ML16225A423
| ML16225A423 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 07/12/2016 |
| From: | Florida Power & Light Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16224A374 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML16225A423 (446) | |
Text
I t
-NOTICE-THE ATTACHED FILES ARE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE INFORMATION &
\
REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH.
THEY HAVE BEEN CHARGED TO YOU
- l FOR A LIMITED TIME PERIOD AND ll I MUST BE RETURNED TO THE RE-if11 CORDS & ARCHIVES SERVICES SEC-TION P1-22 WHITE FLINT. PLEASE DO fi NOT SEND DOCUMENTS CHARGED
¥ OUT THROUGH THE MAIL REMOVAL OF ANY PAGE(S) FROM DOCUMENT FOR REPRODUCTION MUST BE RE-FERRED TO FILE PERSONNEL.
- -NOTICE-I 1,,f)
Page_-~*of"_~
FSAR User Comment :~Form
- r*.
- r FSAR errors or improvement suggestions shotilo be' identified below by FSAR Users and forwarded to the appropriate Nuclear Engfneering* Project Licensing_ .Supervisor.
Originator - - - - - Dept* - - - - - *Location - - - - - Phone* * --~--
Pl ant
- PTN _ _ PSL I PSL. 2 * ~
FSAR Areas Affected Sections Figures
( Comments Attached. _ __ Below ~--
- Engineering Review (To be completed by Project Licensing)
~ccepted _ __ 'lnsuffic.ient Information ..........,_.,.........,__ No Change Requi_r:ed * - - -
Di s*posit ion:
~------------------~
-*:.- .. ;/'
Assigned User Comment #_ _ _ _ _ _ __ Reviewing Engineer _ _ _ _ _ _ __
- ...Form 38, - Rev 6/94 .
I Refer to Drawing 2998 - G - 165 SH 1 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 REACTOR AUX BLDG & DIESEL GEN BLDG FIRE PROTECTION FIRE DOORS, DAMPERS & SPRINKLER SYS FIGURE 9.SA-1 Amendment No. 18, (01/08)
Refer to Drawing 2998 - G - 165 SH 2 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 R.A.B. FIRE PROTECTION I FIGURE 9.5A-2 Amendment No. 18 (01/08)
Refer to Drawing 2998 - G - 165 SH 4 ,
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING FIRE PROTECTION FIRE DOORS, DAMPERS & SPRINKLER SYS FIGURE 9.5A-3 Amendment No. 18 (01/08)
Refer to Dwg.
2998 - G - 165 SH 3 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING FIRE PROTECTION FIRE DOORS, DAMPERS & SPRINKLER SYS I FIGURE 9.5A-4 Amendment No. 18 (01/08)
I.
Refer to Drawing 2998 - G - 165 SH 5 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING FIRE PROTECTION FIRE DOORS, DAMPERS & SPRINKLER SYS FIGURE 9.SA-5 Amendment No. 18 (01/08)
Refer to Drawing 8770 - G - 165 SH 1 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 REACTOR AUXILIARY BLDG &
DIESEL GEN BLDG FIRE PROTECTION FIRE DOORS, DAMPERS & SPRINKLER SYS I FIGURE 9.5A-6 Amendment No. 18 (01108)
NOTES:
I Eggaate Grill Ceiling Opening
~
H&V Register gj LTG Fixture fJ Fire Detector \
0 /lixYve False Ceiling
- Fire Dectore in Control BO Based on 2998-G-076 AMENDMENT NO. 18 01/08 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 .
CONTROL ROOM CEILING TILES FIGURE 9.5A-11
Cl..
aC>
C> ..--
..-- N N
u u _J
_J N 1-N z
,----- I.() ww 1 N I
o~
> -z
(./) (./) -
w
(./) (./) ~~
-o oz u ....J 0 u u 1-z w
w~
Oz
~~
-z 0
w u
- (./)
w
~ (9 a:: ~z w w <{
Z:r:I w u (9 x w w a::
<O
.------.----- I.()
- I N I
. I. >
(/) (./)
(/) w (./) w
<{ (/) (./)
-0
-uo
(/) _J ....J u u I.()
I.()
1 N
I >
(./)
(./) w
<{ (./)
- 0
(./) ....J u
Amendment No. 18 01/08 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 LETDOWN ISOLATION FIGURE 9.5A-12A
S0-01-19 S0-01-18 V5204 11 r
0
~ )>
en o 3CD S0-01-17
(/)
- -t )> ::J
!! )> r- ""U 0. V5203 C') ~ c:: 0 3CD HOT LEG LOOP 2A c:: ""O 0 :E ::J
- 0 r iii m ...+
m z "ti ;:JJ z (Q G> r- Qo 0 (J1 (/) )> r --" INSIDE OUTSIDE
)>
I
-< z-
-I G>
co CONTAINMENT - CONTAINMENT
(/)
-"' 0
-i C:: I N
m z .....
OJ
~ --I ()0
-i 0 co l'IJ s::
""O
)>
z
V1460 S0-01-59 I
I r--r-_J~~V1464 V1239 QUENCH TANK PRESSURIZER V1465 FC CONTAINMENT V1466
~-01-58 FC ACCUMULATOR V1212 I REACTOR VESSEL
V3481 V3545 Amendment No. 18 01/08 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION FIGURE 9.SA-120
V1476 V1477 PRESSURIZER QUENCH TANK Amendment No. 18 01/08 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES FIGURE 9.5A-12E
- ~ Fl RE AREA x I I i~ ~:
~I I
I I~ ~I w
Ii! FIRE AREA Y
~ ~ ~, !
~ <t g ~
I ~ ~I I II I ~
L __ - - - - - , m
~ f4-FIRE STOP I z
~
Iji,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,J~ I I
a:
I I
I COMMON ENCLOSURE A FIRE IN FIRE AREA X WILL NOT AFFECT THE TRAIN B CABLES IN THE COMMON ENCLOSURE BECAUSE THE Fl RE WI LL NOT PROPAGATE INTO Fl RE AREA Y BECAUSE CABLES ARE Fl RE RETARDANT AND A 3 HR. FIRE BARRIER IS PLACED IN THE TRAY WHERE THE CABLE PENETRATES THE WALL.
Refer to Drawing 8770 - G - 084 SH 2 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 FLOW DIAGRAM DOMESTIC &
MAKE-UP WATER SYSTEMS FIGURE 9.SA-14 I Amendment No. 18 (01/08)
Refer to Drawing 2998 - G - 424 SH 1 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 FIRE PROTECTION REACTOR AUX.
BUILDING EL. -0.50' FIRE DETECTORS AND EMERGENCY LIGHTS I FIGURE 9.5A-15 Amendment No. 18 (01/08)
I Refer to Dwg.
2998 - G - 424 SH 2 FLORIDA POWE:R & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 FIRE PROTECTION REACTOR AUX.
BUILDING EL 19.50' FIRE DETECTORS AND EMERGENCY LIGHTS I FIGURE 9.5A-16 Amendment No. 18 (01/08)
I Refer to Drawing 2998 - G - 424 SH 3 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 FIRE PROTECTION REACTOR AUX.
BLDG EL. 43.00' FIRE DETECTORS AND EMERGENCY LIGHTS FIGURE 9.SA-17 Amendment No. 18 (01/08)
I Refer to Drawing 2998 - G - 424 SH 4 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 FIRE PROTECTION REACTOR AUX.
BLDG EL. 62.00' AND EL. 74.00' FIRE DETECTORS AND EMERGENCY LIGHTS FIGURE 9.SA-18 Amendment No. 18 (01/08)
I Refer to Drawing 2998 - G - 424 SH 5 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 FIRE PROTECTION RX AUX.
BLDG EL. 19.50' DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING FIRE DETECTORS
',,,__ -1 AND EMERG LIGHTS FIGURE 9.5A-19 1!..-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-'-~~~~~~~~~~~~~----'
Amendment No. 18 (01/08)
I Refer to Drawing 2998 - G - 424 SH 6 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 RCS FIRE PROTEC. FIRE DET.
&"EMER. LIGHTS FIGURE 9.5A-20 Amendment No. 18 (01/08)
I Refer to Drawing 2998 - G - 424 SH 7 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 RCB FIRE PROTEC.
FIRE DET. & EMER. LIGHTS FIGURE 9.5A*21 Amendment No. 18 (01/08)
I Refer to Drawing 2998 - G - 424 SH 8 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 FIRE PROTECTION. OUT.LYING AREAS FIRE DETECTORS AND EMERGENCY LIGHTS FIGURE 9.5A-22 Amendment No. 18 (01/08)
I Refer to Drawing*
2998 - G - 424 SH 9 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 FIRE PROTECTION STEAM TRESTLE EL. 19.00' TURBINE BLDG. - SWGR RM EL. 19.50' FIRE DETECT & EMERG LIGHTS FIGURE 9.5A-23 Amendment No. 18 (01/08)
I Refer to Drawing 2998 - G - 424 SH 10 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 FIRE PROTECTION OUTLYING AREAS FIRE DETECTORS AND
___, EMERGENCY LIGHTS FIGURE 9.5A-24 1L.-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-'-~~~~~~~~~~~~~__.
Amendment No. 18 (01/08)
I Refer to Drawing 2998 - G - 795 SH 5 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING RADIANT BARRIER FIGURE 9.5A-25 Amendment No. 18 (01108)
SL2-FSAR 3.0 METHODOLOGY
- As required in the NRC letter of September 30, 1976, to FP&L, a fire hazard analysis has been prepa~ed to identify the potential fire hazards in an area, postulate credible fires, and evaluate the consequences of the postulated fires on the operability of safety-related systems and equipment required to maintain the plant's capability for safe shutdown or radio-activity release minimization. The fire hazard analysis has been conducted under the supervision of fire protection engineers who are full members of the Society of Fire Protection Engineers and with broad experience in fire protection which includes actual fire testing or fire control operations and a working knowledge of the mechanics of fire development, spread and effects.
The following methodology was utilized to ensure consistency in the analy-ses of fire hazards, postulated fires and fire effects in the many fire areas of the plant. The content of the six sections of the fire hazard analysis (FHA) for each fire area (Section 5.4, this report) and its role in the development of completed analysis findings is described. Data from sections 1 through 5, which detail features. of construction, occupancy and protection for each fire area, from project drawings and equipment lists, and from consultations with cognizant discipline design engineers are used as the bases for the fire postulations, fire effects evaluations and cri-teria conformance assessments which are developed in Section 6.
3.1 DESCRIPTION
OF FIRE AREA (Section 1, FHA)
To conduct the fire hazard analyses, 51 fire areas are established throughout the plant, as shown on Fire Protection Study Drawings SK-2998-M-708, Sheets 1 through 13. In addition to the guidance in regulatory criteria, the extent and boundaries of these fire areas were based on the distribution of combustible materials, the identification and location of redundant trains of essential equipment and associated cabling required for safe reactor shutdown, the architectural design and location of both external a~d internal walls, and *the degree of accessibility to the fire by station fire brigade and/or outside fire department personnel.
Physical location of the fire area is identified both within the plant complex and on applicable reference drawings. The approximate floor area enclosed by the fire area boundaries is provided. Sub-areas or zones within a fire area, enclosed by partial and/or full heigh.t walls, are described where present.
3.2 ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA (Section 2, FHA)
Table 5-1 gives a List of Essential Equipment required for going from 100%
power to hot standby, continuing from hot standby to cold shutdown and pre-venting uncontrolled radiological releases based on offsite power unavail-able. The list of essential equipment indicates the fire area in which each
- component is located, and the Fire Protection Study Drawings, described 9.5A-3-l
SL2-FSAR above, indicate the locations within each fire area of all essential equipment listed. A cross-reference list, indicating equipment within each fire area, is given as Table 5-2.
Through the use of the Fire Protection Study Drawings and the two tables provided, all essential equipment is identified and located, as well as the essential cable routings feeding this equipment which are outlined on the Fire Protection Drawings. After identifying the essential equipment/
components and associated cable routing, the potential impact of fire damage in a fire area is assessed and the plant capability for continued operation and for detecting and monitoring radiological releases is evalu-ated.
3.3 AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS
-(Section 3, FHA)
The size of fire that may develop, and consequently the damage that may result, in the most extreme fire occurrence in a fire area is a factor of the amount of combustibles present and the total heat that their combustion could generate. Inasmuch as combustibles in an area are not point source concentrated, a more realistic measure of the relative fire hazard, or exposure to fire damage, of an area is determined by spreading this combustible loading over the floor area of the space or, in the case of a localized concentration of combustibles, over the floor area within the sphere of influence of the postulated fire.
The configuration of fire loading varies from area to area. Some areas are devoid, or essentially so, of combustible materials; other areas contain one or more localized fuel concentrations, spatially separated from each other. A localized concentration of combustible material is delineated by*
finite parameters beyond which the fire loading is sharply reduced.
Examples of local fuel concentrations include MCC units, cabinets, charcoal beds in filter housings, oil in equipment reservoirs, containers of waste materials, trash piles and similar items. Linear concentrations of combustibles are usually associated with cable trays either solely within the fire area or extending through several fire areas by penetration of intervening fire barrier walls.
To simplify the calculation of area combustible loadings, conservative calorific values, based on accepted industry literature and specific manu-facturer's data, were adopted for classes of combustible materials, which were representative of heat values of specific materials grouped within the class.
The average values used are:
Cable insulation 18,000 BTU/lb Charcoal 14,000 BTU/lb Combustible or Flammable Liquids 18,500 BTU/lb Ordinary Combustibles 9.5A-3-2 8,000 BTU/lb
812-FSAR Average cable tray heat values were developed by determining the pounds of insulation per foot for various fully loaded tray and cable configurations.
These figures were multiplied by the cable insulation heat values to arrive at a heat value per foot for the various tray sizes and cable types. The largest load was found to be 228,000 BTU per foot for a two foot wide tray which results in a concentrated load of 114,000 BTU/sq ft.
After inventory of all combustible materials in a fire area within the proper class, total BTU and BTU per sq ft values are calculated and then summed to indicate the total combustible fire loading for the overall fire area.
The derived combustible fire loading of an area is then used to compare the area fire hazard relative to those of other fire areas, to judge the adequacy of the area boundary fire barriers, and to verify the proper selection of adequate fire control and suppression systems and equipment.
As a generally accepted fire protection practice, each fire loading increment of 80,000 BTU per sq ft indicates the need for an additional one hour of fire rating for the barriers. The relative fire hazard of an area may be considered as low if the combustible fire loading is below 80,000 BTU per sq ft, moderate if below 160,000, and high if above 160,000.
In addition to the combustibles normally present in an area, transient combustibles which might realistically be introduced into areas as a part of planned operation are also considered. In most cases, the introduction of transient combustible materials into areas where such material may expose safety related equipment will coincide with scheduled station main-tenance. Combustible materials that may be introduced in quantities sufficient to require special attention include:
Construction materials - (e.g. scaffolding, shoring, forms, etc)
Resins in bulk quantities and associated packaging materials Charcoal Combustible liquids (lubricating oils and paints)
Plastic bags and protective sheeting Packaging materials and containers Flammable liquids and gases (solvents and volatile fuels)
The quantity, movement, use and handling of all such materials as well as the provision of supplemental fire protection measures will be administra-tively controlled in the plant through written procedures. For this reason, the fire loss exposure resulting from the addition of transient combustibles in an area during these periods of increased plant sur-vel lience, strict procedural control, and augumented area manning has been considered as being no greater than that from the inventoried non-transient
- combustibles normally present in each area.
9.5A-3-3
SL2-FSAR 3.4 CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS (Section 4, FHA)
If significant localized concentrations of combustibles are identified, such as cable tray stacks, oil-filled equipment, etc., the sphere of local fire influence is estimated and a concentrated combustible fire loading determined. This is used in assessing the need for provision of fire confinement features, fire detection or control systems, or fire equipment in that portion of the overall fire area. (Limited quantities of com-bustible materials, such as grease associated with motor operated valves, flexible HVAC connections, and non-charcoal HVAC filter materials, are included in the combustible inventory. However, they are not considered to generate sufficient hazard to mandate a concentrated combustible loading analysis.)
3.5 FIRE CONTROL (Section 5, FHA)
Effective fire control in plant operational areas is achieved through:
Provision of fire containment structural features, fire detection and suppression systems, fire retardant coatings, and hazard and damage reduction facilities (e.g. smoke venting, drainage, etc), and Prompt and effective response by a trained plant fire brigade using readily available fire extinguishers, inside hose stations, and hose streams from yard hydrants f?r rapid control of plant fires.
3.5.1 Physical Containment (Subsection Sa, FHA)
Fire areas are generally enclosed by fire barrier boundaries (walls, floors, and ceilings) which are, for the most part, of reinforced concrete and/or concrete block construction. These, as well as any alternative construction assemblies, are described for each area. In some cases, only partial physical barriers are used to separate adjacent areas where there is no continuity of combustible materials and, thus, no possibility of direct flame propagation across the delineated fire area boundaries. At cable tray penetrations of rated fire barriers, propagation of cable insulation fires to adjacent areas is prevented by the use of fire retar-dant coatings on the cables in the trays and of suitable fire stops at the barrier openings.
Configuration of the oil storage facilities and other factors, such as drainage or dispersion, are used to limit the exposed surface of spilled fuel. This inhibits the rate of release of heat from the fire so that provided fire area boundaries will confine the fire to the area of involvement.
SL2-FSAR Concealed spaces, such as tunnels, ceilings or chases, that may be part of the fire area are also described.
The fire hazard presented by electrical cable insulation is reduced by covering cable surfaces exposed to a fire. The St Lucie 2 criteria for the fire protection of electrical cable combustible insulation, based on industry fire tests (e.g. Sandia Laboratories and The Factory Mutual Research Corp.), is to provide complete coverage of all exposed surfaces of electrical cables with Flamemastic fire retardant coating.
Based on the above tests, adequacy of the fire protection for the St Lucie 2 plant has been evaluated on the premise that these specified coatings will prevent flame spread along cables in trays or to cables in adjacent or crossing trays under the fire conditions anticipated. The coating material is approved for the limiting of flame spread along conductors under moderate fire exposure conditions. Breakdown of coating material under severe and extended fire exposures is assumed to result in some cable surface flame spread but in damage to only the area of direct exposure.
Combustible fire loadings in cable containing areas in the St. Lucie 2 plant do not provide more than moderate fire exposures.
During postulation of fires in the area, the effectiveness of physical containment features in the reduction of combustible materials exposed to a fire and in the limitation of the spread of a fire is assessed.
3.S.2 Service Penetrations Through Boundary Barriers
- (Subsection Sb, FHA)
Descriptions of area access openings through fire barriers, including as-so'ciated doors or other closures, are given in Subsection Sb.
Size and type of penetrations through fire barriers for mechanical, electrical and HVAC services are identified by barrier being penetrated.
Seal requirements for fire stops at these penetrations are based on:
the potential for air leakage or radioactive migrations through barrier openings, and the potential for spread, through the fire barriers, of flames, heat or smoke generated by the fires postulated on a realistic basis for the area (Section 6).
The selection of design features used for protection of service penetra-tions through fire boundary barriers is guided by several considerations:
Seal assemblies, such as non-combustible boots installed around piping or flexible membranes around ducts, are required to cover open annular spaces between the fire boundary penetration opening and mechanical piping or HVAC ducts to prevent the flow of air, smoke or air borne radioactive materials from one area to another of lower environmental pressure, to absorb radiation
- releases, or to prevent water flow from the area.
- 9. SA-3-S
812-FSAR Seal assemblies are not provided for penetrations through fire barriers for reasons other than stated above. Small clearances provided between ducts or piping and wall surfaces of the barrier opening restrict migration of heat, smoke and flames.
Ducts extending through or terminating at the barrier pene-tration are not fireproofed on the basis that realistic fires postulated for the fire areas (Section 6, FHA),do not provide the fire intensity or severity of exposure required to cause heat failure and collapse of the penetrating duct on both sides of the barrier and, subsequently, to initiate ignition of com-bustibles on the opposite side of the barrier.
Predicated on the maintenance of structural integrity of duct-work penetrations, as described above, fire dampe~s are not required to prevent spread of flames and smoke from one area to another through the duct.
Recognizing the need to maintain both the flow of cooling air to essential operating equipme?t in the area and the supply and exhaust air flows to remove fire-generated smoke .and heat, the potential for inadvertent operation and the consequential blocking of air flows, is avoided by not providing fire dampers in fire barrier ductwork penetrations. Fire dampers could be susceptible to inadvertent failure apart from fire considera-tions.
Propagation of a fire involving electrical cables through cable tray penetrations of fire barriers is prevented by the use of fire retardant coatings over cable surfaces along the tray and suitable fire stops at the fire barrier. Fire stop assemblies consist of various combinations of recognized non-combustible and fire retardant materials so configured to prevent passage of fire through the barrier openings for the required rating times. Present design assemblies utilize non-combustible rigid board, such as marinite, protected with flame retardant and heat insulating coatings and mastics, such as Quelpyre and Flamemastic. These material have been fire tested by such approval groups as Sandia Laboratories and Factory Material Research Corporation (See SL-1 Fire Protection Evaluation which tested these assemblies).
3.S.3 Detection (Subsection Sc, FHA)
Ionization or thermal type smoke detection devices are installed in areas containing combustible materials where operation of essential equipment may be impaired due to a fire. The type of detector is identified by system and its fire control function described.
3.S.4 Fire Protection Systems (Subsection Sd, FHA)
- 9. SA- 3-6
SL2-FSAR Fire extinguishing equipment and suppression systems in or adjacent to the fire area are described and classified as either primary (first use) or secondary (backup) line of fire control defense. Following the postulation of a fire in the area, the adequacy and suitability of the systems and
- equipment is assessed. Accessibility to needed equipment and its cap-ability to be used effectively is reviewed.
3.5.5 Smoke Venting (Subsection Se, FHA)
Credit is taken for plant ventilation systems or natural ventilation for the removal of smoke generated by a fire in plant areas. The total exhaust capacity from the fire area is given and related to the area of the floor to determine the unit smoke removal rate in cfm per sq. ft. It is recog-nized that the smoke dilution required to permit area access and fire control is much less than would be required to permit continued habitabiliy of key operational areas such as the Control Room. Major equipment used for smoke venting is listed for informational purposes in the Essential Lists.
In the event of loss of offsite power (LOOP), smoke venting capability in RAB areas that are not provided with emergency powered exhaust systems is reduced, as only supply systems continue to operate. The slightly positive pressure produced in these areas causes outflow through ductwork of non-operating exhaust systems and dissipation through wall openings to adjacent areas or stairwells. Smoke in general building areas is removed using building venting procedures as a part of the plant response to the fire .
3.5.6 Drainage (Subsection Sf, FHA)
Provisions for drainage of fire suppression water discharged into the area are described in those areas where water may be discharged from fire suppression systems or hose lines. The degree of possible accumulation is considered and the adequacy of water removal facilities assessed to deter-mine the potential for adverse effects on or impairment of area operational equipment. See Table 3-1 for the various sump and drain pump capacities.
3.6 ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE (Section 6, FHA)
Data described above, covering fire area structural and containment fea-tures, occupancy, and function which might influence ignition, development, and consequences of a fire, are reviewed and assessed for each fire area.
Additionally, in areas where a potential for offsite radioactive release may exist, the mechanics of release and the effects of the release are considered.
To determine the adequacy of protection of essential equipment required for safe reactor shutdown during a fire condition, fires have been postulated on two bases for each designated fire area to evaluate the effects on safe
- 9. SA-3-7
SL2-FSAR shutdown capability. One postulation is based on fire protection systems not operating; the second, on systems operating as designed.
A postulated fire is that fire assumed to exist following the identifi-cation of the characteristics of potential fire hazards and quantification and configuration of the combustible loading, assuming ignition of the most significant concentration of combustibles. The effectiveness of area fire protection* equipment and plant design features on the limitation of spread, intensity, and duration of the fire are evaluated. In the postulation, it is recognized that the development of the assumed fire, after ignition has occurred, varies with the type and configuration of combustible materials involved and/or exposed. Fire postulations are based on the data gathered.
to describe the construction and occupancy of the fire area and its fire load. The burning rate, rapidity and extent of fire spread and potential damage to exposed facilities and equipment are then estimated.
In each postulation, key considerations are addressed:
Assuming a point of ignition, where will the fire spread, how rapidly, with what intensity, what else could be involved?
What is the potential extent of damage to essential equipment, of loss of safety function, or of radiological release to the environment?
Will the fire and its consequences be contained within the fire area, and/or could other fire areas be affected?
Are detectors properly located to sense fire or smoke con-ditions so that prompt fire control response can be made?
What fire control equipment will then be used and how effectively?
Are means of smoke removal adequate to permit personnel to enter the fire area, assess the fire, and use manual equipment?
Will damage, smoke and heat from the postulated fire permit any required operation of essential equipment in the area? If not, 1s redundant equipment not exposed by the fire?
If redundant systems, equipment or trains are located 1n the same fire area, are they protected adequately to remain operational?
Basic assumptions used in the fire postulations include:
Lubrication oil fire postulations conservatively assume that the equipment lubricant reservoir has ruptured and the entire contents are spread over the oil-filled equipment and the surrounding floor area. Over smooth concrete floor a spreading factor of 20 sq ft/gallon of oil has been utilized ("Handbook of Industrial Loss Prevention", Factory Mutual System, Second Edition, McGraw-Hill Book Co.), regardless of the floor geo-9.SA-3-8
SL2-FSAR graphy or available drain off capability. Assuming an average oil heat value of 18,500 BTU per pound, the concentrated com-bustible loading in the oil spill area is 7,000 BTU per sq ft.
Cable routed in cable trays exposed by an oil fire or other types of exposure fires (within the sphere of influence of the fire) are assumed to be damaged, thus, loss of function of equipment served by those cables is assumed to occur. Tests predict that approved flame retardant coating on cables will effectively contain the fire to the cable tray of origin. The function of the approved flame retardant coating is to prevent the propagation of fire along the cable tray, or to cable trays outside of the sphere of influence of the oil fire, and thus limit damage to only those cables and equipment directly exposed to flames.
A cable tray fire resulting from an elecrical fault within a cable tray is assumed to cause loss of function of all equip-ment serviced by the electrical cables within the involved tray, although the direct fire damage is not postulated to
.extend beyond the area of origin. The use of an approved flame retardant coating on cables precludes the causing, by an
- electrical fault, of a fire which would affect cable trays above or beside the faulted tray.
The appraisal of the fire defense of the area being analyzed either:
- will verify that the plant capability for safe shutdown has been maintained, that radioactivity release has been kept with-in acceptable limits, and that potential for large loss fire damage and extensive downtime has been controlled or, will highlight overall deficiencies or specific weaknesses and indicate recommendations for their elimination or improvement .
- 9. 5A 9
SL2-FSAR TABLE 3-1 ST LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS RCB AND RAB SUMP AND DRAIN PUMP CAPACITIES Fire Capacity Area Equipment (gpm ea. pu~p) 14 Reactor Cavity Sump Pump 2A and 2B 50 16I Safeguard Room Sump Pumps 2Al and 2A2 50 16II Safeguard Room Sump Pumps 2Bl and 2B2 50 20 Chemical Drain Tank Pump 50 20 Equipment Drain Tank Pump 50 20 Laundry Tank Drain Pumps 2A and 2B 50
- 9. SA.:. 3-10
SL2-FSAR
4.0 DESCRIPTION
OF FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
- 4.1 FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM Smoke and fire detectors are integral with the SL-1 and SL-2 computer base fire detection system. For Unit 2, detectors are arranged in zones with each zone having a local indicating panel. The status of these zones is con-tinuously monitored by a computer in the SL-2 plant Control Room. Should one of these detectors go into its alarm state then the computer will immediately sense that change of state and cause an alarm to sound in the SL-2 Control Room. Upon acknowledgement of this alarm the SL-2 printer displays the zone number from which the alarm was initiated.
Via a view graph of the zone the operator may determine the plant area affected by the alarmed condition. Detector location must be determined at the local zone panel.
Location of the detectors is based upon consideration of the fire hazards in each area being monitored. More than one fire detection device is provided in all zones to prevent an undetected fire due to the single failure of one detection device. The location of fire detectors is shown on Drawings SK-2998-M-708, Sheets 2-13.
Local zones panels, with individual indicators on a graphical mimic dis-play, indicate any detector in alarm. Alarm and trouble indication is transmitted to two independent main fire alarm receiving panels. This information is also transmitted to a central processing unit, and operator console in the Unit 2 Control Room and to a printer located in the Unit 2 Control Room.
Within the plant there are two different kinds of fire detectors, descrip-tions of which follows:
The majority of the fire detection system is currently composed of ioniza-tion (smoke) detectors. These are solid state, dual chamber ionization detectors which are connected in a supervised circuit such as to cause an alarm should any loss of power or other anomalies occur. The outer (sens-ing) chamber is open to the atmosphere through louvered slots in the cham-ber wall. The inner (reference) chamber is designed to prevent entrance of combustion particles, but has a small opening*to the atmosphere to compen-sate for changes in temperature, barometric pressure, and humidity.
Locations in the plant are also protected by fixed temperature/rate-of-rise (FT/ROR) detectors. These detectors alarm when the temperature achieves a preselected setpoint or the rate of rise of the ambient temperature exceeds approximately 15°F per minute .
- 9.SA-4-1
SL2-FSAR The status of all detectors is continuously monitored by the computer and any change in state will cause an alarm. Each individual ionization de-tector can be tested by blowing smoke into its chamber to cause actuation.
Each local display panel has a test button which, when pushed, lights all the indicator lamps for a check of their status. Plant operating proce-dures also provide for periodic testing of this system. See Table 4-1 and 4-4 respectively, for detector location and system failure and effects analysis.
In addition to the above described detectors which are located throughout the plant, separate detection systems are provided to control the deluge and sprinkler systems in the turbine area. These detectors are not part of the computerized fire detector system and are discussed below.
4.2 FIRE WATER SYSTEM (Common to St Lucie Units Nos. 1 and 2)
The fire water system stores city water for fire extinguishment and sup-plies this water to the necessary areas of the plant and site via a 12 in.
diameter underground fire loop around the plant, with hydrants spaced approximately 200 ft apart. The fire water system services all buildings
. and suppression syste~s on the plant site. Post indicator isolation valves are provided for sectionalizing the header. Hydrant 'locations are outlined in Drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 1.
The primary supply for the fire water system is an 8 in. tap from the city water system of Fort Pierce, Florida (rated flow 1200 g]Xll at 40-45 psi).
This water is stored on the site in two 500,000 gallon City Water Storage Tanks (CWST's). Technical Specification minimwn for each tank is 300,000 gallons. There is a high and low level alarm for each tank in the SL-1 Control Room. A separate fire water pump of 2500 g]Xll capacity is connected to each of these tanks. These pumps are electrically driven from the in-dependent safety-related buses of the plant and are capable of supplying more than 10 hose streams simultaneously.
The fire water system, when not operating, is kept pressurized by a hydro-pneumatic tank. This tank pressure is maintained in the range of 95 to 125 psig by the domestic water pumps. If the transformer deluge system or a fire hose is actuated causing system pressure to decrease, both fire pumps start automatically when header pressure drops to 85 psig.
The two motor driven fire pumps draw suction from the two city water stor-age tanks (500,000 gallons each) and discharge into the fire loop. A 500 gpm mobile gasoline engine driven fire pump is also provided. It can take suction from either CWST, a fire hydrant, one of the cooling water canals, or other water storage tanks on site should the need arise.
Upon loss of offsite power, the fire pumps will automatically be loaded on the emergency diesel generator. During a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA),
this is not the case, since available load is assigned to safety equipment.
However, a simultaneous fire and LOCA are not postulated.
- 9. 5A-4-2
SL2-FSAR See Table 4-4 for system failure and effects analysis for the fire water supply and fire pump system.
4.2.l Interior Hose Stations Readily accessible 1-1/2 in. hose lines with electrically safe fog nozzles and continuous flow type hose reels are distributed throughout the plant, so that all areas can be covered with hose streams. Hose station locations are shown in Table 4-2.
4.2.2 Outdoor Hose Stations Surrounding the plant is a 12 in. fire main loop and yard fire hydrants for use in extinguishing fires in yard areas and for augmenting hose station capacities in various buildings. The approximate locations of these are indicated on Drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 1.
4.2.3 Fire Suppression Systems The hydrogen seal oil unit, the turbine oil conditioner units, turbine oil reservoir and the main, auxiliary and start-up transformers are protected by separate dry pipe, thermostatically controlled deluge systems. System thermostats located above and around each of the protected areas, sense a predetermined temperature and/or rapid rate of rise of temperature and give a signal that causes the appropriate deluge valve to open. Upon actuation, these valves allow the water from the fire water system to fill the piping system and discharge from the various spray heads located over and around the particular piece of equipment. If necessary this system can also be manually actuated. Flow in this system will cause a drop in pressure in the main fire loop starting the fire pumps and causing a "Deluge Actuation" alarm in the Control Room.
A wet pipe, fusible head, thermal actuated sprinkler system is also pro-vided in the Turbine Building to extinguish fires result~ng from abnormal conditions in the steam generator feed pump and condensate pump ~ube oil systems and the heater drain pump lube oil system. These systems have installed sprinkler system piping over the effected areas with heat actuated type sprinkler heads located as appropriate to provide adequate coverage of the affected areas. These pipes are continuously pressurized with water from the fire water main. After high temperature in one of the protected areas results in the fusible link on the sprinkler head melting, the water from the system will discharge on this area. This flow will*
result in a loss of pressure in the fire main causing an alarm in the Control Room and the starting of the fire pumps.
A closed head pre-action automatic sprinkler system protects the areas above, below, and around the areas traversed by the lube oil pipes servic-ing the turbine. System thermostats are located above and around the protected areas and, upon sensing a predetermined temperature and/or rapid rate of rise of temperature, cause the actuation of the associated pre-action valve. This allows the pressurized water from the fire water main to fill the previously dry piping on the system side of the valve. The closed head arrangement now becomes a pressurized wet pipe, fusible head, thermal actuated automatic sprinkler system. Thermal actuation of the
- 9. SA-4-3
SL2-FSAR individual fusible linked sprinkler heads, located as designed to provide adequate coverage for the hazards to be protected, causes water from the system to discharge over the affected areas. The pre-action valve can also be manually actuated, if necessary. Flow in the system will initiate a primary signal upon actuation of the pre-action valve and a secondary signal will be initiated by flow from the sprinkler heads. This flow results in a loss of pressure in the fire main, starting the fire pumps and initiating an alarm in the Control Room. See Table 4-4 for a failure and effects analysis on automatic fire suppression systems.
4.3 PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS Located throughout the plant are various types and sizes of portable fire extinguishers. They are placed so as to be convenient to several locations that could have the potential for a fire. Both co and dry chemical 2
types are provided depending upon the type of fire hazard in the immediate area. The plant operating staff has been briefed in the operation of these types of extinguishers. These extinguishers are checked and inspected periodically in accordance with plant operating procedures. A listing of these extinguishers, their location and rating is found in Table 4-3.
Extinguisher locations are also shown on Drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheets 1 through 13.
4.4 LIGHTNING PROTECTION Fifty copper air terminals (lightning rods) are installed on the roof of the containment, with five copper downcomer cables connecting them to driven ground rods and the plant grounding grid at the base of the structure.
Lightning arrester protection is provided on all transmission lines, the switchyard east and west buses and on the primary side of the main trans-formers and the start-up transformers.
9.SA-4-4
SL2-FSAR TABLE 4-1
- Fire Area ST LUCIE UNIT N0.2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FIRE DETECTION BY FIRE AREAS Type Detection Location FAS Fix temperature EL 22.67', Diesel rate of rise Generator 2A (FT/ROR)
FA9 FT/ROR EL 22.67', Diesel Generator 2B FA13 Ionization EL 16.50', Above In-take Cooling Water Pumps FA14 (I) Ionization EL 23.00', RCB Annu-lus above Elec. Pene-trations FA14 (II) Ionization EL 00.00', RCB Elec Tunnel Area above
- FA14 (III) *Ionization cable tray EL 23.00', Area be-tween Reactor Con-tainment Vessel and Secondary Shield Wall above cable tray FA19 Ionization EL *(-) 0.5', RAB East Hallway Area above cable tray FA20 Ionization EL (-) 0.5', RAB West Hallway Area above caple tray FA21 (I) Ionization type EL 19 . 5 I ' RAB detection in general Hot & Cold Locker Locker Room Area. Room (FT/ROR) detectors are located in the hot and cold showers.
FA2i (II) Ionization EL 19.5', RAB First Aid, Laboratory &
Health Physics Rm .
- 9.5A-4-5
SL2-FSAR TABLE 4-1 (Cont'd)
Fire Area Type Detection Location FA22 Ionization EL 19.5', RAB Elec.
Penetration Area above cable tray FA23 . Ionization EL 19.5', RAB Elec.
Penetration Area above cable tray FA28 .Ionization EL 19.5', RAB Switch-gear Rm above equip-ment and cable tray FA32 Ionization EL 19.5', RAB Decon-tamination Room and Maintenance Storage Area FA33 Ionization EL 19.5', RAB Repair Shop and Laboratory
- Areas FA34 (I&II) Ionization EL 43 . 00 I ' RAB Switchgear Rm above equipment and cable tray FA37 Ionization EL 43 . 00 I ' RAB Switchgear Rm above equipment and cable tray FA39 Ionization EL 43 . 00 I ' RAB HVAC Room above equipment and cable tray FA42 (I) Ionization (office) EL 62.00', RAB Con-FT/ROR (toilet) trol Room Toilet and Office Area FA42 (III) FT/ROR EL 62.00', RAB Con-trol Room Kitchen Area FA45 Ionization EL 48.00', FHB Venti-lation Equipment Rm
- 9. 5A-4-6
SL2-FSAR
- Fire Area FA46 TABLE 4-1 (Cont'd)
Type Detection Ionization Location EL 19.5'/48.00'/
62.00', FHB Equipment Area, Work Area and Fuel Storage Area FA47 Ionization EL 19.5, TGB Switch-gear Room above cable tray and switchgear FA51 Ionization EL 19.5', RAB Hallway and Ceiling Area above cable tray
- 9.5A-4-7
SL2-FSAR TABLE 4-2 ST LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FIRE HOSE STATIONS TURBINE BLDG-AUXILIARY BLDG Fire Hose Station Number Building/Elev/Col No. Area Drawing/Coard Length HS-15-41 RAB/-.5'/RAC & 2RA3 Z 19 4/Fl3 50' HS-15-28 RAB/-.5'/RAG & 2RA3 Z 20 4/F8 50' HS-15-43 RAB/-.5'/RAK & 2RA3 20 4/F3 50' HS-15-31 RAB/43 I /RAI & 2RA3 341 6/G9 75' HS-15-32 RAB/43'/RAL & 2RA2 34I 6/ES 50' HS-15-42 RAB/43'/RAL & 2RA5 34II 6/JS 50' HS-15-37 RAB/43'/RAG & 2RA3 Z 39 6/H12 50' HS-15-3 TB/19.5'/24 & L 47 ll/I6 75' HS-15-6 TB/19.5'/21 & B 47 11'/C3 50' HS-15-9 TB/19.5'/27 & B 47 11/ClO 50' HS-15-11 TB/19.5'/32 & D 47 ll/El6 75' HS-15-13 TB/19.5'/30 & L 47 11/113 7S' HS-15-2 TB/39.5'/24 & L 47 *12/J5 SO' HS-15-5 TB/39.5'/21 & B 47 , 12/C2 SO' HS-15-8 TB/39.5'/27 & B 47 12/C8 50' HS-15-14 TB/39.5'/32 & G 47 12/Gl7 75' HS-15-1 TB/62'/24 & L 47 13/K6 75' HS-15-4 HS-15-7 HS-15-10 HS-15-12 HS-15-35 HS-15-36 TB/62'/21 & A TB/62'/27 & A TB/62'/34 & A TB/62 I /30 & L RAB/43'/RAC & 2RA4 RAB/43'/RAC & 2RA3 47 47 47 47 50 50 13/C4 13/ClO 13/Cl8 13/Kl4 6/116 6/G16 7S' 7S' SO' SO' 75' SO' HS-15-33 RAB/19.5'/RAJ & 2RA4 51 S/IS 50' HS-15-34 RAB/19.5'/RAK & 2RA2 51 S/F4 50' HS-15-38 RAB/19.5'/RAC & 2RA3 Z Sl 5/llS 50' HS-15-39 RAB/19.5'/RAI & 2RA3 Sl 5/H7 50' HS-15-40 RAB/19.5'/RAG & 2RA3 Z Sl S/110 SO' HS-15-19 RAB/19.5'/2~RA4 & RAA 29 S/Kl7 50' Notes: 1 - Drawing numbers refer to the sheets of SK-2998-M-708 2 - TB - Turbine Bldg RAB - Reactor Auxiliary Bldg
- 9. 5A-4-8
- SL2-FSAR TABLE 4-3 ST LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHER LOCATIONS FIRE EXTINGUISHER LOCATION DWG SHEET U.L.
AREA TYPE WITHIN PLANT COORD. RATING 1-2 20 lb Dry Chemical On East Side of Diesel Oil Storage Tanks 8/BlO 10A:60BC 1-2 20 lb Dry Chemical On West Side of Diesel Oil Storage Tanks 8/DlO 10A:60BC 3 20 lb Dry Chemical At Northeast Corner of Component Cooling Water 8/F4 10A:60BC Bldg.
3 20 lb Dry Chemical At West Side of Component Cooling Water Bldg. 8/J5 10A:60BC 3 20 lb Dry Chemical At Southwest Corner of Component Cooling Water 8/JlO 10A:60BC Bldg.
4 None 5 None 6 Nom~
7 20 lb Dry Chemical At Top of Stair to Personnel Lock into Containment 2/118 lOAi60BC 8 15 lb co2 Diesel Generator 2A Building Elevation 29.67' on 8/Hl5 lOBC Wall North of Diesel Generator Set 8 15 lb co2 Diesel Generator 2A Building Elevation 29.67' on 8/Jl6 lOBC Wall West of Diesel Generator Set 8 15 lb co2 Diesel Generator Set 2A Elevation-29.67' on 8/Hl6 lOBC Wall South of Diesel Generator Set 8 15 lb co Diesel Generator 2A Building Elevation 29.67' on 8/Fl6 lOBC Wall East of Diesel Generator Set 9 15 lb co Diesel Generator 2B Building Elevation 29.67' on 8/Hl7 lOBC 2
Wall North of Diesel Generator Set 9 15 lb co Diesel Generator 2B Building Elevation 29.67' on 8/Jl8 lOBC 2
Wall West of Diesel Generator Set 9 15 lb co Diesel Generator 2B Building Elevation 29.67' on 8/Hl8 lOBC 2
Wall South of Diesel Generator Set 9 15 lb co Diesel Generator 2B Building Elevation 29.76' on 8/Fl8 lOBC 2
Wall East of Diesel Generator Set
r SL2-FSAR TABLE 4-3 (Cont'd)
FIRE EXTINGUISHER LOCATION DWG SHEET U.L.
AREA TYPE WITHIN PLANT COORD. RATING 10 None 11 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.5' at Northwest Corner of Turbine ll/L2 10A:40BC Building 12 None 13 None 14 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 29.5' Top of Concrete Foundation For 2/El6 10A:40BC Pressurizer 14 20 lb co 2 Elevation 23' Outside Primary Shield Wall 2/115 lOBC Directly Across from 280° Access in Secondary Shield 14 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 18' Inside of Secondary Shield Wall 2/Jl5 10A:60BC at 280° Access Opening
~
\JI
!l> 14 20 lb co 2 Elevation 18' Inside of Secondary Shield Wall 2/El3 lOBC I
.so- at 50° Access Opening 1:
0 14 20 lb co 2 Elevation 23' Outside Secondary Shield Wall at 2/Gll lOBC 0° Location 14 20 lb co 2 Elevation 30.5' on Platform at 240° Outside Door 2/Kl7 lOBC to Service Elevator (At Personnel Loe~)
14 20 lb co 2 Elevation 23' at Foot of Stairway ifl Down From 2/118 lOBC Platform of Personnel Lock
- SL2-FSAR TABLE 4-3 (Cont'd)
FIRE EXTINGUISHER LOCATION DWG SHEET U.L.
AREA TYPE WITHIN PLANT COORD. RATING 14 20 lb co2 Elevation 23' Outside Secondary Shield Wall 2/119 lOBC Approximately 10 Ft West of Reactor Drain Tank 14 20 lb co Elevation 23' Outside Secondary Shield Wall at 2/El8 lOBC 2
136° Access Opening 14 20 lb co Elevation 23' Outside Secondary Shield Wall 2/Dl6 lOBC 2
Approximately 12. Ft North of Regenerative Heat Exchanger 14 20 lb co Elevation 45' at Containment Wall at 180° 3/GlO lOBC 2
(Near Safety Injection Tank 2B2) 14 20 lb co Elevation 45' at Containment Wall Approximately 3/J8 lOBC 2
12 Ft South of Service Elevator 14 20 lb co Elevation 45' Outside Secondary Shield Wall Near 3/F2 - lOBC 2
Stairway Alongside Maintenance Hatch
~
I 14 20 lb co Elevation 45' Outside Secondary Shield Wall 3/D4 lOBC J>- 2 1
...... South of Containment Cooling Unit HVS-2A 14 20*1b co Elevation 62' at Escape Lock at 60° 2/D3 lOBC 2
14 20 lb co Elevation 62' Immediately West of Hydrogen 2/F2 lOBC 2
Recombiner 2A 14 20 lb co Elevation 62' Immediately Outside Door to 2/K7 lOBC 2
Service Elevator 14 20 lb co Elevation 62' at Top of Stairs Alongside South 2/C7 lOBC 2
Wall of Refueling Canal 15 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation (-).5' at the Watertight Door leading to 4/C6 10A:6BC the Pipe Tunnel Area 16 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation -.5' Near Containment Spray Pump 2A 4/C8 10A:60BC 17 None 18 None 19 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation -.5' East Wall at Door To Waste Gas 4/El4 10A:60BC Compressor Area
SL2-FSAR TABLE 4-3 (Cont'd)
FIRE EXTINGUISHER LOCATION DWG SHEET U.L.
AREA TYPE WITHIN PLANT COORD. RATING 19 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation -.5' East-West Passageway at Foot of 4/El2 10A:60BC Stairs Near Boric Acid Holding Tank 20 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation -.5' East-West Passageway Across From 4/F8 lOA:40BC Door to EGGS "B" Train Room 20 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation -.S' East-West Passageway Outside Entry 4/ES 10A:80BC to Shutdown Heat Exchanger lA Room 20 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation -.5' East-West Passageway At Doorway to 4/G3 10A:60BC Equipment Drain Pump Room 21 20 lb co 2 Elevation 19.S' RAB on South Wall of Laundry SA/J4 lOBC Room 21 10 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.S' RAB in Health Physics Room 5A/D4 3A:30BC
~
21 10 lb co 2 Elevation 19.S' RAB in Lab Supply and Storage SA/E3 SBC Vl Area I
.!>- 22 None I
N 23 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.S' South Wal 1 at West End of 5/E7 10A:60BC Containment Penetration Area 24 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation -.S' East-West Passageway Outside 4/Bl2 10A:60BC Watertight Door to Charging Pump Room 25 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.S' H & V Area Adjacent To 5/Dl2 10A:60BC Containment 26 None 27 None 28 15 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.S' at Southwest Corner of Switch- SA/Hl9 60BC gear Room 29 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.S' East Wall of Drumming Station 5/Kl 7 10A:80BC 30 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.S' on North Wall of CVCS Ion 5/El7 10A:80BC Exchanger Room 31 None 32 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.5' RAB on North Wall of Maintenance SA/H7 10A:40BC Storage Area
- FIRE EXTINGUISHER LOCATION
- SL2-FSAR TABLE 4-3 (Cont'd)
DWG SHEET U.L.
AREA TYPE WITHIN PLANT COORD. RATING 33 10 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.S' on West Wall of Instrument 5A/F5 10A:40BC Calibration and Repair Shop 33 ' 10 lb co 2 Elevation 19.S' on South Wall of Radiochemistry 5A/G7 SBC Laboratory 34 20 lb co 2 Elevation 43' on East Wall Near Pressurizer 6/D9 lOBC Heater Control 2A 34 10 lb co 2 Elevation 43' on Wall North of 480V MCC 2B-5 6/G8 SBC 34 20 lb co 2 Elevation 43' at Base of West Stairway 6/F5 lOBC 34 15 lb co 2 Elevation 43' Immediately North of 4160V 6/H9 lOBC Switchgear 2B-3 34 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 43' in Center of Communication 6/H6 10A:40BC Equipment Area 34 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 43' on West Wall South of Hot 6/J5 10A:40BC Shutdown, Panels 35 None 36 None 37 20 lb co 2 Elevation 43' on Wall East of 4160V Switchgear 6/ElO lOBC 2A-3 37 20 lb co 2 Elevation 43' on West Wall North of 480 Volt 6/D9 lOBC Switchgear 2A-2 38 None 39 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 43' on East-West Passageway South of 6/Gl2 10A:60BC H&V Room 39 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 43' in North Section of H&V Room Near 6/Cl2 10A:60BC Plant Vent Monitor Cabinet 40 None 41 None 42 20 lb co 2 Elevation 62' in Control Room Near Turbine 7/G6 lOBC Control Cabinet
SL2-FSAR TABLE 4-3 (Cont'd)
FIRE EXTINGUISHER LOCATION DWG SHEET U.L.
AREA TYPE WITHIN PLANT COORD. RATING 42 20 lb co 2 Elevation 62' East Wall of Control Room Near 7/E6 lOBC Sequence of Events Cabinet 42 20 lb co 2 Elevation 62' Immediately Inside Control Room 7/F3 lOBC Access Door 42 10 lb co 2 Elevation 62' in East-West Corridor Outside of 7/G4 SBC Offices 42 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 62' in Vestibule Providing Access to 7/E3 10A:80BC Personnel Elevator Outside Control Room 42 10 lb co 2 Elevation 62' on North Wall Near Engineered 7/D3 SBC Safeguard Logic Cabinet 42 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 62' Immediately Outside Access Door to 7/G8 10A:80BC Auxiliary Building Roof 43 None 44 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 62' in Northwest Corner of H&V Room 7/D7 10A:80BC 4S 20 lb co 2 Elevation 48' on South Wall of H&V Just West 10/GlO lOBC of Door to Stairway 46 20 lb co 2 Elevation 62' on Southwest Corner of Walkway 10/D8 lOBC Around New Fuel Storage Pool 46 20 lb co 2 Elevation 62' at Northwest Corner of Spent Fuel 10/D2 lOBC Pool Area Near Door to Stairway 46 lS lb co 2 Elevation 19.S on Wall Adjacent to Doorway to 10/K9 lOBC Fuel Pool Pump and Filter Room 46 20 lb co 2 Elevation 19.S' Adjacent to Roll-up Door to 10/J8 lOBC Loading Area 46 20 lb co 2 Elevation 48' in South Wall of New Fuel Storage 10/H7 lOBC Area 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.S Immediately North of Station Air ll/B4 10A:40BC Compressor 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.S' in Open Area North of Closed ll/D4 lOA:40BC Blowdown Cooling Pumps
SL2-FSAR TABLE 4-3 (Cont'd)
FIRE EXTINGUISHER LOCATION DWG SHEET U.L.
AREA TYPE WITHIN PLANT COORD. RATING 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19. 5' Immediately West of Closed ll/E6 lOA:40BC Blowdown Cooling Pumps 4T 20 lb Dr*y Chemical Elevation 19.5' East of Condensate Pumps 11/ClO 10A:40BC 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.5' South of Feedwater Pump 2B ll/Al3 10A:40BC 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.5' on Wall South of Heater Drain ll/Bl5 10A:40BC Pumps 47 20 lb co 2 Elevation 19.5' in Northeas"t Corner of 11/ Al6 lOBC Switchgear Room 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.5' in East End of SWGR Room ll/Bl7 10A:40BC 47 20 lb co 2 Elevation 19.5' on Wall North of Station ll/Dl6 lOBC Service Transformer 2Al 47 20 lb co 2 Elevation 19.5' on Wall Alongside South ll/Fl8 lOBC
"'>I
.,. Wall Rollup. Door Near 4160V Switchgear 2B2 I
..... 47 15 lb co 2 Elevation 19.5' Inside West Door Near 4160V 11/Hl 7 lOBC
"' Switchgear 2B2 47 20 lb co 2 Elevation 19.5' Inside East Door Near 4160V 11/Hl 7 lOBC Switchgear 2A2 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.5' on East Wall at Base of South- 11/Il6 10A:40BC west Stair to Mezzanine (39.5') Level 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.5' on West Wall Alongside H Seal 11/114 10A:40BC 2
Oil Unit 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.5' in *Open Area South of Drain- ll/Dl4 10A:40BC cooler 2B 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.5' on West Wall of Turbine Buildng 11/16 10A:40BC South of Turbine Cooling Water Pump 2B 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.5' on Wall at Base of Northwest ll/H2 10A:40BC Stair to Mezzanine (39.5') Level 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 39.5' Adjacent to East Stairway 12/CB 10A:60BC 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 39.5' Northeast Corner of Floor 12/DZ 10A:40BC Immediately North of MCC-2Al
SL2-FSAR TABLE 4-3 (Cont'd)
FIRE EXTINGUISHER LOCATION DWG SHEET U.L.
AREA TYPE WITHIN PLANT COORD. RATING 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation ~9.5' SouthPast Area Near MCC-2Bl 12/ElS 10A:40BC 47 20 lb Dry ChPmical ElPvation 39.S' Northeast Area NPar MCC-2Al l2/E2 JOA: 60BC 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 39.5' Northwe.st Corner Near 12/11 10A:60BC
- Stair No. l 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 39.S' Immediately WPst of HP TurbinP 12/JS 10A:60BC Exhaust Hood /
47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 39.5' Adjacent to Southwest Stairway 12/JlS *JOA: 60BC No. 2 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 39.5' in Open Area in Southwest Corner l2/Hl7 10A:40BC of Floor 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 39.S' Immediately West of Condenser 2B 12/IlO 10A:40BC
"!' 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 62' Northeast Corner of Operating 13/C4 10A:60BC U1
>I Floor
,....I 47 20 lb co Elevation 62' at North Carrier of HP Turbine 13/GS lOBC 2
"' 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 62' Approximately 10 Feet East of 13/Ell 10A:40BC Auxiliary Priming Ejectors 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 62' at Southeast Corner of Operating 13/Cl8 l0A:40BC Floor 47 20 lb co Elevation 62' at Southeast Corner of l3/Hl6 lOBC 2
Generator 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 62' Southwest Corner at Top of 13/J17 10A:60BC Stair No. 2 a> 47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 62' West Side of Operating Floor 13/KlO 10A:60BC Between Reheater & Moisture Separators 2C and 2D
"'a" 0.
47 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 62' Northwest Corner At Top of 13/K3 10A:40BC
""'..,z Stair No. 1
~
~
48 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 62' in H&V Room Near Control Room Outside Air Intake Monitor 7/G7 10A:80BC I 5
...... 49 None
- SL2-FSAR TABLE 4-3 (Cont'd)
FIRE EXTINGUISHER LOCATION DWG SHEET U.S.
AREA TYPE WITHIN* PLANT COORD. RATING so 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 43' on East Wall Near Boric Acid 6/Hl6 10A:80BC Batching Tank 51 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.S' East End of East-West Passageway S/Hl 7 10A:60BC Outside CVCS Ion Exchanger Room 51 20 lb co 2 Elevation 19.S' East-West Passageway O~tside S/Hl3 lOA:80BC Volume.Control Tank Room 51 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.S' North-South Passageway Outside SA/IS lOA:BOBC Door to Maintenance S_torage Area 51 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.S' North-South Passageway Outside SA/FS lOA: BOBC Door to Instr Calibration & Repair Shop 51 20 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.S' West Wall at Botto~ of Stairway SA/F2 lOA:80BC to Elevation 33.S' 51 10 lb Dry Chemical Elevation 19.S' in Hallway Across from Health- SA/F3 4A:40BC Physics Room
SL2-FSAR TABLE 4-4 (Sheet 1 of 7)
ST LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS A. System Component Subject To Failure Domestic Water Pumps and Hydropneumatic Tanks B. Postulated Failure Mode
.1. One pump fails to start or stops running
- 2. Both pumps fail to operate C. Probable Cause of Failure 1 and 2. Mechanical malfunction, loss of power or control malfunction D. Immediate Effect on System E.
1.
2.
Plant fire main pressure drops Plant fire main pressure drops Inherent Corrective Measures of System on Equipment
- 1. Low pressure switch on hydropneumatic tank starts redundant pump
- 2. Plant fire main pressure below 85 psi starts fire pumps F. Failure Detection 1 and 2. Fire pumps will start and initiate an alarm in the Control Room if pump(s) cannot maintain system pressure.
G. Degree of System Impairment 1 and 2. Although domestic water pumps and hydromatic tanks are used to maintain fire main pressure, their loss does not impair fire system availability or capability.
- 9. SA-4-18
812-FSAR TABLE 4-4 (Sheet 2 of 7)
- A.
B.
System Component Subject To Failure Electric Motor Driven Fire Pumps.
Postulated Failure Mode
- 1. Failure of one pump to start or pump stops running
- 2. Failure of both pumps to start or pump stops running C. Probable Cause of Failure
- 1. Loss of power, loss of start-up signal or mechanical malfunction, one pump only.
- 2. Loss of power, loss of start-up signal or mechanical malfunction, both pumps.
D. ilnmediate Effect on System
- 1. Loss of half of total system fire pump capability, which is 200 percent of required capacity.
- 2. Loss of both fire pumps .
- E. Inherent Corrective Measures of System on Equipment 1.
2.
Redundant fire pump will start on low fire main pressure.
If loss of start-up signal,pumps can be started manually.
On loss of offsite power (LOOP), pumps will automatically be loaded on the emergency diesel generators.
F. Failure Detection
- 1. and 2. Periodic pump testing will detect a pump malfunction.
LOOP will be readily indicated in Control Room.
G. Degree of System Impairment
- 1. Redundant 100% capacity pump will supply system needs
- 2. Minimal - Fire pumps can be started locally*. Also during a LOOP, pumps will be loaded automatically on diesel generators .
- 9.5A-4-19
SL2-FSAR TABLE 4-4 (Sheet 3 of 7)
A.
B.
System Component Subject To Failure Underground Fire Mains.
Postulated Failure Mode
- 1. Pipe rupture (moderate energy crack)
- 2. Closed sectional valve.
C. Probable Cause of Failure
- 1. Deterioration of pipe.
- 2. Mechanical failure (dropped gate) or sabotage.
D. Immediate Effect on System
- 1. Loss of fire main pressure
- 2. Limited effect due to multi-directional supply to all points.
E. Inherent Corrective Measures of System on Equipment
- 1. Isolation valves nearby Pumps start-up on drop in pressure
- 2. Periodic inspections and administrative. procedures F. Failure Detection
- 1. Low fire main pre.ssure Fire pump start-up indication
- 2. Periodic inspections and administrative procedures G. Degree of System Impairment
- 1. Damaged portion of pipe loop can be isolated by sectional valves - most of system will remain in service
- 2. Multi-directional supply will limit the effects to the system 9.SA-4-20
SL2-FSAR TABLE 4-4 (Sheet 4 of 7)
A. System Component Subject To Failure Inside hose station standpipes B. Postulated Failure Mode Pipe rupture (moderate energy cracks)
C. Probable Cause of Failure Deterioration or mechanical damage D. Immediate Effect on System Loss of availability of hose stations supplied by standpipe affected.
Loss of fire main pressure.
E. Inherent Corrective Measures of System on Equipment Affected areas are protected by adjacent standpipe hose stations, portable extinguishers and other fire systems in .the area.
F. Failure Detection Loss of fire main pressure will start fire pumps which will initiate alarms in the Control Room.
G. Degree of System Impairment Damaged standpipe can be isolated from the fire main loop by closing system isolation valves.
Loop and all other systems remain in service with any water loss from modulate energy cracks re-supplied from primary water source .
- 9.SA-4-21
SL2-.FSAR TABLE 4-4 (Sheet 5 of 7)
A.
B.
System Component Subject To*Failure Automatic Fire Suppression Systems (water).
Postulated Failure Mode
- 1. Pipe rupture (moderate energy crack).
- 2. Automatic system valve fails to actuate.
- 3. Inadvertent actuation of system.
C. Probable Cause of Failure
- 1. Deterioration or mechanical damage.
- 2. Mechanical or detection malfunction.
- 3. Spurious signal or inadvertent manual operation.
D. *Immediate Effect on System
- 1. Fire pumps start ~pon loss of fire main press*ure.
- 2. None
- 3. Fire pumps start upon loss of fire main pressure.
E. Inherent Corrective Measures of System on Equipment
- 1. Line crack will be isolated by system shutoff valves.
- 2. None
- 3. . The system can be isolated from nearby shutoff valves.
F. Failure Detection
- 1. Fire pumps start and initiates an alarm in the Control Room.
- 2. Administrative procedures, inspection maintenance, and testing will locate the mechanical failure. A supervisory circuit on
- the detector system will give a trouble signal in the Control Room should the detector system malfunction.
- 3. Fire pumps start and initiate an alarm in the Control Room.
9.SA-4-22
SL2-FSAR TABLE 4-4 (Sheet 6 of 7)
G. Degree of System Impairment Minor - Damaged, impaired or inadvertantly operated system can be isolated from the fire main loop by closing manual system shutoff valves.
9.SA-4'-23
SL2-FSAR TABLE 4-4 (Sheet 7 of 7)
A. System Component Subject To Failure Area Detection Systems B. Postulated Failure Mode
- 1. Failure of individual detector
- 2. Failure of single detector zone
- 3. Failure of fire detection computer system C. Probable Cause of Failure (1,2,3) a .. Mechanical or electrical malfunction of detector, zone, or computer circuitry.
- b. Loss of system power.
D. Immediate Effect on System
- 1. Slight delay in detection response.
- 2. Diminishing of detection capability.
E.
- 3. Potential loss of detection for the entire plant.
Inherent Corrective -Measures of System on Equipment (1, 2) a. Spatial design of detectors provides fo.r overlap sensing capabilities of A and B systems.
3a. Redundant SL-1 computer will monitor SL-2 Plant areas.
(1,2,3) b. The power system is energized by an uninterrupted power supply fed from redundant power sources.
F. Failure Detection 1, 2 and 3 Trouble signal indication.
G. Degree of System Impairment Loss of area detection and its impact on overall plant fire protection has been minimized by overlapping sensing capability of System A and B detectors by supervision of circuits and by an uninterrupted power supply. The SL-1 computer will monitor SL-2 Plant areas when the SL-2 computer is down.
9.SA-4-24
SL2-FSAR 5.0 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS
- 5. 1 USE OF DRAWINGS AND LISTS For purpose of analysis following a fire and loss of offsite power, St Lucie Unit 2 has been divided into 51 distinct fire areas. These areas are shown on Drawings SK-2998-M-708, Sheets 1-13. These drawings depict the essential equipment required for safe shutdown following the fire and also show the fire protection equipment and systems available for detection and control of the fire. In order to make effective use of the drawings and to develop the fire protection analysis, various lists are required, each of which is described below:
a) Essential Equipment List by function (Table 5-1): This list forms the basis for deciding which equipment must be protected from the consequences of the fire. The list is divided into three sections:
- 1) The equipment required to bring the plant from 100 percent power to hot standby
- 2) The equipment required to go from hot standby to cold shutdown
- 3) The equipment necessary to limit radioactive release.
In each of these sections the operations required during that phase are listed in the first column. To the right of this, the equipment and instruments required to accomplish that operation are listed along with the fire area in which the equipment is located, the power so11rce or sources for each of those components, the . fire area of the power source(s) and alternate equipment, if any, which will perform the same function, e.g.,
ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT LIST BY FUNCTION
- 1. 100% Power to Hot Standby/Offsite Power Unavailable Normal Mode Equipment Fire Power Fire Description Required Area Source Area Alternative 1.1 Energiza- 1. LP 227 42I 125V de Bus 2A 34 II Portable Lights tion of Station Battery 35 Control 2A Room Light-ing (See Item 2.9)
LP 228 42I 125V de Bus 2B 34 II Portable Lights Station Battery 2B
- 9.5A-5-1
SL2-FSAR
- 1. 100% Power to Hot Standby/ Offsite Power Unavailable (Cont'd)
Description Normal mode Equipment Required LP 216 Fire Area 42I Power Source LP 216 Trans-former Fire Area 34 I Alternative Portable Lights
- MCC 2A6 37 SWGR 2A-2 37 SWGR 2A-2 37 DG-2A 8 LP 226 LP 226 Trans- 34 II Portable Lights former MCC 2B6 34 II SWGR 2B'-2 34 I I SWGR 2B-3 34 I I DG-2B 9 b) Fire Area Location of Essential Eqnipment (Table 5-2): This list arranges the components found in the above list by fire area. Also incl11ded in this listing is the electrical boxes and pushbutton stations which contain cable necessary for safe shutdown, e.g.,
FIRE AREA LOCATION OF ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT FIRE AREA ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT 19 Gaseous Effluent Monitor RE-6648 (NA)
RE-6648 Isolation Valve FCV-6565(NB)
Liquid Effluent Monitor RE-6627(NA)
RE-6627 Isolation Valves: FCV-6627X(NA)
FCV-6627Y(NA)
PB Sta/Elec Box: B2E23(SB) (B471)*
B2388 (NA) (B454)*
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number.
9.5A-5-2
SL2-FSAR SECTION S. 2
- Drawing No.
SK-2998-M-708, Sh l FIRE PROTECTION DRAWINGS Title Fire Hazard Analysis Fire Areas Area Plot Plan SK-2998-M-708, Sh 2 Fire Hazard Analysis 14' 6 Reactor Building Pl~n EL.18.00', 23.00', 62.00' SK-2998-M-708, Sh 3 Fire Hazard Analysis 14 Reactor Building Plan. EL 4S.OO' SK-2998-M-708, Sh 4 Fire Hazard Analysis 15' 16, 17' Reactor Auxiliary 18, 19, 20, Plan EL -0.SO' 24, 40 SK-2998-M-708, Sh S Fire Hazard Analysis 17' 22, 23' Reactor Auxiliary Bldg 24, 25, 26, Plan EL 19.SO' 27' 28' 29' 30, 31, 40, Sl
- SK-2998-M-708, Sh Sa Fire Hazard Analysis Reactor Auxiliary Bldg Plan EL 19.SO' (Below False Ceiling) 21 ' 32, 33 SK-2998-M-708, Sh 6 Fire Hazard Analysis 31, 34, 35' Reactor Auxiliary Bldg 36, 37, 38, Plan . EL 43. 00 1 39' 40, 41 50 SK-2998-M-708, Sh 7 Fire Hazard Analysis 42, 43, 44, Reactor Auxiliary Bldg 48 Plan EL 62.00' SK-2998-M-708, Sh 8 Fire Hazard Analysis 1, 2, 3, 4, Component Cooling Bldg, 5' 8, 9 Diesel Generator Bldg &
Refueling Water Tank SK-2998-M-708, Sh 9 Fire Hazard Analysis 13' 49 Intake Structure SK-2998-M~708, Sh 10 Fire Hazard Analysis 4S, 46 Fuel Handling Building
- 9. SA- 5-3
SL2-FSAR SECTION 5.2 (Cont'd)
Drawing No.
SK-2998-M-708, Sh 11 Title Fire Hazard Analysis Turbine Building Plan EL 19.50' Fire Areas 47 SK-2998-M-708, Sh 12 Fire Hazard Analysis 47 Turbine Building Plan EL 39.50' SK-2998-M-708, Sh 13 Fire Hazard Analysis 47 Turbine Building Plan EL 62.00' 9.SA-5-4
SL2-FSA~
SECTION 5.3 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS ESSENTIAL LISTS TABLE 5-1 ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT LIST BY FUNCTION 5-2 FIRE AREA LOCATION QF ESSENTIAL l::QUIPMEN'f
/
9.SA-5-5
SL2-FSAR TABLE 5-1 ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT LIST BY FUNCTION
- 1. 100% POWER TO HOT STANDBY/OFFSITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Normal Mode Description Equipment Required Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative 1.1 Energization of Control 1. Emergency Lighting: LP 227 42 I 125 V de Bus 2A 34 II Portable Lighting Room Lighting Station Battery 2A 35 (See Item 2.9) LP 228 42 I 125 V de Bus 2B 34 I I Portable Lighting-Station Battery 2B 36 LP 216 42 I LP 216 Transformer 34 I Portable Lighting MCC 2A6 37
-swGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3' 37 DC-2A 8 LP 226 42 I LP 226 Trans former 34 II Portable Lighting Lil MCC 2B6 -34 I I
>I SWGR 2B2 34 II Lil I SWGR 2B3 34 I I
°' DG-2B 9
- 1. 2 Verify Automatic Reactor 1. Reactor Trip Switchgear 34 I RPS Cab A/B/C/D 42 I Control Rod Position Indic Tri_p 120 V ac Instr Bus 2 MA/MB/MC/MD 34 1 Static Inv Cab 2A/2B/2C/2D 34 I I 125 V de Bus 2A/2B 34 I I Station Battery 2A/2B 35/36 or RPS Cab A/B/C/D 42 I 120 V ac Instr Bus 2A/2B/2C/2D 34 I Static Inv Cab 2A/2B/2C/2D 34 II MCC 2A5/2B5 37 /34 II SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 II SWGR 2A3/2B3 37 /34 II DG-2A/2B 8/9 1.3 Turbine Trips Automatically 1.4 Automatic Diesel 1. Diesel Generator Set 2A (DG 2A) 8 Generator Start-Up and Energi- Diesel Oil Storage Tank (DOST) 2A 1 zation of 4.16 kV Bus (See Item 2.8) Diesel Oil Transfer Pump 2A (DOTP) 1 MCC 2A7 8 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG-2A 8
SL2-FSAR TABLE 5-l(Cont'd)
- 1. 100% POWER TO HOT STANDBY/OFFSITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Normal Mode Description Equipment Required Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative 1.4 (Continued) 1. (Continued)
Diesel Oil Day Tank -zAl (DODT) 8 Diesel Oil Day Tank 2A2 a_ ..:.
Day Tank 2Al Inlet Valve I-SE-17-lA -a -DG-2A Eng Term Bloc1t 2Al 8 DG-2A Control Pnl 8 120 V ac PP-211 8 HCC _2A7'" - 8 SWGR 2A-Z 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG-2A 8 Day Tank 2A2 Inle-t Valve I-SE-17-2A 8 DG-2A Eng Term Block 2A2 8 DG...,2A Control Pnl- 8 120 v ac pp...;211 8 MCC 2A7 8 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG-2A 8 DG-2A Eng Term Block 2Al 8 Day Tank 2Al Refill Level Switches-:
LS-17-542A 8 DG-2A Control Pnl 8 LS-17-543A 8 120 V ac PP-211 8 LS-17-552A 8 MCC 2A7 8 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3- 37 DG-2A 8 DG-2A Eng T B 2A2 8 Day Tank 2A2 Refill Level Switches:
LS-17-SSOA 8 DG-2A Control Pnl 8 LS-17-SSlA 8 120 V ac PP-211 8 LS-l 7_;553A 8 MCC 2A7 8 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG-2A 8 Plant Aux Control Board 42 I
SL2-FSAR TABLE 5-l(Cont'd)
- 1. 100% POWER TO HOT STANDBY/OFFSITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Normal Mode Description Equipment Require~ Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative
- 1. 4 (Continued) 2.. DG Set 2B 9 DOST 2B 2
. DOTP 2B - MCC 2B7 . 9
. SWGR 2B2 34 II
.SWGR 2B3 34 I I DG-2B 9
- DOVT 2lll 9 DODT 2B2 9 DODT 2Bl Inlet Valve I-SE-17--IB 9 -DG-2B Eng TB 21H 9 DG-2B Control Pnl 9 120 V ac PP-21'2 9 MCC 2B7 9 SWGR 2B2 34 H SWGR 2B3 34 I'I DG'-:2B 9 DODT 2B2 Inlet Valve J:-SE-l 7-2B 9 DG-2B Eng TB 2B2 9 DG-2B Control Pnl 9
-120 V ac PP-212 9 MCC 2B7 9 SWGR -ZB2 34 I I SWGR 2B3 34 I I DG-2B. 9 DODT 2Bl Refill Level Switches: DG-2B TB 2Bl 9 LS-17-542B 9 DG-2B Control Pnl 9 LS-17-543B 9 120 V ac PP-212 9 LS-17-552B 9 MCC 2B7 9 SWGR 2B2 34 I I SWGR 2B3 34 I I DG-2B 9 DODT 2B2 Refill Level Switches: DG-2B Eng TB 2B2 9 LS-17-550B 9 DG-2B Control Pnl 9 LS-l 7-551B 9 120 V ac P-212 9 LS-17-553B 9 HCC 2B7 9 SWGR 2B2 34 I I SWGR 2B3 *34 I I DG-2B 9 Plant Aux Control Board 42 I
-I",**
SL2-FSAR TABLE 5-1 (Cont'd)
- l. 100% POWER TO HOT STANDBY/ OFFSITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Normal Mode Description Equipment Required Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative
- 1. 5 Start Auxiliary Feedwater 1. Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) 6 I SWGR 2A3 37 System (Manual Within Pump 2A DG-2A 8 600 Seconds)
(See Item 2.3) AFW Pump 2B 6 I SWGR 2B3 34 II DG-2B 9 AFWP 2A Disch Valve I-MV-09-9 6 II MCC 2A5 37 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG-2A 8 AFWP 2B Disch Valve I-MV-09-10 6 I MCC 2B5 34 II SWGR 2B2 34 II SWGR 2B3 34 II DG-2B 9 RTGB 202 42 I SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II DG-2A/2B 8/9 125 V de Bus 2A/2B 34 II/34 II Hot Shutdown Control
..,, Station Battery 2A/2B 35/36 Panel (HSCP) 2A/2B I SWGR 2A3/2B3 37 /34 II (FA 34 II)
I 125 V de Bus 2A/2B 34 II
"' Station Battery 2A/2B 35/36
- 2. AFW Pump 2C 6 II AFWP 2C Inlet Valves: I-MV-08-3 6 II I-MV-08-3/12/13 Local 6 II/6 I/6 II Starter I-MV-08-12 6 I 125 V de Bus 2AB 34 II I-MV-08-13 6 II 125 V de Bus 2A/2B 34 II/34 II Station Battery 2A/2B 35/36 AFWP 2C Discharge Valves: I-MV-09-11 6 II I-MV-09-11/12 Local 6 II/6 I Starter I-MV-09-12 6 I 125 V de Bus 2AB 34 88 125 V de Bus 2A/2B 34 II/34 I I Station Battery 2A/2B 35/36 AFW Pump 2C Instruments: Over speed trip SW 6 II Turbine Terminal Block 6 II Trip Solenoid SW 6 II Turbine Control Panel 6 II Speed Sensor Tach 6 II Control Transfer Panel 2AB 34 I Speed Sensor Governor 6 II 125 v de Bus 2AB 34 II T & T Valve Status 6 II 125 v de Bus 2A/2B 34 II
SL2-FSAR TABLE 5-1 (Cont'd)
- 1. 100% POWER TO HOT STANDBY/*OFFSITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Normal Mode Description Equipment Required Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative
- 1. 5 (Continued) 2. (Continued)
Actuator 6 II Station Battery 2A/2B 35/36 Ramp Start Switch 6 II RTGB 202 42 I 120 V ac PP-203 34 I HSCP 2AB PP-203 Transformer 34 I (FA 3411)
MCC 2AB 34 I 480 V MCC 2AB 28 MCC 2A2/2B2 37/34 I I MCC 2A3/2B3 37/34 I I DG 2A/2B 8/9
~
Lil
>I 3. Condensate Storage Tank (CST) 10 Lil I CST Level Transmitter LT-12-11 10 RTGB 202 42 I I-'
0 120 V ac PP-201 34 I PP-201 Transformer 34 I MCC 2A6 37 SWGR 2A6 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG-2A 8 1.6 Start Intake Cooling 1. CCW Heat Exchanger: 2A 3 Water (ICW) and Com- 2B 3 ponent Cooling Water*
(CCW) Systems (See CCW Pumps: 2A 3 SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II Item 2.7, 2.6.1) 2B 3 DG 2A/2B 8/9 2C 3 4.16 Kv SWGR 2AB 28 SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II DG 2A/2B 8/9 RTGB 206 42 I SWGR 2A3/2B3/2AB 37/34 II/28 Eng Safeguard Cab 42 I 125 V de Bus 2A/2B/2AB 34II Station Battery 2A/2B 35/36 CCW Pump 2C Isolation Valves:
I-MV-14-1 3 MCC 2AB 34 I I-MV-14-2 3 480 V SWGR 2AB 28 I-MV-14-3 3 SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 I I I-MV-14-4 3 SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 I I DG 2A/2B 8/9 RTGB 206 42 I .)
i I
I
e 9
' 1.
SL2-FSAR TABLE 5-1 (Cont'd) 100% POWER TO HOT STANDBY/ OFFSITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Normal Mode Description Equipment Re9uired Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative 1.6 (Continued) 2. ccw Flow Transmitters:
FT-14-lA 3 RTGB 206 42 I FT-14-lB 3 120 V PP-201/202 34 I PP-201/202 Transformer 34 I MCC 2A6/2B6 37/34 I I SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 I I SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 I I DG 2A/2B 8/9
- 3. ICW Pumps: 2A 13 SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II 2B 13 DG 2A/2B 8/9 2C 13 4.16 Kv SWGR 2AB 28 SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 I I
'f' DG 2A/2B 8/9 IJ1
>I IJ1 RTGB 202 42 I I
Engin Safeg Cab (ESC) SA/SB 42 I ICW Pump 2C Isolation Valves:
I-SB-21-7 49 I-SB-21-7 49
- 4. ICW Flow Indicating Switches:
FIS-21-9A 3 RTGB-206 42 I FIS-21-9B 3 120 V ac PP-201/202 34 I PP-201/202 Transformer 34 I MCC 2A6/2B6 37/34 I I SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 I I SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 I I DG 2A/2B 8/9
- 5. Intake Structure Exhaust Fans:
2 HVE-41A 13 MCC 2A5/2A6 37/34 I I 2 HVE-41B 13 SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 I I 2 HVE-41A Local Selector Switch 13 SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 I I 2 HVE-41B Local Selector Switch 13 DG 2A/2B 8/9 2 HVE-41A Thermostat 13 2 HVE-41B Thermostat 13
- 1. 7 Maintain Steam Generator 1. Auxiliary Feedwater System (See Item 1. 5)
Pressure and Restoration (See Item 1. 5) of Steam Generator Levels (See Item 2.3) 2. Atmosphe~ic Dump Valves:
I-HCV-08-2A 6 II Main Steam Safety Valves I-HCV-08-2B 6 I Main Steam Safety Valves
SL2-F'SAR ATTACHMENT 5-1 (Cont'd)
- 1. 100% POWER TO HOT STANDBY/OFF-SITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Normal Mode Description EguiEment Reguired Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative
- l. 7 (Cont'd) 3. SG Pressure Transmitters:
PT-08-lA 6 I Transfer Control Pnl 2A/2B 37/34 II PT-08-lB 6 I RTGB 202 42 I 120 V PP-201/202 34 I PP-201/202 Transformer 34 I MCC 2A6/2B6 '37/34 II SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 II SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II DG-2A/2B 8/9 or Transfer Control Pnl 2A/2B 37/34 II HSCP 2A/2B 34 II PP-201/202 34 I PP-201/202 Transformer 34 I MCC 2A6/2B6 37/34 II
';,° SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 II IJ1
>I SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II IJ1 DG 2A/2B 8/9
.....I N 4. RC Loop Wide Range Temperature Indic:
TE-1115 14 II RTGB 203 42 I TE-1125 14 II RTGB 205 42 I 125 de PP-201/202 37/34 II PP-201/202 Transformer 37/34 II MCC 2A6/2B6 37/34 II SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 II SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II DG 2A/2B 8/9 HSCP-2A/2B (FA 34 II)
- 5. SG Level Transmitters:
LT-9013A 14 III RTGB 202 42 I LT-9013B 14 III 125 V de Instr Bus 2 34 I MA/2MB/2MC/2MD LT-9013C 14 III Stat Inv Cab 2A/2B/2C/2D 34 II LT-9013D 14 III 125 V de Bus 2A/2B 34 II LT-9023A 14 III Station Battery 2A/2B 35/36 LT-9023B 14 III or LT-9023C 14 III RTGB 202 42 I LT-9023D 14 III 125 V de Instr Bus 34 I 2 MA/2MB/2MC/2MD Static Inv Cab 2A/2B/2C/2D 34 II MCC 2A5/2B5 34 II SWGR 2A2/2B2 35/36 SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II I
~ ~ --~ DG 2A/2B 8/9 I
SL2-FSAR ATTACHMENT 5'....1 (Cont'd)
- 1. 100% POWER TO HOT STANDBY/OFF-SITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Normal Mode Description Equipment Required Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative
- 1. 7 (Cont'd) 5. (Cont'd)
RPS Cab A/B/C/D 42 I 1.8 Energization of:
A) Control Room Air Conditioning 1. Control Room A/C Units:
2 HVA/ACC-3A 42 II MCC 2A6/2B6 37/34 II 2 HVA/ACC-3B 42 II SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 II (See Item 2.6) SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II DG 2A/2B 8/9 2HVA/ACC-3C 42 II MCC 2AB 34 I 480 V SWGR 2AB 28 SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 II
';° SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II ln DG 2A/2B 8/9
>I ln I Control Room ac Dampers: D-20 42 II MCC 2A6/2B6 37/34 II w D-21 42 II 120 V ac PP-201/202 34 I PP-201/202 Transformer 34 I MCC 2A6/2B6 37/34 II SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 II SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II DG 2A/2B 8/9 D-22 42 II MCC 2AB 34 I 120 V ac PP-203 34 I PP-203 Transformer 34 I MCC 2AB 34 I 480 V SWGR 2AB 28 SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 I I SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 I I DG 2A/2B 8/9 HVCB 42 I B) Station Battery 2. Battery Chargers: 2A 34 II MCC 2A5/2B5 37/34 II Chargers (See 2B 34 II SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 II Item 2.10, 2.6.3) SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II DG 2A/2B 8/9 2C 34 II MCC 2AB 34 I 480 V SWGR 2AB 28 SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 I I SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 I I DG 2A/2B 8/9
SL2-FSAR ATTACHMENT 5-1 (Cont'd)
- 1. 100% POWER TO HOT STANDBY/OFF-SITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Normal Mode Description EquiEment Re9uired Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative 1.8 (Cont'd) 2. (Cont'd) 125 V de Bus 2A 34 II Battery 2A/2B 35/36 2B 34 II 2C 34 II 125 V de Bus 2A/2B 34 II Battery 2A/2B 8/9 RTGB 201 42 I
- 3. Station Batteries: 2A 35 2B 36
- 4. Battery Room Exhaust Fans: 2-RV-l 35 120 V PP-201/202 34 I 2-RV-2 36 PP-120/202 Transformer 34 I MCC 2A6/2B6 37/34 II
,_.I DG 2A/2B 8/9
""'" 1.8 C) Containment Cooling 5. Containment Fan Coolers:
Units (See Items 2.6.4, 2 HVS-lA 14 III SWGR 2A2 37 2.6.5) 2 HVS-lB 14 III SWGR 2A3 37 DG 2A 8.
2 HVS-lC 14 IV SWGR 2B2 34 II 2 HVS-lD 14 III SWGR 2B3 34 II DG 2B 9 HVCB 42 :r ESC-SA/SB 42 I
- 6. Reactor Cavity & Support Cooling Units: 2 HVE-3A 14 III MCC 2A5/2B5 37/34 II 2 HVE-3B 14 III SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 II SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II DG 2A/2B 8/9 2 HVS-2A 14 III MCC 2A5/2B5 37/34 II 2 HVS-2B 14 III SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 II SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II DG 2A/2B 8/9 Dampers: D-27 14 III MCC 2A5/2B5 37/34 II D-28 14 III PP-201/202 34 I PP-201/202 Transformer 34 I MCC 2A6/2B6 37/34 II SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 II SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II
SL2-FSAR ATTACHMENT 5-1 (Cont'd)
- 1. 100% POWER TO HOT STANDBY/OFF-SITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Normal M.ode Description Equipment Required Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative*
1.8 (Cont'd) 6. (Cont'd)
DG 2A/2B 8/9 HVCB 42 I 1.9 Maintain Pressurizer Pres- 1. Pressurizer Heater Bank: A 14 II Htr Distr Bank Pl/P2 Panel 14 III sure (See Item 2.2.1) B 14 II SCR Prop PWR Controller 2A/2B 34 I Pressurizer Htr Bus 2A3/2B3 34 I SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II DG 2A/2B 8/9 RTGB 203 42 I RTGB 201 42 I
';°
!i:!I HSCP SA/SB (FA34 II)
\.Jl I
\.Jl
- 2. Pressurizer Level Transmitters:
LT 1103 14 III RTGB 203 42 I 120 V ac PP-221 34 II PP-221 Transformer 34 II MCC 2B6 34 II SWGR 2B2 34 II SWGR 2B3 34 II DG 2B 9 LT 1110 X 14 III RTGB 203 42 I LT 1110 Y 14 III RTGB 205 42 I 120 V ac PP-201/202 34 I PP-201/202 Transformer 34 I MCC 2A6/2B6 37/34 I I SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 II SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II DG 2A/2B 8/9
- 3. Pressurizer Pressure Trans-mitter: PT 1103 14 IV RTGB 203 42 I PT 1104 14 IV RTGB 205 42 I PP-201 34 I PP-201 Transformer 34 I MCC 2A6 37 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG 2A 8
SL2-FSAR ATTACHMENT 5-1 (Cont'd)
- 1. 100% POWER TO HOT STANDBY/OFF-SITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Normal Mode Description Equipment Required Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternate 1.9 (Cont'd) 3. (Cont'd)
PT ll05 14 IV RTGB 203 42 I PT 1106 14 IV RTGB 205 42 I PP-202 34 I PP-202 Transformer 34 I MCC 2B6 34 II SWGR 2B2 34 II SWGR 2B3 34 II DG-2B 9 1.10 Borate RCS to Hot Shutdown 1. Boric Acid Makeup Tank: 2A 17 Refueling Water Storage Tank Boron Concentration (See Item 2.2) 2B 17 Refueling Water Storage Tank BAMT 2A Heater Bank: A 17 MCC 2A5/2B5 37/34 II B 17 SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 I I SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 I I DG 2A/2B 8/9 BAMT 2B Heater Bank: A 17 MCC 2A6/2B6 37/34 II B 17 SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 II SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 I I DG 2A/2B 8/9 BAMT 2A/2B Heater Controls:
TIC 2206 20 MCC 2AS 37 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG 2A 8 TIC 2207 20 MCC 2B5 34 II SWGR 2B2 34 I I SWGR 2B3 34 I I DG 2B 9 TIC 2208 20 MCC 2A6 37 SWGR 2A3 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG 2A 8 TIC 2209 20 MCC 2B6 34 I I SWGR 2B2 34 II SWGR 2B3 34 II DG 2B 9 CVCS Local Annunciator 51 PP-238/239 34 I 125 V de Bus 2A/2B 34 II Battery 2A/2B 35/36
- 1.
SL2-FSAR ATTACHMENT 5-1 (Cont'd) 100% POWER TO HOT STANDBY/OFF-SITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Normal Mode Description Equipment Required Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative 1.10 (Cont'd) 2. Boric Acid Makeup Pumps: 2A 17 MCC 2A6 37 2B 17 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG 2A BAMP 2A/2B Controls:
LIT/LIA 2206 20 RTGB 205 42 I PP-201 34 I PP-201 Transformer 34 I MCC 2A6 37 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG 2A 8
\J;l IJ1 LIT/LIA 2208 20 RTGB 205 PP-202 42 34 I
I
>I PP-202 Transformer 34 I IJ1 I MCC 2B6 34 II
~
-.J SWGR 2B2 34 II SWGR 2B3 34 II DG 2B 9 BAMP 2A/2B Discharge Valve:
v 2514 17 MCC 2A5 37 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG 2A 8 RTGB 205 42 I ESC - SA 42 I
- 3. Gravity Feed Valves: v 2508 17 MCC 2B5 34 II v 2509 17 SWGR 2B2 34 II SWGR 2B3 34 I I DG 2B 9 RTGB 205 42* I ESC - SB 42 I
- 4. Boric Acid Heat Trace Distrib .Transf 2A 51 MCC 2A5/2B5 37/34 II 2B. 51 SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 II SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II DG 2A/2B 8/9
SL2-FSAR ATTACHMENT 5-1 (Cont'd)
- 1. 100% POWER TO HOT STANDBY/OFF-SITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Normal Mode Description Equipment Required Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative
- 1.10 (Cont'd) 5. Charging Pumps: 2A 18 I SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 II 2B 18 II SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II DG 2A/2B 8/9 2C 18 III 480 V SWGR 2AB 28 SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 II SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II DG 2A/2B 8/9
.Charging Pump 2A/2B/2C Instr:
PIS 2224 X 18 I 120 V ac PP-201 . 34 I PP-201 Transformer 34 I MCC 2A6 37 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37
\0 DG 2A 8
~ PIS 2224 Y 18 II 120 V ac PP-202 34 I U1 PP-202 Transformer 34 I
....00I MCC 2B6 34 II SWGR 2B2 34 II SWGR 2B3 34 II DG 2B 9 PIS 2224 Z 18 III 120 V ac PP-203 34 I PP-203 Transformer 34 I MCC 2AB 34 I 480 V SWGR 2AB 28 SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 II SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II DG 2A/2B *8/9 RTGB 205 42 I HSCP 2A/2B/2AB (FA34 II)
ESC SA/SB 42 I
- 6. Charging Valves: I-SE-02-1 14 III RTGB 205 42 I I-SE-02-2 14 ill . 125 V de Bus 2A/2B 34 II Battery 2A/2B 8/9 Pressurizer Spray Valves:
I-SE-02-3 14 III .Transfer Control Pnl 2A/2B 37 /34 II I-SE-02-4 14 III 125 V de Bus 2A/2B 34 II Battery 2A/2B 8/9 BSCP 2A/2R - II)
- *SL2-FSAR ATTACHMENT 5-1 (Cont'd)
- 1. 100% POWER TO HOT STANDBY/OFF-SITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Normal Mode Description Equipment Required Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative
- 1.10 (Cont'd) 6. (Cont'd)
- 7. Volume Control Tank 26 VCT Discharge Valve 2501 51 MCC 2A5 37 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG 2A 8 RTGB 205 42 I
'!' ESC-SA 42 I
\.J1
~ Volume Cont Tank Level Transm
\.J1 I
LT 2227 51 RTGB 205 42 I
\D PP-220 37 PP-220 Transformer 37 MCC 2A6 37 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG 2A 8 RTGB 205 42 I 1.11 Ventilate Reactor Aux- 1. RAB Ventilation System:
iliary Building A) 2 HVS-4A 39 SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 I I (See Item 2.6.6) 2 HVS-4B 39 SWGI.l 2A3/2B3 37/34 I I DG 2A/2B 8/9 HVCB 42 I ESC - SA/SB 42 I B) 2 HVE-9A 39 MCC 2A6/2B6 37/34 II 2 HVE-9B 38 SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 I I SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II DG 2A/2B 8/9 Dampers: D-13 39 HVCB 42 I D-14 39 120 V PP-201 34 I Position Switches: ZS-25-52/53 39 PP-201 Transformer 34 I ZS-25-54/55 39 MCC 2A6 37 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG 2A 8
SL2-FSAR ATTACHMENT 5-1 (Cont'd)
- 1. 100% POWER TO HOT STANDBY/OFF-SITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Normal Mode Description Equipment Required Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative
- 1. 11 (Cont ' d) 1. B) (Cont'd)
D-15 38 HVCB 42 I D-16 38 120 V PP-202 34 I Damper Position Switches: PP-202 Transformer 34 I ZS-25-56/57 38 MCC 2B6 34 II ZS-25-58/59 38 SWGR 2B2 34 II SWGR 2B3 34 II DG 2B 9 Louvers: 2 L-7A 50 HVCB 42 I 2 L-7B 38 120 V PP-201/202 34 I PP-201/202 Transformer 34 I MCC 2A6/2B6 37/34 II SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 I I SWGR 2A3/2B3 37 /34 I I DG 2A/2B 8/9 Temperature Elements:
TE-25-36/42 39/38 HVCB 42 I 37/43 39/38 120 V PP-201/202 34 I 38/44 39/38 PP-201/202 Transformer 34 I 39/45 39/38 MCC 2A6/2B6 37 /34 I I 40/46 39/38 SWGR-2A/2B-2 37/34 I I 41/47 39/38 . SWGR 2A-3/2B-3 37/34 I I Pressure Diff Transmitter: DG 2A/2B 8/9 PDIT-25-5A/5B 39/38 PDIT-25-18A/18B 39/38 PDIT-25-19A/19B 39/38 Flow Switches - FS-25-12A 39 Ann !sol Cab SA 34 I FS-25-12B 38 Ann !sol Cab SB 34 I HVCB 42 I ESC - SA/SB 42 I C) Normal RAB Exhaust SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 I I 2HVE-10A (FA39)
(not available during LOOP) . SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 I I 2HVE-10B (FA39)
DG 2A/2B 8/9 125 V de Bus 2A/2B 34 I I Dampers: SE-25-21A Battery 2A/2B 35/36 (FA39) SE-25-21B HVCB (FA42I)
- SL2-FSAR TABLE 5-1 (Cont'd)
- 1. 100% POWER TO HOT STANDBY/OFF-SITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Normal Mode Description Equipment Re9uired Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative
- l. ll (Continued) 1. (Continued)
D) 2 HVS-5A 48 MCC 2A5/2B5 37/34 II 2 HVS-5B 48 SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 I I SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 I I DG 2A/2B 8/9 HVCB 42 I E) 2 HVE-ll 43 MCC 2A6/2B6 37/34 II 2 HVE-12 43 SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 I I SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 I I DG 2A/2B 8/9 HVCB 42 I
'::' D-2 16 I PP-201 34 I
\J1 D-5A 15 PP-201 Transformer 34 I
>I MCC 2A6 37
\J1 D-6A 15 N
I D-7A 20 SWGR 2A2 37
,..... D-8A 15 SWGR 2A3 37 D-9A 16 I I DG-2A 8 D-llA 20 D-3 16 II HVCB 42 I D-4 16 I I PP-202 34 I D-5B 15 PP-202 Transformer 34 I D-6B 15 MCC 2B6 34 II D-7B 20 SWGR 2B2 34 II D-8B 15 SWGR 2B3 34 II D-9B 16 I I DG 2B 9 D-llB 20 ESC-SA/SB 42 I HVCB 42 I 1.12 Ventilate Electrical 1. Fans 2-RV-3 37 MCC 2A5/2B6 37/34 II Equipment Room 2-RV-4 37 SWGR 2A2/2B2 37/34 II (See Item 2.6.7) SWGR 2A3/2B3 37/34 II DG 2A/2B 8/9
SL2-FSAR TABLE 5-1 (Cont'd)
- 2. HOT STANDBY TO COLD SHUTDOWN/OFF-SITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Normal Mode Description Equipment Required Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative 2.1 Deenergize Pressurizer 1. Pressurizer Heater Controls (See Item 1. 9)
Heaters (See Item 1.9) ..
- 2. 2 Borate RCS to Cold
- 1. Boric Acid Components (See Items l.l0.1/2/3/4/7)
Shutdown (See Items 1.10.1/2/3/4/7)
- 2. Charging System (See Items 1.10.5/6)
(See Items 1.10.5/6)
- 3. Pressurizer s*pray (See Item 1.10.6)
(See Item 1.10.6) 2.3 Cooldown to Shutdown 1. Auxiliary Feedwater System (See Item 1.5.1/2/3)
Cooling System Window (See Item 1.5.1/2/3)
- 2. Atmospheric Dump Valves, Steam (See Item 1.7.2/3/4/5)
Generator & RC Loop Instru-mentation (See Item 1.7.2/3/4/5)
- 3. CVCS/RWT Intertie Valve V2504 18 III MCC 2B5 34 I I Manual Operator Action - Use SWGR 2B2 34 II HPSI System RWT and Power SWGR 2B3 34 II Operated Pressurizer DG 2B 9 Relief Valves RTGB 205 42 I 4; Pressurizer Level Indic (See Item 1. 9. 2)
(See Item 1. 9. 2)
- 5. Pressurizer Pressure Indic:
PT 1102 A 14 IV RTGB 206 42 I PT 1102 B 14 IV 120 V ac Instr Bus 2 MA 34 I (MB/MC/MD)
PT 1102 C 14 III Static Inv Cab 2A/2B/2C/2D 34 II PT 1102 D 14 IV (See Item 1.7.5)
RTGB 206 42 I RTGB 203 42 I Emerg Safeg Cab MA (MB/MC/MD) 42 I
- 6. Refueling Water Storage Tank 4 2.4 A) Block SIAS
- SL2-FSAR TABLE 5-1 (Cont'd)
- 2. HOT STANDBY TO COLD SHUTDOWN/OFF-SITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Normal Mode Description Equipment Required Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative 2.4 (Continued)
B) Isolate Safety 1. Safety Inject Tank Iso Valves:
Injection Tanks v 3614 14 III MCC 2A5 37 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG 2A 8 v 3624 14 III MCC 2A6 37 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG 2A 8 v 3634 14 III MCC 2B6 34 II SWGR 2B2 34 II SWGR 2B3 34 II DG-2B 9
~I V1 I
v 3644 14 III MCC 2B5 34 II N
w SWGR 2B2 34 II SWGR 2B3 34 II DG-2B 9 RTGB 203 42 I RTGB 205 42 I ESC SA/SB 42 I 2.5 Initiate Shutdown Cooling 1. LPSI Pump: 2A 16 I SWGR 2A3 37 at RCS Tavg of 300°F DG 2A 8 2B 16 II SWGR 2B3 34 II DG 2B 9
.RTGB 206 42 I ESC - SA/SB 42 I
- 2. Shutdown Cooling Heat Exch: 2A 15 2B 15
- 3. Shutdown Cooling System Valves:
v 3481 14 II HCC 2A5 37 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG-2A 8
SL2-FSAR TABLE 5-1 (Cont'd)
- 2. HOT STANDBY TG COLD SHUTDOWN/OFF-SITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Nor:nal Mode Description Equipment Required Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative 2.5 (Continued) 3. (Continued) v 3664 24 MCC 2A6 37 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG-2A 8 v 3652 14 II MCC 2A5 37
. SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG-2A 8 HCV-3625 16 I MCC 2A6 37 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG-2A 8
':° V1 FCV-3306 16 I MCC 2A5 37
.!'- DG 2A 8 V-3517 16 I MCC 2A5 37 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG 2A 8 V-3456 16 I MCC 2A5 37 SWGR 2A2 37 SVIGR 2A3 37 DG 2A 8 HCV-3615 16 I MCC 2A5 37 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG 2A 8 HCV-3657 16 I MCC 2A5 37 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG 2A 8 V-3545 14 II MCC 2AB 34 I 480 V SWGR 2AB 28 SWGR 2A2/2B-2 37/34 I I SWGR 2A3/2B3 37 /34 I I DG 2A/2B 8/9
- SL2-FSAR TABLE 5-1 (Cont'd)
- 2. HOT STANDBY TO COLD SHUTDOWN/OFF-SITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Normal Node Description Equipment Required Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative 2.5 (Continued) 3. (Continued)
V-3651 14 II MCC 2B6 34 II SWGR 2B2 34 II SWGR 2B3 34 I I DG 2B 9 V-3665 24 MCC 2B5 34 II SWGR 2B2 34 II SWGR 2B3 34 I I DG 2B 9 V-3480 14 II MCC 2B5 34 II SWGR 2B2 34 II SWGR 2B3 34 I I DG 2B 9
'°U1 HCV-3635 16 II MCC 2B6 34 II
!J> SWGR 2B2 34 II I
U1 SWGR 2B3 34 I I I
N DG 2B 9 U1 FCV-3301 16 II MCC 2B6 34 II SWGR 2B2 34 II SWGR 2B3 34 iI DG 2B 9 V-3658 16 II MCC 2B6 34 II SWGR 2B2 34 I I SWGR 2B3 34 I I DG 2B 9 V-3457 16 II MCC 2B5 34 II SWGR 2B2 34 II SWGR 2B3 34 II DG 2B 9.
HCV-3645 16 II MCC 2B5 34 II SWGR 2B2 34 II SWGR 2B3 34 I I DG 2B 9 HCV-3512 16 II MCC 2B5 34 II SWGR 2B2 34 II SWGR 2B3 34 I I DG 2B 9
SL2-FSAR TABLE 5-1 (Cont'd)
- 2. HOT STANDBY TO COLD SHUTDOWN/OFF-SITE POWER UNAVAILABLE Normal Mode Description Equipment Required Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative RTGB 203 42 I RTGB 206 42 I
- 4. Pressurizer Pressure See Item 1. 9. 3 Transmitters (See Item 1.9.3) 2.6 Continue HVAC Systems 1. Intake Structure Exhaust Fans See Item 1. 6. 5 (See Item 1.6.5)
- 2. Control Room A/C See Item 1. 8. 1 (See Item 1.8.1)
- 3. Battery Room HVAC See Item 1. 8. 4 (See Item 1.8.4)
>D 4. Containment Fan Coolers See Item 1. 8. 5 U1
- ... ( See It em 1 . 8 . 5)
I U1 N
I 5. Reactor Cavity & Support See Item 1. 8. 6
°' Cooling Units (See Item 1.8.6)
- 6. RAli Ventilation Systems See Item 1.11.1 (See Item 1.11.1)
- 7. Electrical Equipment Room See* Item 1.12.1 Ventilation System (See Item 1.12.1) 2.7 Continue ICW & CCW Systems 1. (See Items 1.6.1/2/3/4) See Items 1.6.1/2/3/4) 2.8 Continue Diesel Generators 1. (See Items 1.4.1/2) See Items 1.4.1/2 2.9 Maintain Control Room Lighting 1. (See Item 1.1.1) See Item 1. 1. 1 2.10 Maintain Station Batteries
& Chargers 1. (See Items 1.8.2/3) See Items 1.8.2/3)
- SL2-FSAR TABLE 5-1 (Cont'd)
- 3. LIMITATION OF RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE Normal Mode Description Equipment Required Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative 3.1 Monitor Gaseous Effluents l. Radiation Monitor RE-6648 19 Rad Monit Panel 42 I 120 V ac PP-220 37 PP-220 Transformer 37 MCC 2A6 37 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG 2A 8 RTGB 205 42 I RE-6648 Iso Valve FCV-6565 19 RTGB 205 42 I 125 V de Bus 2AB 34 II 125 V de Bus 2B 34 I I Station Battery 2B 36 3.2 Honitor Liquid Effluents 1. Radiation Monitor RE-6627 19 Rad Monit Panel 42 I
'!' 120 V ac PP-220 37 Vl
- ...I PP-220 Transformer 37 Vl I
MCC 2A6 37 N
..... SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG 2A 8 RTGB 205 42 I RE-6627 Iso Valves: FCV-6627 X 19 RTGB 205 42 I FCV-6627 Y 125 V de Bus 2AB 34 II 125 V de Bus 2A 34 I I Battery 2A 35 3.3 Filtration of Area 1. RAB HVAC Units (See Items 1.11.1, 2.6.6)
Ventilation (See Items 1.11.1,2.6.6) 2 HVE-9A Filter 39 2 HVE-9B Filter 39
SL2-FSAR .
~ABLE 5-1 (Cont'd)
- 3. LU!ITATION OF RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE Normal Mode Description Equipment Required Fire Area Power Source Fire Area Alternative 3.4 Isolate Fuel Handling 1. Fuel Handling Bldg Dampers:
Building D-29 46 HVCB 42 I D-31 46 120 v ac PP-201 34 I D-33 46 PP-201 Transformer 34 I D-35 46 MCC 2A6 37 SWGR 2A2 37 SWGR 2A3 37 DG 2A 8 D-30 46 HVCB 42 I D-32 46 120 v ac pp.:.202 34 I D-34 46 PP-202 Transformer 34 I D-36 46 MCC-2B6 34 II SWGR 2B2 34 II SWGR 2B3 34 II DG 2B 9
~I V1 I
N 00
SL2-FSAR TABLE 5-2
- FIRE AREA ST LUCIE UNIT NO .. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FIRE AREA LOCATION OF ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT 1 Diesel Oil (DO) Transfer Pump 2A DO Storage Tank 2A 2 DO Transfer Pump 2B DO Storage Tank 2.B.
3 Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pumps Drives: 2A 2B 2C CCW Heat Exchangers: 2A 2B CCW Isolation Valves: I-MV-_14-1 I-MV-14:...2 I-MV-14-3 I-MV-14-4 CCW Flow Transmitters: FT-14-lA FT-14-lB Intake Cooling Water (ICW) Flow lndicators: FIS-21-9A FIS-21-9B PB Sta/Elec Box: B2C93(SAB) (PB Sta for CCW Pump 2C, I-MV-14-1 I-MV-14-2, I-MV-14-3, I-MV-14-4)
B2E06(NA) ..
B208(SA)
B204(SB) .
B202(NB)
B205(SAB) 4* Refueling Water Tank (RWT) 5 No Essential Equipment 61 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (AFWP) 2A AFWP ZB Atmospheric Dump Valve I-HCV-08-2B
- 9.SA-5-29
SL2-FSAR FIRE AREA TABLE 5-2 (Cont'd) 6I (Cont'd)
Main.Steam Pressure Transmitters:
AFWP 2C Steam Isolation Valve I-MV-08,...12 I-MV,...08-12 Local Starter PT-08-lA(SA)
(B25l)*
(B250)*
- AFWP 2C Water Isolation Valves: I-MV-09-10 I-MV-09-12 I-MV-09-12 Local Starter PB Sta/Elec Box : (AFWP 2A PB Sta)(SA) (B252)*
(I-MV-08-12 PB Sta)(SAB) (B253)*
(I-MV-09-10 PB Sta)(SB) (B254)*
(AFWP 2B PB Sta){SB) (B261)*
(I-MV-09-12 PB ~ta)(SAB) (B262)*
B2333(SA) (B255)*
B2335(SB) (B257)*
B2336(SB) (B258)*
B2334(SB) (B259)*
B27SO(SB) (B260)*
6II AFWP 2C AFWP 2C Turbine Governor AFWP 2C Control Panel Atmospheric Dump Valve I-HCV-08-2A AFWP 2C Steam Isolation Valves: I~MV-08-3 I-MV-08-13 I-MV-08-3 Local Starter I-MV-08-13 Lo.cal Starter AFWP 2C Water Isolation Valves: I-MV-09-9
.. I-MV-09-11 I-MV-09-11 Local Starter _
PB Sta/Elec Box : (I-MV-09-11 PB Sta)(SAB) (B268)*
(I-MV-09,...9 PB Sta)(SA) (B269)*
(AFWP 2C PB Sta)(SAB) (B270)*
'(I-MV-08-13 PB Sta) (SAB) (B271)*.
B2332(SA) (B263)* .
B233l(SA) (B264)*
B2E67(SAB)* (B265)*
BZ328(SAB) (B267)*
7 No E~sential Equipment
- Fire protection drawing box number.
- 9. SA- 5-30
).
\
SL2-FSAR FIRE AREA TABLE 5-2 (Cont'd)
- 8 Diesel Generator. (DG) Set 2A DO Day Tank: 2Al 2A2 DO Day Tank Inlet Valves: I-SE-17-lA I-SE-17-2A DO Day Tank Auto Refill Switches: LS-17-542A LS-17-543A LS- l 7-551A.
LS-17-550A LS-17-552A LS-17-553A Diesel Generator 2A Control Cabin~t: DO Transfer Pump 2A Controis (I-SE-17-lA} (PB)
(I-SE-17-2A) (PB)
Motor Control Center (MCC) 2A7 120 Volt AC Power Panel (PP) 211 9 Diesel Generator (DG) Set 2B DO Day Tanks: 2Bl 2B2
- DO Day Tank Inlet Valves: I-SE-17-lB I-SE-l 7-2B DO Day Tank Auto Refill Switches: LS-17-542B LS-17-543B LS-l 7-551B
. LS-17-550B LS-17-552B LS-17-553B Diesel Generator 2B Control Cabinet: DO Transfer Pump 2B (I-SE-17-lB) (PB)
(I-SE-17-2B) PB)
MCC 2B7 120V AC PP212 10 Condensate Storage Tank (CST)
CST Level Transmitter: LT-12-11 Electrical Box: B244l(MC)
- 9. SA-5-31
SL2-FSAR FIRE AREA TABLE 5-2 (Cont'd) 11
- 12 13 No Essential ~quip No Essential Equip Intake Cooling Water Pumps ( ICWP): 2A 2B 2C Intake Structure HVAC Units: 2-HVE-41A 2-HVE-41B 2HVE-41A Selector Switch 2HVE-41A Thermostat 2HVE-41B Selector Switch 2HVE-41B Thermontat PB Sta/Elec box : (ICW Pump 2A PB Sta)(SA)
(ICWP 2B PB Sta)(SB)
(ICWP 2C PB Sta)(SAB)
B2El9(SA)
B2E43(SB) 14I No Essential Eq~ipment 14II Pressurizer Heater Bank A Pressurizer Heater Bank B Shutdown Cooling System Isa Valve V3481 Shutdown Cooling System Isa Valve V3651 Shutdown Cooling System Shutoff Valve V3480 Shutdown Cooling System Shutoff Valve V3652 Sh.utdown Cooling system Crosstie Valve V3545 RC Loop Wide Range Temp Indicators: TE-1115 TE-1125 PB Sta/Elec Box : (PB Sta for V3652)(SA) (B201)*
(PB Sta for V365l)(SB) (B202)*
B2Dl8(SAB)(PB Sta for V3545) (B206)*
(PB Sta for V348l)(SA) (B216)*
(PB Sta for V3480)(SB) (B217)*
B2229(MB) (B204)*
B2D22(SAB) (B205)*
B2D03(SA) (B215)*.
B2227(MC) (B226)*
B2D02(MC) (B227)*
B2Dl7(MD) (B236)*
B2Dl3(MD) (B237)*
B2D07(MC) (B239)*
B2D08(MA). (B240)*
B2DOl(MA) (B241)*
B2D09(MD) (B242)*
B2Dl4(MB) (B245)*
B2DlO(MB) (B246)*
- Fire protection drawing box number.
- 9. SA- 5-32
- SL2-FSAR FIRE AREA TABLE 5-2 (Cont'd)
- 14III Containment Fan Coolers: 2HVS-1A 2HVS-1B 2HVS-1D Reactor Cavity Cooling Fans: 2HVS-2A 2HVS-2B 2HVS-2A Inlet Damper D-27 2HVS-2B Inlet Damper D-28 Reactor Support Cooling Fans: 2HVE-3A 2HVE-3B Charging Valves: I-SE-02~1 I-SE-02-2 Pressurizer Spray Valve: I-SE-02-3 I-SE-02-4 Safety Injection Tank* Iso Valves: .V3614 V3624 V3634 V3644 SG Level Indication: LT9013A (B308)*
LT9013B (B310)*
LT9013C (B307)*
LT9013D (B309)*
LT9023A (B303)*
LT9023B (B305)*
LT9023C (B302)*
LT9023D (B304)*
Pressurizer Level Indication: LT1103 LTlllOX LTlllOY Pressurizer Pressure Indication: PT1102C PB Sta/Elec Box : (PB Sta V3634) (SB) (B210)*
(PB Sta V3644) (SB) (B214)*
(PB Sta V3614)(SA) (B218)*
(PB Sta V3624)(SA) (B224)*
- Fire protection drawing box number .
- 9. SA-5-33
SL2-FSAR FIRE AREA TABLE 5-2 (Cont'd) 14III (Cont'd)
(SB) PB Sta 2HVS-2B (SA) PB Sta 2HVS-1A B2D3l(SA)
B2053(NA) ( PP224)
(B315)*
(B316)*
(B203)*
(B207)*
B2054(NB) ( PP225) (B208)*
B2Dl6(SB) (B209)*
IR-50-1 (MC-NA) (B211)*
IR-51-l(NB) (B212)*
B(later )(SB)' (B213)*
B242l(SA) (B219)*.
B2420(SB) (B221)*
B2Dll (MA) (B233)*
B2D04(MD) (B243)*
B2Dl2(MC) (B244)*
B2D05(MB) (B247)*
B2D06(SA) (B248)*
"B2394(SB) (B249)*
IR-58-3(MC) (B302)*
IR-59-l(MA) (B303)*
IR-58-2(MD) (B304)*
- IR-58-1 (MB) (B305)*
B2432(MC) (B306)*
IR-53-5(MC) (B307)*
IR-53-B(MA) (B308)*.
IR-53-9(MD) (B309)*
IR-53-6(MB) (B310)*
B2314(MC) (B311)*
B2359(MA) (B312)*
14IV Containment Fan Cooler 2HVS-1C Pressurizer Pressure Indication: PT1102A PT1102B PT1102D PT1103 PT1104 PT1105 PT1106 PB Sta/Elec box: (PB Sta 2HVS-1C)(SB) (B231 )*
IR-53-16(MA)(SA) (B228)*
IR-53-7 (MB) (B230)*
B2435(MA) (B234)*
B2324(MD) (B235)*
B2D25(MB) (B238)*
- Fire protection drawing box number.
- 9. 5A- 5-34
- SL2-FSAR FIRE. AREA TABLE 5-2 (Cont'd) 15 Shutdown Heat Exchangers: 2A 2B HVAC Dampers: D-SA (ECCS Exhaust Shutdown Ht Ex 2B)
D-SB (ECCS Exhaust Shutdown Ht Ex 2B)
D-6A (ECCS Exhaust Shutdown Ht Ex 2A)
D-6B. (ECCS Exhaust Shutdown Ht Ex 2A)
D-BA (RAB Supply El (-) .50' Pipe Tunnel)
D-BB (RAB Supply El (-) . 50' Pipe Tunnel)
Electrical Boxes: B235(SB) (B448)*
B2E89(SA) (B451 )*
B2G87(SA) (B472)*
B25l(SB) (B452)*
B2G88(SB) (B473)*
B2G89(SB) (B474)*
B2G90(SA) (B475)*
Shutdown Cooling System Valves: V3456(SA)
HCV-3567(SA)
V3517(SA)
HCV-3306(SA)
HCV-3615(SA)
HVAC Dampers: D-1 (RAB ECCS Supply)
PB Sta/Elec Box : B2E72(SA) (PB for V3456, HCV3657 '*
HCV3306) (B403 )*
B2G07(SA) (PB for HCV3615,. HCV3625) (B426)*
B2G06(SA) (PB for HVC-3517) (B407)*
B2029(SA) (PB for LPSI Pump 2A) (B420)*
B2E70(SA) (B402)*
B263(SA) (B422)*
B2E74(SA) (B404)*
BQS6(SA) (B423)*
B253(SA) (B4P0*
B2G09(SA) (B424)*
B2G03(SA) (B405)*
B2G08(SA) (B425)*
B2G04(SA) (B406)*
B2354(SA) (B456)*
B26l(SA) (B421 )*
Shutdown Cooling System Valves: V3457(SB)
HCV-3635(SB)
HCV-364S(SB)
V3GS8(SB)
.HCV-3512(SB)
HCV-330l(SB)
- Fire protection drawing box number .
- 9. SA- 5-35
SL2-FSAR FIRE AREA TABLE 5-2 (Cont'd),
16II (Cont'd)
HVAC Dampers: D-3 *(ECCS D-4 (ECCS D-9A (ECCS D-9B (ECCS Supply)
Supply)
Exhaust)
Exhaust)
PB Sta/Elec Box B2E7l(SB) (B412)*
B2E68(SB)(PB for HCV3457, 3512, HCV3301, 'V3658) (B413)*
B2E73(SB) (B414)*
B252(SB) (B410)*
B2037(SB)(PB for LPSI Pump 2B) (B409)*
B2E94(SB) (B416)*
B2E95(SB)(PB for HCV3635, HCV3645) (B417)*
B2E96(SB) (B418)*
B2C36(SB) (B411)*
B2C38(SB) (B408)*
B2C39(SB) (B415)*
B2C40(SB) (B419)*
B219l(SA) (B468)*
B2192(SB) (B469)*
B2E98(SB) (B470)*
17 Boric Acid Makeup Tanks: 2A 2B BAMT 2A Heaters: Bank A(SA)
Bank B(SB)
BAMT 2B Heaters: Bank A(SA)
Bank B(SB)
BAMT Transfer Pumps: 2A(SA) 2B(SA)
BAMT Transfer Pump Discharge Valve, V2514(SA)
BAMT Gravity Feed Valves: V2508(SB)
V2509(SB)
PB Sta/Elec Box: B2939(SB) (B434)*
B2C78(SA) (B432)*
B294l(SB) (B433)*
B2C62(SA) (B442)*
B2C77 (SB) (B435)*
B2940(SA) (B436)*
B2734(SA)(PB Sta for V-2508, V2590) (B443)*
18I Charging Pump 2A(SA)
Charging Pump 2A Instruments: PIS-2224X (B460)*
PB Sta/Elec Box : B2357(SA) (B461)*
B2C57(SA) (B427)*
- Fire protection drawing box number.
9.SA-5-36
SL2-FSAR FIRE AREA TABLE 5-2 (Cont'd)
- 18II Charging Pump 2B(SB)
Charging Pump 2B Instruments PIS-2224Y PB Sta/Elec Bo~ : B2C50(SB)
B2355(SB)
B2C53(SB)
(B463)*
(B464)*
(B428)*
B2362(SA) (B462)*
B2397(SB) (B465)*
18III Charging Pump 2C(SAB)
CVCS/RWT Intertie Valve V2504(NB)
Charging Pump 2C Instruments: PIS-2224Z PB Sta/Elec Box : B2C5l(SAB) (B430)*
B283l(SB) PB Sta for V2504 (B431)*
B2C54(SAB) (B429)*
19 Gaseous Effluent Monitor RE-6648(NA)
RE-6648 Isolation Valve FCV-6565(NB)
Liquid Effluent Monitor RE-6627(NA)
RE-6627 Isolation Valves: FCV-6627X(NA)
FCV-6627Y(NA)
PB Sta/Elec Box : B2E23(SB) (B471)*
B2388(NA) (B454)*
- 20 BAMT 2A Heater Controls: TIC-22Q6(SA)(B2C60)
TIC-2207(SB)(B2C60)
BAMT 2A Level Controls: LIT/LIA 2206(SA)(IR-3l-1A)
(B447)*
(B446)*
BAMT 2B Heater Controls: TIC-2208(SA)(B2C79) (B444)*
TIC~2209(SA)(B2C79)
BAMT 2B LEVEL Controls: LIT/LI)\2208(SB)(IR-31-2A)
\ .
(B445)*
D-7B(SB)
D-llA(SA)
. D-llB(SB)
Electrical Box: Valve Box for V2514(SA) (B437)*
2lr No Essential Equipment 2lII Electrical Box: B2G50(SAB) (B518)*
22 No Essential Equipment
- PB Sta/Elec Box: B2G48(SAB) (B516)*
B2G49(SAB) (B517)*
- Fire protection drawing box number.
9.SA-5-37
SL2-FSAR FIRE AREA TABLE 5-2 (Cont'd) 24 Shutdown Cooling System Valves: V3664(SA)
V3665(SB)
PB Sta/Elec Box : B2E54(SA)(PB Sta V3664)
B2E55(SB)(PB St* V3665)
B2Gll (SA)
B2E82(SA)
(B506)*
(B509)*
(B504)*
(B505)*.
B2Gl2(SB) (B507)* .
B2E69(SB) (B508)*
- 25 No Essential Equipment 26 Volume Control Tank 27 No Essential Equipment
. 28 4.16 kV Swgr 2AB(SAB) 480 V Swgr 2AB(SAB)
Electrical Boxes: B2715(SAB) (B513)*
B212(SAB) (B514)*
B213(SAB) (B515)*
B211 (SAB) (B512)*
29 No Essential Equipment 30 No Essential Equipment 31 32 33 No Essential Equipment No Essential Equipment No Essential Equipment 34I Reactor Trip Switchgear Pressurizer Htr buses: 2A3 2B3 Pressurizer Htr SCR Controllers: 2A 2B MCC.2AB(SAB)
Annunicator Isolation Cabinets: SA-MA/MC SB-MB/MD SAB Lighting Panel LP-216 Transformer 120V AC Power Panels: PP20l(SA)
PP202(SB)
PP203(SAB) 120V AC Power Panel Transformers: PP201 Transformer PP202 Transformer PP203 Transformer 125V DC Power Power Panels: PP238(SA)
PP239(SB)
PP240(SAB)
- Fire protection drawing box number.
- 9. SA-5-18
SL2-FSAR FIRE AREA TABLE 5-2 (Cont'd)
- 120V AC Instrument Buses: 2MA Transfer Control Panel 2AB 2MB 2MC 2MD Electrical Box: B2895(SB) (B636)*
34II Battery Chargers: 2A 2B 2AB 125V DC Buses: 2A 2B 2AB Static Inverter Cabinets: 2A 2B 2C 2D Hot Shutdown Control Panel
Lighting Panel LP-226 Transformer 120V AC Power Panel PP22l(NB)
- 35 PP221 Transformer(NB)
Transfer Control Pnl 2B Station Battery 2A Battery Room Exhaust Fan 2RV-l 2RV-l Disconnect Switch 2RV-l Starter 36 Station Battery 2B Battery Room Exhaust Fan 2RV-2 2RV-2 Disconnect Switch 2RV-2 Starter 37 4.16 kV Swgr 2A3 (SA) 480V Swgr 2A2 (SA) 480V MCC 2A5 (SA) 480V MCC 2A6 (SA) .
120 V AC Power Panel PP220 (NA)
PP220 Transformer (NA)
Swgr Room Exhaust Fans: 2RV-3 2RV-4 Transfer Control Pnl 2A (SA)
Electrical Boxes: (SA)(PB Sta 2RV-3) (B601)*
- *Fire protection drawing box number.
- 9. 5A- .5-39
SL2-FSAR TABLE 5-2 (Cont'd)
FIRE AREA 38 Fan 2HVE-9B (ECCS Exhaust System) 2HVE-9B Filters 2HVE-9B Dampers: D-15 D-16 Louver 2L-7B Motor
- Fire protection drawing box number.
- 9. SA- 5-40
TABLE 5-2 (Cont'd)
- FIRE AREA 38 (Cont'd) 2HVE-9B Temperature Elements: TE-25-42 TE-25-43 TE-25-44 TE-25-45 TE-25-46 TE-25-47 D-15 Position Switches: ZS-25-56A ZS-25-56B ZS-25-57A ZS-25-57B D-16 Position Switches: ZS-25-58A ZS-25-58B ZS-25-59A ZS-25-59B 2HVE-9B Diff Pressure Indicating Transmitter: PDIT-25-5B, 18B, 19B (B603)*
PB Sta/Elec Box : (SB)(PB Sta 2HVE-9B) (B609)*
B2193(SB) (B604)*
B2195(SB) (B606)*
B2194( SB) (B607)*
- B2G61 (SB) (B608)* .
B2102 (SB) (B610)*
B2725 (SB) (B6ll )*
39 Fan 2HVE-9A (ECCS Exhaust System) 2HVE-9A Filters 2HVE-9A dampers: D-13 D-14 Fan 2HVS-4A 2HVS-'4A Filters Fan 2HVS-4B 2HVS-4B Filters Fan 2HVE-10A**
Fan 2HVE..,.JOB**
2HVE-9A Temperature Elements: TE-25-36 TE-25-37 TE-25-38 TE-25-39 TE-25-40 TE-25-41
- Fire protection drawing box number.
9.5A-5-41
TABLE 5-2 (Cont'd)
FIRE AREA 39 (Cont'd) 2HVE-9A Damper D-13 Position Switches: ZS-25-52A ZS-25-52B ZS-25-53A ZS-25-53B 2HVE-9A Damper D-14. Position Switches: ZS-25-54A ZS-25-54B ZS-25-54A ZS-25-54B 2HVE-9A Diff Press. Ind. Trans. PDIT-25-5A, 18A, 19A. (B618)*
PB Sta/Elec Box B2090(SA) (B612)*
B2104(SA) (B613)*
B2243(SA) PB Sta 2HVS-4A (B634)*
B2E62(SA) (B635)*
B2105 (SB) (B615)*
- B2198(SA) (B616)*
(PB Sta 2HVE-9A) (B621 )*
- B2166(SA) (B619)*
(PB Sta 2HVE-10B) (NB) (B623)*
B2107(NB) (B622)*
B2097(NA) (B625)*
B2109 (NA) (B624)*
IR-83-l(SA) (B618)*
B2110(NA) (B626)*
B2239 (NA) (PB Sta 2HVE-l OA) (B627)*
B2197(SA) (B620)*
'B2G40(SA) (B6l 7)*
40 No Essential Equipment 41 No Essential Equipment
_421 RTGB 201 202 203 205 206 Engineered safeguard Cabinet SA SB MA MB MC
- Fire protection drawing box number.
9.5A-5-42
SL2-FSAR
- FIRE AREA 421 (Cont'd)
TABLE 5-2 (Cont'd)
Engineered safeguard Cabinet MD Radiation Monitoring Panel Reactor Protection System Cabinet HVAC Control Panel Plant Auxiliary Control Board Lighting Panels: LP-216(NA)
LP-227(NA)
LP-228(NB)
LP-226(NB) 4211 2HVA/ ACC-3A (SA)
Damper D-20(SA) 2HVA/ACC-3B (SB)
Damper D-21 (SB) 2HVA/ACC-3C(SAB)
- PB Sta/Elec Box : B2257(SAB)
B2236 B2255(SA)
B2260(SAB)
(PB Sta 2HVA/ACC-3C)(SAB)
(B721)*
(B7l 7)*
( B716) *
(B718)*
(B719)*
(B720)*
42III I-FCV-25-14(SB)
I-FCV-25-15(SB)
I-FCV-25-16(SA)
I-FCV-25-l7(SA)
I-FCV-25-15 Flow Transmitter FT-25-18B(SB)
I-FCV-25-16 Flow Transmitter FT-25-18A(SA)
B2E84(SB) (B704)*
B2E83(SB) (B705)*
B2G81(SB) (B706)*
B2G83(SA) (B707)*
B2E79(SA) (B708)*
B2E20(SA) (B709)*
43 Fan 2HVE-11(SA)
Fan 2HVE-12(SB)
PB Sta/Elec Box (PB Sta 2HVE-ll)(SA) (B702)*
B2G79 (SA) (B703)*
- Fire protection drawing box number.
- 9. 5A-5-43
SL2-FSAR FIRE AREA 44 TABLE 5-2 (Cont'd)
HVAC TEMPERATURE Switches: TS-08-7Bl(SB)
TS-16-lAJ(SA) 45 Elec Box: B2V38(SB)
B2V02(SA) 46 HVAC Dampers: D-29(SA) (Fuel Pool Supply)
D-30 (SB) (Fuel Pool Supply)
D-3l(SA) (Fuel Pool Exhaust)
D-32 (SB) (Fuel Pool Exhaust)
D-33(SA) (FHB Supply)
D-34 (SB) (FHB Supply)
D-35(SA) (FHB Exhaust)
D-36(SB) (FHB Exhaust)
PB Sta/Elec Box : B2V03(SA)
B2V07(SA)
B2V08(SB)
B2V10(SB)
B2Vl4(SB)
B2V30(SB) 47 No Essential Equipment 48 2HVS-SA(SA) 2HVS-SB(SB)
PB Sta/Elec Box B2254(SB) (B7ll)*
(B22SO(SB) (B715)*
B2252(SB) (B710)*
(PB Sta 2HVS-SB) (B7l3)*
49 ICW Pump 2C Isolation Valves: I-SB-21-7 I-Sb-21-7 so HVAC Fan 2HVE-9A Louver 2L-7A Motor Electrical Box B2196(SA) (B605)*
51 Heat Trace Distribution Panels: 2A(SA) 2B(SB)
Volume Control Tank Discharge Valve V250l(SA)
CVCS Local Annuniciator Panel(B221A) (BS03)*
VCT Level Transmitter LT-2227 (IR-47-JA) (BS02)*
PB Sta/Elec Box : B2G24(MB) (B519 )*
B2G23(MD) (B520)*
B2G22(MC) (BS21)*
B2G21 (MA) (BS22)*
B2716 ( SAB)
(PB Sta V2SOJ)(SA)
Fire Protection drawing box number.
(BSlJ )*
( BSOl) *
- 9. SA-S-44
SECTION 5.4
- Fire Area 1
2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS BY FIRE AREA Area Description Diesel Oil Storage Tank 2A Diesel Oil Storage Tank 2B 3 Component Cooling Water Building 4 Refueling Water Tank Area 5 Primary Water Tank Area 6 Steam Trestle Area 7 Yard Area Bounded by RAB, TGB & Steam 'Trestle 8 Diesel Generator Building 2A 9 Diesel Generator Building 2B 10 Condensate Storage .Tank Area 11 Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir Area 12 Transformer Yard 13 Intake Cooling Water Pump Area 14 Reactor Containment Building 15 RAB Shutdown Heat Exchanger 16 RAB ECCS Room 17 RAB Boric Acid Tank Area 18 RAB Charging Pump Area 19 RAB East Hallway and Miscellaneous Equipment Areas (El(-).50')
20 RAB East-West Common Hallway (El(-).50')
21 Personnel Area 22 RAB Electrical Penetration Area (Train A) 23 RAB Electrical Penetration Area (Train B) 24 RAB Pipe Tunnel Area 25 RAB HVAC Plenum Area 26 RAB Volume Control Tank Area 27 RAB Letdown Heat Exchanger Area 28 RAB 480KV & 4.16 KV Switchgear Area 29 RAB Drumming Storage Area 30 RAB Ion Exchanger Area 31 RAB Waste and BA Concentrators 32 RAB Decontamination Room and Maintenance Storage Area 33 RAB Repair Shop and Storage Area 34 RAB Electrical Equipment Room 35 RAB Battery Room A 36 RAB Battery Room *.B 37 RAB Switchgear Room 38 RAB ECCS Ventilation Room 39 RAB HVAC Equipment Room 40 RAB Hold-Up Tank Area 41 RAB Blowdown Heat Exchanger 42 RAB Control Room 43 RAB Electrical Equipment Area Exhaust Fan Room 44 RAB CCW Surge Tank Room 45 FHB HVAC Room
- 9.5A-5-45
SECTION 5 .4 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS BY FIRE AREA Fire Area Area Description 46 Fuel Handling Building 47 Turbine Building 48 RAB Electrical Equipment Area Supply Fan Room 49 Intake Structure 50 RAB Corridor Area 51 RAB Ceiling and Hallways (El 19.50')
9.5A-5-46
- SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 1 (See also FA2)
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: Diesel Oil Storage Tank 2A Elev: 19.00' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 8 le. Floor Area: 650 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Diesel Oil Transfer Pump 2A Diesel Oil Storage Tank 2A
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a . Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils Diesel Oil Tank and Pumps 41,500 gal 5.8 x 10 9 8.9 x 10 6 3c. Others Negligible Totals 5.8 x 10 9 8.9 x 10 6
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Diesel Oil Tank 2A 41,500 gal 5.8 x 10 9 8.9 x 10 6
- 9. SA- FAl-1
SL2-FSAR
- s. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 18 Inch Reinforced Concrete East: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete West: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor:
--- 36 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Roof Vent Opening 3' x 12'
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through barrier walls
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area Access Door on west end of building and sliding wire mesh door on east end of building.
Sc. Detection:
None Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary Portable fire extinguishers are installed in the area as outlined in Dwg Sk-2998-M-708, Sheet 8.
- 9. SA-*FAl-2
- SL2-FSAR
- 2. Secondary .
- 3.
Yard fire hydrants are lcicated approximately 4S feet northwest and southwest of the building (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 8).
Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting:
Natural ventilation through roof and door openings.
Sf. Drainage:
Two 3 inch floor drains are connected to a common 4 inch drain line leading to an oil separation pit.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 1:
The DOSTB is a reinforced concrete structure housing redundant diesel oil storage tanks 2A and 2B. The structure is a free standing building located in the yard area approximately 30 feet east of the Component Cooling Water Building (FA3). The
- structure is separated by a full height, 18 inch thick, rein-forced concrete wall into two isolated compartments (FAl and FA2). Fire Area 1 contains a single storage tank (41,SOO gallons of diesel fuel oil) and its associated equipment and transfer pump. Access into Fire Area 1 is provided via labyrinths from the east and west walls. The access openings are located at least 2 feet above the maximum oil level in the compartment assuming a complete tank rupture. The tanks have standard flame arrestor arrangements and ventilation for each tank area is through the natural movement of air through roof and door openings.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
The most realistic postulated fire for FAl involves a valve seal leak or a leak in the pump equipment and is. relatively minor. The most severe postulated fire for FAl involves the ignition of the contents of Diesel Oil Storage Tank 2A, con-taining a maximum of 41,SOO gallons of diesel oil. A tank rupture and total area spill is confined within the designed enclosure to a maximum depth of 8.S feet with a surface area of 6SO sq ft. Access openings are at least two feet above the maximum oil spill level. Ignition of the released oil is assumed, creating a surface fire which evolves only the oil vapors necessary for continued combustion .
- 9.SA-FAl-3
SL2-FSAR 6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating: (Cont'd)
Diesel Oil Storage Tank 2A in*FAl is isolated from Diesel Oil Storage Tank 2B, located in FA2, by an 18 inch reinforced concrete wall. This provides an adequate barrier for four to six hours and prevents spread of the fire into FA2 and involve-ment of Diesel Oil Storage Tank 2B. If the fire is allowed to burn uncontrolled for longer than the four to six hours, the integrity of the fire barrier could be impaired and non-invol vement of Diesel Oil Storage Tank 2B cannot be assured.
As no other exposed essential equipment is located within 50 feet of the fire area, no loss of safe shutdown equipment is assumed.
The probability of involving the second tank is extremely un-likely, however, in the event that both redundant tanks become impaired, there are sufficient back-up on-site diesel fuel inventories for safe shutdown. There are two Day Tanks of 340 gallons each in the two separated, redundant Diesel Generator compartments. This supply wi 11 provide each diesel generator with fuel for about 140 minutes during hot standby. There are interties provided between the St. Lucie Unit 1 and the St.
Lucie Unit 2 Diesel Oil Storage Tanks and Transfer Pumps. The two Unit 1 tanks have a combined capacity of 40,214 gallons.
Also, in the remote possibility that additional diesel fuel would be required, provisions have been made to deliver oil to the site by commitment from a reliable local fuel oil com-pany on an emergency basis.
Therefore, should a Diesel Oil Tank fire occur simultaneous with loss of offsite power (LOOP) and not be promptly ex-tinguished, the unit could be placed in hot standby, and emergency diesel oil use and procurement procedures will be instituted. The capability to initiate and maintain safe reactor shutdown would not be impaired.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
The postulated fire, if discovered in its incipiency, would be suppressed by effective fire fighting procedures by the employees or the responding fire brigade, using hand portable fire ex-tinguishers, backed-up by hose lines. If the fire developes rapidly, the trained fire brigade is capable of effectively suppressing the fire in this open area structure by initiating proper manual fire fighting evolutions and using available hoses and associated equipment in conjunction with the two nearby yard main fire hydrants. These are located approximately 45 feet to the northwest and southwest corners of the build~ng and are connected to a water supply system. The effective use of large multiple hose streams and appliances, scientifically applied to the surface burning oil a*nd to the containing structure, utilizing available openings, would successfully control and eventually extinguish the postulated fire. The overall capa-9.SA-FAl-4
SL2-FSAR bilities of the plant for safe reactor shutdown would not be im-paired .
- 9. SA- FAl-5
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 2
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building:
(See also FAl)
Diesel Oil Storage Tank 2B Elev: 19.00' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 8 le. Floor Area: 650 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Diesel Oil Transfer Pump 2B Diesel Oil Storage Tank 2B
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible
- 3b.
Jc.
Oils Diesel Oil Tank and Pumps Others 41,500 Negligible 5 .8xl0 9 8.9xl0 6 Totals 5. 8xl0 9 8. 9xl0 6
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Diesel Oil Storage Tank 2B 41,500 gal 5. 8xl0 9 8.9xl0 6
- 9.5A-FA2-1
SL2-FSAR S. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 18 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete East: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete West: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 36 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Roof vent opening 3' x 12' 2.
3.
Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through barrier walls Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area Access Door on west side of building and sliding wire mesh door on east side of building Sc. Detection:
None Sd. Fire Prote~tion Systems:
- 1. Primary Portable fire extinguishers are located in the area as outlined in Drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 8.
- 9. SA-FA2-2
- SL2-FSAR Sd. Fire Protection Systems: (Cont'd)
- 2. Secondary Yard fire hydrants are located approximately 4S feet northwest and southwest of the buildings (See Dwg Sk-2998-M-708, Sheet 8).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting:
Natural ventilation through roof and door openings Sf. Drainage:
Two 3 inch floor drains are connected to a 4 inch common drain line leading to an oil separation pit.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 2:
The DOSTB is a reinforced concrete structure housing redundant Diesel Oil Storage Tanks 2A and 2B. The structure is a free standing building located in the yard area approximately 30 feet east of the Component Cooling Water Building (FA3). The struc-ture is separated by a full height, 18 inch thick, reinforced concrete wall into two isolated compartments (FAl and FA2).
Fire Area 2 contains a single storage tank (41,SOO gallons of diesel fuel oil) and its associated equipment and transfer pump.
Access into Fire Area 2 is provided via labryinths from the east and west walls. The access openings are located at least 2 feet above the maximum oil level in the compartment assuming a com-plete tank rupture. The tanks have standard flame arrestor arrangements and ventilation in the tank area is through natural movement of air through door and roof openings.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
The most realistic postulated fire for FA2 involves a valve seal leak or a leak in the pump equipment and is relatively minor. The most severe postulated fire for FA2 involves the ignition of the contents of Diesel Oil Storage Tank 2B, con-taining a maximum of 41,SOO gallons of diesel oil. A tank rupture and total area spill, is confined within the designed enclosure to a maximum depth of 8.S ft with a surface area of 6SO sq ft. Access openings are at least two feet above the maximum oil spill level. Ignition of the released oil is assumed, creating a surface fire which evolves only the oil vapors necessary for continued combustion .
- 9. SA- FA2-3
SL2-FSAR 6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating: (Cont'd)
Diesel Oil Storage Tank 2B in FA2 is isolated from Diesel Oil Storage Tank 2A, located in FAl, by an 18 inch reinforced concrete wall. This provides an adequate barrier for four to six hours and prevents spread of the fire into FAl and involvement of Diesel Oil Storage Tank 2A. If the fire is allowed to burn uncontrolled for longer than the four to six hours, the integrity of the fire barrier could be impaired and non-involvement of Diesel Oil Storage Tank 2A cannot be assured. As no other essential equipment is located within 50 feet of the fire area, no loss of safe shutdown equip-ment is assumed.
The probability of involving the second tank is extremely un-likely, however, in the event that both redundant tanks become impaired, there are sufficient back-up on-site diesel fuel inventories for safe shutdown. There are two Day Tanks of 340 gallons each in the two separated, redundant Diesel Generator Compartments. This supply will provide each diesel generator with fuel for about 140 minutes during hot standby. There are interties provided between the St Lucie Unit 1 and St Lucie Unit 2 Diesel Oil Storage Tanks and Transfer Pumps. The two Unit 1 tanks have a combined capacity of 40,214 gallons. Also, in the remote possibility that additional diesel fuel would be required, provisions have been made to deliver oil to the site by commitment from a reliable local fuel oil company on an emergency basis.
Therefore, should a Diesel Oil Tank fire occur simultaneous with loss of offsite power (LOOP) and.not be promptly extin-guished, the unit could be placed in a hot standby and emer-gency diesel oil use and procurement procedures would be insti-tuted. The capability to initiate and maintain safe reactor shutdown would not be impaired.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
The postulated fire, if discovered in its incipiency, would be suppressed by effective fire fighting procedures, by employees or the responding fire brigade, using hand or table fire ex-tinguishers, backed up by hose lines. If the fire developes rapidly, the trained fire brigade is capable of effectively suppressing the fire in this open area structure by initiating proper manual fire fighting evolutions and using available hoses and associated equipment in conjunction with the two nearby yard main fire hydrants. These are located approximately 45 feet to the northwest and southwest corners of the building and are connected to a water supply system. The effective use of large multiple hose streams and appliances scientifically applied to the surface burning oil and to the containing structure, uti-lizing available openings, would successfully control and 9.5A-FA2-4
- 812-FSAR 6c . Fire Protection System Operating (Cont'd)
- eventually extinguish the postulated fire. The overall capa-bilities of the plant for safe reactor shutdown would not be impaired .
- 9.SA- FA2-5
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 3
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: Component Cooling Elev: 12.00' (floor)
Water Building 23.50' (open grating deck) lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 8 le. Floor Area: 8070 sq ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire'Area None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Component Cooling Heat Exchanger 2A & 2B Component Cooling Water Pumps 2A, 2B & 2C CCW Isolation Valves: I-MV-14-1, I-MW-14-2, *I-MW-14-3; I-MV-14-4 CCW Transmitters FT-14-lA & lB
- Intake Cooling Water Flow Indicators FIS-21-9A, FIS-21..:.9B P.B Sta/Elec Box: B2C93(SAB) (PB Sta for CCW Pump 2C,: I-Mv-:-14-1 I-MV-14-2,*I-MV-14-3, I-MV-14-4)
B2E06(NA)
B208(SA)
B204(SB)
B202(NB)
B205(SAB)
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligibl,.e 3b. Oils (3) CCW Pumps 6.75 gal 9.45 x 10 5 117 .1 Strainer Gear Boxes 4.00 gal 5.60 x 10 5 69.2 Sump Pump .75 gal 1.05* x 105 13.0 3c. Others 1.11 x 10 5 .
(4) M.O.Valves 6 lbs 13.7 Totals 17.21 x 105 213.0 9.5A-FA3-1
SL2-FSAR
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quan tit~ (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
CCW Pump Oil (one pump) 2.25 gal 3.15 x 10 5 7 . 0 x 10 3.
- 5. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 24/0* Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 24/0* Inch Reinforced Concrete East: 24/24* Inch Reinforced Concrete West: 24/24* Inch Reinforced Concrete Ceiling: 24/22* Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor:
--- 24/24* Inch Reinforced Concrete
- (CCW BLdg/E-W Pipe Tunnel)
- 2. Concealed Spaces None, tunnel considered part of fire. area.
Sb. Service Penetrations Identification
- 1. HVAC throug~ Boundary Barriers:
Size
- Outside Air Intake (8) 3'-0 x 4'-3 (East Wall)
Exhaust Air (2) 3'-3 x 19'-0 (Roof) 2.. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through barrier walls
- 3. Electrical None (embedded conduit)
- 4. Area Access Door on east* and north walls Two maint~nance doors on west wall 9.5A- FA3-2
SL2-FSAR 5c. Detection None 5d. Fire Protection Systems
- 1. Primary Portable fire extinguishers are located in the area as outlined i n drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet *8.
- 2. Secondary Yard fire hydrants are located approximately' 30 feet northeast and southeast of the building (See Dwg.
SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 8).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None 5e. Smoke Venting:
Normal and natural ventilation will be used for smoke removal.
Natural ventilation exhaust rate is 20,660 cfm or a removal rate of 1. 37 cfm/sq ft. Normal ventilation exhaust rate is 24,500 cfm or a removal rate of 1.43 cfm/sq ft.
5f. Drainage A sump at the east end of the building is drained through a 12 inch line to the yard drainage system.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 3:
Fire Area 3 is a one story concrete structure housing the Component Cooling Water Pumps 2A, 2B and 2C, and the Heat Exchangers 2A and 2B and associated equipment. The building has a metal grating operating deck at El 23.50' and a pit area at El 12.00'. _The structure is located approximately 35 feet east of the Fuel Handling Building and approximately 31 feet west of the Diesel Oil Storage Tanks. Included in FA3 is a 10 foot by 14 foot pipe tunnel which opens into the southwest corner of the CCB and runs underground, westerly, to the RAB approximately 35 feet away. Adjacent fire areas FA 4, the Refueling Water Tank area on the south, and FA 5, the Primary
- Water Storage Tank on the north, are isolated from FA 3 by two feet thick concrete walls. *
- 9.SA- FA3-3
SL2-FSAR Access into FA 3 is provided through a door in the east wall leading into the yard area and through a door in the north wall leading to FA 5.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
The postulated fire for FA 3 involves the complete loss of lube oil from one Component Coolant Water Pump Reservoir containing 2.25 gallons of lube oil. The oil from one pump will spread over approximately 40 sq ft, forming a small pool about the base of the pump pedestal. Ignition of the lube oil is as-sumed. Each pump is located atop a 11'-8" high pedestal with approximately 15' separation _between pump pedestals. Metal grating is provided throughout the operating deck area and will not retain the oil which will flow to the floor slab below.
Due to the large separation between the pumps and their asso-ciated accessories, the height of the. pedestal, the lack of continuity of combustibles, the large area (8070 ft 2 ) and the limited amount of oil involved, no other essential equipment located in the area will be affected other than the pump and its associated accessories where the fire originated. ,Equip-ment in adjacent fire. areas will not be impaired. Therefore, two CCW pumps with associated equipment will be available to effect safe shutdown, although only one is required.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
There are three portable fire extinguishers located in the building. There are adequate yard mains, fire hydrants and associated hose equipment nearby with the two closest units being approximately 25 ft and 85 ft from the east side* of the building. An effective response by a trained fire brigade will limit the fire effects in this area. Safe reactor shutdown will not be impaired.
9.5A-FA3-4
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO, 4
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: Refueling Water Tank Area Elev: 18 .50' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 8 le. Floor Area: 3600 sq ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Refueling Water Tank
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a . Cable Insulation Negligible
- 3b.
3c.
Oils Others Grease: Tank Dis-charge Valves None 3.0 lb 55.5 x 10 3 15.4 Totals 55.5 x 10 3 15.4
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Grease: Tank Dis- 1.5 lbs 27.75 x 10 3 7.0 x 10 3 charge Valve
- 9. 5A- FA4-1
SL2-FSAR
- s. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 24 Inch Re*inforced Concrete East: Ope;p West: Open Ceiling: Open Floor Compacted Soil
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification
- 1. HVAC None (Open Area) 2.
3.
Mechanical None (Open Area)
Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area Access Open Area on east and west sides.
Sc. Detection:
None Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary Portable fire extinguishers are located in the area as outlined in Drawing Sk-2998-M-708, Sheet 8.
- 9. SA-FA4-2
SL2-FSAR
- 2.
3."'
Secondary A yard hydrant is loca~ed 50 foot southeast of the area (See Dwg. Sk-299S-M-70S, Sheet S)
Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None 5e. Smoke Venting:
Open Area 5f. Drainage:
Area is sloped to a yard catch basin within this fire area.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 4:
Fire Area 4 is an open area containing the Refueling Water Tank and associated equipment. There is no roof and the east and west sides are open to the site. The adjoining walls on the north (FA3) and on the south (FAS) are 24 inch reinforced concrete and the fioor is compacted soil .
The RWT is safety related and only the minimum Technical Specification water volume in this tank is required for safe shutdown. This volume requirement assures that there is always adequate water available and impairment of level indicating equipment will not mitigate effective tank operation. The two RWT Motor Operated Discharge Valves are locked open assuring sufficient makeup water volume for the Reactor Coolant System is available. There are no other systems or equipment in this area that are required for safe shutdown. All adjoining fire areas, FAS, FA3, FAl and FA2 are adequately segregated from FA4 by spatial separation and fire barrier walls.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating The postulated fire is limited to the 1-1/2 pounds of grease contained in each of the two RWT Motor Operated Discharge Valves. These Valves are spacially separated to prevent spread of fire to involve the other valve. The postulated single valve fire is minor in nature and would burn out quickly due to lack of combustibles. The safe shutdown capabilities of the plant would not be affected as both valves are locked in the proper position .
- 9. 5A-FA4-3
SL2-FSAR 6c. Fire Protection System Operating Due to the lack-of and the non-continuity of combustible mate-rials, plus the fact that the postulated fire is incon-sequential, and that the building is open on. two sides, the existing fire protection provided by the two nearby yard hydrants and associated hose and appliances is deemed more than adequate to meet all of the fire suppression requirements for the area. The overall capabilities of the plant for safe shut-down will not be impaired.
9.5A- FA4-4
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 5
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building Primary Water Tank Area Elev 18.50' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 8 le. Floor Area: 3870 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA None
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a . Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils Primary Water Pumps & .20 gal 28 x 103 7.2 Motors Vacuum Degasifier Pump &
Motor .06 gal 8.4 x 103 2.2 3c. Others None Totals 36.4 x 10 3 9.4
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Primary Water Pump & Motor .10 gal 14 x 10 3 7 x 10 3
- 9.5A-FA5-l
SL2-FSAR
- s. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: open South: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete East: open West: open Ceiling: open Floor: compacted soil
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification
- 1. HVAC 2.
None Mechanical None
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded conduit)
- 4. Area Access Area is open on all sid~s except south end which abuts 2 foot reinforced concrete wall.
Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary Portable fire extinguishers are installed in the adjacent area as outlined in drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 8.
- 2. Secondary A yard fire hydrant is located SO feet south of this area (See Drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 8).
9.SA-FAS-2
SL2-FSAR
- 5e.
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Smoke Venting:
Open yard area Sf. Drainage Area is sloped to a yard catch basin which 1s located within this fire area.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE Ga. Description of Fire Area 5:
Fire Area ~ is located approximately 35 feet east of the Fuel :
Handling Building. FA3, to the south of FA5, is isolated by a 24 inch reinforced concrete wall. The outdoor. taiik. area is open on the other three sides. The othe~ thre~ sides have a~
s foot metal chain link fence a:*round their perimeter. ih~
north side of FA5 is approximately 100 feet a~ay from the south si:de of the St Lucie Unit 1 Diesel Generator Buildi~g. Th~.
east side ba'sically faces an open'. area, being app~oximately 75 feet diagonally from the northwest corner of the Diesel Oil Storage Tank Building (Unit 2).
FA5 contains the Primary Water Storage Tank arranged on its own reinforced concrete pad, the Primary Water Pumps and associated equipment. There is no equipment 1n this.area essential to safe shut down of the plant.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating The postulated fire for FA5 involves the unlikely event which would cause the loss of lube oil inherent to the internal operations of one of the Primary Water Pumps and the assumed ignition of the oil. The resultant impact from the spilled 0 .1 gallons of lube oil will be minimal and the postulated fire will be fnconse~~ential due to the limited quantity and n~n corit inuity of combustibles. Since the fire would be limited to a'sm~ll se~~ion within FA5 and since there. is no essential equipment located adjacent to this area that will be. affected, safe reactor shut down capability will not be impaired.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating Based on the discussion above, the postulated fire will ~ot im-pair the capability to safely shut down the plant and there-9.5A-FA5-3
812-FSAR fore, the existing coverage, by a well trained fire brigade using the nearby fire extinguishers from FAJ. nearby adjacent yard mains, fire hydrants and associated hoses and equipment, is deemed more than adequate to meet the fire suppression requirements for FA5.
I
~
9.5A-FA5-4
- I 1
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 6 (Zones I and II)
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: Steam Trestle Area Elev: 19.50' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 2 le. Floor Area: 4400 sq ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
Zone I - South Steam Trestle area (1800 sq. ft)
Zone II - North Steam Trestle area (2600 sq. ft)
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA See Attachment I
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils Aux FW Pump 2C (Zone II) 10 .5 *gal 1.47 x 10 6 335 Aux FW Pump 2A & 2B (Zone I) 1. 5 gal .21 x 10 6 48 3c. Others Negligible Totals 1.68 x 10 6 383
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Lube Oil AFWP 2C (Zone I) .75 gal .105 x 10 6 7 x 10 3
6 3 Lube Oil AFWP*2B (Zone II) 10.5 gal 1.47 x 10 7 x 10
- 5. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 9.5A-FA6-1
SL2-FSAR
- 1. Fire Area Boundar~
Walls North: 1 Inch Steel Missile Barrier South: 1 Inch Steel Missile Barrier East: 36 Inch Concrete RCB Shield Wall West: 1 Inch Steel Missile Barrier Ceiling: Open (Trestle Structure)
Floor: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete on Sand and Cement Fill.
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identified
- 1. HVAC None (Open Area)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through steel missile barriers 3.
4.
Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
Area Access Doorway in west missile shield wall of Zone I.
Doorway in west missile shield wall of Zone II.
Sc. Detection:
None Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary Portable fire extinguishers will be located in the area as outlined in drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 2.
- 2. Secondary A yard fire hydrant is. located 70 foot northeast of the area (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 2).
9.5A-_FA6-2
SL2-FSAR
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings
- Se.
None Smoke Venting:
Open Area Sf. Drainage:
Zone I has two 3 inch floor drains which connect to a common 3 inch drain leading to the yard drainage system. Zone II has one 3 inch floor drain leading to the yard drainage system.
Also, additional drainage is provided by a yard catch basin which is located in this fire area.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 6 (Zones I and II):
Fire Area 6 is located in the yard area surrounded by a 10 foot high steel missile barrier on the north, south and west sides.
The Containment Building is located to the east, the Turbine Building to the west, FA 7 open area to the south, and an open area between SL-1 and SL-2 to the north. FA 6 is segregated into two subspaces separated by l" thick, approximately 10 foot high steel missile barrier and 30 inch concrete flood walls.
The fioors in the two subspaces are sloped and there are adequate drains in each location leading to catch basins connected to the yard storm drain system. The motor driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps 2A and 2B.and accessories are separated from each other by more than 10 feet and are located in Zone I (south side). The turbine driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump 2C and accessories are located in Zone II (north side) and are separated spatially by missile shields and by flood walls from Zone I.
Access into these compartments housing the safety related pumps and accessories is through doorways in each zone's west side steel missile barrier. There is no interconnection between the zones.
6b. Fire Protection Systems Not Operating:
FA 6 encompasses two segregated Zones. Therefore, two in-dependent design basis fires are postulated for this.area, one in each Zone, with only one incident considered at any one time. Zone I houses the motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater
< Pumps 2A and 2B. Each pump contains O. 75 .gallons of lubricat~
ing oil. The postulat~d fire may involve either one of the two pumps .
- 9.5A-FA6-3
SL2-FSAR 6b. (Cont'd)
Assuming that all the oil is lost from the reservoir of pump 2B, 0.75 gallons of oil will spread over 15 ft. sq of surface area (spreading factor of 20 sq ft/gallon). Redundant pump 2A is located more than 10 ft from pump 2B. Cable in conduit associated with AFW Pump 2C Isolation Valves is routed between pumps 2A and 2B, above elevation 41.00'. The minimum distance between the fire elevation and the redund~nt cabling is 20 ft.
Due to the small quantity of lubricating oil involved (0.75 gal) and due to the lack of continuity of combustible mate-rials, the fire will be of short duration-. Also, air movement within this open area will disperse and dilute the resulting heat and products of combustion. Due to the short duration of the fire and adequate ventilation, the heat and products of combustion will be sufficiently dissipated 20 foot above the fire such that AFWP 2C associated equipment will not be affected.
Zone II houses the turbine driven AFW Pump 2C. The pump con-tains 10.5 gallons of lubricating oil. The postulated fire assumes that all oil escapes from the reservoir and spreads over 210 sq ft of surface area. Subsequently, the oil ignites and burns. Since this is an open area, combustion is not restricted and the fire will be of short duration. Due to the small quantities of oil involved, the lack of continuity of com-bustible materials, and the physical distance and missile bar-riers separating AFWP 2A and 2B from pump 2C, redundant pumps will not be exposed. However, cabling enclosed in conduit, several pushbutton stations and valve I-MV-09-9, which are re-quired for the operation of pump 2A, are located in Zone II over AFWP 2C, above elevation 41.00'. Due to the open area, spatial separation and adequate ventilation, the heat and products of combustion will be sufficiently dissipated 20 foot above the fire elevation such that the AFWP 2A associated equipment will not be affected.
Fires postulated in Zone I and Zone II will be limited to the area of origin and will result in the loss of function of a single AFW Pump. The required redundancy will be provided by either the turbine driven AFW Pump 2C or the two motor driven AFW Pumps 2A and 2B, and therefore safe reactor shutdown ca-pabilities will not be impaired.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
Yard fire hydrants with available hose equipment, fire extin-guishers, and standpipe hose stations on the Turbine Building Ground Floor are located nearby. Due to the limited quantity of combustible material associated with FA 6 and the postulated short fire duration, a trained fire brigade,* using nearby fire equipment, will limit the consequences of any fire effects.
Safe reactor shutdown will not be affected.
- 9. SA- FA6-4
- SL2-FSAR
- ATTACHMENT I FIRE AREA 6 ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT Zone I Auxiliary Feed Water Pump 2A & 2B AFWP 2C Steam Isolation Valve I-MV-08-12 Atmospheric Dump Valve I-HCV-08-2B Main Steam Pressure Transmitters PT-08-lA (SA) and PT-08-lB (SB)
AFWP 2C Water Isolation Valves I-MV-09-10 and I-MV-09-12 Local Starter for Valve I-MV-09-12 PB Sta/Elec Box: (AFWP 2A PB Sta)(SA) (B252)*
(I-MV-08-12 PB Sta)(SAB) (B253)*'
(I-MV-09-10 PB Sta) (SB) (B254)*
(AFWP 2B PB Sta)(SB) (B261)*
B2333(SA) (B255)*
B2335(SB (B257)*
B2336(SB) (B258)*
B2334(SB) (B259)*
B2750(SB) (B260)*
(I-MV-09-12 PB Sta) (SAB) (B262)*
Zone II
- AFWP 2C AFWP 2C Turbine Governor AFWP 2c Control Panel Atmospheric Dump Valve I-HCV-08-2A AFWP 2C Steam Isolation Valves: I-MV-08-3 I-MV-08-13 I-MV-08-3 Local Starter I-MV-08-13 Local Starter AFWP 2C Water Isolation Valves: I-MV-09-9 I-MV-09-11 I-MV-09-11 Local Starter PB Sta/Elec Box: (I-MV-09-11 PB Sta) (SAB) (B268)*
(I-MV-09-9 PB Sta) (SA) (B269)*
(AFWP 2C PB Sta)(SAB) (B270)*
(I-MV-08-13 PB Sta)(SAB) (B271)*
B2332(SA) (B263)*
B233l(SA) (B264)*
B2E67(SAB) (B265)*
B2328 (SAB) (B26 7)*
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number
- 9. 5A-FA6-5
SL2-FSAR
- 1.
ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 7 DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: Yard area bounded by Elev: 19.00 RAB, TGB & Stm. Trestle lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 1 le. Floor Area: 7600 sq ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA None
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Cable Tray between TGB 6 2,370 and RAB 18.0 x 10 3b. Oils Elevator Equipment 15 gal 2.1 x 10 6 276 3c. Others Grease: Elevator Equip. 12 lbs 0.2 x 10 6 26 6 3 Totals 20.3 x 10 2.67 x 10
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 6 3 Elevator Equipment (Oil) 15 gal 2.1 x 10 21. 0 x 1o 3
Elec. Cable Tray
- 114 x 10
- See methodology 9.5A-FA7-1
SL2-FSAR
- s. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: Open South: Open East: 24 Inch reinforced Concrete West: Open Ceiling: Open Floor: Compacted soil
- 2. Concealed Spaces Elevator Mechanical equipment room (100 sq ft)
Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification
- 1. HVAC None (Open Area) 2.
3.
Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through boundary walls Electrical Cable tray penetrations through the east wall of the RAB are sealed to a fire rating equivalent to the barrier wall.
- 4. Area Access FA 7 is an open area which is normally accessible from the west through the TGB*and from the south, through a passage-way to the yard area.
Sc. Detection:
None Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There is a portable fire extinguisher located in FA 7 ad-jacent to the personnel hatch. For additional extinguisher
- 9. SA- FA7-2
SL2-FSAR locations in adjacent FA 47 see Drawing SK-2998-M-708,
- Sheet 11 .
- 2. Secondary Yard hydrants located in or nearby t:his area are shown in Drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 1.
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting:
Open Area
- Sf. Drainage:
Four yard catch basins are located in this area.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 7 Fire Area FA 7 includes the yard area enclosed by the Steam Trestle, Turbine Generator Building, Containment Building, Reactor* Auxiliary Building, and a narrow strip of open area between the TGB and the RAB between column lines A and RAL.
The latter area houses the RAB elevator which is also part of FA 7.
Equipment necessary for safe reactor shutdown is not located in this fire area. Total combustible loading is* 15 gallons of oil and a limited quantity of grease associated with the RAB elevator, located in the elevator mechanical room at ele-vation 82.00', and four 24 inch wide cable trays containing nonsafety related train NB cables. The cable trays leave the RAB ten feet north of column line 2-RAJ at elevation 53.00',
and enter the TGB Building 6 feet south of column line 30. A three hour rated fire penetration is installed in the RAB wall where the trays exit.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating There are two widely separated areas within FA 7 where a con-centration of combustible materials occurs. A fire will be postulated independently ~n each area, and its consequence evaluated.
The first postulated fire is assumed to occur in the elevator mechanical room at elevation 82.00'. This fire will involve 15 gallons of lubricating oil and 12 lbs of grease associated
- with the elevator equipmen~. Since the elevator mechanical*
9.5A-FA7-3
SL2-FSAR room is segregated from any safety related equipment, safe reactor shutdown will not be affected. Also, due to the lack of continuity of combustible materials, the four cable trays traversing FA 7, approximately 50 ft below, and outside the elevator mechanical room, will not be exposed to the postu-lated fire. Safe reactor shutdown capability will not be impaired.
The second independent postulated fire is assumed to involve the cable insulation found in the four cable trays traversing FA 7. The fire is postulated to originate from an electrical fault within one of the cable trays. The fire rated penetra-tion protection at the RAB wall will limit the fire and any subsequent damage to the area of origin. Since none of the cable trays are safety related, safe reactor shutdown capa-
- bility will not be impaired.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating There is a portable fire extinguisher located in FA 7 adajacent to the Personnel Hatch. Fire hydrants and hose equipment are supplied from the southside looped fire yard main. There are available portable fire extinguishers and standpipe hose stations on 'the ground floor of the TGB which are usable to augment the fire suppression capability. Effec-tive use of this equipment by a trained fire brigade will miti-gate the consequences of any postulated fire. Safe reactor shutdown will not be impaired.
(
9.5A-F47-4
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 8 (Also see FA 9)
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: Diesel Generator Bldg. 2A Elev 22.67' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 8 le. Floor Area: 2500 sq ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Diesel Generator (DG) Set 2A DO Day TAnk: 2Al 2A2 DO Day Tank Inlet Valves: I-SE-17-lA I-SE-17-2A DO Day Tank Auto Refill Switches: LS-17-542A LS-17-543A LS-17-551A LS-17-550A
- Diesel Generator 2A Control Cabinet:
LS-17-552A LS-17-553A DO Transfer Pump 2A Controls (I-SE-17-lA)(Pushbutton-PB)
(I-SE- l 7-2A)( PB)
Motor Control Center (MCC) 2A7 120 VAC Power Panel (PP) 212
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity Btu (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils 6 3 Lube Oil (16 cyl and 12 706 gal 98.9 x 10 39.5 x 10 cyl Tandem Diesel) 6 3 (2) Diesel Oil Day Tanks 686 gal 96.1 x 10 38.5 x 10 3c. Others Negligible 6
Totals 195 x 10 78 x 10 3
- 9. 5A-FA8-l
SL2-FSAR
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING S.
Lube Oil (Single 16 cyl. diesel unit)
FIRE CONTROL Quantity 400 gal (Btu)
S6.2 x 10 6
(Btu/sq ft) 22 .4xl0 3
Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 18 Inch Reinforced Concrete East: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete West: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 6 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
1.
Identification HVAC Size Roof Vent opening 2'-8 x 2'-8 Inlet wall openings (S) 8 1 6 x 10'-0 (South Wall)
Inlet wall openings 6'6 x 13'-6 (West Wall)
Inlet wall openings 6 1 6 x 7'-0 (West Wall)
- 2. Mechanical Diesel Exhaust Pipe (2)-22"
- 3. Electrical None (embedded conduit)
- 4. Area Access Man door on east and west side of building 10' x 13' roof hatch 20'-0 x 13'-6 maintenance door on east wall 9.SA-FAS-2
SL2-FSAR Sc. Detection:
A fixed temperature/rate-of-rise (FT/ROR) detectors are provided which initiate a alarm in the Control Room should a fire occur.
Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary Portable fire extinguishers are located as shown in Drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 8.
- 2. Secondary Yard hydrants are located approximately 20 foot east and 3S foot south of the building. (See Dwg. Sk-2998-M-708; Sheet 8).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting A fan ventilation system is available for smoke removal. Ex-haust capacity of this system is SOOO cfm which will provide a removal rate of 2.0 cfm/sq ft.
Sf. Drainage Seven 3 inch floor drains are connected to.a common 4 inch drain line leading to a oil separation pit.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE
- a. Description of Fire Area 8 FA 8, housing Diesel Generator 2A, is the northern compartment of the one story Diesel Generator structure having a floor elevation of 22.67'. It is bounded by concrete walls, ceiling and floor having fire ratings of greater than four hours. The north wall of FA 8 isolates it from FA 4 (Refueling Water Tank Area) with a full height, 24 inch thick, reinforced concrete barrier wall. The south wall is a full height, 18 inch thick reinforced concrete fire barrier wall which isolates FA 8 from FA 9. The east wall has a missile protected maintenance door and man door, and air exhaust openings which face the open area east roadway. The west wall has a missile protected man door and exhaust openings which face the RAB, loc.ated approximately 30 feet away. The 24 inch reinforced concrete roof has a missile protected equipment hatch cover and an exhaust fan .
Emergency Diesel Generator 2A and its accessories are safety related.
- 9. SA- FA8-3
SL2-FSAR 6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating The postulated fire for FA 8 involves the complete loss of lube oil from the sixteen cylinder diesel generator reservoir con-taining approximately 400 gallons of lube oil. The lube oil from this diesel will spread over the entire floor area of the compartment. The fire is postulated by the ignition of the lube oil in contact with hot metal surfaces. Loss of function of the diesel generator set 2A and physical damage to instru-mentation and associated cabling is assumed to occur due to heat and/or direct flame impingement. The solid 18" reinforced concrete structural wall separating redundant Diesel Generator 2A and 2B provides an adequate fire barrier (greater than four hours) to prevent loss of redundant Diesel Generator 2B located in FA 9 due to the most severe oil fire predicted in FA 8.
Even if the postulated fire ignites other sources of combus-tibles within this FA (the two day tanks and the tandem 12-cylinder diesel), the impact of the increased fire will not significantly change the overall fire effects.
Possible oil flow will be confined within this compartment by space configuration, doors, floor drains and curbing. In the unlikely event that oil escapes from the FA, it will flow towards the lowest level of egress at the east doorway (EL 19.00'). This will not expose the electrical manholes located in the crown of the east roadway, as it will be direct-ed away from the premises by the site drainage arrangements.
Other adjacent areas to the south, east and west are open and no exposed essential equipment is located within 50 feet.
Safe reactor shutdown capability will not be impaired as the redundant Diesel Generator Set 2B remains unaffected by the postulated fire.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating Fixed temperature/rate-of-rise (FT/ROR) detectors will provide an alarm and notification in the Control Room to operating personnel. The postulated fire would, however, prompt response by trained fire brigade members, and their effective use of fire extinguishers and hose steams from nearby fire hydrants, connected to the yard main water supply, would limit the extent of the physical damage caused by the effects of the fire. A loss of function of the Diesel Generator Set 2A will not affect the operability of the redundant Diesel Generator Set 2B in the adjacent isolated compartment, thus safe reactor shutdown capa-bility will not be impaired.
9.5A-FA8-4
- SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 9 (Also see FA8)
- l. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: Diesel Generator Bldg 2B Elev: 22.67' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet No. 8 le. Floor Area: 2500 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area: None
- 2. SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Diesel Generator (DG) Set 2B DO Day Tanks: 2Bl 2B2 DO Day Tank Inlet Valves: I-SE-17-lB I-SE-17-2B DO Day Tank Auto Refill Switches: LS-17-542B LS-17-543B LS-17-551B LS-17-550B LS-17-552B
- Diesel Generator 2B Control Cabinet:
MCC 2B7 LS-17-553B DO Transfer Pump 2B (I-SE-17-lB)(PB)
(I-SE-17-2B)(PB) 120 VAC PP212
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a.. Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils Lube Oil (16 cyl and 12 cyl Tandem Diesel) 706 gal 98.9xl0 6 39.5xl0 3 (2) Diesel Oil Day Tanks 686 gal 96. lxlO 6 38.5xl0 3 Jc. Others Negligible Totals 19 5xl0 6 78x 10 3
- 9. SA- FA9-1
SL2-FSAR
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Lube Oil 400 gal S6.2xl0 6 22.4xl0 3 (Single 16 cyl Diesel Unit)
S. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 18 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete East: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete West: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Roof Vent Opening 2'-8 x 2'-8 (Roof)
Inlet Wall Opening ( S) 8'-6 x 10'-0 (South Wall)
Inlet Wall Opening 6'-6 x 13'-6 (West Wall)
Inlet Wall Opening 6'-6 x 7'-0 (West Wall)
- 2. Mechanical Diesel Exhaust Pipe (2)-22"
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area Access Man Door on East and West Wall 10' x 13' Roof Hatch 20'-0 x 13'-6 Maintenance Door of East Wall
- 9. SA-FA9-2
SL2-FSAR
- -- :. - Sc. Detection:
Fixed temperature/rate-of-rise (FT/ROR) detectors are provided which initiate an alarm in the Control Room. should a fire occur.
Sd. Fire Protec'tion Systems:
- 1. Primary Portable fire extinguishers are located in the area as shown in Drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 8.
- 2. Secondary Yard fire hydrants are located 20 feet east and 3S feet south of the building (see Drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 8).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting:
A fan ventilation *system will be used for smoke removal.
Exhaust capacity-of this system SOOO cfm which will provide a removal rate of 2 cfm/ sq ft .
Sf.. Drainage:
Seven 3 inch floor drains are connected to a common 4 inch drain line leading to an oil separation pit.
- 6. .ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF
- POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description.of Fire Area.9:
FA9, housing Diesel Generator 2B, is the southern compartment of the one story Diesel Generator structure having a floor elevation of 22.67'. It is bounded by concrete walls, a ceil-ing, and a floor having a fire rating 6£ greater thari four hours. The north wall of FA9 isolates it from FAS (Diesel Generator iA), with a full height, 18 inch thick, reinforced concrete fire barrier wall. The south wall is a 24 inch rein-forced concrete fire barrier wall adjoining the open yard area.
The east wall ha~ a missile protected maintenance door and man door, and air e:Xhatist openings which face the open area east roadway. The west wall has a missile protected man door and air exhaust openings which face the RAB across an approximate 30' wide open area. The 24 inch reinforced concrete roof has a missile protected equipment hatch cover and exhaust fan.
Emergency Diesel Generator 2B and its accessories. are safety related.
~*
- ~:-
9.SA- FA9-3
SL2-FSAR 6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
The postulated fire for FA9 involves the complete loss of lube oil from the sixteen cylinder diesel generator reservoir con-taining approximately 400 gallons of lube oil. The lube oil from this diesel will spread over the entire floor area of the compartment. The fire is postulated following the ignition of the lube oil in contact with hot metal surfaces. Loss of function of the Diesel Generator Set 2B and physical damage to instrumentation and associated cabling is assumed to oceur due to heat and/oi: direct flame impingement. The solid 18 inch reinforced concrete structural wall separating redundant Diesel Generators 2A and 2B provides an adequate fire barrier (greater than four hours) to prevent loss of the redundant Diesel Generator 2A, located in FA8, due to the most severe oil fire predicted in FA9. Even if the postulated fire ignites other sources of combustibles within this FA9 (the two day tanks and the tandem 12-cylinder diesel), the impact of the increased fire will not signifi_cantly change the overall fire effects.
Possible oil flow will be confined within this compartment by space configuration, doors, floor drains, and curbing. - In the unlikely event that oil escapes from the FA*, it would flow towards the lowest level of egress at the east doorway (EL 19.00'). This will not expose the electrical manholes located in the crown of the east roadway, as it. will be direc-ted away from the premises* by the site drainage arrangements.
Other adjacent areas to the south, east, and west are open and no exposed essential equipment is located within 50 feet.
Safe reactor shutdown capability will not be ~paired as the redundant Diesel Generator Set 2A remains unaffected by the postulated fire.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
Fixed temp~rature/rate-or-rise (FT/ROR) detectors will provide an alarm and notification in the Control Room to operating personnel. The postulated fire would, however, prompt response by trained fire brigade members, and their effective use of fire extinguishers and nearby fire hydrants and associated fire hoses and equipment, connected to the yard main water supply, would limit the extent of the physical damage caused by the effects of the fire. A possible loss of function of the Diesel Generator Set 2B will not affect the operability of the redun-dant Diesel Generator Set 2A in the adjacent isolated com-partment, thus safe reactor shutdown capability will not be impaired.
9.SA- FA9-4
-SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 10
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: Condensate Storage Tank Elev: 19.50' Area.
lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 11 le. Floor Area: 2200 sq ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Condensate Storage Tank Condensate Storage Tank Level Transmitter LT-12-11 Electrical Box B2441 (MC)
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
- 3a.
3b.
Cable Insulation Oils 3c.
- Others Negligible Negligible Negligible Totals Negligible Negligible
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Negligible
- 9. 5A-FA10- l
SL2-FSAR
- 5. FIRE CONTROL 5a. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete East: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete West: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor:
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC 2.
Roof Ventilation opening Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through barrier walls 7'-0 Dia
- 3. El.ectrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area Access Labyrinth on northeast and southeast of shield wall leading to tank area Sc. Detection:
None Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary Portable fire extinguishers are located in the area as outlined in Drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 11.
- 9. 5A-FA10-2
SL2-FSAR 5d*. Fire Protection Systems: (Cont'd)
- 2.
3.
Secondary A yard hydrant is located 30 feet south of this area (See Drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 11).
Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None 5e. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be provided by natural move~
ment of air through wall and roof openings.
5f. Drainage:
Two 3 inch floor drains and one 8 inch open hub are connected to a common 8 inch drain line leading to the plant sewer system.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 10:
The Condensate Storage Tank,located within a 24 inch thi~k concrete enclosure, has been designated as Fire Area ~O. The tank enclosure is located adjacent to the Turbine Oil Reservoir (FA 11) And is separated from this area by a 2 fo0t thick concrete wall.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
The Condensate Storage Tank and its associated level in~trumen tation, LT-12-11, are the only essential equipment contained within the concrete enclosure (FA 10). As the fire loading in FA 10 is negligible, a fire that would *affect the integrity of the Condensate Storage Tank or the functiona~ capabilities of the level instrumentation cannot be postulated. The only fir~
threat would be a fire spread from FA 11; however, any fire within FA 11 is contained and poses no hazard to FA 10. Even in the unlikely event that LT-12-11 is impacted, redund~nt local tank level indication is available. Therefore, safe re-actor shutdown capabilities are not impaired.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
As described above, the fire occuring within FA 10 is postu-lated to be inconsequential and to have no adverse ef~ec~s ~poq other equipment in this or the adjacent areas. The pos tulfl!cec;J.
fire could readily be extinguished by fire brigade and person~
nel using fire extinguishers from adjacent FA ll and FA 4 7 a1;1d standpipe hose stations from FA 47, backed up by hose stre~mp
- 9. 5A- FAl0-3
SL2-FSAR Q fro~ nearby fire hydrants connected to yard main water sup-pli~s.
- 9. SA-F Al0-4
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 11
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir Elev: 19.00' Area lb. Reference Drawing:
- SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 11 le. Floor Area: 3070 sq ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA None
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir 14,000 gal l.96xl0 9 640xl0 3
- Turbine Lube Oil Condi-tioner, Filters & Pumps 850 gal .12xl0 9 39xl0 3 3c. Others Negligible Totals 2.08xl0 9 679xl0 3
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Turbine Lube Oil 14,000 gal l.96xlo 9 640xl0 3
- 9. SA- F All -1 *
. 812-FSAR S. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 30 Inch High Reinforced Concrete Grade Wall South: Open East: Open West: Abuts 30 Inch High Grade Wall and CST Shield Wall Ceiling: Open Floor: 6 Inch Reinforced Concrete on Compacted Soil
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification
- 1. HVAC None (Open Are~)
- 2. Mechanical None (Open Area)
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area Access Open Area, access from all sides Sc. Detection:
Temperature detectors will initiate alarms locally and in the Control Room and will actuate the deluge fire suppression sprinkler system.
Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary Automatic deluge fire suppression sprinkler system .
- 9. 5A-FA11-2
SL2-FSAR Sd. Fire Protection Systems: (Cont'd)
- 2. Secondary A yard hydrant is located 60 feet northeast of the fire area. Also, portable extinguishers are located in FA 11 and adjacent FA 47. (See Dwg. SK~2998-M-708, Sheet 11).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None**
Se. Smoke Venting:
Open Area Sf. Drainage:
This area has curbs and gravel filled retention pits.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 11:
The Turbine Oil Reservoir is located in an *open area between the Turbine Building and the Condensate Storage Tank and has been designated as Fire Area 11. No essential equipment re-quired for safe reactor shutdown is located within this area .
The Condensate Storage Tank, located in FA 10, and associated level instrumentation are the only essential equipment located i.n fire areas adjacent to FA 11. Separation between these two adjacent fire areas is provided by the 2' thick concrete wall which totally encloses the Condensate Storage Tank.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
The postulated fire for FA 11 involves the rupture of the Tur-bine Oil Reservoir and the release of the approximately 14,000 gallons of lube oil. The oil would spread .over a~d be contain-ed within the diked area of approximately 1480 ft . Ignition of the lube oil is assumed. Automatic initiation of the water spray system is assumed not to occur. Under these conditions, the lube oil will continue to burn within the diked area until manual fire fighting procedures are initiat~d to extinguish the fire.
Heat and smoke released during a fire may cause limited damage to equipment located in the adjacent Turbine Building FA 47 which contains no essential equipment. Therefore:. safe .shut-down of the react.pr .will not be impaired. FA 11 and FA 10 (Condensate Storage Tank) are separated by a 2' thick concrete
- 9.SA- FAll-3
SL2-FSAR 6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating: (Cont'd) wall, thus no functional or physical damage will occur to the tank or level transmitters, and safe shutdown capabilities will not be impaired.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
An automatic de.luge water spray system is provided for fire protection of the Turbine Oil Reservoir. Deluge valve actua-tion and water flow will be alarmed in the Control Room prov-iding detection and notification of the fire condition in FA 11. As a backup, prompt response by the Plant Fire Brigade and their effective use of the fire extinguishers in FA 11 and FA 47, standpipe hose stations located in adjacent FA 47 and hose streams from nearby yard hydrants connected to yard main water supply will suppress the postulated fire, limiting damage to equipment in FA 11 and other adjacent fire areas.
- 9. SA- FAll-4
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la.
ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 12 Building: Transformer Yard
, . f:: . . ~ - ' .. \ .
Elev: 19.00'
=-~ **-~
lb. Reference Drawing: SK~2998-M:-70.8, Shee4- 11
,' \' . ';
le. Floor Area: 20,000 Sq Ft ,, *
- ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:-"
Main Transformer 2A&2B and associate-Ci oil pits (2400 sq ft)
Start-up Transformer 1B&2B and associated oil pit (2275 sq ft)
Auxiliary Transformer 2A&-2B and as.sociated oil pit (1050 sq ft)
- ' (
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA None
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) * (Btu/sq ft)
- 3a.
3b.
Cable Insulation Oils Aux Transformer 2A & 2B Negligible 10,700 gal Start-up Transformer 1B&2B 19,336 gal 14.98xl0 8 27.08xl0 8 74.9xl0 3
135 .4xl0 3 Main Transformer 2A&2B 32,800 gal 45.93xl0 8 229.7xl0 3 3c. Others Negligible Totals 87. 99X10 8 44mno 3
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING 4a Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Main Transformer 16 ,400 gal 22. 96Xl0 8 1. 9Xl0 6*
- Based on oil pit area of 1200 sq ft. for each Transformer .
9.5A-FA12-1
SL2-FSAR
- 5. FIRE CONTROL 5a. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: open.
South: open East: 30 inch high grade wall West: open Ceiling: open*
Floor: gravel on compacted soil
- 2. Concealed Spaces None 5b. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification
- 1. HVAC None (Open Area)
- 2. Mechanical None (Open Area)
- 3. Electrical None (Open Area)
- 4. Area Access Area is approachable from north, south and west sides.
- 5c. Detection:
Temperature detectors will initiate* alarms locally and in the Control Room and will actuate the automatic deluge sprinkler system should a fire start in any of the Transformer areas.
Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary Each Transformer has an automatic deluge sprinkler system .
9.5A-FA12-2
~SL2-FSAR
- 2. Secondary Yard fire hydrants and portable, fire extinguishers are located in the immediate area* as. shown on Drawing SK-2998~M-708, Sheet 11.
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective-.Coatings
.None Se. Smoke Venting:
Open Area Sf. Drainage:
A yard catch.basin is located in this area.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE
- a. Description of Fire Area 12:
Fire Area 12, the Transformer Area, is located in the yard ad-jacent to the west of the Turbine Building at the southern end.
Within this area, six transformers are located: two main, two auxiliary and two start-up. The approximate distance between transformers are as follows: The Main Transformers are 3S ft west of the Auxiliary Transformers, Main Transformer 2B is 20 ft north of the Start-up Transformers and Main Transformer 2A is less than 10 ft north of Main Transformer 2B. The Main Transformers are separated by an 18 ft high, 2 ft thick concrete wall, with fire rating greater than four hours. Both Main Transformers are interconnected by two common oil headers each 12 inches in diameter which penetrate the fire wall and which are equipped.with isolation valves that are normally Closed.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
Each Main Transformer contains 16,400 gallons of combustible iiquid, each Start-up Transformer contains 9,700 gallons, and each Auxiliary Transformer contains 5,400 gallons. To determine which transformer fire would result in the worst consequences, a a separate independent fire was postulated for each of the three types of transformers.
The Auxiliary Transformers are located closest to the Turbine Building (greater than 20 ft) but contain the smallest quantity .
- 9~ SA-FA12-3
- sL2-FSAR
- b. Fire Protection System Not Operating (Cont'd) of combustible liquid (5,400 gallons). No essential equipment is located within any of the curbed oil pit areas or in the Turbine Building. Electrical manholes in FA12, some of which contain essential cables, are all located outside of the curbed*
transformer areas and will not be flooded as the transformer pits are sized to contain all oil released. Thus, fires occurring within the curbed areas will have no adverse* effects upon the manholes or to the cables located underground.
The postulated fire for one Auxiliary Transformer assumes the loss of integrity of the transformer and leakage of the 5,400 gallons contained within. The oil pit area is 1050 sq ft with a siX inch curbed boundary and three feet of gravel below grade. All of the escaped oil will be accommodated in this
- volume. Ignition of the oil and malfunction of the automatic water deluge system is assumed. Therefore, the fire would con-tinue to burn until visually detected and manually extinguished by trained fire brigade personnel effectively using fire ex-tinguishers and standpipe hose stations located in FA12 and FA47 and hose streams from nearby yard hydrants connected to the yard main water supplies. Limited smoke damage to equipment
- in the Adjacent Turbine Building could occur, but since no essential equipment is located within, safe reactor shutdown capability will not be impaired.
The postulated fire for the Main Transformer involves the loss of 16,400 gallons of oil which will be contained within the 6 inch high curbed oil pit. The area curbed is 2,400 sq ft with 6 1 -6 11 of gravel provided below grade. The Turbine Building is located 50 ft to the east of these transformers and any result-ing fire effect damage to equipment within the building would not affect safe shutdown capabilities.
The postulated fire for the Start-up Transformer is based upon .
the loss of 9,700 gallons of oil into a 2,275 sq ft, 6 irich high curbed oil pit with 5 1 -8 11 of gravel. A distance of at least 75 ft exists between the Turbine Building and oil pit, and therefore the effects of this fire will result in a very limited
!ire effect damage to the equipment.
Each transformer oil pit is provided with sufficient capacity to contain the loss of oil from one of the associated trans-formers plus water required by the trained plant fire brigade to control the postulated fire. Therefore, no oil will spill over the curbs of the transformer oil pits.
It is noted that safety related conduits pass between the Main transformer oil pits and beneath the Auxiliary Transformer oil pit. However, sufficient earth cover should adequately protect these conduits from fire exposure.
9.5A- FA12-4
SL2-FSAR 6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating: (Cont'd)
- 6c.
None of the three postulated fires described above will result in any loss of function of any essential equipment or result in impairment of safe reactor shutdown capabilities.
Fire Protection System Operating:
Each set of transformers is provided with a separate, automatic water spray deluge system. The flow rates for the Main, Aux-iliary, and Start-up Trans formers automatic de luge water systems are 1418, 718 and 1220 GPM, respectively. Oil retention pits are adequately sized to retain the spill of oil from a single transformer plus a 10 minute flow from the fire suppression systems.
Each system is designed to extinguish a fully engulfed trans-former fire and provides adequate fire protection system cover-age.. With the deluge system operating, any fire effects damage to the Turbine Building would be very limited.
Deluge valve activation and water flow will be alarmed in the Control Room providing notification of the fire condition in FA12. As a backup, prompt response by a trained plant fire bri-gade effectively using fire extinguishers, standpipe hose stations and hose streams from nearby hydrants, could also.
control postulated fires.. Thus no loss of safe reactor shutdown capability will occur .
- 9. SA- FA12-5
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 13
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: Intake Cooling Water Pump Area Elev: 16.50' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 9 le. Floor Area: 400 sq ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Intake Cooling Water Pumps (ICWP): 2A 2B 2C Intake Structure HVAC Units: 2-HVE~41A 2-HVE-41B 2HVE-41A Selector Switch 2HVE-41A Thermostat 2HVE-41B Selector Switch
(ICWP 2B PB Sta)(SB)
(ICWP 2C PB Sta)(SAB)
B2El9(SA)
B2E43(SB)
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils Lube oil ICW Pumps 39.75 gal 5.57Xl0 6 13.9xl0 3 3c. Others Negligible Totals 5. ~7Xl0 6 13 .9Xl0 3
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING 4a Source Quantit~ (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Lube Oil ICW Pump 13.25 gal 1. 86Xl0 6 7Xl0 3
- 9. SA- FA13-1
SL2-FSAR
- s. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete II South: 24 II II II East: 24 II II II 1; West: 24 II Ceiling: 2 Inch Steel Plate Floor: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 2. Mechanical North wall pipe opening 7 '-S x 7 '-0 Pipe floor penetrations (2) 2'-10 dia.
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area Access Door on west wall (3 ft by 7 ft).
Removable roof plates allow access from above.
Sc. Detection:
Ionization type detectors are located in this area which will initiate an alarm in the Control Room should a fire occur.
Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary Portable extinguishers are available from adjacent FA 47 (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 11).
9.SA-FA13-2
SL2-FSAR
- 2.
3.
Secondary Yard hydrants are located east and south of the area (See Drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 9).
Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation' will be used for smoke removal.
Exhaust capacity of this system is 19300 cfm which will provide a removal rate of 48.2S cfm/sq ft. A second 19300 cfm fan is available for stand-by purposes.
Sf. Drainage:
A three inch clearance around pipe floor penetrati~ns allows for drainage to the flooded intake area below.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 13 Fire Area 13 is located at the Intake Structure and consists of the Intake Cooling Water Missile Enclo.sure and the equipment
- contained therein. The boundaries consist of two foot thick
- concrete walls on all four sides resting on the reinforced concrete Intake Structure deck. The north wall has a pipe penetration opening into the valve pit area of FA49. The roof. is constructed of two inch thick steel plates upon which Exhaust Fans 2HVE-41A and 41B are located. Within the Missile Enclosure, Intake Cooling Water (ICW) Pumps and Motors 2A, 2B, and 2C are located and are installed on 2' -:-6 high pedestals.
Ingress and egress is through a labyrinth type 3ft X 7ft opening with a wire mesh door located at the south end of the west wall.
6b. Fire Protection Systems Not Operating:
The postulated fire for FA13 involves the loss of 13.2S gallons of *lube oil from the upper and lower bearing assemblies of any one of the three ICW pumps. The loss of the oil from both bear-ings has been postulated for the purpose of this analysis, al-though the loss of seal integrity or total rupture of the casing is highly improbable. Once released, the oil will spread and be contained in the curbed area surrounding the pump. Ignitiori is assumed, and the oil will continue to burn. until completely consumed. The fire will be confined to a single pump due to the containment of the oil within the curbed area, and the redundant two ICW pumps will not be impacted by the fire.
- Although unlikely, the one operating essential exhaust fan may be impacted due to smoke and products of combustion. However,
- 9. SA- FA13-3
SL2-FSAR a redundant unit is available. The essential valves I-SB-21-7 located in a valve pit *which opens into FA 13 along the north wall, will not be effected by the postulated fire. Involve-ment and loss of equipment outside of FA 13, which is totally surrounded by FA 49, is not postulated due to the two foot thick concrete walls which surround FA 13 and provide a minimum three hour fire barrier. Based on the above, safe reactor shutdown capability will not be impaired.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
Ionization type fire detectors are located in the area and will provide an alarm in the Control Room which will initiate a quick plant fire brigade response. An effective response by the trained fire brigade, using available fire "extinguishers and hose streams from nearby yard hydrants, will suppress the postulated fire and limit the extent of physical damage caused by the effects of the fire. Safe reactor shutdown capability will not be impaired.
9.5A- FA13-4
SL-2 FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2
- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 14 (Zone I, II, III, IV)
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: Reactor Containment Bldg. Elev: 23.00'/45.00'/62.00' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheets 2 & 3 le. Floor Area: 19,100 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
I - Area between Containment Vessel and Shield Building (Annulus)
II - Area between Primary and Secondary Shield Wall III - Area between Containment Vessel and Secondary Shield Wall IV - Reactor Vessel Refueling Cavity and Areas Above Operating Deck
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA See Attachment I
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS
- 3a.
Source Cable Insulation Misc. Power & Control Quantity (Btu) 212xl0 6 (Btu/sq ft) 11, 100 3b. Oils RC Pumps 760 gal 106xl0~ 5,600 Misc. Cranes 25 gal 3.5xl0 183 Sump Pumps 2 gal .3xl0 6 16 Hydraulic Snubbers 22 gal 3.lxlO 6 162 3c. Others Grease: MOV's. 108 lb. 2.0xl0 6 105 Misc. Cranes 6 22 lb. .4xl0 8 6
Tota ls 327.3xl0 17,174
- 9.5A-FA14-1
SL-2 FSAR
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Cable in Elec.
Penetrations RC Pump Oil Cable Tray (Zone I)
(Zone II)
(Zone III)
Quantity 190 gal (Btu)
- 26. 6xl0 6 (Btu/sq ft) 114,000*
7,000 114,000*
Polar Crane Oil (Zone IV) lS gal 2. lxl0 3 7,000
- See Methodology S. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: (See Attachment II)
South: (See Attachment II)
East: (See Attachment II)
West: (See Attachment II)
Ceiling: (See Attachment II)
Floor: (See Attachment II)
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification
- 1. HVAC Various HVAC penetrations through barrier walls
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through barrier walls
- 3. Electrical All electrical penetrations will be sealed to a fire rating equivalent to the barrier wall.
- 4. Area Access Escape hatch at El. 62.00' to FHB Personnel air lock at El. 23.00' 9.SA- FA14-2
SL-2 FSAR
- 4. Area Access (Cont'd)
Maintenance hatch at El.3S.OO' Air tight door to annulus area at El. 23.00' Sc. Detection:
Ionization type detectors are located throughout the Reactor Containment Building as outlined in Dwg's SK-2998-M-708, Sheets 2 & 3. These detectors will initiate an alarm in the Control Room should a fire occur.
Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary Portable fire extinguishers are located in the area as outlined.in Drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 2 and 3.
- 2. Secondary Hydrants are located in the adjacent yard as outlined in Drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 1.
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings
- Se.
Approved fire protective coating will be sprayed on all cable trays.
Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used .for smoke removal. The exhaust capacity of these systems are:
Zone I: 6,000 cfm at 3.3 cfm/sq ft.
Zone II, III & IV: 44,000 cfm at 2.7 cfm/sq ft.
Sf. Drainage:
Floor Drains (Qty) Location Description 13 Operating Deck (El.62.00) All floor drains flow into the building sump at El
(-)7.00'. A sump pump IS Refueling Canal Gutter discharges these drain (El.62.00) wastes into the Equipment Drain Tank in FA20 of the 3 H&V Equipment Area RAB.
(El.41.00'/4S.OO')
- 9.SA-FA14-3
SL-2 FSAR 5f. Drainage: (Cont'd)
Floor Drains 15 (Qty) Location Floor Area (El.23.00)
Description All floor drains flow into the building sump at El (-) 7.00.
13 Floor Area (El.18.00') A sump pump dis-charges these drain 5 Floor Area (El.16.00') wastes into the Equipment Drain Tank 9 Trench Area (El.12.00') in FA20 of the RAB.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 14 (Zone I, II, III, IV):
Fire Area 14 encompasses the entire Reactor Containment Build-ing. For purposes of this analysis, FA 14 has been divided into four zones as described below.
Zone I comprises the entire annular volume between the steel Containment Vessel and the 3 foot thick Shield Building.
Zone II consists of the areas between the Secondary and Primary Shield Walls, basically extending from the floor at El. 18.00' to the underside of the El.62.00' operating deck. This area also extends from the underside of the El.62.00' deck to the underside of the Steam Generator Shield Wall at El.76.00' and to the underside of the Pressurizer Shield Wall at El 87.00'. The Electrical Tunnel at El.00.00' is also included in this Zone.
Zone III consists of areas between the Containment Vessel and the Secondary Shield Wall basically extending from the floor at El. 23.00' to the underside of the El. 62.00' Operating Deck.
The pipe trench at El. 12.00' is also included in this area.
Zone IV consists of the area from the Operating Deck at El.
62.00' to the underside of the Containment Vessel Dome. The Refueling Cavity at El. 21.50' and the Reactor Cavity are also included in this area.
Safe shutdown related equipment, cables, systems and components provided within the Containment are indicated in Attachment I, Fire Area 14 Essential Equipment.
Access in the Containment Building is through:
- a. Escape lock at El. 62.00' connecting to the Fuel Handling Building from Zone IV.
- b. Airtight door at El. 23.00' leading to the yard area from Containment annulus (Zone I).
- 9. SA- FA14-4
SL-2 FSAR 6a. Description of Fire Area 14 (Zone I, II, III, IV): (Cont'd)
- c. Maintenance hatch at El. 35.00' leading to the yard area from Zone III.
- d. Personnel lock at El. 30.00' connecting to yard area from Zone III.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
Separation of electric circuits in FA14 meets the requirements of RG 1.75 by use of spatial separation, barriers and fire retardant coatings.
Redundant safety related equipment are protected from exposure to localized combustible sources by spatial separation and/or the use of existing barriers i.e., concrete walls, floors and ceilings having greater than three hours fire resistive rating.
Electrical cables are concentrated at the Penetration Areas of Zone I at El. 18.00' between column lines 6 and 8 and adjacent Zone III. The cable trays are immediately separated upon entering Zone II and routed to the several items of equipment served.
FA 14 Zone I
- Cable trays originating in the electrical Cable Spreading Rooms (FA 22 & 23) penetrate the Containment Building Wall above El.
18.00', between columns 6 and 8. The redundant electrical cables are grouped separately and are in a metal enclosure with no redundant cable services routed through the same enclo-sure. The cable fire postulated to occur in Zone I, involves the initiation of combustion within a single metal enclosure 'I due to electrical faulting. There is no equipment located in Zone I in the vicinity of the electrical penetration areas.
There are no inherent external sources of combustion that could expose cables routed through Zone I.
In the fire areas adjacent to Zone I, consisting of FA 22 and 23 in the RAB and FA 14 III in the Containment Building, all elec-trical cables are routed in metal cable trays and sprayed with an approved fire retardant coating, thus preventing the propaga-tion of the fire along the cables into zones outside Fire Area 14I. Therefore, the postulated fire will be contained within the individual penetration metal enclosure and cannot spread to contiguous areas because of the penetration fire stops and the flame retardant coating of cables on either side of the pene-tration.
The postulated fire will result in the loss of function of safe-ty related equipment of a single safety train.* Redundant sys-tems will not be affected. Safe reactor shutdown capability will not be impaired.
9.5A-FA14-5
SL-2 FSAR 6b. Fire Protection Systems Not Operating: (Cont'd)
FA 14 Zone II This area is between the Secondary and the Primary Shield Wall.
It contains the two Steam Generators 2A and 2B and the associat-ed Reactor Coolant Pumps 2Bl, 2B2, 2Al and 2A2.
Access into Zone II is from Zone III at column line 20 into the SG-2A area and at column line 2 into the SG-2B area. The con-centration of combustible materials is limited to lubricating oils associated with sump pumps, RCP snubbers, and RCP motors.
The sump pumps contain two gallons of lube oil and the snubbers contain twelve gallons of lube oil and the RCP's contain 190 gallons of lube oil each.
The postulated fire for Zone II assumes the rupture of the RCP motor 2B2 lubricating oil reservoir, spilling the total 190 gallon reservoir contents on the floor. The RCP's are arranged in a configuration that provides maximum spatial separation between the pumps. Pipe trenches in the floor directly below the RCP's will collect some of the spilled oil. As the oil can-not extend to involve RCP's 2Al & 2A2, they will not be exposed by a postulated fire involving RCP 2B2. RCP 2Bl is 30 feet east of RCP 2B2 and the pump reservoir is located 20 feet above floor grade. Therefore, due to separation, a fire in RCP 2B2 will not impact RCP 2Bl.
The postulated fire may damage instruments TE-1125, LT-9023B and LT-9023D. These instruments are connected to the CE Reactor Protective System which is designed to protect and automatically shutdown the reactor. Their loss will not affect manual shut-down of the reactor and may, in fact, automatically shutdown the reactor. Therefore, reactor shutdown capabilities will not be impaired.
The postulated fire may also impact valves V3651, V3652 and V3645. Valves V3651 and V3652 are in-line valves for one of the two normal shutdown cooling paths from hot leg 2B to LPSI Pump 2B, and V3645 is an intertie valve between the two normal shut-down cooling paths. Loss of these valves will not cause the loss of the shutdown cooling function, since an alternate shut-down cooling path exists between hot leg 2A and LPSI Pump 2A.
Therefore, safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be im-paired. Similarly, the above analysis would apply if a fire is postulated for RC Pump 2A2.
FA 14 Zone III Electrical cables servicing essential equipment required for safe reactor shutdown located in the Reactor Containment Build-ing pass through the annular space FA 14 I into the Cable Pen-etration Area of FA 14 III. Cables serving redundant functions are routed separately in cable trays in accordance with the 9.5A-FA14-6
SL-2 FSAR 6b . Fire *Protection Systems Not Operating: (Cont'd)
- separation and barrier requirements of RG 1.75. Due to lack of combustible materials, other than the electrical cable jacketing and insulation in the Penetration Area, only a cable tray fire is postulated. The fire is postulated to orig-inate in a single cable tray and its effects upon that tray and other adjacent or nearby trays or conduits will be determined.
The cable fire postulated to occur in FA 14 III involves the initiation of combustion within a single cable tray C2213 SA due to electrical faulting. The approved fire retardant coating will essentially prevent the propagation of the fire along the tray in either direction from the point of initiation and will also prevent the fire from extending to adjacent trays. Re-dundant tray C2214 SB (El.40.00'), horizontally separated by 4.5 ft, will not be affected by the postulated fire in cable tray C2213 SA.
The postulated fire is assumed to occur in cable tray C2213 SA at El.40.00' at column line 8. The fire retardant coating will limit the fire to its area of origin. Cables in conduits servi-cing SI Tank 2B2 isolation valve V3644 pass below and beside the postulated fire area and these cables may be impact"ed by the fire. However, personnel under close administrative control could be dispatched to the containment to manually close the impaired SI Tank isolation valve which is required to be closed for normal shutdown of the reactor. Thus, safe reactor shutdown capability could still be achieved.
FA 14 Zone IV This area encompasses the Reactor Vessel Cavity, Refueling Cavity and the upper elevations of the Containment _Building.
Combustible materials in this area are limited to lubricating oil contained in the Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM),
the Refueling Machine and the Reactor Crane. The maximum quantity of oil that could escape is the release of 34 gallons of lubricating oil resulting from the rupture of the Polar Crane Oil Reservoir. During normal operations, the Polar Crane is parked over the Refueling Canal with the trolley of the crane at its east most pos1t1on. Thus, the release and subsequent ignition of lube oil does not expose safety related equipment.
There is a Neutron Steaming Shield on the eastside of the Reactor. It is 13' -6" east of the Reactor centerline and it lies between the north and south sides of the primary shield walls in the refueling canal. It extends upwards from EL.
36.00' and rises to EL.68.00', functionally sealing off the Reactor compartment. The neutron streaming shield is made up of a group of Permali wood panels encased in gage #10 steel sheet boxes. They are approximately 12'-6" long x 2'-9" wide x l'-0 thick and they are set into a rigid structural
- steel frame to create the required shield. They are arranged to
- 9. SA- FA14-7
SL-2 FSAR 6b. Fire Protection Systems Not Operating: (Cont'd) be removable using lifting lugs and they slide in and out of the supporting structural steel guides. Since the wood block is encased, the assembly of steel encased and supported Permali wood panels is not considered to be a significant fire load and no fire will be postulated for this feature.
FA 14 Zone IV does not contain equipment required to safely shutdown the Reactor. Equipment in the _area containsrlimited quantities of combustible materials, which are normally utilized during refueling and maintenance periods. Safety related equip-ment in the adjacent zones are not exposed, thus safe reactor shutdown capability will not be effected by the postulated fire.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
Approved fire retardant coatings are provided on combustible cable insulation of all cable tray installed in FA 14 I, II, III and IV. Ionization type smoke detectors are provided in the Cable Areas. Portable fire extinguishers are provided at strategic locations throughout FA 14 and will be available for use. They are backed up by hose streams from the yard hydrants connected to the yard main system, with the one nearest hydrant being approximately 55 feet from the RCB Maintenance Hatch.
An effective response, by a trained fire brigade, will assist in limiting the consequences of any fire effects. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be adversely effected.
- 9. SA- FA14-8
SL-2 FSAR ATTACHMENT I FIRE AREA 14 ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT
- ZONE I No essential equipment.
ZONE II Pressurizer Heater Bank A Pressurizer Heater Bank B Shutdown Cooling System Iso Valve V3481 Shutdown Cooling System ISO Valve V3651 Shutdown Cooling System Shutoff Valve V3480 Shutdown Cooling System Shutoff Valve V3652 Shutoff Cooling System Crosstie Valve V3545 RC Loop Wide Range Temp Indicators: TE-1115 TE-1125 PB Sta/Elec Box: (PB Sta for V3652)(SA) (B201)*
(PB Sta for V365l)(SB) (B202)*
B2Dl8(SAB) PB Sta for V3545 (B206)*
(PB Sta for V348l)(SA) (B216)*
(PB Sta for V3480(SB) (B217)*
B2229 (MB) (B204)*
B2D22(SAB) (B205)*
B2D03(SA) (B215)*
B2227(MC) (B226)*
B2D02(MC) (B227)*
B2Dl 7(MD) (B236)*
B2Dl3(MD) (B237)*
B2D07(MC) (B239)*
B2D08(MA) (B240)*
B2D01 (MA) (B241)*
B2D09(MD) (B242)*
B2Dl4(MB) (B245)*
B2Dl0(MB) (B246)*
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number
- 9.5A-FA14-9
SL-2 FSAR ZONE III Containment Fan Coolers: 2HVS-1A 2HVS-1B 2HVS-1D Reactor Cavity Cooling Fans: 2HVS-2A 2HVS-3B 2HVS-2A Inlet Damper D-27 2HVS-2B Inlet Damper D-28 Charging Valves: I-SE-02-1 I-SE-02-2 Pressurizer Spray Valve I-SE-02-J I-SE-02-4 Reactor Support Cooling Fans: 2HVE-3A 2HVE-3B Safety Injection Tank Iso Valves: V3614 V3624 V3634 V3644 SG Level Indication: LT9013A (B308)*
LT9013B (B310)*
LT9013C (B307)*
LT9013D (B309)*
LT9023A (B303)*
LT9023B (B305)*
LT9023C (B302)*
LT9023D (B304)*
Pressurizer Level Indication: LT1103 LTlllOX LTlllOY Pressurizer Pressure Indication: PT1102C PB Sta/Elec Box : (PB Sta V3634)(SB) (B210)*
(PB Sta V3644)(SB) (B214)*
(PB Sta V3614)(SA) (B218)*
(PB Sta V3624)(SA) (B224)*
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number.
9.5A-FA14-10
SL-2 FSAR FI:i,IB AREA ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT
- -I ZONE III (Cont'd)
(SB) PB Sta 2HVS-2B (SA) PB Sta 2HVS-1A B2D3l(SA)
B2053(NA) ( PP224)
(B315 )*
(B316)*
(B203)*
(B207)*
B2054(NB) ( PP225) (B208)*
B2Dl6(SB) (B209)*
IR-50-l(MC-NA) (B211)*
IR-51-l(NB) (B212)*
B(later)(SB) (B213)*
B242l(SA) (B219)*
B2420(SB) (B221)*
B2Dl l(MA) (B233)*
B2D04(MD) (B243)*
B2Dl2(MC) (B244)*
B2D05(MB) (B247)*
B2D06(SA) (B248)*
B2394(SB) (B249)*
IR-58-3(MC) (B302)*
IR-59-l(MA) (B303)*
IR-58-2(MD) (B304)*
IR-58-l(MB) (B305)*
B2432(MC) (B306)*
IR-53-5(MC) (B307)*
IR-53-8(MA) (B308)*
IR-53-9(MD) (B309)*
IR-53-6(MB) (B310)*
B2314(MC) (B311)
- B2359(MA) (B312)*
ZONE IV Containment Fan Cooler 2HVS-1C Pressurizer Pressure Indication: PT1102A PT1102B PT1102D PT1103 PT1104 PT1105 PT1106 PB Sta/Elec box: (PB Sta 2HVS-1C)(SB) (B231)*
IR-53-16(MA)(SA) (B228)*
IR-53-7(MB) (B230)*
B2435(MA) (B234)*
B2324(MD) (B235)*
B2D25(MB) (B238)*
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number 9.5A- FA14-ll
- N I' / \
3'-0 RC SHIELD WALL 7'-3 RC PRIMARY SHIELD WALL STEEL CONTAINMENT VESSEL ZONE IV FL EL 21.50' FL EL 23.00 ZONE I 4'-0 RC SECONDARY SHIELD WALL FIRE AREA BOUNDARIES NOTE:
(RC) - REINFORCED CONCRETE FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 FIRE AREA #14 - PLAN VIEW ATTACHMENT 11 9.5A-FA14-12
3'-0 RC SHIELD "WALL STEEL CONTAINMENT VESSEL ZONE IV FL EL 21.50' BJ I ZONE II FL EL 23.00'
- FL EL 62.00' ZONE IV 3' -0 RC STEAM GENERATOR MISSILE SHIELD
{TYP)
ZONE I FIRE AREA BOUNDARIES NOTE:
(RC) - REINFORCED CONCRETE FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 FIRE AREA #14 - PLAN VIEW ATTACHMENT II
~--------~~-- - -***- *-. *----*-----*----
9.5A-FA14-13
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 15
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB Shutdown Heat Exchanger Elev: -0.50' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 4 le. Floor Area: 1520 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
Shutdown Heat Exchanger A Compartment Shutdown Heat Exchanger B Compartment
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Shutdown Heat Exchangers: 2A 2B HVAC Motor Operated Dampers: D-5A (ECCS Exhaust Shutdown Ht Ex 2B)
D-5B (ECCS Exhaust Shutdown Ht Ex 2B)
D-6A (ECCS Exhaust Shutdown Ht Ex 2A)
D-6B* (ECCS Exhaust Shutdown Ht Ex 2A)
D-8A (RAB Supply El - .50' Pipe Tunnel)
D-8B (RAB Supply El - .50' Pipe Tunnel)
Electrical Boxes: B235(SB) (B448)*
B2E89(SA) (B451)*
B2G87(SA) (B472)*
B25l(SB) (B452)*
B2G88(SB) (B43 7 )*
B2G89(SB) (B474)*
B2G90(SA) (B495)*
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils Negligible Jc. Others Negligible Totals Negligible
- 9
- SA-FA 15- 1
SL2-FSAR
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING 5.
Source Negligible FIRE CONTROL Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete II South: 12 II II East: 22 II II "II West: 31 II Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor:
6 Inch Reinforced Concrete on Sand and Cement Fill 2 . . Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification
- 1. HVAC Exhaust 24"xl8" Size (east wall)
Exhaust 32 11 x24" (east wall)
Supply 32"xl0 11 (south wall)
Supply 32"xl0" (south wall)
Exhaust 10"xl4" (south wall)
Exhaust 14"xl0" (south wall)
Backdraft Damper 24"xl2" (south wall)
Supply 26"xl2" (west wall)
- 2. Mechanical Various Pipe penetrations through barrier walls
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit) 9.5A-FA15-2
- SL2-FSAR Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers (Cont'd)
- 4. Area Access En trance is through three doors on the sou.th wall, a watertight door on the north wall and a watertight door on the east wall from FA's 20, 24 and 16 respectively.
Sc. Detection:
None Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary A portable fire extinguisher is located in the northeast corner of the fire area and at the southeast doorway in FA20 (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 4).
- 2. Secondary A hose station is located 10 feet south of this fire area as outlined in drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 4.
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings
- Se.
None Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal.
Exhaust capacity of this system is 2000 cfm which will provide a removal rate of 1.3 cfm/sq ft.
Sf. Drainage:
Four 3 inch floor drains are connected to a common 4 inch drain line leading to Sump Tank 2A located in the northwest corner of FA16.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 15:
Fire Area lS, the shutdown Heat Exchanger Area, is located in thP. RAB at elevation (-).SO' between column lines RAK/RAI, and column line 2-RAlz and a reinforced concrete wall 8 ft north of column line 2-RA3. FAlS is isolated from adjacent Fire Areas 20, 24 and 16 by full height concrete walls, a concrete floor and ceiling all having a fire barrier rating greater than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> .
- 9.SA-FAlS-3
SL2-FSAR 6a. Description of Fire Are.a:' (Cont'd)
Fire Area 15 is divided into two compartments by a partial height full length concrete wall that separates the two re-dundant Shutdown Heat Exchangers 2A & 2B. East of Shutdown Heat Exchange 2A is another partial height wall which forms a corridor with the east fire. area boundary wall.
Separate doors are provided for each compartment on the south wall of Fire Area 15 into the common hall of Fire Area 20.
The corridor through the east side of Fire Area 15 is provided with separate doors for access into Fire Area 20, Fire Area 16, and Fire Area 24 ..
Safe shutdown equipment within FA15 consists of the Shutdown Heat Exchangers 2A and 2B, and exhaust ducts and dampers and their associated electrical cabling and boxes. The function of these safety related dampers is to isolate the normal ventila-tion system from the ECCS Ventilation System during emergency shutdown conditions.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
The combustible inventory in FA15 is comprised of minor quanti-ties of miscellaneous plastics, cables and lube oils inherent in the units served and consists of a negligible fire load.
Therefore, only an inconsequential fire can be postulated for FA15 with no resultant effect on plant operations. In the event of shutdown of the normal ventilation system, the venti-lation requirements of FA15 can be met by utilization of the ECCS ventilation system. Therefore, safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be adversely affected.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
A portable extinguisher is located in the Fire Area and in adjacent FA20, at the southeast doorway. A standpipe hose station is located 10 foot south of this fire area in FA20.
In the unlikely event that a small fire occurs, an effective response by the trained fire brigade, utilizing the nearby available portable ,fire extinguishers and standpipe hose stations, will minimize any fire consequences; Therefore, safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be adversely affected.
9.5A-FA15-4
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2
- 1.
FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 16 (Zone I)
(Also See FA16 Zone II)
DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB ECCS Room Elev: (-)10.00' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 4 le. Floor Area: 2080 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area Partial height wall separates the LPSI Pump 2A from the Containment Spray Pump 2A. Zone I is also separated from Zone II by a partial height wall.
Shutdown Cooling System Valves: V3456(SA)
HCV-3567(SA)
V3517(SA)
HCV-3306(SA)
HCV-361S(SA)
HCV-3625(SA)
HVAC Dampers: D-1 (RAB ECCS Supply)
PB Sta/Elec Box: B2E72(SA) (PB for V3456, HCV3657, HCV3306) (B403)*
B2G07(SA) (PB for HCV3615, HCV3625) (B426)*
B2G06(SA) (PB for HCV-3517) (B407)*
B2029(SA) (PB for LPSI Pump 2A) (B420)*
B2E70(SA) (B402)*
B263(SA) (B422)*
B2E74(SA) (B404)*
B256(SA) (B423)*
B253(SA) (B401)*
B2G09(SA) (B424)*
B2G03(SA) (B405)*
B2G08(SA) (B425)*
B2G04(SA) (B406)*
B2354(SA) (B456)*
B261( SA) (B421 )*
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number
- 9.5A-FA16-1
SL2-FSAR
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS 3a.
3b.
Source Cable Insulation Oils Quantity Negligible (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
LPSI and HPSI Pump 14 gal 1. 96xl0 6 .98xl0 3 CS Pump 6 .49xl0 3 7 gal .98xl0 Reactor Drain Pump 2A & 2B 1 gal .14xl0 6 .07xl0 3 Sump Pump 2A & 2B 2 gal .28xl0 6 .14xl0 3 3c. Others Grease: (15) M.O. Valves 135 lbs 2.Sx10 6 1. 28xl0 3 Neoprene boots 125 lbs 2.SxlO 6 l.28xl0 3 Totals 8.36xl0 6 4.24xl0 3
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING 4a. Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Lube Oil LPSI Pump 7 gal . 98xl0 6 7xl0 3
- 5. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 42 Inch Reinforc~d Concrete South: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete (Partial Height)
East: 18 Inch Reinforced Concrete West: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 6 Inch Reinforced Concrete on Sand Fill.
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Exhaust 24"xl0" (west wall)
Supply 14"xl0" (roof) 9.SA-FA16-2
SL2-FSAR 5b . Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers (Cont'd)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls and roof.
- 3. Electrical All penetrations will be sealed to a fire rating equiv-alent to the fire barrier wall.
- 4. Area Access Entrance is through a watertight door on west wall and via stairways and platforms* from Zone II.
5c. Detection None 5d. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There is one fire extinguisher in FA 16I, one in the passageway of FA 15, and at least two in the common
- 2.
hallway of FA 20 (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 4).
Secondary There are two standpipe hose stations in the adjacent hallway of FA 20 (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 4).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation (for both Zones 16I and II) will be used for smoke removal. Exhaust capacity of this system is 10,000 cfm which will provide a removal rate of 2.45 cfm/sq ft.
Twenty-five thousand cfm is available on loss of offsite power.
Sf. Drainage:
Four 3 inch floor drains are connected to a common 3 inch drain line leading to Sump Tank 2A in the northwest corner of this Fire Area .
- 9.5A-FA16-3
SL2-FSAR
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE (THIS ANALYSIS APPLIES TO ZONES I and II) 6a. Description of Fire Areas 16 I and II:
The Safety Injection Pump room, located in the RAB at El
(-)10.00', has been separated into two zones each containing train A and B redundant safety equipment. The two zones are separated by a partial 'height wall, ranging in height from 9.5 ft to 20 ft (20 ft from column lines RAI to RAG and 9.5 ft from RAG to RAE). Each zone contains one Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump, one Containment Spray Pump, and one High Pressure Safety Injection Pump. Only the LPSI Pump is required for safe shutdown. This equipment is serviced by the normal RAB ventilation supply and exhaust systems (2HVE-10A&B and 2HVS - 4A&B) including motorized dampers, and the ECCS ventila-tion systems (2HVE-9 A&B). The valves, operators, pushbutton stations, instrumentation and electrical boxes for each redundant system are also located in the same zone as their associated equipment. There is also a 12.5 foot high partial height, concrete wall traversing Zones I and II for their full width, separating LPSI Pump 2A from the CS Pump 2A and also LPSI Pump 2B from CS Pump 2B. Therefore, redundancy of the essential equipment located within each zone is provided by design and separation by the partial height walls dividing the two zones and the pumps as indicat.ed.
6b.
Access/egress for Fire Zones 16 I and II is provided through doors and interior open platforms and stairways from the passageway. in FA 15 and the common corridor in FA 20.
Fire Protection System Not Operating:
In order to determine the.effects upon redundant equipment located within FA 16, a worst case fire is postulated to occur in each zone and the possibility of adverse affects upon the redundant equipment in the other zone is investigated.
The major combustibles within each zone are limited to lube oil contained in the pump reservoirs. Other combustibles in each zone are the grease contained within MOV's (15 per zone),
. and neoprene boots provided for the mechanical piping penetra-tions. The largest single source of combustibles in either zone is the seven gallons of lube oil contained in each LPSI, HPSI and CS pump. Since only the LPSI pump is required for safe reactor shutdown, the loss of lube oil from either LPSI pump 2A or 2B is considered as the worst condition.
For Zone I, which contains LPSI Pump 2A, the seven gallons of lube oil is assumed to be lost from the bearing reservoirs and spreads over approximately 140 sq ft (20 sq ft/gal spread factor). The oil spill will form a film of approximately .1 inches in depth and will be spread around the LPSI pump pedestal. The oil is assumed to ignite and burn continuously 9.5A-FA16-4
SL2-FSAR 6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating: (Cont'd) until all the lube oil is consumed. Further growth of fire, due to additional combustibles becoming involved, will be neg-ligible, since it would be limited to the grease contained with-in three MOV's directly exposed to the postulated fire. The piping penetration boots will not become involved due to their physical location and separation. The lube oil contained in the other pump reservoirs in the zone will not become involved due to the physical containment and spatial separation.
The postulated fire will be of short duration and the localized temperature will be moderate due to the limited amount of com-bustibles involved and the restricted growth of the fire. The redundant LPSI Pump 2B and associated valves, controls and cabling are located more than 15 feet south of the partial height wall separating the two zones. The wall prevents oil from spreading into Zone II, and the natural flow of hot gases will be upward and out of the fire area, assisted by the 10,000 cfm exhaust capacity of the 2HVE-10A or lOB systems (this sys-tem is not available during loss of offsite power). If offsite power is assumed lost coincidental with the postulated fire (worst case), the exhaust from the area is 25,000 cfm produced by the isolation of the normal exhaust system and manual start-up of the 2HVE-9A or 9B exhaust systems. The exhaust duct inlets for 2HVE-9A and 9B exhaust system are located between and away from the two redundant LPSI pumps and therefore the hot gases and smoke would be exhausted from the fire area before they could approach and impact LPSI Pump 2B.
Due to the 20' high wall isolating the two Zones, the spatial separation provided, the limited amount of exposed combustibles available, and the normal and ECCS exhaust ventilation systems in the Zones, the operability of the redundant LPSI Pump 2B and its associated valves, controls and cabling will not be impaired.
Due to the similarities of the layouts of Zone I and II of FA 16, the worst case postulated fire for Zone II, following the methodology utilized above, will not adversely affect redundant essential equipment in Zone I.
Due to the low combustible loading of FA 16, the limited com-bustibles involved in the postulated fires and the lack of con-tinuity of combustibles, adjacent FA's 15, 24, 18 and 20 will not be affected by the above postulated fires in FA16I or 16II.
Due to the short duration of the fires postulated above, no damage to the integrity of HVAC duct work or to the operability of the system involved will occur.
To initiate shutdown cooling of the RCS, either redundant LPSI Pump 2A or 2B and their associated valves and controls are re-
- quired to be operational. The postulated fires discussed above will not result in the loss of function of both redundant pumps
- 9. SA- FA16- 5
SL2-FSAR 6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating(Cont'd) 6c.
and their associated valves and c~ntrols, and therefore safe reactor shutdown capabilities will be maint.ained.
Fire Protection System Operating:
There is one fire extinghisher in FA 16, one in the passageway in FA 15 and at least two in the common hallway in FA 20.
There are two available standpipe hose stations located in the adjacent common hallway of FA 20; one (HS-15-28) is adjacent to column lines 2-RA3/RAG and one (HS-15-43) is adjacent to column lines 2-RA3/RAK. An effective response, by the trained fire brigade, utilizing the nearby available portable fire ex-tinguishers and standpipe hose stations, will minimize the consequences' of any fire effects. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be adversely affected.
/
q.SA-FA16-6
SL2-FSAR
- 1.
ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 16 (ZONE II)
(ALSO SEE FA 16 ZONE I)
DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB ECCS Room Elev: ( - ) 10. 00' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 4 le. Floor Area: 2000 sq ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area Partial height wall separates the LPSI Pump 2B from the Containment Spray Pump 2B. Zone II is also separated from Zone I by a partial height wall.
Shutdown Cooling System Valves: V3457(SB)
HCV-3635(SB)
HCV-3465(SB)
V3658(SB)
HCV-3512(SB)
HCV-3301( SB)
HVAC Dampers: D-3 (ECCS Supply)
D-4 (ECCS Supply)
D-9A (ECCS Exhaust)
D-9B (ECCS Exhaust)
Elec. Box: B2E72 (B403)*
B2G07 (B426)*
B2G06 (B407)*
B2029 (B420)*
B2E70 (B402)*
B263 (B422)*
B2E74 (B404)*
B256 (B423)*
B253 (B401)*
B2G09 (B424)*
B2G03 (B405)*
B2G08 ( B425) i*
B2G04 (B406)*
B2354 (B456)*
B261 (B42l)i*
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number
- 9, 5A-FA~6 (II)-1
SL2-FSAR
- 3. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL LOADINGS Quantity (Btu) (Btu sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils HPSI and LPSI Pump 14 gal 6 3 l.96xl0 .98 x 10 CS Pump 6 3 7 gal . 98xl0 .49 x 10 Sump Pump 2Bl and 2B2 2 gal .28xl0 6 .14 x 10 3 3c. Others Grease (IS) M.O.
Valves 13S lbs 2. SOxl0 6 1.28 x 103 6 3 Neoprene Boots 12S lbs 2.SOxlO 1.28 x 10 3
Totals 8.22xl0 6 4.lxlO
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING 4a Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu sq ft)
Lube Oil LPSI Pump 2B 7 gal .98xl0 6 . 7xl0 3
- s. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete (Partial Height)
II II II South: 24 II II East: 18 II II II II West: 12 Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 6 Inch Reinforced Concrete on Sand and Cement Fill
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Supply 48 11 xl8 11 (east wall)
Exhaust S2 11 xl6 11 (east wall)
Supply 28 x8 11 (south wall) 11
- 9. SA-FA16 (II)-2
SL2-FSAR Exhaust 20"xl2" (south wall)
Supply 36"x8" (south wall)
Supply 20"xl0" (south wall)
Exhaust 48"x20" (west wall)
Supply 32"x24" (west wall)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls and roof.
- 3. Electrical All penetrations will be sealed to a fire rating equivalent to the fire barrier wall.
- 4. Area Access Entrance is through a watertight door on the west wall and two watertight doors on the south wall.
Sc. Detection None Sd. Fire Protection Systems L Primary There is one fire extinguishers in FA 16I, one in the passageway of FA lS, and at least two in the common hall-way of FA 20 (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 4).
- 2. Secondary There are two standpipe hose stations in the adjacent common hallway of FA 20 (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 4).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting Normal area ventilation (for both Zones 16I and II) will be used for smoke removal. Exhaust capacity of this system is 10,000 cfm which will provide a removal rate of 2.S cfm/sq ft.
Twenty-five thousand cfm is available on loss of offsite power.
Sf. Drainage Four 3 inch floor drains are connected to a common 3 inch
- drain leading to Sump Tank 2B in the southeast corner of this fire area.
9.SA-FA16(II)-3
SL2-FSAR
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE See write-up for Zone I.
9.SA-FA16(Il)-4
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 17
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Buiiding: RAB Boric Acid Tank Area *Elev (-) 0.50' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 4 le. Floor Area: 450 sq ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Boric Acid Make-Up Tanks: 2A 2B BAMT 2A Heaters: Bank A(SA)
Bank B(SB)
BAMT 2B Heaters: Bank A(SA)
Bank B(SB)
BAMT Transfer Pump Discharge Valve, V2514(SA)
BAMT Gravity Feed Valves: V2508(SB)
V2509(SB)
PB Sta/Elec Box: B2939(SB) (B434)*
B2C78(SA) (B432)*
B2941(SB) (B433 )*
B2C62(SA) (B442)*
B2C77(SB) (B435)*
B2940(SA) (B436)*
B2734(SA) (B443)*
(PB Sta for V-2508, V2509)
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number 9.SA-FA17-1
SL2-FSAR
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils BA Make-Up Pump 2A & 2B 2 gal .28xl0 6 .62 x 10 3 3c. Others Grease: M.O. Valves 27 lbs .SOxl0 6 1.11 x 10 3 Totals 0.78xl0 6 1. 73 x 10 3
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3 Lube Oil BA Make-Up Pump 1 gal. .14xl0 6 7 .Oxl0 S. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 24 II II II East: 24 II II II II West: 24 II II Ceiling: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 6 Inch Reinforced Concrete on sand and cement fill.
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Exhaust Air 20 11 x 12 11 (North Wall)
Exhaust Air 18 11 x 14" (South Wall) 9.SA-FA17-2
SL2-FSAR
- 2. Mechanical
- 3.
Various pipe penetrations through walls and ceiling.
Electrical None (embedded conduit)
- 4. Area Access Entrance into the area is through a doorway on the west wall at El.(-).SO' and through a doorway on the south wall at El.19.SO' Sc. Detection:
None Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There are two accessible portable fire extinguishers at elevation (-).SO' in the common hallways of FA 19 and FA 20. There are also two accessible fire extinguishers at elevation 19 . .50', in the common hallway of FA Sl.
(See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, Sheets .4 and S) .
- 2. Secondary There is a standpipe hose station at elevation (-).SO' adjacent FA 19 and a standpipe hose station at elevation 19.SO' in adjacent FA Sl (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, Sheets 4 and S).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal. Exhaust capacity of this systems is 31SO cfm which will provide a re-moval rate of 7.0 cfm/sq ft.
Sf. *nrainage:
Two 3 inch floor drains are connected to a common 4 inch drain line leading to the sump tank 2B in the* southeast corner of FA 16 .
- 9.5A-FA17-3
SL2-FSAR
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 17:
Fire Area 17, the Boric Acid Make-Up Tank Area, is located in the RAB between column lines RAF/RAD and between column lines 2-RA3z/2-RA4 and it extends from El.(-) 0.50' to the underside of the floor at El.43.00'. FA 17 is accessible from FA 19 through an open passageway at elevation(-) 0.50' where the Boric Acid Make-Up Pumps 2A and 2B and associated mechan-ical and electrical equipment can be serviced, and FA 51 through an open passageway at El.19.50' from where a grated platform *surrounding the tanks can be reached. The tanks are set on a concrete floor at El.12.08' which separates the tank compartment from the pump compartment below at EL.(-)0.50'.
The two gravity feed valves are above El.12.08' and are reached by an internal ladder from El.19.50'. The pump discharge valve is located above El. (-)0.50' and is reached from that level.
The entire area is completely separated from adjacent fire areas with greater than 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated walls, floor and ceiling, except for the two open passageways. The compartment is ventilated by non-safety related exhaust ducts. The shut-down equipment in this area consists of the redundant BAMT's 2A and 2B, Tank Heaters 2A and 2B, Boric Acid Make-Up Pumps 2A and 2B, Gravity Valves V2508(SB), V2509(SB) and Pump Discharge Valve V2514 (SA).
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
The two Boric Acid Make-Up Pumps are located next to each other on separate pedestals at El.(-)0.50'. Each pump contains ap-proximately 1 gallon of lubricating oil. A fire will be postu-lated in this area assuming that the one gallon of lubricating oil escapes from the pump reservoir and the oil spreads over a 20 sq ft area (spread factor of 20 sq ft/gal). The oil is as-sumed to ignite and continues to burn until completely consumed.
The quantity of oil is small. However, the resulting fire may expose, for a short time period, both pumps and the electric motor operated Pump Discharge Valve V2514 (SA), which controls the discharge flow from the BA Make-Up Pumps on loss of normal power and is normally in the closed position. Elec-tric power to operate the valve motor is obtained from the SA cable tray train. In addition, the heat trace circuits on the suction and discharge lines of the pump may also be impacted.
Assuming failure, due to the postulated fire, the BA Make-Up Pumps, the Pump Discharge Valve and the local heat trace cir-cuits will cease to function.
Due to the small quantity of oil, and the lack of continuity of combustibles and the separating floor at El.12.08', no other equipment located above the floor at El.12.08' will be damaged.
Alternate means of introducing the contents of the Boric Acid Make-Up Tank into the CVCS is provided through gravity feed,
- 9. SA-FAl 7-4
SL2-FSAR 6b . Fire Protection System Not Operating: (Cont'd)
- Motor Operated Valves V2508 (SB) and V2509 (SB) and the associated heat traced pipes located above the floor at El.12.08'.
Conversely, an alternate fire could be postulated for El.12.08' to involve one or both of the gravity feed valves and associat-ed equipment. This would not expose any of the essential equipment below, therefore the introduction of boric acid into the CVCS Loop will remain operational. The analysis of in-volvement would be similar to the description above.
The postulated oil fires will not result in the loss of redun-dant equipment available to inject the contents of the Tanks in the eves, therefore, safe reactor shutdown capabilities will be maintained.
In the unlikely event that the contents of the Boric Acid Make-Up Tanks 2A and 2B cannot be introduced into the CVCS, an alternate supply of borated water is available from the Refuel-ing Water Tank.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
There are two accessible fire extinguishers at El.(-)0.50';
one in the common hallway of FA20 and one in the common hallway
- of FA 19. There is one available standpipe hose station at El.(-)0.50', (HS-15-41) at column lines 2-RA3z/RAC, located in the adjacent common hallway of FA 19. There are two acces-sible fire extinguishers at El.19.50' in the common hallway of FA 51. There's one available standpipe hose station at El.19.50' (HS-15-38)located in the common hallway of FA 51. An effective response, by the trained fire brigade, utilizing the nearby portable fire extinguishers and standpipe hose stations, will assist in limiting the consequences of any fire effects.
Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be adversely affected .
- 9.5A-FA17-5
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 18 (ZONES I, II, III)
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB Charging Pump Area Elev:(-) 0.50' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 4 le. Floor Area: 1130 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
Zone I Charging Pump 2A Zone II Charging Pump 2B Zone III Charging Pump 2C
- 2. ESSENTIAL SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA 18I Charging Pump 2A(SA)
,Charging Pump 2A Instrument~: PIS-2224X (B460)*
PB Sta/Elec Box: B2C49(SA) (B459)*
B2357(SA) (B461)*
B2C57(SA) (B427)*
- 18II Charging Pump 2B (SB)
Charging Pump 2B Instruments: PIS-2224Y PB Sta/Elec Box: B2C50(SB)
B2355(SB)
B2C53(SB)
(B463)*
(B464)*
(B428)*
B2362(SA) (B462)*
B2397(SB) (B465)*
18III Charging Pump 2C(SAB)
CVCS/RWT intertie Valve V2504(NB)
Charging Pump 2C Instruments: PIS-2224Z PB Sta/Elec Box: B2C5l(SAB) (B430 )*
B283l(SB) PB Sta for*
V2504 (B431)*
B2C54(SAB) (B429)*
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number
- 9.5A:...FA18-l
SL2-FSAR
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity Btu Btu/sq ft 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils Lube Oil Charging Pumps 2A, 2B & 2C 30 gal 4.2xl0 6 3.7xl0 3 3c. Others Grease (9) M.O.Valves 81 lbs 1. Sxl0 6 l.3xl0 3 Elec. Flex Conn. 3 lbs .06xl0 6 3
.OSxlO Totals S. 76xl0 6 S.OSxlO 3
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
(1) Charging Pump Lube Oil 10 gal l.4xl0 6 7.0xlO 3
- s. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 24 Inch Reinforced* Concrete Block Wall East: 36 Inch Reinforced Concrete West: 18 Inch Reinforced Concrete Ceiling: 30 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete on Sand Cement Fill
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Exhaust S2" x 16" (North Wall)
- 9. SA-FA18-2
SL2-FSAR Identification Size
- 2.
Supply Exhaust Mechanical 48" x 18" (North Wall) 38" x 16" (East Wall)
Various pipe penetrations through walls and ceilings.
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area Access Entrance is through a water tight door in the north wall leading into Zone III from FA 24 and a doorway on the south wall leading into Zone I from FA 20.
Sc. Detection:
None Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There are four accessible extinguishers: one in FA 24, and three in the common hallway of FA's 19 and 20 (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 4).
- 2. Secondary There are two available standpipe hose stations in the common hallway of FA's 19 and 20 (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 4).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area vent:llation will be used for smoke removal. Exhaust capacity of this system is 4SSO cfm which will provide a re-moval rate of 4.0 cfm/sq ft.
Sf. Drainage:
Three 3 inch floor drains (one floor drain in each zone) are connected to a common 4 inch drain leading to the Sump Tank 2B
- in the southeast corner of FA16.
9.SA-FA18-3
SL2-FSAR
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 18:
Fire Area 18, the Charging Pump Area, is located in the RAB at elevation (-)0.50' between column lines 2-RA3 and 2-RAlz, and 12 feet west of column line RAC and at column line RAE. FA 18 is isolated from adjacent fire areas by full height reinforced concrete and concrete block walls, concrete floor and roof, all having a greater than three hour fire rating.
FA18 is divided into three zones by partial concrete block walls which separate the three redundant charging pumps from each other and the common hall.
Area access to FA18 is through doors on the north and south sides of the fire area which lead to a hallway common to each charging pump compartment. There are open labyrinths leading from the hallway to each compartment.
Shutdown equipment in FA18 consists of Charging Pumps 2A, 2B and 2C, and related cables and controls, the CVCS/RWT Inter-tie Valve, located in the charging pump 2C's compartment, and the normal ventilation duct system and associated equipment.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
Each of the charging pumps contains approximately 10 gallons of lubricating .oil in its self contained bearing oil system.
The postulated fire fbr FA18 involves the loss of 10 gallons of lube oil from one charging pump lube oil reservoir, and the spreading out of this oil within the curbed cubicle.. The floor area of each compartment is approximately 280 sq ft and the entire 10 gallons of lube oil will spread over approximately 200 sq ft., (assuming a 20 sq ft/gallon spread factor) and will be contained within the curbed compartment. The oil is assumed to ignite and continues to burn until completely consumed.
Due to the small quantity of combustibles involved in the postulated fire, the expected short duration of the fire, the separation provided by the partial height walls, the distances separating the pumps (approximately 16feet between centerline of the pumps), the adequate ventilation which will exhaust the res~lting combustion products and gases, and the lack of continuity of combustible materials, the postulated fire will not result in the loss of function of either of the other two available charging pumps located in FA18. Therefore, safe reactor shutdown capabilities will be maintained.
If the postulated fire were to occur in the compartment con-taining Charging Pump 2C, the remote operability of the CVCS/
RWT Intertie could be adversely affected, but this valve is not required for a normal shutdown as an alternate source of water
- 9. 5A-FA18-4
SL2-FSAR
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE (Cont'd)
- will be available for the RCS shrink make-up. Therefore, safe reactor shutdown capabilities will be maintained.
Due to the small quantity of combustibles involved in the postulated fire and the physical configuration of the compart-ments, no adverse involvement in adjacent FA's 19, 16, 20 and 24 is postulated.
The postulated oil fire described above will not result in the loss of more than one of the three redundant charging pumps and therefore, safe reactor shutdown capabilities will be main-tained.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
There are four accessible fire extinguishers: one in FA24, and three in the common hallway of FA's 19 & 20. There are two available standpipe hose stations located in the adjacent com-mon hallway of FA's 19 and 20; (HS-15-41) at column lines 2-RA3z/RAC and (HS-15-28) at column lines 2-RA3z/RAG. An effective response, by the trained fire brigade, utilizing the nearby portable fire extinguishers and standpipe hose stations, will assist in limiting the consequences of any fire effects. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be adversely affected .
- 9. SA--~ J;.l S-5
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 19
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB East Hallway and Misc Equipment Areas Elev: -0.50' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 4 le. Floor Area: 6920 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
Partitioned areas containing the following equipment: Gas Surge Tank, Waste Gas Compressors, Gas Decay Tanks, Spent Resin Tank, BA Condensate tanks, BA Holding Tank, BA Holding Pumps, BA Con-densate Pumps, Hold-Up Tank Dr. Pump, Hold-Up Tank Recircula-tion Pumps.
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA (To Control Radiological Release)
Gaseous Effluent Monitor RE-6648(NA)
RE-6648 Isolation Valve FCV-6565(NB)
Liquid Effluent Monitor RE-6627(NA)
RE-6627 Isolation Valves: FCV-6627X(NA)
FCV-6627Y(NA)
Electrical Box: B2E23(SB) (B4 71)*
B2388(NA) (B454)*
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS*
Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation 246 x 10 8 355 x 10 4 3b. Oils Misc Pumps, Motors &
. 8 Compressor 11 gal .015 x 10 .02 x 10 4 3c. Others (3) M.O. Valves 27 lbs .005 x 108 . 007 x 10 4 Totals 246 x 10 8 355 x 104
- 9.5A-FA19-1
SL2-FSAR
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Condensate Recovery Pump Cable Tray
- See Methodology Quantity 1 gal (Btu)
.14 x 10 6
(Btu/sq ft) 7 x lo;*
114 x 10
- S. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. The Fire Area Boundary Walls North:
South: (See Attachment I)
East:
West:
Ceiling: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete (minimum)
Floor: 6 Inch Reinforced Concrete on Sand Cement
.Fill
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification
- 1. HVAC (See Attachment I)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and ceiling
- 3. Electrical All electrical tray penetrations are sealed to a fire rating equivalent to the barrier wall.
- 4. Area Access Entrance into the area is provided by the open stairway 2RA-3 leading to FA Sl at EL. 19.SO', the doorway to FA 18, the open doorway to FA 17 and the hallway to FA 20 .
9.SA-FA19-2
- SL2-FSAR Sc . Detection:
- Sd.
Ionization type detectors, which are located over all cable trays traversing this area, will initiate an alarm in the Control Room should a fire occur.
Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There are two accessible fire extinguishers in the common hallway of FA 19 (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 4).
- 2. Secondary There is a available standpipe hose station located in the common hallway of FA 19 (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 4).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings Flamemastic fire retardant coating 1s sprayed on all cable trays.
Se. Smoke Venting:
Norm.al area ventilation will be used for smoke removal. The average exhaust capacity of this system is 1.4 cfm/sq. ft.
Sf. Drainage:
Eleven 3 inch floor drains are connected to the Sump Tank 2B in the southeast corner of FA 16 II. All subspaces within this FA have a minimum of one 3 inch floor drain.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 19:
Fire Area 19 is located at El. (-)0.SO' at the east end of the RAB and includes the Gas Decay Tanks and Compressors, Gas Surge Tank, the Spent Resin tank, the Boric Acid Condensate Tanks and Pumps, the Boric Acid Holding tank and Pumps, the Boric Acid Preconcentrator Filters, the Hold-Up Drain and Recirculation Pumps and the Condensate Recovery Pumps. The common hallway of FA 19 is open to the common hallway of FA 20 at column line RAD. The perimeter walls of this irregular area are rated with a fire resistance rating of greater than three hours. Most walls servicing the various internal areas segregate the diverse functions are full height, greater than three hour rated walls. Some areas have partial height walls, open doors and open hallways. Areas included are between column lines
- RAA/RAF and 2-RAl/2-RAS. Access and egress for FA 19 is provided through the open stairway 2RA-3 leading to FA Sl 9.SA-FA19-3
SL2-FSAR 6a. Description of Fire Area: (Cont'd) at El. 19.5', the doorway to FA 18, the open doorway to FA 17, and the open hallway to FA 20. Equipment in FA 19 includes the valves, instrumentation and boxes servicing the Gas Decay tank and Compressor Areas, the Spent Resin tank Areas and the safety related cable trays routed through these areas. The normal RAB Ventilation System services this area with safety related supply ducts and non-safety related exhaust ducts.
The radiation dose rate levels may range from a low of 2.5 MR/HR for the common hallway *open areas and up to 100 MR/HR in the Gas Decay Tank* and Compressor Compartments, the Spent Resin Tank Compartment and the Boric Acid Holding Tank Compartment.
The systems in the high radiation dose rate level compartments are not required for safe shutdown, and they are serviced by related mechanical and electrical processing, monitoring and instrumentation equipment.
6b. Fire Protectio.n System Not Operating:
The separate fire load conditions in FA19 include nine small pumps associated with the Boric Acid and Waste Management Systems, each containing approximately one gallon of lube oil; two Waste Gas Compressors, also containing approximately one gallon of lube oil; and various cable trays and conduits containing safety related cables. Two fires will be postu-lated for this area. One will be an oil fire resulting from oil leakage from the largest single source to determine the effects upon safety related cable trays and equipment, and the other will be a fire postulated to occur within a cable tray to determine effects upon other adjacent or nearby cable trays or conduits.
Most of the small pumps and the compressors are segregated from the cable trays and conduits by physical distance and partial or full height walls. The one gallon of oil contained in the pump is postulated to be released and will spread over approxi-mately 20 square feet (spread factor of 20 sq ft/gal.) The oil is assumed to ignite and continues to burn until completely consumed.
Due to the small quantity of oil involved in the postulated fire, and the lack of continuity of combustible materials, the postulated fire will .not result in the loss of function of any essential equipment. Therefore, safe reactor shutdown capabilities will be ma:i,.ntained. No significant radioactive release will occur.
Various cable trays. and conduits traverse FA 19. All cables in cable trays will be covered with an approved flame retardant coating. Cable tray design and cable routing within trays meets the separation and barrier requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75. The cable fire postulated to occur in FA 19, involves the 9.5A-FA19-4
SL2-FSAR 6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating: (Cont'd)
- initiation of combustion within a single cable tray due to elec-trical faulting within the subject tray. There are no sources of combustion from adjacent fire areas that could directly expose cable trays routed through FA 19. Also, no redundant essential cable services are routed in the same trays. The flame retardant coating will essentially prevent the propagation of the fire along the tray in either direction from the point of initiation and will prevent the fire from jumping to adjacent cable trays.
Therefore, the postulated cable fire will be contained within a single tray near its area of origin and only cable located within that tray could be damaged or lost.
Since redundant safety related or essen~ial cables are routed in separate flame retardant coated trays, no loss of redundant essential equipment could occur due to the postulated cable tray fire and, therefore, safe reactor shutdown capabilities will be maintained.
Due to the limited propagation of either of the two postulated fires, no adverse effects will occur in adjacent areas.
The principal effect of the postulated fires on the piping and equipment of the Waste Gas System and the Boric Acid System located in FA 19 would be the impairment of valve packings or flange gaskets which would result in minor release of radio-active gaseous or liquid wastes and boric acid solution at connections in the piping. The liquid released would flow via floor drains to the Waste Management System for processing and gaseous releases would be entrained by the Normal RAB Exhaust System and filtered by prefilters and HEPA filters prior to release to atmosphere. Thus, there will be no adverse radio-active release to the atmosphere and space habitability in FA 19 and adjacent Fire Areas will be maintained.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
The principal fire protection feature in FA 19 is the flame retardant coating applied to all cable trays which is a con-tinuous defen~e against exposure fires and also a defense against fire propagation within the cable trays. This system is augmented by two zones of ionization type detectors covering the area which provides annunciation in the Control Room.
There are two accessible fire extinguishers in the common hallway of FA 19, one near the 2-RA3 stairway and one near the entrance to the Gas Decay Tank Area. There is one available standpipe hose station (HS-15-41) located in the common hallway near stairway 2-RA3. An effective response, by the trained fire brigade, utilizing the nearby portable fire extinguishers and standpipe hose stations, will assist in limiting the con-sequences of any fire effects. Safe reactor shutdown capabil-ities will not be adversely affected .
9.5A-FA19-5
SL2-FSAR 6c. Fire Protection System Operating: (Cont'd)
Protective suiting against radioactivity will be required by fire fighting personnel in the unlikely event of a fire in the Gas Decay Tank and Compressor Compartments, the Spent Resin Tank Compartment or the Boric Acid Holding Tank compart-ment. However, since the postulated fires involve a small amount of combustibles, either one gallon .of oil or a short circuit of a single conductor in a flame retardant coated cable tray, the fire will quickly self extinguish or be prompt-ly suppressed by the effective response of the trained plant fire brigade. There will be no adverse radiological release to the atmosphere and space habitability will be maintained .
9.SA-FA19-6
- /\
\
\
30" RC I \.
30" RC---'""'
OPEN--....
42" 24" RC 19 RC 24" RC
- FL EL (-) 0.50' 36" RC HVAC PENETRATIONS NOTE:
NO. SIZE DESCRIPTION ALL WALLS REINFORCED 1 20x12 RETURN AIR CONCRETE(RC)OR CONCRETE BLOCK.
2 36x18 SUPPLY AIR 3 38x16 RETURN AIR FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 FIRE AREA #19 - PLAN VIEW ATTACHMENT I 9.SA-FA19-7
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR*FIRE AREA NO. 20
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB East-West Common Hallway Elev: (-).SO' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-708, Sheet 4 le. Floor Area: 6600 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
Partitioned areas containing the following equipment:
Waste Condensate Tank, Waste Condensate Pumps, Equipment Dra"in Tank, Chemical Drain Tank, .Chemical Drain Pumps, Equipment Drain Pumps, Aerated Waste Storage Tank.
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA BAMT 2A Heater Controls: TIC-2206(SA)(B2C60) (B447)*
TIC-2207(SB)(B2C60)
BAMT 2A Level Controls: LIT/LIA 2206(SA)(IR-31-1A) (B446)*
BAMT 2B Heater Controls: TIC-2208(SA)(B2C79) (B444)*
TIC-2209(SA)(B2C79)
BAMT 2B Level Controls: LIT/LIA2208(SB)(IR-31-2A) (B44S)*
D-7B(SB)
D-llA(SA)
D-llB(SB)
Electrical Box: Valve Box for V2Sl4(SA) (B437)*
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number.
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation MCC 2A-2 & 2B-2 .06xl0 6 9 3b. Oils Misc. Pumps & Motors 10 gal 1. 40xl0 6 212
- 9. SA- FA20- l
SL2-FSAR
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS (Cont'd) 3c. Others Grease: M.O. Valves Neoprene Connections 27 lbs S lbs
.SOx!0 6
.OSxlO 6
76 6
Totals 2.0lxl0 6 303
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Bty) (Btu/sq ft)
Equip. Dr. Pump & Motor 1 gal .14xl0 6 7xl0 3 S. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North:
South: (See Attachment I)
East:
West:
Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete (minimum)
Floor: 6 Inch Reinforced Concrete on Sand Cement Fill
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification
- 1. HVAC See Attachment I
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and ceiling.
- 3. Electrical All tray penetrations will be sealed to a fire rating equivalent to the barrier wall.
9.SA-FA20-2
SL2-FSAR 5b. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers: (Cont'd)
- 5c.
Detection:
Ionization type detectors will initiate an alarm in the Control Room should a fire occur.
5d. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary
. There are three accessible fire extinguishers in the common hallway of FA 20. Also, the common hallway of FA 19 has two additional fire extinguisher. See drawing SK-2998-M-70.8, Sheet 4 for fire extinguisher locations.
- 2. Secondary There are two standpipe hose stations in FA 20 and one standpipe hose station in the adjacent common hallway of FA 19. See drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 4 for hose*
station locations. *
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings All electrical cable trays are sprayed with Flamemastic fire protective coating.
Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal. Aver-age exhaust capacity of these systems is 1.4 cfm/sq ft.
Sf. Drainage:
Floor Drains (Qty) Location Description 2 Chem. Dr Tk Floor Drains connect to and Pump Area common 3 inch drain lead-ing to Chemical Drain Sump Tank in southwest corner of FA20 7 Common Hallway west All floor drains connect of col. line RAG to a common 4 inch drain leading to Sump Tank 2A in the northwest corner of FA16 I I 9.5A-FA20-3
.SL2-FSAR 5f. Drainage: (Cont'd)
Floor Drains (Qty) 2 Location Equip. Dr Tk and Pump Area Description All floor drains connect to a common 4 inch drain leading to Sump Tank 2A in the northwest corner of FA16 II 2 Waste Con. Tk and All floor drains connect Pump Area to a common 4 inch drain leading to Sump Tank 2A in the northwest corner of FA16 II 1 Equip. Dr Pump Area All floor drains connect to a common 4 inch drain leading to Sump Tank 2A in the northwest corner of FA16 II 1 Laundry Dr Tk and Floor drain connects to Pump Area Laundry Sump Tank* in south end of FA20 6.
I Common Hallway east of col. line RAG ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE Floor drain connects to Sump Tank 2B in southeast side of FA16 I 6a. Description of Fire Area 20:
Fire Area 20 is located at El (-).50' of the RAB. The area includes a long corridor leading to all locations on this ele-vation, running west from column line RAD to column line RAH, the open area between column lines RAH, RAL and 2-RA5, 2-RA3, and the area west of column line RAK extending to column line 2-RAl. Within the area various waste management tanks and pumps (Aerated Waste Storage Tank, Chemical and Equipment Drain Tanks, Laundry Drain Tanks, Waste Condensate Tanks and their associated pumping arrangements) are located, separated from the remainder
- of the rooiµ by varying partial height walls. This area also houses safety related instrumentation, cable trays and HVAC exhaust and supply ducts. The perimeter of this large irreg-
. ularly shaped area houses walls, floor and ceilings of rein-forced concrete and concrete block with fire ratings greater than three hours. Access to and egress from the area is provi-ded through open stairway 2-RA-7 and doorways leading to FA15, FA16 and FA18 and through the open hallway to FA19, the latter interface being adjacent to stairway 2-RA-3 in FA19.
9.5A-FA20-4
SL2-FSAR 6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
- Two fires will be postulated for this area. One will be an oil fire resulting from oil leakage from the largest single source to determine the effects upon shutdown related cables and equip-ment. The other will be a separate fire postulated to occur within a cable tray to determine the effects upon other adjacent or nearby cable trays or conduits.
Most of the small drain and sump pumps each containing approxi-mately one gallon cif lube oil, are segregated from the cable trays and conduits by physical distance and partial height walls. This is true for all pumps except Equipment Drain Pumps 2B and 2C, located behind a 10 ft high wall in the northwest corner of the area just south of the Aerated Waste Storage Tank.
Nearby conduits and trays contain cables supplying power and control signals to AFW Pumps 2A and 2B and associated valves and instrumentation. Cables associated with red.undant AFW Pump 2C and associated valves are not located nearby. The one gallon of oil contained in Equipment Drain Pump 2C is postulated to be released and will spread over approximately 20 square feet. The oil is assumed to ignite and continues to burn until completely consumed.
Due to the small quantity of oil involved in the postulated fire, the routing of conduits and cable trays containing redun-dant cabling outside the localized area where the fire is postu-lated to occur, .the spatial separation, vertical and horizontal, between various conduits/cable trays and the lack of continuity of combustible materials, the postulated fire will not result in the loss of function of any redundant essential equipment.
Therefore, safe reactor shutdown capabilities will be main-tained.
A large number of cable trays, both covered and open, and con-duits traverse FA20. All cables in cable trays will be covered with an flame retardant coating. Cable tray design and cable routing within trays meets the separation and barrier require-ments of Regulatory Guide 1.75.
The cable fire postulated to occur in FA20, which is separate from the oil fire discussed above, involves the initiation of combustion within a single cable tray due to electrical faulting within subject tray. Except for the oil fire discussed above, there are no inherent sources of combustion that could expose cable trays routed through FA20. Also, no redundant cable sei-vices are routed in the same tray. The flame retardant coating will essentially prevent the propagation of the fire along the tray in either direction from the point of initiation and will prevent the fire from jumping to adjacent cable trays. There-fore, the postulated fire will be contained within a single tray near its area of origin and only cables located within that tray may be impacted. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be
- affected.
9.SA-FA20-5
SL2-FSAR 6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating: (Cont'd)
The Boric Acid Make-Up Tanks level and temperature control essential *instrumentation located in FA20 but which service the Tanks in FA17 will not be affected by any fire postulated in adjacent cable trays based on the same analysis outlined above.
Due to limited propagation and other conditions associated with the two postulated fires, no adverse effects will occur in FA20 and adjacent areas. Safe reactor shutdown *capabilities will not be affected.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
The principal fire protection fea_ture in FA20 is the flame retardant coating applied to all cable trays which is a passive, continuous defense against exposure fires and fire propagation within cable trays. This feature is augmented by four zones of ionization type detectors providing annunciation in the Control Room.
There are three accessible fire extinguishers, and two available standpipe hose stations in th~ common hallway of FA20; one (HS-15-28) is adjacent to column lines 2-RA3Z/RAG and one (HS-15-43) is adjacent to column lines 2-RA3/RAK. FA19 in the open adjacent area has two additional fire extinguishers and standpipe hose station (HS-15-41) at column lines 2-RA3z/RAC, available for use in FA20. An effective response, by the trained fire brigade, utilizing the nearby portable and manual fire suppression equipment, will assist in limiting the conse-quences of any fire effects. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be adversely affected. *
- 9. 5A-FA20-6
- 36" RC 24" BLOCK 42" OPEN RC 24" RC 20 FL EL (-) 0.50' 36" RC 36" RC
- NO.
1 HVAC PENETRATIONS SIZE 26x 12 DESCRIPTION SUPPLY AIR 2 10x14 RETURN AIR NOTE:
ALL WALLS REINFORCED 3 32x 10 SUPPLY AIR CONCRETE (RC) OR CONCRETE BLOCK.
4 24x 12 BACK DRAFT DAMPER 5 32x 10 SUPPLY AIR 6 14x10 RETURN AIR 7 48 x 20 RETURN AIR 8 32 x8 SUPPLY AIR 9 20x 10 RETURN AIR 10 36 x 8 SUPPLY AIR 11 20x12 RETURN AIR 12 28 x8 SUPPLY AIR 13 20 x 12 RETURN AIR FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 FIRE AREA #20 - PLAN VIEW ATTACHMENT I 9.5A-FA20-7
SL2-FSAR ST.LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 21 (Zone I and II)
- 1. Description of Fire Area la. Building: RAB Personnel Areas Elev: 19.50' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet SA le. Floor Area: 4690 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area Zone I-Hot and Cold Locker Rooms and Laundry Room (3840 sq ft)
Zone II-First Aid, Health Physics and Storage Room (850 sq ft)
- 2. ESSENTIAL SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Zone I: None Zone II: Electrical Box: B2G50(SAB), B518*
- Fire protection drawing box number
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils Negligible 3c. Others Class A Combustible Mat'l 23450 lb* 188xl0 6 40xl0 3 Totals 188xl0 6 40xl0 3
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
. 6 Zone I: Class A 800 lb** 6.4xl0 8xl0 3 Combustible Mat'l
- The assurried average combustible load l.S 5 lb/ sq ft.
- The assumed average combustible load l. s 10 lb/ sq ft.
9.5A-FA21-l
SL2-FSAR
- 5. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Contanment
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North:
South: (See Attachment I)
East:
West:
Ceiling: 6 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces Electrical Cable chases in Zone I and Zone II.
Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification
- 1. HVAC See Attachment I
- 2. Mechanical None
- 3. Electrical All electrical penetrations will be sealed to provide a fire resistance rating equivalent to the barrier walls.
- 4. Area Access Zone I: Two doors on the north wall and three doors on the east wall which lead into the common corridor of FASl.
Zone II: One door from each of the three rooms of this fire area lead into the common corridor of FASl, and a single door on the north wall of the Health-Physics Room leads into the open yard area.
Sc. Detection:
Ionization type detectors initiate an alarm in the Control Room should a fire occur in either Zone I or Zone II.
9.5A-FA21-2
SL2-FSAR
- Sc. Detection: (Cont'd)
Fixed temperature/rate-of-rise (FT/ROR) detectors are located in the two Hot Shower Rooms in Zone I, which initiate an alarm in the Control Room should a fire occur.
Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There is one fire extinguisher in Zone I and two in Zone II. Three nearby fire extinguishers are located in the common hallway of FAS! (See Dwg SK-2998-M-808, Sheet SA).
- 2. Secondary There are three available standpipe hose stations in the adjacent FASl hallway (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet SA).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings Flamemastic fire protective coating is sprayed on all cable trays.
Se . Smoke Venting:
- Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal.
Exhaust capacity of these systems are:
Zone I:
Zone II:
62SO cfm @ 2.90 cfm/sq ft 171S cfm @ 2.17 cfm/sq ft Sf. Drainage:
ZONE I Floor Drains (Qty) Location Description 6 Laundry and Hot Locker Floor drains connect to a Room Areas common 3 11 drain leading to the Laundry Drain tank in FA20 2 Cold Locker Room Areas Floor drains connect to a common 4 11 drain leading to the house sewer system.
ZONE II No floor drains are located in this area. However, with the room doors open, water can flow into the common hallway of FASl and into this area's drainage system (See drainage FASl.)
9.SA-FA21-3
SL2-FSAR
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Areas 21 (Zones I and II):
Fire Area 21 consists of two zones, I and II. The entire area is designated as the Personnel Area and is located at El 19.50' of the RAB. Zone I consists of the Hot and Cold Change Areas, the Laundry and miscellaneous Personnel Areas. Zone II con-sists of the Health-Physics Room, Lab Supply & Storage and the First Aid Room. FA21 is separated from adjacent areas by rein-forced concrete and concrete block walls, concrete floor and ceiling all having fire ratings of greater than three hours.
The area is bounded by column lines 2-RA1/2-RA5 and RAJ/RAL.
Zones I and II are separated by the west end of the east-west corridor of FA 51. Access to FA21 is through five doors from Zone I and three doors from Zone II into the common hall-eays of FA51, and a passageway to the open yard at the north side of the Health Physics Room. Zones I and II are divided into five and three subspaces respectively, separated from each other by concrete block walls and standard doors.
These areas are equipped with standard air conditioning units and do not use the normal HVAC system in the RAB. There will be some electrical trays in the area passing down from FA51 through both Zones I and II, and these will be coated with an approved fire retardant coating; penetrations will be sealed and the trays will be segtegated by fire res{stive removable panels for the full room height. There are no shutdown related equipment in FA21I; however, shutdown related cables pass through the Zone II First Aid Room electrical chase.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
The postulated fire for the Personnel Area of Zone I in assumed to occur in the Clean Clothes Issue Area and is based upon a conservative fire load of 10 lbs/sq ft over an 80 sq ft area.
Combustible materials in these areas normally consist of wood, paper, cloth, cardboard and other cellulosic items. Other com-bustibles that may be in the area will be miscellaneous plas-tics, small amounts of lubricants, cleaning agents, etc., which are considered to be negligible. The combustibles will be assumed to ignite and burn until they are consumed or they are extinguished. The essential electrical cables and trays in the concealed space cable chases are isolated and they are designed and routed to meet the separation and barrier requirements of R.G. 1.75. There are no internal sources of combustibles that could expose these cables, there are no redundant cable ser-vices routed in the same tray and the flame retardant coating will essentially prevent the propagation of a tray fire in any direction from a point of initiation and will keep the fire from affecting adjacent cables. The postulated fire will be contained within the area boundaries. It will not seriously 9.5A-FA21-4
SL2-FSAR
- 6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
expose the cable in the isolated chases. In the unlikely event of combustion within a cable tray due to electrical faulting, it will not propagate and affect adjacent equipment. Since redundant essential cables are not routed in the same area, no loss of redundant essential equipment could occur. There is no other safety-related equipment in this usually occupied Personnel Area, therefore safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be impaired.
Two fires will be postulated for Zone II, one in the First Aid Room, and one in the Lab Supply & Storage Room. The fire in the First Aid Room would involve a minor fire load consisting of miscellaneous ordinary combustibles including cellulosic items and other small amounts of medical supplies. The com-bustibles will be assumed to ignite and due to a lack of continuity of combustibles and a low fire loading, the burn time will be minimal. The same scenario for the essential cables and trays, written for the Personnel Area of Zone 1, applies to the similar conditions for the isolated, concealed space in the First Aid Room. The fire in the Lab Supply &
Storage Room would involve a minor fire load consisting of miscellaneous cellulosic items and other small amounts of laboratory supplies. The combustibles will be assumed to ig-nite and due to the lack of continuity of combustibles and a comparitively low fire loading, the burn time will be limited.
The essential electrical box and cable in conduit along the north wall, service* the essential shutdown cooling intertie valve (V3545), located in the Containment Building. This valve is not used during normal shutdown operations and serves to divert necessary flows should the normal shutdown cooling path be impaired. Thus, loss of this cable will not impair safe reactor shutdown.
The postulated fires will be contained within the boundaries of FA 21. Therefore no essential equipment, either within FA 21 or in adjacent (above and to the sides) areas of FA 51, will be impaired by the fire effects and safe reactor shut-down capabilities will be maintained.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
There are two zones of ionization type detectors in the Person-nel Area subspace of FA21. There are other ionization and thermal detectors placed throughout the area. These automatic units provide alarms in the Control Room, resulting in prompt response by the fire brigade. The main access point to the RAB is through a continuously manned station at the Control Point House, which is adjacent fo FA21. There is one fire extinguisher in Zone I and two units in Zone II. There are at
- least three accessible fire extinguishers accessible in the common hallway of FA51. There are three available sta.ndpipe 9.5A-FA21-5
SL2-FSAR 6c. Fire Protection System Operating: (Cont'd) hose stations in the common hallways of FA51: one (HS-15-33) in the north-south passage adjacent to column lines 2-RA4/RAJ, one (HS-15-34) near stairway 2RA2, and the other (HS-15-39) in the east-west passage adjacent to column lines 2-RA3/RAJ. An effective response, by the trained fire brigade, using the available portable fire extinguishers and the manual hose stations, will provide the necessary fire controls and will assist in limiting the consequences of any fire effects.
9.5A-FA21-6
N
/ '6" BLOCK.
- t S"BLOCK \
6" BLOCK 0~ I
~
. v FL. EL.19.50'----
211 24" RC-...,
NOTE:
J
- 1. ALL WALLS REINFORCED
@~
CONCRETE (RC) OR CON-CRETE BLOCK
- 2. ALL HVAC PENETRATIONS IN FA211 ARE IN FALSE CEILING AT EL. 28.67' r FALSE CEILING EL 28.67'
@~@~
- @~
24".RC
@@(@
HVAC PENETRATIONS 9 12 x 8 RETURN AIR 19 12 x 12 RETURN AIR NO. SIZE DESCRIPTION 10 21x12 SUPPLY AIR 20 8" DIA DRYER EXHAUST 1 9x9 SUPPLY AIR 11 15 x 15 SUPPLY AIR 21 8" DIA DRYER EXHA!JST 2 6x6 SUPPLY AIR 12 12 x 12 RETURN AIR 22 8" DIA DRYER EXHAUST
\
3 12 x 12 RETURN AIR 13 12 x 12 RETURN AIR 4 18 x 20 SUPPLY AIR 14 12 x 8 RETURN AIR 5 12 x 12 RETURN AIR 15 21x21 SUPPLY AIR 6 12 x8 RETURN AIR 16 21x21 SUPPLY AIR 7 10 x6 RETURN AIR 17 10 x 8 RETURN AIR 8 15 x 15 SUPPLY AIR 18 24 x 18 SUPPLY AIR FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 FIRE AREA #21 I - PLAN VIEW ATTACHMENT I 9.SA-FA21-7
- N 24" RCL t FL. EL. 19.50'
~
u 2111 0
...J ell 24" RC
,i.---FALSE CEILING EL. 28.67' l_---~
8" BLOCK NOTE:
ALL WALLS REINFORCED CONCRETE(RC)OR
- CONCRETE BLOCK.
HVAC PENETRATIONS PENETRATION SIZE DESCRIPTION 1 20x 14 AIR SUPPLY 2 12 x 12 AIR RETURN 3 24x 16 RETURN AIR 4 36x 16 SUPPLY AIR 5 36x 16 SUPPLY AIR 6 24x 16 RETURN AIR 7 8x6 RETURN AIR (CEILING)
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 FIRE AREA #21 II - PLAN VIEW ATTACHMENT I 9.5A-FA21-8
SL2-FSAR
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la.
ST LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 22 Building: RAB Electrical Penetration Area Train A Elev: 19.50' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 5 le. Floor Area: 540 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area
- None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA None
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3 3a Cable Insul?tion 98 .8xl0 6 183xl0
- 3b.
3c.
Oils None Others Negligible Negligible Totals 96 .8xl0 6 183xl0 3
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3 Cable Tray 114xl0 *
- See Methodology
- 5. FIRE CONTROL 5a. Physical Containment
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 36 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete 9.5A-FA22-l
SL2-FSAR 2.
East: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete West: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 4S Inch Reinforced Concrete Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Supply air 18"xl4" (West Wall)
Exhaust air 18"xl0" (West Wall)
Supply to FA24 14"xl0" (East Wall)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and ceiling.
- 3. Electrical All cable tray penetrations will be sealed to provide a fire resistance rating equivalent to the fire barrier wall.
- 4. Area Access Doors located on the east and west walls leading from FA24 and FA23 respectively.
Sc. Detection:
Ionization type detectors initiate an alarm in the Control Room should a fire occur.
Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There are accessible fire extinguishers in adjacent FA's 23, 24 and 51 (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 5).
- 2. Secondary There are three available standpipe hose stations in the common hallway of FA51 (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet S).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings Flamemastic fire protective coating cable trays.
is sprayed on all 9.SA-FA22-2
SL2-FSAR
- Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal.
Exhaust capacity of this system is 800 cfm which will provide a removal rate of 1.48 cfm/sq ft.
Sf. Drainage:
There are no floor drains in FA22. However, water can flow out the west door through FA23 and into the common hallway of FASl.
This area's drainage system can then handle the water (see drain-age FAS!).
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 22:
Fire Area 22, Electrical Penetration Area Train A, is located at El 19.SO' in the northwest section of the RAB. The area is sepa-rated from adjacent FA's by walls, floor and ceiling having a fire resistance rating of greater than three hours. Area access is provided by a fire door on the west wall into FA23 and a 3'x7' watertight steel door on the east wall into FA24. FA22 contains safety related RAB supply system ductwork. Electrical penetrations through the Containment Vessel and Shield Building (Fire Area 14, Reactor Containment) supply cable trays traversing the room in various separated stack configurations. The trays contain numerous power and control cables servicing essential equipment required for safe shutdown which is located in the Reactor Containment Building (FA14).
As discussed previously, a large number of cable trays, both covered and open, traverse FA22. All cables in cable trays will be covered with an approved flame retardant coating. Cable tray design and cable routing within trays meet the separation and barrier requirements of Regulatory Guide l.7S. In addition, cables servicing redundant essential equipment and which are re-quired for safe reactor shutdown are routed in a separate room, Electrical Penetration Area B, FA23, which is located adjacent to FA22 and in which separation is provided by a 12 inch rein~orced concrete and concrete block wall.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
The cable fire postulated to occur in FA22, involves the initi-ation and combustion within a single cable tray due to electrical faulting within the subject tray. There are no inherent sources of combustion that could expose cable trays routed through FA22.
Also, no redundant cable services are routed in the same tray or penetration area. The flame retardant coating will essentially
- prevent the propagation of the fire along the tray in either direction from the point of initiation and will prevent the fire from affecting adjacent cable trays. Therefore, the postulated 9.SA-FA22-3
SL2-FSAR fire will be contained within a single tray near its area of origin and only cables located within that tray may be impacted.
Since redundant safety related cables are not routed in the same penetration area, no loss of redundant essential equipment could occur due to the postulated cable tray fire. From a review of the shutdown related cables passing through FA22, it has been determined that the only potential problem pertains to the capability to close the two Safety Injection Tank 2Al and 2A2 Isolation Valves, which should be closed prior to Reactor Vessel depressurization. These valves are serviced through FA22 by cables in the same tray and could be lost in a tray fire. The non-closure of these valves will not prevent but could impair cold reactor shutdown; however, sample time exists before re-quired isolation such that the valves can be shut manually by a plant operator and, therefore, no loss of safe reactor shutdown capabilities occurs.
Due to the limited propagation abilities of the postulated fire and the separation provided, no adverse effects will occur in FA22 and in adjacent areas. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be impared.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
The principal fire protection feature in FA22 is the flame re-tardant coating applied to all cable trays which is a passive, continuous defense against exposure fires, and fire propagations within cable trays. This feature is augmented by ionization type detectors providing annunciation in the Control Room. There are three accessible fire extinguishers in adjacent FA's 23, 24 and 51 for use in FA22. There is an available standpipe hose station (HS-15-34) in the northwest corridor of FA51, with at least two additional units available in the common corridors of FA51 (HS-15-33 and HS-15-39). An effective response by the trained fire brigade will assist in limiting the consequences of any fire effects. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be adversely affected.
9.5A-FA22-4
SL2-FSAR
- ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 23
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB Electrical Penetration Area (Train B)
Elev: 19.50' lb. Reference Drawing: Sk 2998-M-708, Sheet 5 le. Floor Area: 650 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA None
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source
--- 9uantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)_
109.4xl0 6 168 x 10 3 3a. Cable Insulation 3b. Oils Negligible Jc. Other Negligible Totals 109.4xl0 6 168xl0 3
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3 Cable Insulation 114xl0 *
- See Methodology
- 5. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 36 Inch Reinforced Concrete (RCB Shield Wall)
South: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete East: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block West: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete 9.5A-FA23-l
SL2-FSAR Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Space~
None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Exhaust Air 18 11 x 10" (East Wall)
Supply Air 26" x 10" (East Wall)
Supply Air 18 11 x 14" (West Wall)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and ceiling.
- 3. Electrical All cable tray penetrations will be sealed to a fire resistance rating equivalent to the barrier wall.
- 4. Area Access Fire doors are located on the west and ea~t walls which leads to FA-Sl and FA-22 respectively.
Sc. Detection:
Ionization type fire detection devices initiate an alarm in the Control Room should a fire occur.
Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There is a portable* fire extinguisher in FA23 and acces-sible fire *extinguishers in adjacent FA's 24 and Sl (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet S).
- 2. Secondary There are available standpipe hose stations in the corrid-or of adjacent FA-Sl (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet S) .
9.5A-FA23-2
SL2-FSAR
- Sd. Fire Protection Systems (Cont'd)
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings Flamemastic fire protective coating is sprayed on all electrical cable trays.
Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal.
Exhaust capacity of this system is 900 cfm which will provide a removal rate of 1.38 cfm/sq ft.
Sf. Drainage:
No floor drains are provided in FA-23. However, water can flow through the open west door into the hallway of FA-Sl and into this area's drainage system (see drainage FA-Sl).
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 23:
Fire Area 23, Electrical Penetration Area Train B, is located at El.19.SO' in the northwest section of the RAB. The area is separated from adjacent area by walls, floors and ceilings having a fire resistive rating of greater than three hours.
Area access is provided by a fire door on the west wall to the north-south corridor in FASl and a fire door on the east wall from Electrical Penetration Room A (FA 22).
FA23 contains ventilation ducts from the normal HVAC system in the RAB with the supply units being safety related. Electrical penetrations through the Containment and Shield Building from Fire Area 14 (Reactor Containment) supply cable trays travers-ing the room in various stack configurations four to ten feet apart.
All cables in cable trays will be covered with an approved flame retardant coating. Cable tray design and cable routing within trays meets the separation and barrier requirements of Regulatory Guide l.7S. In addition, cables servicing redundant essential equipment and which are required for safe reactor shutdown are routed in a separate room, Electrical Penetration Area (FA22) which is located adjacent to FA23 and in which separation is provided by a 12" reinforced concrete block wall .
- 9.5A-FA23-3
SL2-FSAR 6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
The cable fire postulated to occur in FA23, involves the initi-ation of combustion within a single cable tray due to electric-al faulting within the subject tray. There are no inherent sources of combustion that could expose cable trays routed through FA23. Also, no redundant cable services are routed in the same tray or penetration area. The flame retardant coating will essentially prevent the propagation of the fire along the tray in either direction from the point of initiation and will prevent the fire from affecting adjacent cable trays.
Therefore, the postulated fire will be contained within a single tray near its area of origin and only cables located within that tray may be impacted.
Since redundant safety related cables are not routed in the same penetration area, no loss of redundant essential equipment could occur due to the postulated cable tray fire. From a review of the shutdown related cables passing through FA23, it has been determined that the only potential problem pertains to the capability to close the two Safety Injection Tank 2Bl and 2B2 Isolation Valves, which should be closed prior to Reactor Vessel depressurization. These valves are serviced through FA23 by cables in the same tray and could be lost in a tray fire. The non-closure of these valves will not prevent, but could impair a normal cold reactor shutdown; however, ample time exists before required Safety Injection Tank Isolation, such that the valves can be shut manually by a plant operator and, therefore, no loss of safe reactor shutdown capabilities occurs.
- Due to the limited propagation abilities of the postulated fire and the separation provided, no adverse effect will occur in adjacent areas. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be impaired.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
The principal fire protection feature in FA23 is the flame retardant coating applied to all cable trays which is a passive, continuous defense against exposure fires, and fire propagations within cable trays. This system is augmented by ionization type detectors providing annunciation in the Control Room. There is one fire extinguisher in FA23 and various ac-cessible fire extinguishers in adjacent FA's 24 and 51. There is an available standpipe hose station (HS-15-34) in the north-west corridor of FA51 with at least two additional units avail-able in the common corridors of FA51 (H-15-33 and HS-15-39).
An effective response, by the trained fire brigade, will assist in limiting the consequences of any fire effects. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be adversely effected.
- 9. 5A-FA23-4
SL2-FSAR
- 1.
la. Building:
ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 24 DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA RAB Pipe Tunnel Area Elev: (-) 0.50' and 19.50' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheets 4 & 5 le. Floor Area: 1930 and 1850 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Shutdown Cooling System Valves: V3664(SA)
V3665(SB)
Electrical Boxes: B2E54(SA)(PB Sta V3664) (B506)*
B2E55(SB)(PB Sta V3665) (B509)*
B2Gll(SA) (B504)*
B2E82( SA) (B505)*
B2Gl2(SB) (B507)*
B2E69(SB) (B508)*
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source guantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils Negligible 3c. Others Grease M.O. Valves(l5) 135 lbs 2.5 x 10 6 l .4x10 3 6 .3 Totals 2.5 x 10 l.4xl0
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOAD ING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
M.O. Valve 9 lbs 166 x 10 3 7. 0 x 10 3
- 9.5A-FA24-l
SL2-FSAR
- s. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: See Attachment I South: See Attachment I East: See Attachment I West: See Attachment I Ceiling: See Attachment I Floor: See Attachment I
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC See Attachment I
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and ceiling.
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area Access
- a. At elevation (-) O.SO', entrance is through a watertight door on the west and east ends of the south wall from FA IS and FA 181 .respectively.
- b. At elevation 19.SO' entrance is through an airtight door the west and south walls from FA 22 and FA 28
- respectively.
Sc. Detection:
None 9.5A-FA24-2
SL2-FSAR
- Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
At elevation (-) O.SO', there are four available fire ex-tinguishers: one in each of the hallways of FA 20 and FA 19, and one in the passageway of FA lS and one in FA24 . Elevation 19.SO' also has four available fire extinguishers: one in FA 28, two in the hallway of FA Sl and one in FA 23. See reference drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheets 4 and S.
- 2. Secondary At elevation (-) O.SO', there are three standpipe hose stations available in FA 20. At elevation 19.SO', two standpipe hose stations are available in the hallway of FA Sl. See drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheets 4 and S for locations.
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None*
Se. Smoke Venting:
- Nonnal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal.
Exhaust capacity of this system is 3000 cfm which will provide a removal rate of .78 cfm/sq ft. On an emergency basis, 30,000 cfm of exhaust is available.
Sf. Drainage:
Floor Drains Location (Qty.) (Elevation) Description 2 (-) .SO'. Drains connect to a common 3" drain line which leads to Sump Tank 2A in FA 16.
3 (-) .SO' Drains connect to a common 3" drain line which leads to Sump Tank 2B in FA 16.
7 +19.SO' Drains connect to a common drain line which leads to the Equipment Drain Tank in FA 20 .
- 9.5A-FA24-3
SL2-FSAR
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 24:
FA24 is the pipe tunnel area located at El (-) 0.50' and 19.50' at the north ends of the RAB. At El (-) 0.50', the tunnel is bounded by column lines 2-RAl/2-RAlz, and RAA/RAK.
At El 19.50', the area is bounded by the RCB Shield Wall on the north, column 2-RAlz on the south, and column line RAH on the west. The east wall is partitioned by the biock wall of FA25 on the north. The south end of the east wall opens into a tunnel running east for approximately 40 feet to column line RAC.
Entrance into FA24 at El 19.50' is through doors on the south and west walls leading from FA28 and FA22 respectively. At El (-) 0.50', entrance is via two doors on the south wall from FA's 15 and 18. Also, both elevations are accessible to one another through a large pipe tunnel connecting El (-) 0.50' to El 19.50'.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
Fire Area 24 is a large area, 1930 sq ft at El (-) 0.50' and 1850 sq ft at 19.50', containing mechanical piping and associ-ated valves with limited combustible materials distributed over the area. The only equipment required for safe reactor shut-down located in the area are redundant Shutdown Cooling Isola-tion Valves V-3664 and V-3665. Both of these valves which are motor operated units, are located at elevation 19.50' and are approximately ten feet apart.
The fire postulated to occur for this fire area involves the ignition of the grease contained in a single motor operated valve. For the purpose of this analysis, the worst case would involve the loss of one of the two valves located in FA 24 that are required for safe reactor shutdown. If the fire initiates at V-3664, it may cause loss of function of this valve. Due to the lack of continuity of combustibles, the small quantity of grease involved in the initial fire (approximately 9 pounds of grease) and the separation between redundant valves (greater than 10 ft), there will be no adverse effects to redundant valve V-3445. The converse of the postulated fire is also true. Due to the limited nature of the fires postulated for this fire area, no adverse effects will result in adjacent fire areas.
Since the loss of redundant valves required for safe reactor shutdown will not occur due to the fires postulated above, no loss of safe reactor shutdown capability will occur.
9.SA-FA24-4
SL2-FSAR 6c . Fire Protection System Operating:
- On elevation (-) 0.50', there are four accessible fire ex-tinguishers: one in FA 24, one in the common hallway of FA 20, one in the common hallway of FA 19, and one in the passageway of FA 15. Also, three standpipe hose stations are located in the adjacent common hallway of FA 20. On elevation, 19 .SO',
there are four accessible fire extinguishers: one in FA 24, two in the common hallway of FA 51 and one in FA 23. Three standpipe hose stations are located in the adjacent common hallway of FA 51. An effective response, by the trained fire brigade, utilizing the nearby portable fire extinguishers and standpipe hose stations, will assist in limiting the conse-quences of any fire effects. Safe reactor shutdown capabili-ties will not be adversely affected .
- 9.5A-FA24-5
N FIRE AREA BOUNDARIES & HVAC PENETRATIONS REACTOR CONTAINMENT
,___ 36" RC SHIELD WALL 24" BLOCK 12" RC 24" RC
!J (SH2) 12" BLOCK FA24 43" RC FL EL 19.50' 24" RC 30" RC EL -0.50 EL+ 0.50' EL -0.50' FA24 30" RC 48" RC ------'.-
24" RC NOTE:
(RC) REINFORCED CONCRETE FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 FIRE AREA #24 - PLAN VIEW ATTACHMENT I q.'iA-FA24-fi
- FIRE AREA BOUNDARIES & HVAC PENETRATIONS
,_ _ _ EL_19_._50_'_ _ _ _ - - - ~RATING _ __
. \
24
- EL 4.00' EL 0.50'
- NO. SIZE SECTION A-A (SH. 1)
HVAC PENETRATIONS DESCRIPTION LOCATION 1 24 x28 EXHAl,JST WEST WALL 2 84 x 36 EXHAUST ROOF 3 8 x 12 SUPPLY NORTH WALL 4 10 x 14 SUPPLY NORTH WALL 5 10 x 20 EXHAUST WEST WALL NOTE:
ALL WALLS REINFORCED CONCRETE OR REINFORCED CONCRETE BLOCK FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 FIRE AREA #24 - SECTIONAL VIEW ATTACHMENT I g.')A-FA24-7
SL2-FSAR
- 1.
ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 25 DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB HVAC Plenum Area Elev: 19.50'
- lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-708, Sheet 5 le. Floor Area: 400 Sq Ft ld. Subs paces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA None
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
- . 3a.
3b.
3c.
Cable Insulation Oils Others Negligible Negligible 20 Filter Bags 3 140 x 10 350 Totals 3 140 x 10 350
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 20 Filter Bags 140 x 10 3 4670*
- Concentrated fire load is based on a 30 sq ft filter rack area.
- 5. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary 9.5A-FA25-l
SL2-FSAR Sa. Physical Containment (Cont'd)
Walls North: 36 Inch Reinforced Concrete (RCB Shield Wall)
II II South: 24 II (RAB Shield Wall)
II II East: 24 II West: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block Wall Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 4S Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Supply Duct 48 Dia. (North Wall)
Intake Air Louver 12' x 12 1 -6 11 (East Wall)
Exhaust 2 HVE-6B 20" Dia.
Exhaust 2 HVE-7A,7B 8 11 Dia.
2.
3.
Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls and floor.
Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area Access A fire door is located on the east wall of the fire area.
Sc. Detection:
None Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
A portable fire extinguisher is located in this fire area as outlined in drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 5.
9.SA-FA25-2
SL2-FSAR 5d. Fire Protection Systems: (Cont'd)
- 2.
3.
Secondary There are nearby out~ide yard main hose stations in the
. common area between s1:..2 and. SL-1 and. on the east side of SL-2 (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 1).
Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None 5e. Smoke Venting:
Natural ventilation make-up is through the east wall louvers.
5f. Drainage:
Two 3 inch floor drains connecting* to a common 3 inch drain leading to the Equipment Drain Tank located in the southwest corner of FA 20.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 25:
Fire Area 25 is a H&V area for Containment purge and is located in the northeast section of El 19.50' of the RAB adjacent to the RCB and the open yard area. FA 25 is completely isolated from the remainder of the RAB by 2 ft and 3 ft thick concrete walls having fire ratings greater than three hours, with the only access being through a fire door on the east wall of the area to the outside.
No equipment required for safe reactor shutdown, including safety related cabling servicing such equipment, is located in FA 25.
The purpose of this area is to provide make-up air for the purge fans which are located in an isolated area remote from FA 25. The 48 inch butterfly valve servicing the air supply pipe penetrating the Containment at El. 33.00', located in FA 25, is closed during normal operation to provide for Contain-ment isolation. The air intake louvers (12 ft x 12.5 ft) in the east wall, are protected by a concrete missile barrier.
6a. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
The postulated fire for FA 25 involves the initiation of com-bustion within the twenty Medium Efficiency Filters located in the plenum for supply air to the Containment having a heat release capacity of 7020 Btu/Filter. Due to the separation provided from the remainder of the RAB and from the Containment Building, the postulated fire, even if all twenty filters are 9.5A-FA25-3
SL2-FSAR 6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating (Cont'd) assumed to be consumed in the postulated fire, will not have any adverse effects to areas adjacent to FA 25.
Since equipment required for safe reactor sh~tdown is not located in FA 25, and the postulated fire will have no adverse effects in adjacent fire areas, no impairment to safe reactor shutdown capabilities could result from the postulated fire described above.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
There is one fire extinguisher available in FA 25 and there are nearby available outside yard main hose stations in the common area between SL-1 and SL-2 and in the area on the east side SL-2. An effective response by the trained fire brigade, using fire extinguishers and hose streams from the nearby yard main fire hydrants, will assist in limiting the fire effects. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be adversely affected .
9.5A-FA25-4
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT 2
- 1.
la.
FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 26 DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA Building: RAB Volume Control Tank Area Elev: 19.50' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 5 le. Floor Area: 130 Sq Ft ld .. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Volume Control Tank
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils Negligible 3c. Others Negligible Totals Negligible
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Negligible
- 5. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 33 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 36 II II II East: 33 II It West: 33 Inch Reinforced Concrete and Partial 36 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block
- Ceiling: 35 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 30 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 9. 5A-FA26--l
SL2-FSAR 5a. Physical Containment: (Cont'd) 5b.
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Exhaust Air 12" x 8" (West Wall)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and ceiling.
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area Access Entrance 1s through a labyrinth on the south wall from the corridor of FA 51.
5c. Detection:
- ~
None 5d. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. _Primary There are two nearby fire extinguishers in the hallway of FA 51 (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 5).
- 2. Secondary There is a st'andpipe hose station in the corridor of FA 51 (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 5).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None 5e. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal.
Exhaust capacity of this system is 350 cfm which will provide a removal rate of 2.69 cfm/sq ft.
9.5A-FA26-2
SL2-FSAR Sf. Drainage:
- 6.
Drainage is provided by a 3 inch floor drain connnected to a 3 inch drain header leading to the Equipment Drain Tank in FA 20.
ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 26:
Fire Area 26, the Volume Control Tank Enclosure, is located at El 19.50' near stairway 2-RA-3 of the RAB and is totally sur-rounded by full height, reinforced concrete and concrete block walls having fire ratings in excess of three hours.
Access from the FA 26 to FA 51 is through a curbed labyrinth on the west side of the enclosure. The Volume Control Tank is essential equipment and is the only piece of equipment contained in the full height enclosure.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
No combustible materials are located in this area and transient combustibles would not be stored in the enclosure. Due to the absence of combustibles in this fire area and the isolation from FA 51 provided by the full height enclosure, no fire can be postulated to occur in FA 26 that could cause loss of func-tion of the Volume .Control Tank, and therefore no loss of safe reactor shutdown capability could occur.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
In the unlikely event that they may be required, there are two nearby fire extinguishers and two available standpipe hose stations in the open corridor of adjacent FA 51; one (HS-15-38) is at column lines 2-RA3z/RAC, and the other (HS-15-40) is at column lines 2-RA3z/RAG. An effective re-sponse, by the trained fire brigade, will assist in limiting the consequences of any fire effects in the area. Safe reactor shut down capabilities will not be adversely affected.
9.5A-FA26-3
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 27
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB Letdown Heat Exchanger Area Elev: 19.50' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 5
/
le. Floor Area: 240 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA None
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils Negligible
- Jc. Others Negligible Tota ls Negligible
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu sq ft)
Negligible
- 5. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete East: 18 Inch Reinforced Concrete ivest: 20 Inch Reinforced Cqncrete Ceiling: 35 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 30 Inch Reinforced Concrete 9.5A- FA27-l
SL2-FSAR Sa ... Physical Containment (Cont'd)
Sb.
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Eixhaust Air 12" x 12" (West Wall)
Supply Air 70" x SO" (East and West Wall)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations in walls, floor and ceiling.
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area Access Entrance is through a open labyrinth on the west wall.
Sc.
Sd.
Detection:
None Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There are two accessible fire extinguishers in the ad-jacent hallway of FA Sl as out lined in drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet S.
- 2. Secondary There are two available standpipe hose stations in the ad-jacent hallway of FA Sl as outlined in drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet S.
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal.
Exhaust capacity of this system is 700 cfm which will provide 9.SA-FA27-2
SL2-FSAR Se. Smoke Venting: (Cont'd)
- a removal rate of 2.91 cfm/sq ft.
Sf. Drainage:
Two 3 inch floor drains are connected to a common 4 inch drain line leading to the Equipment Drain Tank in FA 20.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 27:
Fire Area 27, containing the Letdown Heat Exchanger, is located at El 19.SO' of the RAB. It is totally enclosed by full height reinforced concrete and concrete block walls, concrete floor and ceiling having a fire resistive rating of greater than three hours. It is segregated from adjacent FA's 24, Sl, and 28 and its only access is to the open east-west corridor of FA Sl through a curbed open labyrinth doorway. The Letdown Heat Exchanger is basically a passive unit and the area contains no significant combustibles or ignition sources. There are no es-sential equipment, cabling or instrumentation required for safe reactor shutdown. Although t'he safety related supply duct of the normal HVAC system passes through the area, there is no supply branch into FA 27. Supply air is from the corridor through the wire mesh door and the exhaust duct located in FA 27 is not safety related.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
No significant combustible materials are located in this area and transient combustibles would not be stored in the enclo-sure. Due to the relative absence of combustibles and the segregation from adjacent areas provided by full height en-closures, no fire will be postulated to occur in FA 27 that could cause loss of function of the Letdown Heat Exchanger and therefore, no loss of function of safe reactor shutdown cap-ability could occur.
6c~ Fire Protection System Operating:
There are two accessible fire extinguishers in the common hall-way of FA Sl. There are two available standpipe hose stations in the common hallway of FA Sl; one (HS-lS-38) is at column lines 2-RA3z/RAC and the other (HS-lS-40) is at column lines 2-RA3z/RAG. If .required, an effective response, by the trained fire brigade, will assist in limiting the consequences of any fire affects in the area. Safe reactor shutdown cap-abilities will not be adversely affected .
- 9.SA-FA27-3
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 28
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB 480V & 4.16KV (2AB) Switchgear Room Elev: 19.50' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 5 le. Floor Area: 1220 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area None
Electrical Boxes: B2715( SAB) (BS 13)*
B212(SAB) (B514)*
B213(SAB) (B515)*
B2ll(SAB) (B512)*
>~Fire Protection Drawing Box Number.
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Cable Tray 2.49 x 10 6 2.04 x 10 3 3b.. Oils Negligible 3c. Others Negligible 6 3 Totals 2.49 x 10 z-. 04 x 10
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LODADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/ sq ft).
Cable Tray 114 x 10 3*
- *See Methodology 9.5A-FA28-l
SL2-FSAR
- 5. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 8 Inch Block Wall East: 20 Inch Reinforced Concrete West: 8 .Inch Block Wall (Partial height)
Ceiling: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
Exhaust Air 12" x 12" (West Wall)
Supply Air 70" x 20" (North Wall)
Make Up Air 28" x 24" (North Wall)
Supply Air 28" x 10" (North Wall)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and ceiling.
- 3. Electrical
- All penetrations will be sealed to the rating of the fire barriers.
- 4. Area Access Entrance is through a set of double doors on the south wall, an air tight door on the north wall, and a fire door on the west wall.
- 9. 5A-FA28-2
SL2-FSAR Sc. Detection:
Ionization type detectors will initiate an alarm in the Control Room should a fire occur.
Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There is a fire extinguisher in this area, and three ac-cessible fire extinguishers in the adjacent hallway of FA Sl (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, sheet S).
- 2. Secondary There are three available hose stations in the adjacent hallway of FA Sl (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, sheet S).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings Cable Trays are protected with Flamemastic fire retardant coating.
Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal .
- Sf.
Exhaust capacity of this system is 11400 cfm which will provide a removal rate of 9.3 cfm/sq ft.
Drainage:
No floor drains are provided in this area. However, with the south doors open, water will flow into FA Sl hallway and through this area's drainage system (see FA Sl drain system) .
- 9.5A-FA28-3
SL2-FSAR
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 28:
Fire Area 28 is the 2AB Switchgear Room and is located at El 19.50' of the RAB. It is enclosed, except for the partial height west wall, by full height reinforced concrete and concrete block walls and by concrete floor and ceiling having fire resistive ratings of greater than three hours. The west wall rises to El 28.06', where FA 28 is open for the full width and remaining height up to El 43.00' and enters into FA 51.
It is segregated from adjacent FA 51 (at El 19.50') and adjacent FA's 24, 27 and 33 along column lines 2-RAlz and 2-RA3, and column line RAF and a line approximately ten feet to the west of column line RAG. Access to FA 28 is through double swing doors in the south wall into the common crirridor of FA51, through a door in the west wall into FA 33 and through a door in the north wall into FA 24.
- Safe shutdown equipment consists of 480V (2AB) and 4.16KV (2AB) switchgear, electrical services in trays and in the units. Other equipment in this area includes the Hydrogen Sampling Analyzer, CEA Drive units and the 7.5 ton hoist servicing these units. There is an ECCS ventilation duct passing through the area. The normal HVAC system of the RAB serves the area, with supply from a safety related duct and exhaust through a non-safety related duct.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
Combustible materials in FA 28 consists of cabling in the switchgear cabinets and within cable tray C2514 (SAB) routed between the 480V and the 4KV switchgear cabinets. The cable tray is protected by an approved fire retardant coating. The cable fire postulated to occur in FA 28 involves the initiation of combustion within cable tray C2514 (SAB) due to electrical faulting within the tray. The flame retardant coating will essentially prevent the propagation of the fire along the tray in either direction from the point of initiation and will prevent the fire from spreading to adjacent and nearby cabinets and equipment. Cable trays routed in the corridor area, ad-jacent to FA 28, are isolated and are located at a sufficient distance from the involved tray (approximately 20 ft horizont-ally) to preclude the possibility of the postulated fire in-volving these trays. Also, all cable trays in FA 28, and in adjacent FA's, should not seriously expose each other as all cable trays are protected by approved fire retardant coatings.
Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be adversely affected.
9.5A-FA28-4
SL2-FSAR Functions of equipment on the SAB train may be lost due to initiation of combustion within cable tray C2514(SAB) (e.g.,
Component Cooling Water Pump 2C, Intake Cooling Water Pump 2C, Auxiliary Feed Water Pump 2C). However, redundant systems on trains SA and SB will not be affected. Thus, with effective fire retardant coatings, with isolation and separation, and with redundancy maintained, safe reactor shutdown capability, will not be impaired by a postulated fire in FA 28.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
The principal fire protection feature in the area where the postulated fire will occur is the fire retardant coating applied to the cable tray. This system is augmented by ioniza-tion type smoke detectors providing annunciation in the Control Room. There is one accessible fire extinguisher in FA 28 and there are at lea~t three accessible fire extinguishers in the common corridors of adjacent FA 51. There are three available standpipe hose stations in the common hallway of FA 51; one (HS-15-38), adjacent to stairway 2-RA3, one (HS-15-39) adjacent to column lines 2-RA3/RAI, and the other (HS-15-40), adjacent to column lines 2-RA3z/RAG. An effective response, by the trained fire brigade, will assist in limiting the consequences of any fire effects. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be impaired .
- 9. 5A-FA28-5
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 29
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RA1l Drumming Storage Area Elev 19.50' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 5 le. Floor Area 1512 sq ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA None
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu sq ft)
- 3a. Cable Insulation
- 3b. Oils Resin Dewatering Pump &
Motor Negligible
.5 gal .070 x 10 6
.046 x 10 3
3c. Others Class A Combustible 5,000 lb 40 x 10 6 26.5 x 10 3 Material (20 Drums)
Totals 40 x 10 6 3 27 x 10
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu sq ft) 3 3 Class A Combustible Material 250 lb 8 x 10 1. 7 x 10
- Based on one 55 gal drum containing Class A combustible material.
- 9. SA- FA29-1
SL2-FSAR S. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 30 Inch Reinforced Concrete Sou th: 36 II II II II II East: 36 II II West: 30 II II Ceiling: 34 "
II II II II II Floor: 32
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Supply Air 24 11 x 10 11 (North Wall)
Exhaust Air 18 11 x 12 11 (West Wall)
Exhaust Air 12 11 x 12 11 (North Wall)
Exhaust Air 18 1' x 12 11 (West Wall)
Exhaust Air 10 11 x 10 11 (West Wall)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and roof.
Equipment Hatch 10' x 10' (floor)
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area Access Entrance is through a door on the west wall from FA 51 and a low leakage double door on the east wall from the yard area.
Sc. Detection:
None 9.5A-FA29-2
SL2-FSAR Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There is one fire extinguisher in FA29 and there are addi-tional accessible fire extinguishers in the common hallway of adjacent FA 51 (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 5).
- 2. Secondary There is one standpipe hose station located in this area and there are additional hose stations available in the common hallway of FA51 (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 5).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal.
Exhaust capacity of this system is 2400 cfm which will provide a removal rate of 1.6 cfm/sq ft.
5£. Drainage:
Two 3 inch floor drains on connect to a common 3 inch drain header leading to the Equipment Drain Tank in FA20.
- 6. Al~ALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED DIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 29:
Fire Area 29 is located at El 19.50' of the RAB and is designat-ed as the Drumming Storage Area. Full height walls, floor and roof with a fire resistance rating greater than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> separate FA29 from the rest of the RAB. The area is bounded by column lines 2-RA3z/2-RA5 and RAA/RAC. The ceiling above this area is the RAB roof at El 43.00'. Within the area, there is the resin dewatering pump. Access is provided by a 6 ft x 7 ft wire mesh door leading to FA51 and a low leakage double door located on the east wall leading to the outside of the building. Also, a 10 ft x 10 ft hatch is located in the nor~heast corner of the floor leading to the Spent Resin Tank area. The normal HVAC ventila-tion system for the RAB serves the area through a safety related supply and nonsafety related exhaust. No essential equipment is located in FA29.
6b. Fire Protec*tion Systems Not Operating:
FA29 is used as a general maintenance/storage area, therefore a postulated fire would involve ordinary combustible materials having an approximate heat release capacity of 8000 Btu/lb .
9.5A-FA29-3
SL2-FSAR These materials would consist of wood, paper, cloth, cardboard and other cellulosic materials. Although no source of ignition capable of igniting the compressed contents of a SS gallon sealed drum extsts in this fire area, it has been assumed for the purpose of this analysis that the contents of one S5 gallon steel drum will ignite and continue to burn until consumed. It is postulated that the lack of continuity of combustibles out-side FA29 and with the full height wall separation of FA29 from the surrounding fire areas, the fire will be confined within the boundaries of FA29. Therefore, safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be impaired.
No equipment or cabling servicing equipment required for safe reactor shutdown is located in FA29. Although only a remote possibility, uncontrolled smoke and/or heat may have a minor impact on adjacent areas. Since the fire postulated above will be contained within FA29, no adverse effects upon safe reactor shutdown capabilities could result.
6c. Fire Protection Systems Operating:
There is one fire extinguisher in FA29. There are additional accessible fire extinguishers in the common hallways of FASl and adjacent fire areas. There is an available standpipe hose station (HS-18-19) adjacent to the low leakage door in the east wall of FA29. There are also additional hose stations avai-lable in the common hallway of FASl, the closest being (HS 38) adjacent to stairway 2-RA3. An effective response, by the trained fire brigade, will provide adequate control of the postulated fire and will assist in limiting the consequences of any fire effects. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be adversely affected.
- 9. SA-FA29-4
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 30
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB Ion Exchanger Area Elev 19.50' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 5 le. Floor Area: 2070 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
Partitioned areas containing the following equipment: eves Purification Ion Exchangers, eVCS Deborating Ion Exchanger, Fuel Pool Ion Exchanger, Pre-Con~
centrator Ion Exchanger, Waste Ion Exchanger, BA Condensate Ion Exchanger.
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA None
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible
- 3b.
3c.
Oils Others Negligible Negligible Totals Negligible
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Negligible
- 5. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 36 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 36 II II II East: 24 II II II West: 43 " II II
- 9. 5A- FA30-1
- sL2-FSAR Sa. Physical Containment: (Cont'd) 2.
Ceiling: 38 Floor: 38 Inch Reinforced Concrete Inch Reinforced Concrete Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Exhaust Air (2) 12 11 x 16 11 (South Wall)
Supply Air 20 11 x 12 11 (South Wall)
Transfer Grill 12 11 x 12 11 (Floor)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floors and ceiling.
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
Sc.
- 4. Area Access Entrance is through a set of double doors on the north and south walls.
Detection:
None Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There is one fire extinguisher in FA 30 and two fire extinguishers in the adjacent hallway of FA Sl (See Dwg.
SK-2998-M-708, Sheet S).
- 2. Secondary There are two available standpipe hose stations, one in the.
adjacent hallway of FA Sl, and one in the nearby FA 29 (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, Sheet S).
- 3. Fire Reta.rdant Protective Coatings None 9.SA-FA30-2
FSAR Se. Smoke Venting:
- Sf.
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal. Ex-haust capacity of this system is 2800 cfm which will provide a removal rate of 1.35 cfm/sq ft.
Drainage:
A total of twenty-seven 3 inch floor drains service FA 30.
These drains connect to a common 4 inch drain line leading to the Equipment Drain Tank in FA 20.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 30:
Fire Area 30, the Ion Exchanger Area, is located at El 19.SO' of the RAB and is bounded by column lines 2-RA1/2-RA3 and RAA/
RAC. The area is separated from the remainder of the floor by full height walls, floor and ceiling having fire resistive ratings of greater than three hours. Access is provided by a 6 ft x 7 ft door in the south wall entering the common corridor of FA Sl and a S ft x 7 ft door from the outside open yard area in the north wall. FA 30 contains the two CVCS Purification Ion Exchangers, the CVCS Deborating Ion Exchanger, the Fuel Pool Ion Exchanger, the two Pre-concentrate Ion Exchangers, the Waste Ion Exchangers and the two Boric Acid Condensate Ion Ex-changers, all located in segregated cubicles. All of the ion exchangers contained in this area utilize noncombustible. resins contained in individual pressure vessels. The normal HVAC sys-tem of the RAB serves this area with supply through a safety
- related duct and exhaust through non-safety related ducts.
There are two pipe chases above this area, one at El 33.SO' and one at El 37.SO', which are fully isolated from the Ion Exchangers by walls, ceilings and floors having greater than three hour fire resistive ratings. No essential equipment, cables or instrumentation required for safe reactor shutdown are located in this area.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
No significant combustible materials or ignition source are contained within FA 30. Due to the negligible combustible ma-terials, the separation of the equipment and the segregation from adjacent areas provided by full height enclosures, no fire will be postulated to occur in this area that could cause loss of function of the subject units, or that could impact adjacent areas. Therefore, no loss of reactor shutdown capability could occur .
- 9.SA-FA30-3
812-FSAR
.6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
There is one fire extinguisher in FA 30. There are two acces-sible fire extinguishers in the common hallway of FA 51. There are two available standpipe hose stations, one (HS-15-38) in the common corridor of FA 51 at column 2-RA3z/RAC and the other (HS-18-39) in FA 29, adjacent to the east side roll-up door.
An effective response, by the trained fire brigade, will assist in limiting the consequences of any fire effects in the area.
Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be adversely affected.
- 9. 5A- F A30-4
- SL2-FSAR ST ..LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 31
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB Waste and BA Concentrators Elev: 19.50' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet No. 5 and 6 le. Floor Area: 760 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
Partioned areas containing the following equipment Boric Acid Concentrators 2A Boric Acid Concentrators 2A Waste Concentrator
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA
. None
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/Sq Ft)
- 3a.
3b.
Cable Insulation Oils Negligible BA Concentrator Pumps 2A&2B 2 gal .28xl0 6 368 Waste Concentrator Pump 1 gal .14xl0 6 187 3c. Others Negligibie Totals .42xl0 6 555
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Lube Oil BA 2A 1 gal .14xl0 6 3 7xl0 Cone. Pump
- 9. SA- F A31- l
SL2-FSAR
- s. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. The Fire Area Boundary is as follows:
Walls North: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete East 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete West : 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete*
Ceiling:24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 39 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces
. None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Exhaust Air (2) 36"xl6" (North Wall)
Exhaust Air 24"xl2" (North Wall)
Exhaust Air 10"xl4" (West Wall)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and ceilings.
- 3. Electrical All electrical penetrations are sealed to the rating of the fire area barriers
- 4. Area Access Entrances are through labyrinths on the North Wall to each subspace.
Sc. Detection:
None Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There are accessible fire extinguishers in the COlIIIIlOn east-west corridor of FA 51 and in FA 29 (S.ee Dwg 2998-M-708, Sheet 5).
9
- SA- F A3 l - 2
SL2-FSAR
- 2. Secondary
- 3.
There are available standpipe hose stations in the common east-west corridor of FA Sl and in nearby FA 29 (See Dwg 2998-M-708, sheet S).
Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will *be used for smoke removal. Exhaust capacity of this system is SlSO cfm which will provide a re-moval rate of 6.8 cfm/sq ft.
Sf. . Drainage:
Three 3 inch floor drains are connected to a 3 inch drain line leading to the Equipment Drain Tank in FA 20.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 31:
Fire Area 31 is located at El 19.SO' of the RAB and consists of three separate cubicles provided with full height walls con-taining and segregating the two Boric Acid Concentrators (2A and 2B) and the Waste Concentrator. Access to each compartment is provided by a 3 ft x 7 ft wire mesh door to a labyrinth opening from each separate cubicle to the hallway in FA Sl at El. 19.SO'. Fire Area 31 also extends through the floor at El. 43.00' and is isolated as described above, all the way to the roof at El. 62.00'. It is bounded by column lines 2-RAS and a north wall approximately 17 ft from column line 2-RAS and by column lines RAC and RAF. The enclosures provide a fire rating greater than three hours. The normal HVAC System of the RAB serves the area, with air supplys from the corridor through* the labyrinth openings at EL. 19.SO' and air exhausts above EL. 43.00'. FA 31 contains no equipment required for safe reactor shutdown nor do any cables servicing equipment required for safe reactor shutdown traverse FA 31.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
The only combustibles contained in the fire area are the small quantities of lubricating oil (approximately one gallon) contained in each Concentrator Pump. Therefore, the postulated fire for this area assumes the loss of the one gallon of lube oil from one of the Concentrator Pumps (effects will be the same no matter which is chosen), the spread of the oil over ap-proximately 20 sq ft (using a spread factor of 20 sq ft/
gallon), the ignition of the oil and the continuation of com-
- bustion until all combustibles are consumed.
9
- SA- F A31- 3
SL2-FSAR Due to the small quantity of oil involved, the lack of contin-uity of other combustibles in the area, the.isolation provided 6c.
by the fire ar*ea' s barriers and the fact that no equipment, or cables servicing equipment, required for safe reactor shutdown is located in FA 31 and adjacent areas, no loss of safe reactor shutdown capabilities could occur as a result of the postulated fire.
Fire Protection System Operating:
There are accessible fire extinguishers in the common east-west corridor of FA *51 and in FA 29. There are available standpipe hose stations in the common east-west corridor of FA 51 and in adjacent FA 29; the closest unit being (HS-15-38) adjacent to stairway 2-RA-3 and the others being a unit (HS-15-40) at column lines 2-RA3z/RAG and (HS-15-39) ~ear the low leakage door in the east-wall of FA 29. An effective response by the trained fire brigade_, will assist in limiting the consequences of any fire effects. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will be maintained.
9.5A-FA31-4
- SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 32
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB Decontamination Room and Elev 19.50' Maintenance Storage Area lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 5A le. Floor Area: 1400 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
Maintenance Storage Area Decontamination Room Janitor Closet
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA None
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
- 5. 6xl0 6 3a. Cable Insulation 3 4x10 3b. Oils Negligible Jc. Others Class A Combustible Material 7000 lbs 56xl0 6 40xl0 3 Totals 61. 6xl0 6 44xl0 3
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Class A Combustible 7000 lbs 56xl0 6 40xl0 3
- 5. FIRE CONTROL 5a. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 8 Inch Reinfor*ced Concrete Block South: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 9. 5A- FA32-1
- SL2-FSAR
- East: 30 Inch Reinforced Concrete West: 8 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block Ceiling: 6 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces Cable chase in northeast corner of fire area.
Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification
- 1. HVAC See Attachment I
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and ceiling.
- 3. Electrical Electrical penetrations will be sealed to a fire rating equivalent to the FA barriers.
Sc.
- 4. Area Access Entrance is through double fire doors in the north and west walls leading to the corridor of FA Sl.
Detection:
Ionization devices will initiate an alarm in* the Control Room should a fire occur in all three subspaces.
5d. Fire Protection Systems
- 1. Primary There is one fire extinguisher in FA_32 and there are three accessible fire extinguishers in the hallway of FA 51 (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet SA).
- 2. Secondary There are available standpipe hose stations in the common hallway of FA 51 (See Dwg SK-2998-708, Sheet SA) ..
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings Flamemastic fire protective coating is sprayed on all cable trays.
- 9. SA- FA32-2
SL2-FSAR 5e. Smoke Venting:
- Sf.
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal.
Exhaust capacity of this system is 1100 cfm which will provide a removal rate of .78 cfm/sq ft.
Drainage:
Two 3 inch drains (one in the Maintenance Storage Area and one in the Decontamination Room) are connected to a common 3 inch drain header leading to the Equipment Drain Tank in FA 20.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 32:
Fire Area 32 is located at El 19.50' of the RAB and consists of the separated Decontamination Room, Janitor Closet, and Main-tenance Storage Area up to the concrete ceiling located at the 28.66'.* A concealed electrical cable chase passes through the northeast corner of the fire area. It is bounded by column lines 2-RA3z/2-RA5 and column lines RAJ/RAH, and is segregated from FA 40 and FA 51 by reinforced concrete and concrete block walls, concrete floor and ceiling having fire resistive ratings of greater than three hours. Access to FA 32 is through double fire doors on the north wall leading from the east-west corridor in FA 51 to the Maintenance Storage Area and. through double fire doors on the west wall leading from the north-south corridor in FA 51 to the Decontamination Area. These areas are serviced by a safety related supply air system and the exhaust system is nonsafety related.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
The postulated fire for FA 32 is in the Maintenance Storage Area and will involve ordinary combustible materials having an approximate heat release capacity of 8,000 Btu/lb at an average loading of five pounds per square foot. These materials normally consist of wood, paper, cloth, cardboard and other cellulosic items. Other combustibles that may be in the area are miscellan-eous plastics, small amounts of lubricants, etc., which are con-sidered to be negligible.
The combustibles are assumed to ignite and burn until com-pletely consumed. This area contains no equipment required for safe reactor shutdown other than the safety related conduits and trays which pass through the northeast corner of the fire area. The trays will be coated with an approv~d fire retardant coating, and the trays will be segregated by removable panels for the full room height. Therefore, the postulated fire in-volving combustible material will be contained within the area boundaries .
- 9. 5A- FA32-3
SL2-FSAR The essential electrical cables and trays in the concealed space cable chase are isolated and they are designed and routed to meet the separation and barrier requirements of R.G. 1.75. There are no internal sources of combustibles that could expose these cables, there are no redundant cable services routed in the same tray and the flame retardant coating will essentially prevent the propagation of a tray fire in any direction from a point of initiation and will keep the fire from affecting adjacent cables. The postulated fire for the Maintenance Storage Area will be contained within the area boundaries. It will not seriously expose the cable in the isolated chase. In the unlikely event of combustion within a cable tray due to electrical faulting, it will not propagate and affect adJacent equipment. Since redundant essential cables are not routed in the same tray, no loss of redundant essential equipment could occur.
No essential equipment or cabling required for safe reactor shutdown, either within FA32 or in adjacent FA40 and FA51 could seriously be impacted by the postulated fire, therefore, safe reactor shutdown will not be impaired.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
Automatic smoke detectors are provided and they will alarm in the Control Room, resulting in a prompt response by the fire brigade. There is one fire extinguisher in the common hall-ways of FA 51. There are three available standpipe hose sta-tions in the common hallways of FA 51; one (HS-15-33), in the north-south passage adjacent to column lines 2-RA4/RAJ; one (HS-15-39), in the east-west passage adjacent to column.lines 2-RA3/RAI, and the other (HS-15-40), in the east-west passage adjacent to column 2-RA3z/RAG. An effective response, by the trained fire brigade, will assist in limiting the consequences of any fire effects. Safe shutdown capabilities will not be impaired.
- 9. 5A-FA32-4
I I
/
r 6" BLOCK ------.-~
6"BLOCK--
32 FL EL 19.5
- 6" BLOCK--'----
24" RC HVAC PENETRATION NOTE:
NO. SIZE DESCRIPTION 1. ALL HVAC PENETRATIONS IN CEILING AT EL 28.67' 1 12 x 18 RETURN AIR
- 2. ALL WALLS REINFORCED 2 8x4 RETURN AIR CONCRETE (RC) OR CONCRETE BLOCK.
3 12 x 12 RETURN AIR 4 12 x 12 SUPPLY AIR 5 15 x 15 SUPPLY AIR FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 FIRE AREA #32 - PLAN VIEW ATTACHMENT I 9.5A-FA32-5
SL2-FSAR
- . 1.
ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 33 DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB Repair Shop & Laboratory Elev 19.50' Areas lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 5A le. Floor Area: 2100 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
Radio Chemistry Laboratory Instrument Calibration and Repair Shop Health Physics Station Health Physics Counting Room Sample Room
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA None
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/ sq ft) 3a. *Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils Negligible 3c. Others Class A Combustible Material 10500 lb* 84xl0 6 40xl0 3 Totals 84xl0 6 3 40xl0
- The a.ssumed fire *load is Class A Combustible material with a loading of (5) lb/sq ft at 8000 Btu/lb.
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Class A Combustible Material - 10500 lb 84xl0 6 40xl0 3
- 9. 5A- F,A.33.-1
-SL2-FSAR
- s. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 8 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block East: 8 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block West: 8 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block Ceiling: 6 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification
- 1. HVAC See Attachment I
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor ~nd.ceiling.
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area Access Entrance is through two doors on the west wall and two doors on the south wall which lead into the common cor-ridor of FA Sl. A door is also located on the east wall leading from FA 28.
Sc. Detection:
Ionization type fire detectors initiate alarms in the Control Room should a fire occur.
- 9. SA-FAll-2
SL2-FSAR Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There are two fire extinguishers- in FA 33, one accessibl~
fire extinguisher in FA 23, and one accessible fire extin-guisher in the common hallway of FA Sl (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708 Sheet S and SA).
- 2. Secondary There are three available standpipe hose stations in the common corridor of FA Sl (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet SA).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used for smo~e removal. Exhaust capacity o{ this system is 69SO cfm which will provide a remo-val rate of 3.31 cfm/sq ft.
Sf. Drainage:
Floor Drains (Qty)" Location Description l Instrument Calibration A three inch floor drain con-and Repair Shop. nects to the Equipment Drain Tank in FA 20.
l Radio Chemistry A three inch floor drain con-Laboratory nects to the Equipment Drain Tank in FA 20.
2 Sample Room Two 3 inch floor drains are connected to a common 3 inch drain leading to the Equipment Drain Tank in FA 20.
No floor drains are located in the Health-Physics Station and in tµe Health Physics Counting Room. However, with the room doors open, water will flow into the FA Sl hallway and into this areas drainage system (see drainage FA Sl).
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 33:
,. FA 33 consists of the Repair Shops and the Laboratory Areas and is located at elevation 19.SO' of the RAB between column lines RAJ and RAH and between column lines 2-RAlz and RA3. FA33 is 9.SA-FA33-3
SL2-FSAR segregated from adjacent fire areas FA 22, FA 23, FA 24, FA 2~,
and FA 51 (both to the sides and above). by reinforced concrete and concrete block walls, concrete floor and ceiling, the latter being at El 28.66', and all having fire resistive rat-ings greater than three hours. Access to FA 33 is through four doors leading into the common hallways of FA 51, and a single door leading to FA 28. FA 33 is divided into four subspac;:es separated from each other by concrete block*walls and standard doors. FA 33 contains miscellaneous he~lth physics equipment, radio chemistry laboratory equipment, sampling room equipment and an instrument calibration shop. These areas have standa~d air conditioning units and do not use the normal HVAC system in
. the RAB. There is no safety related equipment in FA 13.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
The postulated fire in FA 33 will involve ordinary combustible materials which consists of Class A type materials such as wood, paper, cloth, cardboard and other cellulosic items.
Other combustibles that may be in the area are miscellaneous plastics, small amounts of lubricants and surface coatings which are consi<lered to be negligible. Due to the lack of con-tinuity of the combustible materials and the isolation of sub~
spaces, the fire will be limited to the subspace area of ori-gin. Consequently, adjacent fire areas will not be affected~
Since the area does not contain safety related equipment, and since the postulated fire will be limited and confined, sa~e reactor shutdown capability will not be affected.
6c.. Fire Protection System Operating:
Automatic smoke detectors are provided and they will alarm in I
the Control Room, resulting in a prompt response by the fire brigade members. There are two fire extinguishers in FA 33, one accessible fire extinguisher in FA 23 and three accessible fire extinguishers in the common hallways of FA 51. There are three available standpipe hose stations in the common hallway.s of FA 51; one (HS-15-34) located in the northwest area near stairway 2-RA-2, one (HS-15-39) located in the east-west pass-age near column 2-RA3/RAI, and the other (HS-15 40) in the east-west passage adjacent to column 2-RA3z/RAG. An effective response, by the trained fire brigade, will assist in limiting the consequences of any fire affects.
-~
- 9. SA- FA33-4
.A N I I I \
-24" RC G)C8l
[ JCD
[]0 FALSE CEILING
"~-----"-.../ ....~it---8" RC EL 28'-8 8" RC ----11-~
- ~
8" RC HVAC PENETRATIONS NO. SIZE' DESCRIPTION LOCATION 1 36x 16 SUPPLY AIR WEST WALL 2 24x16 RETURN AIR WEST WALL 3 12 x 18 RETURN AIR ROOF 4 14x10 SUPPLY AIR ROOF 5 60x34 RETURN AIR ROOF 6 12 x 12 SUPPLY AIR ROOF 7 22 x 6 RETURN AIR ROOF NOTE:
(RC) - REINFORCED CONCRETE FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 FIRE AREA #33 - PLAN VIEW ATTACHMENT I 9.SA-FA33-5
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 34 (Zone I)
(Also See FA34 II)
- l. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB Electrical Equipment Room Elev: 43.00' lb. Reference Drawing:. SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6 le. Floor Area: 3710 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Reactnr Trip Switchgear Pressurizer Htr Buses: 2A3 2B3 Pressurizer Htr SCR Controllers: 2A 2B MCC 2AB(SAB)
Annunciator Isolation Cabinets: SA-MA/MC SB-MB/MD
PP202(SB)
PP203(SAB) l20V AC Power Panel Transformers:
SAB PP201 Transformer PP202 Transformer PP203 Transformer 125V DC Power Panels: PP238(SA)
PP239(SB)
PP240(SAB) 120V AC Instrument Buses: 2MA 2MB 2MC 2MD Transfer Control Panel 2AB Electrical Box: B2895(SB) (B636)*
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number.
- 9. SA- FA34(I)-l
SL2-FSAR
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Misc. Power & Control Cable 516. xlO 6 139xl0 3
3b. Oils Negligible 3c. Others Switchgear/Mee l.6xl0 6 .43xl0 3
Totals 517.6xl0 6 139xl0 3
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Cable Tray 114xl0 3*
480 V MCC .83xl0 6 .69xl0 3 5.
- See Methodology FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary:
Walls North: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Snuth: 12 Inch Reinfnrced Concrete Block East: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block West: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Ceiling: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces None 9.5A-FA34(I)-2
SL2-FSAR Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
- Identification
- 1. HVAC Supply Air Supply Air 36" 16" x
x 20" 12" Size (South Wall)
(North Wall)
Supply Air 16" x 12" (East Wall)
Supply Air 38" x 20" (South Wall)
Supply Air 28" x 24" (South Wall)
Transfer Duct 60" x 34" (South Wall)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and ceiling.
- 3. Electrical All penetrations will be sealed to a fire rating equiva-lent to the FA barriers.
- 4. Area Access The area is accessible through a door on the west wall leading to an elevator and a platform from the TGB, on the
- Sc.
east wall from FA 37, on the north wall from FA 36, and on the south wall through a large opening to FA 34 II.
Detection:
Ionization type detectors will init.iate an alarm in the Control Room should a fire occur in this area.
5d. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There are three accessible fire extinguishers in FA 34, plus additional units in adjacent fire areas. See drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6 for locations.
- 2. Secondary There are two available standpipes hose stations in FA 34 I (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings Flamemastic. fire protective coating will be sprayed on all cable trays .
- 9. SA- FA34(I)-3
SL2-FSAR Se. Smoke Venting:
Sf.
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal.
haust capacity of this system is 6.7 cfm/sq ft.
Drainage:
Ex-No in-floor drainage is provided in this area.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 34 (Zone I & II)
Fire Area 34 I & II, the Cable Spreading Room and the B Switch-gear Room respectively, are located at El 43.00' of the RAB, be-tween column lines 2-RA1/2-RA5, and column lines RAH/RAL.
FA 34 is enclosed by outside walls on the north, west and south, and is segregated from adjacent fire areas FA 36, FA 37, and FA 40 by reinforced concrete and con~rete block walls, con-crete floor and ceiling having fire resistive ratings greater than three hours. FA 34 is divided into two Zones,* (I) on the north end and (II) on the south end, by a full height wall ex-tending along column line 2-RA3 from column line RAJ to column line RAL. Between column lines RAI and RAJ no phys-ical separation is provided between the two Zones. FA 34 is ac-cessible from the Turbine Building elevation 39.50', through two open bridges leading to the RAB along the west wall, through an outside elevator and outside open stairway 2-RA-l along the west wall, and from FA 37 through three doors in the east and north wall, and from FA 36 through one door in the north wall. Enclosed interior stairway 2-RA-2 connects FA 34 with FA 20 below and to FA42I above. A 9 ft x 11 ft hatchway with a checker plate hatch cover, with a 7.5 ton monorail arrangement above it, connects FA34 with FA51 at El 19.50' and with FA20 at El (-).50'. There are various floor openings between FA34 and FAs 21, 23, and 51 below which are used for routing electrical cables and are sealed to a fire rating equivalent to the floor. FA34, Zone I, con-tains essential electrical equipment such as the Reactor Trip Switchgear, *and various AC & DC Power Panels, Trans-formers, etc. The space above the equipment starting at El 52.00' to the underside of the floor sla~ at El 62.00' is utilized for electrical cable tray routing for control and low voltage cables leading into the plant Control Room.
FA 34, Zone II, houses essential 480V Switchgear 2B2, 4.16 kV Switchgear 2B3, Transformers and other associated equipment and the Battery Charges 2A, 2B and 2AB. The Safe Shutdown Panel is located along the west wall and is enclosed by concrete block walls, and the Main Fire Alarm Panel is located on the north-central side of Zone II.
9.5A-FA34(1)-4
SL2-FSAR 6a . Description of Fire Area (Zone I & II) (Cont'd)
- FA 34 I and II is serviced by the Electric Room Ventilation*
System, with safety related supply and exhaust ventilation systems. The Switchgear Units and the Pressurizer Heater Buses all have curbs surrounding the equipment. Transformers requiring insulating and cooling use air or high temperature flash point liquids.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
Two fires are postulated in FA 34, one in Zone I and one in Zone II.
The major combustible loading in FA 34 I consists of the elec-trical cable insulation concentrated in the cable trays routed above El 52.00'. All cable trays are sprayed with an approved fire retardant coating. The cables are arranged to meet the separation and barrier requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75.
The cables and redundant equipment are spatially separated and curbed. FA 37, the adjacent A Switchgear Room, is isolated and adjacent Zone II is separated from Zone I. A postulated fire due to electrical faulting is assumed to occur in the bottom tray of a stack of trays. Due to the low energy level of the cables, the fire retardant coating, the separation features and the lack.of continuity of combustibles, the postulated fire will be limited to the cable tray of origin .
- Propagation of flame and heat along the involved tray will also be limited. Gable trays carrying redundant cabling and other related components and equipment will not be exposed to the postulated fire. Adjacent FAs will not be affected.
If instead of the fire being postulated in the cables at the 52.00' elevation, a fire were to occur in one of the pieces of equipment at El 43.00', such as the Pressurizer Heater Buses or Motor Control Centers, it would be limited to the area of ori-gin, due to the arrangement of the equipment, noncombustibi-lity, spatial separation, fire retardant coatings and lack of continuity of combustibles.
The postulated fire in FA 34 II is assumed to occur in any one of the Switchgear and MCC Cabinets or associated approved flame retardant coated cable trays. Redundant cabinets and cable trays are located in adjacent isolated FA 37 and separated FA 34 I. The Hot Shutdown Control Panel Room is isolated and the safety related battery charger units, static inverter units, etc. are separated by full height concrete block wall cubicles.
The postulated fire will be limited to its area of origin due the cable and tray arrangements, fire retardant coatings, isolation separation and lack of continuity of combustibles.
Therefore, the postulated fire could not spread to redundant equipment and cable trays and will not affect adjacent FA's .
- 9. SA- FA34(1)-5
SL2-FSAR 6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating: (Cont'd)
In FA 34 I the approved fire retardant coating on all cable trays, the tray arrangements, isolation, separation and lack of continuity of combustibles will limit the damage by the postulated fire to the cable tray of origin. Redundant cables will not be exposed and affected by the fire. Redundant equip-ment and components and associated units in the area will not be affected. There may be loss of one essential Train. How-ever, redundant equipment which is isolated and/or adequately separated will remain functional, and therefore safe reactor shutdown capability will not be impaired.
In FA 34 II, the approved fire retardant coating on cable trays, the spatial and physical separation between safety re-lated equipment and the lack of continuity of combustibles will limit the postulated fire to the area of origin. Safe reactor shutdown capability will not be impaired due to a fire in FA 34.
Due to the limited propagation of any of the postulated fires in FA 34, no adverse affects will occur 1n adjacent fire areas.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
The principal fire protection feature in FA 34 I and FA 34 II is the approved fire retardant coating applied to all cable trays which is a passive, continuous defense against exposure fires and fire propagations within cable trays. This feature is augmented by ionization type detectors located throughout FA 34 I and over the cable trays of FA 34 II, providing annun-ciation in the Control Room. There are three accessible fire extinguishers in FA 34 I, and three accessible fire extingui-shers in FA 34 II, plus additional units in accessible adjacent areas. There are four available standpipe hose stations; one (HS-15-32) in FA 34 I is adjacent to stair 2-RA-2, one (HS 31) in FA 34 I is adjacent to column lines 2-RA3/RAI, one (HS-15-42) in FA 34 II is adjacent to column lines 2-RA5/RAL and the other (HS-15-37) in adjacent FA 39 is adjacent to column lines 2-RA3z/RAG.
- Quick detection and an effective response by the trained fire brigade will limit the extent of the conse-quences that may be caused by the fire effects. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be impaired.
9
- 5A- F A34 (I) - 6
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 34 (ZONE II)
(Also See FA 34I)
- l. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB Electrical Equipment Room Elev: 43.00' lb. Reference Drawing: Sk-2998-M~708, Sheet 6 le. Floor Area: 4780 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Battery Chargers: 2A 2B 2AB 125 V DC Buses: 2A 2B 2A:B Static Inverter Cabinets: 2A 2B 2C 2D Hot Shutdown Control Panel 4.16 kV Swgr 2B3(SB) 480V Swgr 2B2(SB) 480V MCC 2B5(SB) 480V MCC 2B6(SB)
Lighting Panel LP-226 Transformer 120V AC Power Panel PP22l(NB)
PP241 Transformer(NB)
T~ansfer Contra~ Pnl 2B
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity* (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation 6
Misc Power & Control Cable 114 x 10 23. 8 x 10 3 3b. Oils 3c. Others Switchgear/MCC 3.5 x 10 6 .7 x 10 3
- Totals
- 9. 5A-F A34 (II)-1 117.5 x 10 6 24.5 x 10 3
SL2-FSAR
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Cable Tray 480V MCC
.;\
Quantity Combustible Loading (Btu)
. 83 x 10 6 (Btu/sq ft) 114 x 10 3
- 169 x 10 3
- See Methodology
- 5. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block South: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete East: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block West: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces Sb.
Hot Shutdown Control Panel Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Exhaust 120" x 24" (North Wall)
Exhaust ( 2) 42" x 72" (Roof)
Transfer grille 60" x 34" (North Wall)
Supply 90" x 70" (Roof)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations in walls, floor and ceiling.
Equipment Hatch 9 I x 11'
- 3. Electrical All cable trays will be sealed to a rating equivalent to the fire barriers.
- 9. SA-FA34 (II)-2
SL2-FSAR
- 4. Area Access
- Access is through a door on the west wall which leads to stairway 2RA-1 and a platform to the TGB, on the east wall through a roll-up door to FA 37, and on the north wall through a door and large opening to FA 37 and FA 341 re-spectively.
Sc. Oetection:
Ionization type detectors will initiate an alarm_in the Control Room should a fire occur.
Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There are two accessible fire extinguishers in FA34II, plus additional units in adjacent fire areas. See draw-ing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6 for locations.
- 2. Secondary There is one available standpipe hose stations in FA34II, two available units in FA34I and one available unit in adjacent FA39.
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings Flamemastic fire protective coating will be sprayed on all cable trays.
Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal. Ex~
haust capacity of this system is 6.7 cfm/sq ft.
Sf. Drainage:
No drainage is provided in this area.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE See Write-up for Zone I .
- 9.SA- FA34(II)-3
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 3S (Also See FA 36)
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB Battery Room A Elev: 43.00' 1 Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6 and 7 le. Floor Area: 3SO Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Station Battery 2A Battery Room Exhaust Fan 2RV-l 2RV-l Disconnect Switch 2RV-l Starter
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Sourc~ Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
- 3a.
3b.
Cable Insulation Oils Negligible Negligible 3c. Others Fan Motor Grease l lb 18.S x 10 3 S3 3
Totals 18.S x 10 S3
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Fan Motor*Grease 1 lb 18.S x 10 3 7 x 10 3 S. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
9
- SA- F A3 S - 1
SL2-FSAR
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 36 Inch Reinforced Concrete (RCB Shield Wall')
South: 12 Inch Block Wall East: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete West: 12 Inch Block Wall Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb; Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Roof Exhaust Fan 22 x 22
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and ceiling .
3.
4~
Electrical All electrical penetrations are sealed to the fire rating of the fire boundaries.
Area Access Entrance is through a wire mesh door on the south wall leading from FA 37.'
Sc. Detection:
None Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There are two accessible fire extinguishers 1n FA37 and two in FA34I (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6).
- 2. Secondary There are two available standpipe hose stations in FA34 (See DWG. SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6).
9.SA-FA35-2
812-FSAR
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings
- Se.
None Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal.
Exhaust capacity of this system is 12SO cfm which will provide a removal rate of 3.SS cfm/sq ft.
Sf. Drainage*:
A three inch floor drain leads to the acid neutralization basin.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 3S:
Fire Area 3S, the 2A Battery Room, is located at elevation 43.00' of the RAB between column lines RAI/RAH and between column line RAl and the Containment Building. Fire Area 3S is separated from adjacent fire areas by full height reinforced concrete and concrete block walls, concrete floor and ceiling having fire resistive ratings greater than three hours. Access into FA 3S is through a wire mesh door from FA 37 (the 2A Switchgear Room). FA 3S houses the safety related 2A Battery
- and its associated equipment. This area is supplied air through a branch line of the safety related Electric Equipment Room Ventilation Duct System. Exhaust is provided by a roof (El 62.00') mounted electric motor driven safety related Ex-haust Fan 2 RV-1, which continually operates to provide positive air movement and prevent hydrogen buildup.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
Combustible materials in FA 3S are limited cable in conduit and some wiring associated with the exhaust fan motor. The battery electrolyte is non-combustible, and the battery casing is manufactured out of thermal plastic (Lexan), a material which does not support combustion. The postulated fire is assumed to occur from an electrical short circuit in the fan motor located at elevation 62.00' roof, which could conceivably also involve the approximately one pound of grease inherent to the internal housing of the fan unit. Due to the limited quantity of combustibles in the area, the fire will be confined.
to the fan motor itself. Other equipment in the area will not be affected. Ventilation air supplied to FA JS will continue and space pressure buildup will induce exfiltration of air through openings into FA 37, maintaining Battery Room Venti-lation .
- 9. 5A-FA3S-3
SL2-FSAR The safety related Battery 2A located in FA 35 will not be ex-posed to the fire located on the roof at elevation 62.00' be-cause of spatial separation and confinement and therefore it will remain functional. Also, a totally redundant unit located in separated FA 36 will be available. Therefore, safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be impaired.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
There are four *acces*s.l.ble fire extinguishers: two in FA 3 7 and two in FA 341. ** Th~re are two available standpipe hose stations in FA 341; one (HS-15-32) is located adjacent to stairway 2-RA-2 and the other type station (HS-15-31) is located at column 2-RA3/RAI. There are also at least eight additional fire extinguishers available from the Control Room at elevation 62.00' (FA42) to use on a roof fire if required.
An effective response, by the trained fire brigade, will assist in limiting the consequences of any fire effects. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be impaired.
9.5A-FA35-4
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE~UNIT NO. 2
- 1.
FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 36 (Also See FA35)
DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la.
lb.
Building: RAB Battery Room B Reference Drawing:
Elev:
SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6 and 7 43.00' le. Floor Area: 450 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Station Battery 2B Battery Room Exhaust Fan 2RV-2 2RV-2 Disconnect Switch 2RV-2 Starter 3 .* AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils Negligible 3c. Others Fan Motor Grease 1 lb 18 .5xl0 3 41 Totals 18.5xl0 3 41
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
- 18. 5 x 10 3 3 Fan Motor Grease 1 lb 7 x 10
- 5. FIRE CONTROL 5a. Physical Containment:.*
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 36 Inch Reinforced Concrete (RCB Shield Wall)
- South:
East:
8 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block.
8 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block 9.5A-FA36-l
SL2-FSAR West: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Roof Exhaust Fan 22" x 22"
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and ceiling.
- 3. Electrical All electrical penetrations are sealed to the fire rating of the fire barriers.
- 4. Area Access Sc.
Entrance is through a wire mesh door on the south wall from FA 341.
Detect inn:
None Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There are twn accessible fire extinguishers in FA 34I and two in FA 37 *(see Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6).
- 2. Secondary There are two available standpipe hose stations in FA 34I (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None 9.5A-FA36-2
SL2-FSAR 5e . Smoke Venting:
- 5£.
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal.
Exhaust capacity of this system is 1250 cfm which will pro-vide a removal rate of 2.78 cfm/sq ft.
Drainage:
A three inch floor drain leading to the acid neutralization
. pit.
- 6. ANALYSlS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of. Fire Area 36:
Fire Area 36, the 2B Battery Room, is located at elevation 43.00' of the RAB, between column lines RAJ and RAI and between column line 2-RAl and the Containment Building. FA 36 is separated from adjacent fire areas by full height reinforced concrete and concrete block walls, concrete floor and ceiling having fire resistive ratings greater than three hours. Access into FA 36 is through a wire mesh door from FA 341. FA 36 houses the safety related 2B Battery and its associated equip-ment. This area is supplied air through a branch line of the safety related Electric Equipment Duct System. Exhaust is provided by a roof mounted (elevation 62.00') electric motor driven safety related Exhaust Fan 2RV-2, which continually
- 6b.
operates to provide positive air movement and prevent hydrogen buildup.
Fire Protection System Not Operating:
Combustible materials in FA 36 are limited to a single cable in conduit and some wiring associated with the exhaust fan motor. The battery electrolyte is non-combustible, and the battery casing is manufactured out of thermal plastic (Lexan),
a material which does not support combustion. The postulated fire is assumed to occur from a electrical short circuit in the fan motor located at elevation 62.00' roof, which could con-ceivably also involve the approximately one pound of grease in-herent to the internal housing of the fan unit. Due to the limited quantity of combustible materials involved and due to the lack of continuity of combustibles in the area, the fire will be confined to the fan motor itself. Other equipment in the area will not be affected. Ventilation air supplied to FA 36 will continue, and space pressure buildup will induce exfiltration of air through the disabled exhaust fan housing and minor amounts through openings into FA 341, maintaining Battery Room ventilation.
The safety related Battery 2B located in FA 36 will not be ex-posed to the fire located on the roof at elevation 62.00' be-cause of spatial separation and confinement and the:refore it*
9 . 5A- F A3 6 - 3
SL2-FSAR will remain functional. Also a totally redundant unit located in separated FA 35 will be available. Therefore, safe reactor shutdown capability will not be impaired.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
There are no portable or manual fire protection units installed in FA 36. There are four accessible fire extinghishers, two in FA 341 and two in FA 37. There are two available standpipe hose stations in FA 341; one (HS-15-31) located adjacent to column 2-RA3/RA1 and one (HS-15-32) located adjacent to stair-way 2-RA-2. There are also at least eight additional fire ex-tinguishers available from the Control Room at elevation 62.00' (FA42) to use on a roof fan fire if required. An effective response, by the trained fire brigade, will assist in limiting the consequences of any fire effects. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be impaired.
9.SA- FA36-4
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 37
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB Switchgear Room Elev: 43.00' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6 le. Floor Area: 1470 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA 4.16 kV Swgr 2A3 (SA) 480V Swgr 2A2 (SA) 480V MCC 2AS (SA) 480V MCC 2A6 (SA) 120 V AC Power Panel PP220 (NA)
PP220 Transformer (NA)
Swgr Room Exhaust Fans: 2RV-3 2RV-4 Transfer Control Pnl 2A (SA)
PB Sta/Elec Box: (SA) (PB Sta 2RV~3) (B601)*
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/ sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation 6 3 Misc Power & Control Cable 107xl0 72.SxlO 3b. . Oils Negligible 3c. Others 6 3 MCC/ Switchgear 3.SxlO 2.4xl0 6 3 Totals 110.SxlO 75.2xl0
- 9. SA-FA37-l
SL2-FSAR
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Cable Tray
- See Methodology Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 114xl0 3
S. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block South: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block East : 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block West : 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:*
1.
Identification HVAC Supply Air Supply Air Size 16"xl2" (West Wall) 16"xl2" (North Wall)
Roof Exhaust (2) 6 1 X6 I -
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and ceiling.
- 3. Electrical All electrical penetrations will be sealed to a fire rating equivalent to the barrier wall.
- 4. Area Access Entrance into FA37 is through doors which are located on the north, south, east and west walls.
Sc. Detection:
Ionization type fire detectors are located in this area and will initiate an alarm in the Control Room should a fire occur .
9
- SA- F A3 7 - 2
SL2-FSAR Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There are two fire extinguishers available in FA37 and there are other available units in adjacent FA 341 and FA 34II. See Drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6 for locattons.
- 2. Secondary Standpipe hose stations are available in adjacent FAs 39, 34I and 34II. See drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6 for locations.
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings Flammastic fire protective coating will be sprayed on all cable trays.
Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal. The average exhaust for the Electrical Equipment area is 6.7 cfm/
sq ft.
Sf. Drainage:
Drainage is not provided in this area. However, water can flow
- 6.
through the open doors on the east wall into the floor drain system of adjacent FA39. (See drainage FA39).
ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 37:
Fire Area 3 7, the A Switchgear Room, is located irt the RAB at elevation 43.00' between column lines 2~RA1/2-RA3 and between the column lines RAH/RAI. FA37 is separated from ~djacent Fire Areas FA39, FA3S and FA34I & II by reinforced concrete and con-crete block walls, concrete floor and ceiling all having fire resistive ratings greater than three hours. Access to FA37 is through the east wall double doors from FA39, through the north wall door from FA3S through two doors on the west wall from FA34 (I and II), and through a south wall door from FA34II.
Essential Pquipment, conduit and cables in cable trays required for a safe reactor shutdown are located in FA37, and basically include switchgear, motor control centers, transformers and associated units. Concentrated sources of combustible mate-rials are found in the various switchgear cabinets and stack of cable trays .
- 9. SA- FA37-3
SL2-FSAR The FA receives supply air through the Electrical ~quipment Room Ventilation System which is safety related and which has its main equipment in the HVAC Rooms at elevation 62.00'. Exhaust air is provided by two roof mounted exhaust fans, 2RV-3 and 2RV-4, which are located above the Switchgear Room.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
The postulated fire is assumed to oc.cur in cable tray P2323 approximately 15 ft north of Column Line 2-RA2. Cable tray P2323 is at El 52.00' in a stack of cable trays running north-so.uth between elevations 52. 50' and 57. 50'. The fire is assumed to be initiated by an electrical fault within the tray.
The approved fire retardant coating applied to all the trays in FA37 will prevent the fire from propagating internally and externally along the involved cable tray, and will limit damage of the postulated fire to the area of origin. Only SA Train essential equipment served by the cable routed in cable tray P2323 may be affected. Redundant SB and SAB Train essential equipment located in isolated FA 3411 will remain functional.
Thus, the postulated fire in FA 37 will not impair safe reactor capability.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
The principal fire protection feature in FA37 is the approved fire retardant coating applied to all cable .trays which is a passive continuous defense against exposure fires and fire propagation within and along the cabl.e trays. Area ionization type fire detectors located in FA37 provide annunciation in the Control Room resulting in prompt response by the trained plant fire brigade. Fire extinguishers strategically located in FA37 and adjacent Fire Areas 34 (I and II) and 39 are backed up by standpipe hose stations; one (HS-15-37) is iocated in FA39 near column 2-RA3/RHG, one (HS-15-31) is located is FA34I near column 2-RAE/RAl and the other (HS-15-32) is located in FA34I at stair 2-RA-2, and all are accessible to the FA37 entrances. Quick detection and an eff~ctive response by the trained fire ,brigade, using the available fire extinguishers and manual hoses will limit the physical damage caused by the effects of the fire. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will
.not* be impaired.
9.5A-FA37-4
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 38
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB ECCS Ventilation Equipment Elev: 43.00' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6 le. Floor Area: 494 Sq Ft ld. Subsp~ces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Fan 2HVE-9B 2HVE-9B F~lters 2HVE-9B Dampers: D-15 D-16 Louver 2L-7B Motor 2HVE-9B Temperature Elements: TE-25-42 TE-25-43 TE-25-44 TE-25-45 TE-25-46 TE-25-47 D-15 Position Switches: ZS-25-56A ZS-25-56B ZS-25-57A ZS-25-57B D-16 Position Switches: ZS-25-58A ZS-25-58B ZS-25-59A ZS-25-59B 2HVE-9B Diff Pressure Indicating Transmitter: PDIT-25-SB, 18B, 19B (B603)*
Electric~l Boxes: (SB)(PB Sta 2 HVE-9B) (B609)*
B2193(SB) (B604)*
B2195(SB) (B606)*
B2194(SB) (B607 )*
B2G6l(SB) (B608)*
B210l(SB) (B610)*
B2725(SB) (B611 )*
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number
- 9. SA- FA38- l
SL2-FSAR
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS 3a.
3b.
Source Cable Insulation Oils Quantity Negligible Negligible (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3c. Others 6 3 HEPA Filters (30) (26xl0 3 BTU/Filter) .8 x 10 1. 6xl0 6 3 Charcoal Filters S,700 lbs 79.8 x 10 163.0xlO 6 3 Totals 80. 6 x 10 164.6xl0
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 8 6 Charcoal Filters S,700 lbs 80 x 10 1.1 x 10 *
- Based on filter rack area of 73 sq ft.
S. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North:
South:
East:
24 12 24 Inch Reinforced Inch 'Reinforced Inch Reinforced Concrete Concrete Block Concrete West: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete (Minimum)
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through.Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Exhaust Air 84 11 x 36" (Floor)
Exhaust Air 18" x 10" (North Wall)
Supply Air 14" x 12 11 (South Wall)
Transfer Grille 24" x 24 11 (South Wall Discharge Air Louver 2L-7B 96 x 48" (East Wall) 9
- SA- F A3 8 - 2
SL2-FSAR
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and ceiling.
- 3. Electrical All electrical penetrations are* sealed 'to provide a fire resistance rating equivalent to the fire area barriers.
- 4. Area Access Entrance into this area is through a door from FASO.
Sc. Detection:
The charcoal filter beds and the upstream air temperature of these filters are continually monitored. These monitors initiate alarms in the Control Room should a high temperature condition occur.
Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There is one accessible fire exting.uisher in adjacent FASO and two in adjacent FA39 (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6) .
- 2. Secondary There are three available standpipe hose stations: two in adjacent FASO and one in adjacent FA39 (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings Nnne Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal.
Exhaust capacity nf this system is 900 cfm which will provide a removal rate of 1.8 cfm/sq ft.
Sf. Drainage:
A 3 inch floor drain is connected to a common 3 inch drain header leading tn the Equipment Drain Tank in FA20 .
- 9. SA-FA38-3
SL2-FSAR
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED -FIRE 6p. Descr~ption of Fire Area 38:
Fire Area 38, the HVAC Exhaust Train B Room, is located at El 43.00' in the northeast section of the RAB, between column lines 2-RA/2-RA2 and column lines RAC/RAD. FA 38 is segregated from adjace~t Fire Areas 39, 50 and 41 by reinforced concrete and concrete block walls, and concrete floor and ceiling having fire resistive ratings greater thari three hours. Access into FA 38 is from FA 50 through a door in the south wall. Fire Area 38 contains essential RAB ventilation equipment 2HVE-9B including fan, motot, switches and elements, temperature ele-ments, dampers, filter train charcoal and HEPA filters and required electrical cabling in conduit. The air to the FA is being supplied through a branch duct of the safety related RAB Normal Ventilation System and exhaust is provided by the non-safety related RAB Exhaust System. Under accident conditions, ventilation of ECCS Areas are automatically arranged to provide greater supply air volume. The ECCS exhaust fan is simultan-eously energized and dampers in the exhaust ductwork are opened to allow the fans to draw all exhaust air from the ECCS areas and direct it through exhaust ducts and filter train. The exhaust duct enters FA 38 through a floor opening from FA 24 below, and the air is then processed through the HEPA and charcoal filter banks located in a metal filter enclosure, before it is discharged to the atmosphere via a missile protected exhaust louver in the east wall. The charcoal adsorbers are high efficiency Kl impregnated charcoal units with a bed size of 146 inches x 60 inches x 2 inches, arranged in ten parallel rows with a space between each- parallel unit to form a filter bank, which contains approximately 5,700 pounds of charcoal per unit.
6b. Fire Protection System No!:_ Operating:
The postulated fire in FA 38 is assumed to originate in the charcoal filter-bed. Typically, a -fire in charcoal on.ginates from auto-ignition, as a hot spot and_ as it spreads slowly through the bed, as is indicative of the "secondary burning 11 characteristics of charcoal, which literally contains no volatiles compared to the _ "primary burning" of wood. Since the charcoal _bed is housed in an enclosed steel casing, com-bustion air is also curtailed. There are four thermocouple instruments located in the charcoal filter unit which con-tinuously monitor the charcoal filter bed temperature. These temperature elements (set at 200°F) will initiate an alarm in the Control Room before the charcoal reaches possible ignition temperatures (approximately 626°F). There is also a temperature element which records upstream and downstream temperatures in the Control Room. This temperature dif-ferential allows the Control Room operators adequate time to initiate emergency actions. If the charcoal reaches ignition temperature and a small fire develops in the bed, 9.5A-FA38-4
SL2-FSAR 6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating: (Cont'd)
- the exhaust system can be deenergized and the dampers can be closed, effectively limiting the air supply which would be required to sustain combustion, thus the .contained smoldering type fire would eventually tend to smother itself. This permits follow-up controls and activities to restore normal operations. Should the heat and products of combustion spread outside the filter casing into the open area of FA 38, essential equipment associated with 2HVE-9B may be damaged.
FA 38 is an enclosed room which confines the heat and smoke generated by the postulated fire, thus precluding the possibility of damaging equipment outside FA 38.
Radionuclides, from equipment leakage in the areas serviced by this system, wil 1 be adsorbed by the charcoal. *In the unlikely event that there would be a radiological release, due to a fire condition, it would tend to be confined within the enclosed steel casing. If it is lea.ked into the open area of FA 38, it would be further confined by the outside walls of this room.
The postulated fire in FA 38 may result in the loss function of one Train of the safety related ECCS Ventilation System.* If this system is lost or shut down, the redundant Unit 2 HVE-9A located in the adjacent isolated FA 39 will not be affected.
Therefore, safe re.actor shutdown capabilities wil 1 not be impaired by the fire postulated in FA 38. Although only a remote possibility, a radiological release during a fire con-dition would be of minor significance and a Control Room alert and effective responses would confine the release to its area of origin or within the fire area until it would be safely processed precluding loss of habitability of the area and adverse radioactive release to the atmosphere.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
There are no portable fire extinguishers or manual standpipe hose stations in FA 38. There is one accessible fire ex-tinguisher in adjacent FA SO and two accessible fire ex-tinguishers in adjacent FA 39. There are three available standpipe hose stations; one (HS-1S-3S) is located in FA SO near stair 2-RA-3, one (HS-lS-36) is located in FA SO adjacent to column lines 2-RA3/RAC and the other (HS-lS-37) is located in FA 39 adjacent to column lines 2-RA3z/RAG. The charcoal filter bed temperature as described above and the upstream and downstream air temperatures from the filter bed are monitored, which will initiate an alarm and record temper-atures respectively in the Control Room.
Upon receiving a high temperature alarm, the Control Room operators will initiate emergency procedures and will alert personnel of the adverse conditions. An effective response,
- by the trained fire brigade, may prevent a possible fire from 9
- SA- F A3 8 - S
SL2-FSAR 6c. Fire Protection System Operating: (Cont'd).
starting, considering the time interval bet.ween warning and ignition temperatures. If already in progress, a fire will be extinguished and the consequences of any fire effects will be limited. Safe shutdown capabilities will not be impaired .
- 9. SA-FA38-6
SL2-'FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2
- 1.
la.
FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR THE FIRE AREA NO. 39 DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA Building: RAB HVAC Equipment Room Elev: 43
- cio '
lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6 le. Floor Area: 6,240 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Fan 2HVE-9A 2HVE-9A Filters (Charcoal and HEPA) 2HVE-9A Motor Operated Dampers: D-13 D-14 Fan 2HVS-4A 2HVS-4A Filters Fan 2HVS-4B 2HVS-4B Filters Fan 2HVE-10A (not available during LOOP) 2HVE-10A Pneumatic Damper SE-25-21A Fan 2HVE-10B (not available during LOOP) 2HVE-10B Pneumatic Damper SE-25-21B
- 2HVE-9A Temperature Elements: TE-25-36 TE-25-37 TE-25-38 TE-25-39 TE-25-40 TE-25-41 2HVE-9A Damper D-13 Limit Switches: ZS-25-52A ZS-25-52B ZS-25-53A ZS-25-53B 2HVE-9A Damper D-14 Limit Switches: ZS-25-54A ZS-25-54B ZS-25-55A ZS-25-55B 2HVE-9A Pressure Differential Transmitter PDT-25-5A, 18A, 19A (B618)*
PB Sta/Elec Box: B2090(SA) (B612)*
B2104(SA) (B613)*
B2243 (S.A) (PB Sta 2HVS-4A) (B634)*
- 9.5A-FA39-1
SL2-*F.SAR PB Sta/Elec Box: B2E62(SA) (B635)*
(Cont'd) (SB) (PB Sta 2HVS-4B)
B2105(SB)
B2198(SA)
B2166(SA)
(NB) (PB Sta 2HVE-10B)
B2107(NB)
(B614)*
(B615)*
(B616)*
(B621)*
(B619)*
(B623)*
(B622)*
B2097(NA) (B625)*
B2109(NA) (B624)*
IR-83-l(SA) . (B618)*
B2110(NA) (B626)*
B2239(NA) (PB Sta 2HVE-10A) (B627)*
B2197(SA) (B620)*
B2G40(SA) (B617)*
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Misc Power & Control Cable 157 .4xl0 6 25.2xl0 3 3b. Oils~ Negligible 3c. Others Bag Filters (156) l. lxl0 6 .2xl03 HEPA Filters (174) 4.5xl0 6 .7xl0 3 Charcoal Adsorbers 8100 lbs 114xl0 6 18.3xl0 3 (3-Units)
M.O. Valves Grease 27 lbs .5xl0 6 .lxl0 3
. 6 Totals 277.SxlO 44.5xl0 3
- 4. CONCENTIATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity '(Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
- SOxlO 6 6 Charcoal Adsorbers (2 HVE-9A) 5700 lbs l. lxl0
- Cable Insulation 114xl0 3**
- Based on a filter rack area of 73 sq. ft.
~*
- See Methodology 9.5A-FA39-2
SL2-FSAR s.
FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 36 Inch Reinforced c'oncrete RCB Shield Wall South: 32 Inch Reinforced Concrete and partial 12" Rein-forced Concrete Block East: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block West: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 12 inch Reinforced Concrete
,. 2. Concealed Spaces None
- j v.
Sb. Service Penetrations through Bnundary Barriers:
- -~
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Exhaust (2) 84" x 36" (Floor)
Exhaust 36" x 48" (Floor)
Exhaust SO" x 70" (Floor)
Exhaust 40" x 44 11 (East Wall)
Exhaust 22" x 16" (East Wall)
Louver lS' x 14' (East Wall)
Exhaust Stack 72" dia (Roof)
Exhaust 20 11 dia (Roof)
Exhaust 48 dia (North Wall)
Exhaust 30" dia (North Wall)
Exhaust 30 11 dia (North Wall)
Exhaust 25 11 x 12" (South Wall)
Exhaust 16" x 14" (South Wall)
Exhaust 36" x 16" (South Wall)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and ceiling.
- 3. Electrical Cable tray penetrations will be sealed to a fire rating equivalent to the barrier wall .
- 9.SA-FA39-3
\.
SL2-FSAR
- 4. Area Access Sc.
Entrance is through a set of double doors on the west and a roll-up door on the east wall from FASO and FA37.
Detection:
There are ionization type detectors located in this area which will initiate an alarm in the Control Room should a fire occur. Also, the charcoal filter beds* have temperature monitors. which will initiate an alarm in the Control Room on a high temperature condition.
5d. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primarx There are two accessible fire extinguishers located in FA39, plus additional units located in adjacent areas (See Drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6).
- 2. Secondary There are four available hose stations: one in FA39, two in adjacent FASO, and one in adjacent FA34 (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings Flamemastic fire protective coating will be sprayed on all cable trays.
Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal.
Exhaust capacity of this system is 7,000 cfm which will provide a removal rate of 1.12 cfm/ sq -ft.
Sf. Drainage:
Thirteen 3 inch floor drains are connected to a common 3 inch drain header leading to the equipment drain tank in FA20.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF .POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 39:
Fire Area 39, the HVAC Equipment Room, is located at El 43.00' of the RAB between column line 2-RA3z and the Containment Building.and between column lines RAD and RAH. FA 39 is segregated from the adjacent Containment Building and FAs 3S, 37, 38, 40 and SO by reinforced concrete and concrete block walls, concrete floor and ceiling having fire resistive ratings greater than three hours. Access into FA 39 is from FA 3 7 *
- 9. SA-FA39~4
SL2-FSAR through double doors in the southwest wall and from FA SO through a roll-up door in the southeast wall.
FA 39 houses redundant essential and non-safety related HVAC equipment consisting of fans, dampers, charcoal, HEPA and other filters and associated electrical and mechanical equip-ment. The main features involve the essential ECCS Ventila-tion System Exhaust Unit 2HVE-9A, the safety related Shield Building Ventilation System Exhaust Units 2HVE-6A and 6B, and the non-safety related Continuous Containment/Hydrogen Purge Exhaust System Units 2HVE-7A and 7B, the safety related normal continuous RAB Supply System Units 2HVS-4A and 4B and the non-safety related normal RAB Exhaust System Units 2HVE-10A and lOB. Exhaust systems 2HVE-10A and lOB, although not available during LOOP, have been listed under essential equipment since they provide the normal exhaust to the RAB and in most instan-ces will provide the smoke venting during a fire condition ..
Supply air for the 2HVS-4A and 4B Units is through a missile shield protected intake plenum opening in the northeast corner of the area. Units 2HVE-6A and 6B and Units 2HVE-8A and 8B ex-haust air from their respective areas of the Containment Build-ing. Unit 2HVE-9A and Units 2HVE-10A and lOB are exhausted through ducts penetrating the floor from respective RAB areas be-low. The ECCS Ventilation System 2HVE-9A discharges the air through a duct that penetrates the east wall into FASO, traver-ses FA SO in an easterly direction and then discharges through a missile protected exhaust louver in the east wall of FA SO .
- The three other systems all exhaust through the Plant Stack, located in the northwest corner of the area. These systems; all with different functions, are spatially separated and the ECCS 2HVE-9A Unit has a redundant unit (2HVE-9B) in adjacent iso-lated FA 38.
Under f~re and simultaneous loss of offsite power conditions, the ventilation of the safety related ECCS a~ea is automatical-ly arranged to provide the proper supply air. The exhaust fans are simultaneously energized and dampers in the exhaust duct-work are open to allow the fans to draw the exhaust air from the ECCS area and direct it through the exhaust duct filters, fan and exhaust arrange~ent. This air is processed through the HEPA and charcoal filter banks located in a metal filter enclo-sure, before it is discharged to its atmosphere. The charcoal adsorbers are high efficientcy KI impregnated charcoal units approximately 2 inches wide x 146 inches high x 60 inches deep, arranged in ten parallel rows with a space between each para-llel unit to form a filter bank, which contains approximately S,700 pounds of charcoal per unit. There are also adsorbers in the Shield Building Ventilation System Units 2~V-6A and 6B, amounting to approximately 1200 pounds of charcoal in each Unit. Electrical cables in the area are in trays and in con-duit, with the A and B Trains being spatially separated from each other and all of the HVAC equipment in the overall area.
Two separate (Train A and Train B) horizontal stacks of cable tray, traverse the south end of FA 39 from a penetration
- 9. SA- FA39-5
SL2-FSAR opening in the west wall to where they end at the inside of the east wall, with the lowest tray in each stack (A&B) being at approximately EL 50.00'. All cables in the trays will be cover-ed with an approved flame retardant coating. Cable tray design and cable routing within trays meet the separation and barrier requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75. In addition, cables servicing redundant essential equipment are separately routed and will be in separate Train arrangements.
6b Fire Protection System Not Operating:
Two separate individual fires will be postulated to reflect a charcoal fire and an electrical fire. The first postulated fire in FA39 is assumed to originate in the charcoal adsorbers for the ECCS Ventilation System Unit 2HVE-9A. Typically, a fire in charcoal originates from auto-ignition as a hot spot and as it spreads slowly through the bed, as is indicative of the "secondary burning" characteristics of charcoal, which literally contains no volatiles compared to the "primary burning" of wood. Since the charcoal adsorbers are housed in an enclosed steel casing, combustion air is also curtailed. There are four thermocouple instruments located in the charcoal filter unit, which continuously monitor temperature of the charcoal. These temperature elements (set at 200°F) will constitute a high temperature alarm in the Control Room before the charcoal reaches possible ignition temperatures (approximately 626°F).
There are also temperature elements which record upstream and downstream temperatures in the Control Room. This temperature differential allows the Control Room operators adequate time to initiate emergency actions. If the charcoal reaches ignition temperature and a small fire develops in the bed, the exhaust system can be de-energized and the dampers can be closed, ef-fectively limiting the air supply which would be required to sustain combustion, thus the contained smoldering type fire would eventually tend to smother itself. This permits follow-up controls and activities to restore normal operations. Should the heat and products of combustion spread out&ide the filter casing within the open area of FA39, essential equipment as-sociated with the unit itself may be damaged. The other equip-ment in the area is adequately spatially separated and enclosed in metal casings and plenums, which will preclude any damaging effects from the postulated fire. FA39 is an enclosed room which confines the heat and smoke generated by the postulated fire, thus precluding the possibility of impairing equipment outside of FA39. Radionuclides, from equipment leakage in the areas serviced by this system, will be adsorbed by the char-coal. In the event that there would be a radiological release, due to a fire condition, it should be confined within the en-closed steel casing. If it leaked into the open area of FA39, it would be further confined by the outside walls of this room .
The second postulated fire involves the initiation of com-bustion within a single cable tray due to electrical faulting within the subject tray. There are no inherent sources of 9.5A-FA39-6
SL2-FSAR 6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating: (Cont'd) combustion -that could expose cable trays routed through FA39.
The approved flame retardant coating will essentially prevent the propagation of the fire along the tray in either direction from the point of initiation and will prevent the fire from affecting adjacent cable trays. Therefore, the postulated fire will be contained within a single tray near its area of origin and only cables located within that tray may be impacted.
In the one instance where Train B conduit crosses Train A cable tray in the southwest corridor and in the unlikely event that the tray and the crossover cable is postulated to be impacted by the same fire condition, Train B (Damper SE-25-21B) which services 2HVE-10B, will fail in the proper open position. Re-dundant units located in separate areas, will not be affected.
The first postulated fire in FA39 may result in_ the loss of function of 2HVE-9A Filter Train of safety related ventilation system requirements for the ECCS equipment area. If the system were lost or shutdown due to an emergency, the redundant unit 2HVE-9B located in the adjacent isolated FA38 will not be affected and no adverse effects will occur in adjacent areas.
Therefore, safe reactor shutdown capability will not be impair-ed by the fire postulated in FA39. Although only a remote possibility, a radiological release during a fire condition would be minor significance and a Control Room alert and effective response would confine the release to its area of origin or within the open fire area until it would be safely processed precluding loss of habitability of this area and adverse radioactive release to the atmosphere.
The second postulated fire including the one location concern-ing a crossover condition in FA39 will involve only one cable tray or a single conduit. Since redundant safety related or essential cables are routed in separate flame retardant coated trays, no loss of redundant essential equipment could occur.
Therefore, safe reactor shutdown capabilities will be maintain-ed. No adverse effects will occur in adjacent areas.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
The charcoal filter bed temperature 1s continuously monitored during both equipment operating and equipment not operating periods. The upstream and downstream air temperatures from the filters is also monitored. These temperature instruments will record and initiate an alarm in the Control Room before the charcoal reaches ignition temperature. Concerning the cable trays, the principal fire protection feature is the approved fire retardant coating applied to all trays, which is a passive, continuous defense against exposure fires and fire propagations within and along the cable trays.
9
- 5A- F A3 9 - 7
SL2-FSAR 6c. Fire Protection System Operating: (Cont'd)
There are also zoned systems of ionization type detectors covering the entire FA which provide alarms of any fires in the general area and annunciates in the Control Room. There are two accessible fire extinguishers in FA39 plus additional units located in accessible adjacent areas. There are four available standpipe hose stations; one (HS-lS-37) is located in FA39 adjacent to column lines 2-RA3z/RAG, one (HS-1S-3S) is located in FASO near stair 2-RA-3, one (HS-lS-36) is located in FASO adjacent to column lines 2-RA3/RAC, and the other (HS-lS-31) is located in FA34I adjacent to column lines 2-RA3/
RAI. Upon receiving the high temperature indications and/or upon the receipt of zoned area detection system alarms, the Control Room operators will initiate emergency procedures and will alert personnel of the adverse conditions. Quick detec-tion and an effective response, by the trained fire brigade, may prevent a possible charcoal fire from starting due to the early warning prior to reaching charcoal bed ignition tempera-tures. If there is a charcoal fire in progress, it will be suppressed by the effective response, using the available fire extinguishers and manual hoses. These overall fire protection features will limit the extent of the consequences that may be caused by the fire effects. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be impaired.
9.5A-FA39-8
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT 2
- 1.
FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 40 DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la .. Building: RAB Hold-Up Tank Area Elev: (-)0.50' thru 43.00' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 4, 5 and 6 le. Floor Area: 1,410 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
Hold-up Tanks 2A, 2B, 2C, & 2D
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA None
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible
- 3b.
3c.
Oils Others Negligible Negligible Totals Negligible
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Negligible
- 5. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary walls North: 32 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 39 Inch Reinforced Concrete East: 36 Inch Reinforced Concrete West: 36 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 9. SA-F A40- l
SL2-FSAR Sa. Physicai Containment (Cont'd) 2.
Ceiling:
Floor:
39 Inch Reinforced Concrete 6 Inch Reinforced Concrete Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC Supply 14" x 14" (North Wall)
Supply 14" x 18" (North Wall)
Exhaust 2S" x 12" (North Wall)
Exhaust 16" x 14" (North Wall)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and ceiling.
- 3. Electrical None (embedded conduit)
Sc.
- 4. Area Access Two 3 ft x 7 ft wire gates on the east wall at elevation 43 .OO'.
Detection:
None Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary A portable fire extinguisher is located at elevation 43.00' by stairway 2-RA3 (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6).
- 2. Secondary A standpipe hose station is located at elevation 43.00' near stairway 2-RA3 (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None
- 9. SA-.F A40-2
SL2-FSAR Se. Smoke Venting:
- Sf.
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal.
Exhaust capacity of this system* is 3600 cfm which will
- provide a removal *rate of 2. S cfm/ sq ft ..
Drainage:
Four 3 inch floor drains (one for each hold-up tank cubicle) are connected to a common 3 inch drain leading to the sump tank in the southeast corner of FA16.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 40:
Fire area 40, between column lines RAH/RAF and 2-RA3z/2-RAS, contains Hold-Up Tanks 2A, 2B, 2C and 20 in separate cubicles extending from El (-)0.SO' through El 43.00' up to the roof at El 62.00'. FA 40 is separated from the remainder of the RAB by 32 inch thick concrete walls with the only access pro-vided at the 43.00' elevation through two wire mesh doors on the east wall, one leading into Unit 2A and one leading into Unit 2C. There are three internal open doorways between the cubicles at El 43.00', connecting all units. The open grating floors at El's 7.SO', 20.00', 31. 7S', SI.SO' and the concrete floor at El (-) O.SO', are all reached from El 43.00', in each cubicle, by open ships ladders.
No equipment, required for safe reactor shutdown, or cabling servicing such equipment, is located in FA 40. Only four Hold-Up Tanks are located in the enclosure, with each tank separated from the other by 3 ft thick concrete walls, except for two 3 ft x 7 ft openings at the 43.00' elevation. Venti-lation is provided by the normal RAB safety-related supply ducts and non-safety related exhaust ducts.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
Except for negligible quantities, no combustible material is located in FA 40 and therefore, a credible fire has not been postulated ..
Due to the negligible nature of combustibles in FA 40 and the separation from the adjacent fire areas provided by the concrete walls, and with no equipment required for safe reactor shutdown located in FA 40, no fire can be postulated that could impair safe reactor shutdown capabilities .
- 9.SA-FA40-3
SL2-FSAR 6c. Fire Protection System Operation:
There is one accessible fire extinguisher and one available standpipe hose station near stairway 2-RA-2 at El 43.00' in adjacent FA 50. In the unlikely event that these units will be required, an effective response by the trained fire brigade will assist in limiting any undue consequences. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be adversely affected .
- 9. SA- F.A40-4
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2
- 1.
la.
FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 41 DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA Building: Blowdown Heat Exchanger (RAB Roof) Elev: 43.00' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6 le. Floor Area: 4,800 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA None
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity
-(Btu)
--- (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible 3b . Oils Negligible 3c. Others Negligible Totals Negligible
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Negligible
- 5. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: Open South: Open East: Open West: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Ceiling: Open Floor: 34 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 9. SA- FA41-l
SL2~FSAR Sa. Physical Containment: (Cont'd)
Sb.
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification SiZe
- 1. HVAC Open Area
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through the floor.
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area Access Access into this are~ is through a low leakage type door on the west wall from FA SO and from stairway 2-RA-4 lead-ing to the* El 62.00' roof deck.
Sc. Detectidn:
None Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There is an accessible fire extinguisher in adjacent FA SO (See. Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6).
- 2. Secondary There are two available standpipe hose stations in adjacent FA SO (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting:
Open outside area (RAB Roof El 62.00) 9.SA-FA41-2
SL2-FSAR Sf . Drainage:
- 6.
Four, 4 inch roof drains are connected to a common 5 inch drain leading to the storm sewer system.
ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 41:
Fire Area 41, the Closed Blowdown Rea~ Exchanger Area, en-compasses the open roof area on the east side of the RAB at elevation 43.00' and is included between columns 2-RAl/2-RAS and RAA/RAC. FA 41 is segregated from adjacent building areas by a concrete wall on the west and a reinforced concrete floor slab, which have fire resistive ratings greater than three hours. There are no north, south or east walls and there is no roof over this area. FA 41 is accessible from FA 50 through a low leakage type door and from the Ri\B roof at elevation 62.00' by open staircase 2-RA-4. FA 41 does not have any essential equipment necessary for safe reactor shutdown. There is a one ton swing hoist in the southwest corner and there are four covered valve pits in the concrete floor near the nprth-west side of the heat exchangers which are used to fill ion ex-changers below (El 19. 50') from a movable resin addition tank.
6b . Fire Protection System Not Operating:
FA 41 is devoid of any inherent combustible materials which when ignited may e~pose equipment in FA 41' or essential equipment in adjacent fire areas. Therefore, a fire will not be postulated in this area.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
There is an accessible fire extinguisher and two available standpipe hose stations (HS-15-35 and HS-15-36) located just inside the low leakage door located in the west wall at column lines 2-RA3/RAC. In the unlikely event that they may required, an effective response, by the trained fire brigade, utilizing the nearby fire equipment may assist in limiting any undesirable effects. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be affected .
- 9.5A-FA41-3
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 42 (Zone. I)
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB Control Room Elev: 62.00' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 7 le. Floor Area: 3,590 Sq Ft ld .. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIP~lliNT WITHIN FIRE AREA RTGB 201 202 203 205 206 Engineered Safeguard Cabinet SA SB MA MB MC MD Radiation Monitoring Panel (Radiological Consequences Only)
Reactor Protection System Cabinet HVAC Control Panel Plant Auxiliary Control Board Lighting Panels: LP-216(NA)
LP-227(NA)
LP-228(NB)
LP-226(NB)
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation RTGB I&C Cable 6 3 30~6xl0 8.5xl0 3b. Oils Negligible 3c. Others Negligible 6 3 Totals 30.6xl0 8.5xl0 9.SA- FA42(I)-1
SL2-FSAR
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING S.
Source One RTGB Panel FIRE CONTROL Quantity (Btu)
S .. lxl0 6 (Btu/sq ft)
.43xl0 6
- Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete East: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete West: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces False ceiling area approximately 8 ft deep.
Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification
- 1. HVAC Supply Return 74" 74" x
x Size 24 11 24" (North (North Wall)
Wall)
Transfer Grille 32" x 26" (Nor.th Wall)
Supply 20 11 x 18 11 (South Wall)
Transfer Grille 40" x 24". (South Wall)
Transfer Grille 38" x 20 11 (South Wall)
Supply 20" x 18" (south wall)
Supply 38" x 12" (south wall)
Exhaust 12 11 x 12 11 (south wall)
- 2. Mechanical None
- 3. Electrical All electrical penetrations within the area will be sealed to a fire rating equivalent to the barrier wall/
floor.
- 9. SA- FA42(I)-2
SL2-FSAR
- 4. Area Access Entrance is through doors on the east, south and west walls from FA 42 II, FA 42 III, and the 2-RA-2 stairway respectively.
5c.
- Detection:
Ionization type detector.s located in the office areas will initiate an alarm should a fire occur. The Control Room proper is constantly manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day.
5d. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There are five portable fire extinguishers in FA 42 I.
See Drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 7 for 1c*catious.
- 2. Secondary The nearest standpipe hose stations are located at the floor below (El 43.00') in FA 43 I and on the Turbine Operating Deck rn FA 47, (See Dwg SK-2998-H-708, Sheets 6 and 11).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings
- 5e.
Cabling in trays will be sprayed with Flamemastic fire preventive c6ating.
Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will *be used for smoke removal.
Exhaust.capacity of this system is 650 cfm which will provide a removal rate of .20 cfm/sq ft.
5f. Drainage:
No floor drains are provided in this zone.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE (This Analysis applies to Zones I, II and III) 6a. Description of Fire Area 42:
Fire Area 42, the Control Room Area, is located at El 62.00' of the RAB between column lines 2-RA1/2-RA5 and between column lines RAI/RAL. FA 42 is divided into three Zones.
FA 42 Zone I encompasses the Control Room Proper; FA 42 Zone II is located east of Zone I and is the Control Room HVAC Equip-ment Room; and FA 42 Zone III, located south of Zone I, is t4e
- 9. 5A-FM2(I)-3
SL2-FSAR 6a. Description of Fire Area: (Cont'd)
Kitchen and HVAC Filter Room sub-zones. FA 42 is segregated from the adjacen~ areas (FA 44, FA 48 and FA 43) and from the adjacent RAB roof areas by full height reinforced concrete and concrete block walls, concrete floor and roof having fire resistive ratings greater than three hours. The three zones within FA 42 are separated from each other by full height rein-forced concrete walls. Access into FA 42 is from stair 2-RA-2 and/or the adjacent elevator through a platform ac El 62.00' into Zone I; from the Turbine Building and from an open outside stair 2-RA-l through a platform at El 62.00' through FA 43 into Zone III; and, from the RAB Roof at El 62. 00' through Zone II. Zone I can be entered from Zone II and III through communicating fire doors, but Zone II an~ III are separated from each other.
The offices, toilet and kitchen areas are separated from the operating areas by _concrete block walls and their openings are equipped with low leakage man-doors. The Control Room has a dropped ceiling arrangement at El.72.00' which is approximately
. 8 ft deep with non-combustible acou_stical tiles in metal sus-pension systems. .This space is basically used for HVAC ducts and electrical equipment wiring in two stack_ cable trays and associated conduit, with bottoms at El.74.00'. These are low voltage units and the cables and trays are safely arranged to meet the separation and barrier requirements of RG 1.75 and are coated with an approved fire retardant covering. Surface finishes, coatings and furnishings have low fuel contribution, flame spread and smoke development qualities and their fire loadings are considered as minimal.
In Zone I there are floor openings to the Cable Spreading Area below (FA341). The Cont~ol Room Equipment consists of essential cabinets, panels, boards, consoles, and associated equipment. Th~ units a_re located above their respective floor openings. They are serviced by low voltage, flame resistant, instrumentation and control cables which enter the Contrql Room from the isolated Cable Spreading Area.below, through their respective openings and are then fed into the bottom of the equipment. The cable trays are coated with an approved fire retardant coating and -the floor openings are adequately sealed with an enclosing arrangement providing a fire rating equiva-lent to the floor bairier. Within essenti~l cabinets in the Control Room, approved barriers and/or spacial separation will be used to separate redundant systems as required.
Zone II houses the three redundant safety related Control Room Package Air Conditioning Units: 2HVA/ACC-3A (SA), 2HVA/ACC-3B(SB) and 2HVA/ACC-3C (SAB); each unit being equipped with Motor Operated Dampers and other associated equip~ent.
- 9. 5A-FA42(I)-4
SL2-FSAR The units are spacially separated, being approximately 14 ft apart and the area is isolated and generally devoid of a continuity of combustibles.
Zone III contains two physically separated sub-zones, the Kitchen and the Control Room Emergency Cleanup System (CRECS),
which has two redundant Filter Units 2HVE-13A (SA) and 2HVE-13B (SB), located in metal framed steel housings containing stan-dard HEPA filters, charcoal adsorbers, and associated equip-ment, which are all non-essential. There are boost.er fans servicing the CRECS system, which are located outside of the filter housing. The charcoal adsorbers contain rows of high efficiency commercial impregnated charcoal adsorbers arranged in parallel with spaces between rows, to form a bank which con-tains an approximate total of 804 pounds of charcoal.
During normal operation the Control Room, which is always occupied, is air conditioned by the three redundant Packaged Air Conditioning Units, with two running *and the third in a standby status. Control Room air is drawn into the indoor air handling section through a return air duct system and is cooled as required. Conditioned air is directed back to the Control Room through a supply air duct system. Outside air makeup is effected through two proteGted outside air intakes; one located in the north wall of FA 44 and the other in the south wall of FA 48. On receipt of a Containment Isolation Signal (CIS), the Control Room Emergency Clean-Up Fans are automatically started and the motorized dampers are opened. Outside air intake is isolated during a CIS by redundant valves located in the duct system. This system is connected to the emergency diesel generator and is available during LOOP. Once outside air quality is determined to be satisfactory, dampers are manually operated*to restore normal operations. The Kitchen and Toilet exhaust ducts are also isolated by redundant valves inherent to their arrangement. The Control Room air is recirculated through the pre-filters, HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers, and the area is maintained at a slight positive pressure. The area is basically sealed off, and it is constantly monitored for effective habitability with radiation monitors strategi-cally located to help sense and control conditions. Self-con-tained breathing apparatus will be readily available and accessible. Administrative procedures and strict controls will be affected to provide and maintain safe and habitable fea-tures.
6b Fire Protection System Not Operating:
In order to determine the effects of a fire in FA 42, separate fires w~ll be postulated to occur in each of the three zones, but these fires are not considered to be occurring simultane-ously .
- 9. 5A-FA42(I)-5
SL2-FSAR A postulated fire in Zone I, the *control Room Proper, will be comparatively small in magnitude but could potentially involve redundant electrical circuitry for controls and instrumenta-tion. These low voltage electrical devices and the inherent wiring, with minor amounts of insulation, are highly flame resistant and the terminals are in the Control Room cabinets.
Any concentrated cable loading is physically separated from the *control Room by location in the Cable Spreading Room below.
The cable, conduit and tray arrangements meet the separation and barrier requirements of R.G. 1.75. Cables of redundant trains* enter the bottom of the cabinet 'making use of maximum spacial separation. Separation between redundant wiring within the cabinets is maintained to the greatest extent possi-ble. The cabinets and equipment are spacially separated to provide further protection and to maintain redundancy where feasible. The Control Room will be constantly attended. A thermal impairment of cable components in the Control Room within a cabinet should be sensed promptly by the trained operators and involved circuits can be deenergized. There will be miscellaneous items normally found in the Control Room which include furnishings, paper, plastics, wood surface coatings etc., that are considered as minimal. combustible loading. No combustible construction materials are used. Operational pro-cedures should limit the continuity of combustibles and the use and storage of supplies and equipment. Due to the above conditions, should a fire occur, its potential consequence can be accommodated. Zone I is effectively separated from Zones II and III, and is also isolated from the adjacent FAs and the FAs below.
A fire in Zone II, will be postulated to involve the safety related Motor Operated Damper associated with HVAC Unit 2HVA/
ACC-3B (SB), containing nine pounds of grease. The grease is assumed to ignite and burn until all of it is consumed.
Further growth of fire, due to additional combustibles becoming involved such as associated cabling in conduit and equipment which are basically of low fire loading, will be negligible.
The fire would be limited to the grease contained within the unit as other combustibles would not be impacted due to their low combustibility, physical location, separation, containment and the maintenance of strict administrative controls. The postulated fire will be of short duration and the localized temperature will be moderate due to the limited amount and non-continuity of combustibles involved and th_e restricted growth of the fire. The operability of the redundant HVAC Units 2HVA/ACC-3A(SA) and 2HVA/ACC-3C(SAB) and their associated valves, controls and cabling in conduit will not be impaired and the possible loss of Unit 2HVA/ACC-3B(SB) will not adverse-ly affect the operability of the HVAC functions for the overall Control Room. In the unlikely event that two units *someway become impaired, the third redundant unit in the system could effectively provide the air conditioning necessary to maintain habitability and equipment functions. Zone II is effectively separated from Zone I and III, and FA's adjacent and below.
9.5A-FA42(I)-6
SL2-FSAR Two fires will be postulated for Zone III, one for the Co~trol
.Room Emergency Cleanup System sub-zone and one for th~ Kitchep
- sub-zone. A fire in the CRECS sub-zone will be postulated to have originated in the charcoal adsorber of 2HVE-13A. Typi-cally* a charcoal fire*originates as a hot spot, and subse-quently the fire, mostly in the form of a glow rather toan an open* flame, spreads slowly through the filter bed, as is indi-cative of the "secondary burning" characteristics of charcoal, which literally contains no volatiles compared to the "primary burning" of wood. Since the charcoal bed is housed in an en-closed steel casing, combustion air is also curtailed. Thermo-couple instruments are strategically positioned in the filter units and these temperature elements set at 200°F will initi-ate an alarm in the Control Room before the charcoal reaches possible ignition temperature at approximately 626°F. There are also temperature monitoring instruments which record upstr~am and downstream temperatures in the Control Room. Thi~ tempera~
ture differential allows the Control Room Operators adequate time to initiate emergency actions. If the charcoal reaches ignition temperature and a small fire develops in the charcoal adsorber, the exhaust system can be de-energized and the dampers can be closed effectively limiting the air supply which would be required to sustain combustion, thus the contained smoldering type fire could eventually tend to smother itself. This permits follow-up controls and activities to restore normal operations.
Although equipment associated with 2HVE-13A may be damaged*, the fire will not expose redundant Unit 2HVE-13B, which is also located in Zone III. Adequate spacial separation is provided between the units which are located in an area of limited combustibles such as associated cabling and equipment, all of low fire loading. Thus, the operability of the redundant unit and its associated equipment will not be impaired. The CRECS sub-zone is effectively separated from Zone I, Zone II, the Kitchen sub-zone and from FAs adjacent and below. A fire iµ the kitchen subzone will be postulated to have originated on the domestic type range and oven unit and would be limited to the small amount of cooking oil, associated food and packaging and possibly a standard refuse container that will be used at any specific time. There is a standard kitchen type exhaust fan unit servicing this room. There is no essential equipment in the sub-zone and the appliances, associated equipment, cabinets and furnishings are noncombustible types. The area is of non-combustible construction, it is isolated from Zones I and II and the CRECS sub-zone. There is a limited amqunt and non-con-tinuity *of combustibles and the area and personnel are under strict administrative procedures to maintain a safe and habit-able facility related to Control Room functions. The postu-lated fire should remain in its area of origin; be of short duration. and have little impact on operations.
In Zone I, while the loss of a single shutdown circ~it in the Control Room equipment may be troublesome, it should pot affect redundant shutdown capabilities. Zone II and Zone III (both
- 9. SA- F A4 2 (I) - 7
SL2-FSAR sub-zones) are separated from Zone I and each other and the individual postulated fires may result in the loss of function of the involved equipment only. The redundant units in each area, which are considered as not being affected by ~he fire effects, will remain functionally operable. Althou~Q we do not postulate *the evacuation or the loss of the Control Room, the operator can bring the plant to safe hot shutdown from outside the Control Room, using separate isolated facilities in the Remote Hot Shutdown Area located in FA 34 II at El 43 .oo'*.
Thus, the overall capabilities of the plant for safe reactor shutdown will not be impaired.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
The postulated low intensity fire in Zone I will be readily sensed by the continuously operating personnel and/or by the area products of combustion detectors located in the office areas.
In Zone II, early warning of adverse conditions will be sensed by personnel in tbe continuously occup~ed Control Room.
In Zone III, CRECS sub-zone, the charcoal adsorber b~d temper-atures as described above are continuously monitored. The up-stream and downstream air temperatures of the charcoal adsorber bed are also monitored. These temperature elements will initi-ate alarms and record temperatures respectively in the Control Room. Upon receiving a high temperature alarm, the Control Room operators will initiate emergency procedures and will alert personnel of the adverse conditions.* There are also fixed temperature/rate-of-rise (FT/ROR) detectors in the Kitchen sub-zone, which alarm in the Control Room. An effec-tive response may prevent a fire from starting considering the time interval between warning and ignition temperatures, or control a fire if it is already in progress.
There are .seven portable fire extinguishers in FA 42. Five are distributed throughout Zone I, one is located in the west side vestibule leading to Zone I and the other is out-side the east entrance (roof) to Zone II. There are no manual standpipe hose stations in FA 42. Available standpipe hos.e stations are on the floor below at El 43.00' and from the Turbine Building El 62.00'. An adequate complement of self-contained breathing apparatus will be readily usable. An effective response by the trained fire brigade, utilizing prompt alerting.by detection features in constantly attended and controlled areas and application of portable fire extin-guishers with manual hose backup, will limit the consequences of any fire effects, thereby minimizing the extent of the physical damage and malfunctioning of the equipment in this area. Habitability of the Control Room and the required essenti*al services will be maintained. Safe reactor shutdown capabiliti~s will not be impaired.
9
- 5A- F A4 2 (I) - 8
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 42 (Zone II)
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB Control Room HVAC Area Elev: 62.00' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 7 le. Floor Area: 700 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA 2HVA/ACC-3A(SA)
Damper D-20 (SA) 2HVA/ACC-313(SB)
Damper D-21 (SB) 2HVA/ACC-3C(SAB)
Ptl Sta/Elec Boxes: B2257(SAB) (B721)*
(SA) (PB Sta 2HVA-3A) (B7'17)*
B2236 (B716)*
B2255(SA) (B718)*
B2260(SAB) (B719)*
(SAB) (PB Sta 2HVA-3C) (B720)*
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number
- 3. AREA CO~BUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation 3
Control Cable .07xl0 6 .1 x 10 3b. Oils Negligible 3c .* Others Grease:(3) M.O. Dampers 27 lbs .50xl0 6 . 7 x 10 3
Neopreme Flexible Connections 20 lbs .20xl0 6 .3 x 10 3
- Totals 9.5A- FA42(II)-l
. 77xl0 6 1. lxlO 3
SL2-FSAR
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Grease M.O. Damper 9 lbs .17xl0 6 7xl0 3 S. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block South: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block East: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete West: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification .Size.
L HVAC Supply 74" x 24" (West W(:lll)
Return 74" x 24" (West Wall)
Supply 16" x 16" (North Wall)
Suppiy 16" x 16" (South Wall)
Transfer Grille 36" x 16 11 (West Wall)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through the floor.
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area Access Entrance is through a door on the east and west walls from the open elevation 62.00' roof deck and FA42I respectively.
Sc. Detection:
None
SL2-FSAR Sd. Fire Protection Systems;
- 1. Primary There are accessible fire extinguishers in adjacent FA42I and a extinguisher located at the east wall entrance into this FA (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, She~t 7)
- 2. Secondary The nearest standpipe hose station is located at the fioor below (El 43.00') in FA~4I and on the Turbine Operating Deck in FA47 (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheets 6 and 11),
3! Fire Retardant Protective Coatings Cable trays will pe spr~yed with Flamemastic fire protective coating.
Se. Smoke Venting:
No positive exhaust is provided in this fire area. However, the east door leads to a opeq roof <leek and smoke.can be vented through this door, if required.
Sf . Drainage:
- 6.
A three inch floor drain is connected to a common 3 inch drain header leading to the Equipment Drain Tank in FA20.
ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE See wrtte-up for Zone I .
- 9. 5A- FA42(II)-3
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2
- l.
la, FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 42 (Zone III)
DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA Building: RAB Control Room Filter Area Elev: 62.00 1 lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 7 le. Floor Area: 630 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
Kitchen Sub-zone HVAC Filter Room Sub-zone
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA I-FCV-25-14(SB)
I-FCV-25-lS(SB)
I-FCV-25-16(SA)
I-FCV-25-17(SA)
I-FCV-25-15 Flow Transmitter FT-25-18B(SB)
I-FCV-25-16 Flow Transmitter FT-25-18A(SA)
Elec. Boxes:
B2E84(SB) (B704)*
B2E83(SB) (B705)*
B2G81 (B706)*
B2G83 (B707)*
B2E79 (B708)*
B2E20(SA) (B709)*
>~Fire Protect ion Drawing Box Number
- 3. AREA COMliUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3~. table Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils Negligible Jc. Others HEPA and Bag Filters .2xl0 6 .3xl0 3 Charcoal Adsorbers (2 units) 1608 lbs 6 3 22.5xlo 35.7xl0 Grease (3) M.O. Valves 27 lbs .5xl0 6 .8xl0 3 Flexible Duct Conn .3xl0 6 .5xl0 3 Combustible Mat'l. in 100 lbs .8xl0 6 l. 3xl0 3 Kitchen Totals 24.3xl0 6 38.6xlQ 3 9.5A- FA42(III)-l
SL2-FSAR
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Charcoal Adsorber (1 unit)
Quantity 804 lbs
- Based on a filter rack area of lS sq ft (Btu)
- 11. 3x10 6 (Btu/sq ft)
, 8x10 6
- s. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete East: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete West: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification
- 1. HVAC Size Supply 18" x 20" (North Wall)
Transfer Grille 40" x 24" (North Wall)
Transfer Grille 38" x 20 11 (North Wall)
Supply 20 11 x 18" (North Wall)
Supply 38" x 12" (North Wall)
Exhaust 12" x 12" (North Wall)
Supply 26 11 x 26" (East Wall)
Supply 16 11 x 16 11 (East Wall)
- 2. Mechanical None
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit) 9.SA- FA42(III)-2
SL2-FSAR
- 4. Area Access
- Sc, Entrance is through a pair of double doors on the west wall leading to FA43, and a door on the north wall leading to FA42I.
Detection:
Both the charcoal filters and the air temperature upstream and downstream of the filters are monitored for temperature. Should a high temperature occur in these areas, a.n alarm signal will be initiated. Fixed temperature/rate-of~rise (FT/ROR) type detectors annunciating in the Control room are located in the kitchen area.
Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There are accessible fire extinguishers located in adjacent FA42I (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 7).
- 2. Secondary The nearest available standpipe hose s.tation is located at the floor below (El 43.00') in FA34I aqd on the Turbine Operating Deck (See Dwg SK-2998-M~708, Sheet 3.
6 and 11) .
Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting:
No positive exhaust 'is provided for this area. However, smoke can be vented by opening the west doors of FA42III and the west doors of adjacent FA43 and naturally venting to the open yard.
Sf. Drainage:
Three 3 inch floor drains are connected to a common 3 inch drain header leading to the Equipment Drain Tank in FA20.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE See write-up for Zone I
- 9. SA- FA42 (III)-3
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 43
- 1. DESCRIPrioN OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB Electrical Equipment Area Elev: 62.00' Exhaust Fan Room lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 7 le. Floor Area: 610 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
Fan 2HYE,-l 2 (SB)
PB Sta/Elec Box: (SA) (PB Sta 2HVE-ll) (B702)*
(SA) (PB Sta *2HVE-12) (B701)*
B2G79 (SA) (B703)*
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils Negligible Jc. Others Grease: (2) Fan Motors 2 lbs 37x10 3 .06xl0 3 Neoprene flexible conn 20 lbs 194xl0 3 .32xl0 3
Tot.;ils 3 3 23lxl0 .38xl0
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Fan Motor Grease 1 lb 18. 5xl0 3 7xl0 3
- 9. SA- FA43-1
SL2-FSAR S. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 24 Inch Reinforced.Concrete South: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete East: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete vJes t: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
Outside Air Intake 24" x 18" (West Wall)
- 2. Mechanical None
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area Access Entrance is th*rough double doors on the west and east walls leading from the turbine operating deck and FA 42 III respectively.
Sc. Detection:
None Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There are accessible fire extinguishers in adjacent FAis 42 and 47 (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheets 7 and 13) 9.SA-FA43-2
SL2-FSAR 5d . Fire Protection Systems: (Cont'd)
- 2. Secondary The nearest available standpipe hose* stations are in the floor below (EL 43. 00') in FA 3.4I and on the Turbine Operating Deck in FA 47 (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheets 6 and 13). *
- 3. Fire Retardant jrotective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal. Ex-haust capacity of this system is 3400 cfm which will provide a removal rate 5.6 cfm/sq. ft.
5£. Drainage:
A three inch floor drain leads to the Equipment Drain Tank in FA 20.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description. of Fire Area:
Fire Area 43, designated as the Electrical Equipment Area Exhaust Fan Room, is located at El 62.00' of the RAB FA 43 and is segregated from the adjacent Control Room envelope FA 42 I and III by reinforced concrete walls, concrete floor and ceiling having fire resistive tatings greater than three hours.
It is bounded by column lines 2-RA3z/2-RA5 and a line 10 ft west of column line RAK and column line RAL. Access to FA 43 is through the air lock from FA 42 III though the east wall of FA 43, and through the double doors in the west wall leading to the Turbine Generator Building and to stairway 2-RA-l through a connecting platform. The area houses safety related redundant HVAC Exhaust Fans 2HVE-ll(SA) and 2HVE-12(SB) and associated equipment and ducts, serving FA 34 I and II (the Electrical Equipment Room). The main exhaust for these units is through a missile protected roof penthouse and the exhaust fans are approximately 25 ft apart. The normal ventilation for the area is through a missile protected supply unit in the west wall and the exhaust is through an exhaust inlet into Electri-cal Equipment Exhaust Fan Area.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
The combustible loading in FA 43 consists of one (1) pound of grease associated with each fan motor. The postulated fire
- in this area, to be assumed for the purpose of this analysis, 9.5A- FA43-3
SL2-FSAR 6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
will be initiated in the fan motor, where the grease will ignite and burn until completely consumed.
'As a result of the postul*ated fire, the fan motor involved, either 2HVE-12(SB) or 2HVE-ll(SA), will be: damaged and in-operative. Due to the distance between fan motors, approxi-mately 25 ft, and the lack of continuity of combus_tible materials in the fire area, the redundant fan. and motor will not be affected by the postulated fire. Fire Area 43 is enclosed, thus the fire will be confined to the area (equip-ment) of origin, with limited burn time and impact and it will have no adverse affect on areas outside FA 43.
The postulated fire occurring in FA 43 will render only one of the redundant fans, 2HVE-12(SB) or 2HVE-ll(SA), inoperable.
Since the redundant unit is not affected and safety systems outside FA 43 are not affected, safe plant shutdown capability will not be impaired.
6c. *Fire Protection System Operating:
The nearest fire extinguishers are in adjoining FA 42 and adjacent FA 47 (Turbine Building). Available standpipe hose stations are on the floor below at El 43.00' and from the Turbine Building El 62.00'. Effective response by a trained fire brigade will limit th~ consequences of any fire effects.
Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will* not be affected.
9.5A- FA43-4
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 44
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RA.B CCW Surge Tank Room* Elev: 62.00' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 7 le. Floor Area: 270 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
TS-16-lAl (SA)
.3. AREA " COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a . Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils Negligible 3c. Others Negligible Totals Negligible
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity ( Bt1,1) (Btu/sq ft)
Negligible Negligible
- 5. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 9.5A-FA44-1
SL2-FSAR
- l. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete Block East: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete West: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 12 Inch Reinforced Con,crete
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- l. HVAC Exhaust Fan 24 11 X 24 II (North Wall)
Air Intake 24" x 18" (East Wall)
Air Intake 16" x 16" (North Wall)
Air Intake 16 11 x 16" (South Wall)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walts and floor.
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area Access Entrance is through missile protected double doors on the east wall.
Sc. Detection:
None Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There is one fire extinguisher in FA 44 and other acces-sible fire extinguishers in adjacent FA's 42I, 42II and 48 (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 7).
9.5A-FA44-2
SL2-FSAR
- 1. Fire Area Boundary
- 2. Secondary The nearest standpipe.hose station is located in the floor below (EL. 43.00') in FA SO (See Dwg SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal.
Exhaust capacity of this system is 2000 cfm which will provide a removal rate of 7.4 cfm/sq ft.
Sf. Drainage:
There is a 3 inch floor drain in this area which connects to a common 3 inch header leading to the Equipment Drain Tank in FA 20.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 44:
Fire Area 44 is located at El 62.00' of the RAB ~nd it houses the Component Cooling Water Surge Tank. The tank is a non-essential piece of equipment, therefore it is not required for safe plant shutdown. FA 48 is segregated from the adjacent fire areas by reinforced concrete block walls, concrete floor and ceiling having fire resistive ratings g~eater than three hours. It is located in the northeast corner and is bounded by column_ lines 2-RAl and a line approximately lS fr south of 2-RAI and column lines RAI/RAJ. Access to FA 44 is through double doors protected by a missile shield arrangement, in the east wall leading to the roof at El 62. 00'. There is an open stairway in the area leading up to a removable grating platform used to service the tank which is at El 7S.26'. The room is ventilated by missile protected intake and exhaust units, the former in the east wall and the latter in the north wall. The outside air intake for the Control Room passes through t~e area and the safety related HVAC Temperature Switches TS-08-7Bl (SB) and TS-16-lAl (SA) are located on the duct.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating The combustible loading in F'A 44 is negligible. Due to the lack of combustible materials associated with the equipment in the area, a fire will not be postulated. The safety related equipment cannot be affected by a fire condition. Therefore safe reactor shutdown capability will not be impaired.
9.SA- FA44-3
SL2-FSAR 6c. Fire Protection System Operating There is one fire extinguisher in FA 44. There are other accessible fire extinguishers in adjacent FA's 42 I and II, and 48. Available standpipe hose stations are on the floor below at El 43.00'. In the unlikely event that it may be re-quired, an effective response by a trained fire brigade will limit the consequences of any fire effects. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be affected.
9.5A-FA44-4
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 45
- l. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: FRB HVAC Room Elev. 48.00 1 lh. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 10 le. Floor Area: 1'312 Sq Ft ,
ld. Subs paces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Electrical Box~s~ B2V28 (SB)
B2V02 (SA)
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
- 3a.
Jb.
Jc.
Cable Insulation Oils Others Negligible Negligible Neoprene flexible connections Bag Filters 38 lb
{30 filters)
.37 x 10~ .28 x
.21 x 10 .16 x 103 lo; 6
HEPA Filters (18 filters) .47 x 10 .36 x 10
- l. 05 x' 10 6 .80 x 10 3 Totals
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
HEPA Filters (one unit) 9 124 x' 10 3 40 x io 3
- Based on filter rack area of 6 sq ft .
- 9. SA- FA45-l
SL2-FSAR
- s. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete East: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete West: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Ceiling: 24 Inch.Reinforced Concr~te Floor: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification
- 1. HVAC (See Attachment I)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and ceiling.
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area Access Entrance into. FA 4S is through douole doors on the south wall from a stairway to the yard area and through a door on the north wall from FA 46.
Sc. Detection:
Ionization type detectors will initiate an alarm in the Control Room should a fire occur.
9
- SA- F A4 5 - 2
SL2-FSAR
- Sd. Fire Protection Systems
- 1. Primary There are two available fire extinguishers in the area (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 10).
- 2. Secondary Yard hydrants are available to protect this area* (See Dwg
- sK-2998-M~708, Sheet 1).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None
- se. Smoke Venting:
The normal area ventilation will be 'used for smoke removal.
Exhaust capacity of this system is 6000 cfm which will provide a removal rate of 4.6 cfm/sq ft.
Sf. Drainage:
A 3 inch floor drain is connected to a common 4 inch drain header leading to the Equipment Drain Tank in FA 20 of the RAB .
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 45:
'Fire Area 45, the Fuel Handling Building HVAC Equipment Room,is located on El 48.00' at the south end of the Fuel Handling Building between Column Lines 2-FH6/2-FH7 and RAA/RAC. The r~mainder of the FHB on ~l 19.50', 48.00' and 62.00' is desig-nated FA 46. FA 45 is totally enclosed and separated from FA 46 and other Plant areas ~y reinforced concrete walls, florir and roof having fire resistive ratings greater than three hours. Access to FA 45 from the yard is from open, exterior stair #1 and from FA 46 through the fire door on the north wall. No equipment required for safe reactor shutdown is located in FA 45 and only the non-safety FHB supply and exhaust fans are located in this area. Filtered supply air is provided through the air handling units 2-HVS-6 and 2-HVS-7, having standard outside air intake arrange~ents in the west wall. Exhaust is provided through fan systems 2-HVE-15, 2-HVE-16A and 2-HVE-16B, having standard roof enclosure exhaust arrangements. Upon the receipt of a high radiation level signal, isolation dampers located in FA 46 will close and the exhaust from these systems will be diverted to the charcoal filters in the Shield Building Ventilation System Filter Train, whose exhaust units are in FAs 38 and 39 at 9.5A-FA45-3
SL2-FSAR El 43.00' in the RAB, to limit adverse radioactive releases to the atmosphere.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating The largest single source of combustible materials in FA 45 are the neoprene flexible connections and the fiberglass pre-filters and HEPA filters associated with ventilation systems 2-HVE-15, 16A and 16B contained within the stainless steel cas-ings of each unit. The filters are clas_sified l,>y Underwriters Laboratories as Class l which, by definition, do not contribute fuel when attacked by flame and which emit only negligible amounts of smoke. Assuming ignition of the fiberglass pre-filters and HEPA filters, a postulated fire occurring in one of the FHB exhaust units would not be self-sustaining and would result in only minor damage to the filters. Due to the low combustible loading, the lack of continuity of combustibles and separation, the p9stulated fire would not expose other equipment in FA 45 or disrupt function of equipment in adjacent FA 46. Only essential equipment required to limit radioactive release is located in FA 45, therefore safe reactor shutdown will not be affected.
Radioactive Release There would be no adverse radioactive release to the atmosphere, 6c.
since on a high radiation be diverted to the Shield Train prior to release to.
signal, the fuel pool exhaust will Building Ventilation System Filter the atmosphere.
Fire Protection System Operating Ionization type fire detectors located in FA 45 provide local alarm and annunciation in the Control Room resulting in prompt response by the trained plant fire brigade. Fire extinguishers strategically placed in FA 45 and FA 46 are backed up by yard hydrants accessible to the FHB entrances. An effective res-ponse, by ~he trained fi~e brigade, using the available fire extinguishers and hose streams fr_om nearby yard hydrants con-nected to the yard main water supply, will suppress the pqstulated fire, limiting the physical damage caused by the effects of the fire. Safe reactor shutdown capability will not be impaired.
9.5A-FA45-4
- 24" RC FIRE AREA BOUNDARIES & HVAC PENETRATIONS 24" RC ROOF EL 62.25' ~
- 24" RC 24" RC HVAC PENETRATIONS NO. SIZE DESCRIPTION LOCATION NO. SIZE DESCRIPTION LOCATION 1 8'x3' AIR INTAKE WEST WALL 7 32"x24" EXHAUST ROOF 2 10.5x3' AIR INTAKE WEST WALL 8 30"x26" SUPPLY NORTH WALL 3 26"x30" SUPPLY FLOOR 9 48"x20" EXHAUST FLOOR 4 34"x24" EXHAUST FLOOR NOTE:
(RC) - REINFORCED CONCRETE 5 36"x20" EXHAUST ROOF 6 32"x24" EXHAUST ROOF
- 9. SA- FA45- 5
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 46 .
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: Fuel Handling Bldg. Elev: 19.50'/48.00'/62.00' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 10 le. Floor Area: 2450/1140/4130 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
EL 19.50' Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger, Pump .~nd Filter Area and General Work Area EL 48.00' New Fuel Storage Area EL 62.00' Spent Fuel Pool Operating Decks
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA (To Control Radiological Release)
HVAC Damper.s: D-29 (SA) (Fue 1 Pool Supply)
. D-30(SB) (Fuel Pool Supply)
D~3l(SA) (Fuel Pool Exhaust)
D-32(SB) (Fuel Pool Exhaust)
D~33(SA) (FHB Supply)
.D-34(SB) (FHB Supply)
D-3S(SA) (FHB Exhaust)
D-36(SB) (FHB Exhaust)
PB Sta/Elec Box: B2V03(SA)
B2V07(SA)
B2V08(SB)
B2VlO(SB)
B2Vl4(SB)
B2V30(SB)
- 3. 'AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils Spent Fuel Handling Machine 5.0 gal .70 x 10 6 170 Fuel Pool Pumps 1.5 gal .21 x 10 6 51 New Fuel Elevator and Crane .5 gal .07 x 10 6 17 3c. Others
- New Fuel Crane Grease
- 9. SA- FA46-l
.s lb .01 x 10 6 2
SL2-FSAR 3c. Others (Cont'd)
New Fuel Crane Grease Neopreme Flexible conn.
.s lb
- 11. 0 lb
. 01 x 10 6
.12 x 10 6 2
30 Totals l.llxl0 6
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Spent Fuel Machine 6 3 Lube Oil 5 gal .70 x 106 7 x 103 Fuel Pool Pump .75 gal .11 x 10 7 x 10 S. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physic~l Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 24 Inch reinforced Concrete South: 18 Inch reinforced Concrete East: 24 Inch reinforced Concrete West: 24 Inch reinforced Concrete Ceiling: 24 Inch Reiµforced Concrete Floor: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification
- 1. HVAC See HVAC penetrations FA4S, Attachment I
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through ~alls, floor and ceiling.
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit) 9.SA-FA46-2
SL2-FSAR
- 4. Area Access EL 19. SO' - Entrance is through a large roll-up door on the east wall.
EL 48.00' - Entrance is through double doors on the south wall leading to a stairway to the yard area.
EL 62.00' - Entrance is through a door on south wall lead-ing to the roof area, a stairway on the north wall leading to the yard area, and the Person-nel Escape Hatch on the west wall leading to FA 14.
Sc. Detection:
Ionization type detectors are located in the operating floor area (El.62.00') adjacent to the Refueling Canal, and in the Fuel Bundle Shipping Container Area, the Fuel Pool Cubicle and Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Cubicle (all on El. 19.SO'). These fire detectors will initiate an alarm in the Control Room should a fire occur.
Sd. Fire .Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There are accessible fire extinguishers located in FA 46.
See Drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 10 for locations .
- 2. Secondary There are available hydrants located in the yard area.
See Drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 1 for locations.
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation systems will be used for smoke removal.
Exhaust capacity of these systems are:
Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger, Pump & Filter Area - 5SOO cfm or a removable rate of 4.1 cfm/sq ft.*
- New Fuel Storage Area - 4200 cfm or 3 cfm/sq ft Remainder FHB - 10,000 cfm or 3.1 cfm/sq ft
- 9.5A-FA46-3
SL2-FSAR Sf. Drainage:
Floor Drains (Qty) Location Description 2 Work Area All floor drains connect to (EL. 19. so I) common 4 inch header leading to the Equipment Drain Tank in FA 20 of the RAB.
2 Fuel Pool Heat (See above)
Exch. Area (EL. 19.SO')
7 Fuel Pool Pump (See above)
Room (EL. 19.SO')
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 46:
Fire Area 46 encompasses the entire Fuei Handling Building (FHB) except for the HVAC Equipment Room (FA 4S) which is located at the south end of the FHB on El.48.00'. FA 46 consists of sub-areas for the Cask Storage Area, Spent Fuel Pool,. New Fuel Storage and Refueling Canal all accessible from El 62. 00' and occupying the space from floor Elevations 17. SO' ,
21.SO' and 48.00' respectively to El. 62.00' (FHB Operating Floor). The Work Area and Fuel Bundle Shipping Container Area (El. 19.SO') are located under the New Fuel Storage Area (El.48.00') with openings provided through the common, rein-forced cogcrete slab at *El .. 48.00' for Stair #2 and the open hoist area. Also located in the Heat Exchanger, Pump and Fil-ter Area on El.19. SO' are the Fuel Pool Heat* Exchanger (within a three hour rated cubicle), the Fuel Pool Pumps and Discharge Fuel Pool Purification Pumps (the latter two s*ystems each in a common three hour rated cubicle but separated from each other by a partial height wall) and the Fuel Pool Ftlter (within a three hour rated cubicle). The essential Da!llpers D3l(SA)/
D32(SB) ~nd D3S(SA)/D36(SB) are located approximately 20 ft.
above the respective Hea.t Exchangers and the Fuel Pool Pumps.
The FA 46 areas listed above are separated from FA 4S and all other plant areas by enclosing reinforced concrete walls floors and ceilings having fire resistive ratings greater than three hours. Attached to the exterior of the FHB north wall are* the Cask Washdown Area, Cask and Large Equipment Decontamination Area and exterior Stair #3. Attached to the exterior of the FHB south wall is Stair. 1tl. Access to FA46 from the yard on the north end of the FHB is from Stair #3 and from the south end from Stair #1. Adequate doorways are provided for interior access of all areas and compartments in FA46.
The FHB Ventilation is provided from two independent systems each having a supply and exhau~t fan which are located in
- 9. SA- FA46-4
SL2-FSAR FA 45. Both the FHB Ventilation systems normally exhaust to atmosphere through the FHB Vent Stack. The Fuel Pool Ventila-tion systems 2HVS-6, 2HVE-16A and 2HVE-16B serve the Fuel Pool area, and the FHB Ventilation Systems 2HVS-:7 and 2HVE-15 serve the remaining FHB areas in FA 46. Provisions are included to isolate the ventilation ducts of each system (by*means of dampers) and stop*the fans on high-high alarm by the space radiation monitors. Further, on high-high signal, the Fuel Pool exhaust is directed through the Shield Building Ventila-tion System Charcoal Filter Train and the RAB Vent Stack to the atmosphere.
There is no essential equipment required for safe reactor shutdown located in FA46. The FHB Ventilation System duct work and dampers are categorized as essential since they are required for the control and prevention of the release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
Two fires are postulated for this area. The first fire postu-lated for FA46 involves the loss of lubricating oil from the Spent Fuel Handling Machine Driver which contains five gallons of lube oil. The oil will spread over the floor slab at El 62.00' covering an area of approximately lOO*square feet.
Ignition is assumed, but the resultant fire would be of short duration resulting in some smoke generation and localized ele-vated temperature. Lacking continuity of combustibles in the area, the fire will not spread beyond the immediate area of initiation. In the unlikely event that more than one of the radiation monitors located in the fuel pool area are impaired, there are sufficient monitors located around the entire peri-meter of the fuel pool to effect adequate radiological control.
The second fire postulated for FA46 involves the loss of lubri-cating oil from the Fuel Pool Pump 2A which contains three quarters of a gallon. The oil will spread over the floo.r slab at El. 19.50' around the unit for a limited diameter. Ignition is assumed and the resultant fire would be of short duration developing some smoke .generation and localized elevated temper-ature. The fire will not impact the redundant Fuel Pool Pump 2B due to the lack of continuity of limited combustibles and adequate spacial separation. In the unlikely event that both Fuel Pool Pumps are impaired, sufficient time is available to effect remedial action to maintain adequate Fuel Pool water volume (See Radiological Consequences below'). Due to the same reasoning, the essential Dampers D35/D36 located high above the Fuel Pool Pump and the essential Dampers D32/D31 located high in the adjacent separated cubicle, will not be impacted by the postulated fire.
The postulated fires will not result in the loss of essential
- equipment required for safe reactor shutdown. Therefore, safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be impaired.
- 9. 5A-FA46-5
SL2-FSAR Radiological Consequences Normal radiation levels in the FHB are withi~ the acceptance levels of release to the atmosphere. If any unlikely fire occured, resulting in loss of function of both of the redundant Fuel Pool Pumps or the Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger, which causes the water in the Fuel Pool to heat up, approximately 1-1/2 days would be required to reduce the level of water stored in the pool to the minimum safe level of nine feet above the spent fuel stored in the pool. Pressure switches in the Fuel Pool Pump or Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger piping provide warning of failure of system flow in ample time to replenish the Fuel Pool, utilizing non-seismic lines from the Refueling Water Storage *Tank or sei.smic lines and a portable hook up from the Intake Cooling Water System to maintaining the required minimum safe level over the stored spent fuel. Thus, the loss of the normal Fuel Pool Cooling Systems would not result in an adverse radioactive release to the atmosphere.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
An adequate number of ionization type fire detectors located in FA 46 provide local alarm and annunciation in the Control Room, resulting in prompt response by the trained Plant fire brigade.
An adequate number of fire extinquishers are strategically placed throughout FA 46 at each level and these are backed up by yard hydrant fire protection systems, accessible to the FHB entrances. An effective response by the trained fire brigade, using available fire-extinguishers and hose streams. from nearby yard hydrants, will suppress the postulated fire and limit the extent of the physical damage caused by the effects of the fire. There would be no adverse affects due to radiological release to the atmosphere nor would safe reactor shutdown capability be impaired.
9.5A-FA46-6
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 4 7
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: Turbine Building Elev: 19.50'/39.50'/
62.00' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 11, 12, 13 le. Floor Area: 33500 sq ft (at each elevation) ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA None 3, AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Ja. Cable Insulation 6
Switchgear Room Cable 5.87xl0 .16xl0 3 6
TGB Power & Control Cable 9.90xl0 .30x!0 3 3b. Oils 6
Turbine Generator Lube Oil 14,800 gal 2070xl0 61. 8xl0 3 6 . 3 Misc Pumps, Valves and Motors 336 gal 47xl0 l.4xl0 3c.
- Others Grease: M.O.Valves, Pumps
& Motors . 264 lbs 4. 88xl0 6 .15xl0 3 6
Generator Hydrogen 13,300 cu ft 4.3lxl0 .13xl0 3 6
Totals 2142xl0 64xl0 6
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Turbine Generator Lube Oil 14,800 gal 2.07xl0 9 62xl0 3
- 9
- 5A- F A4 7 -1
SL2-FSAR
- s. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: (30 inch high grade wall South: is continuous aro~nd the East: perimeter of the building)
West:
Ceiling: Open Floor: 6 Inch Reinforced Concrete on Sand Cement Fill
- 2. Concealed Spaces Switchgear Room (SOOO sq ft)
Chemical Storage Room (260 sq ft)
Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size
- 1. HVAC TGB Switchgear Rm air intake (2) 6'x7' TGB Switchgear Rm Exhaust (2) SI XS I Chemical Storage Rm Exhaust 2'x2'
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through fire barrier boundaries.
- 3. Electrical All tray penetrations into the Switchgear Room are sealed to a fire rating equivalent to the barrier wall.
- 4. Area Access
- a. Except for 'the Switchgear Room and the Chemical Storage Room, the building is open and can be ap-proached from all sides.
- b. The Switchgear Room has fire doors on the north, south and west walls of the building. Two roll-up doors are on the south wall of the building. The Chemical Storage Room has a fire door on the south wall.
9.5A-FA47-2
SL2-FSAR Sc. Detection:
A pressure switch will initiate alarms locally and in the Con-trol Room should the sprinkler systems for the Steam Generator Feed Pumps, Condensate Lube Oil Pumps and Heater Drain Lube Oil Pump be activated. Temperature detectors will initiate alarms locally and in the Control Room upon activation of the Turbine Lube Oil and Hydrogen Seal Oil Sprinkler Systems. Ionization type detectors in the Switchgear Room will initiate an alarm in the Control Room.
Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary A wet pipe sprinkler system protects the Steam Generator Feed Pumps, Condensate Lube Oil Pumps, and Heater Drain Lube Oil Pumps. The Turbine Lube Oil Piping is protected by an automatic pre-action sprinkler system. The Genera-tor Hydrogen Seal Oil Unit, is protected by an automatic deluge sprinkler system.
- 2. Secondary Portable fire extinguishers and standpipe hose stations are located throughout the building as ou~lined in Drawing SK-2998-M-708, sheet 11, 12 and 13 .
- 3. Fire ketardant Protective Coatings All major cable trays are sprayed with Flamemastic fire protective coatings.
Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal from the Switchgear Room and Chemical Storage Room. Exhaust capacity of the Switchgear Room is 37200 cfm which will provide a removal rate of 14.3 cfm/sq ft. Exhaust capacity of the Chemical Storage Room is 7SO cfm which will provide a removal rate of 2.9 cfm/sq ft. The remainder of the TGB is open type construc-tion and will be naturally ventilated.
Sf. Drainage:
Approximately every 4SO sq ft of ground floor area (El. 19.SO')
and operating floor area (El. 62.00') is drained by a 3 inch floor drain. The mezzanine deck (El. 39.SO') is basically open grating, and all water will pass through to the lower floor for drainage .
- 9. SA- FA47-3
SL2-FSAR
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 47:
The Turbine Building, designated FA47, is located west of the RAB and RCB and is an open sided building, independent of any safety related structure. The only essential equipment located in the TGB are power and control cables in manhole M256 to ICW Pump Fan 2HVE-41A. Other essential cables pass through man-holes located outside of FA47 along the west grade wall of the building (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 11).
The Turbine Building has three open levels, the Operating Floor at El. 62.00', the Mezzanine Floor at El. 39.50' and the Ground Floor at El. 19.50'. There is a reinforced concrete, 30 inch high grade wall around the perimeter of the building except for a one foot nigh curb adjacent to the Turbine Oil Reservoir Area in the northwest corner of the building, and a 60 foot wide opening in the grade wall on the southeast corner of the build-ing leading to an open corridor in open FA7. Mainly, the Operating Floor is a reinforced concrete slab, the Mezzanine Floor is open steel grating and the Ground Floor is a rein-forced concrete slab on sand cement fill.
The south side of the TGB faces the south roadway and then an open area. The east side borders FA6 (Steam Trestle Area) and FA7 (Yard Area between the RAB and TGB). The north side faces the common laydown area between TGB Unit No. 2 and TGB Unit No. 1. The west side adjoins FAll, the Turbine Lube Oil Reser-voir area on the north and the open Condenser Pit area in the approximate center and FA12, the Transformers Area on the south end. .
The Switchgear Room located at the south end of FA47 is segre-gated from the remainder of the TGB areas. The electrical cable trays associated with the switchgear equipment located both inside and outside of the Switchgear Areas are protected with an approved flame retardant coating and do not constitute an exposure problem. The Chemical Storage Room is located in the northeast corner of the TGB at El 19.50'. It is cutoff and isolated from any essential equipment and is _adequately venti-lated.
In the event of an oil spill from any of the equipment which used the various types of lube oils, the flow will be contained in FA47; however the limitation of any oil spread to the gene-ral area of involvement cannot be assured.
6b. Fire Protection Systems Not Operating:
The fire postulated to occur in the TGB results from an impair-ment in the turbine lube oil system and the leakage and igni-tion of the approximately 14,800 gallons of lube oil contained
- 9. SA- FA47-4
SL2-FSAR in the total system (reservoir, conditioner, pumps, turbine pip-ing, Turbine Generator Unit, etc.). The 14,800 gallons of lube oil could spread over the floor area at El.19.50'. The auto-matic suppression system is considered as not operating and the fire will continue to burn until manual fire fighting pro-cedures ar~ initiated.
Upon discovery, the response by the trained fire brigade will provide effective control of the fire by using nearby portable fire extinguishers, manual standpipe hose stations and outside hose streams from adjacent fire hydrants supplied by a yard main water supply. These actions should mitigate any severe impact to safe reactor shutdown capabilities.
Major damage to equipment and structural components may result from the postulated fire. The postulated fire may also damage essential cabling servicing ICW Pump Fan 2HVE-41A; however re-dundant fan units are available. The essential manholes out-side and adjacent to FA47 will not be impacted as a result of the three foot high grade wall surrounding the TGB which serves to contain the oil and fire within FA47. Therefore, there will be no adverse effects on safe reactor shutdown capabilities.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating The Turbine Building is protected from unacceptable fire hazards by several levels of fixed automatic and manual fire
- protection systems. Ionization type detection devices sepa-rated into two zones are provided in the Switchgear Room.
Four separate automatic water suppression systems provide coverage for all equipment containing lubricating oil.* The Hydrogen Seal Oil Unit at El. 19.50' is protected by thermal detectors located above the seal oil tank which will activate an automatic deluge system with open spray nozzles. Oil and water flows will be contained in a curbed area below the unit.
Closed head standard wet pipe automatic sprinkler systems pro-tect the Heater Drain Pumps, the Feedwater Pumps and the Condensate Pumps. A closed head pre-action automatic sprinkler system protects the areas traversed by the Turbine lube oil pipes and the system is activated by thermal fire detectors.
The Electro-Hydraulic Fluid Reservoir located at El. 49.50',
above the Mezzanine Floor, contains approximately 200 gallons of fire retardant electro-hydraulic fluid in an area devoid of any essential equipment, and is protected by portable and man-ual fire fighting units. In the unlikely event of a spill from the reservoir and ignition of the oil, the migration of the burning fluid will be controlled by the fire response activi-ties and it will have no impact on safe shutdown functions .
- 9.5A-FA47-5
SL2-FSAR Upon ignition of the postulated fire, automatic initiation of the 2675 gpm pre-action fire suppression systems covering the affected areas would occur and the fire and its effects would be brought under control. Early detection and prompt response by the trained fire brigade, effectively using adequate nearby, strategically located, portable fire extinguishers and manual standpipe hose stations, and fire hydrant hose streams from a yard main water supply, will provide a good back-up to the automatic extinguishing systems. Suppression of the post-ulated fire will be achieved and safe reactor shutdown capabil-ities will not be impaired.
9.5A- FA47-6
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT NO. 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 48
- l. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB Electrical Equipment Area Elev: 62.00' Supply Fan Room lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 7 le. Floor Area: 920 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA 2HVS-5A( SA) 2HVS-5B(SB)
Electrical Boxes: B2254 (SB) (B711)*
B2250 (SB) (B715)*
B2252 (SB) (B710)*
- 3.
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS (B713)*
Combustible Loading Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils Negligible 3c. Others Grease: Fan Motors 2 lb 37 x 103 40 3
Filter Bags 42 Filters 295 x 10 321 Elec. Flexible Conn. 23 lb 184 x 103 200 Totals 516xl0 3 561
- 9. 5A- FA48-l
SL2-FSAR
- 4. CONCENTRATED COHBUSTIBLE LOADING S.
Source Grease:
FIRE CONTROL Fan Motor Quantity 1 lb (Btu) 18.SxlO 3
(Btu/sq ft) 7 x 10 3
- Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete South: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete East: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete West: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Ceiling: 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete (minimum)
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification
x Size 70 11 14' (Floor)
(South wall)
Exhaust 26" x 26 11 (South wall)
Exhaust 16" x 16 11 (North wall)
Exhaust 16 11 x 16" (West wall)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and ceiling.
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area Access Entrance is through a missile protected double door on the east wall.
Sc. Detection:
None 9.SA-FA48-2
SL2-FSAR 5d. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary A portable fire extinguisher is located in FA48 with other units available from adjacent FA's 42I and 42II (See Dwg.
Sk-2998-M-708, Sheet 7).
- 2. Secondary The nearest available standpipe hose stations are from the floor below at El. 43.00' and from the Turbine Operating Deck at El. 62. 00' (See Dwg Sk-2998-M-708, Sheets 6 and 13).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting:
Natural ventilation is available through louver openings.
Sf. Drainage:
Four 3 inch floor drains are connected to a common 4 inch drain header leading to the Equipment Drain Tank in FA20 of the RAB .
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 48:
Fire Area 48 is located at El 62.00' of the RAB and is known as the Electrical Equipment Area Supply Fan Room. FA 48 is segre-gated from the adjacent Control Room envelope (FA 42 I, II and III) and from the Roof at El 82.00' by reinforced concrete and concrete block walls, concrete floor and ceiling having fire resistive ratings greater than three hours. It is bounded by column line 2-RA3 and a line approximately 7 ft north of column line 2-RAS, and column lines RAI/RAJ. Access to FA 48 is through double doors located in the east wall protected by a missile shield arrangement and leading to the roof at El 62.00'. There are two redundant Electrical Equipment Area Supply Fans (2HVS-5A and 2HVS-5B) and associated electrical equipment, all essential. Supply air for these units is through a missle protected 15 ft x 14 £t louver arrangement in the south wall and the discharge ducts pass through a floor opening to reach the Electrical Equipment below. The main fan units are spacially separated by 10 ft and both enclosed in a sheet metal housing encompassing the greatest portion of the room. FA 48 also contains a portion of the ducts used for normal make-up outside air for the Control Room.
SL2-FSAR 6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
The combustible loading in FA 48 consists of one pound of grease associated with each of the fan motors, a limited number of flexible duct connectors and s.everal HVAC filters. The greatest concentration of combustible materials is one pound of grease in the fan motor bearing area. The postulated fire assumes that the grease is ignited from the accidentally over-heated bearings. The resulting fire will consume the entire quantity of grease. The fire will be confined to the area of origin and it will not be able to spread to the redundant ran motor located approximately 10 ft away. The fire will not ex-pose electrical boxes and power supply cable in conduits of the redundant equipment. The 15 ft x 14 ft louver in the south wall will allow the heat and smoke generated by the postulated fire to escape. There are no safety related systems or combus-tible materials within 50 ft of the louver. The fire will be confined to the equipment of origin, with limited burn time and impact, and will have no adverse affect on areas outside FA 48.
The postulated fire in FA 48 will render one of the redundant fans (2HVS-5A or 2HVS-5B) inoperable. Since the redundant equipment in FA 48 and safety systems outside *FA 48 are not affected, safe Plant shutdown capability will not be impaired.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
Fire extinguishers are available in adjoining FA 42. Available standpipe hos~ ~tations are on the floor below at El 43.00' and from the Turbine Building El 62.00'. An effective response, by the trained fire brigade, will limit the consequences of any fire effects. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be affected.
- 9. SA- FA48-4
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 49
- 1. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: Intake Structure Elev: 16.50' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 9 le. Floor Area: 6490 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Two Isolation Valves (I-SB-21-7) for ICW Pump 2C
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Snurce Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Negligible 3b. Oils 6
Intake Crane 4 gal .56xl0 .09xl0 3 6
(2) Screen Wash Pumps 4 gal .56xl0 .09x10 3 6 3 (4) CW Pumps 140 gal 19.6lxl0 3.02xl0 6 3 1 Traveling Screen Motor 2 gal . 28xl0 .04xl0 3c. Others 6 3 Grease: (4) M.O. Valves 36 lbs . 67xl0 .lOxlO 6 3 Wood grating 720 lbs 5.76xl0 . 89xl0 6
Totals 27.44xl0 4.23xl0 3
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING 4a Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 6 3
( 1) CW Pwnp 35 gal 4.9xl0 7xl0
- 9.5A-FA49-l
SL2-FSAR S. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: open South: open East: open West: open Ceiling: open Floor: 36 Inch Reinforced Concre.te
- 2. Concealed Spaces Missile closure around valve pits on north side of area.
Electrical manholes M 21S, M 219, M 222, M 224 and M 22S Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification Size HVAC None (Open areas)
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations in the floor deck
- 3. Electrical None (Embedded Conduit)
- 4. Area hccess Open on all sides Sc. Detection:
None 9.5A-FA49-2
SL2-FSAR Sd . Fire Protertion Systems:
- 1. Primary Portable extinguishers are located in the area as shown on Drawing SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 9.
- 2. Secondary Yard fire hydrants are located 40 feet south and SO feet east of the area (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 9).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting:
Open area Sf. Drainage:
No floor drains are in the area. However, floor penetrations for piping and equipment will allow drainage to the flooded intake area below .
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area 49:
Fire Area FA49 includes all of the Intake Structure., including the trash pit, except for the area enclosed by the Intake Cool-ing Water Pumps Missile Enclosure (FA13) which is essentially isolated from the remainder of the Intake Structure by 2 ft thick concrete walls with greater than 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire ratings.
The Intake Structure is essentially an open area, the deck being a concrete slab in which various openings and spaces are provided for pumps, valves, trash rake equipment, etc. The area below the deck, the intake chamber, is constantly filled to a minimum level with water which is used for plant cooling purposes.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
The postulated fire for FA49 involves the loss and ignition of lube oil from any of the four circulating water pump's integral lubricating oil reservoirs containing 3S gallons of oil. The oil will be contained in the curbed area surrounding each pump and thus any fire will impact only a single pump and be con-tained to the area of origin .
- 9
- SA- F A4 9 - 3
SL2-FSAR For the purpose of this analysis, a single fire will be postulated involving the complete loss and ignition of lube oil from CW Pump 2B2. The oil will continue to burn until completely consumed, but will be contained in the curbed area surrounding the pump. The essential manholes to the west and south of CW Pump 2B2 contain essential cabling to ICW Pumps and their associate exhaust fans. *Due to the containment of the fire, as a result of curbing, they will not be impacted. In the unlikely event that manhole M224, which is 12 ft south and the closest to CW Pump 2B2, is impacted, only cabling to ICW Pump 2A will be lost and redundant Pumps 2B and 2C will still be available.
The two essential valves (I-SB-21-7), located in the separate pits on the northside of the area and their associated hand-wheels which project in the open area above the operating deck, are system isolation valves for ICW Pump 2C. In the unlikely event that they are impacted by this or any other postulated fire, ICW Pumps 2A and 2B are still available.
Therefore, safe reactor shutdown capabilities will be main-tained.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating:
There are no fire detection devices or fixed fire protection systems in this open area. The postulated fire would event-ually be discovered and a response by the trained ffre brigade, using available portable fire extinguishers and manual hose streams from nearby yard main fire hydrants, would provide effective controls which would tend to limit the impact of the fire. Therefore, safe reactor shutdown capabilities would be maintained.
9.SA- FA49-4
SL2-FSAR ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 50
- l. DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA la. Building: RAB Corridor Area Elev:43.00' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6 le. Floor Area: 3760 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA HVAC Fan 2HVE-9A Louver 2L-7A Electrical Box B2196(SA) (B605)*
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
- 3a.
3b.
3c.
Cable Insulation Oils Others Negligib.le Negligible Class A Combustible Mat'l 250 lb 2xl0 6 532 Totals 2xl0 6 532
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft)
Class A Combustible Mat'l 250 lb 2xl0 6 6
.36xl0
- 5. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary
- 9.5A- FA50-1
SL2-FSAR Walls North:
South:
East:
West:
Ceiling:
(See Attachment I) 24 Inch Reinforced Concrete Floor: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete
- 2. Concealed Spaces None Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification
- 1. HVAC See Attachment I
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and ceiling.
- 3. Electrical 4.
Electrical penetrations will be sealed to a fire rating equivalent to the fire area barriers.
Area Access Entrance is through a roll-up door on the west wall from FA39 and from a low leakage type door on the east wall from open FA 41. Two wire mesh doors lead into FA40 on the west wall and a door on the north wall leads into FA38. Stairway 2-RA-3 also enters this area from FASl at El. 19.SO'.
Sc. Detection:
None Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
There is one portable fire extinguisher in FASO, and two accessible fire extinguishers in adjacent FA39 (See Dwg.
SK-2998-M- 708, Sheet 6).
- 9. SA-FASO- 2
SL2-FSAR
- 2. Secnndary There are two standpipe hose stations in FASO (See Dwg.
SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 6).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings None Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal. Ex-haust capacity of this system is lSOO cfm which will provide a removal rate of 140 cfm/sq ft.
Sf. Drainage:
Six 3 inch floor drains are connected to a common 3 inch drain header leading to the Equipment Drain Tank in FA 20.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fire Area SO:
Fire Area SO, the Resin Addition Tank and Corridor Area, is an irregular area located at elevation 43.00' in the southeast sec-tion of the RAB, between column line 2-RA2 and a line 12 ft south of column line 2-RA4, and column lines RAC and RAF. FA SO is segregated from adjacent FA's 38, 39, 31, 40 and 41 by reinforced concrete and concrete block walls, concrete floor and ceiling having fire resistive ratings greater than three hours. FA SO is open to the FA Sl corridor area at elevation 19.SO' through an open stairway 2-RA-3; to FA 40 Holdup Tank Area at platform elevation 43.SO', through two separate wire mesh doors in the west wall; from FA 41 through a lnw leakage door in the east wall; from FA 39 through a roll-up door in the west wall; and from FA 38 through a fire door in the north wall.
Essential equipment located in FA SO consists of the motor con-trolled lnuver and electrical box associated with the ECCS area exhaust system 2HVE-9A. This louver is part of the exhaust duct system traversing FA SO which serves 2HVE-9A, physically located in adjacent FA 39; but which discharges to the atmo-sphere via a missile protected exhaust arrangement in the east wall of FA SO. Also traversing FA SO are twn electrical cond-uits, one each from the A and B Trains which respectively operate the louver 2L-7A motor located in FA SO, which is as-sociated with the 2HVE-9A system and the louver 2L-7B motor lncated in FA 38, which is associated with the isolated redund-ant 2HVE-9B system. These conduits are normally adequately spatially separated but they crossover in one locatinn in FA so .
- 9. SA-FAS0-3
SL2-FSAR Area ventilation is supplied through a branch line of the saf-ety related RAB normal ventilation supply system and exhaust is provided by the non-safety related RAB exhaust system.
The north end of FA 50 is used for the storage of resins and associated chemicals, which are bulk packed and transported by the movable Resin Tank used to fill the Ion Exchangers at El 19.50', through the Valve Pits on the open roof area of FA 41.
The south end has a non-safety related Boric Acid Batching Tank and associated monorail arrangement.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating Due to the negligible combustible loading and due to the lack of continuity of combustible materials in FA 50, a fire involv-ing equipment inherent to this area will not be considered.
However, this area may be used for the storage of various ma-terials, such as.resins, etc. Although the resins are not com-bustible, the associated packaging materials may be accumulated and thus pose a fire hazard. Although only remotely possible, a postulated fire is assumed to involve a 55 gallon drum full of Class A combustible materials such as wood, paper, cloth, cardboard and other cellulosic products, arranged in a manner that the fire exposes conduits leading to redundant louver con-trol motors associated with essential equipment located in FA 39 and FA 38. Damage to cabling within the conduit will result in the loss of function of:
a - the louver 2L-7B motor located in FA 38, which oper-ates exhaust louvers of 2HVE-9B located in FA 38, and b - the louver 2L-7A motor located in FA 50 which operates exhaust louvers in FA 50 connected to 2HVE-9A located in FA 39.
The fire would be confined to the drum and would eventually burn itself out and some equipment and materials may be im-paired or destroyed.
The motorized louvers of the ECCS Area Exhaust Ventilation System are arranged to fail in the open position in case of loss of power to the motors associated with the louvers, thus leaving the overall ventilation units functional when needed.
Safe reactor shutdown capability will not be impaired.
The postulated fire may damage some equipment and materials in the area of origin but due to a lack of continuity of combust-ibles it would eventually extinguish itself. Adjacent sep-arated and isolated areas would not be affected by the effects of the fire and safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be impaired.
- 9. 5A- FAS0-4
SL2-FSAR 6c . Fire Protection System Operating
- There are no automatic fire detection devices in FA 50 and the postulated fire may burn for a while, but will be extinguished by confinement and lack of continuity of combustibles. There is one portable fire extinguisher in FA 50 and there are two accessible fire extinguishers in adjacent FA 39. There are three available standpipe hose stations; one (HS-15-35) is located in FA 50 near stair 2-RA-3; one (HS-15-36) is located in FA 50 adjacent to column lines 2-RA3/RAC and the other (HS-15-3 7) is located in FA 39 adjacent to column lines 2-RA3z/RAG. There are also other a~cessibie and available fire extinguishers and standpipe hose stat,ions adjacent to .the open stairs 2-RA-3 at elevation 19.50'. An effective response, by the trained fire brigade, will assist in limiting the adverse consequences of the fire effects. Safe reactor shut-down capability will not be affected .
- 9.5A-FA50-5
I HVAC PENETRATIONS I
- NO.
2 1
3 4
SIZE 36x16 18x10 40x44 22x16 DESCRIPTION EXHAUST EXHAUST EXHAUST SUPPLY 8" BLOCK 5 14 x 12 SUPPLY 6 24x24 TRANS. GRILL N 7 96x48 LOUVER NOTE:
ALL WALLS ARE REINFORCED CONCRETE (RC) OR CONCRETE BLOCK *
- 50 FL EL 43.00' FIRE AREA BOUNDARIES & HVAC PENETRATIONS
- PLAN VIEW ATTACHMENT I
- 9. 5A-FAS0-6
SL2-FSAR St. LUCIE UNIT No. 2
- 1.
la.
FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR FIRE AREA NO. 51 DESCRIPTION OF FIRE AREA Building: RAB Ceiling & Hallways Elev: 19.50' lb. Reference Drawing: SK-2998-M-708, Sheet 5 le. Floor Area: 12000 Sq Ft ld. Subspaces Within Fire Area:
None
- 2. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN FIRE AREA Heat Trace Distribution Panels 2A(SA) and 2B(SB)
Volume Control Tank Discharge Valve V250l(SA)
CVCS Local Annunciator Panel (B221A) (B503)*
VCT Level Transmitter LT-2227 (IR-47-lA) (B502)*
PB Sta/Elec Box : B2G24(MB) (B519 )*
B2G23(MD) (B520)*
B2G22(MC) (B521)*
B2G2l(MA) (B522)*
B2716(SAB) (B511 )*
(PB Sta V250l)(SA) (B501)*
- Fire Protection Drawing Box Number
- 3. AREA COMBUSTIBLE LOADINGS Source Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 3a. Cable Insulation Misc. Cable 1030x10 6 85.SxlO 3 3b. Oils Misc. Pumps & Motors 13 gals 1. 82x10 6 .2xl0 3 3c. Others Negligible Totals 1032xl0 6 86x10 3
- 9.SA- FASl-1
SL2-FSAR
- 4. CONCENTRATED COMBUSTIBLE LOADING 4a. Source Cable Tray
- See Methodology Quantity (Btu) (Btu/sq ft) 114 x 10 3*
- S. FIRE CONTROL Sa. Physical Containment:
- 1. Fire Area Boundary Walls North: (See Attachment I)
II II II South:
II II II East:
II II II West:
Ceiling: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete (minimum)
Floor: 12 Inch Reinforced Concrete (minimum)
- 2. Concealed Spaces Flash Tank Pumps 2A & 2B Area Purification Filter Area Flash Tank Area Sb. Service Penetrations through Boundary Barriers:
Identification
- 1. HVAC See Attachment I
- 2. Mechanical Various pipe penetrations through walls, floor and ceiling.
- 3. Electrical Electrical penetrations will be sealed to a fire rating equivalent to the fire area barriers.
9.SA- FA51-2
SL2-FSAR
- 4. Area Access
- Entrance into this Fire Area from the outside is through double doors on the north, south, east and west sides of the building. Stairway 2-RA-3 on the east side leads to elevation (-) .SO' and elevation 43.00'; on the west side, stairway 2-RA-7 and 2-RA-2 leads to elevation (-) .SO',
and elevation 43.00' and 62.00' respectively. Other entrances are via labyrinths, and doorways leading from the other fire areas (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708 Sheet S).
Sc. Detection:
Ionization type detectors will initial an alarm in the Control Room should a fire occur.
Sd. Fire Protection Systems:
- 1. Primary There are six fire extinguishers in the common hallway of FA Sl. Also, there are accessible fire extinguishers in the numerous adjacent fire areas (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708 Sheet S).
- 2. Secondary There are five standpipe hose stations in the common hall-way of FA Sl (See Dwg. SK-2998-M-708 Sheet S).
- 3. Fire Retardant Protective Coatings Flamemastic fire protective coating is applied to all cable trays.
Se. Smoke Venting:
Normal area ventilation will be used for smoke removal. Aver-age exhaust capacity of this system is 1.1 cfm/sq ft.
Sf. Drainage:
There are a total of sixteen, 3 inch floor drains connected to a common 3 inch drain header which flows to the Equipment Drain Tank in FA 20.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POSTULATED FIRE 6a. Description of Fir~ Area:
Fire Area Sl includes the Hot and Cold Corridors, miscel-laneous equipment areas at El. 19.SO' and the Cable Ro~ting
- 9.SA-FASl-3
SL2-FSAR Areas above the false ceilings at El. 28.66'. This irregular shaped area of the RAB covers portions of the entire El. 19.50' and those portions above El. 28.66' up to El. 43.00', and as such it is bounded by column lines 2-RAl and 2RA5, and column lines RAA and RAL. The areas are enclosed by full height out-side perimeter walls of reinforced concrete and concrete floors and ceilings having fire resistive ratings of greater than three hours. As indicated on the drawings, FA 51 is separated from other El. 19.50' FA's by mainly full height reinforced concrete and concrete block walls, equipped with low leakage doors, with some FA's having open or open labyrinth type doorways or direct openings into their spaces. The hot and cold corridors running north-south and east-west are the main access routes to areas of the 19.50' elevation, which include FA's 17, 21 (I and II) 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, and 33.
Access to the outside of El. 19.50' is through the westside Control Point Guard House, through the northside corridor swing doors to the open yard and through the east side corridor roll-up door to the open yard. Stairway 2-RA-2, on the west side, is enclosed from El 19.50' to El 43.00', stairway 2-RA-7, at column 2-RA3z/RAJ is open down to El (-)0.50' and stairway 2-RA-3 is open from El (-)0.50' to El 19.50' and to El 43.00'.
Access means to the area above the false ceilings (El 28.66')
are by portable ladders.
The area above El 28.66' is utilized for the routing of num-erous cable trays containing both SA and SB safety related cables. Redundant cable trays are also routed through the hot corridor in the east-west direction. All cable trays are covered with approved type fire retardant coatings and they have been arranged to conform to the separation and barrier requirements of R.G. 1.75, to provide adequate fire protection integrity. Both safety and non-safety related mechanical equipment is housed throughout the remaining floor area of FA
- 51. The normal RAB Supply Ventilation System supplies air to the common corridor and equipment areas through safety related ducts. Normal exhaust is by the regular movement of 'the supply air through the openings into the various cubicles, rooms and open fire areas and then through their inherent non-safety related exhaust systems. There are miscellaneous safety and non-safety related mechanical equipment throughout the remaining floor areas of FA 51.
6b. Fire Protection System Not Operating:
The fire postulated to occur in FA 51 involves the initiation of combustion within a single cable tray due to electrical faulting within the subject tray. There are no inherent ex-ternal sources of combustion above the false ceiling which could expose cable trays routed through FA 51. Also, no re-dundant cable services are routed in the same tray nor are power and control cables routed in the same tray. The approved fire retardant coating will essentially prevent the propagation
- 9. 5A-FA51-4
SL2-FSAR of the fire along the tray in either direction from the point of initiation. The fire retardant coating will also prevent the fire from extending to adjacent cable trays. The cable trays also will be arranged to meet the separation and barrier requirements of R.G. 1.75, which will provide further physical independence of the electrical systems and will be designed and located to minimize, consistent with safety requirements, the probability and effects of fires . . Therefore, the postulated fire will be contained within a single tray near its area of origin and due to the limited propagation capabilities of the postulated fire, no adverse effects will occur.in adjacent fire areas. The safety functions of equipment served by the damaged cables may be lost. Since redundant safety related cables are routed in separate approved fire retardant coated trays and since they are arranged in a manner to conform with adequate fire safety requirements, no loss of redundant essential equipment could occur due to the postulated cable tray fire and therefore, safe reactor shutdown capabilities will be main-tained.
6c. Fire Protection System Operating The principal fire protection feature in FA 51 is the approved fire retardant coating applied to all cable trays which is a passive, continuous defense against exposure fir.es, and fire propagations within cable trays. This is further amplified by fire safety concepts added per R.G. 1.75. These systems are augmented by ionization type detectors providing annunciation in the Control Room.
There are six fire extinguishers in the common hallways of FA 51, and also accessible fire extinguishers inside the door-ways of the numerous* adjacent FA' s. There are five available standpipe hose stations in the common hallways of FA 51: one (HS-15-33), in the' north-south passage adjacent to column lines 2-RA4/RAJ; one (HS-15-34), in the east-west passage adjacent to stairway 2-RA-2; one (HS-15-38), in the east-west passage ad-jacent to stairway 2-RA-3; one (HS-15-39), in the east-west passage adjacent to column lines 2-RA3/RAI; and the other (HS-15-40), in the east-west passage adjacent to column lines 2-RA3z/RAG. An effective response, by the trained fire brigade, will assist in limiting the consequences of any fire eff~cts. Safe reactor shutdown capabilities will not be im-paired .
- 9.5A-FA51-5
- 24" RC HVAC PENETRATION NO. SIZE DESCRIPTION 1 8x6 AIR VENT 12 24x 10 SUPPLY AIR 2 26x 10 SUPPLY AIR 13 18x12 RETURN AIR 3 28x 10 RETURN AIR. 14 10 x 14 RETURN AIR 4 16 x 12 SUPPLY AIR 15 18x 14 SUPPLY AIR 5 70x20 SUPPLY AIR 16 14x8 SUPPLY AIR 6 70x50 SUPPLY AIR 17 32x32 RETURN AIR 7 20x 10 SUPPLY AIR 18 24x24 RETURN AIR 8 12 x 16 RETURN AIR 19 60x24 SUPPLY AIR 9 20x12 SUPPLY AIR 20 12x 8 RETURN AIR 10 12x16 RETURN AIR 21 18 x 12 RETURN AIR 11 12x12 RETURN AIR 22 14x12 RETURN AIR NOTE:
(RC) - REINFORCED CONCRETE FLORIDA POWER*& LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 FIRE AREA #51 - PLAN VIEW ATTACHMENT I 9.SA-FASl-6
SL2-FSAR 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
- Fire Protection Administrative Procedures are common to both the SLl and SL2 Plants. Reference is therefore made to the SLl Fire Protection Evaluation, Safety Evaluation Report, and Technical Specifications for specific information with respect to inspection and testing of systems, personnel qualifications and fire protection quality assl,lrance programs.
9.SA-6*-l
- 7.0 SL2-FSAR APPENDIX A TO BTP 9.5-1 Guidelines The conformance of the fire protection program for the St. Lucie Unit No. 2 Nuclear Power Plant to the guidelines given in NRG Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A, dated August 23, 1976 is given in this section.
Appendix A guidelines are restated, in the first (left) column below. The numbering sequence used in Appendix A is retained. Information on various aspects of the project fire protection program is detailed in the second column, as required to show conformance with the guidelines, in the third column to describe alternative approaches and in the fourth column to provide supplemental information. Throughout the project design, fire protection will be provided to maintain the capability for safe plant shutdown and to limit the release of radioactivity to the environment A. Overall Requirements of Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program
- 1. Personnel See Section 6, this repor't, with respect to project lineup.
- 2. Design Bases The overall fire protection program The fire protection program is de-should be based upon evaluation of signed to maintain ability to per-potential fire hazards through the form safe shutdown functions and to plant and the effect of postulated minimize radioactive releases to the design basis fires relative to environment. It reflects good fire maintaining ability to perform protection engineering practice and safety shutdown functions and guided by plant fire hazard analyses minimize radioactive releases to and by credible fire postulations the environment.
The design bases of these goals are directed toward -
- 1) Fire prevention through the con-trol, separation and limitation of sources of ignition;
- 2) Fire limitation by means of fire cutoffs and barriers to either confine any fire to the area in which it may occur or to prevent fire from communicating to and en-dangering safety related equip-ment;
SL2-FSAR APPENDIX A To BTP 9.5-1 Guidelines (Cont'd)
Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks
- 3) Fire detection in areas containing essential equipment or areas of high combustible loading to give early warning of fires so that such fires are extinguished in their incipient stages; and
- 4) Fire extinguishment by means of installed facilities commensurate with the fire hazard presented.
- 3. Backup Total reliance should not be placed Provision of fire suppression for the Automatic deluge systems are pro-on a single automatic fire suppres- various plant areas avoids total vided for main, auxiliary and sion system. Appropriate backup reliance on any single system, auto- startup transformers, the turbine fire suppression capability should matic or manual. hydrogen seal oil unit, the tur-be provided. bine oil conditioner units, and the turbine oil reservoir. An automatic pre-action system is provided for the turbine lube oil piping. Automatic standard wet pipe sprinkler systems are pro-vided for the turbine area steam generator feed pump, the con-densate pump lube oil systems and the heater drain pump lube oil system.
Use of cable fireproofing obviates the need for automatic suppression in congested cable areas.
A full complement of appropriate hand fire extinguishers is in-stalled throughout the plant to provide either initial fire-fight-ting capacity or backup to any automatic or manual suppression systems. As a backup to hand fire extinguishers and/or automatic suppression systems; a system of 1-1/2 inch small hose connections is installed so that areas within each building are reached with hose lines attached to a standpipe connection. As a final backup to all of the protection outlined above, outside hydrants and hose houses are also provided .
SL2-FSAR APPENDIX A To BTP 9.5-1 Guidelines (Cont'd)
Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks continuing evaluation and include ad'ditional fire barriers, fire protection capability, and admin-istrative controls necessary to protect the operating units from construction fire hazards. ~he superintendent of the operating plant should have the lead respon-sibility for site fire protection.
- 9. Simultaneous Fires Simultaneous fires in more than Simultaneous fires in more than one The only shared facility con-one reactor need not be postu- reactor are not postulated, as sidered is the redundant fire lated, where separation require- separation requirements are met. pumps.
ments are met. A fire involving A fire involing more than one more than one reactor unit need reactor unit is not postulated not be postulated except for except for shared facilities that facilities shared between units. affect safe. shutdown units.
'D
~ B. Administrative Procedures, Controls
....,I and Fire Brigade I
l/l See Section 6.0, this report.
C. Quality Assurance Program See Section 6.0, this report.
SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks D. General Guidelines for Plant Protection
- 1. Building Design (a) Plant Layouts should be Plant layouts are arranged so that:
arranged to:
(1) Isolate safety related Safety related systems are isotated systems from unaccep- from exposing fire hazards through table fire hazards, and the use of physical isolation, spatial separation, fire retardant coatings, automatic suppression or any combi-nation of the above deemed feasible.
(2) Separate redundant Systems required for safe plant shut-safety related systems down are separated from each other from each other so that to the extent that both trains are both are not subject to not damaged or operation impaired by damage from a single a common fire. Where spatial sep-fire hazard. aration cannot be accomplished, pro-tection against damage from a single fire hazard is achieved by combi-nations of fire retardant coatings, barriers and fire detection and suppression systems or combinations deemed feasible.
(b) In order to accomplish l.(a) To verify separation and isolation of (See Fire Hazard Analyses Section) above, safey related systems critical equipment components, a fire and fire hazards should be hazards analysis has been made to identified throughout the identify throughout the plant, safety plant. Therefore, a detailed related systems and associated fire fire hazard analysis should hazards. As necessary, the fire be made. The fire hazards hazards analysis will be reviewed and analysis should be reviewed updated to reflect actual conditions.
and updated as necessary.
(c) For multiple reactor sites, Cable Spreading Rooms are not shared In the Cable Spreading Rooms, (Refer to Hethodology) cable spreading rooms should between reactor units. The Cable cabling for redundant safety not be shared between reac- Spreading Room for each reactor unit divisions required for safe shut-tors. Each cable spreading is adequately separately or isolated down are separated by meeting the room should be separated from from other areas of the plant. intent of RG 1.75 separation other areas of the plant by barriers. criteria, fire retardant coatings barrie.rs (walls and floors) and fire barriers.
having a minimum fire resis-tance of three hours.
Cabling for redundant safety divisions should be sepa-
SL2-FSAR APPENDIX A To BTP 9.5-1 Guidelines (Cont'd)
Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives kemarks
- 4. Single Failure Criterion A single failure in the fire sup- Redundancy of equipment and systems pression system should not impair is used as required to avoid im-both the primary and backup fire pairment of both primary and suppression capability. For ex- secondary fire suppression capa-ample, redundant fire water pumps bility. For example, piping and with independent power supplies valving to fire protection systems and controls should be provided. are arranged so that any single Postulated fires or fire protec- break does not impair the water tion system failures need not be supply to both hose connections considered concurrent with other and automatic suppression systems plant accidents or the most protecting the same area.
severe natural phenomena.
The site fire system uses two re- The fire protection system for dundant electric motor driven fire St. Lucie Unit ~o. 2 is an ex-pumps with independent power supplies tension of the fire protection which are automatically loaded on the system for St. Lucie Unit No. 1.
diesel generators of St. Lucie Unit lJ1 No. 1. As additional backup, a 500
- i>-
....,1 gpm, mobile gasoline engine driven I
fire pump is available.
Water is available from two separate city water tanks.
Postulated fire or fire protection system failures are not considered concurrent with other plant accidents or the most severe natural phenomena.
However, in the event of the most No post SSE hose standpipe systems The fire protection system is severe earthquake, i.e., the Safe are provided in any areas of the not designed to withstand design Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), the plant. (For further details see basis earthquake loads; however, fire suppression system should be E.3.(d). its failure does not prevent the capable of delivering water to proper operation of essential manual hose stations located with- systems and components. (For in hose reach of areas containing further details see E.3.(d)).
equipment required for safe plant shutdown.
The fire protection systems should, Piping and supply for the fire pro-however, retain their original tection system is designed and in-design capability for (a) natural stalled to withstand natural pheno-phenomena of less severity and mena in accordance with the Uniform greater frequency (approximately Building Code.
once in 10 years) such as torna-does, hurricanes, floods, ice Man-created site events postulated storms, or small intensity earth- for the project are considered in quakes which are characteristic of the fire protection system design.
SL2-FSAR APPENDIX A To BTP 9.5-1 Guidelines (Cont'd)
Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks the site geographic region and (2) for potential man-created site Lightning protection is incorporated related events such as oil barge in the facility design.
collisions, aircraft crashes which have a reasonable probability of occurring at a specific plant site.
The effects of lightning strikes should be included in the overall plant fire protection program.
- 5. Fire Suppression Systems Failure or inadvertent operation Automatic sprinkler fire suppression of the fire suppression system systems are not provided in areas should not incapacitate safety where inadvertant operation could related systems or components. adversely impact safety related Fire suppression systems that are systems or components. Pressurized pressurized during normal plant fire suppression systems consider operation should meet the guide- the guidelines specified in APCSB Ln
- > lines specified in APCSB Branch Branch Technical Position.3-1.
.....,I Technical Position 3-1, "Protec-
.,..I tion Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment."
- 6. Fuel Storage Areas The fire protection program A fire protection program (plans, personnel and equipment) will be operational prior for buildings storing new reactor to receiving fuel on site.
fuel and for adjacent fire zones which could.affect the fuel stor-age zone should be fully opera-tional before fuel is received at the site.
- 7. Fuel Loading The fire protection program for an A fire protection program entire reactor unit should be for the entire plant will fully operational prior to initial be operational prior to fuel fuel loading in that reactor unit. loading.
- 8. Multiple-Reactor Sites On multiple-reactor sites where A fire protection program is there are operating reactors and provided for both the operating construction of remaining units SL-1 Plant and the SL-2 Plant is being completed, the fire pro- which is under construction.
tection program should provide
- Appendix A Guidelines
- Project Conformance SL2-FSAR Alternatives Remarks rated by walls having three In areas outside of the cable Area fire hazards are given in hour fire barriers. spreading rooms, where redundant Fire Hazards Analyses. (See safety related trays are exposed Fire Hazards Analyses section.)
to the same fire hazard, pro-tection is provided in the form of spatial separation, fire re-tardant coatings or barriers, used singly or in combination.
(d) Interior wall and structural Walls and structural materials components, thermal insula- are non-combustible. Other interior tion materials and radiation finish materials, including thermal shielding materials and sound- insulation, radiation shielding and proofing should be non-combus- sound-proofing, are non-combustible tible. Interior finishes or have a flame spread, smoke and should be non-combustible or fuel contribution of 50 or less as listed by a nationally recog- defined in ASTM E-84, 'Surface nized testing laboratory, such Burning Characteristics of as Factory Mutual or Under- Building Materials', wherever writers' Laboratory, Inc. for practicable.
flame spread, smoke and fuel
\.J>
contribution of 25 or less in
)> its use configuration (ASTM E-
.....I 84 Test), "Surface Burning
.....I Characteristics of Building Materials").
(e) Metal deck roof construction Not applicable should be non-combustible (see the building materials directory of the Underwriters Laboratory, Inc.) or listed as Class I by Factory Mutual System Approval Guide.
(f) Suspended ceilings and their Suspended ceilings and their supports should be of non- supports will be of non-com-combustible construction. bustible construction. Con-Concealed spaces should be cealed spaces will be devoid devoid of combustibles. of combustibles to the extent practicable. Electrical wiring to lighting fixtures and to HVAC systems is in steel conduit.
SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks (g) High voltage - high amperage High voltage - high amperage trans-transformers installed inside formers are installed within build-buildings containing safety ing spaces. Interior medium high related systems should be of voltage-ampere transformers located the dry type or insulated and in safety related structures are of cooled with non-combustible the dry type or use approved non-liquid. combustible fluids.
(h) Buildings containing safety Oil filled main auxiliary and startup related systems should be transformers are located outdoors protected from exposure or and are separated from safety re-spill fires involving oil lated structures by at least 50 ft filled transformers by: or by three hour fire barrier walls.
locating such transformers at least 50 feet distant; or In addition, these transformers are ensuring that such build- protected by automatic water deluge ing walls within 50 feet of fire suppression systems.
oil filled transformers are without openings and have a fire resistance rating of at least three hours.
(i) Floor drains, sized to Means of drainage is provided remove expected fire fight- throughout the main buildings. In ing water flow, should be pro- areas containing fire suppression vided in those areas where systems or standpipe hose stations, fixed water fire suppression drainage provided removes ex-systems are installed. pected fire water flows or controls Drains should also be pro- accumulations.
vided in other areas where hand hose lines may be used if such fire fighting water could cause unacceptable damage to equipment in the area.
Equipment should be instal- In general, all plant equipment led on pedestals, or curbs is on pads and is not exposed to should be provided as re- damage from fire suppression water quired to contain water discharge.
and direct it to floor drains. (Se~ NFPA 92M, "Water-proofing and Draining of Floors.")
Drains in areas containing Areas with equipment containing sig-combustible liquids should nificant amounts of combustible liquids have provisions for pre- have containment curbing to prevent venting the spread of the inadvertent oil flows to surrounding fire throughout the drain areas and the drainage system.
system .
- Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance SL2-FSAR Alternatives Remarks Water drainage from areas Drainage of fire protection water dis-which may contain radio- charge from areas of potential radio-activity should be sampled active contamination is collected, and analyzed before dis- sampled and analyzed. When activity charge to the environment. levels preclude discharge directly to the environment, the liquids are routed to the waste processing facili-ties for suitabli treatment prior to disposal.
(j) Floors, walls and ceilings Fire areas are isolated from other enclosing separate fire areas plant areas by floors, walls and ceil-should have minimum fire ings having adequate fire resistance rating of three hours. ratings as described in the Fire Hazard Analysis.
Penetrations in these fire Service penetrations at fire barriers barriers, including conduits are sealed as required by plant design.
and piping, should be sealed Exposed cable surfaces are covered or closed to provide a fire with flame-retardant coatings. Suit-resistance rating at least able penetration fire stops are used equal to.that of the fire for electrical* penetrations through barrier itself. fire barriers.
Door openings should be pro- Door openings through fire barriers Normally locked and closed doors tected with equivalent rated are protected with fire doors having on all fire areas may be detri-doors, frames and hardware fire ratings related to that required mental to the safe and efficient that have been tested and for the fire barrier. These doors operation of the plant.
approved by a nationally are of the self-closing or automatic recognized laboratory. closing type or are normally locked Such doors should be normally closed.
closed and locked or alarmed with alarm and anunciation in the control room.
Penetrations for ventilation Fire dampers are not provided (Refer to Methodology) system should be protected in ventilation ducts penetrating Continued operation of ventilating by a standard "fire door fire barriers .. systems is considered more para-damper" where required. mount than the blocking of duct (Refer to NFPA 80, "Fire openings to prevent passage of Doors and Windows.") heat and flames.
SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks
- 2. Control of Combustibles (a) Safety related systems should Essential equipment is isolated or (For discussion of combustible be isolated or separated from or protected against exposure from controls, see Methodology) combustible materials. When ignition sources or high com-this is not possible because bustible loading. This separation of the nature of the safety and protection consists of spatial system or the combustible separation, physical fire rated bar-material, special protection riers, fire suppression, fire control, should be provided to prevent fire retardant coatings or damage a fire from defeating the limitation systems or any combina-safety system function. Such tion of these which provide the protection may involve a com~ degree of separation required by the bination of automatic fire fire hazard anaylsis.
suppression and construction capable of withstanding and No essential systems are located in containing a fire that con- areas likely .to contain combustible sumes all combustibles pre- materials such as administrative sent. offices, shops, locker rooms, and similar occupancies.
Examples of such com- Examples of isolation and protection of (Refer to the Fire Hazard bustible materials- that may typical combustible materials using Analyses) not be separable from the re- this concept are:
mainder of its system are:
(1) Emergency diesel genera- Skid-mounted redundant 343 gal diesel tor fuel oil day tanks fuel oil day tanks are located within the Diesel Generator Areas, however, these areas are separated from each other and from other plant areas by three hour fire barriers.
Hoseline equipment and portable ex-tinguishers are available for use.
(2) Turbine-generator oil The turbine-generator lubricating oil and hydraulic control system is located within the turbine fluid systems building, remote from all essential equipment. This area is provided with an automatic water fire sup-presion system for equipment and property protection. A fire in this area does not pose any hazard to essential equipment.
(3) Reactor coolant pump The reactor coolant pumps in the lube oil system Containment have an integral lube oil system confined to the individual equipment .
Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance SL2-FSAR Alternatives Remarks (b) Bulk gas storage (either &ite bulk storage of compressed or compressed or cryogenic), cryogenic gases is not located with-should not be permitted 'in structures honsing essential inside struct11res ho11sing equipment. B*1lk storage of f larnmab le safety related eq11ipment. gases is located outdoors to avoid Storage of flammable gas exposnre to essential. equipment, such as hydrogen, should be systems or structures.
located outdoors or in separate detached buildings so that a fire or explosion will not adversely affect any safety related systems or eq11ipment. (Refer to NFPA SOA, "Gaseo11s Hydrogen Systems.)
Care should be taken to lo- High pressure gas storage containers cate high pressure gas are equipped with temperature and storage containers with tne pressure relief devices which pre-long axis parallel to b11ild- vent trajectory movement of the ing walls. This will mini- container. The containers are mize the possibility of wall secured at all times to structures penetration in the event of or vehicle racks. Orientation of a container failure. Use of storage vessels* is parallel to compressed gases (especially building walls. Safe permitted use flammable and f11el gases) of compressed gases inside build-inside buildings should be ings is contro~led by operational controlled. (Refer to procedures.
NFPA 6, ' Ind11strial Fire Loss Prevention.")
(c) The use of plastic materials Plastics are not used as a primary should be minimized. In par- construction material but may be used ticular, halogenated plastics minimally as accessory material such as polyvinyl chloride when required.
(PVC) and neoprene should be used only when substitute Use of plastic or other combustible non-combustible m'iterial.s interior finish materials within the are not available.
- All p las- plant is minimized to the extent tic materials, including flame practicable.
and fire retardant materials, will burn with an intensity The.contribution by plastic materials and BTU production in a range of smoke, flame, heat and toxic com-similar to that of ordinary bustion by products is recognized hydrocarbons. When burning, and is included in the Fire Hazard they produce heavy smoke Analyses.
that obscures visibility and can plug air filters, especi-ally charcoal and HEPA. The halogenated plastics also re-lease free chlorine and hydro-gen chloride when b11rning
SL2-FSAR Appendix A Gnidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks which are toxic to hnmans and corrosive to eqnipment.
(d) Storage of flammable liquids Storage and use of flarmnab le and shonld, as a minimnm, comply combustible liquids follows "the with the requirements of intent and basic criteria of NFPA 30, NEPA 30, "Flammable and Com- "Flammable and Combustible Liquid bustible Liquids Code." Code.' Specific standard reqnirements are met where compatible with other design requirements.
- 3. Electric Cable Construction, Cable Trays and Cable Penetrations (a) Only non-combustible mater- Cable tray construction materials ials should be 11sed for cable are non-combustible and will satisfy tray construction. the requirements of ASTM E-136.
(b) See Section E.3 for fire pro- See Section E.3.
tection guidelines for cable spreading rooms.
(c) Automatic water sprinkler Fire retardant coatings and fire (Refer to Methodology) systems should be provided detection systems are provided for for cable trays outside the congested runs of cable trays out-cable spreading room. Cables side of the Cable Spreading Room should be designed to allow where redundant trains expose each wet ting down with deluge other or are exposed to a common water without electrical fire. Cable design allows wetting faulting. '.1anual hose sta- without electrical faulting.
tions and portable hand Standpipe hose stations and port-extinguishers should be able extinguishers are available provided as backup. for use.
Safety related equipment in Essential equipment is not subject the vicinity of such cable to damage by the operation of trays, that does not it- sprinkler systems.
self require water protec-tion, but is subject to un-acceptable damage from sprink-ler water discharge., should be protected from sprinkler system operation or malfunc-tion.
Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance SL2-FSAR Alternatives H.emarks (d) Cable and cable tray pene- Suitable fire stop seal assemblies As further defense in depth, tration of fire barriers (ver- are provided at cable and cable the use of fire retardant tical and horizontal) should tray fire barrier penetrations coatings as a continuous be sealed to give protection fire break along all exposed at least equivalent to that cable tray runs reduces the fire barrier. The design of need for barrier penetration fire barriers for horizontal fire stops.
and vertical cable trays should, as a minimum, meet the requirements of ASTM E-119, Fire Test o.f Building Construction and Materials",
including the hose stream test.
(e) Fire breaks should be pro- All exposed cable insulation surfaces vided as deemed necessary by are covered with fire retardant the fire hazards analysis. coatings which act as a continuous Flame retardant coatings may fire break. De~ating is considered.
be used as a fire break for S11pplemental mechanical fire breaks grouped electrical cables to are provided as required.
limit spread of fire in cable ventings. (Possible cable derating owing to use of* such coating materials must be considered during design.)
(f) Electrical cable constructions The potential for unchecked fire should as a minimum pass the spread along exposed cables is current IEEE No.
- 383 flame reduced, through the use of cables test. (This does not imply which satisfy the requirements of that cables passing this test !LEE 383, and in addition, by the will not require additional covering of all exposed cab le insu-fire protection.) lation surfaces *with a fire retardant coating.
(g) To the extent practical, cable The cable construction used and the construction that does not give prov1s1on of fire retardant coatings off corrosive gases while burn- over cable insulation s1irfaces mini-ing should be used. mizes generation of hazardous concen-trations of corrosive or toxic gases when cables are overheated or when exposed to flames.
(h) Cable trays, raceways, conduit, Cable trays and conduits are used for trenches, or culverts should be cables only. Miscellaneous storage used only for cables. Miscel- is not permitted in cable trays, race-laneous storage should not be ways, trenches or culverts, nor is permitted, nor should piping for piping for flammable or combustible flammable or combustible liquids liquids or gases permitted in areas.
or gases be installed in these areas.
SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks (i) The design of cable tunnels, Plant ventilation systems are Congested cable areas such as culverts and spreading rooms used for smoke removal. the Cable Spreading Room should provide for automatic employ fire retardant coatings or manual smoke venting as on cables. The cable coatings required to facilitate manual essentially eliminate the fire fighting capability. smoke/toxic gas potential associated with burning cables.
Good housekeeping practices assure that ignition sources are not present.
(j) Cables in the control room Cables entering the Control Room should be kept to the minimum are kept to the m1n1m1nn necessary necessary for operation of the for operation of the Control Room, Control Room. All cables relate only to the area and terminate entering the Control Room there. Cables are not installed in should terminate there. floor trenches in the Control Room.
Cables should not be installed in floor trenches or culverts in the control room.
Ventilation (a) The products of combustion that Potential for smoke concentrations need to be removed from a speci- resulting from fires in cable insula-fic fire area should be evaluated tion is reduced by use of fire to determine how they will be retardant coatings over cable insula-controlled. Smoke and corrosive tion surfaces.
gases should generally be auto-matically discharged directly Plant ventilation systems are used for outside to a safe location. smoke removal. Also, two 5000 cfm portable smoke ejectors are available for use in the SL] and SL2 plant areas.
Smoke and gases containing radio- Non-recirculating ventilation systems active materials should be are provided for fire areas which may monitored in the fire area to contain airborne radioactive materials.
determine if rel.ease to the Smoke from fires which might occur in environment is within the permis- areas containing radioactive materials sible limits of the plant Techni- monitored for radioactivity using the cal Specifications. existing area monitors or monitors installed at the ventilation system discharge points .
- Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance SL2-FSAR Alternatives Remarks (b) Any ventilation system designed Exhaust of smoke or corrosive gases to exhaust smoke or corrosive through the use of plant ventilation gases should be evaluated to systems which have been evaluated for ensure that inadvertent opera- controlled areas violations avoids tion or single failures will the additional. evaluation which is not violate the controlled areas required for a separate smoke venting of the plant design. This system.
requirement includes containment func*tions for protection of the pub lie and maintaining habitabi 1-ity for operations personnel.
(c) The power supply and controls To the extent practicable, power Power supplies, controls apd for mechanical ventilation systems supply and.controls for ventilation cable routings for essential should be run outside the fire systems are in.stalled outside the equipment are depicted on the area served by the system. areas served or equipment isolation Fire Protection Drawings and or protection is provided. are detailed in cable listings.
(d) Fire suppression .systems should Reg. Guide l .52, Rev. l, does not be installed to protect charcoal require internal fire suppression filters in accordance with systems for charcoal adsorbers.
Regulatory Guide 1.52, "Design Normally, air is circulated through Testing and Maintenance Criteria idle charcoal filter units to remove for Atmospheric Cleanup Air decay heat, maintaining the charcoal Filtration." well below combustion temperature.
The operator is alerted to any adsorber heating by the high adsorber temperature
- instrumentation alarms. In the event of fire in the adsorbers, the fire is con-trolled by closing the isolation dampers to the pressure-tight filter cabinet, thus starving the fire's oxygen supply.
Adequate fire extinguishers and standpipe hose stations are available.
(e) The fresh air supply intakes Air supply intakes are physically separated to areas containing safety from exhaust air outlets to minimize the related equipment or systems possibility of exhausted air being drawn should be located remote from into the supply intakes.
the exhaust air outlets and smoke vents of other fire areas to minimize the possibility of contaminating the intake air with the products of combustion.
SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks (f) Stairwells should be designed to For egress from and access to the Stair enclosures will not be The use of flame retardant minimize smoke infiltration Control Room, life safety stairwells provided throughout the plant. coatings in congested cables during a fire. Staircases sho11ld and elevators are encased in *towers areas reduces greatly the serve as escape routes and access with a two hour fire rating, required potential for smoke ana toxic routes for fire fighting. Fire by the NFPA Life Safety Code, and gas generation and thus lessens exit routes should be clearly provided with Class B self closing the life safety exposure to marked. Stairwelli, elevators fire doors with 1-l/2 hour ratings personnel occupying the plant and chutes should be enclDsed ih to minimize smoke infiltration. areas. The Fire Hazard masonry towers with minimum fire Fire exit routes are clearly marked. Analyses addressed are indicated rating of three hours and a11to- for specific functions such as matic fire doors at least equal Operating procedures governs opera- access to the Control Room.
to the enclosure construction, tion of elevators during a fire Open stairwells are indicated at each opening into the emergency. where required for the safe and building. Elevators should not efficient operation of the be used during fire emergencies. plant.
(g) Smoke and heat vents may be The existing means .of ventilation Area smoke venting rates are useful in specfic areas such for all plant areas are used for given in the Fire Hazard as cable spreading rooms and smoke venting. Two 5000 cfm por- Analyses.
diesel fuel oil storage areas table smoke ejectors are available and switchgear rooms. When for use in both SLl and SL2 plants.
natural-convection ventilation is used, a minimum ratio of I sq. foot of venting area per 200 sq. feet of floor area should be provided. If forced-convection ventilation is used, 300 cfrn should be provided for every 200 sq. feet of floor area. See NFPA No. 204 for additional guidance on smoke control.
(h) Self-contained breathing Self-contained approved breathing apparatus, using full face units with a minimum capacity of positive pressure masks, one-half hour are provided for fire approved by NIOSH (National brigade, damage control, and control Institute for Occupational room personnel.
- safety and Health - approval formerly given by the U.S.
Bureau of Mines) should be provided for fire brigade, damage control and control room personnel. Control room personnel may be furnished breathing air by a manifold system piped from a storage reservoir if practical. Service or operating life should be a minimum of one half hour for the self-contained units.
- Appendix A Guidelines At least two extra air bottles Project Conformance SL2-FSAR Self-contained approved breathing Alternatives Remarks should be located onsite for units are provided with at least each self-contained breathing four units being provided in the unit. In addition, an onsite plant firehouse, two in the Control 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> supply of reserve air Room and approximately sixteen in should be provided and arranged the Health Physics Cold Locker Room.
to permit quick and complete Approximately twenty spare bottles replenishment of exhausted are available for these units; a supply air bottles as they are cascade system for cylinder refill returned. If compressors are will also be provided.
used as a source of breathing air, only units approved for breathing air sho11ld be nsed.
Special care mnst be taken to locate the compressor in areas free of dust and contaminants.
(i) Where total flooding gas Not applicable Essential plant areas are not extinguishing systems are used, protected by total flooding area intake and exhaust ventila- gas fire suppression systems.
tion dampers should close npon initiation of gas flow to main-tain necessary gas concentration.
(See NFPA 12, "Carbon Dioxide Systems", and l2A, "Halon 1301 Systems.")
- 5. Lighting and Communication Lighting and two way voice communica- A Redundant Normal Emergency AC tion are vital to safe shutdown and Lighting System provides the necessary emergency response in the event of lighting vital to safe shutdown and fire. Sui tab le fixed and portable emergency response in the event of emergency lighting and communication fire. This system is powered from the devices should be provided to satisfy diesel generators and provides approxi-the following requirements: mately 15% of the normal plant lighting load.
(a) Fixed emergency lighting should A Redundant Emergency DC i"ight ing consist of sealed beam units System, powered from the safety related with individual 8 hc.ur minimum 125V de system batteries, provides battery power supplies. evacuation lighting in the Control Room, and at the Remote Shutdown Panel. In all other safety related areas, including access/egress ro11tes to/ from these areas, self-contained storage battery lighting fixtures are provided. The DC Emergency Lighting System provides illumination only during loss of either of the redun-dant Normal Emergency AC Lighting Sys-tems described above.
SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks (b) Suitable sealed beam battery Sealed beam battery powered portable powered protable hand lights hand lights will be provided for should be provided for emer- emergency use.
gency use.
(c) Fixed emergency communication Fixed emergency voice powered head should use voice powered head sets will be provided in various sets at preselected stations. critical areas throughout the plant.
(d) Fixed repeaters installed to Not applicable permit use of portable radio communication. units should be protected from exposure fire damage.
V1
...,I I
I-'
co
- Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance SL2-FSAR Alternatives Remarks E. Fire Detection and Suppression
- 1. Fire Detection (a) Fire detection systems should The guidelines of NFPA 72D are uti-as a minimum comply with NFPA lized in the design of the fire 72D, "Standard for the In- detection systems.
sta-llation, Maintenance and Use of Proprietary Protective Conditions of smoke or heat generated Signaling Systems". by a fire are transmitted to the Control Room Annunciator from area detector systems or from fire sup-pression system operation devices or detectors.
Fire detectors are placed so that no single area, zone or protection systems will be dependent upon the operation of any single detector.
This redundancy in all areas covered by detectors provides reliable detection of incipient and developed fires even though one detector has failed. The mean-time-between-failure for an individual detector has no significant effect on opera-tional reliability of the detector system .as a whole or as applicable to any given area or zone.
Fire and smoke detection systems are connected to the annunciator, through supervised signal circuits, to identify the zone number and the corresponding area description.
Annunciator signals indicate that
-the circuit is normally operative and no fire condition has been de-tected, that the circuit- is exper-iencing trouble such as shorts; grounds or power supply failure, o*r that a detector in that identif ie~
zone has sensed a fire or smoke condition.
The majority of tne fire detection systems utilize ionization *(products of combustion) type detectors which are provided where it is advisable to detect and locate smoke and smoldering conditions at an early stage. Automatic fire suppression
- Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance SL2-FSAR Alternatives Remarks Lined steel nr cast iron pipe Cement lined cast iron pipe is used sh nu ld be used to reduce in- for the yard main fire loop to ternal tuberculation. Such minimize the effects of tubercu-tuberculation deposits in an lation. Flushing of the system can unlined pipe over a period of be accomplished through the yard years ~an significantly re- hydrants, hose connections, etc.
duce water flo~ through the combination of increased fri-ctinn and reduced pipe dia-meter. Means fnr treating and flushing the systems should be provided.
Approved visualiy indicating Sectional control valves are pro-sectional control valves, vided to facilitate system main-such as Post Indicator Valves, tenance. For connections to the should* be provid~d to isolate systems in the buildings, isolation portions of the main for valves are located in these branch maintenance or repair without lines to minimize the need to shutting nff the entire clnse valves in the main loop.
system. Sectional isolation valves are provided in the yard loop piping for use if maintenance on the loop or on yard hydrants becomes necessary.
All control valves in the Fire Suppression Water Supply System (except hose valves and inside hose connections) are indicating post-equipped gate valves (PIV) or out-side stem and yoke valves (OS&Y).
The fire main system piping Fire main system piping is separate should be separate from ser- 'from all other plant systems.
vice or sanitary water system piping.
(b) A common yard fire main loop The undergrourid yard Eire loop is may serve multi-unit nuclear common to the building complex power plant sitew, if cross- housing both Units and associated connected between units. equipment. In addition, the under-Sectional control valves ground loop is cross-connected, should permit maintaining with a 12-inch yard main, in an independ"ence of the indi- east-west direction in the common vidual loop around each area between Unit No. 1 and Unit unit. For such installa- No. 2. Post indicator isolation t inns, cnmmon water supplies valves are provided for section-may also be utilized. The alizing the fire main loop, in-water supply should be sized cluding fire hydrant feed mains.
for the largest single ex-pected flow. For multiple
SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks reactor sites with widely separated plants (approach-ing 1 mile or more), separate yard fire main loops should be used.
Branch connections from the loop pro-vide water to the plant water sup-pression, hose stations and yard hydrants. Sectional control valves provided in the pump discharge connec-tions to the loop and in the yard main loop piping are positioned to assure supply of fire water to both Units from any or all fire pumps.
The fire protection water supply and system pump capacity are designed to satisfy the demands of the largest single expected flow.
(c) If pumps are required to meet Site fire pumps are installed in ac-Lil system pressure or flow re- cordance with NFPA 20 "Standard for
~
....., quirements, a sufficient num- Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps" .
N I ber of pumps should be pro- Water is taken from two independent N vided so that 100% capacity" water tanks by two outdoor type, 2,500 will be available with one gpm, 125 psi approved fire pumps, both pump inactive (e.g., three motor-driven, with independent power 50% pumps or two 100% pumps). supplies, installed at the tanks and The connection to the yard discharging through independent under-fire main loop from each fire ground connections into the fire main pump should be widely sepa- loop. On loss of offsite power, fire rated, preferably located on pumps are automatically loaded on the opposite sides of the plant. emergency diesel generators.
Each pump should have its own driver with independent power The discharge connections are supplies and control. At separated to minimize damage to least one pump (if not power- both connections simultaneously.
ed from the emergency diesels) The fire main loop valves and should be driven by non- fire pump discharge valves are electrical means, preferably arranged to permit discharge diesel engine. Pumps and from either pump through either drivers should be located in connection to the main fire loop.
rooms separated from the re-*
maining pumps and equipment The entire fire suppression water by a minimum three-hour fire supply system is maintained under wall. pressure in the range of 95 to 125 psig by means of a hydro-pneumatic tank, pressurized by domestic*water pumps. The fire pumps are designed for automatic starting when the fire main water
- Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance SL2-FSAR Alternatives Remarks pressure drops to 85 psig. Adequate isolation is provided between pump installations to prevent loss of*
service of more than one pump in event of a single fire occurrence.
The site fire pumps provide redundant, not supplementary, water supplies to the fire main loop, thus adequate water capacity and pressure are available with either pump out of service. As additional backup, a site 500 gpm, mobile, gasoline engine driven fire pump is provided.
Alarms indicating pump run- Alarms and indications of fire pump ning, driver availability, operating conditions, such as pump or failure to.start.should running, power availability and be provided in the control failure to start, are provided in room. the Control Room.
Details of the fire pump in-stallation should as a mini-mum conform to NFPA 20, "Standard for the Installa-tion of Centrifugal Fire Pumps".
(d) Two separate reliable water Two separate city water storage Each tank can supply approximately supplies should be provided. tanks (500,000 gallons each) provide 167 percent of the minimum re-primary and backup sources of fire quirements, or a total of 333 -per-water. A 1200 gpm potable water line cent can be supplied by both provides makeup to the city water tanks.
storage tanks to refill either tank within eight hours.
If tanks are used, two 100% Each fire pump takes suction from (minimum of 300,000 gallons its related tank only. The tanks are each) system capacity tanks interconnected with the shutoff valve should be installed. They of one of the tanks arranged to be should be so interconnected normally closed, therefore, a leak that pumps can take suction in one tank or its piping does not from either or both. How- cause both tanks to drain. By open-ever, a leak in one tank or ing the normally shut valve the pumps its piping should not cause can take suction from either or both.
both tanks to drain. The main plant fire water supply The mobile 500 gpm fire pump can take capacitf should be capable of suction from either city water storage refilling either tank in a tank, a fire hydrant, a cooling water minimum of eight hours. canal or oth~r water storage tanks.
-* ?-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks Common tanks are permitted The city water storage tanks are for fire and sanitary or used for.fire and service water service water storage. When functions. Technical Specification this is done, however, minimum for each tank is 300,000 minimum fire water storage gallons. There is a high and low requirements should be level alarm for each tank in the dedicated by means of a Control Rnoms.
vertical standpipe for other water services.
(e) The fire water supply (total The maximum fire protection water capacity and flow rate) demand from the largest, single, should be calculated on the automatic fixed water extinguishing basis of the largest expected system with sufficient reserve flow rate for a period of two capacity to simultaneously provide hours, but not less than four (4) standard, 2-1/2 in., fire-300,000 gallons. This flow hose streams approximates 2,500 gpm.
rate should be based (con- Alternatively, this design capacity servatively) on 1,000 gpm for supplies 10 2-1/2 in. hose streams manual h.ose streams plus the (250 gpm each) simultaneously.
greater of: Minimum two hour supply at this flow rate is 300,000 gallons. The available tank capacity greatly exceeds the requirement for fire water.
(1) all sprinkler heads opened and flowing in the largest designed fire area; or (2) the largest open head deluge system(s) operating.
(f) Lakes or fresh water ponds of Not applicable sufficient size may qualify as sole source of water for fire protection, but require at least two intakes to the pump supply. When a common water supply is permitted for fire protection and the ulti-mate heat sink, the following conditions should also be satis.fied:
(1) The additional fire pro-tection water require-ments are designed into the total storage capacity; and
- Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance SL2-FSAR Alternatives Remarks (2) Failure of the fire pro-tection system should not degrade the function of the ultimate heat sink (g) Outside manual hose install- Fire hydrants are installed approxi-ation should be sufficient to mately every 200 feet along the fire reach any location with an main loop and .the cross-connection effective hose stream. To in the yard area around the main accomplish this, hydrants plant building complex. Connections should be installed approx- from the main loop supply hydrants imately every 250 feet on the at outlying structures. Hose houses yard main system. The lat- are installed at each hydrant and eral to each hydrant from the are equipped with the standard comple-yard main should be con- ment of 2-1/2 inch fire hose, nozzles, trolled by a visually indi- and hose-line equipment, per NFPA 24.
cating or key operated (curb) valve. A hose house, A gasoline powered 500 gpm mobile fire eqµipped with hose and com- pump and hose trailer equipped with bination nozzle, and other 500 feet of 1 1/2 inch fire hose is
'° auxiliary equipment recom- currently available for use by the lJ1
- ... mended in NFPA 24, "Outside fire team.
I
....., Protection", should be N
I provided as needed but at lJ1 least every 1,000 feet.
Threads compatible with those Fire hose and hose line equipment used by local fire depart- are equipped with couplings which ments should be provided on fit local fire department hose threads.
all hydrants, hose couplings and standpipe risers.
- 3. Water Sprinklers and Hose Standpipe Systems (a) Each automatic sprinkler sys- Sprinkler systems and interior hose tem and manual hose station standpipes are independently supplied standpipe should have an in- th.rough separate connections from the dependent connection to the yard main or from the internal loop plant underground water main. cross connections through buildings Headers fed from each end are to assure that no single failure in permitted inside buildings to the water supply system impairs both supply multiple sprinkler and the primary and backup fire protection standpipe systems. When pro- in building areas.
vided, such headers are con-sidered an extension of the yard main system. The header arrangement should be such that no single failure can impair both the primary and backup fire protection systems.
SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks Each sprinkler and standpipe Each sprinkler and standpipe sys-system should be equipped tem connection to the yard main with OS&Y (outside screw and or internal loop cross connections yoke) gate valve, or other ~s equipped with a gate valve with approved shut off valve, and a post indicator, with an OS&Y water flow alarm. Safety re- (outside screw and yoke) gate valve, lated equipment that does not *or with an approved* shutoff valve.
itself require sprinkler The fire pump operating signal is water fire protection, but is initiated following operation of subject to unacceptable dam- sprinkler* systems or standpipe risers.
age if wetted by sprinkler Sprinkler systems are equipped with water discharge should be pro- local alarms. Essential equipment tected by water shields or is not subject to damage by sprinkler baffles. discharge.
(b) All valves in the fire water Correct valve position is assured systems should be electri- by normal plant operating prac-cally supervised. The elec- tices governed by administrative trical supervision signal procedures.
should indicate in the con-trol room and other appro-priate command locations in the plant (See NFPA 26, "Supervision of Valves").
(c) Automatic sprinkler systems The guidelines of NFPA 13 and NFPA should as a minimum conform 15 are followed in the design of to requirements of appropri- automatic sprinkler systems and ate standards such as NFPA water spray systems.
13, "Standard for the Instal-lation of Sprinkler Systems",
and NFPA 15, "Standards for Water Sp_ray Fixed Systems".
(d) Interior manual hose instal- Standpipe hose stations are pro-lation should be able to vided on approximately 100 foot reach any location with at spacing and are located so that least one effective hose any location can be reached with an stream. To accomplish this, effective stream. These hose standpipes with hose connec- stations will be equipped with up tions, equipped with a maxi- to 75. feet of 1-1/2 inch woven mum of 75 feet of 1-1/2 inch jacket* lined fire hose with woven jacket-lined fire hose nozzles approved for use on and suitable nozzles should energized electrical equipment.
be provided in all buildings, including containment, on all Readily accessible and continuous floors and should be spaced flow type hose reels are distributed at not more than 100-foot throughout the nuclear plant so intervals. that all areas are within reach of of a fog nozzle when attached to up up to 75 foot lengths of hose.
- Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance SL2-FSAR Alternatives Remarks Interior hose station standpipes are not located in Cnntainment.
Individual standpipes shnuld Standpipe supply mains for multiple be of at least 4-inch diam- hnse connection risers are 4" eter for multiple hnse diameter and those suppl.ying single cnnnections and 2-1/2 inch hose connection risers are 2-1/2
inch diameter for single diameter.
hose connectinns.
These systems should follnw Standpipe systems are designed to the requirements of NFPA 14, the guidelines of NFPA 14.
"Standpipe and Hnse Systems" for sizing, spacing and pipe support requirements.
Hose stations should be lo- Hose stations are located for ready cated outside entrances to access and use by available per-normally unoccupied areas and sonnel on fires which may occur in inside normally occupied the fire area.
areas.
Standpipes serving hose Sectional shutoff valves provided for stations in areas hnusing standpipes serving hose stations in safety related equipment essential areas ~re located outside should have shut off valves* the essential areas.
and pressure reducing devices (if applicable) outside the area.
Provisions should be made to No post SSE hose standpipe sys- The fire protection system is not supply water at least to tems are provided in any areas designed to withstand design standpipes and hose connec- of the plant. basis earthquake loads; however, t ions fnr manual fire fight- its failure does not prevent the ing in areas within hose Other portions of the fire pro- proper operation of essential reach of equipment required tection system are not required systems and components.
for safe plant shutdown in to be designed to Seismic the event of a Safe Shutdown Category I classification, that The water piping for the fire Earthquake (SSE). The stand- is, to be operable after an SSE. protection sys_tems *are located so pipe system serving such hose as not to expose essential equip-stations should be analyzed ment to water damage.
for SSE loading and should be provided with supports The fire protection system and the to assure system pressure Reactor Auxiliary Building are integrity. .The piping and designed to prevent flooding of valves for the portion of essential equipment in the event hose standpipe system of fire equipment use or damage; affected by this functional therefore, the system is not requirement should at least designed .to Seismic Class I satisfy ANSI Standard B31.1, Standards.
"Power Piping". The water
SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks supply for.this condition Basic plant design, control of*
may be obtained by manual combustibles and ignition sources operator .actuation of in conjunction with strict com-valve(s) in a connection to pliance to stringent administra-the hose standpipe header tive controls, preclude fires.
from a normal Seismic Cate-gory I water system such as Extinguishers and mobile fire Essential Service Water Sys- equipment are available for back-tem. The cross connection up fire protection. Outside fire should be (a) capable of .protection (Fort Pierce Fire providing flow to at least 'Department, etc.) response is
.two hose stations (approxi- availabl.e.
mately 75 gpm/hose station),
and (b) designed to the same standards as the seismic Category I water system; it should not degrade the performance of the Seismic Category I water system.
(e) The proper type of hose noz- Adjustable spray nozzles, ap-zles to be supplied in each proved for use on energized elec~
l;~
area should be based on the trical equipment, are provided on
- ... fire hazard analysis. The standpipe hoselines available for
....,I usual combination spray/ discharge on electrical equipment I
N CD straight-stream nozzle may and cabling.
cause unacceptable mechanical damage (for example, the deli-cate electronic equipment in the control room) and be unsuitable. Electrically safe nozzles should be pro-vided at locations where electrical equipment or cabling is located.
(f) Certain fires such as those To augment the overall fire pro-involving flammable liquids tection response, a standard respond well to foam suppres- portable foam generator including sion. Consideration should* adequate equipment and supplies be given to use of any of the of foam concentrates, arranged available foams for such for effective use, is available specialized protection appli- for both SL-1 and SL-2 Plants.
cation. These include the more common chemical and me-chanic al low expansion foams, high expansion foam and the relatively new aqueous film forming foam (AFFF).
\
J SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks
- 4. Halon Suppression Systems The use of Halon fire extinguish- Halon fire suppression systems, pro-ing agents should as a minimum vided for the site Doument Control comply with.the requirements of Center, are designed and installed in NFPA 12A and 12B, "Halogenated accordance with NFPA 12A.
Fire Extinguishing Agent Systems -
Halon 1301 and Halon 1211". Only UL or FM approved agents should be used.
In addition to the guidelines of See Section 6.0, this NFPA 12A and 12B, preventative report.
maintenance and testing of the systems, including check weighing of the Halon cylinders should be
- done at least quarterly.
Particular consideration should also be given to:
(a) minimum required Halon con-centration and soak time (b) toxicity of Halon (c) toxicity and corrosive characteristics of thermal decomposition products of Halon.
- 5. Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems Not applicable
- 6. Portable Extinguishers Fire extinguishers should be pro- Fire extinguishers are located The types and locations of fire vided in accordance with guide- throughout plant operational areas extinguishers are outlined in lines of NFPA 10 and lOA, "Port- for ready access and use. Type of Table 4-3 in this report.
able Fire Extinguishers, Main- extinguishers is based on the nature tenance and Use". Dry chemical of the fire postulated for the area extinguishers should be installed in accordance with NFPA lOA. Basic with due consideration given to types to be used are carbon dioxide cleanup problems after use and and dry chemical.
possible adverse effects on equip-ment installed in the area. Extinguisher selection will consider the unique characteristics of the fire suppression agent and their effect on the proper application of the agent to
SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks the fire. Considerations include quantity required in relation to the size of the anticipated fire, cleanup after use, thermal shock effects of the agent or its fire decomposition products.
lJ1
~
I w
0
,f.
I
\.
- Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance SL2-FSAR Alternatives Remarks F. Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas
- 1. Primary and Secondary Containment (a) Normal Operation Fire protection requirements Fire extinguishers will be provided for the primary and secondary in the Containment areas as required containment areas should be for most effective fire control provided on the basis of recognizing the different types of specific identified hazards. .operations in the area, accessibility For example: and available personnel usage.
- Lubricat in'5 oil or hydrau lie Lubricating oil spills involving the fluid system for the primary Reactor Cooling Pumps and associated coolant pumps equipment are confined to provide maximum separation between redundant pumps.
- Cal:>l.e tray arrangements and All exposed cable insulation surfaces cable penetrations in the Containment are covered with a fire retardant coating.
- Charcoal filters Not applicable There are no charcoal filters in the Containment.
Because of the general in- The amount of transient fire No automatic suppression systems accessabi li.ty of these areas loading in the Containment is are used in the Containment.
during normal plant opera- controlled and limited through tions, protection should be administrative procedures. Basic plant design, control of provided by automatic systems. combustibles and ignition sources Automatic sprinklers should be Fire protection equipment opera- in conjunction with strict compli-installed for those hazards tion does not compromise the ance to stringent administrative identified as requiring fixed integrity of the Containment or controls, precluue fires.
suppression. Operation of the the other essential systems.
fire protection systems should Total Containment requirements Configuration of essential equip-not compromise integrity of are satisfied. ment, isolation; separation and the containment. or the other fire retardent coatings on exposed safety related systems. Fire cable insulation surfaces safe-protection activities in the guard redundant units.
containment areas should function in conjunction with Extinguishers are placed in the total containment require- Containment areas and other ex-ments such as control of tinguishers are available from contaminated liquid and . nearby areas. Also available as gaseous release and backup protection is the nearby ventilation. standpipe hose stations from adjacent indoor areas and fire
SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks hydrant hose streams from nearby outside areas. (Ref~r to the Fire Hazard Analyses).
Fire detection systems Ionization type smoke detectors, an-should alarm and annunciate nunciating in the Control Room, are in the control room. The installed over electrical penetrations type of detection used and and trays in the Containment.
the location of the detec-tors should be most suitable to the particular type of fire that could be expected from the identified hazard.
A primary containment general area fire detection capa-bility should be provided as backup for the above describ-ed hazard detection. To ac-complish this, suitable smoke
.!)
detection (e.g., visual obscu-Ln
>I ration, light scattering and
....., particle counting) should be w
I installed in the.air recirc-N ulation system ahead of any filters.
Automatic fire suppression Not Applicable capability need not be provided in the primary containment atmospheres that are inerted during normal operation. However, special fire protection requirements during refueling and maintenance operations should be satisfied as provided below.
(b) Refueling and Maintenance Refueling and maintenance Strict administrative procedures operations in containment will limit the amount of combustible may introduce additional materials within the area. (See hazards such as contami- Section 6.0 in this report.)
nation control materials, decontamination supplies, wood planking, temporary wiring, welding and flame cutting (with portable compressed fuel gas supply).
Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance SL2-FSAR Alternatives Remarks Possible fires would not necessarily be in the vicinity of fixed detection and suppression systems.
Management procedures and controls necessary to as-sure adequate fire protec-tion are discussed in Section 3a.
In addition, manual fi~e A full complement of portable fire (See F. 1. (a)) (See F.l.(a))
fighting capability should extinguishers, approved for use on be permanently installed energized electrical equipment and During maintenance periods, hose-in containment. Standpipes on combustible liquid fires, is lines are laid into Containment with hose stations, and permanently provided in the Contain- from adjacent areas. Standpipe portable fire extinguishers, ment Building as standby fire stations and fire hydrant hose should be installed at stra- extinguishing equipment for use stations are located nearby tegic locations throughout during refueling and maintenance.* Containment entrances.
containment* for any required manual fire fighting opera-l.J1 tions.
- r-.._,
I Adequate self-contained Self-contained breathing apparatus w
w breathing apparatus should are provided near the entrance to be provided near the the Containment. (See Section containment entrances for D.4.h) fire fighting and damage control personnel. These units should be independent of any breathing apparatus or air supply systems provided for general plant activities.
- 2. Control Room The control room is essential to The Control Room complex is cut off (Refer to the Fire Hazard Analyses safe reactor operation. It must from all .other plant* areas by for Control Room details).
be protected against disabling three-hour fire walls, ceiling slabs, fire damage and should be separ- and floors. All penetrations into ated from other areas of the this complex are protected to pro-plant by floors, walls and roofs vide a three-hour rating.
having minimum fire resistance ratings of three hours.
SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks Control room cabinets and consoles are subject to damage from two distinct fire hazards:
(a) Fire originating within a The probability of a Control Room cabinet or console; and fire is remote. Basic plant design, noncombustible construction, isola-(b) Exposure fire involving com- tion, separation, sealed penetrations, bustibles in the general room coatings, low voltage electrical area. devices, flame resistant wiring, control of ignition sources and com-bustibles and strict compliance to stringent administrative controls, preclude fires.
Manual fire fighting capability Standpipe hose stations are located should be provided for both outside the Control Room. The hazards. Hose stations and availability of these hose lines, portable water and Halon extin- together with the location of carbon guishers should be located in dioxide and/or dry chemical portable the control room to eliminate fire extinguishers within the Control the need for operators to leave Room, provides adequate manual fire the control room. An addit- protection for these areas:
ional hose piping shut off valve and pressure reducing device should be installed outside the control room. Hose stations adjacent to the control room with portable extinguishers in the control room are acceptable.
Nozzles that are rompatible with Nozzles approved for use on the hazards and equipment in the energized electrical equipment control room should be provided are provided at hose stations for the manual hose station. The near the Control Room.
nozzles chosen should satisfy actual fire fighting needs, satisfy electrical safety and minimize physical damage to electrical equipment from hose stream impingement.
Fire detection in the control room Ionization and thermal type heat room cabinets, and consoles should detectors are located in the be provided by smoke and heat office, toilets and kitchen areas detectors in each fire area. of the Control Room facilities, Alarm and annunciation should be at ceiling level, with alarm and provided in the control room. indication in the Control Room.
Fire alarms in other parts of the Rapid migration of combustion by-plant should also be alarmed products, rapid response by highly
- Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance SL2-FSAR Alternatives Remarks and annunciated in the control sensitive ionization type detectors room. located as noted and a Control Room constantly occupied by trained operators mitigates the need for detection within cabinets and consoles.
All other plant fire and smoke signals are transmitted to the Control Room to provide alarm and indication.
Breathing apparatus for control Self-contai~ed breathing apparatus room operators should be readily are readily available in the available. Control room floors, Control Room.
ceiling, supporting structures, and walls, including penetrat- The Control Room envelope is designed ions and doors, should be desig- for minimum air leakage.
ned to a minimum fire rating of three hours. All penetration seals should be air tight.
The control room ventilation There are smoke detectors provided intake should be provided in the outside makeup inlet which with smoke detection capab- detect smoke entering the Control ility to automatically alarm Room. Smoke induction into the locally and isolate the control Control Room is minimized by room ventilation system to isolating the two intake air systems.
protect operators by prevent-ing. smoke from entering the The normally recirculating (with control room. Manually oper- limited makeup air) Control Room venti-ated venting of the control lation system is not designed to room should be available so be switched manually to operate in a that operators have the option non-recirculating mode. The effective of'venting for visibility. habitability of the area is maintained by constant monitoring, judicious use of plant operating personnel and readily available self-contained breathing apparatus, and by manual venting, where feasible.
Cables should not be located in To the extent practicable, all Cables located above the suspended concealed floor and ceiling cables entering the Control Room ceiling are covered with flame spaces. All cables that enter terminate there. Cables are not retardant coatings.
the control room should termin- installed in floor trenches in the ate in the control room. That Control Room.
is, no cabling should be simply routed through the control room from one area to another.
SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks Safety related equipment should Essential equipment is located above be mounted nn pedestals or the the floor and the cabinets and con-control ro0m sh0uld have curbs soles are mounted on pads. Openings and drains to direct water away in areas adjacent to the Contrnl Room from such equipment. Such will provide adequate drainage to drains should be provided with direct water away from the Control means for closing to maintain Room.
integrity of the control r0nm in the event of other accid-ents requiring control room isolation.
- 3. Cable Spreading Room The primary fire suppression Automatic fire suppression systems Basic plant design, noncombus-in the cable spreading room are not required in the Cable tible construction, isolation, should be an automatic water Spreading areas as all cable separation, approved fire re-system such as closed head insulation surfaces are coated tardant coatings, flame resis-sprinklers, open head deluge, with an approved fire retardant tant wiring, control of igni-or open directional spray coating. tion sources and combustibles nozzles. *Deluge and open and strict compliance to spray systems should have stringent administrative provisions for manual oper- controls, preclude fires.
ation at a remote station; however, there should be provisions to preclude inad-vertent operation. Location of sprinkler heads or spray nozzles should consider cable tray sizing and arrangements to assure adequate water coverage. Cables should be Cables to be used are of a design designed to allow wetting which does not fault electrically if down with deluge water exposed to fire suppression water without electrical faulting. discharge.
Open head deluge and open Not Applicable directional spray systems should be zoned to that a single failure will not deprive the entire ar~a of automatic fire suppression capability.
The use of foam is acceptable, Not Applicable provided it is of a type capable of being delivered by a sprinkler or deluge system, such as an Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF).
- Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance SL2-FSAR Alternatives Remarks An automatic water suppression Standpipe hose stations and appro-system with manual hoses and priate portable extinguishers located portable extinguisher backup both within and adjacent to the cable is acceptable, provided: spreading areas provide manual fire protection. Floor drainage in the cable spreading areas is sized to handle design fire suppression water discharge.
(a) At least two remote and Ingress to, egress from and* access separate entrances are within the cable spreading areas is provided to the room for provided to the extent required for access by fire brigade effective fire control.
personnel; and (b) Aisle separation provided between tray stacks should be at least three feet wide and eight feet high.
Alternately, gas *systems (Halon Not App 1i cab le or co ) may be used for prim-2 ary f1re suppression if they are backed up by an installed water spray system and hose stations and portable extin-guishers immediately outside the room and if the access requirements stated above are met.
Electric cable construction Electrical cabling is specified should, as a minimum, *pass to meet the requirements of IEEE 383.
the flame test in IEEE Std 383, "IEEE Standard *for Type Test of Class lE Electric Cables, Field Splices and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
Drains to remove fire fighting Not applicable as gas systems are water should be provided with not used.
adequate seals when gas extin-guishing systems are also in-stalled.
SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks Redundant safety related cable In the Cable Spreading Rooms, sep- (Refer to Methodology. Area fire divisions should be separated by aration of cabling for redundant hazards are given in the Fire walls with a three-hour fire safety divisions required for safe Hazards Analyses).
rating. shutdown is accomplished by RG 1.75 separation criteria, fire retardant coatings, fire barriers and/or combinations thereof.
For multiple-reactor unit sites, Cable Spreading Rooms are not shared cable spreading rooms should not between reactor units. The Cable be shared between reactors. Each Spreading Room for each reactor unit cable spreading room of each unit is adequately separated or isolated should have divisional cable se- from other areas of the plant.
paration as stated above and be separated from the other and the rest of the plant by a wall with a minimum fire rating of three hours. (See NFPA 251, "Fire Tests, Building Construction and Materials", or ASTM E-119, Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials",- for fire test resistance rating.)
The ventilation system to the Not Applicable cable spreading room should be designed to isolate the area upon acutation of any gas ex-tinguishing system in the area.
In addition, smoke venting of The cable spreading area is provided Reduction of fire development the cable spreading room may be with area fire-detection systems. The through use of fire retardant desirable. Such smoke venting normal ventilation system provides the cable coatings, control of com-systems should be controlled venting of the area. bustibles and ignition sources automatically by the fire detec- in conjunction with strict com-tion or suppression system as pliance to stringent adminis-appropriate. Capability for trative procedures, reduces remote manual control should smoke generation possibilities also be provided. in this area.
- Appendix A Guidelines Project.Conformance SL2-FSAR Alternatives Remarks
- 4. Plant Computer Room Safety related computers should The Computer is not safe shutdown be separated from other areas of related, and it is located in the the plant by barriers having a Control Room. The office, toilet minimlUD three-hour fire resistant and kitchen areas are equipped with rating. Automatic fire detection ionization and thermal type de-should be provided to alarm and tectors, annunciating in the Control annunciate in the control room Room. The Control Room Complex and alarm locally. Manual hose is separated from other portions stations and portable water and of the plant by three hour fire halon fire extinguishers should barriers.
be provided.
An adequate supply of dry chemical and carbon dioxide type portable extinguishers is provided for manual fire control. Standpipe hose stations are available as backup fire sup-pression.
- 5. Switchgear Rooms Switchgear rooms should be se- The Switchgear Rooms used in connec-parated from the remainder of tion with safety-related equipment the plant by minimum three-hour are separated by three hour fire rated fire barriers, if practic- partitions from other plant areas.
able. Automatic fire detection All service penetrations are protected should alarm and annunciate in according to plant design. (See D.l.J) the control room and alarm locally. Fire hose stations and The rooms are equipped with ionization portable extinguishers should be type heat detectors, which annunciate readily available. in the Control Room. Standpipe hose stations are provided to serve this area. Drainage of fire protection water is through regular drainage facilities. Portable fire extin-guishers are provided for manual fire control.
Acceptable protection for cables Grouped cable insulation surfaces Flame retardant cable coating that pass through the switchgear are covered with a fire retardant reduces the potential for flame room is automatic water or gas coating. Additional protection spread between trays. (Refer to agent suppression. Such auto- will be provided by barriers, the Fire Hazard Analyses).
matic suppression must consider spatial separation and physical preventing unacceptable damage to isolation, control of combustibles, electrical equipment and possible ignition sources and flame resis-necessary continment of agent tant wiring in conjunction with following discharge. strict administrative controls or combinations of
SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks the above. An adequate supply of dry chemical and carbon dioxide type portable extinguishers are provided for manual fire control. Standpipe hose stations are available as back-up fire suppression.
- 6. Remote Safety Related Panels The general area housing remote Ionization type fire detectors in-safety related panels should stalled in areas containing key essen-be provided with automatic fire tial remote panels that are needed to detectors that alarm locally and operate equipment required for safe alarm and annunciate in the con- shutdown (e.g., Diesel Generator Panel, trol room. Combustible materials etc.) provide adequate local and Con-should be controlled and limited trol Room alarms. Portable extinguish-to those required for operation. ers and standpipe hose line connections Portable extinguishers and are available in the areas for manual manual hose stations should be fire protection. Combustibles are provided. closely controlled.
U1
- 7. Station Battery Rooms
- r-
..,..I Battery rooms should be protec- Battery Rooms are separated by three 0
ted against fire explosions. hour fire barriers. Battery chargers Battery rooms should be separa- are designed such that overcharging, ted from each other and other with resultant liberation of free hydro-areas of the plant by barriers gen gases, is minimized. Rooms are pro-having a minimum fire rating of vided with adequate ventilation to main-three-hours inclusive of all tain the amount of hydrogen gas released penetrations and openings. (See below the specified limits. Battery NFPA 69, "Standard on Explosion Rooms are protected by standpipe hose Prevention Systems.") Ventila- connections and portable extinguishers.
tion systems in the battery Electrical equipment is suitable for rooms should be capable of main- hydrogen atmospheres.
taining the hydrogen concentra-tion well below 2 volume percent hydrogen concentration. Stand-pipe and hose and portable ex-tinguishers should be provided.
Alternatives:
(a) Provide a total fire rated barrier enclosure of the battery room complex that exceeds the fire load con-tained in the room.
- Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance SL2-FSAR Alternatives Remarks (b) Reduce the fire load to be within the fire barrier capability of 1-1/2 hours.
OR (c) Provide a remote manual act-uated sprinkler system in each room and provide the 1-1/2 hour fire barrier separation.
- 8. Turbine Lubrication and Control Oil Storage and Use Areas A blank fire wall having a Turbine lube oil storage and use are minimum resistance rating of separated from safety related equip-three hours should separate ment in various buildings by spatial all areas containing safety separation as well as three hour rated related systems and equip- walls. Automatic water fire suppression ment from the turbine oil systems are provided for the lube oil system. and hydrogen seal oil areas and these are backed up by portable fire extin-guishers and standpipe hose stations.
- 9. Diesel Generator Areas Diesel generators should be sep- Each diesel generator is separated Basic plant design, noncombustible arated from each other and other from the other by a concrete wall construction, isolation, separa-areas of the plant by fire bar- and from other areas of the plant tion, control of ignition sources riers having a minimum fire by three hour fire barriers. The and combustibles in conjunction resistance rating of three hours. compartments and tanks are ventilated with strict compliance to strin-to avoid accumulation of oil fumes. gent administrative controls, preclude fires. (Refer to the Fire Hazard Analyses).
Automatic fire suppression such All compartments are protected by A portable foam generator in-as AFFF foam, or sprinklers should carbon dioxide and dry chemical cluding adequate equipment and be installed to combat any diesel portable fire extinguishers. supplies of foam concentrate generator or lubricating oil fires. Spatial separation of this build- is available for use in both ing from the main structure and SL-1 and SL-2 Plants.
fire barrier separations between redundant equipment, preclude safe shutdown capability impairment from a single fire incident. In addition, outside manual hose in-stallations and fire hydrants con-nected to the main water supply sys-tem are strategically located to be capable of combating diesel generator or lubricating oil fires.
SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks Automatic fire detection should Thermal type fire detectors in these be provided to alann and annunci- areas actuate the system alarm both ate in the control room and alarm locally and in the Control Room.
locally. Drainage for fire fight- Drainage, separate from other plant ing water and means for local drainage systems, is provided for the manual venting of smoke should be removal of fire protection water and provided. the oil it may contain. Fans and natural ventilation systems serve these areas.
Day tanks with total capacity up There are two day tanks, each with to 1100 gallons are permitted in a capacity of 343 gallons, (sized to the diesel generator area under comply with ANSI-N-195), located in the following conditions: each separated redundant diesel gener-ator area. The tanks are vented.
(a) The day tank is located in a Each day tank is isolated from separate enclosure, with a the redundant diesel generator minimum fire resistance rat- and its associated day tank by ing of three hours, including a fire rated enclosure curbed to doors or penetrations. These contain spilled oil within its enclosures should be capable fire area.
of containing the entire con-tents of the day tanks. The enclosure should be ventilated to avoid accumulation of oil fumes.
(b) The enclosure should be pro- Automatic fire suppression sys-tected by automatic fire sup- tems are not required to main-pression systems such as AFFF tain safe shutdown capability, or sprinklers. (see the Fire Hazard Analysis for this area).
- 10. Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Areas Diesel fuel oil tanks with a cap- The diesel fuel oil storage tanks acity greater than 1100 gallons are housed in separate compartments should not be located inside within a building with construction the buildings containing safety having a minimum fire resistance related equipment. They should rating of three hours. Potential be located at least 50 feet from oil spills are confined within each any building containing safety compartment. The storage tank related equipment, or if located building is isolated from other within 50 feet, they should be buildings by over* 30 feet housed in a separate building separation across a roadway. Dry with construction having a mini- chemical extinguishers are provided mum fire resistance rating of adjacent to the transfer pump area.
three hours. Buried tanks Adequate fire hydrants and large hose are considered as meeting the lines connected to a yard main water three hour fire resistance supply system are strategically requirements. See NFPA 30, located to be capable "Flammable and Combustible
- /
SL2-FSAR
\
Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks Liquids Code", for additional of protecting the tank arrangement guidance. and to be used for backup protection.
When located in a separate Automatic fire* suppression systems A standard portable foam generator building, the tank should be are not required for these tanks including adequate equipment and protected by an automatic fire to maintain shutdown cap<i.bility. supplies of foam concentrates,* is suppression system such as -::::;.: *available for both SL-1 and SL-2 AFFF or sprinklers. Plant areas.
Tanks, unless buried, should not Not Applicable be located directly above or below safety related systems or equipment regardless of the fire rating of separating floors or ceilings.
- 11. Safety Related Pumps Pump houses and rooms housing Essential redundant pumps in the main Automatic fire suppression systems Fire detection is available for safety related pumps or other plant area are segregated by physical are not required in these areas the safety related intake safety related equipment should barriers between the pumps. No signi- to maintain safe shudown cooling water pumps which are be separated from other areas ficant combustible loading is present capability. located remote from main plant of the plant by fire barriers in the immediate area of the pumps, as areas at the Intake Structure.
having at least three-hour rat- addressed in the Fire Hazard Analyses. (For specific detail see Fire ings. These rooms should be In addition, smoke or heat detectors Hazards Analysis; for this area.)
protected by automatic sprinkler are installed and curbs are provided protection unless a fire hazards in the areas where there are integral analysis can demonstrate that a lube oil systems, as feasible. Port-fire will not endanger other able extinguishers, standpipe hose safety related equipment required stations, and yard main fire hydrant for safe plant shutdown. Early hose stream systems provide manual warning fire detection should be fire protection.
installed with alarm and annuncia-tion locally and in the control room. Local hose stations and portable extinguishers should also be provided.
Equipment pedestals or curbs Floor drains, pedestals and curbs and drains should be provided are provided to accommodate any to remove and direct water water discharged from fire sup-away from safety related presion equipment.
equipment.
(See Section D.l.(i))
/
SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks Provisions should be made for For ventilation details see manual control of the ventila- Sections D.4.(a) and (b).
tion system to facilitate smoke removal if required for manual operation.
- 12. New Fuel Area Hand portable extinguishers New fuel unloading, new fuel storage, should be located within this and spent fuel pool areas are located area. Also, local hose stations in the Fuel Handling Building. This should be located outside but building is cut off from other struc-within hose reach of this area, tures by three hour barriers.
Automatic fire detection should Automatic fire detection systems alarm alarm and annunciate in the con- and annunciate in the Control Room trol room and alarm locally. and alarm locally. Operations in this building are not related to safe Combustibles should be limited shutdown of the reactor. Combustible to a minimum in the new fuel loading is minimal. Hand-portable area. The storage area should extinguishers and adequate fire be provided with a drainage hydrants and hose lines connected to system to preclude accumulation the yard main water supply system of water. are available to provide fire pro-tection for the building.
The storage configuration of new Water spray has been considered in fuel should always be so main- the design of the new fuel storage tained as to preclude criticality racks so as to preclude criticality.
for any water density that might Fire detectors are provided in gen-occur during fire water appli- eral areas of the new fuel storage cation. racks.
- 13. Spent Fuel Pool Area Protection for the spent fuel See comments for F.12, above.
pool area should be provided Hand-portable extinguishers and by local hose stations and adequate fire hydrants &nd hose portable extinguishers. lines connected to the yard main Automatic fire detection water 'supply system are available should be provided to to provide fire protection for alarm and annunciate in the the building.
control room and to alarm locally.
'I
~
- SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks
- 14. Radwaste Building The radwaste building should be Waste processing areas, located Automatic fire suppression sys- Basic plant design, noncombustible separated from other areas of in the Reactor Auxiliary Building, tems are not required to maintain construction, isolation, separa-the plant by fire barriers having are cut off by concrete walls, safe shutdown capabilities. tion, control of ignition sources at least three-hour ratings. Auto- floors and ceilings from other and limited combustibles and matic sprinklers should be used plant areas. The ventilating system strict compliance to stringent in all areas where combustible for these areas are part of the administrative controls, preclude materials are located. Automatic normal Reactor Auxiliary Building fires.
fire detection should be provided Ventilation System. Portable ex-to annunciate and alarm in the tinguishers and standpipe hose control room and alarm locally. systems are provided in the area.
Automatic fire detection which During a fire, the ventilation annunciates and alarms in the Control systems in these areas should be Room is provided in those areas, capable of being isolated. Water as required. Water is drained to should drain to liquid radwaste liquid radwaste sumps. Refer to the building sumps. Fire Hazard Analyses for specific details.
Acceptable alternative fire pro-tection is automatic fire detection to alarm and annunciate in the control room, in addition to manual hose stations and port-able extinguishers consisting of hand held and large wheeled units.
- 15. Decontamination Areas The decontamination areas The decontamination storage area is Automatic fire suppression sys-should be protected by auto- in the Reactor Auxiliary Building tems are not required to maintain matic sprinklers if flammable and is cut off from other areas by safe shutdown capability. The liquids are stored. Automatic walls, floor and ceiling having ventilation system is part of fire detection should be pro- greater than three hour fire rat- the safety related supply and vided to annunciate and alarm ings. Storage of combustible non-safety related exhaust normal in the control room and alarm liquids or combustible naterials RAB systems.
locally. The ventilation is limited by administrative pro-system should be capable of cedures.
being isolated. Local hose stations and hand portable Manual firi protection is provided extinguishers should be pro- from standpipe hoselines and portable vided as backup to the sprinkler extinguishers.
system.
SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks
- 16. Safety kelated water Tanks Storage tanks that supply water Various storage tanks that supply for safe shutdown should be pro- water for safe shutdown, such as tected from the effects of fire. the Refueling Water Tank and Local hose stations and portable Condensate Storage Tank, are extinguishers should be provided. located in protected outside Portable extinguishers should be areas. Portable extinguishers, located in* nearby hose houses. standpipe hose stations and strategi-Combustible materials should not cally located fire hydrants and hose-be stored next to outdoor tanks. lines connected to a yard main water A minimum of 50 feet of separa- supply system are available for use.
tion should be provided between Combustible materials are not stored outdoor tanks and combustible near these tanks.
materials where feasible.
- 17. Cooling Towers Cooling towers should be of non- Not Applicable combustible construction or so located that a fire will not adversely affect any safety related systems or equipment.
Cooling towers should be of non-combustible construction when the basins are used for the ultimate heat sink or for the fire protection water supply.
- 18. Miscellaneous Areas Miscellaneous areas such as Plant administrative offices, shops, records storage areas, shops, warehouses and other miscellaneou warehouses, and auxiliary boiler areas are in separate detached build-rooms should be so located that ings. Fire protection, consisting of a fire or effects of a fire, portable extinguishers*and standpipe including smoke, will not adversely hose lines, are p~ovided for these areas.
affect any safety related systems Automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems or equipment. Fuel oil tanks for are provided in the warehouses where auxiliary boilers should be buried feasible. Fires or fire effects do not or provided with dikes to contain adversely affect any essential systems.
the entire tank cont.ents.
The fuel oil tanks for the auxiliary boilers are remotely located in the St. Lucie Unit No. 1 area. The aux-iliary boiler area is protected by an automatic deluge system. The fuel oil tanks for the. boilers are diked.
I
- I SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Remarks G. Special Protection Guidelines
- l. Welding and Cutting, Acetylene-Oxygen Fuel Gas Systems This equipment is used in various Welding and cutting operations are areas throughout the plant. Stor- conducted in accordance with age locations should be chosen to NFPA SlB and NFPA 241. See permit fire protection by auto- Section 6, this report, for matic sprinkler systems. Local Administrative Procedures.
hose stations and portable equip-ment should be provided as backup. The requirements of NFPA 51 and SlB are ,applicab.le to these hazards. A permit system should be required to utilize this equip-ment. (Also refer to 2f herein.)
- 2. Storage Areas for Dry Ion Exchange Resins Dry ion exchange.resins should not Bulk resin storage will be maintain-be stored near essential safety ed in an area that does not house or related systems. Dry unused re- expose areas containing safety re~
sin should be protected by automa- lated systems. Automatic sprinkler tic pipe sprinkler installations. systems will not be provided unless Detection by smoke and heat dete- is is determined that delays in re-ctors should alarm and annunciate plenishing material destroyed in a in the control room and alarm fire would handicap normal plant locally. Local hose stations and operations or that loss of this portable extinguishers should pro- material would impair plant vide backup for these areas. Stor- capability for safe shutdown age areas of dry resin should have or for radioactive release control.
curbs and drains. (Refer to NFPA 92M, Waterproofing and Selected storage areas will be ade-Draining of Floors.") quately drained, and curbed if necessary.
Portable extinguishers and non-seismic standpipe hoselines will be provided for these areas.
- 3. Hazardous Chemicals Hazardous chemicals should be Bulk chemical storage will be stored and protected in accordance maintained in an area that does with the recommendations of NFPA not house or expose areas con-49, "Hazardous Chemicals Data." taining safety related systems.
Chemicals storage areas should be well ventilated and protected Portable extinguishers will be against flooding conditions provided. Hoselines will be pro-since some chemicals may react vided for those chemicals which with water to produce ignition. will not react with water.
SL2-FSAR Appendix A Guidelines Project Conformance Alternatives Reri1arks
- 4. Materials Containing Radioactivity Materials that collect and contain Radioactive materials in metal radioactivity such as spent ion containers will be stored where exchange resins, charcoal filters, they will not expose safety related and HEPA filters should be stored systems or equipment. Requirement in closed metal tanks or containers for control of decay heat will be that are located in areas free developed for specific storage from ignition sources or combusti- materials.
'"-\ bles. These materials should be protected from exposure to fires in adjacent areas as well. Con-sideration should be given to requirements for removal of isotopic decay heat from entrained radioactive materials.
- >. ~r
9.6 CRANES - OVERHEAD HEAVY LOADS HANDLING SYSTEMS 9.6.1 NUREG-0612, "CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR PLANTS" The objectives of NUREG-0612 are: (a) to ensure that all load handling systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated so that their probability of failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed; and (b) to ensure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (1) additional features are provided to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small, or (2) conservative evaluations of load handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small.
9.6.2 SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO NUREG-0612 The overhead load handling systems identified in Table 9.6-1 are subject to. the general guidelines of NUREG-0612.
9.6.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF NUREG-0612 GUIDELINES 9.6.3.1 Safe Load Paths Specific load paths are prepared, and referenced in the applicable procedures, for major loads which routinely are carried over the same routes. To provide suitable visual aid to crane operators, an individual is used to lead the heavy load over the path. Deviations require prior approval by the On-site Review Group.
9.6.3.2 Load Handling Procedures Procedures have been developed for handling heavy loads over or in proximity to irradiated fuels and safe shutdown equipment. This administrative procedure describes the measures taken to ensure that heavy loads remain with the safe load paths. In addition, the procedure defines the safe load paths. The procedure requires that ( 1) a .sign is placed at the controls of each affected crane stating that all heavy loads greater than or equal to 1380 lb shall be carried in the defined safe load path and (2) a map of the safe load paths is posted on the crane.
9.6.3.3 Crane Operator Training A program for crane operator training, qualification, and conduct has been implemented in accordance with ANSI 830.2-1976, Chapter 2-3 with the following exceptions:
- 1. Eye test of 20/40 in both eyes for new employees will be required.
- 2. A crane deadman switch will be used instead of a main line disconnect to secure power because of the power.requirements of the crane motor heaters.
- 3. Controls necessary for crane operation will be tested before beginning a new shift.
- 4.
- At shift change, the upper limit device will be tested under no load unless the hook is loaded or unless no crane operation in the area of the upper limit is anticipated.
9.6-1 Amendment No. 19 (06/09)
9.6.3.4 Special Lifting Devices The following special lifting devices have been identified as subject to compliance with the criteria of NUREG-0612:
- spent fuel transfer cask lifting yoke
- spent fuel transfer cask lifting yoke extension
- core support barrel lift rig
- upper guide structure lift rig A detailed comparison of the existing design of these devices and the design, fabrication, and testing requirements of ANSI N14.6 has been performed. Results indicate that the spent fuel transfer cask lifting yoke and extension are in compliance with ANSI N 14.6-1993; and that the core support barrel and upper guide structure lift rigs are in compliance with ANSI N14.6-1978 with the following limited exceptions relative to stress design factors (3 for minimum yield and
. 5 for ultimate):
- Upper Guide Structure Lift Rig Actual 3 x Actual Syie1d Component Stress Stress (a) 100°F 11,600 psi A. Spreader Beam 34,000 psi 30,000 psi Bending 14,500 psi B. Column Plate 43,500 psi 30,000 psi Bending
- Core Support Barrel Lift Rig Actual 3 x Actual Syie1d Component Stress Stress (@ 100°F 10,030 psi A. .Spreader Beam .30,100 psi 30,000 psi Bending 10,714 psi B. Column. Plate 32,243 psi 30,000 psi Bending All nonconforming stresses are less than 1/2 of the yield stress, which meets the design requirements in effect at the time of fabrication (1976).
The lift rig was not load tested to 150% capacity.
Both lift rigs were load tested to 125% of operating load prior to use, which was considered a good test standard at the time the lift rig was fabricated. Following the load test all structural welds were liquid penetrant inspected prior to shipment. The 125% load test is considered to be adequate to insure the integrity of the equipment provided visual inspection criteria are employed prior to each use. Specified periodic nondestructive examination of the upper guide structure lift rig and core support barrel lift rig, shall be performed at an interval not to exceed ten years.
Additionally, periodic nondestructive examination of the reactor head lift*rig shall be performed at an interval not to exceed ten years. [Reference 2, Engineering Evaluation PSL-ENG-SECS 015, "Requirements for Periodic Inspection and Testing of Special Lifting Devices in Reactor Containment Building (Unit 2)"].
In lieu of the magnetic particle and liquid penetrant examination techniques, the use of the acoustic emission examination method is acceptable for inspection of the special lifting devices (including the reactor head lift rig) at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant.
9.6-2 Amendment No. 22 (04/14)
9.6.3.5 Lifting Devices (Not Specifically Designed)
The program for sling use and maintenance meets the requirements of ANSI 830.9. Further, the rated capacities are marked on each sling. Since crane hoisting speeds are relatively slow (less than 30 fpm at rated load), any contribution from a dynamic effect would not be significant.
In addition, as required by ANSI 830.9, a safety factor of 5 is applied.
9.6.3.6 Cranes (Inspection. Testing and Maintenance)
The crane inspection, testing, and maintenance program complies with the requirements of ANSI 830.2-1976 with the exception that tests and inspections are performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI 830.2 for periodic inspection and testing, or where the frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency.
9.6.3.7 Crane Design St. Lucie Unit 2 cranes comply with the applicable design requirements of ANSI 830.2, CMAA 70 and CMAA 74.
The main hoist for the spent fuel cask handling crane also complies with NUREG-0554, Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants.
References to Section 9.6
- 1. FPL Engineering Evaluation PSL-ENG-SECS-07-035, "Use of Acoustic Emission Technology as an Alternate Method for NDE of Special Lifting Devices"
- 2. FPL Engineering Evaluation PSL-ENG-SECS-09-015, "Requirements for Periodic Inspection and Testing of Special Lifting Devices in Reactor Containment Building (Unit 2)"
9.6-3 Amendment No. 19 (06/09)
TABLE 9.6-1 NUREG-0612 UNIT 2 COMPLIANCE MATRIX Weight or Guideline I Guideline 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Guideline 5 Guideline 6 Guideline 7 Equipment Designation Heavy Capacity Safe Load Crane Op Special Lifting Crane-Test Loads (tons) (tons) Paths Procedure Trainina Devices Slinqs and Inspection Crane Desiqn Charging pump A, B, &
c (3) 1 5 R c c --- c c c Turbine gantry Crane (2) 1 200/35 R c c --- c c c Reactor polar crane 191.4 200/60 c c c --- --- c c Auxiliary Telescoping jib 1 1 R c c --- c c c Refueling machine 1 1 R c c --- c c c Refueling machine hoist 1 1 R c c --- c c c Fuel Transfer machine 1 1 R c c --- c c c Spent-fuel handling machine 1 1 R c c --- c c c Refueling canal bulkhead monorail 1.25 3 R c c --- c c c Cask storage pool bulkhead monorail 1.25 3 R c c --- c c c Spent fuel cask handling crane 124.8* 150/25 c c c --- --- c c Diesel generator monorails (8) 1 1 R c c --- c c c Intake Structure Bridge Crane 1 45 R c c --- c c c Fourteen heavy-load handing systems are excluded because load drop will not cause damage to system or components required for shutdown or decay heat removal.
C = License action complies with NUREG-0612 Guideline.
NC = Applicant action does not comply with NUREG-0612 Guideline.
R = Applicant has proposed revisions/modifications designed to comply with NUREG-0612 Guideline.