or containment building failures. An interfacing systems LOCA is considered not credible and is discussed further below.

19.1.5.1.1.4 Development of System Models System logic models, i.e., fault trees, that were developed for the internal events PRA model were used as the basis for the PRA-based SMA logic models. The PRA-based SMA logic models include the seismic failures. Details of the fault tree logic model development for systems where explicit evaluation of seismic failures needed to be included are provided in the subsections that follow. The developed model was for seismic induced initiating events which were identified and shown in the seismic induced initiating event tree illustrated in figure 19.1-48A.

19.1.5.1.1.4.1 Direct Core Damage (S-DMG)

A seismic event that causes significant structural failure is assumed to preclude equipment operation and operator actions needed to prevent core damage because structural failure could cause widespread equipment failures. The fault tree for top event S-DMG was created to model seismic failure of structures. Failures included in this fault tree include the following:

x Reactor Containment Two separate failures were considered in modeling seismic structural failure of the reactor containment, failure of the external containment structure and failure on the internal containment structure.

x Auxiliary Building Seismic structural failure of the Auxiliary Building is modeled as direct core damage.

x Nuclear Island Seismic induced sliding of the Nuclear Island (common basemat of containment building and auxiliary building) is modeled as direct core damage.

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x Turbine Building Seismic structural failure of the Turbine Building is modeled as direct core damage.

x Compound Building Seismic structural failure of the Compound Building is modeled as direct core damage.

EDG building and diesel fuel oil tank building are related to the function of EDG, but the EDG building and diesel fuel oil tank building would not impact to auxiliary building, because the governing failure mode for EDG building is the shear wall failure which is directed to the pararell of auxiliary building and diesel fuel oil tank building is located under the ground, therefore, it do not affect auxiliary building.

A seismic event that causes significant RCS component failure is assumed to lead to excessive LOCA which cannot be accommodated by the ECCS, and it is assumed to lead to direct core damage. These seismic induced failures are also included in the S-DMG.

Failures included in this fault tree include the following:

x Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)

Seismic induced column support failure of the RPV is modeled as direct core damage.

x Reactor Pressure Vessel Internal Failure Seismic induced core support barrel lower flange failure of the RPV internal is modeled as direct core damage.

x Steam Generator Seismic induced Anchor failure of snubber lever support assembly failure of the Steam Generator is modeled as direct core damage.

x Steam Generator Nozzle

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Seismic induced economizer nozzle failure of the Steam Generator is modeled as direct core damage.

x Pressurizer Seismic induced pressurizer skirt support failure is modeled as direct core damage.

x Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP)

Seismic induced RCP upper horizontal column support failure is modeled as direct core damage.

S-DMG is assumed to lead to containment integrity failure upon the seismic event. Thus it is assumed to lead to large release.

19.1.5.1.1.4.2 Station Blackout (S-SBO)

As described in the section 19.1.5.1.1.3, LOOP is assumed with the occurrence of seismic event and off-site power recovery is not credited in the seismic event. The HCLPFs for EDG building and diesel fuel oil tank building are higher than that for the auxiliary building and NI stability. Consequently, when the two buildings are failed then the auxiliary building assumed to be failed. The three building failure would cause the unavailable for all of EDGs at the EDG building and auxiliary building, it would lead to SBO. Therefore, the failure of EDGs will lead to the SBO without off-site power recovery and consequently lead to the direct core damage. The seismic induced failures of the equipment leads to seismically induced SBO.

x Emergency Diesel Generator Building x Diesel Fuel Oil Tank Building x Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) x Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil transfer pump x Starting Air Tank x Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank

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x Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank x Silencer x Air Intake Filter x Lube Oil Water Heat Exchanger x Motor Driven Fuel Oil Feed Pump x EDG Room Emergency Exhaust Fan x 125V DC Control Center x 4.16kV MCSG x Batteries & Racks Additionally, S-SBO is assumed to lead to containment isolation failure due to the loss of all I&C before or at the time of core damage.

19.1.5.1.1.4.3 Loss of All Instrumentation and Control (S-IC)

Mitigation of an accident requires that the operators have adequate indication available to progress through the emergency operation guidelines and operate the equipment necessary to control the plant. However, plant instrumentation and control (I&C) are not explicitly modeled in the internal events PRA. Loss of instrumentation and control is assumed to result directly in core damage.

Of the equipment on the SEL, Table 19.1-42, the ESF-CCS GC, ESF-CCS LC, and plant protection system (PPS) cabinets are needed to route and process signals and indications needed for the operators to control plant parameters and equipment. The cabinets all are located on the 156-foot elevation and have the same parameters for fragility values.

Specific fragility assessments of the cabinets were not performed. Rather, all cabinets were assigned a HCLPF of 0.5g and seismic failure of all the cabinets was modeled with a single, correlated failure.

The 480V MCC cabinets are located on the various building elevation, and specific fragility assessment of the cabinets were not performed. Loss of all 480V MCC is conservatively

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modelled as the one correlated event which leads to total loss of I&C. In addition to the seismic failure of the cabinets, loss of all 120 VAC instrumentation power also could cause a total loss of I&C. Loss of all 120 VAC is modelled as failure of the inverter and regulating transformer on each of the four 120 VAC power channels.

Though the failure of the equipment below does not directly cause loss of instrumentation

& control, it will cause numerous component failures. Thus the failure of the equipment below will cause similar circumstances as S-IC with respect to accident mitigation.

Therefore the equipment failures below are assumed to cause the initiating event as S-IC.

x 125V DC Battery Chargers x 480V Load Center x 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) x Main Control Room (MCR) Safety Consoles S-IC is assumed to lead to containment isolation failure due to the loss of all I&Cs before or at the time of core damage.

19.1.5.1.1.4.4 Main Steam Line Break (S-MSLB)

Seismic induced failure of MSSV, MSADV or MSSV is assumed to MSLB for which reactivity control is not assured, since steam line failure at axiliary building location cause the containment isolation fail. Consequently, this initiating event is assumed to lead to direct core damage.

S-MSLB is assumed to lead to containment isolation failure due to the opening path through main steam line upon the seismic induced failure of the components above.

19.1.5.1.1.4.5 Total Loss of Component Cooling Water (S-TLOCCW)

Seismic induced failures of equipment which are lead to prompt or delayed loss of total CCW or total Essential Service Water (ESW) is defined as seismic induced total loss of component cooling water. Over time, the loss of ESW and CCW are essentially the same with respect to accident mitigation under seismic event. This initiating event is assumed to lead to direct core damage due to the loss of all cooling water over time. The seismic induced failures which will cause this initiating event are below.

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x Essential Service Water Intake Structure (ESW IS) x Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger (CCW HX) Building x Essential Service Water Pump x CCW Heat Exchangers x CCW Pump x CCW Surge Tank x Essential Chilled Water Pumps x Essential Chillers x ECW Compression Tank x ECW Air Separator x Essential Chilled Water System Control Panel x AFWP Room Cubicle Cooler x CCWP Room Cubicle Cooler x SI Room Cubicle Cooler x SC Pump & Mini-flow HX. Room Cubicle Cooler x Mech. Pen. Room Cubicle Cooler x CS Pump Room Cubicle Cooler x Auxiliary Charging Pump Room Cubicle Cooler x Charging Pump Room Cubicle Cooler x Electrical Penetration Room Area Cubicle Cooler x I&C Equipment Room Cubicle Cooler

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x EDG Room Emergency Cubicle Cooler x EDG Room Emergency Cubicle Cooler x Essential Chiller & Pump Cubicle Cooler x ESW Pump Room Supply Fan Containment failure event for this initiator is considered containment isolation failure and late overpressure failure before or at the time of core damage.

19.1.5.1.1.4.6 Anticipated Transient Without Scram (S-ATWS)

Seismic induced ATWS is modeled based on the seismic failure of control element drive mechanism (CEDM) leading to CEDM binding in the extension shaft. Due to the total failure of CEA insertion and limited capacity of secondary heat removal during the early phase of the accident, this initiator is assumed to directly lead to core damage.

S-ATWS is assumed to lead to containment failure due to the lower HCLPF of mitigation system than ATWS initiating event before or at the time of core damage.

19.1.5.1.1.4.7 Loss of Coolant Accidents Modeling of LOCAs for the PRA-based SMA is performed to identify insights related to seismic design of the plant. As with the internal events PRA, three sizes of LOCAs are considered, small, medium, and large. For seismic-initiated breaches in the RCS, there are significant uncertainties in the size of the break that would result from any specific failure.

That is, any seismic-induced failure of the RCS could result in a spectrum of break flow and analytical means are not available to predict the specific size of a break that would occur due to seismic-induced failure or the likelihood of a break range given a spectrum of potential seismically-induced failures.

Given the analytical limitations for determining seismic-induced LOCA break flow, a practice was employed to use available information to evaluate and express the three LOCA categories for the PRA-based SMA. For the PRA-based SMA, the available component fragility data are evaluated for identifying LOCA events and component seismic failures, that are considered to result in nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) boundary breaches, are used to categorize LOCA size categories. Component failures that can result in NSSS boundary breaches are sorted by maximum potential size. Then, the maximum size for

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each failure is grouped into the size range from the internal events LOCA categories mentioned previously.

Although multiple, smaller, breaches of the RCS could occur simultaneously and result in a total flow that would be considered in a larger LOCA category than that being considered for each individual failures, consideration of such effects is beyond the ability to identify with existing data sources and assumed to result in direct core damage. Additionally, no means is available to determine the degree of correlation between different seismic-induced failures of the RCS. Consequently, it is not feasible to use existing data to determine how multiple, seismically-induced, failures of the RCS would result in a specific plant response.

Use of the maximum potential break size from each of the identified RCS failures is considered adequate for use in the PRA-based SMA to determine the plant-level HCLPF and identify seismic-related insights.

The occurrence of a LOCA after a seismic event presents unique challenges to accident mitigation. The seismic failures having potentially sufficient breach size are modeled as follows:

x Pressurizer Seismic failure of the Pressurizer Surge Line is modeled as Large LOCA.

x Pressurizer spray nozzle Seismic failure of the Pressurizer spray nozzle is modeled as Medium LOCA.

x Various RCS small piping or Tubing Line Seismic failure of the RCS small piping or tubing line is modeled as Small LOCA S-LLOCA and S-MLOCA are assumed to lead to direct core damage and also containment failure due to lower HCLPF of mitigation than LLOCA or MLOCA initiating event.

After a S-SLOCA, mitigation systems are assumed available. In the event of a loss of mitigation systems after S-SLOCA occurs, it would lead to core damage. This would also lead to a loss of containment isolation and late overpressurization before or at the time of core damage. The event tree for S-SLOCA is illustrated in figure 19.1-48B.

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19.1.5.1.1.4.8 Loss of Off-Site Power Seismic induced LOOP is assumed, should no initiating event causing seismic induced SSC damage occur. After a S- LOOP, mitigation systems are assumed available. In the event of a loss of mitigation systems after S- LOOP occurs, it would lead to core damage. This would also lead to a loss of containment isolation and late overpressurization before or at the time of core damage. The event tree for S-SLOOP is illustrated in figure 19.1-48C.

19.1.5.1.1.4.9 Seismic Event Additions to Internal Events Fault Trees The internal events PRA model were modified to include seismically-induced failures.

Since not all the plant equipment have specific fragility data, BOP components in the SEL were assigned a HCLPF of 0.5g. However, seismic failure of each plant component was modeled as a separate basic event to identify important components to mitigate seismic induced initiating events.

The major assumptions for the PRA-based SMA system model are as follows:

a. The loss of offsite power from the earthquake occurs due to the failure of the switchyard or transformer stations outside the plant. It is generally known that the weak link in the offsite power system is ceramic insulators installed in the switchyard and transformer station. Assuming that the offsite power system has the similar type of ceramic insulators, the HCLPF capacity for the offsite power is assigned to be 0.09g (Reference 7977). It is assumed that the seismic event would result in a LOOP, since offsite power equipment is not seismic Category I.

b. No credit is taken for non-safety-related systems, and they are assumed in the model to have failed or to be non-functional due to the seismic event.

c. In the PRA-based SMA system fault trees, the operator actions in the random failure cutsets from the internal events PRA are assumed to apply.

d. If components are same, located on same building location and elevation, they are treated as the fully correlated. To account for potential correlation and dependencies, the correlation between component seismic capacities was assigned binary values of 0 or 1 (fully independent or fully dependent).

Consequently, the components of the same type in the system conservatively

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assumed to be 100% correlated and assigned them as 1, the specific correlation is described in Table 19.1-42.

e. Failure of the reactor trip signal is not modeled since the breakers for motor generator sets would be de-energized following a LOOP due to a seismic event, thereby causing the release of control rods into the core even if the reactor trip function fails. However, seismic induced mechanical failure was modeled to represent the inability of control rod insertion.

f. The following seismic Category I buildings and structures are identified as buildings and structures that involve safety-related SSCs to prevent core damage.

1) Reactor Containment Building

2) Reactor Containment Internal

3) Auxiliary Building

4) CCW heat exchanger building

5) ESW building

6) Emergency Diesel generator building/Diesel Fuel Oil tank building

g. The HCLPFs of turbine building and compound building is assumed to be 1.67 times CSDRS equal to or exceed HCLPF 0.5g, given design details for turbine building and compound building are not available. The failure of these buildings is assumed to result in impact to safety-related SSCs and direct core damage. at the Beyond Design Basis.

h. Seismic spatial interactions between seismic Category I equipment and non-seismically qualified equipment will be avoided by proper equipment layout and design. This interaction includes flooding, spraying, steam jet impingement, pipe whip, jet forces, missiles, fire and the effect of failure of any non-seismic Category I equipment. Such effects cannot be performed, because site-specific SSCs location and layout details are not available. The COL holder should review these seismic spatial interactions during the seismic walkdown (COL 19.1(4)).

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i. Vulnerability of a relay to seismic-induced chatter is highly dependent on the specific type, make and model of relay. The HCLPF for relays is assumed to be 1.67 times CSDRS, given design details for relays are not available.

j. No credit is given to recovery of the mitigation systems and seismic induced failures.

k. When the seismic induced initiating event occurs at the high level of HCLPF (e.g. Large LOCA, Medium LOCA etc.), it is assumed that SSCs for mitigation would not be available and it leads to directly core damage and containment failure.

l. At APR1400 design, no RCP seal design information was available for seismic fragility development. However, the RCP motor is supported by motor stand, which is direct load path of seismic inertia of the motor to the pump and its support. Consequently, seismically induced stress in the RCP sealing is assumed to be small such that the seal failure at a seismic event will not govern seismic fragility of the RCP. Therefore, it is assumed to be bounded by Small LOCA.

m. At APR1400 design, steam generator tube design information was not available for seismic fragility development. For The steam generator tube fragility, a HCLPF of 2.5 times CSDRS was assumed. HCLPF of steam generator tube is equal to or higher than the HCLPF for the steam generator nozzle. The COL applicant is to demonstrate that HCLPF of steam generator tube is equal to or higher than 2.5 times CSDRS the HCLPF for the steam generator nozzle.

n. To derive core damage cutsets for the seismic induced initiating events which do not directly lead to core damage. i.e. Small LOCA and LOOP, the event trees of at-power internal event PRA were used. In the event trees, the reactor trip failure was excluded because seismic induced ATWS is separately treated. ATWS due to binding of control extension shaft in CEDM is unique event for the PRA-based SMA, thus seismic induced ATWS is separately treated.

o. To identify dominant containment failure cutsets for the seismic induced initiating events which are not directly lead to containment failure, Level 1

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event trees above was extended to incorporate containment isolation failure and late overpressure failure as the most probable containment failure modes.

Failure of the containment heat removal was classified as late overpressure failure whether the reactor cavity is flooded or not. Therefore BMT (Basemat Melt-Through) is explicitly considered in the model.

p. HEPs for all operator actions are set to 0.1 to easily identify human failure events in the cutsets. If single operator action is in the cutset with only seismic induced failures, the operator action is considered important. The relative importance of the operator action is based on the HEPs in the internal event model. The performance-shaping factor such as ground motion intensity, location of the action, and time for the action are considered. The damage state of all of the operator action in APR1400 is assumed to be in the most severe condition, because HCLPF of the SSCs except for structures and NSSS are 0.5g. The performance shape factors with the consideration of the seismic condtion are assumed (e.g. 5 for MCR or 10 for local area) in accordance with EPRI 3002000709 (Reference 77).

q. As indicated in the EPRI 3002000709 (Reference 77), seismic induced breaks in one or a very few small impulse lines connected to the primary circuits cannot be precluded, given the large number of such lines and their unusual configurations. Therefore, it is a common (although not a universal) practice in Seismic PRAs to include such a Very Small LOCA (VSLOCA) as an additional assumed failure impact in every seismically initiated accident sequence. The EPRI 3002000709 (Reference 77) presents four optional approaches to model the VSLOCA. In this analysis, the approach of option 2 is adopted, i.e., the VSLOCA has the seismic capacity of 0.3g HCLPF.

r. As indicated in the EPRI 1025287 (Reference 78), the HCLPF value of ruggedness SSCs for a site is above about 2.5 times GMRS. In order to avoid that the PRA-based SMA-results masked by such inherently ruggedness items (e.g. distribution systems, check valve, small instrumentation, etc.), HCLPF capacity are assumed to be rugged. be 2.5 times CSDRS. The COL applicant should confirm that the SSCs are rugged with HCLPFs equal to or higher than 2.5 times CSDRS. (COL19.1(8)).

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s. Plant walkdown are assumed to should be conducted to confirm the assumptions and information used in PRA-based SMA, HCLPF fragilities and LPSD procedures for at-power and LPSD condition. Walkdows also would address impacts of the seismic induced flooding, fire, and accessibility issues affecting operator actions. However, pPlant specific seismic walkdowns are not applicable for DC application phase. and Consequently, the COL holder should demonstrate execute the seismic walkdown (COL 19.1(4)).

t. The remote shutdown room is not considered in the PRA-based SMA, and no credit is taken for operator actions from the remote shutdown room in the PRA-based SMA.

19.1.5.1.1.5 Seismic Fragility Analysis The lack of site-specific information for a DC application application limits the ability to conduct a more meaningful assessment of the secondary effects following a seismic event.

For example, effects of consequential line breaks causing jet impingement cannot be performed because the physical plant layout and construction details are not available. the site-specific SSC location and layout details are not available. The COL applicant or holder should review such a dynamic effects during the seismic walkdown (COL 19.1(4)).

Similarly, any assessment of human error probability values cannot be performed.

Because the DC uses a PRA-based SMA, however, changes in probability value do not affect the overall conclusions of the results, i.e., the plant level HCLPF. If there are any secondary effects causing changes in the HCLPF of SSCs, it will be included in the model.

Seismic fragilities are calculated for specific structures and NSSS components. With the exception of the nuclear island (commont basemat of containment building and auxiliary building), emergency diesel generator building, diesel fuel oil tank building, and the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS), fragility values for the other components included in the SEL are assumed to have a HCLPF equal to or exceeding 1.67 times CSDRS. In addition to them, turbine building, compound building, CCW Hx. building and ESW IS are assumed to have a HCLPF equal to or exceeding HCLPF 0.5g. For this SMA the HCLPF is 0.5g.

According to DC/COL-ISG-020, two methods are acceptable for determining seismic fragility of the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) to demonstrate a seismic margin over the design-specific CSDRS. They are the Conservative Deterministic Failure Margin (CDFM) method and the Separation of Variables (SOV) method. The CDFM

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method requires code allowable as capacity and design analysis demand while the SOV method requires determination of medians and variabilities associated with capacities, equipment response, and structural response. The CDFM method is selected for this evaluation for the APR1400 Design Certification application.

19.1.5.1.2 Determination of Seismic Margin in the Design 19.1.5.1.2.1 Seismic Equipment List The seismic equipment list (SEL) is developed from the internal events PRA model. The SEL provides a documented list of the plant SSCs that could be used to respond to an earthquake or mitigate potential reactor plant damage initiated by a seismic event. The plant has a number of systems that are available for safe shutdown after a seismic event.

In selecting the systems, the following potential seismic initiating event scenarios were considered:

a. Direct core damage scenarios such as building collapse or RCS component catastrophic failure (S-DMG)

b. Station blackout (S-SBO)

c. Loss of all I&C (S-IC)

d. Main Steam Line Break (S-MSLB)

e. Anticipated transient without scram (S-ATWS)

f. Total Loss of Component Cooling Water (S- TLOCCW)

g. Large break LOCA (S-LLOCA)

h. Medium break LOCA (S-MLOCA)

i. Small break LOCA (S-SLOCA)

j. Loss of offsite power (S- LOOP)

As with typical PRA-based SMAs, the analysis considers equipment needed to supply offsite power to be of very low seismic capacity. If offsite power is available after an earthquake, then the earthquake was relatively mild and such events would cause very little

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damage, with virtually all of the safety systems being available for accident mitigation following such a mild event. Additionally, it would be reasonably expected that much of the balance-of-plant systems would also be undamaged.

The following scenarios are not considered further for the SEL:

a. Interfacing Systems LOCA (ISLOCA) - The active ISLOCA-related valves are on the SEL. Check valves have very high seismic capacity, and a potential ISLOCA from these valves following a seismic event is considered not significant.

b. Initiating Event with Partial Failure of Support System - Initiating events such as loss of one train DC power or loss of one train cooling water are not considered as seismically induced initiators because all the same redundant components in the support system will fail simultaneously by earthquake due to an assumed full correlated failure.

Table 19.1-41 lists the systems that were evaluated for the PRA-based SMA with their associated plant designators. Only specific portions of these systems are included in the SEL and SMA models. Because the support systems provide support functions for multiple frontline systems, their availability after an earthquake is critical for successful mitigation of the seismic event.

As described in Subsection 19.1.5.1.1.2, the P&IDs and electrical single-line diagrams were used as the initial input to the SEL. The internal events PRA basic events were then reviewed to provide reasonable assurance that all appropriate equipment was included in the SEL. The SELs are is presented in Table 19.1-42, which includes approximately 350 components. The system modeling and structures associated with the SEL equipment are discussed in Subsection 19.1.5.1.1.4.

19.1.5.1.2.2 Seismic Fragility Analysis Results The following building structures and the RCS components of the APR1400 standard design are evaluated by the CDFM method using the design-specific information within the scope of the DC application. The resulting HCLPF capacities and the associated failure modes of the SSCs are summarized in Table 19.1-43. All the other SSCs are assumed to meet the 1.67 times CSDRS and assumed to have HCLPF of 0.5g conservatively.

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a. Safety-related building structures

1) Reactor containment building

2) Reactor containment internal

3) Auxiliary building

4) Emergency diesel generator building/Diesel fuel oil tank building

b. RCS components

1) Reactor pressure vessel (RPV)

2) Reactor vessel internals (RVI)

3) Control element drive mechanism (CEDM)

4) Pressurizer (PZR)

5) Steam generators (SG)

6) Reactor coolant pumps (RCP)

7) Reactor coolant loop (RCL) piping The APR1400 PRA-based SMA is bounding assumed to bound for the selected site. , site-specific SSC and soil effects (including sliding, overturning, liquefaction, and slope failure)

The COL applicant will confirm and update from new information from the site, e.g. site features, design departures, etc, that the PRA-based seismic margin assessment is bounding for the selected site, site-specific SSCs and soil effects (including sliding, overturning, liquefaction, and slope failure). (COL 19.1(8)).

The dominant contributors to the plant HCLPF are provided in Table 19.1-44A, B, C and D.

19.1.5.1.2.3 Plant Level HCLPF The dominant top cutsets for core damage or containment failure is derived through thesystem analysis. The top 100 core damage and containmemt failure cutsets include: all of the seismic induced failure sequences; all of the operator action failure with a seismic event; the random failure event with seismic event; and the random failure and operator

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action failure with a seismic event. These top cutsets are representative for the seismic accident sequences and used to develop the plant level HCLPF. The cutsets of the combination of seismic event, random failure and operator action failure are used only to develop the insights. The cutsets are grouped into the categories below based on the basic event type in the cutset;

a. Seismic event(s) only

b. Seismic event(s) and Human Failure Event(s)

c. Seismic event(s) and Random Equipment Failure Event(s)

d. Seismic event(s), Human Failure Event(s) and Random Equipment Failure Event(s)

The plant level HCLPF is calculated based on the min-max approach. The plant level HCLPF is obtained by direclty applying the cutsets into the equation below.

Plant Level HCLPF= Min{Max(cutset(1)), Max(cutset(2)), ....Max(cutset(n))}

where, (n) is the number for cutsets which includes seismic failure event(s) only.

For example, the plant level HCLPF by the seismic induced initiators not directly leading to core damage is can be calculated as follows. Let us assume that the cutsets from seismic induced initiators of LOOP, Small LOCA and Large LOCA which includes seismic induced failure(s) only are as follows.

Cutset 1: SEIS-LOOP-0.09G

• SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G

• SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G Cutset 2: SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G

• SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G

• SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G Cutset 3: SEIS-PIPE-RCS-FAIL-0.55G Cutset 4: SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G

• EIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G

• MSOPH-S-ASC-SLOCA Cutset 5: SEIS-LOOP-0.09G

• SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G

• SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G

• DGDGR-A-DGA

• DGDGR-B-DGB By applying the custsets to the min-max equation, the plant level HCLPF can be obtained by the loop initiator below.

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Plant level HCLPF = Min{Max(0.09g, 0.5g, 0.5g), Max(0.3g, 0.5g, 0.5g), Max(0.55g)

Max(0.3g, 0.5g)*0.1, Max(0.09g, 0.5g, 0.5g)*2.5E-2*2.5E-2}

= Min(0.5g, 0.5g, 0.55g, >0.5g, >0.5g) = 0.5g The APR1400 PRA-based SMA considered sequence-level HCLPFs and fragilities for all sequences leading to core damage or containment failures up to approximately one and two thirds the ground motion acceleration of the Design Basis SSE. The plant HCLPF was calculated by finding the lowest HCLPF sequence. The resultant plant level HCLPF value equal to 0.5g, which is greater than or equal to the RLE. Therefore, the plant level HCLPF demonstrates the APR1400 design can withstand a review level earthquake of 1.67 times the CSDRS and the assessment of the seismic capacity of the APR1400 design meets the expectations of SECY-93-087.

19.1.5.1.2.4 Risk Insights 19.1.5.1.2.4.1 Core Damage Risk Insights All the core damage cutsets with single direct core damage event are shown in Table 19.1-44A. The top 100 core damage cutsets, having more than 2 basic events (including seismic induced events) are shown in Table 19.1-44B. As discussed above, based on the cutsets review, the plant HCLPF of APR1400 for core damage is 0.5g. Consequently, APR1400 meets the requirement to withstand a review level earthquake of 1.67 times CSDRS. The important at-power insights, core damage cutsets and HCLPF values for the APR1400 PRA-based SMA are as follows:

a. APR1400 has 576 structures (including NI stability), any one of which fails leads to direct core damage due to the catastrophic failure of RCS or safety-related components. The 76 structures are listed in section 19.1.5.1.1.4.1 and 19.1.5.1.1.4.2.

The structure failure induced S-DMG HCLPF is 0.5g. The sequence HCLPF is 0.5g, because each of structure is 0.94g, 0.51g, 0.52g, 0.5g and 0.5g. The results are led by the collapse of seismic category II building (e.g. turbine building and compound building), COL applicant confirm that the HCLPF of turbine building and compound building is equal to or higher than 1.67 times CSDRSHCLPF 0.5g.

The 5 structures are listed in the section 19.1.5.1.1.4.1. Therefore the structure failure induced S-DMG HCLPF is 0.5g.

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b. APR1400 has 6 RCS components, any one of which fails leads to direct core damage due to the catastrophic failure of RCS. The HCLPF of the each component is 0.92g, 0.51g, 0.6g, 0.54g, 0.63g and 1.31g. The 6 RCS components are listed in the section 19.1.5.1.1.4.1. Therefore the RCS component catastrophic failure induced DCD HCLPF is 0.51g.

c. APR1400 has 13 components, any one of which fails leads to SBO thus resulting in core damage. The HCLPF of the each component is same as 0.5g. The 13 components are listed in the section 19.1.5.1.1.4.2. Therefore the S-SBO HCLPF is 0.5g.

d. APR1400 has 4 components, any one of which fails leads to S-IC thus resulting in core damage. The HCLPF of the each component is same as 0.5g. except for one component type. The exceptional one component type is all the screen-outed plant-wide distributed equipment. It has the HCLPF of 0.75g. The 4 components are listed in the section 19.1.5.1.1.4.3. Therefore the S-IC HCLPF is 0.5g.

e. APR1400 has 3 components, any one of which failure leads to S-MSLB thus resulting in core damage. The HCLPF of the each component is same as 0.5g.

The 3 components are listed in the section 19.1.5.1.1.4.4. Therefore the S-MSLB HCLPF is 0.5g.

f. APR1400 has 25 24 SSCs, any one of which fails leads to S-TLOCCW thus resulting in core damage. The HCLPF of the each SSC is same as 0.5g. The 25 24 SSCs are listed in the section 19.1.5.1.1.4.5. Therefore the S-TLOCCW HCLPF is 0.5g.

g. APR1400 has 1 component, of which fails leads to S-ATWS thus resulting in core damage. The HCLPF of the component is same as 0.64g. The component is listed in the section 19.1.5.1.1.4.6. Therefore the S-ATWS HCLPF is 0.64g.

h. APR 1400 has 2 components, of which fails leads to S-LLOCA, S-MLOCA thus resulting in core damage. The S-LLOCA HCLPF is 0.55g and the S-MLOCA HCLPF is 0.51g. In case of large LOCA and medium LOCA have the relatively lower HCLPF than usual, it because the HCLPF result have the conservatism (e.g.

enveloped 9 site response spectrum and design). When the plant specific design information is reflected in the HCLPF, it may result in higher value. COL applicant has to demonstate that the design of NSSS to have higher 2.5 times CSDRS.

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i. APR1400 has 2 seismic induced initiating events which do not directly led to core damage. They are small LOCA and LOOP. The sequence level HCLPF for Small LOCA and LOOP are 0.5g and both 0.5g.

j. Important seismic induced failures for non-direct core damage initiators are seismic induced failures of a motor driven auxiliary feed water pump, turbine driven auxiliary feed water pump, containment spray pump, shutdown cooling pump, and safety injection pump. These SSCs are related to perform the secondary heat removal, RCS injection and long term containment heat removal.

k. Important operator actions for non-direct core damage initiators are as follows.

- RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW (Operator Fails to Open POSRVs in Early Phase for F&B Operation): Failure of operator action to open POSRV cause failure of feed &

bleed operation. The failure of feed & bleed operation and secondary heat removal after seismic induced LOOP or SLOCA event leads to core damage.

- SIOPH-S-IRWSTCOOL (Operator Fails to Cool IRWST Water Using SCS Pump): Failure of operator action to cool IRWST water using SCS pump causes the failure of long term containment heat removal. The failure of long term containment heat removal and secondary heat removal after seismic induced S-LOOP or SLOCA event leads to core damage.

- SIOPH-S-INJ (Operator Fails to Align SCS for Injection): Failure of operator action fails to align SCS for injection causes the failure of the SCS injection.

The failure of the SCS injection and SI injection after seismic event of LOOP or SLOCA leads to core damage.

- MSOPH-S-ASC-SLOCA (Operator Fails to Perform Aggressive Secondary Cooldown After SLOCA): Failure of operator action to perform aggressive secondary cooldown causing causes the failure of the aggressive secondary cooldown. The failure of operator action to perform aggressive secondary cooldown and SI injection after seismic event of SLOCA leads to core damage.

- AFOPH-S-ALT-LT (Operator Fails to Transfer AFW Source from AFWST to RWT): Failure of operator action to transfer AFW source from AFWST to RWT causes the failure of secondary heat removal. The failure of secondary heat

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removal and long term containment heat removal after seismic event of SLOCA or S-LOOP leads to core damage.

The final HEP is based on the internal event and is calculated by applying a with performance shaping factor and the important operator action after updating the HEP is in the following order:

1) MSOPH-S-ASC-SLOCA

2) RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW

3) SIOPH-S-INJ

4) AFOPH-S-ALT-LT

5) SIOPH-S-IRWSTCOOL

l. Important random failure events for non-direct core damage initiators are as follows.

- DGDGR-A-DGA, DGDGR-B-DGB, DGDGR-C-DGC, DGDGR-D-DGD (FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A, B, C and D):

Failure of EDG A, B, C or D with LOOP leads to failure of essential power supply partially.

- RCPVWQ4-200/1/2/3 (4/4 CCF of RC PV V200/201/202/203): CCF of RC PV V200/201/202/203 cause the failure of the feed & bleed operation. The failure of feed and bleed operation and failure of secondary heat removal leads to core damage.

- CSMPM2A-PP01A, CSMPM2B-PP01B (CS PUMP 1 PP01A/ CS PUMP 2 PP01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M): Failure of CS Pump 01A& 01B is related to the failure of long term containment heat removal. The failure of long term containment heat removal and secondary heat removal after seismic event of S-LOOP or SLOCA leads to core damage.

- SIMPM1A-SCPP01A, SIMPM1B-SCPP01B (SC PUMP PP01A or 01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M): Failure of SC pump 01A & 01B is related to the failure of long term containment heat removal. The failure of long term

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containment heat removal and secondary heat removal after seismic event of S-LOOP or SLOCA leads to core damage.

19.1.5.1.2.4.2 Containment Failure Risk Insights All the containment failure cutsets which are directly resulted from single seismic induced damage are shown Table 19.1-44C. The top 100 containment failure cutsets which are composed of more than 2 failure events including seismic induced failure event are shown in Table 19.1-44D. Based on the cutsets review, the plant HCLPF of APR1400 for containment failure is 0.5g. The important insights, containment failure cutsets and HCLPF values for the APR1400 PRA-based SMA are as follows:

a. APR1400 has 576 structures (including NI Stability), any one of which failure leads to direct core damage due to the catastrophic failure of RCS or safety-related components. The 7 structures are listed in section 19.1.5.1.1.4.1 and 19.1.5.1.1.4.2.

The structure failure induced S-DMG HCLPF is 0.5g. This containment failure can be classified as early containment failure. This event is also assumed to directly lead to the containment structural failure. The sequence HCLPF is 0.5g, because each of structure is 0.94g, 0.51g, 0.52g, 0.5g and 0.5g. The results are driven by the collapse of seismic category II building (e.g. turbine building and compound building). The COL applicant is to confirm that the HCLPF of turbine building and compound building is equal to or higher than 1.67 times CSDRSHCLPF 0.5g. The 5 structures are listed in the section 19.1.5.1.1.4.1. Therefore the structure failure induced S-DMG HCLPF is 0.5g. This containment failure can be classified as early containment failure.

b. APR1400 has 6 RCS components, any one of which failure leads to direct core damage due to the catastrophic failure of RCS. This event is also assumed to directly lead to the containment structural failure due to impact to the containment from the large movement or vibration of RCS, and the containment structural failure.

The HCLPF of the each component is 0.92g, 0.51g, 0.6g, 0.54g, 0.63g and 1.31g.

The 6 RCS components are listed in the section 19.1.5.1.1.4.1. Therefore the RCS component catastrophic failure induced S-DCF HCLPF is 0.51g. This containment failure can be classified as early containment failure.

c. APR1400 has 13 components, any one of which failure leads to S-SBO thus resulting in core damage. This event is also assumed to directly lead to the

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containment isolation failure due to the total loss of supporting system failure. The HCLPF of the each component is same as 0.5g. The 13 components are listed in the section 19.1.5.1.1.4.2. Therefore the S-SBO induced containment failure HCLPF is 0.5g. This containment failure can be classified as containment isolation failure.

d. APR1400 has 4 components, any one of which failure lead to S-IC thus resulting in core damage. The HCLPF of the each component is same as 0.5g except for one component type. The exceptional one component type is all the screen-outed plant-wide distributed equipment (e.g. BOP piping & supports, AOVs, cable trays &

supports, etc.). This event is also assumed to directly lead to the containment isolation failure due to the total loss of all instrumentation and control. It has the containment failure HCLPF of 0.75g. The 4 components are listed in the section 19.1.5.1.1.4.3. Therefore the S-IC containment HCLPF is 0.5g. This containment failure can be classified as containment isolation failure.

e. APR1400 has 3 components, any one of which failure lead to S-MSLB thus resulting in core damage. This event is also assumed to directly lead to the containment isolation failure through the failed main steam line components. The HCLPF of the each component is same as 0.5g. The 3 components are listed in the section 19.1.5.1.1.4.4. Therefore the S-MSLB containment failure HCLPF is 0.5g.

This containment failure can be classified as containment isolation failure.

f. For the seismic initiators of S-TLOCCW, S-SLOCA and S-LOOP, additional mitigation (e.g. Containment heat removal and Containment isolation failure) was considered for the containment failure.

g. Important seismic induced failures for non-direct containment failure initiators leading to containment failure are seismic induced failures of motor driven auxiliary feed water pump, turbine driven auxiliary feed water pump, containment spray pump, shutdown cooling pump, and safety injection pump. These SSCs are related to perform the secondary heat removal, RCS injection and long term containment heat removal.

h. Important operator actions for non-direct core damage initiators are as follows.

- AFOPH-S-ALT-LT (Operator Fails to Transfer AFW Source from AFWST to RWT): Failure of operator fails to transfer AFW source from AFWST to RWT

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causes the failure of secondary heat removal. The failure of secondary heat removal and long term containment heat removal after seismic event of SLOCA or S-LOOP leads to containment failure.

- MSOPH-S-ASC-SLOCA (Operator Fails to Perform Aggressive Secondary Cooldown After SLOCA): Failure of operator action to perform aggressive secondary cooldown causes the failure of the aggressive secondary cooldown.

The failure of operator to perform aggressive secondary cooldown, SI injection and Containment isolation after seismic event of SLOCA leads to containment failure.

- RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW (Operator Fails to Open POSRVs in Early Phase for F&B Operation): Failure of operator action to open POSRV cause failure of feed &

bleed operation. The failure of feed & bleed operation, secondary heat removal and Containment isolation after seismic induced LOOP or SLOCA event leads to containment failure.

- SIOPH-S-IRWSTCOOL (Operator Fails to Cool IRWST Water Using SCS Pump): Failure of operator action to open POSRV to cool IRWST water using SCS pump causes the failure of long term containment heat removal. The failure of long term containment heat removal, secondary heat removal and Containmnet isolation seismic induced S-LOOP or SLOCA event leads to containment isolation.

The final HEP based on the internal event is calculated with performance shaping factor. The important operator action is same as those in Section 19.1.5.1.2.3.1

i. m Important random failure events for non-direct containment failure initiators do not impact significantly in the PRA-based SMA results in the top 100 cutsets.

19.1.9 Combined License Information COL 19.1(4) The COL applicant or holder is is to review as-designed and as-built information and conduct walkdowns as necessary to confirm that the assumptions used in the PRA (including PRA inputs to RAP and SAMDA) remain valid with respect to internal events, internal flood and fire events

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(fire barrier and fire barrier penetrations, routings and locations of pipe, cable, and conduit), and HRA analyses (development of operating procedures, emergency operating procedures, and severe accident management guidelines and training), external events including PRA-based seismic margins,and HCLPF fragilities, seismic spatial interactions and LPSD procedures. See Subsection 19.1.2.2.

COL 19.1(8) The COL applicant is to will confirm and update that the PRA-based seismic margin assessment is bounding for the selected site, site-specific SSC and soil effects (including sliding, overturning liquefaction, and slope failure). The COL applicant will confirm and update from new information from the site, e.g. site features, design departures, etc, that the PRA-based seismic margin assessment is bounding for the selected site, site-specific SSC and soil effects (including sliding, overturning, liquefaction, and slope failure). The COL applicant is to confirm that the as-built plant has adequate seismic margin and do not exceed the CDF and LRF design targets specified in Subsection 1.2.1.1.1 e. See Subsection 19.1.5.1.2.

The COL applicant is to demonstrate that HCLPF capacity is equal to or exceed 1.67 times the GMRS HCLPF 0.5g for site-specific structures (ESW IS and CCW HX Building).

The COL applicant is to demonstrate that site-specific structures (the turbine building, compound building, ESW IS and CCW HX building) have a HCLPF capacity that is equal to or greater than 0.5g and will update the PRA-based seismic margin analysis with the site-specific structure HCLPF value, accordingly.

The COL applicant is to demonstrate that HCLPF capacity is equal to or exceed 1.67 times the CSDRS for BOP components and is to complete the SEL.

The COL applicant is to demonstrate that the seismic capacity for equipment and relay qualified by testing should remain functionally operational within 1.67 times the required response spectra (CSDRS based RRS) in the procurement specification.

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The COL applicant is to demonstrate that HCLPF capacity is equal to or exceed 1.67 times the CSDRSHCLPF 0.5g for turbine building and compound building.

The COL applicant is to demonstrate that HCLPF capacity is equal to or exceed 2.5 times the CSDRS for the inherently rugged items (such as valve, small instrumentation and distribution system. Etc.) are rugged.

The COL applicant is to demonstrate that the inherently rugged components identified in 19.1.5.1.1.2 have seismically rugged capacity.

The COL applicant is to demonstrate that the NSSS steam generator tube HCLPF is designed to have a HCLPF value higher than 2.5 times CSDRS HCLPF for the steam generator nozzle.

COL 19.1(22) The COL applicant is to demonstrate that failure of buildings that are not seismic Category I (e.g., turbine building and compound building) does not impact SSCs designed to be seismic Category I at the SSE level.

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19.1.10 References

74. WSRC-TR-93-262, Rev. 1, Savannah River Site Generic Data Base Development, Westinghouse Safety Management Solution, May 1998.

75. NUREG/CR-4639 (EGG-2458), Nuclear computerized Library for Assessing Reactor Reliability (NUCLARR), May 1990.

76. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, SPAR Basic Event Unavailability Data and Results, 2010 Parameter Estimation Update, http://nrcoe.inel.gov/resultsdb/publicdocs/AvgPerf/TrainUA2010.pdf

77. EPRI 3002000709, Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Implementation Guide, December, 2013

78. EPRI 1025287, Seismic Evaluation Guidance, February, 2013 7879. Risk Assessment of Operational Events Handbook External Events, Volume 2, R.1.01, USNRC, January 2008 7980. DC/COL-ISG-028, Assessing the Technical Adequacy of the advanced Light-Water Reactor Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the Design Certification Application and Combined License Application, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Table 19.1-4 (26 of 27)

No. Insight Disposition Risk Insights from PRA Models 66 HCLPF capacity need to be equal to or exceed 1.67 times the GMRS HCLPF 0.5g for site-specific structures (ESWIS and CCW Hx Building) and The COL 19.1(8)

HCLPF capacity is equal to or exceeds 1.67 times the CSDRS for BOP components, and is to complete the SEL.

The HCLPF for turbine building and compound building need to be equal to or higher than 1.67 times CSDRS HCLPF 0.5g.

The COL applicant is to demonstrate that site-specific structures (the turbine building, compound building, ESW IS and CCW HX building) have a HCLPF COL 19.1(8) capacity that is equal to or greater than 0.5g and will update the PRA-based seismic margin analysis with the site-specific structure HCLPF value, accordingly.

The HCLPF for test equipment including relay need to be equal to or higher than 1.67 times CSDRS. COL 19.1(8)

HCLPF capacity for Inherently rugged items (such as valve, small instrumentation and distribution system. Etc.). is equal to or exceed 2.5 times the CSDRS. The COL applicant is to demonstrate that the inherently COL 19.1(8) rugged components identified in 19.1.5.1.1.2 have seismically rugged capacity.

The HCLPF for NSSS needs to be equal to or higher than 2.5 times CSDRS COL 19.1(8) Subsection 19.1.5.1.2.4 The important operator action and random failure event for PRA-based SMA should be managed by COL holder to improve the human error.

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Table 19.1-41 (1 of 2)

Systems Considered for Seismic Equipment List System Description Actuation Reactor trip Safety Injection (SI)

Containment isolation (CIS)

Containment ventilation isolation (CVIS)

Main steam line isolation Feedwater line isolation AFW start EDG start and load sequence CRD Control rods RCS Reactor Coolant System, including RC Pumps, SG, PZR, POSRVs MS Main Steam: MSSVs, MSIVs, MSADVs AFW Auxiliary Feedwater (MD and TD)

CVCS Chemical Volume & Control System: Charging, pressurizer spray, and RCP seal injection SC Shutdown Cooling System CS Containment Spray SI Safety Injection CCW Component Cooling Water ESW Essential Service Water ECW Essential Chilled Water EDG HVAC Emergency Diesel Generator Area HVAC System E-I&C HVAC Electrical and I&C Equipment Areas HVAC System ESW/CCW HVAC ESW Pump Building / CCW HX Building HVAC System Aux Bldg HVAC Aux Building Controlled Area HVAC System Aux Bldg HVAC Aux Building Clean Area HVAC System

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Table 19.1-41 (2 of 2)

System Description MCR Main Control Room Consoles ESF ESF Cabinets RX Trip Reactor Trip Switchgear DG Fuel Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer System EDG Emergency Diesel Generators EP Electrical power

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Table 19.1-42 (1 of 19)G Seismic Equipment List Floor No. Equipment ID Equipment Description Building Correlation Factor1)

Elevation 1 1-431-M-RV01 Reactor Pressure Vessel 69'-156' Containment 1 2 - Reactor Vessel Internals 69'-156' Containment 1 3 1-431-M-SG01 Steam Generator #1 114'-136' Containment 1

4 1-431-M-SG02 Steam Generator #2 114'-136' Containment 5 1-431-M-PZ01 Pressurizer 114'-156' Containment 1 6 1-431-M-PP01A Reactor Coolant Pump #1 114'-136' Containment 7 1-431-M-PP01B Reactor Coolant Pump #2 114'-136' Containment 1

8 1-431-M-PP01C Reactor Coolant Pump #3 114'-136' Containment 9 1-431-M-PP01D Reactor Coolant Pump #4 114'-136' Containment 10 1-441-M-TK01A Safety Injection Tank 1 136' Containment 11 1-441-M-TK01B Safety Injection Tank 2 136' Containment 1

12 1-441-M-TK01C Safety Injection Tank 3 136' Containment 13 1-441-M-TK01D Safety Injection Tank 4 136' Containment 14 1-451-M-HE01 Regenerative Heat Exchanger 128' Containment 1 15 1-451-M-PP01A Charging Pumps #1 55' Aux.

1 16 1-451-M-PP01B Charging Pumps #2 55' Aux.

17 1-451-M-HE02 Letdown Heat Exchanger 100' Containment 1

 )XOO\&RUUHODWHGHTXLSPHQWKDYHFRUUHODWLRQIDFWRU

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Table 19.1-42 (2 of 19)G Floor No. Equipment ID Equipment Description Building Correlation Factor Elevation 18 1-521-V-0012 Main Steam Isolation Valve 137' Aux.

19 1-521-V-0011 Main Steam Isolation Valve 137' Aux.

1 20 1-521-V-0014 Main Steam Isolation Valve 137' Aux.

21 1-521-V-0013 Main Steam Isolation Valve 137' Aux.

22 1-521-V-0101 Main Steam Atmospheric Dump Valve 137' Aux.

23 1-521-V-0102 Main Steam Atmospheric Dump Valve 137' Aux.

1 24 1-521-V-0104 Main Steam Atmospheric Dump Valve 137' Aux.

25 1-521-V-0103 Main Steam Atmospheric Dump Valve 137' Aux.

26 1-461-M-TK01A Component Cooling Water Surge Tank 172' Aux.

1 27 1-461-M-TK01B Component Cooling Water Surge Tank 172' Aux.

Essential Chiller (includes Compressor Condenser, Evaporator, 28 1-633-M-CH01A 78' Aux.

controls, RVs, Tanks)

Essential Chiller (includes Compressor Condenser, Evaporator, 29 1-633-M-CH02A 78' Aux.

controls, RVs, Tanks) 1 Essential Chiller (includes Compressor Condenser, Evaporator, 30 1-633-M-CH01B 78' Aux.

controls, RVs, Tanks)

Essential Chiller (includes Compressor Condenser, Evaporator, 31 1-633-M-CH02B 78' Aux.

controls, RVs, Tanks) 32 1-607-M-HV33A MDAFW Pump Room Unit 78' Aux.

33 1-607-M-CW33A MDAFW Pump Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 78' Aux.

1 34 1-607-M-HV33B MDAFW Pump Room Unit 78' Aux.

35 1-607-M-CW33B MDAFW Pump Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 78' Aux.

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Table 19.1-42 (3 of 19)G Floor No. Equipment ID Equipment Description Building Correlation Factor Elevation 36 1-431-V-0200 POSRV 200 136' Containment 37 1-431-V-0201 POSRV 201 136' Containment 38 1-431-V-0132 MOV Control Valves (POSRV 201) 136' Containment 39 1-431-V-0133 MOV Control Valves (POSRV 201) 136' Containment 40 1-431-V-0202 POSRV 202 136' Containment 1

41 1-431-V-0134 MOV Control Valves (POSRV 202) 136' Containment 42 1-431-V-0135 MOV Control Valves (POSRV 202) 136' Containment 43 1-431-V-0203 POSRV 203 136' Containment 44 1-431-V-0136 MOV Control Valves (POSRV 203) 136' Containment 45 1-431-V-0137 MOV Control Valves (POSRV 203) 136' Containment 46 1-441-M-PP01A SDC Pump 1 50' Aux.

1 47 1-441-M-PP01B SDC Pump 2 50' Aux.

48 1-441-M-PP02A SI Pump 1 50' Aux.

49 1-441-M-PP02B SI Pump 2 50' Aux.

1 50 1-441-M-PP02C SI Pump 3 50' Aux.

51 1-441-M-PP02D SI Pump 4 50' Aux.

52 1-441-M-HE01A SDC HX 1 50' Aux.

1 53 1-441-M-HE01B SDC HX 2 50' Aux.

54 1-441-M-HE02A SDC Miniflow HX 1 50' Aux.

1 55 1-441-M-HE02B SDC Miniflow HX 2 50' Aux.

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Table 19.1-42 (4 of 19)G Floor No. Equipment ID Equipment Description Building Correlation Factor Elevation 56 1-442-M-PP01A Containment Spray Pump 1 50' Aux.

1 57 1-442-M-PP01B Containment Spray Pump 2 50' Aux.

58 1-442-M-HE01A Containment Spray Heat Exchanger 55' Aux.

1 59 1-442-M-HE01B Containment Spray Line 2 Heat Exchanger 55' Aux.

60 1-442-M-HE02A CS Pump 1 Miniflow Heat Exchanger 50' Aux.

1 61 1-442-M-HE02B CS Pump 2 Miniflow Heat Exchanger 50' Aux.

62 1-461-M-PP01A CCW Pump 1A 55' Aux.

63 1-461-M-PP02A CCW Pump 2A 55' Aux.

1 64 1-461-M-PP01B CCW Pump 1B 55' Aux.

65 1-461-M-PP02B CCW Pump 2B 55' Aux.

CCW HX 66 1-461-M-HE01A CCW Heat Exchanger 1A 100' Building CCW HX 67 1-461-M-HE02A CCW Heat Exchanger 2A 100' Building CCW HX 68 1-461-M-HE03A CCW Heat Exchanger 3A 100' Building 1

CCW HX 69 1-461-M-HE01B CCW Heat Exchanger 1B 100' Building CCW HX 70 1-461-M-HE02B CCW Heat Exchanger 2B 100' Building CCW HX 71 1-461-M-HE03B CCW Heat Exchanger 3B 100' Building

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Table 19.1-42 (5 of 19)G Floor No. Equipment ID Equipment Description Building Correlation Factor Elevation 72 1-462-M-PP01A ESW Pump 1A 69' ESW building 73 1-462-M-PP02A ESW Pump 2A 69' ESW building 1

74 1-462-M-PP01B ESW Pump 1B 69' ESW building 75 1-462-M-PP02B ESW Pump 2B 69' ESW building 76 1-542-M-PP01A Aux Feedwater Pump C (Turbine Driven) 78' Aux.

1 77 1-542-M-PP01B Aux Feedwater Pump D (Turbine Driven) 78' Aux.

78 1-542-M-PP02A Aux Feedwater Pump A (Motor Driven) 78' Aux.

1 79 1-542-M-PP02B Aux Feedwater Pump B (Motor Driven) 78' Aux.

80 1-591-M-PP22A Fuel Oil Feed Pump 100' EDG Building 1

81 1-591-M-PP22B Fuel Oil Feed Pump 100' EDG Building 82 1-591-M-PP22C Fuel Oil Feed Pump 100' Aux.

1 83 1-591-M-PP22D Fuel Oil Feed Pump 100' Aux.

84 1-595-M-TK01A Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank A 63' EDG Building 1

85 1-595-M-TK01B Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank B 63' EDG Building 86 1-595-M-TK01C Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank C 65' Aux.

1 87 1-595-M-TK01D Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank D 65' Aux.

88 1-595-M-PP01A Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 63' EDG Building 89 1-595-M-PP01B Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 63' EDG Building 1

90 1-595-M-PP02A Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 63' EDG Building 91 1-595-M-PP02B Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 63' EDG Building

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Table 19.1-42 (6 of 19)G Floor No. Equipment ID Equipment Description Building Correlation Factor Elevation 92 1-595-M-PP01C Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 65' Aux.

93 1-595-M-PP01D Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 65' Aux.

1 94 1-595-M-PP02C Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 65' Aux.

95 1-595-M-PP02D Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 65' Aux.

96 1-595-M-TK02A Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank A 121' EDG Building 1

97 1-595-M-TK02B Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank B 121' EDG Building 98 1-595-M-TK02C Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank C 120' Aux.

1 99 1-595-M-TK02D Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank D 120' Aux.

100 1-601-V-Y0011A Electro-Hydraulic Inlet Damper 172' Aux.

1 101 1-601-V-Y0011B Electro-Hydraulic Inlet Damper 172' Aux.

102 1-602-M-AH02A EDG Room Exhaust Fan/Motor 100' EDG Building 1

103 1-602-M-AH02B EDG Room Exhaust Fan/Motor 100' EDG Building 104 1-602-M-AH02C EDG Room Exhaust Fan/Motor 172' Aux.

1 105 1-602-M-AH02D EDG Room Exhaust Fan/Motor 172' Aux.

106 1-591-M-DG01A 4.16kV CLASS 1E DIESEL GENERATORS 1-591-M-DG01A 100' EDG Building 1

107 1-591-M-DG01B 4.16kV CLASS 1E DIESEL GENERATORS 1-591-M-DG01B 100' EDG Building 108 1-591-M-DG01C 4.16kV CLASS 1E DIESEL GENERATORS 1-591-M-DG01C 100' Aux.

1 109 1-591-M-DG01D 4.16kV CLASS 1E DIESEL GENERATORS 1-591-M-DG01D 100' Aux.

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Table 19.1-42 (7 of 19)G Floor No. Equipment ID Equipment Description Building Correlation Factor Elevation CS PUMP & MINIFLOW HEAT EXCHANGER RM Aux Bld 110 1-606-M-HV10A 50' Aux.

Controlled Area HVAC Fan/Motor 111 1-606-M-CW10A CS (Quad C) Mini Flow HX Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 50' Aux.

1 CS PUMP & MINIFLOW HEAT EXCHANGER RM Aux Bld 112 1-606-M-HV10B 50' Aux.

Controlled Area HVAC Fan/Motor 113 1-606-M-CW10B CS (Quad D) Mini Flow HX Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 50' Aux.

114 1-606-M-HV11A SI PUMP RM Aux Bld Controlled Area HVAC Fan/Motor 50' Aux.

115 1-606-M-CW11A SI Pump (Quad C) Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 50' Aux.

116 1-606-M-HV11B SI PUMP RM Aux Bld Controlled Area HVAC Fan/Motor 50' Aux.

117 1-606-M-CW11B SI Pump (Quad D) Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 50' Aux.

1 118 1-606-M-HV12A SI PUMP RM Aux Bld Controlled Area HVAC Fan/Motor 50' Aux.

119 1-606-M-CW12A SI Pump (Quad A) Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 55' Aux.

120 1-606-M-HV12B SI PUMP RM Aux Bld Controlled Area HVAC Fan/Motor 50' Aux.

121 1-606-M-CW12B SI Pump (Quad B) Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 50' Aux.

SC PUMP & MINIFLOW HEAT EXCHANGER RM Cubical 122 1-606-M-HV16A 50' Aux.

Cooler 123 1-606-M-CW16A SC Pump & Mini Flow HX Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 50' Aux.

1 SC PUMP & MINIFLOW HEAT EXCHANGER RM Cubical 124 1-606-M-HV16B 50' Aux.

Cooler 125 1-606-M-CW16B SC Pump & Mini Flow HX Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 50' Aux.

126 1-606-M-HV18A CHARGING PUMP RM Cubicle Cooler 55' Aux.

1 127 1-606-M-HV18B CHARGING PUMP RM Cubicle Cooler 55' Aux.

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Table 19.1-42 (8 of 19)G Floor No. Equipment ID Equipment Description Building Correlation Factor Elevation Aux Building Controlled Area (I) Emergency Exhaust ACU 128 1-606-V-Y0001A 156' Aux.

Outlet Damper Aux Building Controlled Area (II) Emergency Exhaust ACU 129 1-606-V-Y0001B 195' Aux.

Outlet Damper Aux Building Controlled Area (I) Emergency Exhaust ACU Inlet 1 130 1-606-V-Y0002A 156' Aux.

Damper Aux Building Controlled Area (II) Emergency Exhaust ACU 131 1-606-V-Y0002B 195' Aux.

Inlet Damper 132 1-607-M-HV31A Ess. Chiller Room Cubical Cooler 78' Aux.

133 1-607-M-CW31A Ess. Chiller Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 78' Aux.

134 1-607-M-HV31B Ess. Chiller Room Cubical Cooler 78' Aux.

135 1-607-M-CW31B Ess. Chiller Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 78' Aux.

1 136 1-607-M-HV32A Ess. Chiller Room Cubical Cooler 78' Aux.

137 1-607-M-CW32A Ess. Chiller Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 78' Aux.

138 1-607-M-HV32B Ess. Chiller Room Cubical Cooler 78' Aux.

139 1-607-M-CW32B Ess. Chiller Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 78' Aux.

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Table 19.1-42 (9 of 19)G Floor Correlation Factor No. Equipment ID Equipment Description Building Elevation 140 1-606-M-HV13A CCW PUMP RM Aux Bld Controlled Area HVAC Fan/Motor 55' Aux.

141 1-606-M-CW13A CCW Pump (Quad A) Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 55' Aux.

142 1-606-M-HV13B CCW PUMP RM Aux Bld Controlled Area HVAC Fan/Motor 55' Aux.

143 1-606-M-CW13B CCW Pump (Quad B) Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 55' Aux.

1 144 1-606-M-HV14A CCW PUMP RM Aux Bld Controlled Area HVAC Fan/Motor 55' Aux.

145 1-606-M-CW14A CCW Pump (Quad C) Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 55' Aux.

146 1-606-M-HV14B CCW PUMP RM Aux Bld Controlled Area HVAC Fan/Motor 55' Aux.

147 1-606-M-CW14B CCW Pump (Quad D) Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 55' Aux.

AUX. CHARGING PUMP RM Aux Bld Controlled Area 148 1-606-M-HV21B 55' Aux. 1 HVAC Fan/Motor SC HEAT EXCHANGER RM Aux Bld Controlled Area HVAC 149 1-606-M-HV17A 55' Aux.

Fan/Motor 150 1-606-M-CW17A SC HX Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 55' Aux.

1 SC HEAT EXCHANGER RM Aux Bld Controlled Area HVAC 151 1-606-M-HV17B 55' Aux.

Fan/Motor 152 1-606-M-CW17B SC HX Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 55' Aux.

CS HEAT EXCHANGER RM Aux Bld Controlled Area HVAC 153 1-606-M-HV15A 55' Aux.

Fan/Motor 154 1-606-M-CW15A CS HX Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 55' Aux. 1 CS HEAT EXCHANGER RM Aux Bld Controlled Area HVAC 155 1-606-M-HV15B 55' Aux.

Fan/Motor

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Table 19.1-42 (10 of 19)G Floor Correlation No. Equipment ID Equipment Description Building Elevation Factor 156 1-607-M-HV33A MDAFW Pump Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 78' Aux.

157 1-607-M-CW33A MDAFW Pump Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 78' Aux.

1 158 1-607-M-HV33B MDAFW Pump Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 78' Aux.

159 1-607-M-CW33B MDAFW Pump Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 78' Aux.

160 1-603-M-HV01A CLASS 1E SWITCHGEAR 01C RM Cubical Cooler 78' Aux.

161 1-603-M-HV01B CLASS 1E SWITCHGEAR 01D RM Cubical Cooler 78' Aux.

1 162 1-603-M-HV02A CLASS 1E LOADCENTER 01C RM Cubical Cooler 78' Aux.

163 1-603-M-HV02B CLASS 1E LOADCENTER 01D RM Cubical Cooler 78' Aux.

164 1-603-M-HV03A CHANNEL A DC&IP EQUIP. RM CC Cubical Cooler 78' Aux.

165 1-603-M-HV03B CHANNEL B DC&IP EQUIP. RM Cubical Cooler 78' Aux.

1 166 1-603-M-HV04A CHANNEL C DC&IP EQUIP. RM Cubical Cooler 78' Aux.

167 1-603-M-HV04B CHANNEL D DC&IP EQUIP. RM Cubical Cooler 78' Aux.

168 1-603-M-HV05A MUX A RM Cubical Cooler 78' Aux.

1 169 1-603-M-HV05B MUX B RM Cubical Cooler 78' Aux.

170 1-603-M-HV07A CLASS-1E SWITCHGEAR 01A RM Cubical Cooler 78' Aux.

171 1-603-M-HV07B CLASS-1E SWITCHGEAR 01B RM Cubical Cooler 78' Aux.

1 172 1-603-M-CW07B Class 1E Switchgear 01B Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 78' Aux.

173 1-603-M-CW01C Class 1E Switchgear 01C Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 78' Aux.

174 1-603-M-CW03A Channel A DC&IP Equip Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 78' Aux.

1 175 1-603-M-CW04C Channel C DC&IP Equip Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 78' Aux.

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Table 19.1-42 (11 of 19)G Floor Correlation No. Equipment ID Equipment Description Building Elevation Factor 176 1-603-M-CW02C Class 1E Load Center 01C Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 78' Aux.

1 178 1-603-M-CW02D Class 1E Load Center 01D Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 78' Aux.

177 1-603-M-CW07A Class 1E Switchgear 01A Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 78' Aux.

1 179 1-603-M-CW01D Class 1E Switchgear 01D Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 78' Aux.

180 1-603-M-CW03B Channel B DC&IP Equip Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 78' Aux.

1 181 1-603-M-CW04D Channel D DC&IP Equip Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 78' Aux.

182 1-603-M-HV06B 480V CLASS 1-E MCC 01B RM Cubical Cooler 100' Aux.

183 1-603-M-CW06B 480V Class 1E MCC 01B Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 100' Aux. 1 184 1-603-M-CW06A 480V Class 1E MCC 01A Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 100' Aux.

185 1-606-M-HV19A Mechanical Pen Room HVAC Fan/Motor 100' Aux.

1 186 1-606-M-HV19B Mechanical Pen Room HVAC Fan/Motor 100' Aux.

187 1-602-M-HV12C EDG Room Emergency Cubical Cooler 100' Aux.

188 1-602-M-AH12C EDG Room Emergency Cubical Cooler Fan/Motor 100' Aux.

189 1-602-M-HV13C EDG Room Emergency Cubical Cooler 100' Aux.

190 1-602-M-AH13C EDG Room Emergency Cubical Cooler Fan/Motor 100' Aux.

1 191 1-602-M-HV12D EDG Room Emergency Cubical Cooler 100' Aux.

192 1-602-M-AH12D EDG Room Emergency Cubical Cooler Fan/Motor 100' Aux.

193 1-602-M-HV13D EDG Room Emergency Cubical Cooler 100' Aux.

194 1-602-M-AH13D EDG Room Emergency Cubical Cooler Fan/Motor 100' Aux.

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Table 19.1-42 (12 of 19)G Floor Correlation No. Equipment ID Equipment Description Building Elevation Factor 195 1-603-M-HV09A ELECT. PENETRATION RM Cubical Cooler 120' Aux.

1 196 1-603-M-HV09B ELECT. PENETRATION (D) RM Cubical Cooler 120' Aux.

197 1-603-M-HV14B 480V CLASS-1E MCC 03B RM Cubical Cooler 120' Aux.

1 198 1-603-M-CW14B 480V Class 1E MCC 03B Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 120' Aux.

199 1-606-M-HV20A Mechanical Pen Room HVAC Fan/Motor 120' Aux.

200 1-606-M-HV20B Mechanical Pen Room HVAC Fan/Motor 120' Aux. 1 201 1-606-M-CW20B Mechanical Penetration Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 120' Aux.

202 1-603-M-HV10A 480V CLASS-1E MCC 03C RM Cubical Cooler 137' Aux.

203 1-603-M-HV10B 480V CLASS-1E MCC 03D RM Cubical Cooler 137' Aux.

204 1-603-M-CW10D 480V Class 1E MCC 03D Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 137' Aux.

205 1-603-M-HV14A 480V CLASS-1E MCC 03A RM Cubical Cooler 137' Aux.

206 1-603-M-HV15A 480V CLASS-1E MCC 04A RM Cubical Cooler 137' Aux.

1 207 1-603-M-HV15B 480V CLASS-1E MCC 04B RM Cubical Cooler 137' Aux.

208 1-603-M-CW15B 480V Class 1E MCC 04B Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 137' Aux.

209 1-603-M-CW10C 480V Class 1E MCC 03C Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 137' Aux.

210 1-603-M-CW15A 480V Class 1E MCC 04A Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 137' Aux.

211 1-603-M-CW14A 480V Class 1E MCC 03A Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 137' Aux.

212 1-603-M-HV12A PENETRATION MUX A RM Cubical Cooler 137' Aux.

213 1-603-M-HV12B PENETRATION MUX B RM Cubical Cooler 137' Aux. 1 214 1-603-M-CW12B Pent. MUX B Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 137' Aux.

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Table 19.1-42 (13 of 19)G Floor Correlation No. Equipment ID Equipment Description Building Elevation Factor 215 1-603-M-HV11A ELECT. PENETRATION RM Cubical Cooler 137' Aux.

216 1-603-M-HV11B ELECT. PENETRATION RM (D) Cubical Cooler 137' Aux.

217 1-603-M-HV13A ELECTRICAL PENETRATION RM(A) Cubical Cooler 137' Aux. 1 218 1-603-M-HV13B ELECTRICAL PENETRATION RM(B) Cubical Cooler 137' Aux.

219 1-603-M-CW13B Elect Penetration Room B Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 137' Aux.

220 1-603-M-HV18A RSC RM Cubical Cooler 137' Aux.

221 1-603-M-HV18B RSC RM Cubical Cooler 137' Aux. 1 222 1-603-M-CW18B RSC Room Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 137' Aux.

223 1-603-M-HV16A I&C Equipment Room (A) Cubical Cooler 157' Aux.

224 1-603-M-HV16B I&C Equipment Room (B) Cubical Cooler 157' Aux.

225 1-603-M-CW16B I&C Equip Room B Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 157' Aux.

226 1-603-M-HV17A I&C Equipment Room (C) Cubical Cooler 157' Aux.

1 227 1-603-M-HV17B I&C Equipment Room (D) Cubical Cooler 157' Aux.

228 1-603-M-CW17D I&C Equip Room D Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 157' Aux.

229 1-603-M-CW16A I&C Equip Room A Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 157' Aux.

230 1-603-M-CW17C I&C Equip Room C Cubical Cooler Cooling Coil 157' Aux.

231 1-601-M-CW01A Control Room Supply AHU Cooling Coil 172' Aux.

1 232 1-601-M-CW01B Control Room Supply AHU Cooling Coil 172' Aux.

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Table 19.1-42 (14 of 19)G Floor No. Equipment ID Equipment Description Building Correlation Factor Elevation 233 1-602-M-HV12A EDG Room Emergency Cubical Cooler 100' EDG Building 1

234 1-602-M-HV12B EDG Room Emergency Cubical Cooler 100' EDG Building 235 1-602-M-HV13A EDG Room Emergency Cubical Cooler 135' EDG Building 1

236 1-602-M-HV13B EDG Room Emergency Cubical Cooler 135' EDG Building 237 1-605-M-AH01A ESW Pump Room Supply Fan 90' ESW building 238 1-605-M-AH02A ESW Pump Room Supply Fan 90' ESW building 1

239 1-605-M-AH01B ESW Pump Room Supply Fan 90' ESW building 240 1-605-M-AH02B ESW Pump Room Supply Fan 90' ESW building 241 1-633-M-PP01A Essential Chilled Water Pump 78' Aux.

242 1-633-M-PP01B Essential Chilled Water Pump 78' Aux.

1 243 1-633-M-PP02A Essential Chilled Water Pump 78' Aux.

244 1-633-M-PP02B Essential Chilled Water Pump 78' Aux.

245 1-751-J-PM01 RO Console (Frame) 157' Aux.

246 1-751-J-PM02 TO/EO Console (Frame) 157' Aux.

1 247 1-751-J-PM03 SS Console (Frame) 157' Aux.

248 1-751-J-PM04 STA Console (Frame) 157' Aux.

249 1-751-J-PM05 Safety Console (Frame) 157' Aux. 1 250 1-752-J-PA03A ESF-CCS Cabinet(A, B, C, D) 157' Aux.

251 1-752-J-PA03B ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet (Ch.BE) 157' Aux.

1 252 1-752-J-PA03C ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet (Ch.CE) 157' Aux.

253 1-752-J-PA03D ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet (Ch.DE) 157' Aux.

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Table 19.1-42 (15 of 19)G Floor No. Equipment ID Equipment Description Building Correlation Factor Elevation 254 1-752-J-PA14A Plant Protection System Cabinet(A) 157' Aux.

255 1-752-J-PA14B PPS Cabinet Ch.B-1 157' Aux.

1 256 1-752-J-PA14C Plant Protection System Cabinet(C) 157' Aux.

257 1-752-J-PA14D PPS Cabinet Ch.D-1 157' Aux.

258 1-772-E-SW01A Reactor Trip Switchgear 137' Aux.

259 1-772-E-SW01B Reactor Trip Switchgear 137' Aux.

1 260 1-772-E-SW01C Reactor Trip Switchgear 137' Aux.

261 1-772-E-SW01D Reactor Trip Switchgear 137' Aux.

262 1-823-E-SW01A CLASS 1E AB 4.16kV SWGR 01A 78' Aux.

263 1-823-E-SW01B CLASS 1E AB 4.16kV SWGR 01B 78' Aux.

1 264 1-823-E-SW01C CLASS 1E AB 4.16kV SWGR 01C 78' Aux.

265 1-823-E-SW01D CLASS 1E AB 4.16kV SWGR 01D 78' Aux.

CLASS 1E AUX. BLDG 480V LOAD CENTER 1-825-E-266 1-825-E-LC01A 78' Aux.

LC01A 267 1-825-E-TR01A 480V LOAD CENTER XFMR 78' Aux.

CLASS 1E AUX. BLDG 480V LOAD CENTER 1-825-E-268 1-825-E-LC01B 78' Aux.

LC01B(DIV.II) 269 1-825-E-TR01B 480V LOAD CENTER XFMR 78' Aux.

1 CLASS 1E AUX. BLDG 480V LOAD CENTER 1-825-E-270 1-825-E-LC01C 78' Aux.

LC01C 271 1-825-E-TR01C 480V LOAD CENTER XFMR 78' Aux.

CLASS 1E AUX. BLDG 480V LOAD CENTER 1-825-E-272 1-825-E-LC01D 78' Aux.

LC01D 273 1-825-E-TR01D 480V LOAD CENTER XFMR 78' Aux.

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Table 19.1-42 (16 of 19)G Floor No. Equipment ID Equipment Description Building Correlation Factor Elevation 274 1-827-E-MC01C CLASS 1E AUX. BLDG 480V MCC 1-827-E-MC01C 78' Aux.

275 1-827-E-MC01C-3 120/208V AC DIST. PNL 78' Aux.

276 1-827-E-MC01D CLASS 1E AUX. BLDG 480V MCC 1-827-E-MC01D 78' Aux.

277 1-827-E-MC01D-3 120/208V AC DIST. PNL 78' Aux.

1 278 1-827-E-MC02C CLASS 1E AUX. BLDG 480V MCC 1-827-E-MC02C 78' Aux.

279 1-827-E-MC02C-3 120/208V AC DIST. PNL 78' Aux.

280 1-827-E-MC02D CLASS 1E AUX. BLDG 480V MCC 1-827-E-MC02D 78' Aux.

281 1-827-E-MC02D-3 120/208V AC DIST. PNL 78' Aux.

282 1-827-E-MC01A CLASS 1E AUX. BLDG 480V MCC 1-827-E-MC01A 100' Aux.

283 1-827-E-MC01A-3 120/208V AC DIST. PNL 100' Aux.

284 1-827-E-MC01B CLASS 1E AUX. BLDG 480V MCC 1-827-E-MC01B 100' Aux.

285 1-827-E-MC01B-3 120/208V AC DIST. PNL 100' Aux.

1 286 1-827-E-MC04C CLASS 1E AUX. BLDG 480V MCC 1-827-E-MC04C 100' Aux.

287 1-827-E-MC04C-3 120/208V AC DIST. PNL 100' Aux.

288 1-827-E-MC04D CLASS 1E AUX. BLDG 480V MCC 1-827-E-MC04D(DIV. II) 100' Aux.

289 1-827-E-MC04D-3 120/208V AC DIST. PNL 100' Aux.

290 1-827-E-MC03B CLASS 1E AUX. BLDG 480V MCC 1-827-E-MC03B 120' Aux.

1 291 1-827-E-MC03B-3 120/208V AC DIST. PNL 120' Aux.

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Table 19.1-42 (17 of 19)G Floor No. Equipment ID Equipment Description Building Correlation Factor Elevation 292 1-827-E-MC03A CLASS 1E AUX. BLDG 480V MCC 1-827-E-MC03A 137' Aux.

293 1-827-E-MC03A-3 120/208V AC DIST. PNL 137' Aux.

294 1-827-E-MC03C CLASS 1E AUX. BLDG 480V MCC 1-827-E-MC03C 137' Aux.

295 1-827-E-MC03C-3 120/208V AC DIST. PNL 137' Aux.

296 1-827-E-MC03D CLASS 1E A/B 480V MCC 1-827-E-MC03D 137' Aux.

297 1-827-E-MC03D-3 120/208V AC DIST. PNL 137' Aux. 1 298 1-827-E-MC04A CLASS 1E AUX. BLDG 480V MCC 1-827-E-MC04A 137' Aux.

299 1-827-E-MC04A-3 120/208V AC DIST. PNL 137' Aux.

300 1-827-E-MC04B CLASS 1E AUX. BLDG 480V MCC 1-827-E-MC04B 137' Aux.

301 1-827-E-MC04B-3 120/208V AC DIST. PNL 137' Aux.

CLASS 1E ESW STRUCTURE AREA 480V MCC 1-827-E-302 1-827-E-MC02A 100' ESW building MC02A 303 1-827-E-MC02A-3 120/208V AC DIST. PNL 100' ESW building CLASS 1E ESW STRUCTURE AREA 480V MCC 1-827-E-304 1-827-E-MC02B 100' ESW building MC02B 305 1-827-E-MC02B-3 120/208V AC DIST. PNL 100' ESW building 1 306 1-827-E-MC05A CLASS 1E EDG-A BLDG 480V MCC 1-827-E-MC05A 100' EDG Building 307 1-827-E-MC05A-3 120/208V AC DIST. PNL 100' EDG Building 308 1-827-E-MC05B CLASS 1E EDG-B BLDG 480V MCC 1-827-E-MC05B 100' EDG Building 309 1-827-E-MC05B-3 120/208V AC DIST. PNL 100' EDG Building

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Table 19.1-42 (18 of 19)G Floor No. Equipment ID Equipment Description Building Correlation Factor Elevation 310 1-841-E-MC01A CLASS 1E 125V DC CONTROL CENTER (A/B) 78' Aux.

311 1-841-E-MC01A-C1 CLASS 1E 125V DC DISTR. PNL 1 78' Aux.

1-841-E-MC01A-312 CLASS 1E 125V DC DISTR. PNL 2 78' Aux.

D1 313 1-841-E-MC01B CLASS 1E 125V DC CONTROL CENTER (A/B) 78' Aux.

314 1-841-E-MC01B-C1 CLASS 1E 125V DC DISTR. PNL 1 78' Aux.

1 315 1-841-E-MC01B-D1 CLASS 1E 125V DC DISTR. PNL 2 78' Aux.

316 1-841-E-MC01C CLASS 1E 125V DC CONTROL CENTER (A/B) 78' Aux.

317 1-841-E-MC01C-D1 CLASS 1E 125V DC DISTR. PNL 78' Aux.

318 1-841-E-MC01D CLASS 1E 125V DC CONTROL CENTER (A/B) 78' Aux.

1-841-E-MC01D-319 CLASS 1E 125V DC DISTR. PNL 2 78' Aux.

D1 320 1-841-E-BC01A CLASS 1E BATT. CHARGER (A/B) 78' Aux.

321 1-841-E-BC01B CLASS 1E BATT. CHARGER (A/B) 78' Aux.

322 1-841-E-BC01C CLASS 1E BATT. CHARGER (A/B) 78' Aux.

323 1-841-E-BC01D CLASS 1E BATT. CHARGER (A/B) 78' Aux.

1 324 1-841-E-BC02A CLASS 1E BATT. CHARGER (STAND-BY) (A/B) 78' Aux.

325 1-841-E-BC02B CLASS 1E BATT. CHARGER (STAND-BY) (A/B) 78' Aux.

326 1-841-E-BC02C CLASS 1E BATT. CHARGER (STAND-BY) (A/B) 78' Aux.

327 1-841-E-BC02D CLASS 1E BATT. CHARGER (STAND-BY) (A/B) 78' Aux.

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Table 19.1-42 (19 of 19)G Floor No. Equipment ID Equipment Description Building Correlation Factor Elevation 328 1-841-E-BT01A CLASS 1E 125V DC BATTERY 100' Aux.

1 329 1-841-E-BT01B CLASS 1E 125V DC BATTERY 100' Aux.

330 1-841-E-BT01C CLASS 1E 125V DC BATTERY 78' Aux.

1 331 1-841-E-BT01D CLASS 1E 125V DC BATTERY 78' Aux.

332 1-842-E-IN01A CLASS 1E CH.A 40KVA INVERTER (A/B) 78' Aux.

333 1-842-E-IN01B CLASS 1E CH.A 40KVA INVERTER (A/B) 78' Aux.

1 334 1-842-E-IN01C CLASS 1E CH.C 40KVA INVERTER (A/B) 78' Aux.

335 1-842-E-IN01D CLASS 1E CH.C 40KVA INVERTER (A/B) 78' Aux.

336 1-842-E-IN02A CLASS 1E SAFETY MOV INVERTER (RC SYS ONLY) 78' Aux.

337 1-842-E-IN02B CLASS 1E SAFETY MOV INVERTER 30KVA 78' Aux.

1 338 1-842-E-IN02C CLASS 1E SAFETY MOV INVERTER 78' Aux.

339 1-842-E-IN02D CLASS 1E SAFETY MOV INVERTER 30KVA 78' Aux.

340 1-842-E-TR01A CLASS 1E REGULATING TRANSFORMER 78' Aux.

341 1-842-E-TR01B CLASS 1E REGULATING TRANSFORMER 78' Aux.

1 342 1-842-E-TR01C CLASS 1E REGULATING TRANSFORMER 78' Aux.

343 1-842-E-TR01D CLASS 1E REGULATING TRANSFORMER 78' Aux.

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Table 19.1-43 (1 of 5)

Seismic Fragility Analysis Results Summary HCLPF Component Location Failure mode (g)

Buildings Reactor Containment building CTMT Tan. shear fail near the base 0.94 Sliding toward the turbine Stability of NI Structure CTMT basemat 0.52 building Reactor Containment Internal CTMT Tan. shear fail near the base 1.09 Shear fail of shear wall at Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Building 0.51 the basemat Emergency Diesel Generator Emergency Diesel Shear fail of shear wall at 0.87 Building Generator Building the basemat Diesel Fuel Oil Tank Shear fail of shear wall at Diesel Fuel Oil Tank Building 0.73 Building the basemat Turbine Building Turbine Building Collapse into Aux BLDG [1][4]

Compound Building Compound Building Collapse into Aux BLDG [1][4]

CCW HX Building CCW HX Building Generic [5][4]

ESW IS ESW Building Generic [5][4]

RCS Components Reactor Pressure Vessel CTMT El. 69'~156' Column support 0.92 Core Sup. Barrel lower Reactor Vessel Internal CTMT El. 69'~156' 0.51 flange CEDM (Control Element Drive Binding of Cntrl. extension CTMT 0.64 Mechanism) shaft CTMT El. Anch. fail of snubber lever Steam Generator 0.6 114'~136'06 support asm.

CTMT El.

Steam Generator Nozzle Economizer nozzle 0.54 114'~136'06 Pressurizer CTMT El. 114'~156' Skirt support 0.63 Pressurizer nozzle CTMT El. 114'~156' Spray nozzle 0.51 Reactor Coolant System Piping CTMT Surge line nozzle 0.55 CTMT El. Upper horiz. column Reactor Coolant Pumps 1.31 114'~136'06 support BOP components (mechanical, electrical and I&C components)

Charging Pumps Aux. BLDG El. 55' Generic [1]

Regenerative Heat Exchanger CTMT El. 114' Generic [1]

Letdown Heat Exchanger CTMT El. 100' Generic [1]

Auxiliary Charging Pump Aux. BLDG El. 55' Generic [1]

Table 19.1-43 (2 of 5)

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HCLPF Component Location Failure mode (g)

Safety Injection Tanks CTMT. El. 136' 06" Generic [1]

Shutdown Cooling Pumps Aux. BLDG El. 50' Generic [1]

Shutdown Cooling Heat Aux. BLDG El. 50' Generic [1]

Exchanger SC Pump Miniflow Heat Aux. BLDG El. 50' Generic [1]

Exchanger Safety Injection Pump Aux. BLDG El. 50' Generic [1]

Containment Spray Pump Aux. BLDG El. 50' Generic [1]

CS Miniflow Heat Exchanger Aux. BLDG El. 50' Generic [1]

Containment Spray Heat Aux. BLDG El. 55' Generic [1]

Exchanger Aux. BLDG El.

Main Steam Isolation Valves Generic [1]

137'06" Main Steam Atmospheric Aux. BLDG El.

Generic [1]

Valves(ADV) 137'06" Aux. BLDG El.

Main Steam Safety Valves Generic [1]

137'06" AFW Pump-Motor Driven Aux. BLDG El. 78' Generic [1]

AFW Pump-Turbine Driven Aux. BLDG El. 78' Generic [1]

EDG El. 100' Emergency Diesel Generators Generic [1]

Aux. BLDG El. 100' Emergency Diesel Generators AB El. 100' Generic [1]

(Aux. Building)

Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil EDG El. 65' Generic [1]

transfer pump Aux. BLDG El. 63' Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil AB El. 63' Generic [1]

transfer pump (Aux. Building)

Starting Air Tank Aux. BLDG El. 100' Generic [1]

EDG El. 121' Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank Generic [1]

Aux. BLDG El. 120' Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank AB El. 120' Generic [1]

(Aux. Building)

EDG El. 63' Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Generic [1]

Aux. BLDG El. 65' Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Aux. El. 65' Generic [1]

(Aux.Building)

Silencer Aux. BLDG El. 100' Generic [1]

Air Intake Filter Aux. BLDG El. 109' Generic [1]

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-43 (3 of 5)

HCLPF Component Location Failure mode (g)

Lube Oil Water Hx Aux. BLDG El. 100' Generic [1]

EDG El. 100' Motor Driven Fuel Oil Feed Pump Generic [1]

Aux. BLDG El. 100' Motor Driven Fuel Oil Feed Pump AB El. 100' Generic [1]

(Aux. Building)

Essential Service Water Pump ESW IS. El. 69' Generic [1]

CCW HX BLDG El.

CCW Heat Exchangers Generic [1]

100' CCW Pump Aux. BLDG El. 55' Generic [1]

CCW Surge Tank Aux. BLDG El. 172' Generic [1]

Essential Chilled Water Pumps Aux. BLDG. El. 78' Generic [1]

Essential Chillers Aux. BLDG El. 78' Generic [1]

ECW Compression Tank Aux. BLDG El. 172' Generic [1]

ECW Air Separator Aux. BLDG El. 78' Generic [1]

Essential Chilled Water System Aux. BLDG El. 78' Generic [1]

Control Panel AFWP Room Cubicle Cooler-MD Aux. BLDG El. 78' Generic [1]

CCWP Room Cubicle Cooler Aux. BLDG El. 55' Generic [1]

Aux. BLDG El. 50' SI Room Cubicle Cooler Generic [1]

Aux. BLDG El. 55' SC Pump & Mini-flow Hx. Room Aux. BLDG El. 50' Generic [1]

Cubicle Cooler Aux. BLDG El. 55' Aux. BLDG El. 100' Mech. Pen. Room Cubicle Cooler Generic [1]

Aux. BLDG El. 120' Aux. BLDG El. 50' CS Pump Room Cubicle Cooler Generic [1]

Aux. BLDG El. 55' Aux Charging Pump Room Aux. BLDG El. 55' Generic [1]

Cubicle Cooler Charging Pump Room Cubicle Aux. BLDG El. 55' Generic [1]

Cooler Aux. BLDG El. 120' Elect. Pen. Room Area Cubicle Aux. BLDG El. Generic [1]

Cooler 137'6" Elect. Pen. Room Area Cubicle AB El. 137' Generic [1]

Cooler (El. 137')

I&C Equipment RooM Cubical AB El. 157' Generic [1]

Cooler

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-43 (4 of 5)

HCLPF Component Location Failure mode (g)

EDG Room Emergency Cubicle EDG El. 100' Generic [1]

Cooler EDG Room Emergency Cubicle EDG El. 135' Generic [1]

Cooler Essential Chiller & Pump Cubicle Aux. BLDG El. 78' Generic [1]

Cooler CCW HX B El. 100' CCW HX. Room Supply Fans Generic [1]

CCW HX El. 126' ESW Pump Room Supply Fan ESW IS. El. 90' Generic [1]

EDG Room Emergency Exhaust EDG El. 100' Generic [1]

Fan Aux. BLDG El. 172' EDG Room Emergency Exhaust AB El. 172' Generic [1]

Fan (Aux. Building)

Control Room Emergency Makeup Aux. BLDG El. 172' Generic [1]

ACU ESF-CCS GC Cabinet Aux. BLDG El. 156' Generic [1]

Aux. BLDG El. 156' ESF-CCS LC Cabinet Aux. BLDG El. Generic [1]

137'6" Plant Protection System Cabinet Aux. BLDG El. 156' Generic [1]

Aux. BLDG El.

Reactor Trip Switchgear Generic [1]

137'6" MCR Operator Consoles Aux. BLDG El. 156' Generic [1]

MCR Safety Consoles Aux. BLDG El. 156' Generic [1]

125V DC Battery Chargers Aux. BLDG El. 78' Generic [1]

SI Inverter Aux. BLDG El. 78' Generic [1]

120V AC Inverter(VBPSS) Aux. BLDG El. 78' Generic [1]

Regulating Transformer Aux. BLDG El. 78' Generic [1]

125V DC Control Center Aux. BLDG El. 78' Generic [1]

4.16kV MCSG Aux. BLDG El. 78' Generic [1]

480V Load Center Aux. BLDG El. 78' Generic [1]

Aux. BLDG El.

480V MCC(Aux. EL.137'06") Generic [1]

137'06" 480V MCC(Aux. EL.120') Aux. BLDG El. 120' Generic [1]

480V MCC(Aux. EL.100') Aux. BLDG El. 100' Generic [1]

480V MCC(Aux. EL.78') Aux. BLDG El. 78' Generic [1]

480V MCC(ESW IS EL.100') ESW IS. El. 90' Generic [1]

Aux. BLDG El. 78' Batteries & Racks Generic [1]

Aux. BLDG El. 100'

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-43 (5 of 5)

HCLPF Component Location Failure mode (g)

Off-Site Power various Generic 0.09[3][2]

Reactor Coolant System RCS various Generic 0.3[4][3]

Small piping or tubing line BOP Piping & Supports various Generic 0.75g[2]

HVAC Ducting & Dampers various Generic 0.75g[2]

Cable Trays & Supports various Generic 0.75g[2]

Motor Operated Valves various Generic 0.75g[2]

Air Operated Valves various Generic 0.75g[2]

Electrical Conduit various Generic 0.75g[2]

Relief and Check Valves various Generic 0.75g[2]

Resistance Temperature Detectors various Generic 0.75g[2]

Pressure Transmitters various Generic 0.75g[2]

Key Assumptions

[1] The component is assigned to COL item (COL 19.1(8)) and HCLPF value is assumed to be equal to or exceed 1.67 times CSDRS.

[2] Inherently Ruggedness Item were assumed as CSDRS x 2.5 = 0.75g

- EPRI-1025287 (Reference 78) COL item (COL 19.1(8))

[3] [2] HCLPF based on generic value from Risk Assessment of Operational Events Handbook Volume 2 - External Events, R.1.01, January 2008, USNRC (Reference 79 78).

[4] [3] HCLPF based on Option 2 in "SPRA implementation guide", EPRI 3002000709 (Reference 77)

[5] [4] Turbine building, compound building, ESW IS and CCW HX Building are assigned to COL item (COL 19.1(8)) and HCLPF value is assumed to be equal to or exceed 1.67 times GMRS HCLPF 0.5g. For quantification purposes, a HCLPF value of 0.5g is assumed for the site-specific structures (turbine building, compound building, ESW IS and CCW HX building). The COL applicant will demonstrate these site-specific structures HCLPF will be equal to or greater than 0.5g.

(COL 19.1(8))

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Table 19.1-44A (1 of 11)

At-Power Seismic Event Direct Core Damage Initiator Cutsets Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level BasicEvent Cutset Description HCLPF 1 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-480V-LC-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE 480V Load Center 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-IC FLAG FOR Loss of All Instrumentation and Control 

2 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-480V-MCC-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE 480V MCC 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-IC FLAG FOR Loss of All Instrumentation and Control 

3 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-4KV-BUS-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE 4.16kV MCSG 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

4 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CCHX-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCW Heat Exchangers 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

5 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Aux Charging Pump Room

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-ACVPP-0.5G 

Cubicle Cooler

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

6 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Elect. Pen. Room Area

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-EPA-0.5G 

Cubicle Cooler

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

7 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Elect. Pen. Room Area

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-EPA-137-0.5G 

Cubicle Cooler (EL.137')

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44A (2 of 11)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level BasicEvent Cutset Description HCLPF 8 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE I&C Eq. Room Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-IC-0.5G 

Cooler (EL.157')

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

9 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE EDG Room Emergency

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-EDG-100-0.5G 

Cubicle Cooler (EL.100')

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

10 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE EDG Room Emergency

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-EDG-135-0.5G 

Cubicle Cooler (EL.135')

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

11 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Mech. Pen. Room Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-MPR-0.5G 

Cooler

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

12 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CCPP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCW Pump 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

13 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CCTK-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCW Surge Tank 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

14 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CCW-BLDG-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCW Hx Building 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44A (3 of 11)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level BasicEvent Cutset Description HCLPF 15 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC FAILURE OF COMPOUND BUILDING COLLAPE INTO

 0.5g SEIS-CPD-FAIL-0.5G 

AUXILIARY BLDG FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Containment Structural Damage 16 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Heat

 0.5g SEIS-CSHX01-FAIL-0.5G 

Exchanger

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

17 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CSHX02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CS Miniflow Hx 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

18 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-DC-BC-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE 125V DC Battery Chargers 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-IC FLAG FOR Loss of All Instrumentation and Control 

19 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-DC-BT-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Batteries & Racks 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

20 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-DC-MCC-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE 125V DC Control Center 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44A (4 of 11)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level BasicEvent Cutset Description HCLPF 21 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Emergency Diesel

 0.5g SEIS-DG-FAIL-0.5G 

Generators SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Emergency Diesel

 0.5g SEIS-DG-CD-FAIL-0.5G 

Generators (Aux. Building)

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

22 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-DGFT-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Air Intake Filter 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

23 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-DGHX-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Lube Oil Water Hx 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

24 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Motor Driven Fuel Oil Feed

 0.5g SEIS-DGPP-FAIL-0.5G 

Pump SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Motor Driven Fuel Oil Feed

 0.5g SEIS-DGPP-CD-FAIL-0.5G 

Pump (Aux. Building)

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

25 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-DGSL-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Silencer 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

26 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-DGTK40-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Starting Air Tank 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44A (5 of 11)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level BasicEvent Cutset Description HCLPF 27 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil

 0.5g SEIS-DOMPS-FAIL-0.5G 

transfer pump SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil

 0.5g SEIS-DOMPS-CD-FAIL-0.5G 

transfer pump (Aux. Building)

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

28 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Diesel Fuel Oil Storage

 0.5g SEIS-DOTK01-FAIL-0.5G 

Tank SEIS-DOTK01-CD-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Diesel Fuel Oil Storage

 0.5g 

0.5G Tank (Aux. Building)

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

29 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-DOTK02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank 

SEIS-DOTK02-CD-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank

 0.5g 

0.5G (Aux. Building)

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

30 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-ESF-RPS-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE ESF-CCS GC Cabinet 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-IC FLAG FOR Loss of All Instrumentation and Control 

31 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-ESWIS-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE ESWIS 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44A (6 of 11)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level BasicEvent Cutset Description HCLPF 32 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-IPINV-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE 120V AC Inverter(VBPSS) 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-IC FLAG FOR Loss of All Instrumentation and Control 

33 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-IPREGTR-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Regulating Transformer 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-IC FLAG FOR Loss of All Instrumentation and Control 

34 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Main Steam Atmospheric

 0.5g SEIS-MSADV-FAIL-0.5G 

Valves(ADV)

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-MSLB FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced MSLB 

35 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Main Steam Isolation

 0.5g SEIS-MSIV-FAIL-0.5G 

Valves

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-MSLB FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced MSLB 

36 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-MSSV-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Main Steam Safety Valves 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-MSLB FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced MSLB 

37 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-RP-PM05-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE MCR SAFETY CONSOLE 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-IC FLAG FOR Loss of All Instrumentation and Control 

38 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Heat

 0.5g SEIS-SIHX01-FAIL-0.5G 

Exchanger

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44A (7 of 11)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level BasicEvent Cutset Description HCLPF 39 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE SC Pump Miniflow Heat

 0.5g SEIS-SIHX02-FAIL-0.5G 

Exchanger

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

40 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Essential Service Water

 0.5g SEIS-SXPP-FAIL-0.5G 

Pump

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

41 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC FAILURE OF THE TURBINE BUILDING COLLAPE

 0.5g SEIS-TB-FAIL-0.5G 

INTO AUXILIARY BLDG FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Containment Structural Damage 42 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE EDG Room Emergency

 0.5g SEIS-VGAH02-FAIL-0.5G 

Exhaust Fan SEIS-VGAH02-CD-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE EDG Room Emergency

 0.5g 

0.5G Exhaust Fan (Aux. Building)

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

43 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE ESW Pump Room Supply

 0.5g SEIS-VGAH-FAIL-0.5G 

Fan

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

44 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CS Pump Room Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-VKHV10-FAIL-0.5G 

Cooler

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44A (8 of 11)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level BasicEvent Cutset Description HCLPF 45 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-VKHV11/12-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE SI Room Cubicle Cooler 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

46 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCWP Room Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-VKHV13/14-FAIL-0.5G 

Cooler

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

47 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE SC Pump & Mini-flow Hx.

 0.5g SEIS-VKHV16-FAIL-0.5G 

Room Cubicle Cooler

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

48 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Charging Pump Room

 0.5g SEIS-VKHV18-FAIL-0.5G 

Cubicle Cooler

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

49 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Essential Chiller & Pump

 0.5g SEIS-VOHV32-FAIL-0.5G 

Cubicle Cooler

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

50 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFWP Room Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-VOHV33-FAIL-0.5G 

Cooler-MD

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

51 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-WOCH-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Essential Chillers 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44A (9 of 11)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level BasicEvent Cutset Description HCLPF 52 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Essential Chilled Water

 0.5g SEIS-WOLP-FAIL-0.5G 

System Control Panel

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

53 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Essential Chilled Water

 0.5g SEIS-WOPP-FAIL-0.5G 

Pumps

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

54 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-WOTK02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE ECW Air Separator 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

55 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-WOTK-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE ECW Compression Tank 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW 

56 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.51g

 0.51g SEIS-AB-FAIL-0.51G SEISMIC FAILURE OF AUXILIARY BUILDING 

FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Containment Structural Damage 57 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.51g

 0.51g SEIS-RVI-RCS-0.51G SEISMIC INDUCED RX VESSESL INTERNAL FAILURE 

FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Containment Structural Damage 58 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.51g SEIS-PZRNOZZ-RCS-FAIL- SEISMICALLY-INDUCED MEDIUM LOCA DUE TO PZR NOZZ

 0.51g  

0.51G FAILURE

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-MLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED MEDIUM LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44A (10 of 11)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level BasicEvent Cutset Description HCLPF 59 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.52g

 0.52g SEIS-NI-FAIL-0.52G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Nuclear Island failure 

FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Containment Structural Damage 60 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.54g SEIS-SGNOZZ-RCS-FAIL-

 0.54g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Steam Generator Nozzle 

0.54G FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Containment Structural Damage 61 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.55g SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LARGE LOCA DUE TO RCS PIPE

 0.55g SEIS-PIPE-RCS-FAIL-0.55G  

FALURE

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LARGE LOCA  

62 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.6g

 0.6g SEIS-SG-RCS-FAIL-0.6G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SG SUPPORT FALURE 

FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Containment Structural Damage 63 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.63g

 0.63g SEIS-PZR-RCS-FAIL-0.63G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED PZR SKIRT FAILURE 

FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Containment Structural Damage 64 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.64g SEIS-CEDM-RCS-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CEDM (Control Element

 0.64g 

0.64G Drive Mechanism)

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-ATWS FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced ATWS 

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44A (11 of 11)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level BasicEvent Cutset Description HCLPF 65 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.75g Generic Seismic Equipment Failure all eqiupment correlated to failure

 0.75g SEIS-ALL-SSC-0.75G 

at 0.75g HCLPF

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-IC FLAG FOR Loss of All Instrumentation and Control 

66 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.92g 65 0.92g SEIS-RV-RCS-FAIL-0.92G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED REACTOR VESSEL FALURE 

FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Containment Structural Damage 67 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.94g 66 0.94g SEIS-CTS-EX-FAIL-0.94G SEISMIC FAILURE OF CONTAINMENT EXTERIOR 

FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Containment Structural Damage 68 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 1.09g SEISMIC FAILURE OF CONTAINMENT INTERNAL 67 1.09g SEIS-CTS-IN-FAIL-1.09G 

STRUCTURE FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Containment Structural Damage 69 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 1.31g 68 1.31g SEIS-RCP-RCS-FAIL-1.31G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED RCP SUPPORT FALURE 

FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Containment Structural Damage

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (1 of 36)

At-power Seismic Event Top 100 core damage cutsets of Non-Direct Core Damage Initiator Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 1 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

2 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

3 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SI-INV-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE SI INVERTER  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (2 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 4 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

5 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SI-INV-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE SI INVERTER  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

6 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

7 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (3 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 8 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

9 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SI-INV-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE SI INVERTER  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

10 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

11 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SI-INV-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE SI INVERTER  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (4 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 12 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

13 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

14 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-SIT-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC FAILURE OF SITS  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

15 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.00E-01 AFOPH-S-ALT-LT Operator Fails to Transfer AFW Source From AFWST to RWT  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (5 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 16 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.00E-01 AFOPH-S-ALT-LT Operator Fails to Transfer AFW Source From AFWST to RWT  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SI-INV-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE SI INVERTER  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

17 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.00E-01 AFOPH-S-ALT-LT Operator Fails to Transfer AFW Source From AFWST to RWT  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SI-INV-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE SI INVERTER  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

18 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.00E-01 MSOPH-S-ASC-SLOCA Operator Fails to Perform Aggressive Secondary Cooling After SLOCA  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

19 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.00E-01 RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW Operator Fails to Open POSRVs in Early Phase for F&B Operation  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (6 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 20 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.00E-01 RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW Operator Fails to Open POSRVs in Early Phase for F&B Operation  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

21 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.00E-01 RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW Operator Fails to Open POSRVs in Early Phase for F&B Operation  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

22 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.00E-01 RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW Operator Fails to Open POSRVs in Early Phase for F&B Operation  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

23 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E-01 SIOPH-S-IRWSTCOOL Operator Fails to Cool IRWST Water Using SCS Pump  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (7 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 24 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E-01 SIOPH-S-IRWSTCOOL Operator Fails to Cool IRWST Water Using SCS Pump  

25 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E-01 SIOPH-S-IRWSTCOOL Operator Fails to Cool IRWST Water Using SCS Pump  

26 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E-01 SIOPH-S-IRWSTCOOL Operator Fails to Cool IRWST Water Using SCS Pump  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (8 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 27 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E-01 SIOPH-S-IRWSTCOOL Operator Fails to Cool IRWST Water Using SCS Pump  

28 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E-01 SIOPH-S-INJ Operator Fails to Align SCS for Injection  

29 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.00E-01 AFOPH-S-ALT-LT Operator Fails to Transfer AFW Source From AFWST to RWT  

 1.00E-01 RCOPH-S-SDSL OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN 1 OF 4 SDS VALVE LATE PHASE  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

30 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.00E-01 AFOPH-S-ALT-LT Operator Fails to Transfer AFW Source From AFWST to RWT  

 1.00E-01 RCOPH-S-SDSL OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN 1 OF 4 SDS VALVE LATE PHASE  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (8 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 31 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.00E-01 AFOPH-S-ALT-LT Operator Fails to Transfer AFW Source From AFWST to RWT  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E-01 SIOPH-S-IRWSTCOOL Operator Fails to Cool IRWST Water Using SCS Pump  

32 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-A-DGA FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-B-DGB FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

33 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-A-DGA FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-B-DGB FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (9 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 34 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-A-DGA FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-B-DGB FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

35 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-A-DGA FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-B-DGB FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

36 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-A-DGA FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-B-DGB FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (10 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 37 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-C-DGC FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01C  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-D-DGD FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01D  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

38 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-C-DGC FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01C  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-D-DGD FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01D  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (11 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 39 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-C-DGC FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01C  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-D-DGD FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01D  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

40 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-C-DGC FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01C  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-D-DGD FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01D  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (12 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 41 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-A-DGA DG 01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-B-DGB FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

42 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-A-DGA DG 01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-B-DGB FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (13 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 43 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-A-DGA DG 01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-B-DGB FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

44 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-A-DGA DG 01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-B-DGB FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

45 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-A-DGA DG 01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-B-DGB FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (14 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 46 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-B-DGB DG 01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-A-DGA FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

47 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-B-DGB DG 01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-A-DGA FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (15 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 48 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-B-DGB DG 01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-A-DGA FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

49 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-B-DGB DG 01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-A-DGA FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

50 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-B-DGB DG 01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-A-DGA FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (16 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 51 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-C-DGC DG 01C UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-D-DGD FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01D  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

52 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-C-DGC DG 01C UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-D-DGD FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01D  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (17 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 53 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-C-DGC DG 01C UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-D-DGD FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01D  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

54 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-C-DGC DG 01C UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-D-DGD FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01D  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (18 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 55 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-D-DGD DG 01D UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-C-DGC FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01C  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

56 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-D-DGD DG 01D UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-C-DGC FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01C  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (19 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 57 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-D-DGD DG 01D UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-C-DGC FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01C  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

58 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-D-DGD DG 01D UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-C-DGC FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01C  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

59 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.10E-04 RCPVWQ4-200/1/2/3 4/4 CCF OF RC PV V200/201/202/203 FAIL TO OPEN  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (20 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 60 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.10E-04 RCPVWQ4-200/1/2/3 4/4 CCF OF RC PV V200/201/202/203 FAIL TO OPEN  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

61 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.10E-04 RCPVWQ4-200/1/2/3 4/4 CCF OF RC PV V200/201/202/203 FAIL TO OPEN  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

62 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.10E-04 RCPVWQ4-200/1/2/3 4/4 CCF OF RC PV V200/201/202/203 FAIL TO OPEN  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (21 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 63 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-A-DGA DG 01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-B-DGB DG 01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

64 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-A-DGA DG 01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-B-DGB DG 01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (22 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 65 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-A-DGA DG 01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-B-DGB DG 01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

66 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-A-DGA DG 01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-B-DGB DG 01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

67 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-A-DGA DG 01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-B-DGB DG 01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (23 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 68 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-C-DGC DG 01C UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-D-DGD DG 01D UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

69 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-C-DGC DG 01C UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-D-DGD DG 01D UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (24 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 70 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-C-DGC DG 01C UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-D-DGD DG 01D UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

71 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-C-DGC DG 01C UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 1.44E-02 DGDGM-D-DGD DG 01D UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (25 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 72 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 7.12E-03 CSMPM2A-PP01A CS PUMP 1 PP01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-D-DGD FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01D  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

73 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 7.12E-03 CSMPM2A-PP01A CS PUMP 1 PP01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-D-DGD FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01D  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (26 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 74 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 7.12E-03 CSMPM2A-PP01A CS PUMP 1 PP01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-D-DGD FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01D  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

75 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 7.12E-03 CSMPM2A-PP01A CS PUMP 1 PP01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-D-DGD FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01D  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (27 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 76 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 7.12E-03 CSMPM2B-PP01B CS PUMP PP01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-C-DGC FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01C  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

77 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 7.12E-03 CSMPM2B-PP01B CS PUMP PP01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-C-DGC FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01C  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (28 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 78 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 7.12E-03 CSMPM2B-PP01B CS PUMP PP01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-C-DGC FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01C  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

79 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 7.12E-03 CSMPM2B-PP01B CS PUMP PP01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-C-DGC FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01C  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (29 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 80 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-A-DGA FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 7.12E-03 SIMPM1B-SCPP01B SC PUMP PP01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

81 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-A-DGA FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 7.12E-03 SIMPM1B-SCPP01B SC PUMP PP01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (30 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 82 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-A-DGA FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 7.12E-03 SIMPM1B-SCPP01B SC PUMP PP01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

83 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-A-DGA FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 7.12E-03 SIMPM1B-SCPP01B SC PUMP PP01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

84 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-A-DGA FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 7.12E-03 SIMPM1B-SCPP01B SC PUMP PP01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (30 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 85 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-B-DGB FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 7.12E-03 SIMPM1A-SCPP01A SC PUMP PP01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

86 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-B-DGB FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 7.12E-03 SIMPM1A-SCPP01A SC PUMP PP01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (31 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 87 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-B-DGB FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 7.12E-03 SIMPM1A-SCPP01A SC PUMP PP01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

88 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-B-DGB FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 7.12E-03 SIMPM1A-SCPP01A SC PUMP PP01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

89 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-B-DGB FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 7.12E-03 SIMPM1A-SCPP01A SC PUMP PP01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (32 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 90 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-A-DGA FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A  

 6.66E-03 PFHBO1B-SW01B-H2 PCB SW01B-H2 4.16KV SWGR SW01B FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

91 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-A-DGA FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A  

 6.66E-03 PFHBO1B-SW01B-H2 PCB SW01B-H2 4.16KV SWGR SW01B FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (33 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 92 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-A-DGA FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A  

 6.66E-03 PFHBO1B-SW01B-H2 PCB SW01B-H2 4.16KV SWGR SW01B FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

93 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-A-DGA FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A  

 6.66E-03 PFHBO1B-SW01B-H2 PCB SW01B-H2 4.16KV SWGR SW01B FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

94 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-A-DGA FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A  

 6.66E-03 PFHBO1B-SW01B-H2 PCB SW01B-H2 4.16KV SWGR SW01B FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (34 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 95 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-B-DGB FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B  

 6.66E-03 PFHBO1A-SW01A-H2 PCB SW01A-H2 4.16KV SWGR SW01A FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

96 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-B-DGB FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B  

 6.66E-03 PFHBO1A-SW01A-H2 PCB SW01A-H2 4.16KV SWGR SW01A FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (35 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 97 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-B-DGB FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B  

 6.66E-03 PFHBO1A-SW01A-H2 PCB SW01A-H2 4.16KV SWGR SW01A FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

98 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-B-DGB FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B  

 6.66E-03 PFHBO1A-SW01A-H2 PCB SW01A-H2 4.16KV SWGR SW01A FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

99 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-B-DGB FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B  

 6.66E-03 PFHBO1A-SW01A-H2 PCB SW01A-H2 4.16KV SWGR SW01A FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44B (36 of 36)

Sequence No. BE. Prob. Basic Event Cutset Description Level HCLPF 100 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 2.50E-02 DGDGR-C-DGC FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01C  

 6.66E-03 PFHBO2B-SW01D-G2 PCB SW01D-G2 4.16KV SWGR SW01D FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44C (1 of 7)

At-power Direct Containment Failure cutsets Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level BasicEvent Cutset Description HCLPF 1 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-480V-LC-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE 480V Load Center 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-IC FLAG FOR Loss of All Instrumentation and Control 

2 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEIS-480V-MCC-FAIL-

 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE 480V MCC 

0.5G

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-IC FLAG FOR Loss of All Instrumentation and Control 

3 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEIS-4KV-BUS-FAIL-

 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE 4.16kV MCSG 

0.5G

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

4 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-DC-BC-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE 125V DC Battery Chargers 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-IC FLAG FOR Loss of All Instrumentation and Control 

5 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-DC-BT-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Batteries & Racks 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

6 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-DC-MCC-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE 125V DC Control Center 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

7 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-DG-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Emergency Diesel Generators 

SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Emergency Diesel Generators (Aux.

 0.5g SEIS-DG-FAIL-CD-0.5G 

Building)

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44C (2 of 7)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level BasicEvent Cutset Description HCLPF 8 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-DGFT-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Air Intake Filter 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

9 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-DGHX-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Lube Oil Water Hx 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

10 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-DGPP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Motor Driven Fuel Oil Feed Pump 

SEIS-DGPP-CD-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Motor Driven Fuel Oil Feed Pump

 0.5g 

0.5G (Aux. Building)

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

11 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-DGSL-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Silencer 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

12 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-DGTK40-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Starting Air Tank 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

13 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil transfer

 0.5g SEIS-DOMPS-FAIL-0.5G 

pump SEIS-DOMPS-CD-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil transfer

 0.5g 

0.5G pump (Aux. Building)

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44C (3 of 7)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level BasicEvent Cutset Description HCLPF 14 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-DOTK01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank 

SEIS-DOTK01-CD-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank (Aux.

 0.5g 

0.5G Building)

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

15 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-DOTK02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank 

SEIS-DOTK02-CD-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank (Aux.

 0.5g 

0.5G Building)

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

16 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-ESF-RPS-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE ESF-CCS GC Cabinet 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-IC FLAG FOR Loss of All Instrumentation and Control 

17 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-IPINV-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE 120V AC Inverter(VBPSS) 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-IC FLAG FOR Loss of All Instrumentation and Control 

18 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEIS-IPREGTR-FAIL-

 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Regulating Transformer 

0.5G

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-IC FLAG FOR Loss of All Instrumentation and Control 

19 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Main Steam Atmospheric 0.5g SEIS-MSADV-FAIL-0.5G 

Valves(ADV)

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-MSLB FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced MSLB 

Table 19.1-44C (4 of 7)

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level BasicEvent Cutset Description HCLPF 20 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-MSIV-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Main Steam Isolation Valves 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-MSLB FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced MSLB 

21 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-MSSV-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Main Steam Safety Valves 

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-MSLB FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced MSLB 

22 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEIS-RP-PM05-FAIL-

 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE MCR SAFETY CONSOLE 

0.5G

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-IC FLAG FOR Loss of All Instrumentation and Control 

23 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-VGAH02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE EDG Room Emergency Exhaust Fan 

SEIS-VGAH02-CD-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE EDG Room Emergency Exhaust Fan

 0.5g 

0.5G (Aux. Building)

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SBO FLAG FOR Seismic-Indiced SBO 

24 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC FAILURE OF COMPOUND BUILDING COLLAPE INTO

 0.5g SEIS-CPD-FAIL-0.5G 

AUXILIARY BLDG FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with Containment

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Structural Damage 25 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC FAILURE OF THE TURBINE BUILDING COLLAPE INTO

 0.5g SEIS-TB-FAIL-0.5G 

AUXILIARY BLDG FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with Containment

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Structural Damage Table 19.1-44C (5 of 7)

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level BasicEvent Cutset Description HCLPF 26 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.52g

 0.52g SEIS-NI-FAIL-0.52G SEISMIC FAILURE OF Nuclear Island 

FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with Containment

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Structural Damage 27 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.51g

 0.51g SEIS-AB-FAIL-0.51G SEISMIC FAILURE OF AUXILIARY BUILDING 

FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with Containment

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Structural Damage 28 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.51g

 0.51g SEIS-RVI-RCS-0.51G SEISMIC INDUCED RX VESSESL INTERNAL FAILURE 

FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with Containment

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Structural Damage 29 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.51g SEIS-PZRNOZZ-RCS-

 0.51g SEISMICALLY-INDUCED MEDIUM LOCA DUE TO PZR NOZZ FAILURE  

FAIL-0.51G

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-MLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED MEDIUM LOCA  

30 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.54g SEIS-SGNOZZ-RCS-

 0.54g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Steam Generator Nozzle 

FAIL-0.54G FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with Containment

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Structural Damage 31 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.55g SEIS-PIPE-RCS-FAIL-

 0.55g SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LARGE LOCA DUE TO RCS PIPE FALURE  

0.55G

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LARGE LOCA  

Table 19.1-44C (6 of 7)

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Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level BasicEvent Cutset Description HCLPF 32 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.6g

 0.6g SEIS-SG-RCS-FAIL-0.6G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SG SUPPORT FALURE 

FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with Containment

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Structural Damage 33 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.63g SEIS-PZR-RCS-FAIL-

 0.63g SEISMICALLY-INDUCED PZR SKIRT FAILURE 

0.63G FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with Containment

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Structural Damage 34 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.64g SEIS-CEDM-RCS-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CEDM (Control Element Drive

 0.64g 

0.64G Mechanism)

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-ATWS FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced ATWS 

35 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.75g Generic Seismic Equipment Failure all eqiupment correlated to failure at 0.75g

 0.75g SEIS-ALL-SSC-0.75G 

HCLPF

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-IC FLAG FOR Loss of All Instrumentation and Control 

36 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.92g SEIS-RV-RCS-FAIL-35 0.92g SEISMICALLY-INDUCED REACTOR VESSEL FALURE 

0.92G FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with Containment

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Structural Damage 37 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.94g SEIS-CTS-EX-FAIL-36 0.94g SEISMIC FAILURE OF CONTAINMENT EXTERIOR 

0.94G FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with Containment

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Structural Damage Table 19.1-44C (7 of 7)

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Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level BasicEvent Cutset Description HCLPF 38 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 1.09g 37 1.09g SEIS-CTS-IN-FAIL-1.09G SEISMIC FAILURE OF CONTAINMENT INTERNAL STRUCTURE 

FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with Containment

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Structural Damage 39 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 1.31g SEIS-RCP-RCS-FAIL-38 1.31g SEISMICALLY-INDUCED RCP SUPPORT FALURE 

1.31G FLAG FOR Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Damage with Containment

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-DMG-CF 

Structural Damage

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (1 of 24)

At-power Seismic event Top 100 containment failure cutsets of Non-Direct Containment Failure Initiator Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 1 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SI-INV-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE SI INVERTER  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

2 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

3 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SI-INV-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE SI INVERTER  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (2 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 4 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

6 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (3 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 7 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SI-INV-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE SI INVERTER  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

8 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

9 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SI-INV-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE SI INVERTER  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (4 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 10 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

11 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

12 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

13 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CCHX-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCW Heat Exchangers  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (5 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 14 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CCHX-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCW Heat Exchangers  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

15 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CCHX-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCW Heat Exchangers  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

16 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Aux Charging Pump Room

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-ACVPP-0.5G  

Cubicle Cooler

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

17 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Aux Charging Pump Room

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-ACVPP-0.5G  

Cubicle Cooler

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

18 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Aux Charging Pump Room

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-ACVPP-0.5G  

Cubicle Cooler

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (6 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 19 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE EDG Room Emergency Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-EDG-100-0.5G  

Cooler (EL.100')

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

20 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE EDG Room Emergency Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-EDG-100-0.5G  

Cooler (EL.100')

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

21 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE EDG Room Emergency Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-EDG-100-0.5G  

Cooler (EL.100')

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

22 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE EDG Room Emergency Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-EDG-135-0.5G  

Cooler (EL.135')

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (7 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 23 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE EDG Room Emergency Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-EDG-135-0.5G  

Cooler (EL.135')

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

24 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE EDG Room Emergency Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-EDG-135-0.5G  

Cooler (EL.135')

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

25 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Elect. Pen. Room Area Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-EPA-0.5G  

Cooler

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

26 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Elect. Pen. Room Area Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-EPA-0.5G  

Cooler

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

27 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Elect. Pen. Room Area Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-EPA-0.5G  

Cooler

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (8 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 28 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Elect. Pen. Room Area Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-EPA-137-0.5G  

Cooler (EL.137')

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

29 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Elect. Pen. Room Area Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-EPA-137-0.5G  

Cooler (EL.137')

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

30 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Elect. Pen. Room Area Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-EPA-137-0.5G  

Cooler (EL.137')

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

31 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE I&C Eq. Room Cubicle Cooler

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-IC-0.5G  

(EL.137')

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (9 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 32 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE I&C Eq. Room Cubicle Cooler

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-IC-0.5G  

(EL.137')

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

33 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE I&C Eq. Room Cubicle Cooler

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-IC-0.5G  

(EL.137')

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

34 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-MPR-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Mech. Pen. Room Cubicle Cooler  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

35 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-MPR-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Mech. Pen. Room Cubicle Cooler  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

36 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CCLR-MPR-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Mech. Pen. Room Cubicle Cooler  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (10 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 37 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CCPP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCW Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

38 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CCPP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCW Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

39 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CCPP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCW Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

40 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CCTK-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCW Surge Tank  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

41 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CCTK-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCW Surge Tank  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (11 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 42 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CCTK-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCW Surge Tank  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

43 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEIS-CCW-BLDG-FAIL-

 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCW Hx Building  

0.5G

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

44 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEIS-CCW-BLDG-FAIL-

 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCW Hx Building  

0.5G

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

45 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEIS-CCW-BLDG-FAIL-

 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCW Hx Building  

0.5G

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

46 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-ESWIS-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE ESWIS  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (12 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 47 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-SXPP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Essential Service Water Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

48 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-VGAH-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE ESW Pump Room Supply Fan  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

49 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-VKHV10-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CS Pump Room Cubicle Cooler  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

50 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

SEIS-VKHV11/12-FAIL-

 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE SI Room Cubicle Cooler  

0.5G

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (13 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 51 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

SEIS-VKHV13/14-FAIL-

 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCWP Room Cubicle Cooler  

0.5G

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

52 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE SC Pump & Mini-flow Hx. Room

 0.5g SEIS-VKHV16-FAIL-0.5G  

Cubicle Cooler

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

53 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Charging Pump Room Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-VKHV18-FAIL-0.5G  

Cooler

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

54 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Essential Chiller & Pump Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-VOHV32-FAIL-0.5G  

Cooler

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (14 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 55 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-VOHV33-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFWP Room Cubicle Cooler-MD  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

56 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-WOCH-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Essential Chillers  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

57 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Essential Chilled Water System

 0.5g SEIS-WOLP-FAIL-0.5G  

Control Panel

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

58 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-WOPP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Essential Chilled Water Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

59 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-WOTK02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE ECW Air Separator  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (15 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 60 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-WOTK-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE ECW Compression Tank  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

61 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-ESWIS-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE ESWIS  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

62 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-ESWIS-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE ESWIS  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

63 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (16 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 64 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-SIT-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC FAILURE OF SITS  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

65 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-SXPP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Essential Service Water Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

66 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-VGAH-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE ESW Pump Room Supply Fan  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

67 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-VKHV10-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CS Pump Room Cubicle Cooler  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (17 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 68 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

SEIS-VKHV11/12-FAIL-

 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE SI Room Cubicle Cooler  

0.5G

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

69 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

SEIS-VKHV13/14-FAIL-

 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCWP Room Cubicle Cooler  

0.5G

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

70 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE SC Pump & Mini-flow Hx. Room

 0.5g SEIS-VKHV16-FAIL-0.5G  

Cubicle Cooler

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

71 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Charging Pump Room Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-VKHV18-FAIL-0.5G  

Cooler

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (18 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 72 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Essential Chiller & Pump Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-VOHV32-FAIL-0.5G  

Cooler

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

73 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-VOHV33-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFWP Room Cubicle Cooler-MD  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

74 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-WOCH-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Essential Chillers  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

75 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Essential Chilled Water System

 0.5g SEIS-WOLP-FAIL-0.5G  

Control Panel

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (19 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 76 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-WOPP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Essential Chilled Water Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

77 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-WOTK02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE ECW Air Separator  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

78 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 0.5g SEIS-WOTK-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE ECW Compression Tank  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

79 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-SXPP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Essential Service Water Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

80 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-VGAH-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE ESW Pump Room Supply Fan  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (20 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 81 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-VKHV10-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CS Pump Room Cubicle Cooler  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

82 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEIS-VKHV11/12-FAIL-

 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE SI Room Cubicle Cooler  

0.5G

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

83 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEIS-VKHV13/14-FAIL-

 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCWP Room Cubicle Cooler  

0.5G

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

84 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE SC Pump & Mini-flow Hx. Room

 0.5g SEIS-VKHV16-FAIL-0.5G  

Cubicle Cooler

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

85 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Charging Pump Room Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-VKHV18-FAIL-0.5G  

Cooler

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

86 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Essential Chiller & Pump Cubicle

 0.5g SEIS-VOHV32-FAIL-0.5G  

Cooler

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

5$,4XHVWLRQB5HY $WWDFKPHQW 

Table 19.1-44D (21 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 87 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-VOHV33-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFWP Room Cubicle Cooler-MD  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

88 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-WOCH-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Essential Chillers  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

89 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Essential Chilled Water System

 0.5g SEIS-WOLP-FAIL-0.5G  

Control Panel

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

90 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-WOPP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Essential Chilled Water Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

91 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-WOTK02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE ECW Air Separator  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

92 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-WOTK-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE ECW Compression Tank  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-TLOCCW FLAG FOR Seismic-Induced TLOCCW  

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Table 19.1-44D (22 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 93 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.00E-01 AFOPH-S-ALT-LT Operator Fails to Transfer AFW Source From AFWST to RWT  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SI-INV-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE SI INVERTER  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

94 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.00E-01 AFOPH-S-ALT-LT Operator Fails to Transfer AFW Source From AFWST to RWT  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Shutdown Cooling Pumps  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

95 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.00E-01 MSOPH-S-ASC-SLOCA Operator Fails to Perform Aggressive Secondary Cooling After SLOCA  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 0.5g SEIS-SIPP02-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Safety Injection Pump  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

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Table 19.1-44D (23 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 96 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.00E-01 RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW Operator Fails to Open POSRVs in Early Phase for F&B Operation  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

97 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.00E-01 RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW Operator Fails to Open POSRVs in Early Phase for F&B Operation  

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

98 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.00E-01 RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW Operator Fails to Open POSRVs in Early Phase for F&B Operation  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

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Table 19.1-44D (24 of 24)

Cutsets Sequence No. BE. Prob. Level Basic Event Cutset Description HCLPF 99 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 1.00E-01 RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW Operator Fails to Open POSRVs in Early Phase for F&B Operation  

 0.5g SEIS-AFTP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Turbine Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.3g SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-SLOCA FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA  

100 1.00E+00 %SEISMIC DUMMY SEISMIC EVENT 0.5g

 0.5g SEIS-AFMP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE AFW Pump-Motor Driven  

 0.5g SEIS-CSPP01-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Containment Spray Pump  

 0.09g SEIS-LOOP-0.09G SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E+00 SIE-FLAG-LOOP FLAG FOR SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP  

 1.00E-01 SIOPH-S-IRWSTCOOL Operator Fails to Cool IRWST Water Using SCS Pump  

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Figure 19.1-48A At-Power Seismic Event Tree

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Figure 19.1-48B At-Power Seismically Induced Small LOCA Event Tree

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Figure 19.1-48C At-Power Seismically Induced LOOP Event Tree

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1. At-Power Seismic Event Tree for Core Damage Seismic event trees for core damage were developed to represent the accident progression and significant equipment failures that can be expected following a seismic event at-power operation.

A series of three event trees was developed to model all significant accident sequences.

Modeling of all accident sequences begins with the S-LOOP event tree where the initiating event represents any seismic event that causes a loss of offsite power (LOOP). The other one event tree is entered by a transfer from sequences on the first event tree. Multiple event trees are used to reduce the number of sequences shown on any one tree resulting in easier viewing of the pictorial representation. The three event trees are shown in Figures 1 through 3. The accident sequences and top events represented are described below.

1.1 Primary Seismic Event Tree for Core Damage Modeling of all seismic-initiated accident sequences begins with the S-LOOP event tree, shown in Figure 1. Seismic accident sequences that result in a LOOP are considered in this analysis.

Top events shown on the event tree are arranged, from left to right, by decreasing severity.

Each top event is described in Table 1. The initiating event S-LOCA and S-LOOP is transferred to secondary Event tree to represent the accident sequence. The other 8 initiating event is treated as direct core damage. Thus, the secondary Event trees for 8 initiating event is not considered.

Table 1 Primary Seismic Event Tree for Core Damage Top Event Top Event Top Event Description Consequence of Sequence SEISMIC EVENT Seismic Event -

S-DMG Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Direct to Core Damage Damage with Containment Structural Damage S-SBO Seismic-Indiced SBO Direct to Core Damage S-IC Loss of All Instrumentation and Control Direct to Core Damage S-MLSB Seismic-Induced MSLB Direct to Core Damage S-TLOCCW Seismic Induced TLOCCW Direct to Core Damage S-ATWS Seismic-Induced ATWS Direct to Core Damage S-LLOCA Seismic-Induced LLOCA Direct to Core Damage S-MLOCA Seismic-Induced MLOCA Direct to Core Damage S-SLOCA Small LOCA or RCP Seal LOCA Transferred to ET S-SLOCA S-LOOP Seismic Event Causes LOOP Transferred to ET S-LOOP 1.2 S-SLOCA Event Tree A2-1

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Each top event on the S-SLOCA event tree is described in Table 2.

Table 2 S-SLOCA Event Tree Top Event Top Event Top Event Description Success Criteria S-SIS SAFETY INJECTION 1 of 4 SI pumps provides DVI injection S-SHR DEL. AFW AND REM. STEAM 1 of 4 AF pumps to 1 of 2 SGs, and 1 MSADV or 1 MSSV on associated SG S-ASC AGGRESSIVE SECONDARY COOLING 1 of 4 AF pumps provides AFW to 1 of 2 SGs, 1 of 4 SITs injects borated water into RCS, and RCS is rapidly depressurized using 1 of 2 MSADVs on associated SG on associated SG S-SCSI SCS Injection 1 of 2 SCS pumps provides injection from IRWST S-BLEED SAFETY DEPRESSURIZATION 2 of 4 POSRVs need to open S-LHR CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL 1 of 2 CS pumps provides containment cooling or 1 of 2 SC pumps provides IRWST cooling 1.3 S-LOOP Event Tree Each top event on the S-LOOP event tree is described in Table 3.

Table 3 S-LOOP Event Tree Top Event Top Event Top Event Description Success Criteria S-RPC POSRV STUCK OPEN RECLOSE Primary pressure transient limited by AFTER RCS PRESS. CHALLENGE steam relief using one MSSV to below POSRV lift setting or all opened POSRV must reclose.

S-SHR DEL. AFW AND REM. STEAM 1 of 4 AF pumps to 1 of 2 SGs, and 1 MSADV or 1 MSSV on associated SG S-BLEED SAFETY DEPRESSURIZATION 2 of 4 POSRVs need to open S-FEED SAFETY INJECTION FOR FEED 1 of 4 SI pumps provides DVI injection S-LHR CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL 1 of 2 CS pumps provides containment cooling or 1 of 2 SC pumps provides IRWST cooling A2-2

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Figure 1 Primary At-Power Seismic Event Tree A2-3

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Figure 2 S-SLOCA Event Tree A2-4

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Figure 3 S-LOOP Event Tree A2-5

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2. Seismic Event Tree for Containment failure Seismic event trees for containment failure were developed to represent the accident progression and significant equipment failures that can be expected following a seismic event at-power operation. Seismic event trees for containment failure were developed by extending the Seismic event tree for core damage to incorporate containment isolation failure and late overpressure failures as the most probable containment failure modes. The seismic accident sequences for Containment failure are described in Table 4. The seven of total ten seismic initiating events lead to the direct containment failure, and three seismic initiating events are considered the mitigation feature and operator actions. The three event trees which dose not cuase the non direct containment failures are shown in Figures 4 through 6.

Table 4 Seismic Intiating Event for Containment failure Seismic Initiating Seismic Initiating Event Description Consequence of Sequence Event S-DMG Seismic Events Leading to Direct Core Direct to Containment failure Damage with Containment Structural Damage S-SBO Seismic-Induced SBO Direct to Containment Isolation failure S-IC Loss of All Instrumentation and Control Direct to Containment Isolation failure S-MLSB Seismic-Induced MSLB Direct to Containment Isolation failure S-TLOCCW Seismic Induced TLOCCW Containment Isolation and late overpressure failure S-ATWS Seismic-Induced ATWS Direct to Containment failure S-LLOCA Seismic-Induced LLOCA Direct to Containment failure S-MLOCA Seismic-Induced MLOCA Direct to Containment failure S-SLOCA Small LOCA Containment Isolation and late overpressure failure S-LOOP Seismic-Induced LOOP Containment Isolation and late overpressure failure The top event on the containment failure event tree is described in Table 5.

Table 5 Containment Failure Event Tree Top Event Top Event Top Event Description Success Criteria S-CIS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM Success of the containment isolation S-CSR1 CONTIANMENT HEAT REMOVAL 1 of 2 CS pumps provides long-term heat removal in recirculation mode A2-6

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Figure 4 S-TLOCCW Containment Failure Event Tree A2-7

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Figure 5 S-SLOCA Containment Failure Event Tree A2-8

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Figure 6 S-LOOP Containment Failure Event Tree A2-9

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Table. At-Power PRA-based SMA FMEA Results FMEA for Failure FMEA for IE ID in IE FLAG in Basic Event SSCs Location HCLPF (g) Containment Remark mode Core Damage Seismic ET Seismic ET ID Failure DIRECT CORE LOSS of Containment Bldg DAMAGE CONTAINMEN Reactor Reactor Tan. shear Structural Failure SEIS-CTS-due to RCS T INTEGRITY SIE-FLAG-Containment Containment fail near 0.94 and Subsequent S-DMG EX-FAIL-Catestrophic is assumed due to DMG-CF building building the base RCS Structural 0.94G Failure Containment Failure i.e. Excessive Structure Failure LOCA DIRECT CORE LOSS of Containment Bldg DAMAGE CONTAINMEN Reactor Reactor Tan. shear Structural Failure SEIS-CTS-due to RCS T INTEGRITY SIE-FLAG-Containment Containment fail near 1.09 and Subsequent S-DMG IN-FAIL-Catestrophic is assumed due to DMG-CF Internal building the base RCS Structural 1.09G Failure Containment Failure i.e. Excessive Structure Failure LOCA DIRECT CORE LOSS of Containment Bldg Sliding DAMAGE CONTAINMEN Structural Failure CMNT toward the due to RCS T INTEGRITY SIE-FLAG- SEIS-NI-Nuclear Island 0.52 and Subsequent S-DMG Basement turbine Catestrophic is assumed due to DMG-CF FAIL-0.52G RCS Structural building Failure Containment Failure i.e. Excessive Structure Failure LOCA DIRECT Aux bldg is assumed CORE LOSS of to collapse to Shear fail DAMAGE CONTAINMEN containment bldg.

Auxiliary Auxiliary of shear due to RCS T INTEGRITY Containment Bldg SIE-FLAG- SEIS-AB-0.51 S-DMG Building Building wall at the Catestrophic is assumed due to Structural Failure DMG-CF FAIL-0.51G basemat Failure Containment and Subsequent i.e. Excessive Structure Failure RCS Structural LOCA Failure EDG C&D are Mitigation Mitigation installed in the Aux Emergency Emergency Shear fail Modeling is Modeling is Bldg SEIS-DG-Diesel Diesel of shear Required 0.87 Required It is not modeled N/A - BLDG-Generator Generator wall at the (Failure of (Failure of EDG due to high seismic FAIL-0.87G Building Building basemat EDG A&B A&B Only) capacity greater than Only)

EDG. Thus, seismic A3-1

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Table. At-Power PRA-based SMA FMEA Results FMEA for Failure FMEA for IE ID in IE FLAG in Basic Event SSCs Location HCLPF (g) Containment Remark mode Core Damage Seismic ET Seismic ET ID Failure failure of EDG building is included in the EDG failure.

EDG C&D are installed in the Aux Bldg Mitigation It is not modeled Mitigation Shear fail Modeling is due to the relatively SEIS-DG-Modeling is Diesel Fuel Oil Diesel Fuel Oil of shear Required low failure impact FOTK-0.73 Required N/A -

Tank Building Tank Building wall at the (Failure of (loss of 2 EDGs out STRUCT-(Failure of EDG basemat EDG A&B of 4 EDGs) and 073G A&B Only)

Only) higher HCLPF than EDG components which causes EDG unavailable.

DIRECT Turbine bldg is CORE LOSS of assumed to collapse DAMAGE CONTAINMEN Collapse to containment bldg.

Turbine Turbine due to RCS T INTEGRITY SIE-FLAG- SEIS-TB-into Aux [4] Impact to Rx Bldg S-DMG Building Building Catestrophic is assumed due to DMG-CF FAIL-0.5G Bldg and Subsequent Failure Containment RCS Catestrophic i.e. Excessive Structure Failure Failure LOCA DIRECT Compound Bldg is CORE LOSS of assumed to collapse DAMAGE CONTAINMEN Collapse to containment bldg. SEISMIC-Compound Compound due to RCS T INTEGRITY SIE-FLAG-into Aux [4] Impact to Rx Bldg S-DMG CPD-FAIL-Building Building Catestrophic is assumed due to DMG-CF Bldg and Subsequent 0.5G Failure Containment RCS Catestrophic i.e. Excessive Structure Failure Failure LOCA DIRECT CORE LOSS of RCS Catestrophic DAMAGE CONTAINMEN Failure is assumed SEIS-RV-Reactor CTMT El. Column due to RCS T INTEGRITY SIE-FLAG-0.92 to lead to S-DMG RCS-FAIL-Pressure Vessel 69'~156' support Catestrophic is assumed due to DMG-CF Containment 0.92G Failure Containment Structrual Failure i.e. Excessive Structure Failure LOCA A3-2

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Table. At-Power PRA-based SMA FMEA Results FMEA for Failure FMEA for IE ID in IE FLAG in Basic Event SSCs Location HCLPF (g) Containment Remark mode Core Damage Seismic ET Seismic ET ID Failure The Direct DIRECT Containment RCS flow through Core Sup. CORE failure is assumed the core is assumed SEIS-RVI-Reactor Vessel CTMT El. Barrel DAMAGE SIE-FLAG-0.51 conservatively to be blocked due to S-DMG RCS-FAIL-Internal 69'~156' lower due to Loss of DMG-CF considering the the Rx Internal 0.51G flange Flow through relatively high Failure Core HCLPF DIRECT DIRECT CORE Containment DAMAGE Failure Binding of RCS Pressure spike SEIS-CEDM (Control is assumed is assumed cntrl. is assumed not SIE-FLAG- CEDM-Element Drive CTMT 0.64 conservatively conservatively S-ATWS extension supressed for the ATWS RCS-FAIL-Mechanism) considering the considering the shaft ATWS 0.64G relatively high relatively high HCLPF HCLPF ATWS ATWS DIRECT CORE LOSS of Anch. fail RCS Catestrophic DAMAGE CONTAINMEN of snubber Failure is assumed SEIS-SG-Steam CTMT El. due to RCS T INTEGRITY SIE-FLAG-lever 0.6 to lead to S-DMG RCS-FAIL-Generator 114'~136'06 Catestrophic is assumed due to DMG-CF support Containment 0.6G Failure Containment asm. Structrual Failure i.e. Excessive Structure Failure LOCA SG Economizer nozzle failure leads DIRECT The Direct to FWLB. It rapidlly CORE Containment drains S/G SEIS-Steam DAMAGE failure is assumed secondary side thus CTMT El. Enconomiz SIE-FLAG- SGNOZZ-Generator 0.54 dut to the very conservatively operator action time S-DMG 114'~136'06 er nozzle DMG-CF RCS-FAIL-Nozzle short available considering the for feed and bleed is 0.54G operator action relatively high very short.

time HCLPF Therefore DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed.

A3-3

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Table. At-Power PRA-based SMA FMEA Results FMEA for Failure FMEA for IE ID in IE FLAG in Basic Event SSCs Location HCLPF (g) Containment Remark mode Core Damage Seismic ET Seismic ET ID Failure DIRECT CORE LOSS of RCS Catestrophic DAMAGE CONTAINMEN Failure is assumed SEIS-PZR-CTMT El. Skirt due to RCS T INTEGRITY SIE-FLAG-Pressurizer 0.63 to lead to S-DMG RCS-FAIL-114'~156' support Catestrophic is assumed due to DMG-CF Containment 0.63G Failure Containment Structrual Failure i.e. Excessive Structure Failure LOCA SEIS-Pressurizer CTMT El. Spray 4 inch diameter for SIE-FLAG- PZRNOZZ-0.51 MLOCA MLOCA S-MLOCA nozzle 114'~156' nozzle PZR spray nozzle MLOCA RCS-FAIL-0.51G 12 inch diameter for SEIS-PIPE-Reactor Coolant Surge line SIE-FLAG-CTMT 0.55 LLOCA LLOCA PZR Surge Line S-LLOCA RCS-FAIL-System Piping nozzle LLOCA Nozzle 0.55G DIRECT CORE LOSS of DAMAGE CONTAINMEN RCS Catestrophic Upper SEIS-RCP-Reactor Coolant CTMT El. due to RCS T INTEGRITY Failure Causes SIE-FLAG-horiz.colu 1.31 S-DMG RCS-FAIL-Pumps 114'~136'06 Catestrophic is assumed due to Containment DMG-CF mn support 1.31G Failure Containment Structrual Failure.

i.e. Excessive Structure Failure LOCA It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT operation of SI Mitigation SEIS-CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG-ESWIS ESW Building Generic [4] Modeling is S-TLOCCW ESWIS-DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW Required FAIL-0.5G TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT operation of SI Mitigation SEIS-CCW-CCW Hx CCW Hx CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG-Generic [4] Modeling is S-TLOCCW BLDG-Building Building DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW Required FAIL-0.5G TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed A3-4

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Table. At-Power PRA-based SMA FMEA Results FMEA for Failure FMEA for IE ID in IE FLAG in Basic Event SSCs Location HCLPF (g) Containment Remark mode Core Damage Seismic ET Seismic ET ID Failure Mitigation Mitigation SEIS-Charging AB El. 55' Generic [1] Modeling is Modeling is Loss of CVCS N/A - CVPP01-Pumps Required Required FAIL-0.5G Mitigation Mitigation SEIS-Regenerative CTMT El. 114' Generic [1] Modeling is Modeling is Loss of CVCS N/A - CVHX01-Heat Exchanger Required Required FAIL-0.5G Mitigation Mitigation Letdown Heat CTMT El. 100' Generic [1] Modeling is Modeling is Loss of CVCS N/A - N/A Exchanger Required Required Mitigation Mitigation SEIS-Auxiliary Loss of Aux AB El. 55' Generic [1] Modeling is Modeling is N/A - CVPP03-Charging Pump Charging PP Required Required FAIL-0.5G RCS Catestrophic Mitigation Mitigation Safety Injection CTMT. El. 136' Failure Causes SEIS-SIT-Generic [1] Modeling is Modeling is N/A -

Tanks 06" Containment FAIL-0.5G Required Required Structrual Failure Mitigation Mitigation SEIS-Shutdown AB El. 50' Generic [1] Modeling is Modeling is - N/A - SIPP01-Cooling Pumps Required Required FAIL-0.5G Shutdown Mitigation Mitigation SEIS-Cooling Heat AB El. 50' Generic [1] Modeling is Modeling is - N/A - SIHX01-Exchanger Required Required FAIL-0.5G SC Pump Mitigation Mitigation SEIS-Miniflow Heat AB El. 50' Generic [1] Modeling is Modeling is - N/A - SIHX02-Exchanger Required Required FAIL-0.5G Mitigation Mitigation SEIS-Safety Injection AB El. 50' Generic [1] Modeling is Modeling is - N/A - SIPP02-Pump Required Required FAIL-0.5G Mitigation Mitigation SEIS-Containment AB El. 50' Generic [1] Modeling is Modeling is - N/A - CSPP01-Spray Pump Required Required FAIL-0.5G Mitigation Mitigation SEIS-CS Miniflow AB El. 50' Generic [1] Modeling is Modeling is - N/A - CSHX02-Hx Required Required FAIL-0.5G Containment Mitigation Mitigation SEIS-Spray Heat AB El. 55' Generic [1] Modeling is Modeling is - N/A - CSHX01-Exchanger Required Required FAIL-0.5G A3-5

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Table. At-Power PRA-based SMA FMEA Results FMEA for Failure FMEA for IE ID in IE FLAG in Basic Event SSCs Location HCLPF (g) Containment Remark mode Core Damage Seismic ET Seismic ET ID Failure No assurance for Containment subcriticality after DIRECT Isolation Failure MSLB. This leads to Main Steam CORE is assumed due to DIRECT CORE SIE-FLAG- SEIS-MSIV-AB El. 137'06" Generic [1] S-MSLB Isolation Valves DAMAGE the steamline DAMAGE. MSLB FAIL-0.5G MSLB break outside Broken Steam Line containment is Considered as Isolation Failure No assurance for subcriticality after MSLB. This leads to DIRECT CORE Containment DAMAGE.

DIRECT Isolation Failure Main Steam Isolation of ADV SEIS-CORE is assumed due to SIE-FLAG-Atmospheric AB El. 137'06" Generic [1] blocik MOV is S-MSLB MSADV-DAMAGE the steamline MSLB Valves(ADV) assumed failed in a FAIL-0.5G MSLB break outside very short time after containment I.E.

Broken Steam Line is Considered as Isolation Failure No assurance for Containment subcriticality after DIRECT Isolation Failure MSLB. This leads to SEIS-Main Steam CORE is assumed due to DIRECT CORE SIE-FLAG-AB El. 137'06" Generic [1] S-MSLB MSSV-Safety Valves DAMAGE the steamline DAMAGE. MSLB FAIL-0.5G MSLB break outside Broken Steam Line containment is Considered as Isolation Failure Mitigation Mitigation SEIS-AFW Pump-AB El. 78' Generic [1] Modeling is Modeling is - N/A  AFMP-Motor Driven Required Required FAIL-0.5G Mitigation Mitigation AFW Pump- SEIS-AFTP-AB El. 78' Generic [1] Modeling is Modeling is - N/A 

Turbine Driven FAIL-0.5G Required Required A3-6

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Table. At-Power PRA-based SMA FMEA Results FMEA for Failure FMEA for IE ID in IE FLAG in Basic Event SSCs Location HCLPF (g) Containment Remark mode Core Damage Seismic ET Seismic ET ID Failure Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure Emergency CORE is assumed due to SIE-FLAG- SEIS-DG-Diesel EDG El. 100' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation - S-SBO SBO FAIL-0.5G Generators Station system failure Blackout caused by loss of all control Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure Emergency CORE is assumed due to SEIS-DG-Diesel SIE-FLAG-AB El. 100' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation - S-SBO CD-FAIL-Generators SBO Station system failure 0.5G (Aux. Building)

Blackout caused by loss of all control Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure Emergency CORE is assumed due to SEIS-SIE-FLAG-Diesel Fuel Oil EDG El. 65' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation - S-SBO DOMPS-SBO transfer pump Station system failure FAIL-0.5G Blackout caused by loss of all control Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure Emergency SEIS-CORE is assumed due to Diesel Fuel Oil SIE-FLAG- DOMPS-AB El. 63' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation - S-SBO transfer pump SBO CD-FAIL-Station system failure (Aux. Building) 0.5G Blackout caused by loss of all control Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure CORE is assumed due to SEIS-Starting Air SIE-FLAG-AB El. 100' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation - S-SBO DGTK40-Tank SBO Station system failure FAIL-0.5G Blackout caused by loss of all control A3-7

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Table. At-Power PRA-based SMA FMEA Results FMEA for Failure FMEA for IE ID in IE FLAG in Basic Event SSCs Location HCLPF (g) Containment Remark mode Core Damage Seismic ET Seismic ET ID Failure Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure CORE is assumed due to SEIS-Diesel Fuel Oil SIE-FLAG-EDG El. 121' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation - S-SBO DOTK02-Day Tank SBO Station system failure FAIL-0.5G Blackout caused by loss of all control Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure SEIS-Diesel Fuel Oil CORE is assumed due to SIE-FLAG- DOTK02-Day Tank AB El. 120' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation - S-SBO SBO CD-FAIL-(Aux. Building) Station system failure 0.5G Blackout caused by loss of all control Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure CORE is assumed due to SEIS-Diesel Fuel Oil SIE-FLAG-EDG El. 63' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation - S-SBO DOTK01-Storage Tank SBO Station system failure FAIL-0.5G Blackout caused by loss of all control Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure SEIS-Diesel Fuel Oil CORE is assumed due to SIE-FLAG- DOTK01-Storage Tank Aux. El. 65' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation - S-SBO SBO CD-FAIL-(Aux.Building) Station system failure 0.5G Blackout caused by loss of all control Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure CORE is assumed due to SIE-FLAG- SEIS-DGSL-Silencer AB El. 100' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation - S-SBO SBO FAIL-0.5G Station system failure Blackout caused by loss of all control DIRECT Containment CORE Isolation Failure SIE-FLAG- SEIS-DGFT-Air Intake Filter AB El. 109' Generic [1] - S-SBO DAMAGE is assumed due to SBO FAIL-0.5G Station the isolation A3-8

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Table. At-Power PRA-based SMA FMEA Results FMEA for Failure FMEA for IE ID in IE FLAG in Basic Event SSCs Location HCLPF (g) Containment Remark mode Core Damage Seismic ET Seismic ET ID Failure Blackout system failure caused by loss of all control Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure CORE is assumed due to SEIS-Lube Oil Water SIE-FLAG-AB El. 100' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation - S-SBO DGHX-Hx SBO Station system failure FAIL-0.5G Blackout caused by loss of all control Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure Motor Driven CORE is assumed due to Fuel Oil Feed SIE-FLAG- SEIS-DGPP-EDG El. 100' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation - S-SBO Pump (EDG SBO FAIL-0.5G Station system failure Building)

Blackout caused by loss of all control Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure Motor Driven CORE is assumed due to SEIS-DGPP-Fuel Oil Feed SIE-FLAG-AB El. 100' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation - S-SBO CD-FAIL-Pump (Aux. SBO Station system failure 0.5G Building)

Blackout caused by loss of all control It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT operation of SI Essential Mitigation ESW IS. El. CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG- SEIS-SXPP-Service Water Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW 69' DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW FAIL-0.5G Pump Required TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed It is highly unlikely DIRECT of long term Mitigation SEIS-CCW Heat CCW Hx Bldg CORE operation of SI SIE-FLAG-Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW CCHX-Exchangers El. 100' DAMAGE Pumps under TLOCCW Required FAIL-0.5G TLOCCW seismic event thus DIRECT CORE A3-9

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Table. At-Power PRA-based SMA FMEA Results FMEA for Failure FMEA for IE ID in IE FLAG in Basic Event SSCs Location HCLPF (g) Containment Remark mode Core Damage Seismic ET Seismic ET ID Failure DAMAGE is assumed It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT operation of SI Mitigation CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG- SEIS-CCPP-CCW Pump AB El. 55' Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW FAIL-0.5G Required TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT operation of SI Mitigation CCW Surge CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG- SEIS-CCTK-AB El. 172' Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW Tank DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW FAIL-0.5G Required TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT operation of SI Essential Mitigation SEIS-CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG-Chilled Water AB. El. 78' Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW WOPP-DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW Pumps Required FAIL-0.5G TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT operation of SI Mitigation SEIS-Essential CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG-AB El. 78' Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW WOCH-Chillers DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW Required FAIL-0.5G TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed ECW DIRECT Mitigation It is highly unlikely SEIS-SIE-FLAG-Compression AB El. 172' Generic [1] CORE Modeling is of long term S-TLOCCW WOTK-TLOCCW Tank DAMAGE Required operation of SI FAIL-0.5G A3-10

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Table. At-Power PRA-based SMA FMEA Results FMEA for Failure FMEA for IE ID in IE FLAG in Basic Event SSCs Location HCLPF (g) Containment Remark mode Core Damage Seismic ET Seismic ET ID Failure TLOCCW Pumps under seismic event thus DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT operation of SI Mitigation SEIS-ECW Air CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG-AB El. 78' Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW WOTK02-Separator DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW Required FAIL-0.5G TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed It is highly unlikely of long term Essential DIRECT operation of SI Mitigation SEIS-Chilled Water CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG-AB El. 78' Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW WOLP-System Control DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW Required FAIL-0.5G Panel TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT operation of SI AFWP Room Mitigation SEIS-CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG-Cubicle Cooler- AB El. 78' Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW VOHV33-DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW MD Required FAIL-0.5G TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT operation of SI Mitigation SEIS-CCWP Room CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG-AB El. 55' Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW VKHV13/14 Cubicle Cooler DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW Required -FAIL-0.5G TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed A3-11

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Table. At-Power PRA-based SMA FMEA Results FMEA for Failure FMEA for IE ID in IE FLAG in Basic Event SSCs Location HCLPF (g) Containment Remark mode Core Damage Seismic ET Seismic ET ID Failure It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT operation of SI Mitigation SEIS-SI Room AB El. 50' CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG-Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW VKHV11/12 Cubicle Cooler AB El. 55' DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW Required -FAIL-0.5G TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed It is highly unlikely of long term SC Pump & DIRECT operation of SI Mitigation SEIS-Mini-flow Hx. AB El. 50' CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG-Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW VKHV16-Room Cubicle AB El. 55' DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW Required FAIL-0.5G Cooler TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT operation of SI Mech. Pen. Mitigation CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG- SEIS-CCLR-Room Cubicle AB El. 100' Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW MPR-0.5G Cooler Required TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT operation of SI Mitigation SEIS-CS Pump Room AB El. 50' CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG-Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW VKHV10-Cubicle Cooler AB El. 55' DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW Required FAIL-0.5G TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT Aux Charging Mitigation operation of SI SEIS-CCLR-CORE SIE-FLAG-Pump Room AB El. 55' Generic [1] Modeling is Pumps under S-TLOCCW ACVPP-DAMAGE TLOCCW Cubicle Cooler Required seismic event thus 0.5G TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is A3-12

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Table. At-Power PRA-based SMA FMEA Results FMEA for Failure FMEA for IE ID in IE FLAG in Basic Event SSCs Location HCLPF (g) Containment Remark mode Core Damage Seismic ET Seismic ET ID Failure assumed It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT operation of SI Charging Pump Mitigation SEIS-CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG-Room Cubicle AB El. 55' Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW VKHV18-DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW Cooler Required FAIL-0.5G TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT operation of SI Elect. Pen. Mitigation CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG- SEIS-CCLR-Room Area AB El. 120' Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW EPA-0.5G Cubicle Cooler Required TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed It is highly unlikely of long term Elect. Pen. DIRECT operation of SI Mitigation SEIS-CCLR-Room Area CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG-AB El. 137' Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW EPA-137-Cubicle Cooler DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW Required 0.5G (El. 137') TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT operation of SI I&C Equipment Mitigation CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG- SEIS-CCLR-RooM Cubical AB El. 157' Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW IC-0.5G Cooler Required TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed A3-13

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Table. At-Power PRA-based SMA FMEA Results FMEA for Failure FMEA for IE ID in IE FLAG in Basic Event SSCs Location HCLPF (g) Containment Remark mode Core Damage Seismic ET Seismic ET ID Failure It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT operation of SI EDG Room Mitigation SEIS-CCLR-CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG-Emergency EDG El. 100' Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW EDG-100-DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW Cubicle Cooler Required 0.5G TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT operation of SI EDG Room Mitigation SEIS-CCLR-CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG-Emergency EDG El. 135' Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW EDG-135-DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW Cubicle Cooler Required 0.5G TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT operation of SI Essential Mitigation SEIS-CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG-Chiller & Pump AB El. 78' Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW VOHV32-DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW Cubicle Cooler Required FAIL-0.5G TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed CCW Hx. CCW Hx B El.

Room Supply 100' CCW Hx Generic [1] No Impact No Impact - N/A  N/A Fans El. 126' It is highly unlikely of long term DIRECT operation of SI ESW Pump Mitigation SEIS-CORE Pumps under SIE-FLAG-Room Supply ESW IS. El. 90' Generic [1] Modeling is S-TLOCCW VGAH-DAMAGE seismic event thus TLOCCW Fan Required FAIL-0.5G TLOCCW DIRECT CORE DAMAGE is assumed EDG Room DIRECT Containment SIE-FLAG- SEIS-EDG El. 100' Generic [1] - S-SBO Emergency CORE Isolation Failure SBO VGAH02-A3-14

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Table. At-Power PRA-based SMA FMEA Results FMEA for Failure FMEA for IE ID in IE FLAG in Basic Event SSCs Location HCLPF (g) Containment Remark mode Core Damage Seismic ET Seismic ET ID Failure Exhaust Fan DAMAGE is assumed due to FAIL-0.5G (EDG Building) Station the isolation Blackout system failure caused by loss of all control Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure EDG Room SEIS-CORE is assumed due to Emergency SIE-FLAG- VGAH02-AB El. 172' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation - S-SBO Exhaust Fan SBO CD-FAIL-Station system failure (Aux. Building) 0.5G Blackout caused by loss of all control Control Room Emergency AB El. 172' Generic [1] No Impact No Impact - N/A  N/A Makeup ACU Containment ESF-CCS GC, LC DIRECT Isolation Failure and PPS Cabinet CORE is assumed due to Failure is SEIS-ESF-ESF-CCS GC SIE-FLAG-AB El. 156' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation Seismically S-IC RPS-FAIL-Cabinet IC LOSS of system failure Correlated. 0.5G Control caused by loss of Modleled as a single all control Event Containment ESF-CCS GC, LC DIRECT Isolation Failure and PPS Cabinet CORE is assumed due to Failure is SEIS-ESF-ESF-CCS LC AB El. 156' AB SIE-FLAG-Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation Seismically S-IC RPS-FAIL-Cabinet El. 137'6" IC LOSS of system failure Correlated. 0.5G Control caused by loss of Modleled as a single all control Event Containment ESF-CCS GC, LC DIRECT Isolation Failure and PPS Cabinet CORE is assumed due to Failure is SEIS-ESF-Plant Protection SIE-FLAG-AB El. 156' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation Seismically S-IC RPS-FAIL-System Cabinet IC LOSS of system failure Correlated. 0.5G Control caused by loss of Modleled as a single all control Event A3-15

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Table. At-Power PRA-based SMA FMEA Results FMEA for Failure FMEA for IE ID in IE FLAG in Basic Event SSCs Location HCLPF (g) Containment Remark mode Core Damage Seismic ET Seismic ET ID Failure Reactor Trip AB El. 137'6" Generic [1] No Impact No Impact - - - N/A Switchgear MCR Operator AB El. 156' Generic [1] No Impact No Impact - - - 

Consoles Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure CORE is assumed due to SEIS-RP-MCR Safety SIE-FLAG-AB El. 156' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation - S-IC PM05-FAIL-Consoles IC LOSS of system failure 0.5G Control caused by loss of all control Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure 125V DC CORE is assumed due to SEIS-DC-SIE-FLAG-Battery AB El. 78' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation - S-IC BC-FAIL-IC Chargers LOSS of system failure 0.5G Control caused by loss of all control Mitigation Mitigation SEIS-RC-SI Inverter AB El. 78' Generic [1] Modeling is Modeling is -   INV-FAIL-Required Required 0.5G Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure 120V AC CORE is assumed due to SIE-FLAG- SEIS-IPINV-Inverter(VBPS AB El. 78' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation - S-IC IC FAIL-0.5G S) LOSS of system failure Control caused by loss of all control Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure CORE is assumed due to SEIS-Regulating SIE-FLAG-AB El. 78' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation - S-IC IPREGTR-Transformer IC LOSS of system failure FAIL-0.5G Control caused by loss of all control DIRECT Containment SEIS-DC-125V DC SIE-FLAG-AB El. 78' Generic [1] CORE Isolation Failure - S-SBO MCC-FAIL-Control Center SBO DAMAGE is assumed due to 0.5G A3-16

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Table. At-Power PRA-based SMA FMEA Results FMEA for Failure FMEA for IE ID in IE FLAG in Basic Event SSCs Location HCLPF (g) Containment Remark mode Core Damage Seismic ET Seismic ET ID Failure Station the isolation Blackout system failure caused by Station Blackout Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure CORE is assumed due to SEIS-4KV-SIE-FLAG-4.16kV MCSG AB El. 78' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation - S-SBO BUS-FAIL-SBO Station system failure 0.5G Blackout caused by Station Blackout Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure CORE is assumed due to SEIS-480V-480V Load SIE-FLAG-AB El. 78' Generic [1] DAMAGE the isolation - S-IC LC-FAIL-Center IC LOSS of system failure 0.5G Control caused by loss of all control 480V Mitigation Mitigation SEIS-480V-MCC(Aux. AB El. 137'06" Generic [1] Modeling is Modeling is - - - MCC-FAIL-EL.137'06") Required Required 0.5G 480V Mitigation Mitigation SEIS-480V-MCC(Aux. AB El. 120' Generic [1] Modeling is Modeling is - - - MCC-FAIL-EL.120') Required Required 0.5G 480V Mitigation Mitigation SEIS-480V-MCC(Aux. AB El. 100' Generic [1] Modeling is Modeling is - - - MCC-FAIL-EL.100') Required Required 0.5G 480V Mitigation Mitigation SEIS-480V-MCC(Aux. AB El. 78' Generic [1] Modeling is Modeling is - - - MCC-FAIL-EL.78') Required Required 0.5G 480V Mitigation Mitigation SEIS-480V-MCC(ESW IS ESW IS. El. 90' Generic [1] Modeling is Modeling is - - - MCC-FAIL-EL.100') Required Required 0.5G Containment DIRECT Isolation Failure CORE SEIS-DC-Batteries & AB El. 78' is assumed due to SIE-FLAG-Generic [1] DAMAGE - S-SBO BT-FAIL-Racks AB El. 100' the isolation SBO Station 0.5G system failure Blackout caused by loss of A3-17

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Table. At-Power PRA-based SMA FMEA Results FMEA for Failure FMEA for IE ID in IE FLAG in Basic Event SSCs Location HCLPF (g) Containment Remark mode Core Damage Seismic ET Seismic ET ID Failure all control LOOP is LOOP is assumed SIE-FLAG- SEIS-LOOP-Off-Site Power various Generic 0.09[2] - S-LOOP asumed failed failed LOOP 0.09g SLCOA SLCOA Various RCS Small Leak Small Leak from SIE-FLAG- SEIS-RCS-small pipe and various Generic 0.3[3] from RCS is - S-SLOCA RCS is assumed SLOCA LEAK-0.3g Tubing line assumed at at SSE SSE Key Assumptions

[1] The component is assigned to COL item (COL 19.1.(8)) and HCLPF value is assumed to be equal to or exceed 1.67 times CSDRS

[2] HCLPF based on generic value from Risk Assessment of Operational Events Handbook Volume 2 - External Events, R.1.01, January 2008, USNRC (Reference 79).

[3] HCLPF based on Option 2 in "SPRA implementation guide", EPRI 3002000709 (Reference 77)

[4] Turbine building, compound building, ESW IS and CCW HX Building are assigned to COL item (COL 19.1(8)) and HCLPF value is assumed to be equal to or exceed 1.67 times GMRS.

A3-18

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APR1400 SMA - ISG-020 Implementation (At-Power)

DC-COL ISG-020 Guidance Implementation Met (1) seismic accident initiation events; Seismic Accident initiating event are selected based on Yes FMEA in Section 19.1.5.1.1.4 of the DCD Markup (2) a summary of the operating modes, accident sequences and a summary of the operating modes, accident sequences Yes event/fault trees, and damage levels considered in the analysis; and event/fault trees, and damage levels considered in Section 19.1.5.1.1.4 of the DCD Markup (3) the definition of the response spectrum shape used for the For the APR1400, the RLE is selected based on the Yes fragility analysis of SSCs, accident sequences, and the plant; design response spectra of the site-independent SSE which is developed from the certified seismic design response spectra (CSDRS) in Section 19.1.5.1.1 a of the DCD Markup (4) identification of the methods used to calculate sequence-level The methodology of the seismic risk evaluations are Yes and plant-level HCLPFs for the sequences, operating modes, and described in Section 19.1.5.1.1 f of the DCD Markup damage levels considered; (5) a table with the capacities (e.g., in terms of the median and It is shown in Table 19.1-43 Yes logarithmic standard deviation of the fragilities) for the SSCs in the SEL; (6) a summary description of the methods used for the derivation The methodology of the seismic risk evaluations are Yes of the component fragilities, including a summary of how the described in Section 19.1.5.1.1 of the DCD Markup component probability of failure is related to the ground motion parameter; (7) for equipment in the SEL which is qualified via tests, a The methodology of the seismic risk evaluations are Yes description of the procurement specifications including the described in COL 19.1(8) of the DCD Markup enhanced RRS as described in Section 5.1.2 of this ISG to ensure A4-1

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APR1400 SMA - ISG-020 Implementation (At-Power)

DC-COL ISG-020 Guidance Implementation Met appropriate HCLPF capacity of the procured equipment; (8) risk-significant SSCs, dominant cut-sets and sequences, and The results of the seismic risk evaluations are Yes seismic event/fault trees; described in Section 19.1.5.1.2.4 and table 19.1-44A/B/C/D of the DCD Markup (9) sequence-level and plant-level HCLPF capacities for the The results of the seismic risk evaluations are Yes operating modes and damage levels; described in Section 19.1.5.1.2.4 and table 19.1-44A/B/C/D of the DCD Markup (10) a summary of independent peer reviews; and, Given the limited information available at the DC Yes stage for the PRA-based SMA, a peer review will be conducted after a plant specific Seismic PRA by COL holder. 1)

(11) analysis assumptions, COL action items, interface items, and These related items are described in Section Yes post licensing activities. 19.1.5.1.1.4.9 for analysis assumption and 19.0.1 for COL items of the DCD Markup Note 1): In order to review the PRA technical adequacy, a self-assessment was performed for the PRA-based SMA. Any findings and observations from self-assessment are dispositioned to provide reasonable assurance that issues are capture and addressed. Any changes required or affecting PRA model and associated documentation are conducted in a manner consistent with DCD section 19.1.2.4 A4-2

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1. At-Power Seismic Fault Tree Modeling System logic models, i.e., fault trees, that were developed for the internal events PRA model were used as the basis for the PRA-based SMA logic models. The PRA-based SMA logic models include the seismic failures. Details of the fault tree logic model development for systems where explicit evaluation of seismic failures needed to be included are provided in the subsections that follow.

The naming convention is used for new basic event of seismic failures:

SEIS-CTS-EX-FAIL-0.94G x SEIS : Prefix for Seismic failure event x CTS-EX-FAIL : Failure mode of SSCs x 0.94G : HCLPF value of SSCs Details of the fault tree logic model development for systems where explicit evaluation of seismic failures needed to be included are provided in the subsections that follow.

1.1 Direct Core Damage (S-DMG)

A seismic event that causes significant structural failure is assumed to preclude equipment operation and operator actions needed to prevent core damage. However, structural failure could cause widespread equipment failures. Since these structures were not explicitly included in the internal events model, a new fault tree, G-S-DMG, was created to model seismic failure of these structures. The G-S-DMG fault tree is shown in Figure 1. The new basic events for seismic failure related to S-DMG are included as below.

HCLPF Basic Event ID Basic Event Description SSCs (g)

Reactor SEIS-CTS-EX-FAIL- SEISMIC FAILURE OF CONTAINMENT Containment 0.94 0.94G EXTERIOR building Reactor SEIS-CTS-IN-FAIL- SEISMIC FAILURE OF CONTAINMENT Containment 1.09 1.09G INTERNAL STRUCTURE Internal A5-1

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HCLPF Basic Event ID Basic Event Description SSCs (g)

SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Nuclear SEIS-NI-FAIL-0.52G Nuclear Island 0.52 Island failure SEIS-AB-FAIL-0.51G SEISMIC FAILURE OF AUXILIARY BUILDING Auxiliary Building 0.51 SEISMIC FAILURE OF THE TURBINE BUILDING SEIS-TB-FAIL-0.5G Turbine Building 0.5 COLLAPE INTO AUXILIARY BLDG SEISMIC-CPD-FAIL- SEISMIC FAILURE OF COMPOUND BUILDING Compound 0.5 0.5G COLLAPE INTO AUXILIARY BLDG Building SEIS-RV-RCS-FAIL- SEISMICALLY-INDUCED REACTOR VESSEL Reactor Pressure 0.92 0.92G FALURE Vessel SEIS-RVI-RCS-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED RX VESSESL INTERNAL Reactor Vessel 0.51 0.51G FAILURE Internal SEIS-SG-RCS-FAIL-SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SG SUPPORT FALURE Steam Generator 0.6 0.6G SEIS-SGNOZZ-RCS- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Steam Steam Generator 0.54 FAIL-0.54G Generator Nozzle Nozzle SEIS-PZR-RCS-FAIL-SEISMICALLY-INDUCED PZR SKIRT FAILURE Pressurizer 0.63 0.63G SEIS-RCP-RCS-FAIL- SEISMICALLY-INDUCED RCP SUPPORT Reactor Coolant 1.31 1.31G FALURE Pumps 1.2 Seismic-Induced Station Blackout (S-SBO)

The occurrence of a SBO after a seismic event is assumed to lead to direct core damage. Since S-SBO were not explicitly included in the internal events model, a new fault tree, S-SBO, was created to model seismic failure of these structures. The S-SBO fault tree is shown in Figure 2.

The new basic events for seismic failure related to S-SBO are included as below.

HCLPF Basic Event ID Basic Event Description SSCs (g)

Emergency SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Emergency Diesel SEIS-DG-FAIL-0.5G Diesel 0.5 Generators Generators Emergency Diesel SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Emergency Diesel SEIS-DG-CD-FAIL-0.5G Generators 0.5 Generators (Aux. Building)

(Aux.

Building)

Emergency SEIS-DOMPS-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Emergency Diesel Diesel Fuel Oil 0.5 0.5G Fuel Oil transfer pumps transfer pump Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil SEIS-DOMPS-CD-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Emergency Diesel transfer pump 0.5 0.5G Fuel Oil transfer pumps(Aux. Building)

(Aux.

Building)

SEIS-DGTK40-FAIL- Starting Air SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Starting Air Tanks 0.5 0.5G Tank A5-2

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HCLPF Basic Event ID Basic Event Description SSCs (g)

SEIS-DOTK02-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Diesel Fuel Oil Day Diesel Fuel Oil 0.5 0.5G Tanks Day Tank SEIS-DOTK02-CD- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Diesel Fuel Oil Day Diesel Fuel Oil 0.5 FAIL-0.5G Tanks (Aux. Building) Day Tank SEIS-DOTK01-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Diesel Fuel Oil Diesel Fuel Oil 0.5 0.5G Storage Tanks Storage Tank Diesel Fuel Oil SEIS-DOTK01-CD- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank 0.5 FAIL-0.5G Storage Tanks (Aux. Building)

(Aux.Building)

SEIS-DGSL-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Silencers Silencer 0.5 Air Intake SEIS-DGFT-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Air Intake Filters 0.5 Filter Lube Oil SEIS-DGHX-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Lube Oil Water Hxs 0.5 Water Hx Motor Driven SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Motor Driven Fuel Fuel Oil Feed SEIS-DGPP-FAIL-0.5G 0.5 Oil Feed Pumps Pump (EDG Building)

Motor Driven SEIS-DGPP-CD-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Motor Driven Fuel Fuel Oil Feed 0.5 0.5G Oil Feed Pumps (Aux. Building) Pump (Aux.

Building)

EDG Room Emergency SEIS-VGAH02-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF EDG Room Exhaust Fan 0.5 0.5G Emergency Exhaust Fans (EDG Building)

EDG Room Emergency SEIS-VGAH02-CD- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE Room Exhaust Fan 0.5 FAIL-0.5G Emergency Exhaust Fans (Aux. Building)

(Aux.

Building)

SEIS-DC-MCC-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF 125V DC Control 125V DC 0.5 0.5G Centers Control Center SEIS-4KV-BUS-FAIL-SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF 4.16kV MCSGs 4.16kV MCSG 0.5 0.5G Batteries &

SEIS-DC-BT-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Batteries & Racks 0.5 Racks 1.3 Loss of All Instrumentation and Control (S-IC)

S-IC is modeled as occurring if failure of all four channels of 480 VAC power, 125V DC power and I&C cabinet (Safety Console, ESF-CCS GC, ESF-CCS LC and PPS cabinet) are lost.

Since I&C failures were not explicitly included in the internal events model, a new fault tree, S-LOIC-EQUIP-F, was created to model seismic failure of these structures. The S-LOIC-EQUIP-F fault tree is shown in Figure 3. The new basic events for seismic failure related to S-LOIC-EQUIP-F are included as below.

A5-3

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HCLPF Basic Event ID Basic Event Description SSCs (g)

SEIS-ESF-RPS-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF ESF-CCS GC ESF-CCS GC 0.5 0.5G Cabinets Cabinet SEIS-ESF-RPS-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF ESF-CCS GC ESF-CCS LC 0.5 0.5G Cabinet Cabinet SEIS-ESF-RPS-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF ESF-CCS GC Plant Protection 0.5 0.5G Cabinets System Cabinet SEIS-RP-PM05-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF MCR SAFETY MCR Safety 0.5 0.5G CONSOLE Consoles SEIS-DC-BC-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF 125V DC Battery 125V DC 0.5 0.5G Chargers Battery Chargers SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF 120V AC Inverters 120V AC SEIS-IPINV-FAIL-0.5G 0.5 (VBPSS) Inverter(VBPSS)

SEIS-IPREGTR-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Regulating Regulating 0.5 0.5G Transformers Transformer SEIS-480V-LC-FAIL- 480V Load SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF 480V Load Centers 0.5 0.5G Center 1.4 Seismic-Induced Main Steam Line Break (S-MSLB)

The occurrence of a MSLB after a seismic event is assumed to lead to direct core damage. Since SEIS-MSLB were not explicitly included in the internal events model, a new fault tree, S-MSLB, was created to model seismic failure of these structures. The SEIS-MSLB fault tree is shown in Figure 4. The new basic events for seismic failure related to S-MSLB are included as below.

HCLPF Basic Event ID Basic Event Description SSCs (g)

Main Steam SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Main Steam Isolation SEIS-MSIV-FAIL-0.5G Isolation 0.5 Valves Valves Main Steam SEIS-MSADV-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Main Steam Atmospheric 0.5 0.5G Atmospheric Valves(ADV)

Valves(ADV)

SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Main Steam Safety Main Steam SEIS-MSSV-FAIL-0.5G 0.5 Valves Safety Valves 1.5 Seismic-Induced Total Loss of Component Cooling Water (S-TLOCCW)

The occurrence of a TLOCCW after a seismic event is assumed to lead to direct core damage.

Since S-TLOCCW were not explicitly included in the internal events model, a new fault tree, S-TLOCCW, was created to model seismic failure of these structures. The G-S-TLOCCW fault A5-4

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tree is shown in Figure 5. The new basic events for seismic failure related to S-TLOCCW are included as below.

HCLPF Basic Event ID Basic Event Description SSCs (g)

SEIS-ESWIS-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE ESWIS ESWIS 0.5 SEIS-CCW-BLDG- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CCW Hx CCW Hx 0.5 FAIL-0.5G Building Building Essential SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Essential Service SEIS-SXPP-FAIL-0.5G Service Water 0.5 Water Pumps Pump SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF CCW Heat CCW Heat SEIS-CCHX-FAIL-0.5G 0.5 Exchangers Exchangers SEIS-CCPP-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF CCW Pumps CCW Pump 0.5 CCW Surge SEIS-CCTK-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF CCW Surge Tanks 0.5 Tank Essential SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Essential Chilled SEIS-WOPP-FAIL-0.5G Chilled Water 0.5 Water Pumps Pumps Essential SEIS-WOCH-FAIL-0.5G SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Essential Chillers 0.5 Chillers ECW SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF ECW Compression SEIS-WOTK-FAIL-0.5G Compression 0.5 Tanks Tank SEIS-WOTK02-FAIL- ECW Air SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF ECW Air Separators 0.5 0.5G Separator Essential SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Essential Chilled Chilled Water SEIS-WOLP-FAIL-0.5G 0.5 Water System Control Panels System Control Panel AFWP Room SEIS-VOHV33-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF AFWP Room Cubicle Cubicle 0.5 0.5G Coolers-MD Cooler-MD SEIS-VKHV13/14-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF CCWP Room Cubicle CCWP Room 0.5 0.5G Coolers Cubicle Cooler SEIS-VKHV11/12-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF SI Room Cubicle SI Room 0.5 0.5G Coolers Cubicle Cooler SC Pump &

SEIS-VKHV16-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF SC Pump & Mini- Mini-flow Hx.

0.5 0.5G flow Hx. Room Cubicle Coolers Room Cubicle Cooler Mech. Pen.

SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Mech. Pen. Room SEIS-CCLR-MPR-0.5G Room Cubicle 0.5 Cubicle Coolers Cooler CS Pump SEIS-VKHV10-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF CS Pump Room Room Cubicle 0.5 0.5G Cubicle Coolers Cooler Aux Charging SEIS-CCLR-ACVPP- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Aux Charging Pump Pump Room 0.5 0.5G Room Cubicle Coolers Cubicle Cooler A5-5

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HCLPF Basic Event ID Basic Event Description SSCs (g)

Charging SEIS-VKHV18-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Charging Pump Room Pump Room 0.5 0.5G Cubicle Coolers Cubicle Cooler Elect. Pen.

SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Elect. Pen. Room SEIS-CCLR-EPA-0.5G Room Area 0.5 Area Cubicle Coolers Cubicle Cooler Elect. Pen.

SEIS-CCLR-EPA-137- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Elect. Pen. Room Room Area 0.5 0.5G Area Cubicle Coolers (EL.137') Cubicle Cooler (El. 137')

I&C SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF I&C Eq. Room Equipment SEIS-CCLR-IC-0.5G 0.5 Cubicle Coolers (EL.137') Room Cubical Cooler EDG Room SEIS-CCLR-EDG-100- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF EDG Room Emergency 0.5 0.5G Emergency Cubicle Coolers (EL.100')

Cubicle Cooler EDG Room SEIS-CCLR-EDG-135- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF EDG Room Emergency 0.5 0.5G Emergency Cubicle Coolers (EL.135')

Cubicle Cooler Essential SEIS-VOHV32-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF Essential Chiller & Chiller &

0.5 0.5G Pump Cubicle Coolers Pump Cubicle Cooler ESW Pump SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF ESW Pump Room SEIS-VGAH-FAIL-0.5G Room Supply 0.5 Supply Fans Fan 1.6 Seismic-Induced Anticipated Transient Without Scram (S-ATWS)

The occurrence of a S-ATWS after a seismic event is assumed to lead to direct core damage.

Since S-ATWS were not explicitly included in the internal events model, a new fault tree, S-ATWS, was created to model seismic failure of these structures. The S-ATWS fault tree is shown in Figure 6. The new basic events for seismic failure related to S-ATWS are included as below.

HCLPF Basic Event ID Basic Event Description SSCs (g)

CEDM (Control SEIS-CEDM-RCS-FAIL- SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURE OF THE CEDM (Control Element Drive 0.64 0.64G Element Drive Mechanism)

Mechanism)

A5-6

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1.7 Large LOCA (S-LLOCA)

The occurrence of a large LOCA after a seismic event is assumed to lead to direct core damage.

Since S-LLOCA were not explicitly included in the internal events model, a new fault tree, S-LLOCA, was created to model seismic failure of these structures. The S-LLOCA fault tree is shown in Figure 7. The new basic events for seismic failure related to S-LLOCA are included as below.

HCLPF Basic Event ID Basic Event Description SSCs (g)

Reactor SEIS-PIPE-RCS-FAIL- SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LARGE LOCA DUE TO Coolant 0.55 0.55G RCS PIPE FALURE System Piping 1.8 Medium LOCA (M-LOCA)

The occurrence of a Medium LOCA after a seismic event is assumed to lead to direct core damage. Since S-MLOCA were not explicitly included in the internal events model, a new fault tree, S-MLOCA, was created to model seismic failure of these structures. The S-LLOCA fault tree is shown in Figure 8. The new basic events for seismic failure related to S-LLOCA are included as below.

HCLPF Basic Event ID Basic Event Description SSCs (g)

SEIS-PZRNOZZ-RCS- SEISMICALLY-INDUCED MEDIUM LOCA DUE TO Pressurizer 0.51 FAIL-0.51G PZR NOZZ FAILURE nozzle 1.9 Small LOCA (S-SLOCA)

The occurrence of a small LOCA after a seismic event presents unique challenges to accident mitigation. NSSS seismic failures presented below table were evaluated for contribution to Small LOCA. Where appropriate the NSSS seismic failures where used to model Small LOCA.

The G-S-SLOCA fault tree is shown in Figure 9.

HCLPF Basic Event ID Basic Event Description SSCs (g)

Reactor SEIS-RCS-LEAK-0.3g SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SMALL LOCA Coolant 0.3 System A5-7

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1.10 Seismic Event Causes LOOP (S-LOOP)

The occurrence of a LOOP after a seismic event presents unique challenges to accident mitigation. The G-S-LOOP fault tree is shown in Figure 10. The new basic events for seismic failure related to S-LOOP are included as below.

HCLPF Basic Event ID Basic Event Description SSCs (g)

SEIS-LOOP-0.09g SEISMICALLY-INDUCED LOOP - 0.09 A5-8

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Figure 1 - G-S-DMG Fault Tree A5-9

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Figure 2 - S-SBO-EQUIP Fault Tree A5-10

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Figure 3 - S-LOIC-EQUIP-F Fault Tree A5-11

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Figure 4 - SEIS-MSLB Fault Tree A5-12

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Figure 5 - G-S-TLOCCW Fault Tree A5-13

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Figure 6 - G-S-ATWS Fault Tree Figure 7 - G-S-LLOCA Fault Tree A5-14

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Figure 8 - G-S-MLOCA Fault Tree Figure 9 - G-S-SLOCA Fault Tree A5-15

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Figure 10 - G-S-LOOP Fault Tree A5-16