ML17308A449
| ML17308A449 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 04/05/1988 |
| From: | Krimm R Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | Stohr J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17221A739 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8804290155 | |
| Download: ML17308A449 (54) | |
Text
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- zcezrxRATED DIARIBUTION DEMONSTTION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR: 8804290155 DOC. DATE: 88/04/05 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-335 St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1, Florida Power & Light Co. 05000335 50-389 St. Lucie Plant, Unit '2, Florida Power & Light Co. 05000389 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION KRIMM,R.W. Federal Emergency Management Agency RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION STOHR,J.P. Division of Radiation Protection & Emergency Preparedness
SUBJECT:
Forwards exercise rept re offsite radiological emergency preparedness exercise conducted on 870826. R DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE35D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: I TITLE: Emergency Preparedness-Appraisal/Confirmatory Action Ltr/Exercise Rep NOTES: D RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME PD2-2 PD INTERNAL: ARM/DAF/LFMB LTTR ENCL 1
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CODE/NAME TOURIGNY,E EP/EPB 10 LTTR ENCL 1
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A NRR/PMAS/ILRB12 1 1 E FILE 02 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 GN2/DRS /EPRPB 1 1 EXTERNAL: LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1
, NSIC 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 11 ENCL 10
> Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 0~
liPR g )gpss MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Philip Stohr Acting Director Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S uclear Regulatory Commission FROM:
Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs SUB JECT'xercise Report for the August 26, 1987, Exercise of Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Plans for the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Attached is a copy of the Exercise Report for. the August 26, 1987, full participation joint exercise of the offsite REP plans for the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. The State of Florida and St. Lucie and Martin Counties, all located in the 10-mile plume emergency planning zone (EPZ),
participated during this exercise. This exercise report was prepared by the Region IV office staff of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
There were no deficiencies identified during this exercise. However, there are two areas requi ring corrective actions, and several areas recommended for improvement. FEMA Reg'ion IV staff will furnish a copy of this exercise report to the State of Florida and will obtain a schedule of corrective actions from the State which addresses the areas requiring corrective action.
Region IV will assure completion by the State of the necessary corrective actions.
Based upon the results of this exercise, there continues to be reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be implemented by the offsite jurisdictions around the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, the 44 CFR 350 approval granted on February 15, 1984, remains in effect.
If you should have any questions, plea'se cont'act Dr. Joan Hock at 646-2860.
Attachment As Stated 8804290155 880405 PDR A13OCK 05000335 F DCD
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F deral Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 APR -g ig"",
MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Philip Stohr Acting Director Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S Nuclear Regulatory Commission FROM:
Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs SUBJECT Exercise Report for the August 26, 1987, Exercise of f te Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP ) Plans Of si for the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Attached is a copy of the Exercise Report for the August 26, 1987, full participation joint exercise of the offsite REP plans for the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. The State of Florida and St. Lucie and Martin Counties, all located in the 10-mile plume emergency planning zone (EPZ),
participated during this exercise. This exercise report was prepared by the Region IV office staff of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
There were no deficiencies identified during this exercise. However, there are two areas requiring corrective actions, and several areas recommended for improvement. FEMA Region IV staff will furnish a copy of this exercise report to the State of Florida and will obtain a schedule of corrective actions from the State which addresses the areas requiring corrective action.
Region IV will assure completion by the State of the necessary corrective actions.
Based upon the results of this exercise, there continues to be reasonable
-assurance that appropriate protective measures can be implemented by the offsite jurisdictions around the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, the 44 CFR 350 approval granted on February 15, 1984, remains in effect.
If you should have any questions, please contact Dr. Joan Hock at 646-2860.
Attachment As Stated
Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV l37l Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 700 Atlanta, GA 30309 ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXERCISE Conducted on August 26,'987 Exercise Report. November 16, 1987 Utility: Florida Power and Light Company Plant Location: Hutchinson Island, St. Lucie County, Florida Participating State and Local Governments:
State of Florida St. Lucie County Martin County Indian River County
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Pacae I. EXERCISE
SUMMARY
IZ. DETAILED DISCUSSION State of Florida State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
Emergency News Center (ENC)
Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL)
Radiological Field Monitoring Teams Medical Drill St. Lucie Cou t 10 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 10 Outside Activities Martin Count Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 14 Field Activities 15 Indian Rive Cou t 16 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 16 Outside Activities 16 ZII.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF INADEQUACIES 20 IV.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT 21 V. APPENDICES 23 A. Evaluator List and Assignments B. Exercise Ob)ectives and Scenario
I. EXERCISE
SUMMARY
The St. Lucie full participation exercise was conducted on August 26, 1987, and was observed by twenty-two Federal evaluators representing five Federal agencies. The evaluation was based on NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Nuclear Power Plants".
The St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant is owned and operated by Florida Power and Light Company. It is located on Hutchinson Island approximately 12 miles southeast of the City of Fort Pierce in St. Lucie County. Parts of St. Lucie and Martin Counties lie within the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) and are risk counties. Indian River, Brevard, and Palm Beach Counties have agreed to host evacuees from the 10-mile EPZ should evacuation be necessary. All or parts of Brevard, Osceola, St.
Lucie, Okeechobee, Martin,- Highlands, Glades, Hendry, Indian River and Palm Beach Counties lie within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ.
During this exercise, the Counties of St. Lucie, Martin and Indian River participated and fully activated emergency response plans. The State of Florida also fully participated by staffing the State Emergency Operating Center (EOC) in Tallahassee, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), the Emergency News Center (ENC), the Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL) and deploying three field monitoring teams.
This exercise included the following major participants:
Florida Power and Light Company St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Florida Division .of Emergency Management Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services St. Lucie County Emergency Management Agency Martin County Emergency Management Agency Indian River County Emergency Management Agency All objectives of the exercise were accomplished, and no NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-l, Rev. 1 deficiencies were identified. There were, however, two areas requiring corrective action identified, and several areas were recommended for improvement. These requirements and recommendations are listed in Sections III and IV of this report.
II. DETAILED DISCUSSION State of Florida State Emer enc 0 erations Center SEOC The Florida Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) contains excellent alerting and mobilization procedures. However, for this exercise, the State staff was prepositioned.
Outstanding leadership was demonstrated during the exercise.
State agencies fully demonstrated their capability to support the operation. Cross-training for radiological emergency response was being effected as evidenced by the cpxestions posed by the State agencies during briefings of ongoing events and the answers provided by the utility company representative.
The Florida REP contains adequate provisions for 24-hour staffing. Emergency operations can be extended over a period. of time. Rearrangement of seating in the SEOC and the excellent display of maps and status boards greatly enhanced emergency operations. Status boards were clearly visible and kept up-to-date.
All communications systems were fully operational except the recently installed Emergency Broadcast System (EBS). The system lacks a component which will be purchased and installed as funds are available. This is not considered an inadequacy since the system can be activated and linked to radio. A capability to, communicate with all required elements was demonstrated during the exercise.
Although a press briefing was not given, a briefing room was available with three work stations for reporters. The SEOC is considered secondary to the Emergency News Center; however, an agreement exists with a local television station to televise when necessary.
Procedures developed for verification of the initial message from Florida Power and Light Company (FP&L) concerning a nuclear .
incident should be followed. The telephone number for verification should be known by the State Warning Point operator and not requested from the caller. Uerification numbers for all commercial nuclear power plants in Florida should be posted in the State Warning Point.
Access to the EOC was controlled at all times during the exercise. Handling of rumor control was excellent.
Deficiencies: None.
Areas Re irin Corrective Actions: None.
Areas Recommended for Im rovement:
- l. Follow established procedures for verifying initial call from FP&L concerning a nuclear incident.
Emer enc 0 erations Facilit EOF Communications and coordination between the Florida Division of Emergency Management and the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) were excellent. Similarly, the overall interaction among the representatives of the State, Florida Power and Light Company, and the NRC Region II emergency response team was exceptional.
The Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) emergency operations were commendable. Dose assessment and field monitoring team operations were conducted in close coordination with FP&L representatives. DHRS personnel were familiar with the FP&L procedures for making Protective Actionvery Recommendations based on plant conditions. The State assessments generally agreed with the FP&L assessments during the exercise.
The facilities available to DHRS representatives at the EOF were excellent (e.g., work space, administrative support services, and telephones). DHRS dose assessment and field monitoring activities were fully demonstrated. Field team direction and control was effective. Team briefings and exposure control were excellent.
FP&L's initial protective action recommendations (PAR's) were based upon pre-defined plant conditions. DHRS representatives quickly assessed FP&L's initial PAR's by independent4y confirming the PAR's and informing the Governor's Authorized Representative (GAR) of their results. State and FP&L were in agreement on initial PAR's. As theThe'simulated emergency progressed, the
'he State maintained close contact with FP&L to monitor plant and meteorological conditions which could lead to a change in the initial PAR's. Several hours into the General Emergency condition, FP&L and State representatives gathered in a quiet conference room to discuss the possibility of changing the initial PAR's based upon changes in plant conditions and non-technical considerations. This technique, is commendable and facilitated a consensus among the key decision makers.
FP&L's facilities were exceptional and permitted DHRS personnel to fulfill their functions in a timely and effective manner.
State assessments were compared on a periodic basis with FP&L assessments, and agreement was reached on a second set of PAR's which were issued to local officials. All of the DHRS personnel in the EOF were competent and experienced, and were familiar with the DHRS emergency procedures.
DHRS field monitoring team operations were controlled from the EOF. This is commendable since it coordination with FP&L representatives.
permits face-to-face.
Field monitoring results were logged on a standardized form and entered intoteam a computer database. DHRS monitoring team data were also logged on FP&L's field monitoring status board. No significant communication or control problems were noted. The new "Environmental Survey Team Map" is outstanding and is indicative of the innovative approaches being used by FP&L and DHRS emergency preparedness representatives.
Su erior Items:
- 1. The State DHRS representatives were well trained and very knowledgeable of dose assessment procedures.
- 2. The DHRS Emergency Operations Staff have adopted innovative techniques and capabilities.
- 3. The New "Environmental Survey Team Map" is outstanding and greatly assists in the conduct of field team operations.
- 4. The co-location of key FP&L and State of Florida personnel in the EOF facilitated effective protection action decision making. The practice of convening appropriate utility and State personnel in a private conference room to discuss protection action recommendations was commendable.
Deficiencies: None.
regs Re ii Corrective Actions: None.
Areas ecommended for Im rovement: None.
Emer enc News Center ENC The Emergency News Center was activated by the ENC Manager, a utility staff PIO, at 1:45 p.m. and was operational at 2:30 p.m.
State and county staff arrived between 2:00 p.m. and 2:15 p.m.
The ENC is located in the same building as the EOF near the intersection of I-95 and Midway Road, gust outside the 10-mile EPZ for the St. Lucie Plant. The facility is adequate in size and equipment. Displays were adequate, and PIO staffs of the utility, State and county governments were positioned together in the same operations room.
There were seven FP&L PIO's present in the ENC, three State PIO's, and four county PIO's, two each from St. Lucie and Martin Counties.
The co-location of staffs facilitated close coordination of news releases, and the cooperative attitude of the knowledgeable staff, along with excellent direction demonstrated by the News Center Manager, resulted in a bonafide ")oint" information center. Periodic updates were requested from the staff by the ENC Manager which kept all representatives informed. Although news releases were well coordinated and generally promptly released, there was a delay between the General Emergency declaration at 1:48 p.m. and the General Emergency news release at 3:35 p.m.
Frequent media briefings were held in an adjoining room, and access to technical staff and decision-makers was readily available. Answers to queries from the media were handled well and technical )argon was generally avoided. Preparatory consultations were conducted by the PIO's in the operations room before going into media briefings. Several agressive media representatives were present at the briefings which added realism to the exercise.
The rumor control system, while in place and apparently adequate, needs minor improvements such as including the rumor control telephone numbers for the public in the early news releases and EBS messages. It would also be advantageous to include more exercise play for the rumor control system during the next exercise.
Stringent security, both external and internal, was maintained at the ENC/EOF facility during the exercise. Adequate staffing was demonstrated through generous staffing levels throughout the exercise and by having a personnel roster available.
Su erior Items:
- 1. General management of facility and briefings.
- 2. Coordination of personnel and news releases.
Deficiencies: None.
Areas Re irin Corrective Actions: None.
Areas Recommended for Im rovement:
- 1. Rumor control telephone numbers should be included in EBS messages and news releases.
- 2. Time notations on news releases should be consistently 24-hour or conventional time.
- 3. The General Emergency news release should be issued more promptly.
Mobile Emer enc Radiolo ical Laborato MERL Laboratory equipment aboard the Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL) is of research grade and represents currently accepted methods for radioisotope identification and analysis.
Procedures for analyzing environmental samples were adequately demonstrated.
The MERL was relocated from the White City substation to the Stuart substation during the exercise since plume direction would hive adversely effected the operation of the MERL. The MERL experienced an actual power outage during the exercise causing the MERL to have to rely on its own power generation system.
Additional Omni-Fax equipment aboard the MERL helped keep personnel updated regarding plant conditions, and the newly-developed environmental monitoring maps were effectively used by the MERL staff during the exercise to keep track of the location of monitoring teams in the field.
- 1. Field monitoring, equipment and methods.
Areas Re irin Corrective Actions: None.
Areas Recommended for Im rovement: None.
Radiolo ical Field Monitorin Teams the MERL primary location (FP&L substation in White City) and thus activation of the teams was not demonstrated. Prior to departure for field assignments, the teams went through checklists, readied their equipment, and were briefed.
Field Team gl was well equipped with appropriate radiation survey instrumentation, air sampling equipment and other supplies for plume pathway monitoring and sample collection. All instruments and air sampling equipment observed had been recently calibrated.
The field team equipment was largely packed in kits for rapid
.deployment. Useful new maps showing the 10-mile EPZ and off site monitoring points were available.
The field team's technical operations were generally
'satisfactory. Sampling of air for radioiodines was demonstrated, and a cartridge and particulate filter were returned to the MERL for analysis. Calculation of radioiodine concentration in air was demonstrated in the field; however, teams should be made aware of the minimum levels of radioiodine they can detect with their equipment so that spuriously low (statistically insignificant) values for radioiodines are not reported as valid measurements.
The field team vehicle had two radios and a cellular telephone, and use of both radios was demonstrated during the exercise.
Adequate radio contact was maintained throughout the exercise.
Field team exposure control was generally satisfactory. The team members were equipped with anticontamination suits and respirators, but these were not demonstrated. Each team member had two 0-200mR dosimeters, one 0-5R dosimeter, one 0-20R dosimeter, and a film badge and TLD. The team members read and recorded dosimeter readings at reasonable 'intervals and were aware of dose limits and procedures (information that was also printed on the new maps for their convenience). No actual KI was available in the vehicle but was available at the MERL, the point from which field teams were dispatched. Its use was simulated during the exercise. Prior to team gl reporting to the hotline at the MERL in its repositioned, back-up location in Stuart, vehicular monitoring and decontamination was demonstrated by fire department personnel adjacent to the Martin County airport.
Su erior Items:
- 1. Field team was well equipped and well prepared overall.
- 2. The Environmental Survey Team Map.
Deficiencies: None.
Areas Re irin Corrective Actions: None.
Areas Recommended for Im rovement:
Field teams should be apprised of the minimum detectable levels of radioiodine they can measure with their equipment so that their methodology will not lead to spuriously low (statistically insignificant) numbers being reported as valid measurements.
Field Team 2 Charlie 62 - Field Team 52 was prepositioned at the substation in White City at 12:30. Prior to dispatch the team was briefed on weather and plant conditions. The team went through the equipment checklists and operationally checked the radiological instruments.
The team was familiar with the area and could drive directly to the monitoring points using the new FP&L Environmental Survey Team Map covering the 10-mile EPZ.
The team was well trained and used their SOP's. They tracked the plume, and the instruments were protected from contamination by being enclosed in plastic bags. An air sample was taken and counted following the SOP step by step with one monitor reading and the other following the steps.
Radio communications were clear with no dead spots.
control was well demonstrated and the team knew 500mR Exposure was the maximum dose allowed without authorization.
Su erior Items:
- 1. The Environmental Survey Team Map.
- 2. Following their SOP's.
- 3. Radio communications.
Areas Re irin Corrective Actions: None.
Areas Recommended for Im rovement: None.
Field Team 3 C The field monitoring teams were initially assembled and subsequently dispatched from the MERL at the FP&L substation at White City. Instruments and other contents of team kits were checked and/or prepared for operation.
Team members were briefed regarding the plant situation and the current and forecasted weather conditions. This information indicated that the MERL might have to be moved during the exercise.
Previous questions concerning the use of the CDV-700 for field measurements had been resolved. Probes were covered with plastic or rubber sleeves.
The protective equipment included clothing and full face respirators for use by team members. Luminescent vests had been included for nighttime use as a result of a suggestion made during the last exercise.
Air samples were correctly taken to areas of low background for purge and counting with the two-channel analyzer. Calculations for iodine concentration were demonstrated and agreed with control data.
Procedures for collection of soil and forage samples were demonstrated by this team. They were aware of the need for controlling unnecessary contamination during this process.
Procedures for decontamination of vehicles and personnel were not demonstrated but were available.
Su erior Items:
- 1. The "Environmental Survey Team Map" assisted in the greatly improved performance of field monitoring teams.
- 2. The success of the field monitoring portion of the exercise was enhanced by an excellent controller system.
Deficiencies: None.
Areas Re irin Corrective Actions: None.
Areas R comme ded for Im rovement: None.
Medica Drill Performance of the Lawnwood Medical Center staff was excellent.
Follow-up verification of accident notification was prompt, .and communication on patient condition was updated at appropriate intervals. Patient transfer from the transport team to the hospital staff was smooth.
Medical Center staff was knowledgeable and proficient in their operations. Health Physics support was provided by plant personnel. The Health Physicist in the treatment room integrated smoothly into the treatment team. A second Health Physicist provided monitoring support outside of the treatment room (monitoring transport team, etc.). Decontamination procedures were performed adequately.
Su erior Items:
- 1. Staff knowledge.
Deficiencies: None.
Areas Re irin Corrective Actions: None.
Areas Recommended or m roveme : None.
St. Lucie Count Emer enc 0 erations Center EOC Activation and staffing were performed in a timely manner.
Proper "call-up" procedures were followed. Fifty participants representing seventeen county and State agencies participated at the St. Lucie County Emergency Operations Center (EOC).
Emergency operations management was effectively conducted by the County Director and EOC Manager.
The EOC is a new facility, completed in July 1986. This facility is a "state-of-the-art" EOC and meets all requirements and standards for a county EOC. The St. Lucie Amateur Radio Club, a volunteer organization, provided their services during the exercise. The communications capability is outstanding. Public
'alerting and notification, including an instructional message to the public, was accomplished efficiently and effectively. All A&N requirements were met within the 15-minute time frame.
Staffing capability was demonstrated by actual shift changes and/or submission of "second-shift" rosters. Displays were good and briefings by the EOC Manager and the Florida Power and Light Company representative were timely and effective. The St. Lucie County Sheriff's Office provided excellent security for the EOC.
Only a limited number of news releases were received from the Media Center due to a malfunction of the transmission equipment.
Although not an objective of the exercise, school evacuation procedures were discussed during the exercise. The procedures should be reviewed and formalized in order to be in compliance with Guidance Memorandum EV-2, "Protective Actions for School Children".
Su erior Items:
- 1. The new EOC facility.
- 2. The communications capability within the EOC.
Deficiencies: None.
Areas Re irin Corrective Actions: None.
Areas Recomm'ended for Im rovement:
- 1. Develop additional school evacuation procedures that conform to FEMA Guidance Memorandum EV-2.
Outside Activities Waterwa s Warni - The St. Lucie Site Plan, Annex R, states that boaters in the water within the 10-mile EPZ will be notified of the emergency by loud speakers from boats and aircraft. One of these agencies that has such a responsibility is the City of Ft.
Pierce Marine Patrol, operated by the Police Department. One 20-foot boat with a 225 horsepower motor is docked at the city marina on the IntraCoastal Waterway. It took the patrolman approximately six minutes to get the boat operational.
take approximately 35 minutes to cover the City of Ft.
It would of responsibility. This area is approximately 4 miles Pierces'rea square and is located between 8 to 10 miles from the plant site.
The boat has a siren, a loud speaker, a spot light and has radio communication capabilities with the following: Ft. Pierce Police Department; St. Lucie, Palm Beach, Indian River, Martin and Okeechobee Counties Sheriffs'ffices; disaster preparedness radio; Intercity radio, U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Customs Service in Miami.
A radiological kit containing CDV 715, CDV 700, dosimeters, charger, batteries and headphone was taken on the boat when the area of coverage was demonstrated.
The patrolman displayed excellent knowledge of his responsibilities and duties and of the area that the Ft. Pierce Marine Patrol is responsible to warn if a disaster occurs.
There is one back-up person to run the boat in case the patrolman is unavailable for assignment.
Su erior Items:
f
- 1. Excellent knowledge of responsibilities displayed by the Ft. Pierce Marine Patrol personnel.
Deficiencies: None.
Areas Re irin Corrective Actions: None.
Areas Recommended for Im rovement: None.
Access Control Points Two access control points were observed.
One was located at the North end of A1A and its intersection with Blue Heron Boulevard, and the other was located at the South end of A1A and across the street from Fire Station g8 (1 mile south of nuclear plant). Emergency personnel from the St. Lucie County Sheriff 's Office arrived at approximately 2:37 p.m. and from the St. Lucie County Road Department at 2:55 p.m. The road department personnel had barricades to block the roads but simulated their placement. Sheriff's Office personnel were there to man the control points. They were familiar with evacuation routes and what to do in case of an evacuation of the area. They had communications capabilities with the St. Lucie County EOC, Emergency Services, and Ft. Pierce Police Department.
Personnel from the Sheriff's Office had required dosimeters and TLD s and periodically checked their dosimeter readings. They were knowledgeable about what to do in case there were traffic obstructions. Personnel from the St. Lucie County Road Department were not wearing dosimeters. (K.3.a.) They said they would only deliver the barricades then immediately leave the area and would not need them. They demonstrated adequate knowledge of their responsibilities. The objective for St. Lucie County to control access to an evacuated area was accomplished.
Su erior Items:
- l. Excellent knowledge of responsibilities displayed by deputies of the St. Lucie County Sheriff's Office and personnel of the St. Lucie County Road Department.
Deficiencies: None.
Areas Re irin Corrective Actions:
- 1. K.3.a. Provide County Road Department personnel with dosimeters.
Areas Recommended for Im rovement: None.
Decontamination - A decontamination/washdown facility for emergency workers and vehicles in St. Lucie County was demonstrated by the Ft. Pierce - St. Lucie County Fire Department. A seven-man team conducted the demonstration and successfully decontaminated two police cars.
Procedures are well established and followed. The facility was organized to assure that contamination would not be spread.
Dosimetry logging was established and maintained throughout the demonstration. Dosimeter readings were taken every 30 minutes and logged. Each worker was supplied with a CDV-700, 883 Dosimeter (0-200mR) and a permanent badge-type dosimeter. The pancake probes on the CDV-700's were protected with plastic baggies and each worker wore surgical-type rubber gloves.
Two portable wash-down units constructed of pipe that sprays water from the top, bottom and sides were used. The two units are used to accommodate different types of vehicles, one for cars and the other for trucks.
Waste water is isolated and then disposed of land removal, if necessary. All other contaminated waste was by collected in plastic garbage bags and held in metal drums for disposal.
The activities demonstrated were well organized and the personnel well trained. The personnel assigned to this operation are well equipped and the training for using this equipment seems adequate. Procedures for protecting personnel assigned to the decontamination station are well established and followed.
Deficiencies: None.
Areas Re irin Corrective Actions: None.
Areas Recomme de fo rove e t: None.
containing EBS information have been installed throughout the 10-mile EPZ. These signs replace the previous ones and are a vast improvement.
The new signs are eye-catching and easy to read and understand even from a moving vehicle. St. Lucie County is commended for their prompt and positive action on this matter.
Su erior Items:
- 1. EBS signs.
Areas Re irin Corrective Actions: None.
Areas Recommended for Im rovement: None.
artin Count Emer enc 0 erations Center EOC The alerting and mobilization exercise objective was fully met in Martin County. Staff was in place within 40 minutes of Alert declaration and the EOC was declared operational within 16 minutes. A shift change was also demonstrated for several positions.
Ob)ective III, demonstration of effective emergency operations management and coordination, was fully met. Management skills for the entire operation were well exhibited by both the Operations Officer and his deputy, who also served as the second shift Director. Briefings were sufficiently frequent and informative. Message handling was efficient, effective, and thorough, with written message procedures provided for each staff position at the decision table. Security at this facility during a real incident would be adequate because all access doors would be locked (they were not on the exercise day, however).
Ob)ective IB, demonstrating adequacy of facilities to support emergency operations, was fully met. The EOC itself continues to be an outstanding physical plant with respect to layout, utilization of available space, and capability for long-term operation. Communications are excellent, with multiple back-ups available and demonstrated. Noteworthy at this exercise participation and vital contribution of RACES personnel, was the including a first-time demonstration of the use of packet transmissions to and from PCs.
Ob)ective'V, demonstration of systems and procedures for notification of the -public, was fully met. Procedures were coordinated with St. Lucie County 'and executed smoothly, meeting the 15-minute decision-to-EBS criterion comfortably. Activation of St. Lucie County public alert sirens by Martin County Lucie County's request) was accomplished without problems. (at St.
Sirens and EBS transmission were in proper sequence. Protective action recommendations, as updated, were transmitted (simulated) in a timely fashion.
Ob)ective VIII, demonstration of decision making and implementation of appropriate public protective actions, was fully met. Provisions for evacuating schools, institutions, and
special needs (including mobility-impaired) persons were complete and impressive. Staff and equipment support from public safety, law enforcement, and fire/rescue operations throughout Martin County appear adequate to handle expected evacuee flow.
Su erior Items:
- 1. Message handling in the EOC.
- 2. Provisions for special needs evacuees.
- 3. RACES participation.
Deficiencies: None.
Areas Re irin Corrective Actions: None.
Areas Recommended for Im rovement:
- 1. Improve visibility of status board entries.
Field Activities Personnel of Martin County mobile command center demonstrated their capability to dispense dosimetry kits and KI to emergency personnel. The three staff members on board appeared knowledgeable of their responsibilities.
Three radiological monitoring teams (Dist II, Jensen Beach FD, Hutchinson) were located at ma)or roads on the St. Lucie and Martin County line and were to be pulled back 1/2 mile when their current readings doubled from the background level taken at the Alert status.
The traffic and access control point at Ocean Boulevard and Seawalls Point Drive was staffed by personnel from the Sheriff's Office, Sills Point Police, and a fire rescue unit. The TCP was activated at 5:30 p.m. All emergency workers were experienced, well trained, and vere knowledgeable of PAGs.
The vehicle decontamination facility was located at Monterey,
)ust east of AlA. Manned by District II firemen, properly clad, the facility was good, with,provisions being made to capture and retain run-off water. Monitoring was thorough and efficient.
Su erior Items:
- 1. Communications among units, intensity of participation by field workers (mainly FD's and EMS).
Deficiencies: None.
Areas Re irin Corrective A'ctions: None.
Areas Recommended for Im rovement: None.
Indian River Count Emer enc 0 erations Center EOC This Emergency Operations Center was informally evaluated since Indian River County is a host county.
The Director exhibited excellent leadership abilities and is commended for his performance.
Facilities were fully adequate and approriately arranged. Number and participation of staff was excellent. Sixty-seven people participated in this exercise and demonstrated an enthusiastic attitude as well as a thorough knowledge of their responsibilities. Adequate communications capabilities were demonstrated. Back-up communications were also demonstrated through amateur radio systems.
Su erior Items:
- 1. Leadership displayed by the Director.
Deficiencies: None.
Areas Re irin Corrective Actions: None.
regs Recommended for Im rovement: None.
Outside Act vities Shelters Shelters were activated at the Sebastian River Middle High School and at the Mueller Center of the Indian River Community Center.
Participation at both shelters was excellent and included personnel (mostly volunteers) from Indian River County Emergency Management, County Sheriff's Department, County Health
Department, American Red Cross, and the HAM Radio Operators Club.
All key shelter personnel interviewed, i.e., the managers and health personnel, had appropriate training and were knowledgeable of their responsibilities.
Some of the areas identified as'needing improvement at the last exercise have been addressed (i.e., identification of those evacuees having been through the decontamination process, and provision of strip maps).
The Reception Center initial registration process was not demonstrated at this exercise, and confusion seems to exist as to which organization is responsible for this activity. (J.12.)
evacuees are to be registered at one location and then referred If to shelters elsewhere, as indicated in the Plan, responsibility for this should be clearly understood by all concerned, and additional specifics, such as standardized forms, should be developed.
Some problems were observed in Red Cross channels of communication; i.e., shelter personnel were reporting to the local Red Cross Chapter as opposed to the Red Cross representative at the County EOC, and some information such as requests for additional personnel did not reach appropriate destinations. These problems will be addressed by local Red Cross officials and the Emergency Management Director.
Over the past few years, Indian River has shown a substantial improvement in their response capabilities. It might be helpful during future exercises to activate reception/shelter staffs "in sync" with the scenario, as opposed to pre-positioning personnel.
This would test response capabilities more realistically and would alleviate long hours of waiting on the part of participating volunteers.
In general, this was a good exercise, no deficiencies were noted, stated objectives were met, and the county demonstrated its ability to protect the population.
Su erior Items:
- l. Excellent participation.
Deficiencies: None.
Areas Re irin Corrective Actions:
- 1. J.12. Clarify which organization has responsibility for registration at reception centers.
Areas Recommended for Im rovement:
- 1. SOPs for Reception Centers, such as development of standardized registration form.
Traffic Control Points Decontamination Two traffic control points were observed. All objectives were met at these points.
One was located at I-95 and Olson Road, the other just outside Sebastian Middle School. Both points were manned by Sheriff's Department officers. Both control points were ordered to be manned by the EOC at 1:55 p.m. The roadblock at I-95 and Olson Road was manned by Sheriff's Department and South County Fire Department personnel. The decontamination system used was a spray device composed of piping arranged in an inverted "U" shape so that two cars at a time could be washed. The water supply was a well located about 1500'rom the overpass where the roadblock was located. After a vehicle was washed it was monitored and either released or sent to the "Life for Youth" Ranch for further evaluation.
At the Ranch, cars were impounded and the occupants were monitored, and, if contaminated, were decontaminated at the 12 shower facilities of the Ranch. Occupants were then sent to mass care facilities.
Operations at both facilities were adequate and personnel were knowledgeable of their responsibilities. However, the monitoring procedure could be improved by protecting the probes with plastic bags.
Instruments observed did not have a calibration sticker on them.
The box they came in did have a sticker. Some of the stickers indicated that the CDV 700's had not been calibrated in the last year, a requirement. Because instruments could be mixed when in use and not placed back in the original box, it would be better to have a calibration sticker on each instrument. Also, there were no forms for keeping records of activities at the site. A form should be designed to facilitate the recordation of monitored persons. Also, a system should be devised for giving people proof of car impoundment.
The second traffic control point, at Sebastian Middle School, had the same system in place as the first TCP, described above. The same comments are appropriate for both locations.
Deficiencies: None.
Areas Re uirin Corrective Actions: None.
Areas Recommended for Im rovement:
- l. We would suggest that a calibration sticker be placed on each instrument.
,2 ~ It is suggested that a form be designed to the recordation of monitored persons.
facilitate 3 ~ We recommend a method of giving proof of car impoundment.
- 4. It is recommended that additional training the decontamination team monitors.
be given to
- 5. It is bags.
recommended that probes be covered with plastic
III.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF INADEQUACIES Facilit or NUREG Corrective Scheduled A~ctivit Item Action Date of Com letion Deficiencies None Areas Re uirin Corrective Actions St. Lucie K.3.a., Provide County Road County Department personnel with dos imeters.
Indian River J.12. Clarify which organization County has responsibility for registration at reception centers.
[KI
IV.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Facilit or A~ctivit Areas Recommended for Im rovement SEOC 1. Follow established procedures for verifying initial call from FP&L concerning a nuclear incident.
Emergency Rumor control .telephone numbers should News Center be included in EBS messages and news releases.
2 ~ Time notations on news releases should be consistently 24-hour or conventional time.
3 ~ The General Emergency news release should be issued more promptly.
Radiological Field teams should be apprised of the Field Monitoring minimum detectable levels of radioiodine Team gl they can measure with their equipment so that their methodology will not lead to spuriously low (statistically insignificant) numbers being reported 'as valid measurements.
St. Lucie County 1. Develop .additional school evacuation procedures that conform to FEMA Guidance Memorandum EV-2.
Martin County Improve visibility of status board entries.
A~ctivit Areas Recommended for Im rovement Indian River SOPs for Reception Centers, such as County development of standardized registration form.
2 ~ We would suggest that a calibration sticker be placed on each instrument.
3 ~ It is suggested that a form be designed to facilitate the recordation of monitored persons.
4 ~ We recommend a method of giving proof of car impoundment.
- 5. It is recommended that additional training be given to the decontamination team monitors.
- 6. It is recommended with plastic bags.
that probes be covered
V. APPENDICES A. Evaluator List and Assignments B. Exercise Objectives and Scenario
FEDERAL EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENTS ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXERCISE August 26, 1987 CHIEF EVALUATOR AND RAC CHAIRMAN Glenn Woodard (FEMA)
STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER TALLAHASSEE Jane Sammons (FEMA)
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY FT. PIERCE Bob Tro)anowski (NRC)
Dave Lassiter (DOE)
EMERGENCY NEWS MEDIA CENTER FT. PIERCE Tom Hawkins (FEMA)
Jim Sutch (FEMA)
Denise Hunt (FEMA)
MOBILE EMERGENCY RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORY MERL Ray Boyett (FEMA)
RADIOLOGICAL FIELD MONITORING TEAMS Caroline Herzenberg (FEMA)
Fred Oleson (FEMA)
Ed Sears (FEMA)
Frank Wilson (FEMA)
ST. LUCIE COUNTY FT. PIERCE John Heard (FEMA)
Tim Dowd (FEMA)
Al Lookabaugh (FEMA)
TIN COUNTY STUART Chris Saricks (FEMA)
Bill Chambers (FEMA)
INDIAN RIVER COUNTY VERO BEACH Virginia Baker (FEMA)
Mary Lynne Pate (FEMA)
MEDICAL ACTIVITIES Brad Eichorst (DHHS/FDA)
OBILE EVALUATO Al Hall (DOT/FAA)
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STATE OF FLORI DA DEPARTMENT OF COMM U NITY AFFAI RS 2571 EXECUTIVE CENTER CIRCLE, EAST ~ TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399, 808 MARTINEZ THOMAS C. PEI.HAM Governor Secretary July 13, 1987 t Mr. Glenn Woodard, Chief Federal Emergency Management Agency Natural and Technological Hazards Division 1371 Peachtree Street, Northeast Atlanta, Georgia 3030 9
Dear Mr. d:
Enclosed for your review and approval are the revised Goals and Objectives for the August 26, 1987 Full Participation State and Local Plume Exposure Pathway exercise at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. Changes xef lect additions or clarification requested by Mr. John Heard of your office.
Any questions or comments should be directed to Chip Hultquist of my staff at the Department of Community Affairs, Division of Emergency Management, 1720 South Gadsden Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904/487-4915).
Sincerely, Gordon L. Guthrie Director GLG:va Enclosure cc: Jay Maisler William O'rien Philip Rodi Douglas Wright Harlan Keaton Russ Camarda EMERGENCY MANACEMENT ~ HOUSINC AND COMMUNITYDEVELOPMENT ~ RESOURCE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PONER PLANT FULL PARTICIPATION STATE/LOCAL EXERCISE AUGUST 26, 1987 The following goals and objectives reflect appropriate staffing by the State of Florida. The licensee' Emergency Operations Facility will be.,staffed by the Governor's Authorized Representative, the Public Information Officer located at the Emergency News Center, and liaison personnel assigned to local government emergency operations centers. The exercise will evaluate emergency response and communications capabilities among state and local governments, and the licensee.
Goals I. To evaluat'e portions of the Florida Radiological Emergency Management Plan for Nuclear Power Plants and conf irm its adequacy for response to an emergency situation at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. Specif ic portions of the plan to be addressed are:
A. Annex R St. Lucie Site Plan B. Annex B Emergency Response Organizations and Responsibilities C. Annex E Notification and Activation D. Annex F Emergency Communications E. Annex G Public Information F. Annex H Emergency Facilities G. Annex I- Accident Assessment H. Annex J Radiological Exposure Control Revised 7/13/87
I. Annex K Protective Response J. Annex L Medical and Public Health Support II. To evaluate the radiological emergency preparedness capa-bilities of those counties within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
III. To provide an opportunity for state agency personnel to be cross-trained in different aspects of radiological emergency operations.
I. Emergency Operations, Facilities and Resources A. To demonstrate point-to-point communication between state and local emergency response organizations and Florida Power and Light (FP&L) emergency personnel at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant and the EOF upon activation.
B. To determine the adequacy of the state, St. Lucie, Martin, and Indian River counties'OCs to support emergency operations, including establishing a com-munications link between the EOCs. RACES will be demonstrated.
II. Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff A. To demonstrate the procedures for the alert and noti-fication of key emergency response personnel. All state and Indian River County staff will be preposi-tioned for the purpose of alert and notification.
St. Lucie and Martin counties will demonstrate alert and notification of personnel using actual time.
III. Emergency Operations Management A. To demonstrate the ability of key individuals within principal emergency response organizations to coor-dinate and direct the response operations and activi-ties of their respective organizations.
IV. Public Alerting and Notification A. To demonstrate the systems and procedures for notifi-cation of the public that a radiological emergency condition exists. The means of notification to be demonstrated will be the dual capability of Martin and St. Lucie counties to activate the siren systems.
Messages will be developed, but not transmitted to broadcast systems. Siren system activation will be demonstrated by St. Lucie and Martin counties in sequence with the exercise scenario.
V. Public and Media Relations A. To demonstrate the organization and procedures for the coordinated and timely dissemination of information to the public and media. This will include coordination of news releases among FP&L, state and county public information officials. The Emergency News Center will be fully staffed and operational.
VI. Accident Assessment'
~ To demonstrate the procedures for determining the radiological consequences of the emergency. This will include deployment of the Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory and field teams under the coordination, direction and control of the State.
VII. Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures A. To demonstrate the ability of St. Lucie County to pro-vide adequate health and medical services to con-taminated individuals. Martin County will conduct a medical drill for training purposes only. The Martin County mobile command post will demonstrate the ability to provide TLD's, dosimeters, and KI to emergency response personnel.
VIII. Actions to Protect the Public and Emergency Workers A. To demonstrate the adequacy of the decision-making process with regard to determining the appropriate protective actions to protect the public.
B. To demonstrate the ability of St. Lucie and Martin counties to implement recommended protective actions.
This will include a demonstration of the decon-tamination of vehicles in Martin and Indian River counties and sheltering of evacuees in Indian River County.
C. To demonstrate the ability of St. Lucie and Martin counties to control access to an evacuated area.
D. To demonstrate the organizational ability of St. Lucie and Martin counties to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility impaired individuals within the plume EPZ.
Evacuation will be simulated.
E. Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles.
STATE OF FLORI DA DEPARTMENT OF COMMU NITY AFFAI RS 257I EXECUTIVE CENTER CIRCLE, EAST ~ TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 323gg 808 MARTINEZ THOMAS G. PELHAM Crwernor Secretary July 10, 1987 Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, Chief Natural and Technological Hazards Division Federal Emergency Management Agency 1375 Peachtree Street, Northeast Atlanta, Georg ia 3030 9
Dear Mr. Woodard:
Enclosed is the scenario for the St. Lucie Nuclear Power plant state and local full participation exercise. The exercise time-window will be August 26, 1987, beginning at 10:00 a.m. and concluding at 6:00 p.m.
The scenario was developed by representatives of Florida Power and Light Company, Florida Division of Emergency Management, Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS), Indian River County Department of Emergency Management, St. Lucie County Department of Emergency Management, and Martin County Department of Public Safety. The scenario is adequate to test and demonstrate capabilities as required by the exercise objectives. Control messages continue to be developed to assure full demonstration of state and local response.
I have also enclosed a schedule of meetings and personnel assigned for the exercise. The State, Indian River, St. Lucie and Martin County EOCs will be activated for the exercise. The emergency operations facility, emergency news center, DHRS radiation control personnel with the mobile emergency radiation laboratory, and the DHRS field teams will be fully activated and exercised.
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ~ HOUSING AND COMMUNITYDEVELOPMENT ~ RESOURCE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
Mr. Glenn C. Woodard July 10, 1987 Page Two Zf you have any questions, please contact me at the Department of Community Affairs, Division of Emergency Management, 1720 South Gadsden Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399
( 904/487-4915) .
Sincerely, I
/ mar'ill LeB1 nc Operations and Management Consultant II Enclosures
ST- LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FULL PARTICIPATION STATE/LOCAL EXERCIS E AUGUST 26, 1987 Revision 7/10/87 Unit 2 Initial Conditions The Unit has just returned to 100% power following an uncomplicated trip. (Unit returned to power on August 25 at 10:00 p.m.)
Unit 2 is near end-of-life with 20 days left before scheduled refueling.
RCS activity has shown an increase since returning to operation. Initial activity upon return to power was 4 uci/ml I-131 DEQ. The 8:00 a.m. sample indicated
2-A Auxiliary feedwater pump is out of service for inboard bearing replacement. Estimated time to repair is 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.
2-B Charging pump is out of service to replace packing. Estimated time to repair is. 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
A small primary/secondary tube leak in S/G 2-A was detected upon return to power: Leak has remained steady at approximately .06 gpm.
Periodic containment anomaly check is due this shift coordinated wit'h HP to begin at 10:15 a.m.
Containment mini-purge is in progress at this time.
1 PORV block valve is out of service, closed, and de-energized due to burned-out motor. Estimated time to repair is twelve hours.
Unit 1 Conditions Unit 1 is at 100% power 120 days into current cycle.
All equipment operable and available.
Meterological conditions are typical for South Florida. Tge present temperature is 83 degrees P.
and the wind is variable at 1 to 3 mph. Forecast for today is partly cloudy, winds from the east to southeast at approximately 5 mph. There is a 50%
chance of thunderstorms.
10:00 a.m. Exercise commences.
10:15 a.m. Nuclear Operator (NO) and Health Physics Tech. (HP) enter containment for anomaly check.
10:30 a.m. NO calls control room from containment asking per-mission to backseat manual letdown isolation valve V-2593 and informs NPS that backseating this valve has worked in the past.
10:40 a.m. NPS or ANPS grants permission for backseat.
10:45 a.m. Gordon Guthrie, Chip Hultquist, Rod Westall, Skip Dugger, Shirley Collins, and Bart Frost arrive at the St. Lucie EOC for a meeting with Phil Rodi.
10:50 a.m. NO has no success backseating valve using reach rod, so he takes it upon himself to enter cubicle and phy-sically backseat valve using a valve wrench. HP objects but cannot stop NO. When NO applies pressure to valve, bonnet cracks, releasing large amounts of steam. NO is scalded, jumps away, hits head on angle iron, and is knocked unconscious (which will lead to fatality). I Cracked bonnet creates a .85 gpm primary system leak.
10:55 a.m. HP calls control room for help after pulling unconscious operator from the valve area and carrying him to personnel hatch. Burns to the HP's face and wr ists are received in the process.
ll:00 a.m. While dragging the dead operator out of the contain-ment, the HP cuts the face of the inner door seal causing inner door seal failure.
The HP is extremely excited about the condition of operator and fails to close the inner door before opening the outer door. The ringfeeder (clutch) which should not allow this to occur has become corroded (due to a lack of pm) and is not working properly. The HP succeeds in opening the outer door with the inner door open, but in doing so shears the Geneva latch plate (at a defective area, i.e. manu-facturing flaw) and the outer door cannot be latched.
Alarm in the Control Room will indicate that the per-sonnel hatch is open.
Ops should curtail min ipurge at this time realizing that a potential primary leak is in progress.
Neither butterfly valve completely reseats. Ops should be unaware of this leak path due to open airlock contributing to any increase in plant vent monitor.
11:05 a.m. First aid team arrives at personnel hatch and finds HP Technician semi-conscious and NO dead.
a.m. Control room receives call from first aid team on the status of injuries and that both hatch doors are open.
ll:15 a.m. A NOTIFICATION of UNUSUAL EVENT should be declared for contaminated, injured worker prior to first aid vehicle leaving site for hospital.
Control room leak rate procedure indicates a .85 gpm primary leak.
NPS sends in a second containment entry team to verify that pressure boundary leakage exists.
Operations department secures inner hatch door and informs Technical group to do a seal test on inner door (outer door will not lock down).
Within approximately 15 minutes of being made aware that both hatch doors are left open the NPS should declare an UNUSUAL EVENT based on a loss of contain-ment integrity.
ll:30 a.m. State Warning Point receives Notification of Unusual Event.
ll:30 a.m.
~ ~ Technical group begins seal test on inner personnel hatch.
ll:40 a.m. Verification from containment entry team that pressure boundary leakage exists causes the NPS to institute shutdown at 1% per minute.
ll:45 a.m. Technical group test the inner door seal and f inds the leakage to be 15,000 SCCM.
12:00 p.81. The Mechanical maintenance department checks with stores and finds there are spare Geneva plates and they inform the NPS they will have the personnel hatch repaired in approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
12:15 p.m. V-2593 leak increases to 55 gpm.
12:20 p.m. At 60%, power, shutdown rate increases to 2% per minute to address recognition of the larger leak rate.
12:30 p.m. Media rumors of unconfirmed number of deaths and major reactor problems at St. Lucie plant.
At approximmtely this time, EC should declare ALERT based on 50 gpm mismatch between charging and let-down with other indications of primary leak in containment.
During controlled shutdown, NPS/EC attempts to swap A and B Aux-Transformer breakers to start-up position (offsite power). 2B fails to swap but remains closed. Ops will attempt to start B diesel which will fail to start.
State Warning Point receives notification of ALERT.
Reactor at approximately 20% power and holding to complete repairs to B Auxiliary transformer breaker and B diesel.
Indian River, St. Lucie, Martin counties, and SEOC activated.
Contingency message may be given at this time to ECO to activate EOF due to increased media attention.
EOF/ENC is activated. Appropriate state personnel depart St. Lucie EOC and travel to the EOF.
2-B 'Start-up breaker repaired. Cause was a loose connector on control power fuse block.
Shutdown resumes.
Bonnet on V-2593 "zippers" of f valve, increasing leak rate to approximately 4550 gpm. Reactor trips.
Start-up breaker reopens and 2B diesel generator still not repaired causing loss of all B-side power, including 2B Auxiliary feed pumps. C Auxiliary feed pump used to supply feed water to A and B steam generators; trips on overspeed. Ops must get T.O. to reset overspeed latch. Upon reset, 2C Auxiliary feedwater pump starts but trips again on overspeed.
T.O. reports oil level in governor control low and goes out to find oil. In the meantime, RCS is indi-cating saturated conditions.
All B-side safeguards are off.
At approximately this time, a Site Area Emer enc should be declared due to leak greater than capacity of charging pumps and unusual decrease in pressurizer level and pressure with a constant T (av).
State Warning Point receives Notification of Site Area Emer enc Personnel hatch is repaired but the seal, has not yet been confirmed by a satisfactory leak test. Mini-purge is stillthatleaking but it is not obvious to the Control Room the valves did not seat or that any additional leakpath from containment exists.
As containment pressure increases, release exits con-tainment through mini-purge and escapes into the environment. 90% of the release is taken up by the Auxiliary Building Supply Fans (directly above the area where the mini-purge is located); 10m escapes unmonitored into the environment.
1:45 p.m. Reactor core uncovered at this time. A General recognition of the loss of 3 fission product bar-riers. Protection Action Recommendations should be:
Evacuate 0-2 miles, complete radius Evacuate 2-5 miles, complete radius Shelter 5-10 miles, complete radius Sectors N, P, Q affected WNW sector A SITE AREA EMERGENCY may initially be- declared due to the primary leak being greater than charging pump capacity. This should be escalated shortly after core uncovery.
1:50 p.m. State Warning Point receives Notification of General 1:55 p.m. T.O. puts oil in 2C Aux. feedwater pump. Pump start is successful and feeding steam generators. Total time without AFW approximately 30 minutes.
2B Start-up Transformer breaker is repaired and B-side power is restored.
2:00 p.m. St. Lucie and Martin counties order PAR's.
2:00 p.m. EOF should be operational at this time.
2:05 p.m. St. Lucie County EOC siren activation system, is in-operable. St. Lucie requests siren system activation from Martin County.
2:15 p.m. H2-Analyzer indicating 1.0%, 'H2 in containment.
2:30 p.m. Due to increased pressure in containment, airborne radioactive release from containment via the mini-purge intake increases. Release exits the Auxiliary Building unmonitored, and is picked up by the Auxiliary Building ventilation intake. Increased activity is detected by radiation monitors throug hou t the Auxiliary Building and through the plant vent.
Control Room becomes aware of the existence of this release path.
2:45 p.m. With H2 recombiners in operation, hydrogen is slowly being reduced in containment.
3: 30 p.m. Containment pressure continues to reduce as plant regains control of incident.
Plant goes into recirculation phase at approximately this time. When this occurs, dose rates and air activity in the Auxiliary Building increase signifi-cantly due to gases in RCS escaping from LPSI pump leaks. Some additional activity is released through the Plant Vent.
4:00 p.m. Plant reaches shutdown cooling temperature.
4:30 p.m. Emergency repair crews succeed in securing mini-purge isolation value, terminating the release from containment.
5: 30 p.m. Containment hydrogen further reduces, plant con-ditions appear stable.
6: 00 p.m. Exercise is terminated.